Although planning theory is regarded as an analysis of the relationship of knowledge to action by many theories, a view from the poor and minority strata of this society suggests a different alternative—that planning theory is an analysis of the relationship of "knowledge" to inaction, particularly with regard to the continuation of deteriorating conditions in inner cities. This is because the body of thought referred to as "Planning Theory" has not provided planners or politicians with any illuminating tools with which to serve the interest of urban poor and minority groups. The proposed models of societal guidance and change may describe existing conditions, but they describe them inadequately to allow required changes to be made in the system. It is the thesis of this article that this inadequate description stems from three basic conceptual problems that are not addressed in the literature. These problems are: (1) the failure to provide theories which are both rigorous and relevant to the urban experience and the means for their implementation; (2) an incomplete analysis of the urban political and economic milieux; and (3) the confused role of the planner in this setting. This article attempts to explain them as a first step in the future development of a more workable "Urban Planning Theory".

(Author/JM)
PLANNING THEORY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE LINKAGES BETWEEN IMPLEMENTATION, KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

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January 1974
The Rand Paper Series

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The Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California 90406
PLANNING THEORY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE LINKAGES BETWEEN IMPLEMENTATION, KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION

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January 1974

In partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Planning at the University of California at Los Angeles.
Planning - "An activity concerned with the relation of knowledge to action."

John Friedmann and Barclay Hudson (1973)

"Planning Theory? What is that?" Those were my words in the Fall of 1969. After five years of study and thought, I can still ask the same question, and by now the echo is deafening. Each time I or one of my professors tries to answer the question, the response changes. I suppose I shall continue to ask the question throughout my life, and to attempt a different answer every time, based upon the advancement of the concept and (I hope) my improved understanding of that advancement.

This paper represents my answer at this moment. It expresses the problems I see in conceptualizing the practice of planning and my personal concerns over the direction of the field—today. As an admittedly temporal exercise, developing this paper has been a little like writing on water—but then, nothing lasts forever.
Perhaps planning theory is regarded as an analysis of the relationship of many theorists, but a view from the poor and minority strata of this society suggests a different alternative—that planning theory is an analysis of the relationship of "knowledge" in practice, particularly with regard to the continuation of deteriorating conditions in inner cities of this country. This is because the body of thought referred to as "Planning Theory" has not provided planners or politicians with any illuminating tools with which to serve the interest of urban poor and minority groups. The proposed models of societal guidance and change may describe existing conditions, but they describe them inadequately to allow required changes to be made in the system. It is the thesis of this article that this inadequate description stems from three basic conceptual problems that are not addressed in the literature. These problems are: (1) The failure to provide theories which are both rigorous and relevant to the urban experience and the means for their implementation; (2) An incomplete analysis of the urban political and economic milieux; and (3) The confused role of the planner in this setting. The problems are interdependent, and in solving one, insight into the solution of the others would be gained. This article will attempt to explain these three problems as a first step in the future development of a more workable "Urban Planning Theory."

1. **Toward a Planning Theory with Rigor and Relevance**

At the present time accepted theories of societal guidance and intervention are not adequate to produce solutions to peculiar urban problems. It is the opinion of the writer that such theories must be both rigorous (they must be grounded in a replicable model of observation which is general enough to provide transferability from one situation to another); and they must be relevant (they must be reflective of a problem situation that demands solution in real-world terms). These two criteria are not easily met. There are built-in tensions which, in providing rigor, pull theorists too far into the world of abstraction and unreality. Their theories about guidance
are impressive intellectual statements that bear no relation to the operation of social systems in a modern world. By the same token, attempts at providing often reduce concepts of societal guidance to the level of the case study, which limits their generalizability and usefulness in providing insights into the true nature of the larger system. As of this writing, the bulk of the literature on societal guidance falls prey to one or the other of the pitfalls. A review of some of the dominant philosophies will demonstrate this point.

Rationality

The theory of rational planning says that every action has its instrumentality. Mannheim (1947; p. 39-71) described this philosophy in detail, defining different types of rationality. According to his taxonomy, functional rationality was the intelligent implementation of means toward previously discerned goals. On the other hand, substantial rationality was the use of intelligence to discern appropriate societal goals. He argued that the increasingly irrational elements in society and their increasing interdependence upon each other made it more difficult, but also more necessary to discern appropriate societal goals. Mannheim asserted that in every age, there were certain factors, or , which guided all policy setting or goal formulation. How one was to go about identifying those is one of the secrets Mannheim kept to himself. Rigorous but not relevant.

Robert Dahl and Charles Lindbloom saw rationality as a method of planning (Dahl & Lindbloom; 1953; p. 413ff). Although their approach is less global than Mannheim's, they begin to apply the rational goal-setting devices of the U.S. market system to unify goals of an essentially pluralist system. Although they present a far more realistic model of urban activity than Mannheim, they fail to provide any explanation of the forces in operation when the market system fails to unify goals. Nor do they present a workable model for implementing massive societal change. Again we have rigor without relevance.
Bauer and Gergin (1968, p. 181ff; 299ff) stress the roles of information access and improved technology in rational decisionmaking. More recently, Klitgaard (1972, p. 41ff) used a model similar to those proposed by Dahl and Lindbloom and Gergin to describe how it could conceivably be both functionally and substantially rational for decision-makers to discriminate on the basis of race.

Unfortunately, rational planning (or decisionmaking) is severely limited by the finite capacity of man to absorb and utilize information, the absence of perfect information, and the inability of planners to specify rational means of implementation. In addition, no one normative consensus exists for decisions between equally rational alternatives. Although these shortcomings might not have crucial impact on the national or regional determination of policy, the implications for local policy are severe. First of all, the proliferation of irrational elements in inner city areas (violence, capital deterioration, abandonment of income-producing property, unequal access to educational and cultural benefits even though taxed at the same rate, etc.) has created a state of emergency in which no principia recta are discernible. Second, there is the overriding implication that imperfections in the market process of allocating goods and services (lauded by Dahl and Lindbloom) have allowed inner-city conditions and processes to become as irrational as they now are. There is no faith that this same market process will provide for equalization of these conditions. Third, the rational development of large-scale policies provides no assurance that the implementation of those policies at the local level will not be irrational. Finally, there is the problem of arriving at consensus as to goals in the presence of many competing spheres of influence. Normally, the less influential spheres do not have their interests protected, and those with more political clout are able to determine the selection of goals. Imperfections in the system do not assure that goals are chosen democratically, so even though a particular decision may be rational it may not necessarily be fair. The competition between and among various spheres of influence and interest may, because of the sheer force of numbers and practical administration, assure that the interest of the most powerful
spheres are served, while the less powerful are systematically ignored. This last issue will be discussed more fully under section 2 which discusses the failure of planning theory to provide for complete analysis of the political and economic milieux of the inner city.

While the rational model of planning may have some place in the national or regional scale (and it is certainly based on respected, replicable principles), the microcosmic nature of the city intensifies the conflicts between irrational elements and imperfections in the market process. In addition, so many negative externalities may be present in the small scale microcosm that the outcomes are nearly impossible to predict. As a result, the concept of rationality needs to be reworked in order to be relevant to a planner hoping to effect change in the inner city.

Incrementalism

Incrementalism was proposed as an alternative to rationalism. Its prime advocates include Herbert Simon, James March and Charles Lindbloom. In fact, however, it is merely an operationalization of rationalist theory that has been adapted to fit administrative modes of behavior. This modification has served to make incremental theory only slightly more relevant than rationality, but a lot less rigorous. Incremental planning theory stresses the need for small changes applied to a system and their effects evaluated (monitored) over a short period of time so that other small changes can be made. This theory subsumes individual goals into organizational goals, assumes that the system will function to maximize those goals, and that change can only come through the demonstration of a more efficient strategy or revised organizational goals. Such changes are most likely to be the result of pressures exerted by the most powerful strata, and least likely to involve system reorganization. Incrementalist theory, while the most pervasive, is also the most insidious of the "Planning Theories," because it is the least evaluative and most self-perpetuating in nature.

This is probably the most widely held and readily implemented theory of planning. It has more applicability to Urban Planning than pure rational theory does, but the very shortsightedness of limiting goals to the
means available for their implementation limits progress. There is no place for reliance on the human capacity for ingenuity in developing new modes of implementation, and this practicallyhamstrings new ideas. So popular is this mode of planning behavior that incrementalist theory has become synonymous with administration.

The prime criticism of administrative theories like incrementalism is that they only empirically describe the state of urban systems, rather than directing the massive changes that are necessary. The safety of the incrementalist approach lies in the smallness of the increment and the self-perpetuation, implicit in the system, together with the abdication of the planner from imposing a value system. Incrementalism stops just short of pure empiricism, and fails to provide any significant insights into the nature of system intervention. So, in losing some of the rigor of pure rationality, we gain little relevance for the concepts of societal guidance in a time of crisis. Clearly, such incrementalism can no longer be morally defended as an Urban Planning theory. The urban crisis demands more immediate and far-reaching change, coupled with a more optimistic reliance on the capacity of man to produce the means for that change.

Organization Development

A newer branch of "Planning Theory" is organization development. This writer regards organization development as an offshoot of old incrementalist ways of thinking and planning change. Many of the old incrementalist schools have now begun to advocate organization development as the new tool for planning innovation (Cyert and March, 1963, Thompson, 1967, Rein, 1970, and Bennis, Benne, and Chin, 1969). While organization development for the most part still subsumes individual goals into organizational goals, new insights into the operation of that "system" and the roots of collective behavior are an added dimension. In addition, the character of the organization involved becomes a factor to be considered (at last!, we begin to examine what the innovation is >for, and how that feeds back into the type of organization that is instituting the change). We cease merely talking about guidance, and begin to examine the crucial aspects like
and Lure, also, we begin a discussion of the commitment of those who are guiding. The "free floating intelligentsia" who guide a society according to its rational goals are gone. They are being replaced by involved and committed professionals who have some involvement in both planning and implementation. The gap between knowledge and action begins to close, and the relevance-rigor dichotomy is not as severe.

Although organization development literature moves much closer to the delivery of innovation by dealing explicitly with guidance for and guidance of, one crucial phase of the problem is curiously missing: guidance by. One wonders if the relevance of this question has escaped the organization development authors, but in the meantime, the "people" power movement has come to the fore. Organization development would have passed the acid test for rigor and relevance 20 years earlier, but in the changing social context of the late sixties, these theories are somewhat anachronistic. Just as relevance catches up with rigor, the nature of relevance itself changes and guidance theorists go back to their drawing boards.

**Humanism**

The "new wave" of planning theorists described by Hudson and Friedmann (1973) has based a new class of planning thought on sociology, psychology, biology and cybernetics. They begin to examine the technocratic components of modern society and to develop a new understanding of the learning process, which plays an important role in monitoring societal guidance. In addition to addressing the "relevance" issues posed by "guidance for" and "guidance of," they begin to direct their models toward the issue of "guidance by."

Amitai Etzioni, while not truly a humanist, did begin to discuss consensus-building and social controls as steps toward the selection of goals. He acknowledged political realities and possible blocks in the decision process, but did not follow through with any real techniques for consensus building, given those realities. Although he says that rational decisions can be made if decisionmakers are given adequate information, he does not appear to be a rationalist. Yet neither
does he appear to be in sufficient tune with social and political reality to prescribe a workable change or guidance technique. Measured by the hard yardstick of the late 60's, Etzioni is neither rigorous or relevant, but some of his insights on the organization of society serve the group of writers who follow quite well.

Although later writers seem more in tune with the demands of the real world, they often indulge in flights of fancy in developing their models. Edgar Dunn (Economic and Social Development, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971) used extended biological metaphors to describe his theories of learning systems. His description leans very heavily on the concept of social Darwinism, which is grounded in reality, but often undemocratic. The result of this technique is to reduce the power of the concepts Dunn presents. The homeostatic system of social learning described by Dunn can be helpful in monitoring change and its impacts, but the metaphor of the society as a complex organism limits the capacity of the system for immediate change.

John Friedmann (Transactive Planning, MS 1971) also develops a theory of learning systems, but his is developed through tracing the historical and social ideologies concerning planning. He interacts the social unrest of the 60's to produce a model of a self-activating society that has some similarity to both those proposed by Etzioni and Dunn. Though he moves away from Etzioni's rhetoric and Dunn's metaphor, he does not come full-face to a confrontation with the issues of implementation facing the field of Urban Planning, but retreats to the relative safety of philosophies of societal guidance; venturing out to propose a new role for the planner as a kind of "consensus broker." The discussion of this role is notable because it marks an acknowledgment of the relevance of the guidance by issue in theories of societal guidance. The role outlined, however, is shadowy, and the author shies completely away from issues of equity; (one suspects that a true democracy is not being advocated here) trust; (how the planner becomes accepted enough that his clients believe he will act in their best interests); and power (which is crucial to implementation). Despite these shortcomings, the book is useful in rethinking the value system on which planning action has been based in the past.
Charles Hampden-Turner (Radical Man, Anchor, 1971) uses a model of "psycho-social development" which is similar to the social learning models of the previous two authors, except that he uses it to explain certain phenomena (he calls them "development") about the psychology of social protest movements--e.g., the Liberation Movement and the Radical Student Movement. Like the previous models, Hampden-Turner's is a feedback or social learning model which utilizes realization of values and observation of processes to monitor societal transformation. But the transformation referred to begins in the individual, and then spreads to the society. This is similar to the concept of "active men creating active societies," but it has more impact because the author carefully traces the progression from a psychological case. He deals less with typologies of thought and action (rationality, incrementalism, activism) than with a description of the societal "change-agent" mode. One can believe that this mode is of great value in thinking about making society better, which is the real aim of the planner. Rather than an explanation of why society needs guidance and a description of the processes observable (which are inadequate to deal with the level of demand for change that now exists), Hampden-Turner presents an analysis of man's capacity for change, supported by forceful examples taken from the current political milieu.

Donald Schon (Beyond the Stable State, Random House, 1971) adds another dimension to the evolving concept of societal change in his discussions of the societal tensions created by instability. In this instability, Schon sees an opportunity for the creation of more effective learning systems which will have the effect of making change progressive and perpetual rather than disruptive and intermittent. His description of the "dynamic conservatism" of institutions provides an excellent reason for the failure of incremental systems to deal adequately with change.

The group of theorists described above has at last brought to thinking about societal change an understanding of the tensions between rigor and relevance. For the most part, their models are both testable and observable, but they are not so empirically limited as to
preclude generalization among and between systems. One would hope that the further refinement and subsequent application of social learning theories would provide an improvement in the delivery of services to the urban clientele, particularly those who have traditionally stood at the fringes of society.

There is, however, a growing discontent with the usefulness of theory among these fringes, and it has moved up to include some individuals and groups who are not members of the poor/minority/radical fringe. This discontent has produced a rationale for organizing behavior that is so empirical as to be non-generalizable, which is one of the requisites for theory. It has led to a style of action which may be regarded as anti-theory, and is most commonly found in Advocacy Planning.

Advocacy

Advocacy or Pluralism proceeds from the "power to the people" premise of much of the social unrest of the late 60's. It demands that planning become value laden, and that consensus-building is unimportant because the interests of certain groups will always be in conflict. It rejects the hierarchical organization of power and seeks to build collectivities of power outside that hierarchy. This preoccupation with power assures that the interests of the group's plan are not lost in its implementation. Since planning takes place within the collectivity, it is usually very specialized and possibly short-term in nature. Since most of the literature on advocacy and pluralism adopts the case-study approach, few applicable models of operation are usually discernible.

This approach toward the guidance of change processes has both advantages and problems, however. First, a few of the advantages:

- Provides for immediate feedback as to the progress toward the goal
- Individual values become more important, and are more likely to be similar to group values

Davidoff (JAIP, Nov. 1965, p. 334) considers advocacy planning as a more pluralistic operationalization of rational planning. He is nearly alone in doing so. Most of the literature about advocacy seems to suggest it as an alternative to currently accepted theories.
2. **The Incomplete Analysis of the Political and Economic Milieux of the City**

Related to the problem of producing theories which are both rigorous and relevant to the urban experience is the problem of analyzing **The Incomplete Analysis of the Political and Economic Milieux of the City**.

Related to the problem of producing theories which are both rigorous and relevant to the urban experience is the problem of analyzing **The Incomplete Analysis of the Political and Economic Milieux of the City**.

*Skjel (JAIP, Jan. 1972, p. 15) suggests that the advocacy strategy does not operate well from a framework of purely rational decisionmaking.*
the political and economic milieux of the urban area as opposed to the region (or nation). In developing countries, local policies and economics are likely to be closely related to the political and economic climate of the country. Local government officials may be dependent upon the national government, or even deputized as agents of the governmental elite. The economics of regions and urban areas also tends to be subject to national policy in developing countries, according to Alonso ("Urban and Regional Imbalances in Economic Development," University of California, Berkeley, Reprint #42).

Even in the United States, regional politics has a tendency to be closely related to national policy, particularly with respect to agricultural and industrial development, transportation, recreation and natural resources planning, health services delivery, and increasingly, energy supply and environmental quality. Overall policies set by Federal agencies have marked impact, for example, on the agricultural uses to which land is put on a regional scale. Wheat may or may not be planted this year, for example, depending on decisions made nationally as to whether farmers will be subsidized for not planting it. These decisions are based on export projections, projections of domestic need, current supplies and prices, as well as national political considerations. Suggestions recently made by the President are now governing the speed at which we may drive, what time it is, when we may purchase gasoline, and even the temperature in our homes and offices.

These suggestions or indications of national direction are implemented regionally and locally in both formal and informal fashions. Informally, local and regional governmental agencies may act prior to national suggestion or command, or they may act immediately upon publication of such a request. Formally, policy may be set in the executive or legislative branch, then interpreted by the States, and finally implemented on the local level. In this fashion, policy is said to "filter down" through the various governmental strata.

There are so many governmental strata and political jurisdictions in the United States that local politics becomes very complicated. These strata may be regarded as spheres of influence, many of which are
exogenous to the local jurisdiction, but nevertheless with the power
to exert some degree of control. Those spheres of influence which
partly are within the local jurisdiction have only the powers that are
left to them by the exogenous strata.

For example, a school in California is said to be operated by the
principal. In reality he is responsible to at least 11 different
spheres of influence at the local level which include the area super-
intendent, the local school board, the district superintendent, the
County board of education, and the County superintendent. Beyond that,
he is also responsible to the State Board of Public Instruction, the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, any Interstate or Regional
Commissions (i.e., accreditation), the U.S. Office of Education, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the President. He
may also become responsible to any strata in the judicial or legislative
branch, depending on legislation or court orders (as to desegregate).
In addition to the spheres of influence, he is also responsible to
some degree to various spheres of interest. These may include community
organizations, teachers' groups, the PTA, various unions, and in an
enlightened school, student government. These interest groups may
have no formalized power over his actions, but he is deputized to
serve in their best interests, and individually or collectively they
can often exert enough "informal" pressure to control his activities.

This example, though taken from education, could be replicated
in almost any phase of local government or service delivery. As a
result of the many spheres of influence and interest which become
operant on the local level, a policy which is articulated on the
national level may be implemented in a very different fashion from
that intended and the results may vary widely across jurisdictional
space. Excellent examples of this can be seen in the literature assess-
ing school desegregation activities.

For example, the Brown vs. (Topeka, Kansas) Board of Education
decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 1954 abolished the legality
of racially separate school systems. As a result, cities across the
nation immediately moved to establish unitary school systems. In some
cases this action had the effect of desegregating the schools (e.g., 
Washington D.C., Baltimore), while in others the racial separation was 
maintained as an unofficial school policy (e.g., San Francisco, "Lawn-
dale").

It is therefore imperative that a complete analysis of applicable 
jurisdictions and attendant political and economic factors be under-
taken by any agent who presumes to "plan" for the urban area. The 
aforementioned spheres of influence and interest often conflict and 
compete with one another, making urban administration and planning an 
extremely difficult task. In fact, the specificity of political 
requirements may make the generalizations suggested by many theories 
completely inapplicable, or at best distort them beyond the point of 
recognition. When theories of change and societal guidance become so 
distorted, they are of limited use to the decisionmaker.

Friedmann and Hudson (1973) discuss the paucity of empirical stud-
ies on the urban scene. It is possible that this very paucity is due 
to the imbalances between rigor and relevance that most of the theories 
fall prey to. If one studies the list of prime theorists (in planning 
philosophy, systems and rationality, and organization development) one 
notes no repetition of names between that and the list of authors of 
empirical studies of Urban Planning. It is of further interest that 
the authors of those empirical studies of Urban Planning are by and 
large political scientists, rather than planners. Perhaps the key 
reason for this is that political and administrative theories to date 
have more applicability to Urban Planning problems than most planning 
theories. Advocacy planning studies are the one general exception to 
this rule. As mentioned before, advocacy seems to be regarded as anti-
theoretical by everyone except Davidoff. Surely an applicable urban 
planning theory which grounded itself firmly in a recognition of the 
urban political environment could bridge this gap in the field. So 
far, the most promising theory around is that of learning systems 
planning, which, if combined with a suitable implementation technique 
(such as advocacy where applicable), might produce some real advance-
ment in the field of societal guidance.

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*Crain et al., The Politics of School Desegregation; NORC; 1968.
3. The Role of the Planner

The literature describes the planner variously as a communications expert—consensus-builder (Etzioni); non-partisan intellect with the best interest of the society at heart (Mannheim); an administrator or executive who has some influence and control over implementation (Schon).

While it is theoretically possible for all of these roles to be operant in one capable individual, in reality, there is no such being. The multiplicity of urban problems demands a planner who is an expert in many fields—economics, sociology, psychology, administration, law, and politics, to name a few of the more important ones. The multidisciplinary approach of some planning schools encourages the formation of these skills, but the two-year program is not enough in itself to insure their presence. Nor is it apparent that the demands of on-the-job training will produce the skills.

In addition to wondrous knowledgeability, the planner must possess patience, understanding, courage and good will in enormous amounts. He or she must have the "right" value system. It would also be helpful if he or she possessed second sight, although this is not required specifically in the literature. And to top it all off, this person must be eager to represent the interests of those who have had no representation and to do it as a free-lance agent, for there are no jobs for this person (planning agencies tending to require more mundane skills such as zoning administration and the like). If he or she is lucky (?) enough to find a job as a planner, he will seldom use his knowledge of economics, sociology, psychology, et al., because he will promptly be put to work coloring maps, making models, or talking with business representatives about the refusal of their petition for a zoning variance. For, speculate as we will about the future of planning, its present is largely made up of mundane tasks for the new professional.

* Usually without the support of the power structure, who conspire to keep them without representation.
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. The small literature on advocacy planning outlines a specific role for the planner as a community organizer and alternative professional to the municipal elite (Peattie, "Drama and Advocacy Planning," JAIP, Nov. 1970; Guskin and Ross, "Advocacy and Democracy: The Long View," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Jan. 1971). Additionally, the role of the advocate planner could include: a liaison-spokesman between the community and the bureaucracy; a social scientist who collects data to support protests; or grantsman who finds financial support for community projects. All of these roles have their attendant difficulties, and as a result, the position of the advocate planner is often unenviable. He is often the target of community suspicion and mistrust or regarded by the municipal authorities as a troublemaker who must be neutralized or discredited. In spite of these problems the role of the advocate planner is new and well suited to the conceptualization of the planner as "change agent."

Learning systems planning provides additional roles for the planner. Planning in learning systems theory becomes a specified function of any organization or agency involved in the provision of services, rather than something to be done in a City Planning or Finance Department. This view of planning is in tune with reality, and is one which must become generally accepted if the concept of societal guidance is ever to become operationalized.

Donald Michael discusses this problem at length in The Unprepared Society (Basic Books, 1968), and Schon (1971) alludes to it in his discussion of the Federal Government as a learning system. This is heartening reading for would-be planners, but it is not yet realized. So far, most of the professional planners in the Federal Government are probably employed by HUD or EDA (one agency is near-defunct and the other reeling under a series of cutbacks and reorganizations). It is doubtful that many Federal civil servants outside the planning profession have spent much time grappling with the concepts of learning systems planning. So for the time being, the Federal Government will have to hobble along as a less than optimal learning system.
Perhaps someday, the perception of the purview of planning will change popularly, so that the new generalist planner can be respected as a professional, but in the meantime, he or she remains on the periphery of the profession, seldom allowed to make any change, although he or she was trained as a "change agent."

Does this mean that schools should cease to train specialized generalists and get back to the fine points of zoning and model-building? No! When the field of Urban Planning becomes self-defined enough to recognize the social changes that must be made if the city is to maintain itself as a viable organism, this specialized generalist will be in great demand. But in order to speed the change and assure that the planners in power in the city are such "renaissance people," it is necessary that certain things be done now. First, some courses should be offered which expose the student to the present practice of planning. Next, professional planners should be welcomed back to planning schools, and not prohibited from making a living while they study.

Last, and most importantly, the profession itself should begin to exert internal pressure against the comfortable confines of the traditional planning role. At professional meetings, planners should be challenged rather than applauded. For there is nothing to applaud. The profession itself should be appalled at the deterioration of facilities and services and find new ways of dealing with those problems. The planner should not be comfortable and smug, secure that the incremental approach will continue to keep planning offices open, but constantly in search of new ways to introduce planned change into the system.

The role of the Urban Planner requires new definition, but such definition can only come from the field. Urban Planning is now in the process of defining itself theoretically and practically, and when the process is further along, requirements for new professionals can be more adequately specified.
CONCLUSION

The three interdependent problems discussed in the body of this paper are not intended to be the definitive statement about Planning Theory. It is clear that the concept of societal guidance is an evolving one, and can be expected to be of greater importance as the third world gains ascendancy and society is forced to become more pluralistic. At the present, there is no static solution to the issue of rigor and relevance; likewise, the role(s) of the planner and the political and economic milieu within which he plans are also changing. But we can ill afford to cease improving upon the theories that now exist.

The history of planning thought confirms this. There probably would never have been a learning systems theory if men had not grappled with the concepts of rationality outlined by Mannheim and others. And so the next theory will arise out of a realization of the inadequacies of the present ones. It is imperative that the new theory continues in the direction of social learning models by being generalizable and normative as well as implementable. This goal is not easily achieved, but when it is, questions of rigor and relevance will have been dealt with, as well as ongoing analysis of the economic and political milieu of the city. In this new context, the well-trained and adaptable planner will be able to define for himself a more meaningful role.

The times are turbulent, and the challenge to social theorists is great. In the operationalization of their theories lies the salvation of society or its damnation. If they cease to analyze and we planners fail to implement and modify those theories, planning as a profession will earn the ignominy that it will surely inherit.