The paper examined: (1) the relationship between research into municipal services equalization and current explanations of internal colonialism, and (2) some aspects of the dynamic of racial exclusion and inequality in San Antonio, Texas. Data were obtained from research reviews, census figures, and city, county, and State sources. Characteristics of the internal colonial explanation discussed were electoral and administrative exclusion of Chicanos, a lack of any meaningful self-government in the barrios, an historical policy of official containment of the barrio population and a current private perpetuation of that containment, and consistently inequitable city policies whose effects are experienced by ethnically and linguistically distinct peoples residentially segregated. The paper also argues that the internal colonial explanation(s) merits further substantiating research and investigation in light of the tentative municipal service research findings, and (2) institutions and processes of domination are subtle, pervasive, and inextricably intertwined between the public and private sectors. (NQ)
MUNICIPAL SERVICES EQUALIZATION AND INTERNAL COLONIALISM IN SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS: EXPLORATIONS IN "CHINATOWN"

Charles L. Cotrell
Department of Political Science
St. Mary's University
San Antonio, Texas

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"Forget it Jake, it's Chinatown."

(Taken from the movie "Chinatown.")

Introduction

My purposes in this paper are: (1) To explore the relationship between research into municipal services equalization and current explanations of internal colonialism in the context of San Antonio, Texas; (2) To examine some aspects of the dynamic of racial exclusion and inequality in the context of one city; (3) To argue that the internal colonial explanation(s) merits further substantiating research and investigation in light of the tentative municipal service research findings contained below; and (4) That the institutions and processes of domination are subtle, pervasive and inextricably intertwined between the public and private sectors. Thus, this paper is at once both inquiry and argument, exploration and prescription.

Municipal Services Equalization Research

Municipal services research is a new and growing body of
research findings and methodologies in the social sciences.\textsuperscript{1}

A number of academic disciplines are involved in developing the techniques of inquiry. The research findings are put to a variety of uses--from pure research to litigation,\textsuperscript{2} from professional evaluations of governmental performance to informational bases for citizen activists\textsuperscript{3} demanding equal

\textsuperscript{1}See the up-to-date bibliography on the evaluation and delivery of municipal services prepared by Professor Larry Susskind contained in \textit{The Next Step: Toward Equality of Public Service}, Report of the Conference on Public Service Equalization Litigation, May 16-17, 1974, Trinity Parish, New York City (copies available from Trinity Grants Program, 14 Trinity Place, New York, N.Y., 10006.)

\textsuperscript{2}Two legal suits of this genre are Hawkins \textit{v.} Town of Shaw 437 F. 2d 1286 (1973), a rural Mississippi suit which demonstrated that inequities in municipal services abridged the Black plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and Mary Burner, \textit{et al.}, \textit{v.} Walter E. Washington, \textit{et al.} \textit{Civil Action No. 242-71} (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia), a complaint which alleges that fundamental inequalities exist--demonstrable along racial community lines--in the delivery and maintenance of municipal services in Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{3}One of the more effective citizen groups in San Antonio, Texas, has been COPS--Communities Organized for Public Services. A middle and lower middle class Mexican American citizens' organization, COPS has employed the strategies of Saul Alinsky in demanding equity in the delivery of municipal services in this city. Coming on the political scene in June, 1974, COPS has focused on a wide array of municipal service inequities, ranging from drainage conditions in the barrios to proportional inequities in tax assessment which affect the public funds available for barrio improvements.
public services. Regardless of the purposes and uses of the data gathered by the researchers, several research considerations are central to a municipal services research undertaking.

Developing accurate and convincing assessment measurements is of primary importance in research of this sort. Lack of information concerning selected indices of equity or time-consuming research is sometimes needed to effectively assess certain services. For example, an analysis of zoning decisions over a two year period in order to determine effect and equity upon different geographic parts of San Antonio took the time of two people working one month.

Another important consideration involves the construction of a suitable and convincing distributional standard, i.e., what is the basis of a standard of equity in each particular service assessed? What are the technical considerations affecting a standard of distribution? What are the populations' needs?

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4For an excellent discussion of many of these research considerations, see Robert L. Lineberry and Robert E. Welch, "Who Gets What: Measuring the Distribution of Urban Public Services," Social Science Quarterly 54 (March, 1974), 700-712.
needs? What are the populations' demands?²

There are, however, differences among researchers in this area concerning the issue of why inequalities in municipal services exist. My own experience⁶ leads me to the following explanation: Inequalities in governmental services generally and municipal services specifically begin and end as a political process. The political process for Chicanos and other minority populations throughout the Southwest can be thought of as always containing a Catch-22, i.e., the poor quality of their municipal services continues unabated because of a lack of political access, which is a product of electoral discrimination and a legacy of institutional racism within this region. Public officials and administrators pay little attention to unorganized constituencies. Political, social, economic, and psychological institutions of exclusion and

⁵For a discussion of the standard of needs in municipal services research, see Bryan D. Jones and Clifford Kaufman, "The Distribution of Urban Public Services," 6 Administration and Society (November, 1974), 337-360.

⁶During the past year, I have conducted minority electoral access-governmental performance research in three Southwestern cities (San Antonio, Texas, Corpus Christi, Texas and Tucson, Arizona) under the auspices of a very generous grant from the John Hay Whitney Foundation of New York.
domination persist. Thus, the circle is complete—people who have no political access have no recourse when they are neglected or ignored in establishing and administering governmental services. The political exclusion of minority populations is integrally related to the kind of services which they receive. We can expect poor governmental performance if a group is electorally excluded.

Within the context used here, Chicano political access means electoral strength and effective representation (both electoral representation and representation within various bureaucracies). In turn, electoral strength and effective representation are products of such factors as election systems, residential and educational segregation, regional patterns of racism—official and unofficial, past and current, racially polarized voting within the confines of a community and voting and nonvoting within the Anglo and Chicano communities.7

Approaches in Municipal Services Equalization Research

From my experience, the basic problem concerning the relevance of municipal services research as (1) explanation, (2) for informational use in advocacy by political groups and, (3) in litigation can be summed up in the following questions: (a) Is there identifiable political responsibility for the poor quality of municipal services found in Chicano communities? I.e., are elected officials legally responsible--directly or indirectly--for the poor quality of municipal services? (b) Does information exist (and can it be obtained) which will demonstrate inequities in municipal services among different ethnic and income groups? (c) Which distributional standards should one employ and which indicators of equity in municipal services should be selected?

Standards in the Selection of Indicators of Municipal Services

For the purposes of effective advocacy by citizen groups

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8The following three sections are taken from an unpublished memorandum—"Equity in Municipal Services: Notes on Research in the Southwest"—which I wrote for purposes of aiding field researchers in San Antonio, Corpus Christi and Tucson. This constitutes the approach which I have taken in municipal services equalization research.
and for the purposes of litigation, it is suggested that the following criteria be used in selecting municipal services (keep in mind that establishing political and legal responsibility for services is vital). (1) Select services wherein city councils', commissions' and agencies' responsibilities are clearly contained in city charters, ordinances, or other authoritative sources. Thus, legal and political responsibility are easily identified and fixed. (2) Avoid researching services whose legal and political responsibility are not easily identified or fixed. For example, avoid focusing on a city utilities board which is legally removed from the appointive and directive authority of elected bodies, such as city councils. Political and legal remedies may be difficult to find in these situations. (3) Select municipal services for research which have been maintained by public funds (public bonds monies, general revenue funds, Local Revenue Sharing funds, etc.) This is particularly important in advocacy and litigation in that it cannot be said that inequities in services are the result of inequalities of wealth and/or inequalities resulting from private development and/or maintenance of these services. For example, city water supplies many times
have a history of private ownership and delivery of services—despite the contemporary pattern of public ownership and delivery. (4) If your focus is the maintenance of services, again choose those services which are "consumed collectively by the entire community and can be financed only through taxation." This is important in the rationale of the research because the entire community can be said to need certain basic services—imperatives to the quality of urban life. According to Little, "such services can be financed only through taxations because their benefits cannot be limited to those who paid for them." Conversely, avoid researching those services which have been established or which were maintained by a benefit tax, i.e., a tax paid solely by those who benefit from a particular service (this is based on the economic principle that certain services are "private"—having no collective or community effect—these services are available to those

10Idem., 684.
private individuals who can afford to pay.) For example, the installation of curbs in neighborhoods is many times financed by a special assessment. Hence, inequities between neighborhoods with and without curbs is the result of an ability to pay, not legally demonstrable discrimination in the development and maintenance of services.

As a corollary to the criteria of public financing, was the service in question installed or established at private expense, then maintained at public expense? If this is the case, a current inequity in the service may be the result of private (instead of public) neglect in the past.\(^\text{11}\)

**Demonstrating the Research Findings**

After selecting indicators of municipal services according to the above criteria, one of the simplest and most dramatic ways of demonstrating research findings is to record or to plot according to geographic areas of minority population

\(^{11}\text{See Dove v. Bumpers, supra., as an example of a case wherein failure to recognize this distinction had disastrous results for the Black plaintiffs in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The court reasoned that private developers--not the city--were responsible for installing streets, sewer lines, and storm drainage systems. Therefore, the city could not be held responsible for inequities according to geographic and racially homogenous areas.}\)
concentrations found in most Southwestern cities. Geographic quadrants or districts containing dense minority populations can be chosen as impact areas. Map overlays, statistics plotted according to geographic quadrants, and public expenditures for services according to geographic quadrants or districts usually demonstrate graphically inequities in services characterizing minority populations which have been "ghettoized."

Research service indicators over a period of time in order to determine patterns of fluctuations in the services received. If at all possible, avoid one year studies (because of the possibility that decisions made during that year were unusual and not reflective of the pattern of inequities endured by a community). However, the fruitfulness of researching inequities in a particular service can often be determined by a six-month or one-year survey.

Many times, information gained from public agencies will not be enough for purposes of determining whether patterns of inequity exist. It may become necessary to develop indices of equity derived from the information at hand. Kevin Cox's
Politics, Power and Conflict in the City: A Geographic View\textsuperscript{12}

and Burner v. Washington, a complaint filed in Federal District Court, District of Columbia in 1972, were very helpful in developing useful indices of inequities.

In summary, we end where we began—electoral access of minority groups is integrally related to the quality of municipal services which they receive. (Indeed, the electoral access-policy performance relationship can be applied to state legislatures and school districts as well.) Our research has indicated that in situations wherein there are no or few minority elected officials, the performance of elected bodies vis-a-vis minority communities is suspect.

Municipal Services Research and Internal Colonial Explanations

In examining various explanations of internal colonialism,\textsuperscript{13}


I was influenced by the following considerations in adapting an explanation which corresponds to the conditions of the Chicano population of San Antonio. Would the explanation take into account the institutions and processes indigenous to urban life in San Antonio and other major cities of the Southwest? In Pablo Gonzalez-Casanova's "Internal Colonialism and National Development," the characteristics, institutions and structures describing the political form of internal colonialism merit our attention:

... a colony is: (1) A territory without self-government. (2) It is an unequal position with respect to the metropolis where the inhabitants do govern themselves. (3) The administration and responsibility for administration is a concern of the state which dominates it. (4) Its inhabitants do not participate in elections of higher administrative bodies, i.e., rulers are assigned by the dominating country. (5) The rights of its inhabitants, their economic situation, and their social privileges are regulated by another state. (6) This position does not correspond to natural bonds--but rather to artificial models which are the product of conquest or of international concession. (7) Colonial inhabitants belong to a race and culture different from that of the dominating people. Customarily they also speak a different language.

... However, these illustrations are not sufficient to explain the nature of a colony. On the one hand, we are
dealing with a formalistic juridical-political definition, whose attributes may be absent even without the colonial situation disappearing; and without permitting the statistical treatment of a true variable which moves from a colonial structure to an independent structure. 

Several observations should be made concerning Gonzalez-Casanova's definition of the political forms of internal colonialism. One could reformulate the Gonzalez-Casanova definition and apply it to the Chicano urban situation in many parts of this country. The reformulated description of the political forms contained in the internal colonial situation is: (1) The Chicano urban population is residentially segregated in most Southwestern cities. In terms of voting strength and effective representation, Chicano barrios are without self-government. (2) The delivery and maintenance of services to and within barrios are unequal relative to other portions of the city. (3) Administration of services to and within the Chicano barrio are conducted by administrators who are responsible to the dominant Anglo population.
within the city. (4) The Chicano population is systematically disenfranchised electorally and has a disproportionate number of persons appointed to administrative boards, commissions and juries. (5) Political rights—such as voting—the economic situation—and educational attainment is defined and dominated by an Anglo population which resides outside the barrio. (6) The conditions described above reflect a historical policy of containment of the Chicano population through racially restricted housing and is continued currently through private discrimination in house selling and renting, as well as systematic, economic, political, and educational discrimination. (7) The barrio inhabitants belong to a cultural and linguistic group different from that of the dominating people.

The governmental services assessment research which I have conducted during the past year treats several of the forms of internal colonialism (especially the first three) as propositions in need of demonstration. Some of these findings are contained below.

Another issue in the internal colonial explanation which deserves special attention is the question of race. Is
racism, both historical and current, a basis for patterned exclusion and persistent inequalities? The electoral access-municipal services findings below strongly suggest that race is an integral part of explanations of persistent and patterned inequalities. As Barrera, Munoz and Ornelas contend: "The factor of race and culture is important, as Gonzalez-Casanova points out, because it differentiates this exploitive relationship from one based on class, or on some other basis."15 We can refine this statement by suggesting that: (a) Race and class are inextricably intertwined in the inner city; however, ethnicity becomes salient in the explanation when patterns of containment, lack of access and domination can be demonstrated to occur along racial lines. (b) It is not important to our understanding of this exploitive relationship to impute intentional containment and domination to any racial or cultural group in society; rather, lack of access by Chicanos and domination of Chicanos can be a measurable effect of a system or a set of institutions and practices. Of course, this is not to suggest that willful

15Barrera, Munoz and Ornelas, op. cit., 287.
discrimination and exclusion does not occur.

Let us now examine the relationship of internal colonialism and electoral access—municipal services research in an empirical context.

**Explorations of Internal Colonialism in San Antonio**

If an internal colonial explanation were to be applied to San Antonio, one would begin with an attempt to define the configurations of the Chicano population in that city. The Chicano population is concentrated in thirty-one contiguous census tracts, all of which are seventy percent and above Chicano. The configuration of this concentration is historically derived. Residential segregation, so crucial in maintaining educational, economic and political isolation, was conditioned, prior to 1950, by racial restrictions contained in deeds which prohibited the sale of certain properties to various nonwhite minority groups—including those of "Mexican descent."16 (See Figure 1 for the configurations of racially

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16 The practice of state law sanctioning racial residential exclusion was declared unconstitutional in the United States Supreme Court case *Shelly v. Kraemer* 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948).

The degree of racial residential segregation in other select Texas and Southwestern cities can be found in the Institute For Research On Poverty's *Indexes of Racial Residential Segregation For 109 Cities in the United States, 1940 to 1970*, compiled by Annemette Sorensen, Karl E. Taeuber and Leslie J. Hollingsworth, Jr. (Studies in Racial Segregation, No. 1, University of Wisconsin-Madison).
deeded property which served historically to contain the Mexican American population in San Antonio.)

Although certain census tracts in the "buffer" area immediately outside of the barrio are as much as fifty percent Chicano, it is strongly suspected\(^\text{17}\) that containment was/is continued after racial restrictions were declared unconstitutional by (a) private citizen discrimination in renting, leasing and selling property, (b) private realtors showing only certain areas to nonwhites and, (c) cost restrictions in property deeds which effectively bar minority inner city populations from buying in essentially Anglo suburbs.

Table 1 illustrates the socio-economic plight of the Chicano population contrasted with the county-wide population in Bexar County (San Antonio's estimated 745,000 population forms the bulk of Bexar County's 830,000). Approximately fifty-five percent of the entire Chicano population of San

\(^{17}\)A study of the influence of race on leasing and selling patterns in San Antonio is currently underway. However, the United States Commission on Civil Rights conducted housing purchase surveys in Little Rock, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Denver and found that: "Real estate brokers, ... often steered the purchaser into locations which they believed most appropriate for the buyer's racial or ethnic background." (Cox, op. cit., 56.)
TABLE 1
SELECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS
OF MEXICAN AMERICAN AND GENERAL POPULATION
CONDITIONS, BEXAR COUNTY (SAN ANTONIO)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>BEXAR</th>
<th>11.6</th>
<th>All MSYC*</th>
<th>8.0</th>
<th>Mex. Am. MSYC*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(*MSYC = median school years completed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>All families</th>
<th>194,103</th>
<th>median income</th>
<th>8,045</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexican Am. fam.</td>
<td>79,751</td>
<td>median income</td>
<td>6,495</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| INCOME BELOW POVERTY |       |      | All families | 30,922 | % of all families | 15.9 |
|                      |       |      | mean family income | 2,213 |
|                      |       |      | Mexican Am. families | 19,998 | % of all families | 25.1 |
|                      |       |      | mean family income | 2,506 |

| EMPLOYMENT STATUS   |       |      | All Male & Female; 16 yrs. and over | 322,921/58.8% | in labor | 226,648/41.2% |
|                     |       |      | not in labor | 98,669/44.9% |
|                     |       |      | Mexican Am. M & F; 16 yrs. and over | 121,244/55.1% | in labor | 98,669/44.9% |
|                     |       |      | not in labor | 98,669/44.9% |

| HOUSING             |       |      | All Units | 249,025 | lacking some or all plumbing | 6.3 |
|                     |       |      | Mex. Am. Units | 87,872 | lacking some or all plumbing | 89.1 |

Antonio lives in these contiguous census tracts. Twenty-seven percent of the entire city's population lives in these barrio census tracts, while twenty-six percent of the city's population lives in twenty census tracts located on the Anglo Northside.

Although beyond the purview of this paper, economics looms large in the picture of containment and control. Containment is shaped by the amount of Chicano ownership of businesses in the barrio, the kind of businesses that Chicanos own, the willingness of private financial banking and lending institutions to invest (through loans and other financing arrangements) in rebuilding the barrio and the reinvestment practices of barrio-located businesses. Moreover, public and private employment of Chicanos, including the job levels to .

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18 One citizen group--COPS--is currently conducting a campaign against the banking and loaning practice of "redlining" a geographic area like the barrio, i.e., a banking and loaning institution policy of not loaning monies to people seeking improvement in "poor risk", deteriorated areas. The COPS' strategy is to conduct a survey of thousands of barrio residents in order to determine what the residents are "worth" in terms of actual cash investments. After this estimate is made (the estimate runs as high as thirty million dollars), pressure is exerted on banking and loaning institutions to "greenline"--instead of "redline." "Greenlining Next Tactic of COPS," San Antonio Light, February 25, 1975, 1-H.
which Chicanos are hired, is a crucial determinant of containment and control.\textsuperscript{19} These patterns and practices require further investigation.

In their article, "The Barrio As An Internal Colony," Barrera, Ornelas and Munoz cite the "mechanisms of political domination"\textsuperscript{20} which are used politically to contain barrio peoples. The mechanisms of domination include force and outright repression, disenfranchising techniques, patterned exclusion of Chicanos from elected and appointed governmental bodies, racial gerrymandering and changes in the political rules of the game when Chicanos begin to show signs of electoral strength. In San Antonio, there is evidence of electoral, administrative and judicial (grand jury) domination and exclusion of the Chicano population.

\textsuperscript{19} A recent study of Equal Employment Opportunity statistics in San Antonio city government demonstrates the point: In 1974, Anglos occupy 39.7\% of all city jobs, while Spanish-surnamed persons hold 54.5\%. However, of the jobs that pay $13,000 and above, Anglos occupy 68.1\% while Spanish-surnamed individuals hold 30.0\%. More importantly, Anglos occupy 12.8\% of all jobs that pay $6,000 and less, while Spanish-surnamed persons occupy 76.0\% of those jobs. Taken from an unpublished study by Roland Rios, Equal Employment Opportunity in San Antonio, Texas, 1973-74, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1975.

San Antonio city politics has been controlled for twenty years by an Anglo dominated political machine called the Good Government League (GGL). First coming to power on the basis of a city charter reform effort employing a council-manager form of government and at-large elections, the GGL has demonstrated a phenomenal record of electoral success. The internal structure of this political organization is beyond the purview of this study. Nevertheless, if one examines the GGL membership rosters, the steering committee make-up, or the candidate selection committee, there is a dearth of Spanish surnames on the rolls. And, if one examines the residential locations of the Good Government League Candidate Selection Committee, it becomes apparent that barrio residents are conspicuously absent. (See Figure 2 for the residential locations of the GGL Candidate Selection Committee members.)


FIGURE 2
RESIDENCE OF SAN ANTONIO CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS 1958-1960 AND 1969
RESIDENCE OF OIL BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BY CENSUS TRACT

[Map showing distribution of council members and oil board directors within census tracts.]

TAKEN FROM TRUETT CHANCE, THE RELATION OF SELECTED CITY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS...SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
question of Anglo domination in controlling access to the GGL slate becomes meaningful in the light of the electoral dominance exercised by the GGL in city elections. From the period 1955 to 1973, the GGL has captured eighty-two of ninety electoral races for the city council. In contested races, only two persons who were not originally introduced by the GGL in electoral politics have ever beaten the GGL. In contested races, only four persons have ever defeated the GGL. In the period, 1960 to 1974, Mexican American representation on the city council has been twenty-seven percent, in spite of the fact that this group constitutes over one-half of the city's population. Further, residential locations of city council members demonstrates that only two GGL councilmen (from the period 1955-73) have lived in the barrio.23

Another indicator of Anglo domination and Chicano exclusion is appointments to key boards and commissions. Figures 3 and 4 contain the residential locations of Spanish-surnamed and

Figure 3

SELECT SAN ANTONIO BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
1952-Present

Anglo & Black

- Housing
- Library
- Equalization
- City Water
- Transit
- Planning & Zoning

Spanish-Surnamed

- Housing
- Library
- Equalization
- City Water
- Transit
- Planning & Zoning
Select San Antonio Boards & Commissions 1962-Present

Figure 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-spanish surnamed</th>
<th>●</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish-surnamed</td>
<td>⭐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
San Antonio Boards + Commissions
All current members

Figure 4
non-Spanish-surnamed appointments to five key boards and commissions in the city. All of these appointments are made by the city council. Finally, as Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate, the residential locations of various board and commission members—historically and currently—tend to cluster overwhelmingly in Northside census tracts. Chicanos have been and are systematically excluded from these policy-making board and commission posts.

Yet another indicator of exclusion is Mexican American participation on grand juries in Bexar County (San Antonio). The grand jury—a key step in the Texas criminal justice system—has the authority to formally indict those charged with felonies. In a study undertaken by the Mexican American Equal Rights Project and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, an examination of jury lists from 1959 to 1974 revealed that there was an average of 2.1 Spanish-surnamed individuals serving on the twelve member grand juries empanelled during this period of time.24 Exclusion of Chicanas—

Mexican American females--was more systematic: (a) no Mexican American female served on a grand jury in Bexar County prior to 1968 and, (b) the average number of Chicanas who did serve from 1968 to 1974 is 0.4. The importance of Chicano exclusion in this crucial decision-making area is that a significant percentage of those accused felons whose cases are brought before the grand jury are barrio residents. Contained in the grand jury study are the residential locations of the grand jury members; the same Northside clustering of locations is found for this period. Thus, decisions concerning the fates of large numbers of Mexican Americans accused of felonies are made by grand juries whose make-up is primarily Anglos who live outside of the barrio.

The barrio remains virtually without electoral or administrative self-government as a result of a combination of factors. Election systems play an important role in the exclusion and domination process. City elections in San Antonio are held under an at-large arrangement (as they are in nearly all large Texas cities)--where all of the candidates are elected by the entire city electorate. As a legal arrangement, the at-large structure serves as an umbrella wherein other
legal devices--such as the majority run-off and numbered place system, as well as racially polarized voting and the legacy of past racial discrimination, act to dilute and to minimize the voting strength of barrio citizens.25

The exclusion of Chicanos documented above has meaning beyond electoral and administrative political access. Perhaps one of the most significant results of exclusion is the degree of equity barrio residents receive in public services. An examination of the degree of equity found in select municipal services is appropriate.

Equity in Select Municipal Services in San Antonio

There are a number of approaches in selecting indicators designed to measure equity in municipal services. One set of indices are known as indicators of "input equality."26

25 For an explanation of the dynamic of at-large elections in Texas, see Charles L. Cotrell, "The Effect(s) of At-Large Elections on the Political Access and Voting Strength of Mexican Americans and Blacks in Texas," 13-20. Paper delivered at the Rocky Mountain Political Science Association Meeting, April 25, 1974. Also, the United States Supreme Court decision White v. Regester (412 U.S. 755, 1973), declared the use of at-large elections for state legislative positions in Dallas and Bexar Counties (Texas) an unconstitutional infringement on the voting rights of Mexican American and Black inner city populations. See also Graves v. Barnes (343 F. Supp. 731, W.D., Tex., 1972), another at-large election suit currently pending decision by the United States Supreme Court.

26 Lineberry and Welch, op. cit.
Indicators of input equality attempt to measure expenditure levels and resource commitments in the establishment and delivery of a service. Take the example of streets: One needs to know the proportion of a city budget and/or bonds monies allocated to street construction, maintenance and repair. Further, these allocations can be plotted according to expenditure amount by quadrant or district within a city. One of the more immediate problems with this approach is in developing a distributional standard which informs expenditures according to criteria of need. What certain proportions of expenditure by quadrant or district means is not entirely clear. There may be significant differentials in expenditure level in different parts of a city, but there may also be significant differences in street problems or needs. Nevertheless, input equality does give some insight into the general priorities a city administration places on different service expenditures or a lack thereof.

Another approach to making judgments concerning equity focuses upon the decision-making of officials who are responsible for different policy areas. Decisions concerned with affirming or denying zoning requests, "reprogramming" priorities in public bond project expenditures or decisions concerning
the locations and capacities of public parks and libraries are usually part of the public record. However, a focus upon decision-making alone fails to include crucial considerations such as: (a) the distributional standard(s) involved in the decision (or which should have been involved in the decision) and, (b) effect(s) which a particular policy has on different parts of a city.

The most profitable approach in attempting to measure municipal services equity is derived from efforts to measure the effect of services on different geographic areas of a city. This approach stresses the selection of indicators which convincingly measures the effects which the establishment and delivery of services have on different populations living in different parts of a city. Although the problem of developing suitable distributional standards still remains with this approach, as with the others, the value of the approach is to present indices of equity which are empirically demonstrable and whose impact can be registered according to geographic areas. Obviously, in residentially segregated cities, effects of policies are registered according to racially homogeneous populations. Thus, systematic and patterned exclusions and
inequalities become empirically demonstrable.

The remainder of the discussion in this section will focus on select municipal service equity research in San Antonio. Findings representing the three approaches outlined above are included. Each of the following municipal service policy studies has been condensed considerably in order to include a number of policy areas.

One indicator of input equality concerns the new federalism—Local Revenue Sharing funds. The importance of this financing structure for cities and towns needs little explanation. Millions of dollars are being rechanneled into the hands of local elected officials for distribution. The priorities and parts of cities to which these funds are directed reveal something about patterns of equity as perceived and voted upon by local officials. Table 2 is derived from an ad hoc monitoring project

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established to determine where and to whom Local Revenue Sharing Funds were going in San Antonio. The definitions of the Westside and the Northside corresponds to the barrio and the more affluent Anglo populated suburbs respectively. As Table 2 illustrates, the distribution of both funds and projects is heavily weighted on the Northside.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS BY QUADRANT</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quadrant</th>
<th>WESTSIDE</th>
<th>NORTHSIDE</th>
<th>SOUTHSIDE</th>
<th>EASTSIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure level</td>
<td>2,416,745</td>
<td>3,761,794</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>2,825,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Median* Family Income</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>13,593</td>
<td>5,501</td>
<td>6,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Median Owner Value</td>
<td>9,291</td>
<td>26,309</td>
<td>7,972</td>
<td>10,598</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*The data was drawn from only those census tracts in which projects were located.)

SOURCE: Taken from the Ad Hoc Local Revenue Sharing Project, San Antonio, Texas, 1974.

These differences exist in spite of the fact that barrio needs measured in terms of physical conditions would seem to require a different distributional pattern. In addition, when one examines by geographic quadrant project completion statuses...
(i.e., those projects funded through Local Revenue Sharing Funds), there is a much higher completion rate among the Northside (Northwest and Northeast quadrants) projects. Hence, in spite of the apparent need for physical improvements and in spite of large wealth differentials, there is a significant inequality in the city council decisions to allocate Local Revenue Sharing Funds.

Another indicator of input inequality is proportional differences in tax assessments. There are inequities within inequities in this complex area. Most concede that the property tax assessment process is riddled with inequities for everyone. However, a recent survey of tax assessment equity has suggested that there are disproportionate ratios (a) between tax assessments of private business properties and assessments of homeowners, i.e., homeowners are assessed at a higher rate proportionately than are private business properties and, (b) there are proportional inequities in

28 See Jonathan Rowe and Douglas Crooks, "Study Describes Tax Inequities," People and Taxes, 1974. (This periodical can be obtained from P.O. Box 14198, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C., 20044.)

29 One estimate—that of Communities Organized for Public Services—holds that $25,000,000 would be made available for needed barrio improvements if tax assessment inequities were remedied.
assessments demonstrable by geographic quadrant among homeowners.

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**TABLE 3**

**TAX ASSESSMENT VARIANCES AND AVERAGES**

**BY QUADRANT, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS**

1975*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance:</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tax assessment appraisals were randomly sampled in 120 cases--30 in each quadrant. In this study, the ranges of variance are 1.14% to 76%. Bexar County's assessment rate is 60%, with a tax levy of $1.89 per $100.00 assessed valuation. Thus, this Table reflects low, high and average variances in appraised value and proportional inequities in the appraised value. Taken from an unpublished study by Nita Langner, *Tax Assessment Inequities in San Antonio*, St. Mary's University Graduate School, 1975.

Table 3 illustrates that barrio homeowners are assessed proportionately at a higher rate than are Northside homeowners (the Southwest and Southeast quadrants contain high proportions of inner city minority population). Assessments are levied by the County Tax-Assessor Collector, an elected official, in Texas.
There is a final irony concerning inequities for the barrio resident in this story: When improvements in neighborhood conditions are demanded by Chicanos, they are told that there are not enough public funds to meet their needs.

One focal point in the decision-making approach to municipal services research in San Antonio has been zoning decisions--those almost invisible decisions which determine so much of the residential quality of life in the city. The issue of equity in zoning decisions requires the construction of indices of equity which attempt to measure the impact of decisions on the residential quality of different parts of the city. The Zoning Commission--a nine-member board appointed by the City Council for two-year terms--makes decisions concerning land use for the city. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that residential integrity--residential areas which are basically intact and free from various categories of commercial zoning are basically desirable environments.30

30 With the aid of city staff, we were able to render judgments on the block maps attached to each zoning case as to whether residential homogeneity had been violated or upheld by the Zoning Commission decision.
Further, on requests for changes from residential to commercial zoning, it is assumed that the Zoning Commission would adopt a decision-making pattern which either affirmed (protected) neighborhood integrity (by denying requests for changes from residential to commercial categories) or did not protect neighborhood integrity (by affirming high percentages of requests from residential to commercial zoning categories).

Further, it was suspected that the basically Northside-residing members of the Commission would tend to protect a more "desirable" quadrant of the city, the Northside, (especially the Northeast quadrant) at a higher rate than the barrio (essentially the Southwest quadrant). Table 4 suggests that this

TABLE 4
SURVEY OF ZONING COMMISSION DECISIONS BY QUADRANT, 1973-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1973-1974 Cases</th>
<th>Approved % of Total</th>
<th>Denied % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NW</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>47% 24%</td>
<td>16 53% 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63% 38%</td>
<td>13 37% 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36% 9%</td>
<td>9 64% 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59% 29%</td>
<td>12 41% 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>58 = 54%</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 = 46%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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pattern of decision-making occurred during the period 1973-74. The first draft of a replicate study—"Zoning: A Study of the Northeast and Southwest Quadrants, 1971-72"—affirms the findings of the 1973-74 study summarized above, except that sharp patterns of inequity do not appear for the year 1972.

The measured effect of these decisions seems to be clear: The decisions of an Anglo-dominated Zoning Commission protect neighborhood integrity by denying commercial encroachment on the Northside at a consistently higher rate than in the barrios. Administrative domination thus has the effect of reenforcing through Zoning decisions the physical environment of the barrio.

The areas wherein attempts were made to make judgments concerning the equity of policy effects include fire protection, streets and street maintenance, parks, libraries, bus transportation, drainage, and the delivery of health services (the

31 Unpublished study prepared by John L. Lopez, St. Mary's University Graduate School, 1975.

32 Idem., p. 11.
38

studies of parks, bus transportation, libraries, drainage, and health are still underway). Further, studies of the equity in street lighting and the emergency medical service are included. Summaries of the findings contained in these studies can be found below.

The condition of streets according to geographic area is a crucial indicator in understanding a very important public works area. Are the streets paved? Do the streets have curbs? What are the conditions of the streets (potholes, dirty, etc.)? How often are the streets maintained? The condition of streets according to the degree of paving and the general condition is contained in Figure 5. The pattern of poor streets revealed through this infra-red photographic survey of the city is remarkable to this observer: Almost without exception, the streets in poor condition are located on the Westside and Eastside of the city. The clustering effect of poor street

33The information for Figure 5 was taken from the City of San Antonio, Department of Planning and Community Development, Photo Interpretation: Land Use and Neighborhood Analysis, San Antonio, Texas, 1972 (San Antonio: 1972).
Street Conditions in San Antonio

- Bad street or litter

0614
conditions speaks for itself.

A study of three areas located in the Northwest, Southwest and Southeast quadrants concluded that streets in the Southwest and Southeast quadrants of the city were more consistently dirty and were more consistently without curbs.\(^{34}\) It was also determined that the street sweeper swept more frequently in the select Northside neighborhood than in the Westside or Eastside neighborhoods.\(^{35}\) And, due to the fact that installing curbs is a function of special assessments paid by the street residents, the Westside and Eastside survey areas had fewer curbs.\(^{36}\) The important point concerning curbs and equity in policy procedure is this: Street sweepers do not sweep areas without curbs. Interviews with city administrators indicate that this is a necessary policy due to the fact that street sweepers need curbs to function effectively.\(^{37}\) Nevertheless,

\(^{34}\) Gregory Hudspeth, *The Operation of the Street Division of the City Public Works Department: A Study in Equity*, unpublished, St. Mary's University Graduate School, 1975. The Hudspeth study consisted of select indicators of input equality, interviews and visual surveys of the three areas.

\(^{35}\) *Idem.*, 6.

\(^{36}\) *Idem.*, 6-7.

the lack of an ability to pay for curbs leads to an inability to acquire other services.

Fire protection can be considered a fundamental urban service. It is also one of the most difficult and complex to measure in terms of equity. A recent study of fire protection equity in San Antonio concludes that:

The general appearance of distribution of the fire protection service by the San Antonio Fire Department appears initially to be equally functional throughout the city. However, upon closer examination it is evident that not all citizens throughout the city are receiving equal amounts of fire protection service. While it is probably true that all districts have sufficient amounts of equipment, and fire companies and stations, it is also a little known fact that the districts with high incidence of populations and high densities are usually the districts which have fewer experienced (or seasoned) personnel, more equipment and in some cases, more fire stations, along with higher incidences of minority population with lower incomes.38

Esparza suggests that experienced personnel is a crucial consideration in adequate fire protection, as well as the condition

38Leonardo Esparza, The Distribution and Evaluation of Fire Protection Services for the City of San Antonio, Texas, unpublished, St. Mary's University Graduate School, 1975. Esparza correlated certain socio-economic characteristics of fire districts—including ethnicity—with an impressive array of indicators of equity in fire protection. These indicators include number of alarms, frequency of response, condition of fire fighting equipment, water pressure, kind of housing structure, fire insurance rate and experience level(s) of fire fighting personnel by district. The fire districts tended to overlap meaningfully the racially homogeneous residential areas in the city.
of the equipment. He concludes that barrio and ghetto residents receive inequitable service according to these two indicators. 39

An evaluation of the condition of San Antonio's recreation areas is currently underway. 40 The study tentatively concludes that:

Although all four sectors (quadrants) are deficient in some recreational aspect, there are certain communities which have not received equitable service. Most of these parks are located in the Northeast and Southwest (quadrants). Proportionately, the Northeast has the least number of parks with playgrounds, fields for sports, swimming pools, tennis courts, refreshment centers, and restrooms. In the Southwest can be found the most parks needing drinking fountains, lights, some type of equipment or ball field repair, and especially ground maintenance care. In addition, there were more parks in the Southwest with mudholes/mounds and more with poor drainage systems. 41


40 Flo Harvey, Distribution of Municipal Services: Parks and Recreation, St. Mary's University Graduate School, 1975. Ms. Harvey is using certain indicators of input equality, along with sixteen indices of park equity which are applied by site visits. These indicators include playground equipment, field activities, tennis courts, recreation buildings, refreshment centers, restrooms, drinking fountains, lights, ground care needs, insufficient equipment, neglect of facilities, potholes and mounds, poor drainage and parks with no other recreational services within one mile.

41 Idem., 12.
It remains to be seen how the Southwest would have compared with the other sectors had there been no Model Cities Program (extensive federal funding). Two observations should be entered concerning these conclusions:

(1) This was a survey of public parks; it did not include private parks or suburban private member facilities (such as swimming pools or tennis facilities). What I am suggesting is that the Northeast quadrant population may not need extensive public recreational areas;

(2) The disclaimer concerning the use of federal funds contained in the conclusions quoted above is significant. Ten parks in the Southwest quadrant were funded through federal monies. The use of federal monies many times releases the city from obligating city funds to certain geographic areas. One must examine closely and critically the use of federal funds in lieu of city obligations.

A number of other policy areas are currently under...
evaluation. These include assessments of equity in library services, bus transportation in the city, drainage and public bonds projects, expenditure levels, and project completion statuses. Health is yet another unfinished policy area undergoing evaluation. Although not all of the health services in San Antonio fall within the purview of the Metropolitan Health District, a brief description of the conditions reflected in socio-economic and health indicators would be insightful.

In a very thorough inventory of health conditions, the barrio area described above and the Chicano population generally have the highest concentrations of active tuberculosis cases, infant mortality rate, neonatal deaths per 1,000 births, syphilis and gonorrhea cases.

According to a Health Services Needs Index established by the Hospital District, the areas with the greatest health

43Planning Report, 1974, Bexar County Hospital District, San Antonio, Texas, prepared by J. Scoggins (December, 1974).

needs are the Chicano barrio and the Black ghetto. These same census tracts have the highest density of population per census tract as well as the highest incidence of families twenty-five percent below the poverty level.

Not all of the studies undertaken revealed inequities in the delivery of services. A study of street lighting in San Antonio by Professor Robert Welch and assessment of emergency medical services appear to indicate equitable services in these areas.

In the case of street lighting, one of the reasons for equity appears to be affected by citizen access procedures—citizens simply call in and request street lighting in San Antonio. And, the Emergency Medical Service, the newest

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46 Idem., Section II, Figures 4 and 5.


public service which the city offers, appears to have benefited from the community-wide participation which went into establishing the service.

Finally, a study of government services in San Antonio by Professor Truett Chance concludes that "... these results furnish partial support for the public regarding (policies and services implemented for the general benefit of the city) thesis." The Chance study, however, was an attempt to correlate the frequency and use of certain services to socio-economic characteristics of census tracts. He did not develop indices of effect, which might explain his generally favorable conclusions.

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50 Idem., 108.
Conclusions

This study began as an inquiry into the relationship between municipal services research and internal colonial explanations. As I have tried to demonstrate, the research findings above document certain key attributes of the internal colonial model as revised in this paper. Characteristics of the internal colonial explanation such as electoral and administrative exclusion of Chicanos, a lack of any meaningful self-government in the barrios, a historical policy of official containment of the barrio population and a current private perpetuation of that containment, consistently inequitable city policies whose effects are experienced by ethnically and linguistically distinct peoples--residentially segregated--are documented in the city of San Antonio. This preliminary and, for some of the studies contained herein, tentative set of findings leads me to the conclusion that: (a) internal colonial explanations, in light of municipal services research, are more than hollow metaphor and, (b) municipal service research appears to be a very suitable technique in documenting the process and the effects of internal colonialism.

Another conclusion concerns the relationship between public and private "government". Certain findings above
support the assertion that there is a subtle, but definite relationship between public and private "governments" in the internal colonial process in San Antonio. Further research would shed light upon the dynamics of power which exist between elected and appointed public officials and private persons who wield influence in the halls of government.

Finally, this paper would not be complete without repeating the classic maxim that more research efforts documenting exclusion and domination are needed in other cities throughout the Southwest and the nation. For knowledge is a crucial first step on the long road to the political transformation and independence of colonized peoples.
Epilogue

What are the prospects for changing the patterns of inequity spelled out above? In San Antonio, there appear to be several obstacles, attitudinal and organizational, to change. These obstacles, which can be thought of in terms of prevailing institutions or ethos, act to maintain the patterns of inequality, discrimination and exclusion of the Chicano community. The first ethos is electorally and organizationally ensconced. The GGL has successfully captured the symbolism of reform and progress in their electoral and political appeals. Robert Lineberry writes about the basic content of early American urban reformer goals thusly:

1. An aversion to 'politics' as a means of arriving at public-policy decisions and specifically to political parties and organized interest groups;
2. A holistic conception of the community as a whole to which special interests should be clearly subordinated;
3. A strong preference for professional management of community affairs, implying preference for public policy-making by technical experts like the city manager;
4. A strong faith in the efficacy of structural reform.

The goal of the early reformers was to rationalize and democratize city government by substituting community-oriented leadership for the permicious politics of the machine. They rejected the personal kind of political accountability associated with the
machine, patronage, ward leaders, and demands for ethnic recognition. Instead, they stressed a political accountability modeled upon that of the business corporation (or their image of it), which would have a small policy-making body, the council (board of directors), directly responsible to the electorate (stockholders), without the intervention of parties and groups, and administration by professional experts. A manager (corporation president) would serve at the discretion of the council. Although a number of structural reforms were advocated by the reformers, the most lasting in their effects have been manager government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large constituencies.  

The basic theme--progress and unity, not politics--has been successfully employed to undercut any "dissenting" faction; the claim has been that reform politics results in generally equitable policies for the entire city. Although it is seriously questionable that the reformer ideal has lived up to a politics in the general interest (a "public regarding" ethos) in San Antonio, the GGL has successfully avoided a "special interest" label as a representative organ for the Northside.

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A second obstacle to change consists in the average citizen's unawareness of the relationship between public institutions and processes and private government. Bluntly stated, the actions or inactions of powerful "private" citizens and institutions goes virtually unmonitored by active citizens. The public and barrio costs of the activities of private developers goes unnoticed—each foot of development on the growing Northside costs inner city residents by exacerbating drainage problems in the lower elevations of the barrio. The "redlining" practices of financial borrowing institutions is not conceived as a policy with significant public effects and costs. In tax assessment inequities, the relationship between underassessed private business properties and underfinanced city programs for the barrio and ghetto is not clearly perceived. Until proponents of change see "public" and "private" politics as interconnected, pervasive

52 Communities Organized for Public Services is a rare exception to this awareness.

and meaningful political change will be very difficult to effect.

Finally, Ornelas, Munoz and Barrera speak of yet another obstacle to change—the capacity of a group to mobilize racial bias in efforts designed to prevent political, economic and social change. Both aggregate and survey electoral data demonstrate racially polarized voting in San Antonio; further, survey data demonstrates the manner in which some policy issues are racially tinged.

The residue of racially polarized attitudes can be tapped overtly or subtly. In elections, the opponents to the GGL can be identified as "militants," advocates of "Brown Power."

54 Op. cit.,


56 See unpublished survey results "Racial Attitudes and Project Turn-Key," (San Antonio, 1971).

57 Contained in the GGL 1971 thirty minute campaign film "Join the Dream."
Or, groups such as COPS can be depicted as representing "special interests" opposed to the general interest of the city. Until electoral and organizational changes are made in San Antonio, the prospects for remedying the inequities cited above remain dim.