The study traces the development of Brazilian federal initiatives since 1964 to reform the system of access to higher education, examines the effect of those policies, and assesses the utility of Braybrooke and Lindblom's "strategy of disjointed incrementalism" for analyzing public policy formation in this setting. The results reveal that: incremental policy changes in recent years collectively mark the beginning of fundamental progress concerning access to higher education in Brazil; and the theoretical model presented for analyzing public policy-making in Brazil is a useful one and should be considered for further studies in comparative educational policy research. (Author)
HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING IN BRAZIL: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS


by

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INTRODUCTION

The period since the Second World War has witnessed many evolutionary and revolutionary changes which have altered patterns of political, economic, and social organization. Among the most notable characteristics of the post-war era have been the unprecedented increase in the demand for education. Affecting both developed and less developed countries, the demand for places in the educational system can be positively linked to mounting educational aspirations of parents and their children, governmental belief in education as a key to economic growth, and the population explosion.

Brazil is another country which has taken steps to move from an elitist to a democratic educational system by expanding educational opportunity. The modernizing authoritarian regime has, indeed, extended its centralizing administrative activities to the area of higher education and--with regard to the problem of access--has concentrated its efforts on reforming the key mechanism of selection: the exame vestibular (college entrance examinations).

In recent years access to higher education has become an increasingly important public policy issue in Brazil. It has been widely debated among students and parents, bureaucrats, the press, teachers, and university presidents. A particularly significant political aspect of the issue is that the parents of the middle-class students clamoring for entry to the higher levels of education represent the socioeconomic group which supported the military's ascendancy to power in 1964.

The objectives of the paper are to trace the development of Brazilian federal initiatives since 1964 to reform the system of access to higher education, examine the effect of those policies, and assess the utility of a particular theoretical framework for analyzing public policy formation in this setting.
ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Whereas admission to higher education in the U.S. is collectively based upon such criteria as secondary school performance, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and college entrance examination scores--only this last factor serves as the basis for admission to higher education in Brazil. Since 1911, the exame vestibular has been the sole determinant of access to the university and the most awesome problem of access to higher schooling in Brazil. Because of this total reliance on entrance examinations, Brazilian high school graduates would usually spend an additional year preparing for the exame vestibular. This was primarily done through a cursinho (privately owned and operated training course). Thus, by enrolling in a crash program geared exclusively to the entrance exams, students were able to increase their chances of passing.

Since colleges and universities conducted their own entrance examination competition, students had to register at the institution(s) they wished to attend. The registration fee for the tests varied, depending upon the institution and the course of study. Colleges could charge as much or as little as they wanted for the entrance exam competition. Higher education institutions offered written, oral, and sometimes practical tests; they could also require aptitude and vocational tests if they desired. The physical conditions for test-taking were very often dehumanizing. Stadiums, arenas, and other huge complexes were used because of the large number of applicants (recent high school graduates, those who graduated earlier but postponed taking the tests, and repeater candidates).

1Other nations also utilize examinations which serve for admission to higher education (e.g. France, England, Chile, West Germany). However, in the Brazilian case, the total dependence on examinations and the failure to seek complementary criteria for selection make that nation's access system the most archaic, deficient, and inequitable of all.
The entrance examinations were eliminatório (eliminative). A predetermined score, arbitrarily chosen, was used as a cut-off point for passing. Consequently, the number of candidates who passed the exams often exceeded the number of available freshman places. Excedentes was the name given to candidates who passed the exams but were denied admission; and there were usually demonstrations, protests, and other pressures exerted to admit them.1

The most serious problems which the system of access to higher education created (or aggravated) dealt with testing procedures, secondary education, and economic conditions. In the first case, the tests were unduly difficult, exceeding the secondary school level, and relying quite heavily upon the memorization of facts; in actuality, the examinations (along with the policy of numerus clausus) were intended to drastically reduce the size of the admissions group of each college and university. Furthermore, the core subjects, material content, type of tests, and the system of grading and selecting candidates varied among institutions and fields of study. Also, candidates took the exams for admission to one major course of study only--more than one career choice was not allowed. As already mentioned, the exam competition was eliminative, based on an arbitrary passing score.

With respect to secondary schooling, the exclusively preparatory rather than formative nature of high school education induced most graduates to seek university admission. The absence of counseling services denied secondary school graduates guidance to prepare for either higher education or the world of work. Fundamentally, the most serious deficiency was the lack of articulation between secondary and higher education. Since the college entrance exams were the only criterion for admission to the university--the candidate's secondary school work was meaningless. The construction and scoring of the tests, done

exclusively by professors, and the omnipresent *cursinhos* further undermined the legitimacy of secondary education and hindered cooperation with higher education.

Finally, the system of access to higher education brought problems of an economic nature. Candidates from poor families experienced economic discrimination in seeking a higher education (even though public colleges and universities are tuition-free). The *cursinhos*, which definitely improved a candidate's chances for admission, were expensive to attend. Also, in addition to high exam registration fees in all institutions, the fact that examination competitions were held on different dates and at different times meant that those who could afford to pay more than one registration fee could take more than one college's entrance exams, thereby improving their chances of admission.

An economic problem of wider dimension, however, was the maldistribution of candidates between programs. This created difficulties with respect to national manpower considerations. Demand was great for socially prestigious professions (engineering, medicine, law, economics); however, in some of these career areas--namely engineering and medicine--there was a substantial disproportion between candidates and places available. In other high status professions (e.g. law, economics), although demand was great, the disproportion was less severe. Yet, these professions were overcrowded and employment was modest. In still other professional areas (e.g. agronomy, veterinary medicine), candidate demand was low, even though employment opportunities were good.

The search for solutions to these problems of access to higher education received the attention of policy-makers at the highest levels of the federal government.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY REFORM

The democratically-elected, leftist government of President João Goulart was overthrown on March 31, 1964. A coalition of middle-class civilians and military officers staged this coup d'état to rid their country of economic and social strife, government corruption, and communist influence.

Upon assuming power, the military leadership directed its attention to the immediate problems of consolidating power, suppressing the radical left, and bringing relief to the ailing economy. Educational reform, initially, was not a high priority for federal policy-makers.

In 1967 concurrent with increasing anti-government student demonstrations, steps were taken to reassess the system of access to higher education. The position paper issued by the Council of Rectors of Brazilian Universities in October, 1967, was, in a sense, the precursor of subsequent public policy on access to higher education.¹ The document focused on the specific problems of admission and linked the access issue with the issue of university reform and the expansion of higher learning.² Specifically, the development of a new policy on the exame vestibular was, according to the Council, of national importance given its economic, social, political, and pedagogical aspects; consequently, they felt that educational policy on college entrance examinations should be placed within the broader framework of social and economic development planning.

The crystallization of these ideas was hastened by the University Reform Law of 1968. This law embodied a federal commitment to modernize Brazilian

¹Aluíso Pimenta et al., Estabelecimento de uma Política para Admissão de Alunos no Ensino Superior no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Conselho de Reitores das Universidades Brasileiras, 1967).

²Ibid., p.65. The Council suggested the following measures be adopted within feasible time sequences: (1) promotion of more adequate articulation between secondary and higher education; (2) expansion and rational distribution of places in the university based upon specialized manpower requirements; (3) student orientation to dissuade candidates from applying for admission to socially prestigious programs in which the labor market was saturated; and (4) modernization and improvement of testing and measurement procedures.
higher education and focus on the *exame vestibular* as a means of reforming the system of access. Special attention was given to unification of the entrance examinations in article 21:

> Within the period of three years from the date of enactment of this law, the entrance examination competition will be fully identical in content for all courses of study or areas of specific knowledge and unified in its execution, in the same university or federation of schools or the same isolated establishment of pluricurricular organization, in accordance with the statutes and by-laws.¹

The initial emphasis placed on unification was done with the intention of doing away with multiple registrations and, subsequently, achieving a far more accurate account of the demand for higher education.²

Under the tenure of Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho (1969-1974), the issue of access to higher education received the greatest attention of the federal government, including both military governments and the civilian governments prior to 1964.

Attacking the problem of the *excedentes*, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) announced in October, 1970, that beginning with the 1971 examination competition *excedentes* would "technically" disappear. This would be achieved by making the exams classifying rather than eliminative.³ In other words, instead of an arbitrary cut-off point, the fifty freshman vacancies for study in a certain program would be filled by the candidates with the fifty highest marks on the exams. Also announced were simultaneous examinations in the federal universities throughout the country. Proposed by the Ministry of Education and Culture and approved by the Council of Rectors, the simultaneous examinations would take place only in federal universities. However, it was

¹Guido Ivan de Carvalho, *Ensino Superior: Legislação e Jurisprudência*, 2ª edição (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), p. 78. "Isolated establishments" are single-purpose institutions which are usually private and not affiliated with a larger institution (e.g. School of Design, College of Insurance).


³Globo, 21 October 1970.
hoped that state and private institutions of higher education would join on their own accord at some future time.

The simultaneous exam competition held in 1971 in federal universities was a great success, and the MEC proceeded to plan regionally unified examinations. A national commission for unified college entrance exams (CONVESU) was created in February, 1971, to examine the reform of access to higher education via entrance examinations. It completed its preliminary study on March 27, 1971, recommending the following:

1. Regionalization of college entrance examinations.
3. Encourage the creation of non-profit foundations to coordinate higher education institutions' participation in a regional examination system.
4. Construction of multiple choice, objective tests for the entrance exams.
5. Utilization of computers for correcting tests, classifying candidates, and general management.
6. The exam competition should be a non-profit operation with fees collected by the executive organ; any profits will be used only for subsidiary activities related to the selection process (e.g. research, development).
7. In addition to subject matter tests, a test of intellectual ability should be introduced.
8. Preventive measures should be taken to assure the administration of a just examination: careful screening of examiners, guaranteeing objective tests, training reviewers for each examination commission in methods of testing and measurement, and standardizing scores.
9. Implementation of a regionally unified exam for 1972 with regard to date and time.
10. Grouping exams in three areas, encompassing all career programs: biological sciences, exact sciences and technology, and human sciences.
11. Whether university admission is to first-cycle studies (general education) or directly to a career program, the process should be nevertheless, classifying—not eliminative.¹

The presidential decree of July 13, 1971, which regulated the college entrance examination competitions, contained most of these recommendations. The decree also specified that the Commission on Educational Fees of the Federal Education Council would regulate the amount of the exam registration fee. Furthermore, only municipal, state and federal universities would have to schedule their exam competition on the same date and time.

A special commission was appointed to cooperate with public and private universities in developing jointly held examinations in various localities. However, because of time constraints, the commission proposed that Greater Rio de Janeiro be selected as an experimental laboratory for the new system of regionally unified examinations by subject area; and that efforts would be limited to the areas of greatest congestion: science/technology and biomedical sciences.

The rectors of the universities of Greater Rio de Janeiro signed an accord with the Ministry of Education on October 13, 1971, in which norms were established for the 1972 examination competition in the science/technology and biomedical areas. The agreement also created a center to coordinate and administer the unified examination, and all participating faculties were to be subordinate to this unit. The center was given the name CESGRANRIO (Center for the Selection of Candidates to Higher Education in Greater Rio de Janeiro).

The first experiment with a unified entrance exam competition in Greater Rio de Janeiro was successful. Consequently, it was decided to consolidate

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1On September 22, 1971, the Commission on Educational Fees set a limit of CR$120 (US$ 20) on registration fees, demanded a full accounting within ninety days from higher education institutions, and required that profits from the exam competition be used for educational research on the selection process or for scholarships.

2Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Convênio, Departamento de Assuntos Universitários, Rio de Janeiro, 12 October 1971.
gains and avoid brisk changes. Such innovations as the pre-option system would be maintained, and vigorous efforts would be made to recruit additional higher educational institutions (particularly private isolated colleges) into the CESGRANRIO network and expand the exam program to cover the humanities and social sciences. Also, CESGRANRIO added another innovation to college entrance examinations by publishing several brochures to help candidates for admission. A Roteiro do Candidato (Handbook for Candidates) was published for each of the three sector areas. It contained general information on the competition as well as a detailed description of the exams themselves. The publication clearly and concisely covered all stages of the competition, from the examination through matriculation. In addition to this, a Roteiro de Profissões (Handbook of Careers) was distributed to all candidates and also made available to secondary school students who were thinking about going to college. The booklet was arranged by sector areas (COMBIMED, COMCITEC, COMSART) and briefly described and discussed each course of study, career alternatives, personal requirements (i.e. aptitudes needed to exercise the profession), job market conditions—both regionally and nationally—prospective employers, and the employment outlook for the immediate future.

With regard to the second experiment with unified examinations in Greater Rio de Janeiro, CESGRANRIO's efforts to refine the 1973 competition yielded positive results. The overall response from concerned parties—students, professors, institutions—was somewhat more praiseworthy than the year before.

1According to the system of pre-option, the candidate makes two choices for a program of study in one subject matter area and several institutional choices—this is all done at the time of exam registration. To illustrate, in the science/technology area a candidate could do as follows: first choice career, engineering; institutional choices, Catholic University, Federal University, Santa Ursula University—second choice career, mathematics; institutional choices, State University, Federal University, Santa Ursula University. In the system of pre-option, candidates' first choice option has priority in classification over candidates who choose the same career as second option—even if the latter candidates' scores are higher.

2The three sector areas were assigned the following acronyms: COMBIMED (biomedical sciences), COMCITEC (science and technology), and COMSART (humanities and social sciences).
Because CESGRANRIO had established its administrative authority and legitimacy and satisfied the performance expectations of the Minister of Education, it was able to secure a change of status from a government commission to a semi-autonomous, non-profit foundation regulated by the Ministry of Education. In January, 1973, all property and effects jointly acquired by the entities which established and originally constituted CESGRANRIO were turned over to the new foundation.¹

During 1973 additional progress was made to overcome many of the access problems which had traditionally plagued candidates for admission to higher education. Concurrently, added government support for CESGRANRIO further indicated that the new foundation would be the model for federally initiated unification plans throughout Brazil.

In the first case, the Ministry of Education issued Regulation No. 113 BSB (February 21, 1973) which offered several revisions, clarifications, and minor innovations suggested by CESGRANRIO and its president, Carlos Serpa. Particularly important was the clause which required the gradual incorporation of the core curriculum of secondary school subjects into the entrance examinations. As to the problem relating to student guidance, Prof. Serpa announced that on June 14 CESGRANRIO would launch its Campaign to Demystify the Entrance Exams. By way of television, radio, newspapers, movie houses, speeches and visits to schools, CESGRANRIO would attempt to clarify the selection process and "sensitize the student to something he needs to perceive: deciding on which


²Fundação CESGRANRIO, Legislação Atualizada Referente aos Concursos Vestibulares de 1974 (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação CESGRANRIO, 1973). The primary and Secondary Education Reform Law No. 5,692 (August 11, 1971) provides for a "common nucleus" of subjects (i.e. core curriculum) required of all students: communication and expression, social studies, mathematics, and physical and biological sciences.
As for federal support of CEBGRANBIO, the success of the regionally unified examinations in Greater Rio de Janeiro prompted Minister Passarinho to call on Prof. Serpa to do the same for other regions. Consequently, in April, 1973, he traveled to Belo Horizonte, capital of the State of Minas Gerais, where he met with university rectors to discuss the creation of a Center for the Selection of Candidates to Higher Education in Greater Belo Horizonte. He made it clear that CEBGRANBIO’s intention was not to take over or manage exam competitions in other regions, but to furnish technical assistance to local specialists so that they could create their own teams, taking into account the resources and problems of each region. Serpa acknowledged that after leaving Belo Horizonte, he would meet with educators and university rectors to discuss unification in a number of other states. He added that this unification would occur gradually and spontaneously—the method defended by Minister Passarinho.

The more significant aspects pertaining to the development of, and reaction to, federal policy actions on access to higher education may be summarized and categorized into three stages:

Stage I. Federal efforts to reform the system of access to higher education initially were concerned with overcoming distortions in the system of selection (e.g. excedentes, multiple registrations). Drafting legislation, creating legal frameworks, and issuing ministerial and presidential decrees and regulations served to define and shape a broad policy of reform. A national commission (CONVESU) was set up to aid the Minister in planning and policy formation, particularly with regard to the unification of entrance exams on a regional

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2Diário de Notícias, 4 April 1973.
The Minister of Education proceeded with haste to implement changes for the 1972 college entrance exam competition in public institutions. Because of time limitation, the scope of program innovation had to be narrowed: the pilot project would be confined to Greater Rio de Janeiro; a network (CESGRANRIO) was created for this purpose.

Reaction to federal planning initiatives was guardedly optimistic. Some offered a mild endorsement of federal intentions, while others maintained a wait-and-see attitude. All were concerned about the issue of excedentes, viewing it as the most pressing problem of selection for higher education.

After the 1972 exam competition, the reaction of concerned parties became more clear-cut. The press, including major newspapers (except the Estado de São Paulo) lauded the unified entrance examination system. Praise also came from professors whose institutions participated in unification and from students. Although self-critical of the administrative shortcomings in implementing the new system, the federal government was very satisfied with what had transpired—particularly in Greater Rio. CESGRANRIO was quite pleased but recognized the need—as did students—for orientation materials and the addition of many more colleges in the COMSART area.

The cursinhos offered a mixed reaction, although most—particularly the large more prestigious ones—applauded the new system. The major criticism was that the publication of the exam program and norms of the competition should have come earlier. Secondary schoolteachers were critical of the unified exam system. They believed that the topics covered on the tests should have been announced much earlier, and they opposed the exclusion of essay questions from the competition. Still, they did agree with grouping the tests by subject matter areas and supported the system of classifying candidates. Finally, isolated colleges were critical of the new system. They wanted to select their own students, believing that in a unified exam competition they would receive the least
able candidates—both academically and financially. Undoubtedly, they were also very much concerned with the loss of registration fees in joining unification.

Stage II. Planning for the second unified exam competition did not gain momentum until after federal policy-makers had partially assessed the experience of the 1972 competition. CONVESU subsequently decided that the most prudent policy would be to consolidate past gains and avoid rapid change; major attention would continue to be focused on CESGRANRIO. In turn, CESGRANRIO devoted its resources to the refinement of tests and programs, compilation and dissemination of testing and occupational information for candidates, and the participation of more colleges in the unified examination network. At the same time, the federal government acted to hasten and expand unification throughout Brazil. Legal and financial means were used in pursuing this goal.

The reaction to the 1973 unified exam competition was, on the whole, more favorable. A clear majority of students supported the second experiment with a unified exam, as did university professors. The cursinhos were more enthusiastic in their response, as was the press. Nevertheless, the press warned about diluting the quality of higher education by an excessive expansion of university enrollments. Finally, a number of isolated colleges, while opposed to the idea of unification, joined, nevertheless, for political reasons (e.g. to avoid sanctions by the Ministry of Education and Culture).

1 It was the belief of many private isolated colleges that by participating in a unified exam competition they would end up with the less able and poorer students. They ascertained that, in the first instance, bright candidates prefer the large, academically prestigious, free public institutions. In the second case, the cursinhos—which definitively improve one's chances for performing well on the entrance exams—are prohibitively costly for poor students to take advantage of.
Stage III. The planning of the third experiment with a unified examination system proceeded in greater isolation than previous experiments. (This was particularly true in the case of CESGRANRIO). Since the government was extremely pleased with the way in which unification was progressing, it felt little need to solicit additional advice or assistance. During this time, CESGRANRIO's status changed from a government commission to a federally-regulated foundation. Attention was focused on refining testing and measurement procedures, recruiting additional private colleges for unification, and launching a student-oriented campaign to demystify the entrance exam competition. In a potentially serious development, several private colleges in the CESGRANRIO network became dissatisfied with the unification scheme and threatened to withdraw. However, this did not occur.

This, then was the sequence of policy development which brought about reform in the system of access to higher education.
Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Having traced the development of policy reform, it is now necessary to present a theoretical framework and methodology by which to analyze public policy-making on access to higher education.

Theoretical Framework

In *A Strategy of Decision*, David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom focus upon policy evaluation as a social process and analyze the operating procedures of individual policy-makers in a political system.¹ From their respective disciplines of philosophy and political science/economics, Braybrooke and Lindblom examine the phenomenon of incrementalism² and its importance within the policy process.³


²In an earlier work by David Braybrooke, "Welfare, Happiness, and the Choice of Policies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1954), he critically discusses the intelligibility of Jeremy Bentham's philosophy of utilitarianism and suggests the feasibility of a felicific census rather than a felicific calculus as a major factor in policy choice. *A Strategy of Decision* rehabilitates utilitarianism, with modifications, and states an ethical theory in which the strategy developed by the authors serves as a practical substitute for the felicific calculus. Previously, Lindblom peripherally touched upon the concept of incrementalism; this served as a reference point for his development of a strategy of decision. See Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare* (New York: Harper and Row, 1953).

³It is most appropriate for the researcher to mention why he selected disjointed incrementalism as a theoretical framework for analyzing policy on access to higher education in Brazil. Having been a student of Brazilian affairs for six years prior to undertaking this study, the researcher was not unfamiliar with the political, economic and social dimensions of Brazilian society. A major presumption which the researcher had—and which was confirmed after arrival in Brazil—was that apocalyptic change has not been a feature of Brazilian development. Consequently, although many theoretical frameworks could have been used in the study, the strategy of disjointed incrementalism (the antithesis of apocalyptic change) was given special consideration by the researcher. Only after careful and considerable deliberation and actual field research did the researcher finally select Braybrooke and Lindblom's strategy as the best theoretical approach to utilize.
From their scholarly endeavors there emerges a theory to explain the processes of evaluation and decision with regard to alternative public policies. This theory accounts for the costliness of analysis in terms of resources such as time, attention, energy, and money and considers the impossibility, at times, of carrying analysis to conclusion. Furthermore, it explains how considered evaluations of policy can be reached when the rationales suggested by conventional theories of choice cannot be provided.¹

Baybrooke and Lindblom refer to their approach as the strategy of disjointed incrementalism.

Precepts of the Strategy

The first of eight interrelated attributes of the strategy which the authors present is margin-dependent choice. Given present conditions, policies, and objectives, policy analysts strive to improve the situation by comparing alternative courses of action which will approximate the status quo. Both past and recent experiences from other communities, regions, and nations as well as imagination provide policy analysts with the sources of information from which to formulate policies which incrementally differ from the status quo. Braybrooke and Lindblom distinguish the characteristics of incremental or margin-dependent choice as follows:

only those policies are considered whose known or expected consequent social states differ from each other incrementally

... only those policies are considered whose known or expected consequences differ incrementally from the status quo...

examination of policies proceeds through comparative analysis of no more than the marginal or incremental differences in the consequent social states...

choice among policies is made by ranking in order of preference the increments by which social states differ.²

¹Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, p. vi. A number of their premises parallel assertions made by Karl Popper in his The Open Society and Its Enemies, I (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1945), 139-144. Namely, that one can simplify the problem of evaluation by focusing upon social maladies, instead of ideal constructs or utopias; that because man’s competence is limited, only minor units of the social structure may be changed at any one time; and continuous readjustment alleviates the necessity of being correct in any single decision.

²Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, pp. 85-86.
It can be seen that margin-dependent choice differs considerably from a rational-deductive system of problem-solving. Moreover, the highest priority given the status quo means policy analysts need not concern themselves with controversial and time-consuming philosophical and moral discussions about all possible social states (e.g., constitutional democracy versus one-party dictatorship).

Value conflicts which do arise, however, center upon "trading ratios at the margin between pairs of values" and are resolved by determining "how much of one value is worth sacrificing, at the margin reached in a given situation, to achieve an increment of another."1

The second attribute of the strategy is a restricted variety of policy alternatives. It would follow that if policies which differ only incrementally from the status quo are the only ones that policy-makers will decide upon, alternative choices will subsequently consist of a restricted variety. For a society which practices incremental politics will naturally seek incremental alternatives.

As for non-incremental alternatives, policy analysts lack an organized way to systematically deal with such alternatives; they cannot be "rationally explored." Furthermore, it is important to point out that non-incremental alternatives are very often "politically irrelevant." For example the City University of New York System (CUNY) in searching for a solution to its financial problems cannot give much credence to the non-incremental alternative of abolishing the "open enrollment" policy it adopted in 1970. This would be "politically irrelevant," not to mention politically suicidal!

A third characteristic of the strategy of disjointed incrementalism is its restricted variety of policy consequences. Policy analysts will surely neglect the unimportant consequences of policies; and although their attention will

1Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, pp. 87-88.
be devoted exclusively to important policy consequences, this does not mean they will assess all important consequences. Of the policies they consider important they often choose not to tackle: "The uninteresting (to them), the remote, the imponderable, the intangible, and the poorly understood, no matter how important."¹

It would be erroneous to infer a predilection for short-term rather than long-term considerations. The decision to exclude various consequences which may be important are arbitrary; policy analysts do not audaciously proclaim a neat, non-arbitrary differentiation among the important and the unimportant.

The fourth feature of the strategy is adjustment of objectives to policies. This implies a reciprocal relationship between means and ends or policies and values. In other words, although policies are sought to achieve specified objectives, it is also true that objectives are sought to support specified policies. Objectives are contingent upon means, and, subsequently, will shift with the degree of "possibility" (i.e., costliness). Costliness depends upon the relative importance of means available to pursue certain objectives; and objectives are examined in terms of their appropriateness to a defined alternative or a small group of fixed alternatives.

Two additional aspects of ends-means relationships are: (1) objectives at times become meaningful only after the means have been selected; and (2) certain objectives become irrelevant once one means has been decided upon.²

Fifth, the strategy of disjointed incrementalism entails a reconstructive treatment of data. As the authors point out:

¹Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, p. 90.

evaluation. . . is not rigidly bound to treat problems in their original forms. . . it transforms problems in the course of exploring data. Old possibilities are discarded, and new urgencies appear. Fact systems are restructured as new ones are discovered. Policy proposals are re-designed as new views of the facts are adopted.¹

In this sequence, shifts in values take place; however, the reverse can also take place, commencing with shifts in values, thus establishing another reciprocal relationship.

Values, in the strategy of disjointed incrementalism, are expressed as themes rather than as rules which prescribe or prohibit. Changing views with regard to facts are molded by changes in evaluative themes. To illustrate, Braybrooke and Lindblom suggest that facts regarding specific federal agencies will be restructured when concern moves away from efficiency in performance towards their link to the maintenance of party organizations. They go on to say that the multiplicity and fluidity of values invite exploratory responses—imaginative, innovative, and speculative.²

A sixth component of the strategy is serial analysis and evaluation. As this implies, analysis and evaluation proceed in a series of steps which are adapted to incremental changes. Federal legislation regarding social security, public education, and revenue-sharing are examples.

The authors state that

it is a characteristic of political processes in most governments that any single office, organization or agency pursues a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly changing, problems that lie within its field of interest or authority.³

Consequently, analysts (if they are experienced, realistic, and mature enough) accept the fact the alleviation rather than solution is the best they can expect in confronting most problems.

¹Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision. p. 98.
²Ibid., p. 99.
³Ibid., p. 100.
Seventh, besides being incremental, exploratory, serial, and means-dependent, the strategy is characterized by a remedial orientation of analysis and evaluation. These characteristics both aid and influence the analyst to "identify situations or ills from which to move away rather than goals toward which to move." For example, universal higher education is considered to be an important national goal in the opinion of a number of educators. Although they cannot agree upon the kind of education and structure for such a system nor how to bring it about, they can, however, direct themselves to ameliorative methods such as: compensatory and remedial education programs offered within the universities, massive provisions for financial assistance and work/study programs, campaigns to recruit students who ordinarily would not consider post-secondary education, modifications in curricula to include non-traditional study, extension education, and adoption of flexible course scheduling to include evenings and weekends.

The eighth and final aspect of the strategy is social fragmentation of analysis and evaluation. As this suggests, analysis and evaluation occur at a great number of points in society and in centers by analysts who take many different approaches and maintain less than perfect communication with each other. For example, the education of handicapped children is a topic of study in the American Foundation for the Blind, the National Institutes of Health, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Office of Education, and the Center for Research and Demonstration in the Education of the Handicapped at Teachers College, Columbia University, to name but a few of the types of complex organizations which deal with this problem.

The disjointed process by which analysis and evaluation of problems and policy take place at various points, lacking both articulation and coordination,

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is certainly an obstacle to a complete and conclusive treatment of any issue.

Nevertheless, as Braybrooke and Lindblom point out:

Disjointedness has its advantages—the virtue of its defects—chief among them the advantage of preserving a rich variety of impressions and insights that are liable to be "coordinated" out of sight by hasty and inappropriate demands for a common plan of attack. There are circumstances to which no plan is especially suited.¹

Methodology

The assembly of a substantial data base is vital to the analysis of public policy formation. Unfortunately, data on the process of public policy formation are sparse and unsystematic. This may be attributed to the fact that there have been: (1) difficulties in identifying policy-makers and participants in the process; (2) a lack of theories in which pertinent issues and variables are involved; and (3) problems stemming from the fact that public policy formation is generally historically bound.²

Much labor has been expended and great care taken by the researcher to select a methodology which is both useful and reliable for examining public policy formation, in general, and the strategy of disjointed incrementalism in particular.

Before presenting the techniques of assessment which were used to test the theory, a brief statement of the methodological precautions which were taken is in order.

Validity was determined as follows. To begin with, validity was ascertained through direct and intuitively obvious observations (i.e., face validity). The amount of publicity and attention the issue and the participants received via the media and other information sources was essential in establishing validity. In addition, validity was verified by comparing the extent to which other observations of the policy-maker were rationally or theoretically related.

This is known as construct validity. The cross-relevance of items was also an important consideration in interviewing.

Reliability was accounted for in terms of the stability of the individual's behavior and environment. Multiple observations were made at different intervals over a period of approximately nine months.

As to biases, great attention was given to this methodological issue to insure, even further, a valid and reliable study. Investigator bias was reduced by guaranteeing anonymity to the respondent with regard to responses which the interviewee did not want attributed to him. Furthermore, the researcher did not share with the respondent opinions, hypotheses, or expectations regarding the study. Question bias was guarded against by first asking the respondents about their understanding of the issue and then about their attitudes. The placement of questions was an important consideration to determine the salience of the issue, for the respondent, in the early part of the questioning.1 This was done to mitigate the effects of social desirability. Preceding this, however, open-ended questioning was initiated for the same purpose. Finally, retrospective bias was reduced by formulating a chronology of events relating to the decision issue and subsequently presented to the respondent at the interview.

Returning to the techniques of assessment, as yet unstated, the researcher chose to employ Gergen's methodological approach of assessing "leverage points" in the process of policy formation.2

According to Gergen, the identification of a core group of persons is vital to the success of any approach dealing with policy analysis:

1 The researcher was careful to avoid questioning interviewees along a certain line and posing questions without regard to sequence.

The subunits of greatest importance are individual persons rather than organizations or institutions, and that a thorough understanding of public policy will ultimately depend on knowledge of individual participants.¹

Gergen utilizes the notion of leverage points, rather than "power" and influence," because the former, he believes, is more appropriate for analysis of both an entire society and a single community. He proposes a three-dimensional model for identifying leverage points and asserts that any individual in a society can be compared along these lines.² The first dimension is issue relevance—the extent to which public policy on a particular issue affects an individual and modifies his normal behavior. Second, subphase resources provide the participant with leverage at various stages of policy formation: initiation; staffing and planning; communication and publicity; institutional sanction; intra-elite organizing; financing; and sanction and control. The third dimension is personal efficacy; this denotes a "personality constellation" or "set of social capacities" which are linked to an individual's effective leverage.

Gergen's model possesses some dynamic properties that are worth mentioning. To begin with, issue evaluation is a dynamic characteristic of the model in which a policy-maker's basic attitude towards an issue—the degree to which he is for or against an outcome—determines the extent of leverage he will employ. Another dynamic property deals with potential and actual leverage. A strong leverage position does not, in itself, mean the individual will actually operationalize it on every issue; this will depend upon the extent to which his position is polarized, thereby prompting him to exert actual leverage. Related to actual and potential leverage is leverage configuration. This is

²Ibid., pp. 183-190.
synonymous with the concept of coalitions in which persons possessing disparate
degrees of leverage unite to collectively affect an issue outcome. Lastly, the
process of policy formation through time brings an additional dynamic charac-
teristic to the model. Leverage configuration is highly fluid; therefore,
the formation of public policy is continuously being altered and modified.

The two-stage procedure which Gergen proposes for assessing leverage\(^1\) was
adopted and adapted by the researcher to the exigencies of the strategy of dis-
joined incrementalism and the nature of the specific issue being analyzed. The
first stage identifies the issue and the participants in the formal policy-
making structure. The issue (access to higher education) was predetermined.
Therefore, the researcher immediately proceeded to interview several knowledge-
able individuals in the field. This was done to obtain information as to the
formal positions of leadership regarding decision-making on the issue involved.
Initial interviews were conducted with those individuals named in order to
determine: various pertinent aspects of the issue, other persons involved in
the issue area, and the subphase activities of all nominees.

The second stage of Gergen's technique for assessing leverage builds upon
the information previously gathered. From the list compiled, a final group
of policy-makers was selected for extensive interviews. These interviews
were conducted to determine: the extent of subphase resources which each policy-
maker possessed regarding the particular policy issue, the importance of any
policy decisions relevant to the issue, and personal efficacy of others.

The technique outlined above assesses the main dimensions of the model
and accounts for its dynamic characteristics as well. Gergen states the
viability of the technique:

\(^1\)Gergen, "Assessing the Leverage Points in the Process of Policy Formation,"
pp. 198-200. Gergen's proposed technique combines the advantages found in the
reputational, positional, social participation, opinion-leadership, and
demographic approaches for the identification of leaders and policy-makers.
It first of all takes into account issue specificity. It then centers on the formal or positional system of leverage, and uses this system to generate information concerning persons capable of exerting leverage in an informal sense, and to designate at which leverage sub-phase each candidate might be placed. This latter step also takes into account multiple modes of leverage. Assessments of resources within leverage sub-phases and ratings of personal efficacy are obtained for any individual only from those persons most likely to be acquainted with the area. Finally, assessments of issue relevance are obtained from the individuals themselves.

The researcher, however, followed the suggestion offered by Gergen in another work—namely, that the study of public policy formation requires a "strategy of interlocking research" phases. In other words, selected techniques of assessment may be utilized during different stages of data gathering. For example, after the actual leverage and leverage configuration are determined, role analysis could be initiated followed by a standardized interview. Following Gergen's suggesting, the face-to-face interview and role analysis were employed in the study.

He is quite explicit in stating, however, that the formation of public policy is a "continuing process, and it is almost impossible to freeze the process at any one point and gain an adequate conceptualization." Therefore, the "overall research strategy" suggested by Gergen offered the researcher flexibility, enabling him to make the methodological techniques of assessment fit the theoretical framework rather than vice versa! Clearly, certain techniques are more appropriate, valid, and reliable at certain stages of policy formation (an inherently fluid process) than others. For the investigator engaged primarily in qualitative rather than quantitative research on public policy formation, an eclectic use of methodology is not only convenient—it is essential.

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3Cross, Mason, and MeEachern's observations on role conformity and conflict, as presented in Explorations in Role Analysis, were helpful at certain stages of the study.
APPLICABILITY OF THE THEORY

Having presented the sequence of policy development on access to higher education and a theoretical framework chosen for analyzing policy formation, it is now necessary to determine the efficacy of disjointed incrementalism as a theory in the phenomena studied. Before attempting to do so, however, some methodological considerations will be stated for purposes of clarification.

Before assessing the applicability of the theory of disjointed incrementalism, it is necessary to state a clarification with regard to Gergen's three-dimensional model for identifying leverage points. Namely, this methodology was actually designed to deal with pluralist policy-making structures and behavior. Nevertheless, the macro- and micro-analytic properties of the model are such that it greatly facilitates the study of policy formation by elites.

The use of Gergen's scheme for identifying leverage points did, indeed, yield positive results. In fact, it became the operating basis for the researcher's investigations. The search to identify leaders and policy-makers, as elucidated in the section on theory and methodology, commenced with interviewing several well-informed persons in the field of educational planning. The candidates which these individuals named as "prime movers" in policy-making on access to higher education served as the basis for extensive, in-depth interviews.

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1 What is being tested is the efficacy of disjointed incrementalism as a conceptual framework in the analysis of higher educational policy in Brazil. This does not involve, however, testing the theory as to its theoretical validity per se.

2 It became readily apparent to the researcher (after only several interviews and one month of intensive research in Brazil) that higher education policy was thoroughly dominated by an elite. Moreover, several key members of this elite had been exercising leverage continuously since the post-war years—regardless of the ideology of the government in power!
This procedure for determining leverage was indispensable, especially when one realizes that in Brazil formal positions of leadership and decision-making very often do not reveal the actual policy-making sources. The researcher successfully found out that policy-making on access to higher education was dominated by a small elite; moreover, all interviewees, at both stages, agreed who the elite was.

Elite phenomena, indeed, fit Gergen's three-dimensional model extremely well. The first dimension (issue relevance) obviously is uniformly applicable for the elite--especially if it is an issue-oriented elite, as is true in Brazil. In the case of Brazil, the relevant issue was reform of the system of access to higher education. The second dimension (subphase resources) such as staffing, organizing, planning, financing rests entirely with a fairly homogeneous, centralized, easily identifiable group (the Ministry of Education's Department of University Affairs and its auxiliary units). Finally, the third dimension (personal efficacy) is part and parcel of the simple fact that a certain "set of social capacities" is a prerequisite for membership in the policy-making elite.

The nature of Brazilian bureaucracy, along with the major importance of personal efficacy in policy-making, mean that actual and potential leverage with respect to an issue are dependent upon a "personality constellation" rather than organizational factors: the man, rather than the position, is the prime source in shaping policy.

In short, the researcher was led to focus major attention on elites: the source of power and influence in public policy-making for higher education. This should not be mistaken for an abandonment of Gergen's three-dimensional model, but rather, as Gergen himself suggests, graduation to an "interlocking research phase" in which other techniques of assessment are utilized for subsequent stages of analysis.
Therefore, having identified the elite group as the most important source of policy formation and execution, the techniques of extensive interviewing, content analysis, role analysis, and observation over time were utilized whenever and wherever they were deemed useful for the purposes of the study.

The Eight Stages of "Disjointed Incrementalism"

Margin-Dependent Choice

Choices under the military governments were made at the margin of the status quo: only incremental changes were planned and operationalized. Value conflicts did, indeed, involve trading one shared value to bring about an incremental increase of another.

To begin with, the very political universe out of which educational policies were fashioned was identified with the status quo. The process by which the military deposed the constitutionally-elected government of President Goulart in 1964 was by no means a "revolution," in the strict sense of the term.

If not a "revolution," then what did happen in 1964? A far better explanation can be found by viewing the situation as a conspirational coup d'etat. Defined by Chalmers Johnson:

Conspirational coups are attempts at revolutionary change made by a small, secret association united by a common sense of grievance that may or may not correspond to the objective condition of a social system. These revolutions are always calculated and they do not involve the masses.¹

Policy formation for higher education, a unit of the educational subsystem, was even less inclined to deviate from the status quo; the reason being historical tradition. For almost 400 years, Brazilian higher education was:

(1) exclusively professional in character; (2) a major source of literary and humanistic ornamentalism or 'ilettantism' for the upper classes; (3) a low or

non-existent priority for federal governments; and (consequently) (4) overwhelmingly offered in isolated, private colleges.

Brazil did not have a true university until 1934 (University of São Paulo); and even amidst university development and expansion in the 1940's and during the post-war growth of modernization, industrialization, social and economic change--Brazilian universities were intent upon avoiding change in order to develop a tradition, albeit a young one. The need to firmly implant and nurture without interruption a university, per se, along with the orientation of higher educationists and government policy-makers (products and often proponents of the traditional educational system), led to a clear, definitive preference for higher education policy choices which would differ only marginally from the status quo.

In sum, margin-dependent choice is an omnipresent feature of the Brazilian educational system. As Agnes Toward cogently observes:

"...changes claimed for the educational system are likely to be bureaucratic rather than structural, palliative rather than therapeutic, involving new nomenclature applied to old programs by practiced administrators."¹

Restricted Variety of Policy Alternatives

The policy alternatives available to the Brazilian government for the issue of access to higher education were restricted by the fact that only strategies which differed incrementally from the status quo could be considered. The researcher submits that, in addition, even certain incremental policy alternatives were restricted! It seems that Braybrooke and Lindblom may have overlooked the fact that bureaucracy--its nature, structure, vitality, and response capabilities--can determine whether or not that which is incremental and feasible is also viable.² This is especially true in the case of Brazil. To quote


²The point here is that in bureaucracies, senior policy-makers may be restricted in considering certain feasible policy alternatives due to the lethargy and/or incompetence on lower levels of bureaucracy. This is true in the case of Brazil.
Minister of Education Passarinho:

Unfortunately, we do not have the flexibility of the armed forces ministries which can punish subordinates or functionaries quickly, in any part of the country. Consequently, the irregularities found in the various areas of the MEC's activities are not immediately remedied, as we all desire.¹

The problems of admission to higher education, as elucidated previously, were numerous and complex. In fact, so formidable were these problems that it became apparent to policy-makers that anything short of a great, quantum leap and radical transformation would be doomed to failure.

Yet, what would be the result? Rapid expansion of public colleges and universities would bring about a great decline in the quality of higher education; moreover, even if quality were to be sacrificed, sufficient physical, human, and capital resources were simply not available. Nor were such resources available to graft onto secondary education, overnight, a substantial formative/vocational dimension, complete with guidance and counseling services. As for abolishing the cursinhos, upon which so many high school students depended, such an action would be politically dangerous (i.e., the government had enough aggravation from students and did not need any more). Finally, it was not possible,logistically or otherwise (e.g., persuasion, propaganda), to bring about—voluntarily or involuntarily—a more rational distribution between candidates' career preferences and economic manpower requirements.

The only realistic alternative was for the government to focus attention on the development of a policy on college entrance examinations.² According to senior policy-makers, the problem of the excedentes was merely the most visible manifestation of a woefully deficient system of selection to higher education. To resolve the problem of the excedentes only would be to relieve


²Interviews with Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho, Brasilia, 19 June 1973; and Professor Newton Sucupira, former Director, Department of University Affairs, Brasilia, 18 June 1973.
the symptoms without curing the illness. It became clear that the *exame vestibular* was the centrifugal force, affecting in a profound way, all other problems of access to higher education. Policy-makers believed that because of the prime importance of the college entrance exams, a policy of incremental change would not only produce multiple effects in a number of spheres, in the short-run, but--hopefully--bring about major, non-incremental change in the long-run.

Returning to the policy alternatives decided upon—unification of the entrance examinations—the desired goal was regional unification by core areas (technology and exact sciences; biomedical sciences; arts, humanities, and social sciences); however, the MEC made it known that logistically, politically, and educationally, unification would have to first take place along these lines within the university. National unification—one exam series for all Brazil—was never considered as an immediate alternative.

The MEC had decided unequivocally upon which policy alternative would be followed to instigate change and prescribed the boundaries and directions as well. Together with input from CONVESU, Minister Passarinho hoped to achieve an optimal accommodation between the political and the technical.

**Restricted Variety of Policy Consequences**

The MEC senior policy-makers did, in fact, arbitrarily choose not to consider remote, imponderable, intangible, uninteresting and poorly understood consequences of policy. They definitely were not philosopher/thinker-types who contemplate that which is theoretically possible (the synoptic ideal) instead of what is operationally feasible. Attention was focused exclusively on the important policy consequences of the MEC's unification plans and CONVESU's proposals. The Minister was primarily concerned, in the beginning, with the problem of *excedentes* and the need for simultaneous exams in order to eliminate multiple inscriptions (a practice which both prevented an accurate accounting of the demand for higher education and economically discriminated against poor candidates).
The Ministry of Education had a firm commitment to reforming access to higher education along certain lines. Policy-makers desired to pursue and implement their plans with dispatch; and there were enough major consequences to be considered without dwelling upon intangible, unclear, and less significant results which could occur. In addition, it was common knowledge that Minister Passarinho was not especially interested in the technical aspects of policy--unless they were aspects which had significant political implications.

One might ask: Does this behavior not reveal short-sightedness, self-assuredness, arrogance, and even recklessness among policy-makers? Not necessarily. This type of restricted analysis is a common practice among economists; and, as many environmental and conservation groups will attest, it is a fundamental feature of decision-making in corporations and other enterprises.

In the case of access to higher education in Brazil, two important factors intervened to restrict even further the variety of major policy consequences and accelerate the flow of public policy. First, the federal government was not "breaking new ground," so to speak, with regard to the concept of unified college entrance examinations. This experiment had taken place before, in a number of places, on various levels, and under different arrangements; the kind and degree of success and failure varied. (This will be discussed in the seventh feature of the strategy.) Consequently, the MEC could address its attention to a finite configuration of policy consequences and avoid certain pitfalls, based on past situations.

Second, the Ministry of Education and Culture was insulated from negative reaction, due to miscalculations of policy consequences, by nature of the Brazilian political system. An authoritarian regime faces fewer limitations upon its executive power; hence, it need not display as much caution or moderation in either the formulation or implementation of policy. As a result of cooptation and then domination of the judicial system, emasculation of the legislative system, and the evaporation of active and independent interest groups, the government could choose
whether or not to make adjustments and revisions in policy, due to consequences it may not originally have considered. With particular regard to higher education, the federal government had an additional, major instrument of leverage—it controlled the purse strings upon which federal higher education was exclusively dependent, state higher education was significantly dependent, and private higher education was partially dependent.

Adjustment of Objectives to Policies

While it is true that policies are sought to attain certain objectives, the reverse also takes place. That is, the ends of public policy are governed by means. Policy objectives are derived largely from an inspection of means. Therefore, a reciprocal relationship exists between means and ends.

This was true in the case of policy-making on access to higher education in Brazil. Although policies were initially sought to achieve comprehensive, widespread and uniform reform of the system of selection, the deep-rooted traditions of Brazilian higher education limited the means actually available to the MEC to mandate and monitor major change; and, consequently, it necessitated a readjustment of policy objectives.

Very early in the process of policy formation, the desired objective of one national college entrance examination was put aside: politically, administratively, and educationally it would be impossible to implement. The most obvious and important limitation of this plan was the generally poor quality of secondary education, particularly in the public sector. As already mentioned, for the very same reasons, the desired objective of aptitude tests in the exam series was abandoned for immediate consideration. In short, a national college entrance examination system based on aptitude tests would have to wait until the educational quality and performance of primary and secondary education had improved substantially. Consequently, policy objectives were adjusted to provide for subject matter-based, achievement tests, only, and for unification to proceed on a regional basis.
Even regional unification plans had to be readjusted in terms of scope. It soon became apparent that multiple regional unification systems would be politically and administratively too difficult to set up, particularly in a short period of time. Therefore, the government decided to confine its efforts to Greater Rio de Janeiro. Both geographically and politically that area was the ideal choice. There were a great many colleges concentrated in a relatively small area. Furthermore, Rio de Janeiro, being the former capital, was quite susceptible to government influence. In addition, there were already plans, at the highest levels of government, to unite the State of Guanabara with the State of Rio de Janeiro economically and politically in the near future.\(^1\)

Finally, it must be stressed that the time factor entered prominently in the decisions of policy-makers to adjust their original objectives. Both CONVESU and CESGRANRIO were expected to fulfill arduous missions within a very brief period of time (less than one year). If there was to be any innovation at all in the 1972 examinations, great expectations would have to be lowered. Lacking the authority to take direct measures to force private higher educational institutions to join unification, the government initially relied upon public relations to gain the cooperation of private colleges.

CESGRANRIO, too, had to make adjustments. The time factor prevented unification of exams by the three desired subject matter groups (biomedical sciences; technology; arts, humanities, and social sciences). Consequently, COMSART—the most complex area to coordinate—was temporarily relegated to a position of lesser priority. CESGRANRIO, therefore, concentrated its major efforts in COMBIMED and COMCITEC. Even so, there was insufficient time to contact all isolated colleges in Greater Rio, and CESGRANRIO thus decided to aim at only the most popular ones.

\(^1\)Jornal do Brasil, "Decisão política da integração pode ser tomada em 73," 31 December 1972.
What emerged, in the aggregate, from the readjustment of objectives, mentioned above, was an overall reform policy characterized by gradualism. As these readjustments were increasingly made, the Ministry of Education was espousing more and more its intentions to unify the entrance exams gradually.

Be that as it may, Braybrooke and Lindblom clearly point out that the relationship between ends and means is reciprocal. It has been shown in the above discussion that, with respect to access to higher education in Brazil, the proximate ends of policy are governed by means. However, this should not be considered a refutation of the conventional view of policy-making in which means are governed by ends. For in the case of Brazil the relationship is, indeed, reciprocal.

Any plan for a true unification of college entrance exams—be it rational or regional in scope—would have to include private higher education. For in terms of number of institutions, total enrollments, and rate of expansion, the private sector exceeded the public sector. Although the federal government did not have the authority to compel private higher education to join unification—the ends of public policy were of such crucial importance that the government found the means to indirectly apply leverage in order to attain its objectives.

That leverage was aimed precisely at the very lifeblood of private institutions—the inscription fees they collected from the college entrance examination competitions. The profits from the exam competitions were used by the colleges for such purposes as: remuneration for those responsible for making, monitoring, and marking the tests; faculty and administrative salaries and bonuses; and investment. Through the Commission of Education Fees of the Federal Education Council, a limit of CR$120 was set for inscription fees. Furthermore, profits were required to be used only for scholarships or research on the selection process; and institutions were required to furnish a full accounting of income and expenditures within ninety days from the date of the entrance examinations.
Not wishing to create the impression that regulations dealing with inscription fees were coercive measures, Minister Passarinho offered monetary incentives to those private colleges which would accept his "invitation" to join unification in Greater Rio de Janeiro. In reality, this was to compensate them for lost inscription fees. Yet, the nuance of coercion, or at least sanctions, was present when the Minister stated further that those institutions not cooperating with the MEC should not expect to have their requests for financial or technical assistance looked upon with great favor.

Actually, an invitation only from the MEC would probably have achieved very little; for most private college administrators with whom this researcher spoke stated that the MEC had a poor track record for living up to its promises.

However, due to both the great success and popularity of the first CESGRANRIO experiment, participating institutions were thus encouraged to stay, and many non-participating colleges were prompted to join. This, combined with the fact that Law 5,540 prohibited unreasonably difficult exams; an inscription fee limit and conditions were imposed; and unification reduced the time, efforts, and costs of mounting an exam competition—all prompted many non-federal colleges and universities to join CESGRANRIO. These were clear indicators of the intentions and directions of federal educational policy.

In sum, the federal government did not hesitate to utilize both sanctions and rewards to prevent major readjustments of objectives to policies and was, thus, able to pursue its policy goals.

Reconstructive Treatment of Data

An additional feature of disjointed incrementalism is that in the course of exploring new data, problems are transformed, a shift in values occurs, and new policy proposals appear; this process, though, may commence with a shift in values.
However, in the case of policy formation on access to higher education in Brazil, the reconstructive treatment of data was not a notable characteristic. First, there was no significant shift in values among policy-makers which served as a motivating force or consequence of policy development. While the philosophical positions of the three major education ministers under the military government (Moniz de Aragão, Dutra, and Passarinho) may have differed—they all shared the same values. Among these was the belief in the need for a more equitable system of access to higher education. Multiple inscriptions, excesses, unfair tests, and exorbitant fees were all distortions which the education ministers believed needed correction. Unification of entrance examinations as a means of correcting these inequities in the system was a welcome innovation.

Second, the exploration of new data available did not actually transform the problems facing policy-makers. Long before the military regime came to power, policy-makers were cognizant of the historically-rooted structural and functional problems of access to higher education. Project studies, reports, and assessments, merely confirmed the existence and seriousness of the problems of access.

Finally, the new policy proposals which emerged were not in any sense radical ones; rather, they were incremental steps which, in fact, comprised a gradual progression and amplification of past efforts and experiences at reform.

Serial Analysis and Evaluation

That policy-making proceeds by way of long chains of policy steps is a logical outgrowth of the theory of margin-dependent choice. As Braybrooke and Lindblom observe:

The return of analysts, time after time, to approximately the same values at approximately the same margins of choice and to confrontation of the same analytical and evaluative problems in a highly familiar context, though perhaps
The problem of access to higher education in Brazil is one which, most definitely, has been analyzed and evaluated serially. As previously stated, the formidable problems of selection, endemic to the Brazilian educational system, were by no means new. Piecemeal efforts were made to remedy the situation long before the military came to power in 1964. And although one would expect a centralized authoritarian regime to fully utilize its capabilities to make quantum leaps in dealing with certain problems—the Brazilian federal government did not do so.

The concept and application of unified college entrance examinations were not new ones, as we shall see in examining the next feature of the theory. In addition, the section of this paper which treats the development of policy reform offers sufficient confirmation of the fact that a long chain of incremental policy steps were taken to arrive at present policy situations and positions.

Through serial analysis and evaluation, policies were decided upon—including the cautious policy of lowering expectations and pursuing, instead, the modest goal of implementing CONVESU’s recommendations in one region (Greater Rio), rather than running the risk of achieving only minimal success or failing miserably in multiple regions. The embodiment of these reform measures was CESGRANRIO, created by Regulation No. 206 in October 1971. This was the culmination of the government’s efforts to promulgate reform of the system of access to higher education.

Remedial Orientation of Analysis and Evaluation

The authors maintain that the characteristics of the strategy support and encourage movement away from certain situations rather than movement towards

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1 Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, p. 100.
specific goals. That is, the alleviation of a particular social evil instead of the pursuit of a better world.

The initial concerns of Brazilian educational policy-makers were in accordance with these features of remedial orientation of analysis and evaluation. In the beginning, a grand design for reform, comprising goals towards which to move, was not the focus of attention. Instead, policy-makers concentrated on moving away or alleviating specific problems which were becoming more acute: excedentes, multiple examination registration, and grossly unfair test questions.

However, this characteristic of the strategy of disjointed incrementalism accurately describes only the initial phase of policy-making on access to higher education. For thereafter, all indicators revealed that policy-makers were clearly moving towards specific, well-defined goals; and it was anticipated that an important by-product of this campaign would be the alleviation of certain undesirable situations.

One might ask: How and why do policy-makers who have heretofore followed an incremental strategy of policy formation deviate from this course and, instead, vigorously move towards the implementation of goal-oriented decisions?

To begin with, past experiences and practice with partially unified entrance examinations served as a guiding source for policy-makers in their quest for a new system of access to higher education. In 1963, a center known as CESCEM was created in São Paulo under private auspices to administer unified exams in the biomedical sciences. Shortly thereafter, this gave way to the establishment of the Carlos Chagas Foundation—a private testing organization which by 1973 had incorporated 19 medical and medical-related institutions (federal and state as well as private) into its network. Also created in the 1960’s were GESA in Rio Grande do Sul, unifying six medical schools; and CESCEA and Mapofei in São Paulo. 

1 Adolpho Ribeiro Netto, A Fundação Carlos Chagas: Seleção para a Universidade e Pesquisa para a Educação (São Paulo: Fundação Carlos Chagas, 1973.)
Paulo for admission to schools of economics/administration and exact sciences/engineering, respectively.

However, the true forerunner of CESGRANRIO was CICE, a consortium of engineering schools in Guanabara State which first offered a unified exam competition in 1967. So successful was this experiment with a partially unified entrance exam, that it received the attention of the MEC; and CICE's coordinator, Carlos Alberto Serpa (a professor of metallurgical engineering at the Catholic University), came into the federal limelight.

As one can see, the roots of CESGRANRIO lie in the recent past. From these past endeavors, policy-makers were able to draw upon a reservoir of information, avoid serious pitfalls, and direct their efforts towards the most promising strategy by which to confront the problem of access to higher education.

To continue, another factor which allowed and actually encouraged policy-makers to swiftly move towards their goals was the nature of the Brazilian political system, along with the political climate at the time policy initiatives gained momentum.

In essence, a military regime, characterized by the centralization of authority, depoliticization, and a small and visible military-technocratic elite determining policy, faces far fewer restrictions and obstacles in formulating and implementing policy than do other systems of government. Consequently, it can move over a wider range of activities and at a faster pace. With the congress having lost even its forum, the press under censorship, and dissent thoroughly stifled, the elite could move with confidence and alacrity towards achieving its objectives.

Finally, in addition to the factors of: (a) past precedent, and (b) political authoritarianism, there is a third factor which supports the contention that the orientation of analysis and evaluation was, for the most part, not remedial.
Predetermined goals (which may even be considered a consequence of the first two factors) was a vital feature of policy development on access to higher education. From a careful scrutiny of government publications, newspaper articles, reports, written correspondence, conversations, and interviews, it became evident that many of the fundamental goals as well as specific objectives for reforming the system of access to higher education had been circulating several years before the creation of CONVESU and the presentation, and subsequent acceptance, of that commission's recommendations.

Going further back in time, one can find some of the seeds of reform in an essay written in 1962 by Valnir Chagas—an essay which later constituted Opinion No. 58/62 of the Federal Education Council. Chagas wrote that the basic cycle of university studies offered a sound way for higher education institutions to structure their entrance exams, since basic cycle studies—and, therefore, entrance exams—could be grouped by social sciences, biological sciences, and human sciences.1

These three factors, then—past precedent, political authoritarianism, and predetermined goals—prompted policy-makers to move swiftly and confidently towards realizing their objectives and goals.

Social Fragmentation of Analysis and Evaluation

The eighth and last feature of Braybrooke and Lindblom's strategy is a problematic one for this study. The authors assert that analysis and evaluation occur at a great many points throughout society in a fragmented manner, as they call it. Moreover, the lack of articulation and coordination among analysts denotes a "disjointed" process by which policy is formulated. Using the U.S. for reference purposes, the authors state:

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A problem as many faceted as national security, for example, is under study in at least hundreds and perhaps in several thousand different centers—government agencies, universities, private organizations, committees, and other institutions. Furthermore, regarding certain notions about efficiency, each of many different approaches is taken simultaneously by dozens or hundreds of centers in imperfect communication with one another.¹

In the case of Brazil, analysis and evaluation of the problem of access to higher education—and, for that matter, higher education in general—proceeded in just the opposite fashion! The MEC, largely through the Department of University Affairs and its auxiliary units, thoroughly dominated the analytical and evaluative functions.

There are three factors which, taken collectively, offer a rational explanation for this contradiction with the last characteristic of Braybrooke and Lindblom's strategy. First, the authoritarian political system restricts decentralized analysis and evaluation, preferring instead centralized control; moreover, it places constraints on the dissemination of official data. Second, as a developing nation Brazil does not possess the federal financial resources to support or subsidize a multitude of non-federal centers, institutions, organizations, projects, and studies. Where the government has provided funds for non-federal research and development, these have been in lifeblood, critical areas which bring a faster and greater economic return (e.g., commerce, industry, natural resources exploration, commodities). Third, centralized planning and other federalist features of the administrative state have been ever present since Vargas' Estado Novo (1937-1945). This obviated either the need or inclination to have the government "contract" work outside federal bureaucratic structures.

It would be erroneous to conclude that there is a major flaw in Braybrooke and Lindblom's theory—namely, that social fragmentation of analysis and evaluation are characteristic of politically open-economically developed nations rather than

than politically closed-economically less developed ones. True, the former countries (e.g., U.S., Great Britain, France, Sweden) are more likely to manifest such a trait—although this researcher has some reservations concerning social-ist Sweden. And it is also true that the latter nations (e.g., Cuba, North Vietnam, Uganda, Bolivia) are far more inclined not to display that feature. Nevertheless, such distinctions do not hold true in every case.¹

There are politically closed-economically less developed countries such as Chile and Peru where there is social fragmentation of analysis and evaluation. More importantly, to some extent Brazil may be considered one such country! For while it is correct that higher education policy does not fit the description, policy-making in a number of other areas (e.g., industry, natural resources, agriculture) as well as in other spheres of educational activity, such as adult and technical education, does, indeed.

Moreover, upon close scrutiny one could rightly argue that policy formation on access to higher education was, at least, fragmented to the extent that a number of groups outside the MEC's Department of University Affairs did play a part in its development: the Federal Education Council, Council of Rectors, CONVESU, CESGRANRIO, and the Carlos Chagas Foundation. In addition, secondary contributions were made by students, university professors, private colleges, and cursinhos.

However, with regard to disjointedness, the fact that in policy formation on access to higher education Brazil deviates significantly from the strategy elicits certain connotations—both positive and negative—concerning the concept of disjointedness itself.

Among the positive aspects the authors state:

¹There are also countries which are politically open-economically less developed (e.g., India, Venezuela) or politically closed-economically developed (e.g., U.S.S.R., Spain) which may or may not analyze and evaluate policy in a socially fragmented manner.
Disjointedness has its advantages—the virtues of its defects—chief among them the advantage of preserving a rich variety of impressions and insights that are liable to be "coordinated" out of sight by hasty and inappropriate demands for a common plan of attack. There are circumstances to which no one plan of attack is especially suited.\(^1\)

Where independent and public institutions, without coordination or articulation, analyze and evaluate issues, problem areas, and government policy, the plethora of knowledge—even if exclusively margin-dependent—can amplify, clarify and enrich subsequent policy formation. Disjointedness is a boon to imagination and creativity and the exploration of alternative futures. Regardless of whether or not the outputs of these endeavors are operationalized, they are at least available for contingencies at some later time.

It logically follows that disjointedness could be especially useful, and even vital, for the analysis and evaluation of policy in authoritarian systems of government. After all, if the variety of impressions and insights is restricted due to depoliticization, media censorship, and curtailment of individual liberties, only governmental and authorized non-governmental agencies remain to fill the vacuum of policy inputs. Therefore, in order for a multitude of raw and processed data, as well as proposals, to exist there must be a particularly heavy reliance upon these agencies.

Disjointedness has its defects, however. For one, the high cost and fragmentation of financial resources. This, of course, leads to such negative consequences as duplication of efforts, cost of coordinating the various units, and waste in unwittingly supporting at times analysis and evaluation of alternatives which are far removed from marginal choices. Other defects are the mammoth volume of inputs generated, inaction of decision-makers, and the time lag in finally implementing and then reassessing policy.

\(^1\)Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, p. 106.
One's predilection for, or abhorrence of, disjointedness depends upon one's moral judgments. What is clear, however, is the fact that in elite political systems, such as Brazil, the rejection of disjointedness is a precarious course of action. For without the involvement of independent sources to analyze, evaluate, and criticize issues, problems, and actions, that which emerges is a homogenized, bland, and at times sterile analysis and evaluation of policy. Pitfalls and dangers very often cannot be anticipated and innovation, experimentation, and contingency planning cannot proceed. What protected Brazil from these potential difficulties and problems was the fact that access to higher education was an issue which had long been familiar to all: the variety of alternatives had been previously explored and the consequences previously anticipated.

Again, the limitations are not due to the authors' theory but to the special circumstances of the problem and its setting.
CONCLUSION

The major findings of the study may be classified under two headings: (1) theoretical; and (2) educational. These categories are not, however, rigid and exclusive ones, but merely convenient reference points for interpreting the results of the research.

Theoretical Findings

In assessing the applicability of disjointed incrementalism towards explaining the process of policy formation and its outputs, it can clearly be seen that the theory should be neither wholly accepted nor totally rejected. Basically, what does one find at each of the eight stages of the strategy?

The first four stages—or more precisely, features—of the theory explain very well policy formation on access to higher education. First, it is revealed that margin-dependent choice is a reflection of: (1) the political characteristics of the regime (ideologically conservative-structurally authoritarian); (2) higher education's traditionally elitist role; (3) its historically low status as a federal priority. The second feature, restricted variety of policy alternatives, is a consequence of the inertia of the federal bureaucracy as well as the complex and formidable nature of the problems of access to higher education. Next, the restricted variety of policy consequences fits the behavioral characteristics of the central policy-making groups—cautious, rational, managerial, and pragmatic. In addition, since the problem was not a new one, most consequences were either known or anticipated. Furthermore, the authoritarian powers of the regime insulated the Ministry of Education and Culture from strong reaction from disenchanted individuals and groups. The fourth feature, adjustment of objectives to policies, is an integral part of the policy-making process. The awesome task of reforming the system of access to higher education, due to many deep-rooted obstacles, combined with the limitations of time in initiating change, forced policy-makers to adjust their objectives and goals to the means available. However,
as the authors state, the ends-means relationship is reciprocal. And it was shown that the federal government did find the means to vigorously pursue certain policy goals by exerting leverage via regulation of registration fees, limitations on its uses, and financial sanctions.

The fifth characteristic, reconstructive treatment of data, is not, however, a notable aspect of policy formation on access to higher education. First, there was not a significant shift in values among policy-makers. Second, since the educational problems facing the policy-makers were familiar ones—and ones for which a number of remedies had been tried—there was no notable transformation of the general problem nor promulgation of radically new policy proposals.

For this second reason—the formidable problems of selection—policy-making most definitely adheres to the sixth feature of disjointed incrementalism: serial analysis and evaluation. Piecemeal, serial steps were taken by the federal government to reform the system of access to higher education.

Only in the initial phase of reform does remedial orientation of analysis and evaluation, the seventh feature, accurately describe policy formation. The factors of past precedent, political authoritarianism, and predetermined goals, enabled policy-makers to move undauntedly towards implementing goal-oriented decisions.

The eighth and final characteristic of the theory, social fragmentation of analysis and evaluation, is only partially useful in explaining policy-formation on access to higher education. Due to centralized control (stemming from political reasons and bureaucratic custom) and limited financial resources (most acute in developing nations), analysis and evaluation were not disjointed and not entirely fragmented.

Lack of disjointedness poses a potentially serious problem for policy-makers: without independent sources of analysis, evaluation, and criticism, there is the definite possibility that obstacles, setbacks, and dangers will be neither
anticipated nor resolved swiftly and smoothly. The safeguard in the case of Brazil, of course, was the fact that the policy issue (access to higher education) involved a traditional problem—one in which many alternatives, efforts, and consequences had already been anticipated. As for fragmentation, this did occur, however, under the umbrella of federal agencies or federally-related groups and institutions.

Nevertheless, it was noted that policy-making in other spheres and in other areas of education, does, in fact, adhere to this principle of Braybrooke and Lindblom's theory.

**Educational Findings**

The educational findings of the study may be grouped as follows: (1) technical; (2) institutional; and (3) socioeconomic. They summarize the positive accomplishments of government policy actions, negative aspects of these initiatives, and tasks which are yet to be completed.

First, with respect to the technical dimension, the change from an eliminative to a classifying examination system has done away with excedentes and made the process of selection more just. The simultaneity of the exam competition has improved a candidate's chances for selection by permitting multiple applications to college via a single series of tests.

Objective tests and the standardization of test scores have brought administrative conveniences to those responsible for the tests. They have alleviated the dispute over test-grading and the controversy concerning political favoritism; at the same time, they have brought about an improvement in the quality of test items. However, a critical need has been created for specialists in testing and measurement—one which Brazil is having difficulty meeting.

The distribution of handbooks on careers, dispensing of testing information, and use of media campaigns—all done by CESGRANRIO—have been positive steps
towards alleviating the anxiety, tension, and misinformation which has traditionally surrounded the exam competition. Moreover, this has helped fill the gap in guidance information which secondary education still is not equipped to provide students.

As for grouping the exams by three areas (biomedical sciences; science and technology; and arts, humanities, and social sciences), this was administratively convenient. But more importantly, it provided educational policy-makers with the means to unify, at some future time, college entrance exams based exclusively on the core curriculum of secondary education. Consequently, this would shatter the importance of the cursinhos, and they would disappear. On the other hand, arbitrary assignment of major subjects to one of the three test areas was not particularly rational. (Where does a major in psychology belong? Biomedical sciences, science and technology, or social sciences?)

The pre-option system of classification has provided the candidate with two career choices and many institutional choices. However, while it has selected the most interested candidates, it has not always selected the most able ones. Furthermore, it has limited a candidate's selection to only one of the three subject matter areas. Finally, the career pre-options are inconsistent with the basic cycle of university studies: the former requires career decisions before enrollment; the latter expects career decisions to be made after a year of general education. Taken together, they could conceivably create a system of external excedentes at the time the student begins study in his major area.

As for the institutional findings, public higher education has been satisfied with the unified examination system, due to the administrative convenience and the economy of time and energy which unification has brought. While the secondary education community has been antagonistic towards the higher education establishment, it has indeed been pleased that the government has encouraged colleges and

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1In fact, for careers in which the number of candidates has been less than the number of freshman places available, candidates have been able to gain admission simply by not making a zero on any test in the examination series.
universities to follow CEBGRANRIO's example in employing secondary schoolteachers as reviewers in test construction for the exam competition.

Reform and unification of the college entrance examinations have signified a lesser role for the cursinhos; in order to survive financially, a number of cursinhos have begun to merge, and some have even purchased private high schools.

With respect to private colleges, government-mandated unification has exacerbated the already keen competition among them. For a number of these institutions, it has been a matter of survival. Private institutions have been very reluctant to join the unified exam system, believing that their chances of receiving many poor students and less able students would increase considerably. Another serious reservation they have had about participating in a unified exam system is that in the classification process, small private colleges whose purpose, almost exclusively, has been to meet the needs of local residents would be saturated with a cosmopolitan student body, at the expense of local candidates. This would be especially acute among rural colleges of medicine, engineering, architecture, and other prestigious areas of professional study.

The third category, the socioeconomic aspects of education, has also manifested mixed findings. Education determines income, and higher education yields particularly high benefits. To candidates--most of whom are from the middle and upper classes--social prestige has been more important than the economic rewards of a particular career. The simultaneity of entrance exams in public institutions has aided the government in achieving a more accurate accounting of the demand for higher education. However, free tuition encourages high enrollment; and despite federal efforts to bring supply and demand into closer equilibrium, the lag between the two is still great.

A noble effort has been made, at least, with the enactment of the 1971 Primary and Secondary Education Reform Law. The "professionalizing" provision
of the law requires that every high school student graduate with some vocational-technical training. Should the high school graduate not classify for higher education, he will at least have a marketable skill.

Poor students have benefitted greatly from the inscription fee limit and the simultaneity of exams. For a flat fee, they have two career choices and can apply for admission to study at a multitude of institutions. Nevertheless, scholarships are few and modest in amount; and the high tuition and full-time study requirement for certain professional programs (engineering, medicine, architecture, dentistry) at private institutions are tremendous barriers to poor students.

**Major Conclusions**

The major conclusions of the study may also be categorized according to theoretical and educational criteria.

**The Theoretical Dimension**

It may be generally concluded that, for the most part, disjointed incrementalism is a useful theoretical framework for public policy analysis in education. Its limitations in the analysis of access to higher education in Brazil are due to the nature of the political and bureaucratic systems, the homogeneous characteristics of the policy-making elite, and the fact that they had long been familiar with the policy issue at hand.

In essence, all shortcomings can be attributed to the unique and peculiar circumstances of the problem and its setting. In actuality, then, instead of fragmented and disjointed incrementalism the researcher found fragmented yet connected incrementalism.

The theory has been far more useful in explaining policy-making phenomena in the U.S. However, since it has been tested too few times in analyzing policy
in this country, and hardly at all in the case of foreign nations, the researcher does not make any general claim as to the efficacy of the theory.

Before the decision is made to employ or discard the theory of disjointed incrementalism, the researcher recommends that sufficient data be gathered and initial field research executed in the examination of any higher education policy developments.

In short, the theory should be grounded in the data assembled, and the researcher guided by the indicators discovered.

The Educational Dimension

This study leads to a number of conclusions of far-reaching importance concerning the contemporary development of education in Brazil and the system of access to higher education. These are as follows:

1. Selection for higher education continues to be economic in nature: access to higher education is for the most part a middle class phenomenon. Candidates from the higher income families have the highest passing rate on the college entrance examinations. For the children of the poor, selection for higher education begins long before the entrance exam competitions: the shortage of public (and high cost of private) primary and secondary schools, along with the expensive cursinhos, present formidable financial obstacles for lower income groups. While the political and technical decisions made have done much to bring about a more equitable system of access, they have not brought about a more equal one.

2. Articulation between secondary and higher education is slowly improving due to the 1971 Primary and Secondary Education Reform Law. By testing candidates for admission on the core curriculum of secondary education, legitimacy and credibility are thus given to this level of schooling. Also, by providing high school students with a "professionalizing" cycle of studies, the government hopes
to offer an alternative to higher education—namely, work—for those who do not really want to continue their studies; and for those who fail to gain admission to the university, it gives them marketable skills geared to national manpower requirements. While these secondary education reforms have been praised by many technocrats and proponents of secondary education, others believe the professionalizing component is unachievable due to the high cost of installing machine shops, laboratories, and other technical facilities for secondary education institutions.

3. The economic aspects of access to higher education (particularly manpower considerations) have been of special importance to the government. The thrust of the federal government's higher education reform efforts has been shifting from quantitative concerns to qualitative ones. Higher education expansion has occurred largely in the private sector. Expansion in public institutions has taken place in less costly areas of study such as law, philosophy, and arts and letters. Yet, these are the very fields in which the labor market is already saturated.

4. Although there has not been a radical transformation of the system of access to higher education in Brazil, the federal government has, nevertheless, made a number of incremental changes which collectively mark the beginning of fundamental progress. This is especially impressive when one considers the awesome and complex educational problems it inherited.

5. The federal government has chosen to reform the system of access to higher education via the *exame vestibular*. Today, the college entrance exams still remain the exclusive means by which candidates are selected for admission.

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1Interview with Cláudio de Moura Castro, Institute of Economic and Social Planning (IPEA), Ministry of Planning and General Coordination, Rio de Janeiro, 12 October 1972.


3The skeptics and critics of federal policy assert that, in the lexicon of the government, "quality" is a euphemism for disinterest in expanding higher education.
to higher education. It has been decided that unification of college entrance examinations will proceed on a regional basis with the federal government closely monitoring the process—in essence, centralization with decentralized nuclei.

6. The most notable educational, administrative, and technical achievements made in the reform and regional unification of the college entrance exams have occurred in the area of Greater Rio de Janeiro. The CESGRANRIO Foundation has been the exclusive vehicle for this progress. It is the model which the government has chosen for the regional unification of college entrance exams.

7. For a truly unified network of college entrance examinations, private higher education must be brought into the system. Many private colleges are reluctant to join, and several of those which have joined unification are having their misgivings.

8. Brazil is heading towards an entrance examination system similar to that of the U.S. The CESGRANRIO Foundation intends to complement its subject matter tests (i.e., achievement tests) with aptitude tests, develop a data bank of test items, and continually strive to scientifically refine testing procedures and measurement devices.²

It is hoped that American educational researchers will find this study both important and useful. To begin with, it indicates that policy analysis in itself is an extremely important method of inquiry; for it focuses on the shape, content, speed, intensity, and direction of educational decisions, actions, and changes. In addition it paves the way for further studies in comparative educational policy research, utilizing the approach taken by the researcher. Finally, the


study has practical implications, in that it serves to guide interest groups and legislators, cross-nationally, as to where, when and how to intervene to influence policy outcomes.