This paper comments on the public function of teaching research at the University of Halle in the eighteenth century. It is argued that the mercantilist conception of the university's function helps to clarify the Prussian bureaucracy's policy toward the administration of its universities during the three decades before the onset of the reform period in 1806.

(Author/MJM)
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY HALLE: THE MERCANTILIST
CONCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSITY

by

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A paper prepared for:
The American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting
Division F: History and Historiography of Education
Session: "The Eighteenth Century College"
April 3, 1975
Washington, D.C.
In a recent paper I examined opinions about the professorial dignity and its proper functions which German academics, university administrators, and educational reformers had expressed during the later eighteenth century. In particular that paper inquired about the place of scholarship and academic publication in the professor's corporate function.¹ One conclusion of that inquiry was this: that the prevailing conception of the university's place in society and relationship to the state decisively influenced the theory and the practice of professorial scholarship. Following the phrase happily coined by Friedrich Paulsen, that conception of the place of the university in society may be called "academic mercantilism."

In today's paper I want to develop further certain suggestions implicit in this earlier essay. I want to argue that the mercantilist conception of the university's function helps us to understand the Prussian bureaucracy's policy toward the administration of its universities during the three decades before the onset of the reform period in 1806. It helps to clarify certain paradoxes in this policy, and -- although the issue can only be touched upon here -- it gives us a fresh
perspective from which to ask what was really new and significant about the Prussian university reforms of the Napoleonic period. In all this we restrict our attention exclusively to the Prussian universities, and among these, largely to Halle -- the university whose institutional destiny was perhaps most determined by the mercantilist concept.

Among the German universities of 1770 a few like Heidelberg and Leipzig could trace their distinguished pedigrees back to the Middle Ages. Most, however, had their origins in the spate of university foundings that had occurred between 1550 and 1625. The political and religious fragmentation of this era had accelerated on the one hand the breakdown of imperial and municipal power and on the other the growth of the principle of territorial sovereignty among the many small German states. Under these conditions each petty prince strove to found a Landsuniversität in his own principality, however small. These "territorial-confessional" universities, as Friedrich Paulsen called them, owed their origins to the practical needs of the emerging territorial states. They provided the principality with professional men and bureaucrats, alleviated its dependence upon its neighbors for university trained personnel, and prevented the flow of talent and wealth out of the state. Most important, the Landsuniversität ensured religious stability and conformity by creating a local, easily controlled source of clerics.2

The view of the university's function in society implicit
in the territorial-confessional model proved to be both potent and resilient, for as late as 1750 it still dominated legal and political conceptions of the university. Under its aegis the absolutist princes had by the early eighteenth century extensively secularized university life; had obliterated the remnants of the universities' corporate autonomy; and had subjected the institutions, in theory at least, to the financial and administrative dictates of their bureaucracies.3

By the mid-eighteenth century, moreover, the territorial-confessional model had accommodated itself with surprising plasticity to the rationalistic stirrings of Aufklärung thought. University reformers and theorists seized upon ideas implicit in the model and elaborated them into a systematic view of the university's function in society. Considerations like these, for example, play a large part in the deliberations of Gerlach Adolf von Münchhausen over the founding of Göttingen University, in the writings of J. D. Michaelis, and less explicitly in the works of lesser known theorists of the day.4 For the most part these theorists continued to regard the purpose of the universities within the state as that of training bureaucrats, clergymen, and other professional groups for civic life. By removing from these groups the necessity of studying outside the state, the Landsuniversität prevented the drain of talent and wealth from the state and allowed the state more easily to enforce political and religious conformity.

The formulations did not rest with these protectionist considerations. In a strongly cameralistic vein they usually
went on to another issue: how can the university be successfully managed so that its fame would also lure wealthy and talented students from abroad? For if this could be achieved, the universities would supplement the primary goal of academic self-sufficiency by drawing funds into the state that would stimulate the local economy and ultimately help to defray the costs to the state of sustaining universities. This pragmatic theory of the university's purpose, with all its cameralistic and protectionist overtones, constituted the essence of "academic mercantilism." Until quite late in the century no theorist doubted that considerations like these would and should dominate state policy toward the local universities.

The Prussian bureaucracy, although it possessed by 1750 virtually total authority to regulate the affairs of the local universities, never translated this authority into an explicit university policy. In practice, however, it adhered consistently to administrative principles based solidly upon the tenets of academic mercantilism. To ensure that its universities could provide Prussia with academic self-sufficiency and a favorable competitive position with respect to other states, Prussia tried to maintain monopolistic conditions under which the Landuniversitäten were protected from foreign rivals. In 1749 and then at intervals throughout the century the state prohibited Prussian youth from studying abroad at penalty of disqualifying themselves from any future state appointment. These edicts had two objectives. First, they ensured the state
more control over the education its subjects received -- Frederick II especially feared the infection of "superstitions" religious doctrines from abroad. Second, the latter half of the eighteenth century brought plummeting enrollments to virtually all the German universities; at Halle enrollments fell from over a thousand early in the century to fewer than six hundred students in 1790. By assuring the universities a captive audience of Prussian students the edicts thus afforded the domestic universities a modest protection in the face of these declines and the financial difficulties that accompanied them. How effective these edicts actually were is difficult to judge; certainly they were one factor which promoted the extreme provincialism of Prussian academic life. According to the figures of one contemporary, Ernst Brandes, Prussians made up 89.5% of Halle's enrollment in 1802. The various edicts restricting study abroad remained theoretically in effect in Prussia until 1810.

Similar monopolistic measures applied to the faculty, in the form of legal restrictions upon the right to resign one's post in order to accept a call to a non-Prussian university. Conrad Bornhak cites the case of a Professor Schmauss at Halle, who was able to accept a call to Göttingen in 1744 only by informing the local authorities that he was moving to another apartment in Halle, loading his wagon with household goods, and then driving speedily across the border. In practice these restrictions seem to have fallen into abeyance by the
later eighteenth century; I know of no case in which a professor's resignation was not eventually accepted by the Kuratorium in Berlin. But there were cases in which resignation requests were delayed, ignored, rebuked, or otherwise obstructed. In following this policy Prussian administrators acted no differently from those of other German states; restrictions on the professor's right to resign were in effect even at the liberal University of Göttingen and remained so, at least in theory, into the nineteenth century. In some respects Prussian policy was even relatively liberal. The Prussian bureaucracy did not follow other German states in constraining its universities to appoint only natives (Landskinder) to university chairs, as was the case at Leipzig and to a lesser extent at Jena. The right of Prussian academics to resign at will was legally guaranteed by the Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794 and fully recognized in practice at least by the time of Frederick William III.

The effect that these protectionist measures had upon academic life defies any sort of reliable assessment, but certainly they did contribute to the atmosphere of collegiate localism, sometimes of rampant inbreeding, that characterized Prussian academia in the later eighteenth century. Many commentators have noted the provincialism and the faculty nepotism of the smaller Prussian universities like Duisburg and Königsberg; fewer pointed out that somewhat similar conditions prevailed at Halle. In 1775 the Halle faculty
numbered twenty-eight men at the Ordinariat and Extraordinariat rank. Of these twenty-eight, I have collected at least a modicum of biographical information on twenty-four. Of this group, seventeen had been born or educated in the city of Halle. Most of the seventeen had also received their university education at Halle; and fifteen spent their entire professorial careers at Halle University. The professors of this circle usually had institutional or professional affiliations in the local community outside the university. Eight or nine seem to have been recruited into the faculty "horizontally," that is, directly from professional practice outside academia. Entrée meant a great deal at Halle; many of the professors who lacked a local background nevertheless owed their posts to academic or family ties with established local figures. As might be expected under these conditions, faculty mobility -- the movement of academics into and out of the Halle community -- remained relatively low. Between 1760 and 1790 Halle experienced 85 changes in its professorial ranks -- new appointments, promotions, deaths, or resignations. Of these, only 28 or 33% involved changes that took a professor into or out of the Halle community. The comparable figure for the period 1820 to 1850 was to be 49%, plus the vast increase in mobility at the Privatdozent level. Although Halle was beyond dispute the best administered, most open and cosmopolitan university in Prussia, its corporate, collegiate faculty remained nevertheless a close -- and closed --
It must be emphasized that this collegiate localism of university life did not result wholly from the protectionist bias of Berlin's administrative policy; it reflected rather the powerful influence of local interests and represented the continuation of traditional patterns of corporate autonomy. What is striking is the extent to which Berlin's policy of academic mercantilism, with its emphasis upon the securities of monopoly, harmonized with the vested interests of the local corporate faculties. Often Berlin's policy allowed the faculties to exercise a de facto authority over university affairs where de jure authority had long since been usurped by the state. The degree of academic inbreeding, not to mention outright nepotism in corporate ranks, testifies that local interests remained the effective dispensers of patronage in matters of appointment, despite the fact that all authority rested in principle with the king and his ministers.¹⁶

Other aspects of university administration also reflected Prussia's mercantilist commitments. In keeping with its usual policy of the small means, Prussia consistently chose during the entire eighteenth century to concentrate its administrative attention and invest its available funds primarily in Halle and to allow its smaller and less prestigious institutions -- Königsberg, Duisburg, Frankfurt-an-Oder -- to sink slowly into poverty and neglect. Clear examples of the preferential treatment accorded Halle could be observed in Frederick II's
founding of new chairs following the Seven Year's War, in the professorial appointments engineered by Freiherr von Zedlitz near the end of his tenure as head of the Oberkuratorium under Frederick, and in the distribution of new funds provided the universities by Frederick William II in 1787.17 Throughout the eighteenth century, the administration in Berlin had sought two results from this policy of favoring Halle. First, it hoped that the example of a single, vigorous university of great excellence would inspire greater reform in other institutions than the state could possibly achieve by spreading its limited resources through its entire university system. This policy had much initial success; witness Halle's role as the seminal institution from which were propagated to other universities such enlightened studies as natural law, cameralism, and Wolffianism. Second and more realistically, Berlin desired an institution which could efficiently fulfill the mercantilist aim of drawing students, professors, and wealth into Prussia. Only Halle could fulfill this goal, for their geographical locations and their advanced decay disqualified the other Prussian universities. Prussia therefore maintained Halle as a showplace in the competition with Jena, Heidelberg, and Leipzig. This policy, too, enjoyed considerable initial success; until the 1750's Halle was the leading university of Germany and had largely eclipsed the University of Leipzig, as its founders had intended in 1694. Its preeminence evaporated after 1760 in the face of competition from Göttingen and
Jena, however, and the preferential treatment accorded Halle by the state served by the end of the century mainly to accelerate the decay of the smaller universities.

In pursuance of their mercantilist instincts, the bureaucracy of Frederick II and his successors took for granted their right to regulate even the minutiae of university affairs in the interest of state needs and petty economies. The curatorial council in Berlin could and occasionally did demand accounts of lectures offered and attendance observed, and it frequently prescribed textbooks and methods to professors. The state attempted -- not always with success, said contemporarly critics -- to enforce Lehrfreiheit, the right of each professor to lecture in any area of his competence, thereby prohibiting in theory a single professor from monopolizing a given subject. It compelled professors to offer their obligatory number of free, "public" lectures; it refused to tolerate teachers who attracted only small numbers of students; and in a few cases it censured teachers for pedagogical laxness. Especially between 1720 and 1750 the state arbitrarily imposed stringent budget reductions upon its universities, even on Halle, a measure the chief result of which was to drive a number of prominent Halle professors to Göttingen. Before the nineteenth century, however, Berlin lacked the bureaucratic apparatus through which to maintain a firm and consistent control over local practices. For this reason interventions like the ones just cited tended to occur
spasmodically, arbitrarily, and often ruthlessly.20

While the tenets of academic mercantilism hardly constituted a "policy" as such, they do constitute the one thread of consistency which ran all through Berlin's apparently haphazard and usually ineffectual attempts to manage its universities. More important, these tenets defined implicitly a definite relationship, a definite set of mutual obligations, between university and state. Understanding this relationship and its limitations helps to explain what some historians have regarded as the failure of Prussian administration in the decades preceding the reform era.

It is a commonplace of German historiography that the second half of the eighteenth century found the universities in a period of institutional uncertainty and acute intellectual disarray. By the century's end Aufklärung critics from many quarters had begun to launch vehement attacks upon the failures of university pedagogy, the debasement of student life, the pedantry and viciousness of professorial scholarship, the flagrant nepotism and other abuses of corporate privilege. In an enlightened world, so critics contended, universities represented gothic anomalies, mired in dogma and corporate intransigence and blind to the practical needs of a modernizing society.21 With ideological abuse came institutional crisis as well. German universities relied heavily upon student fees, and as enrollments fell professorial incomes contracted drastically. In Prussia Duisburg and Frankfurt-an-Oder
had by 1780 clearly ceased to be viable institutions. Königsberg, although it was better situated geographically, was sunk in desperate poverty and intellectual stagnation, the presence of Immanuel Kant notwithstanding. Even Halle had lost its former preeminence by this date and also faced severe financial difficulties.²²

In this situation the Prussian state did little or nothing to alleviate the difficulties facing its universities. As the financial squeeze upon the institutions worsened, state outlays remained almost constant under Frederick William I and Frederick the Great. Not until 1787 did Frederick William II allot an extra ten thousand thaler yearly to the universities. Even this significant increase brought the annual state expenditure to only 43,000 thaler, and the additional sum went almost exclusively to Halle.²³ Conrad Bornhak in his history of the administration charges the Oberkuratoren of the later eighteenth century with inefficiency and lack of initiative, with having failed to provide the universities with vigorous direction, and with having pursued a "policy of neglect" toward the institutions.²⁴ This lack of initiative, he noted, contrasted sharply with the vigor and decisiveness of Prussian educational policy in other areas. During the later part of the reign of Frederick the Great, for example, Freiherr von Zedlitz thoroughly reformed, modernized, and secularized Prussia's school system; and in higher education the state experimented actively, founding academies
for mining, architecture, and veterinary medicine between 1770 and 1799. But despite this experimentation the state shrank from any fundamental reorganization of the traditional university system -- this despite the fact that such a reorganization was being widely called for in the reform literature of the period and despite the open recognition by prominent members of the educational bureaucracy that such a reorganization was badly needed. This situation, then, poses an obvious historical problem: why did the reform impulse make so little headway in the bureaucracy before 1803?

One partial answer seems to have lain in the attitudes of hostility or indifference toward the universities evinced by influential segments of the Berlin establishment. Frederick the Great, who set the tone for the bureaucracy, agreed with the universities' critics that the institutions were fundamentally obsolete, and during the later part of his reign he took little interest in their management. Later statements by prominent bureaucrats, some of them preserved in the debates of the Mittwochgesellschaft, leave no doubt that by the century's end many influential government figures believed the universities to be obsolete and held the evils to lie in their basic organization, pedagogical methods, and institutional values. Mere reform offered little hope for such fundamental and irreparable deficiencies, while abolition or total reorganization seemed impossible from a practical standpoint. Faced with this
quandary Berlin in effect did nothing: it allowed its universities to deteriorate, and it invested its money and initiative in wholly new kinds of educational institutions. In 1797 Julius von Massow, head of Prussia's Oberkuratorium, wrote:

Out of the fullness of my heart do I subscribe to the opinion that instead of universities there should be only gymnasiums and academies for doctors, lawyers, and so forth. But the realization of this idea, so correct in theory, demands so many preparations for such an important reform . . . that for the next fifty years we will have yet to endure the anomalous universities.29

Statements like this suggest that the state tolerated the universities only as necessary evils in which no further investment could be justified.

Viewed within the traditional framework of academic mercantilism, however, this entire issue takes on a rather different perspective. For within that framework of assumptions about the state's obligation to its universities, Prussia clearly did not practice a "policy of neglect."

As the earlier discussion indicated, the state acted frequently to protect the institutions from foreign competition, to maintain the viability of Halle, to oversee the content of instruction in the interest of state needs, and to ensure economy of operation. In short, it took all the steps necessary to guarantee that its universities continued to fulfill the limited, well-delineated functions prescribed by the academic mercantilism of the mid-eighteenth century. And toward these ends Prussian policy succeeded. Halle
remained a prominent institution despite its declining status, and until Halle's loss in 1806 Prussia remained self-sufficient in training the bureaucrats and professional men it required, all at extremely low cost. In particular Halle continued to meet its most crucial mercantilist obligation, that of training clergymen in the manner prescribed by the state; and it was to the overseeing of this function rather than to any general program of reform that the educational bureaucracy devoted its main attention.

The most interesting aspect of academic mercantilism was the obligations of state and university that it did not entail. Beyond their obvious role in supplying professional men, the theory never envisioned the universities as the ideological instruments of larger national policies and certainly never portrayed them as symbols of national prestige in their own right. Consequently, beyond the limited objective that the university's fame should ideally attract foreign students with open purses, the theory per se implied no necessity on the part of the state to maintain a vigorous intellectual life in its universities nor to sustain them at high levels of prestige and prosperity. By the century's end many Prussian officials agreed with critics and reformers that the universities were sadly deficient when judged by loftier standards of modernity and vitality. But within the framework of mercantilist thinking the state simply had no obligation to correct these deficiencies so long as they did not prevent the universities
from meeting the very limited expectations which policy did place upon them. Lingering mercantilist considerations, therefore, blunted the reform movement and with it the bureaucracy's enthusiasm for change.

Finally, this background offers a different perspective on the actual university reforms of the Napoleonic period. Traditional historiography has portrayed the Humboldtian reforms as actions inspired by the new currents of idealist and neohumanist pedagogical theory; on one level this interpretation is undoubtedly correct. On a mundane level, however, the reforms can also be seen as a gradual retreat from the mercantilist considerations which had formerly guided Prussian policy toward a broader vision of the universities' role in society. Prussia founded the universities of Bonn and Breslau explicitly to foster provincial development and to integrate the provinces into the mainstream of Prussian affairs. These objectives went well beyond the mercantilist intention in order to employ the universities in a policy oriented toward distinctly political and nationalistic ends. In establishing dual theological faculties at the new universities, Prussia explicitly rejected the older territorial-confessional principle, in which the maintenance of religious conformity had been a central aim of university policy. The reorganization also tacitly rejected preferential treatment of single institutions. The reorganization granted Königsberg, Breslau, and Halle enough money and talented professors to ensure, if not full equality with Berlin and Bonn,
their ability to compete with them in student numbers and learned prestige. In the founding of Berlin, in further encroachments upon faculty corporatism, and in the overall rationalization of the university system and its administration, the reformers recognized explicitly a new role for the universities as national symbols. With it they accepted a far greater responsibility on the part of the state for the maintenance of the universities than academic mercantilism had ever envisioned. These departures resulted more from the short-range political exigencies of the time than from any conscious policy or philosophy; nevertheless, the achievements of the reform period did mark a steady retreat from the mercantilistic considerations of earlier decades.31
NOTES


Brandes, Göttingen, pp. 172-173.


For a discussion of horizontal recruitment and its significance see Turner, "University Reformers," pp. 507-508. Note the close similarity between the Halle figures and those cited for the University of Göttingen during the same period.

The computation is based on the information about the Halle faculty provided in Schrader, Halle, 2: 554-567. The staff changes tabulated do not include those affecting Privatdozenten, nor do they include the initial appointments of Extraordinarien.


26 Two public calls for the radical reform of the Prussian universities by professors themselves were Johann Christoph Hoffbauer, Über die Perioden der Erziehung (Leipzig: Johann Schlegel, 1800) and Ludwig Heinrich Jacob, Über die Universitäten in Deutschland, besonders in den Königl. preußischen Staaten (Berlin: Voss, 1798). Also see Anon., "Zwei neue Universitäten in Europa gegen Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts," Berlinische Monatschrift, 25 (1795): 364-372. The charge that the bureaucracy contemplated no reforms demands qualification. Early in his tenure as Oberkurator (1796-1806) Julius von Massow attempted to introduce strong new disciplinary edicts against students; the move met vigorous opposition from the local faculties and was never carried through. The reform period actually began in 1803, when Prussia received the faltering universities of Erfurt, Münster, and Paderborn as part of the Napoleonic territorial reorganization in western Germany. By 1805 Massow was making plans to abolish or consolidate Prussia's smaller institutions and found a new university at Münster. The events of 1806 interrupted these plans. See Alfred Heubaum, "Die Reformbestrebungen unter Jul. v. Massow . . .," Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für deutsche Erziehungs- und Schulgeschichte, 14 (Berlin, 1904): 185-225 and Bornhak, Universitätsverwaltung, pp. 191-195.


28 Adolf Stöbel, "Die Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft über Aufhebung oder Reform der Universitäten (1795)," Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte, 2 (Leipzig, 1899): 201-222; also see Schrader, Halle, 2: 491-512.


30 General treatments of the educational reforms, all of which reflect this interpretation, are Eduard Spranger,

This interpretation of the university reforms is elaborated in my dissertation, The Prussian Universities . . ., pp. 220-277.