The major contention of this paper is that the emphasis in developing countries on non-formal alternatives to formal schooling can be related to a major reconstruction now underway of the concept of economic development. The earlier concept of development is defined as economic growth reflected in increased gross national product, principally through industrialization. A number of variables which need to be incorporated, however, are left out of this economically based model: humanitarian and survival needs, nationalism, the growing aspirations of people in developing nations, the limits of industrialization, the role of rural development, employment as a problem and goal in its own right, and an imperative for decentralized planning. In the midst of crisis characterized by greater demand, higher costs, wastage in sequential schooling, and a growing educated unemployed, education must cater to the demands of modernization: basic literacy, manpower training, and a professional elite. The shortcomings that have required a new look at development and the shortcomings in education suggest a way of establishing priorities for implementing non-formal education. Special attention should be given to low-cost, short-duration, need-based, aspiration-accommodating, employment-linked, decentralized, and highly distributive education. Further, wider use of local resources, established oral traditions, and an immediate reward structure are features to consider. (JH)
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NUMBER ONE

NON-FORMAL EDUCATION AND AN EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF DEVELOPMENT

Marvin Grandstaff

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ABOUT THIS SERIES

Through this series of reports we invite readers interested in non-formal education to react to our work and to contribute toward building a new and exciting field of inquiry and practice. The preliminary reports aim at making as explicit as possible some of the crucial issues in the theory and practice on non-formal education. While they represent considerably more than exploratory thinking, we do not think of these statements in any sense as final. Developmental would be a better word to characterize a field still so open to definition and so diffuse in conception and practice.

A word about the Program of Studies in Non-Formal Education at Michigan State University may be in order. The Program, under the sponsorship of the Agency for International Development has the basic purpose of building a systematic knowledge base about non-formal education in response to the growing need for authoritative information about this mode of education in the developing countries. There are nine areas of study: (1) historical perspectives, (2) categories and strategies, (3) country comparisons, (4) learning effectiveness, (5) economic factors, (6) case study survey, (7) model feasibility, (8) administrative alternatives, and (9) participant training.

Teams of faculty members and research fellows in a number of academic disciplines are working on the nine subject areas and the papers in this series represent portions of their production.

We invite responses to these papers as an important means of helping us critically to examine our work in a new field only now being given real form and substance.

Cole S. Brembeck, Director
Institute for International Studies
College of Education
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan
June 14, 1973
The concept of "non-formal education" embraces an enormous number of diverse events and structures. Any attempt to study the substance of what is named by the concept is likely to be selective, either implicitly or explicitly. What is needed are ways to formulate explicit bases of selection and focus. One part of that effort is the general classification of the field—a task on which some progress is being made. Another "handle" on the problem of selection consists in seeking grounds for focus that derive from the progress to which accumulated knowledge about non-formal education will be put. This paper takes the latter approach. I would like to suggest that one possible way to "target" inquiries into non-formal education is to relate the concept of non-formal education to the concept of development. More specifically, it is my contention that the emphasis on non-formal alternatives to formal schooling can be related to a major reconstruction of the concept of development now being carried out in
international assistance agencies, such as AID, the World Bank and UNESCO, within the countries that are recipients of development assistance and within that portion of the academic community concerned with problems of development. If that is so, then efforts to study non-formal education and to plan and implement non-formal programs might acquire focus from a consideration of what development is coming to mean. Assuming that education is usually an instrument toward some more general social goal, rather than an end-in-itself, our study of it has clarity and usefulness to the extent that it is informed by an understanding of that toward which it is an instrumentality. That proposition provides the rationale for this investigation.

SOME DIMENSIONS OF A FOCUS FOR NON-FORMAL EDUCATION

In the paragraphs that follow, I will try to summarize and organize recent efforts to expand and reconstruct the concept of development and to examine the implications of that reconstruction for the systematic study of non-formal education. The bulk of the analysis here treats the conceptualization of "development" and its educational correlates, with the special problem of conceptualizing "non-formal education" regarded as much as a task to be undertaken as one accomplished. That program has necessitated a rather
lengthy (and perhaps laborious) examination of the development concept, so that the reader may begin to wonder when, if ever, the topic of non-formal education is going to be discussed. Although I think that that is unavoidable, it may be helpful to state in advance the conclusions regarding non-formal education that will appear again later in the paper.

Any educational effort has a great many dimensions and any one dimension or set of dimensions can provide a possible way to construct a focus for inquiry. The problem of what dimensions to choose is always an important and difficult one. In this instance, the dimensions are drawn from a consideration of some of the most pressing problems that now exist in the development process. A cluster of seven variables is suggested here as a fruitful basis for inquiry into non-formal education.

1. COST

The importance of cost in educational planning and decision-making cannot be overemphasized. Even in the most developed countries there are limits to the amount of money that can be devoted to education, either in absolute terms or in terms of proportion of national wealth. It is suggested here that one appropriate way to focus on non-formal education is to emphasize the search for educational modes that couple effectiveness with low per capita instructional unit cost.
2. PROGRAM DURATION

Another program variable—and one that is closely related to both cost and effectiveness—is that of time duration. A significant desideratum of educational programs, especially those within the non-formal realm, is that they be of the shortest possible time duration and that they contain frequent completion points.

3. BASIS IN NEED

It is assumed of any educational program that is capable of winning support that it has some base in human need. The connection between education and need may, however, range from relations of clarity and immediacy to relations that are fairly obscure and based in very long-range projections of utility. While there is often a need for educational programs that proceed from obscure and long-range relations to human need, it is suggested here that a focus for non-formal education can be provided by giving primary emphasis to objectives that have a clear and immediate relationship to existing human need.

4. ASPIRATIONS OF PARTICIPANTS

Educational programs vary along the dimension of their provision for accommodation of the aspirations of their participants. Typologically, that variable may range from zero provision to total provision. Along that continuum, we can, in studying non-formal
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education, direct our attention to those cases that make
the greatest provision for allowing the aspirations of
the participants to function as powerful formative ele-
ments in program planning and design.

5. LINKAGE TO EMPLOYMENT

This is a special instance of the relationship
between education and human need. It is selected for
particular examination because the problem of employment
is one of the most stubborn and pervasive ones encoun-
tered in the LDCs (and in developed countries). Employ-
ment is a major imperative in any development effort and
it can provide an important focus for inquiry and plan-
ning in non-formal education.

6. DECENTRALIZED PLANNING AND ALTERATION

A common problem in education is that of built-in
inflexibility, usually arising from centralization of
planning. Although this may be inevitable in some kinds
of educational efforts, it need not be so in all cases.
Non-formal education provides an excellent conceptual
rubric for educational approaches that maximize decen-
tralization of design and planning and that provide for
maximum alteration-in-use.

7. DISTRIBUTION

Finally, educational programs vary in terms of their
distribution among potential audiences. Some have very
limited distribution, while others are distributed to a wider clientele. Here, too, there are sometimes good reasons for programs of limited distribution. Current problems of development, however, seem to make it worthwhile to focus our consideration of non-formal education on programs and objectives that anticipate the widest possible distribution.

With that brief preview, let me move to the explication of the rationale for these seven points. Let me begin with a brief statement, to be elaborated further on, of what seems to be happening in regard to conceptualization within the development community.

**SHIFTING EMPHASIS IN DEVELOPMENT**

Over the past twenty-five years or so, many of the developed nations and a number of international agencies have been involved in providing assistance to the efforts of the LDCs to improve their situations. Prior to, and during that experience, a general notion of what constitutes "development" emerged and formed the basis of strategy, practice and theory. The concept of development became, technically, a commonplace--a given and mostly unexamined component of thought and action. As usually happens in any human endeavor, funded experience has begun to demonstrate flaws and weaknesses in our commonplace conceptualization. Too, the passage of time and the
flow of events alter situations, so that ideas that work at one point in time may prove inadequate at another. We now seem to have reached a juncture at which the inadequacies are sufficiently apparent to warrant the reexamination of our conceptions and their reconstruction. That reconstruction is well underway, both within and without assistance agencies, even though it will surely be some time before the reconstruction is fully developed, and an even larger time before it becomes widely operational. Still, at this point, there are several things that can be said with a measure of certainty about the reconstructed conception of development.

In general, the shifting emphasis may be described as a heightened attention to the "humane," as against the "technical" dimension of development. This means, in most cases, an effort to improve the quality of the lives of the general populations in the LDCs. Central to the reconstruction of the concept is the recognition, as John Hannah has put it, of

the community of interest of all people in the world in the peoples of the poor countries who want to help themselves develop their own resources, human and material, to provide better lives for all of their people. ³

Somewhat more specifically, Mahbub ul Haq of the World Bank has suggested that
The problem of development must be redefined as a selective attack on the worst forms of poverty. Development goals should be expressed in terms of progressive reduction and eventual elimination of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, squalor, unemployment and inequalities."

My purpose here is to give greater detail and specificity to the sort of expansion of the development concept that is implied by those statements and to use that analysis as a tool for constructing one possible focus for the study of non-formal education.

2. LIMITATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

Although I believe the relationship between non-formal education and an expanded conception of development to be useful and important means of structuring inquiry and effort, I do not intend it as an exclusive means. There are, then, several significant qualifications, limitations and disavowals that must be made clearly.

First, the reference here is to efforts that arise from an interest in planning and practice, rather than those that proceed from an abstract interest in the problems and events of non-formal education. Put another way, the frame of reference here is educational efforts that involve deliberate intervention for developmental purposes. The line between the "practical" and the "abstract" is, of course, never easy to draw and even to make the distinction is a little treacherous, since it is often made in order
to argue for the superiority of one perspective or the other. I have no desire to degrade or elevate either sort of activity. I mean only to establish the context of these remarks as being the "practical" realm and to limit their relevance to a concern with practice. There are, to be sure, a great many dimensions of non-formal education, broadly conceived, that are of great interest, but which lie outside the planning area. Those dimensions merit attention and scrutiny, especially since, in a relatively new field of inquiry, work in areas that seem tangential may prove to have substantial and unexpected relevance. Our judgment of what is relevant is conditioned by the state of our knowledge. Where knowledge is only beginning to coalesce, those judgments are apt to be sometimes wrong or partial. To stipulate that this paper is bounded by some such phrase as "deliberate intervention for developmental purposes" should not be taken as an attempt to rule out of order inquiries for which a relationship to that phrase cannot clearly be established. The only purpose of such a qualification is to provide some focus and to pick out a manageable portion of a large and diffuse field.

Another important pair of qualifications has to do with the thrust of reconsidering the concept of development. First, the process of conceptual reconstruction may take place at the level of either theory or practice. This analysis, directed ultimately
to an operational and planning audience, will limit itself mainly to matters of practice. Second, the process may be viewed as either one of abandoning the conventional and commonplace conception of development entirely, or as one of expanding and refining it--of introducing new dimensions and reordered priorities into our models. This paper takes the latter approach. The goals and ideals of conventional development--productivity, capital formation and the like--remain, and will remain, central to planning and development. What is at issue seems to me to be not the rejection of those things, so much as it is the placement of them in a more comprehensive network of goals and ideals.

I suspect that there is a tendency to be overly impressed with problems in the developed countries that can be traced to the process of conventional development itself and to reject that process in its totality. Those problems, described by John Hannah as ones of

- population
- ecology
- of compacted and congested living with ever increasing dependence on the economic system and the state administrative apparatus and a weakening reliance on the personal values of family and community

are essentially problems of overdevelopment--a state that most of the LDCs are a long way from attaining. Thus, remedies and changes of course that may be crucial for the developed countries may be far
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outside the immediate problems of the LDCs. While it may be quite sensible to exhort Americans to trim their consumption and to abandon the goal of unlimited growth in the name of ecology, to levy that responsibility on the LDCs seems a little misguided and more than a little unfair. In many instances in the LDCs, conventional development is still relevant, and to associate the notion of non-formal education with an expanded conception of development does not negate its possible role in the pursuit of conventional development. At most, the association can establish a rough priority structure for the study of non-formal education.

Finally, to emphasize non-formal education does not entail a rejection of formal schooling. Formal education has been a useful tool for certain purposes and it will continue to be. What is involved in the turn to non-formal modes of education is a search for ways to do things that the formal schools have demonstrated their incapability of doing or that can be done more effectively in some arena other than the formal school. Especially pressing is the need to find means through which more, and more effective learning, can be made available to more people, at bearable costs. That, however, does not mean advocacy of the utter abandonment of formal schooling.
3. THE COMMONPLACE CONSTRUCTION OF DEVELOPMENT

The construction of the development concept that has been pervasive since the 1950's is an extrapolation from the dynamics established by the central mechanism of increased economic productivity. The theoretical construct that summarizes productivity—one with which we are all familiar—is Gross National Product (GNP); that is, the total value of all final products—consumption goods, net exports, private investments and government purchases. The byword of development, then, becomes increase in GNP. Policy is derived from and defined by that objective and evaluation of development programs is rendered in terms of GNP.

This proposition is, in effect, a generalization from historical economic experience. "Development" is taken as a comprehensive concept, including a broad range of economic, political, social and humanitarian ideals. The adoption of growth of GNP as the primary engine of development incorporates the assumption that the accomplishment of the whole array of developmental goals will flow from increased GNP. It is, of course, recognized that the movement from economic growth to development, broadly conceived, is not entirely automatic—that it requires policies and management in other areas—but, by and large, the commonplace strategies and thrusts of development assistance have been to place very basic reliance on economic growth.
This is especially true of two major elements of development—employment and, through increased employment, distribution of wealth through the mechanism of wages. Employment and distribution, in turn, are seen as facilitating a great many political and social desiderata. Thus, economic growth is seen to be at very least basic, and, at most, totally adequate to the process of comprehensive development.

Once we establish growth as the sine qua non of development, we may note several components, most of them related in one way or another to increasing GNP. Some of those components, like employment and distribution through the wage mechanism, are theorized as direct consequences of economic growth. Others, such as the broadening of political participation and the homogenization of culturally diverse populations, are seen as indirect consequences. Still others are conceived as either prerequisites to, or necessary concommitants of, economic growth. Those are the components that have greatest interest and pertinence for this discussion, since they shape the empirical picture of development assistance efforts. They are the conceptual foundations of assistance policies.

CAPITAL FORMATION

In economic theory, the difference between a growing and a stagnant economy lies in the fact that, in growing economies, there is a consistently
increasing surplus of wealth beyond consumption and that the wealth is available for investment. "To grow, an underdeveloped economy must build capital." Investment, then, begets further and larger surpluses, which, in turn, are invested and generate further economic growth. A first goal of development is the achievement of the "take-off point" for a given society—that is, the point at which wealth (productivity plus credit) exceeds internal consumption. Conventional development policies have centered on the attainment of the take-off point through such strategies as increasing productivity, external investment and credit and transfer of capital within the economy from sectors with little or no potential surplus to those with high potential for the generation of surpluses. With some exceptions, those policies have embodied one or more of the following tactics.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

To begin with, most of the LDCs have had inadequate agricultural production for even their own domestic needs. They have been afflicted with simple shortage—not enough food—and with the more complex difficulties of poor nutrition arising from poorly distributed production and nutrition-reducing health conditions. Massive assistance efforts have centered on just the provision of adequate nutrition in the LDCs, both in the distribution of agricultural
production in the LDCs. The latter effort has, in addition, been an important staple of the effort to form capital. In most of the LDCs, agriculture is the largest sector of the economy and, on size alone, the best prospect for generating short-run surplus. As Heilbroner puts it,

*When agricultural productivity is enhanced by the creation of larger farms (or by improved techniques on existing farms), part of the ensuing crop must be saved. In other words, the peasant who remains on the soil cannot enjoy his enhanced productivity by raising his standard of living and eating up all his larger crop. Instead, the gain in output per cultivator must be siphoned off the farm.*

There are several ramifications of the employment of agricultural production as a primary growth sector. First, it implies a particular view of agricultural practice—that of the highly mechanized, large, cash-crop, money economy farm. Second, it looks toward the other sectors for employment, anticipating a transfer of labor from the newly mechanized farms.

*By reducing the number of tillers of the soil, a work force can be made available for the building of roads and dams, while this "transfer" to capital building need not result in a diminution of agricultural output.*

Third, it anticipates a substantial period during which the lot of the rural masses would remain pretty much unchanged, while the fruits of their increased production would be transferred into other sectors.
where the new surplus might be channeled into investment, rather than consumption.

**INDUSTRIALIZATION**

Although agriculture is the basic industry in most LDCs it cannot be expected to produce a self-sustaining capital surplus. At best, it can generate a modest surplus capable of moving an economy along the road toward economic growth. At that point, industrialization becomes critical, since industry provides a much more fertile ground for economic expansion. Industrial production is squarely within the money economy, it is a prerequisite for trade and has, in its use of technology, a high potential for return on investment. On the commonplace construction, industrialization comes to symbolize development. Too, the reliance is mostly on fairly heavy industry, producing products for trade (steel, chemicals, rubber, etc.) and only secondarily on goods for domestic consumption (appliances, cars, radios, etc.). There are at least three important concomitants of this sort of industrialization policy, all of which have significances for education. First, the industrial worker, albeit to a lesser extent than his rural counterpart, is part of a system more concerned with capital formation than with improving his own standard of living. It is the achievement of surplus for investment, rather than consumption, that is the primary
objective. Second, urbanization becomes a central characteristic of development, as the building of heavy industry necessitates the movement of workers to large, centralized industrial facilities. Finally, targeting on heavy industry with reliance for manufactured goods placed on the developed countries serves to develop symbiotic networks between LDCs and the developed countries of which they are "clients." Since those networks are symbiotic at the level of economies, they are persistent and tenacious in a way that other sorts of networks—political, cultural and so on—are not. The importance of these conditions for education will be discussed further on.

INSTITUTION BUILDING

Even a casual observation of the history of the developed nations show that the development process is accompanied by the emergence of institutional arrangements that serve to carry forward the activities that lead to (or follow from) economic growth. For this reason, another dimension of conventional development strategy has been the systematic construction of institutions designed to perform the administrative and organizational functions of an expanding economy. There are a great many such institutions, ranging from corporations and lending agencies to state ministries. The question of
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education and conventional development lies within the domain of institution building, and I will discuss that matter in detail shortly. First, let me mention one trait of institution building in general that has importance for the present analysis.

The development process as demonstrated in the history of the developed nations frequently has been a lengthy and chancy affair. This is especially so when the formation and allocation of capital is unregulated by non-economic institutions. Put another way, economic growth is haphazard to the extent that it does not proceed from a base of careful economic planning. The advancement and theorization of the planning process is one of the major accomplishments of Keynesian economics. That body of theory gives a central place to economic intervention within the public sector, primarily through the manipulation of public spending and tax policies. This is especially the case in the LDCs, where the pressure for rapid economic growth is great. In practice, this has taken the form of the creation of strong, highly centralized national governments and bureaucracies, just because of the identification between governance and economics that is the inevitable result of an imperative for economic planning at the national level.
In the politically immature and labile areas of the underdeveloped world, this exercise of leadership typically assumes the form of "strong man" government. In large part, this is only the perpetuation of age-old tendencies in these areas, but in the special environment of development, a new source of encouragement for dictatorial government arises from the exigencies of the economic process itself.¹⁴

What is important here is not so much the moral or political justification of strong central government as it is the anchoring of that kind of government in "the exigencies of the economic process itself." Acceptance of strong government flows from an emphasis on planning which, in turn, follows as a natural consequence of identifying economic growth as the primary or exclusive instrument of development.

EDUCATION

Let me turn now to a quick sketch of the approach to educational assistance that has evolved from the economic construction of development. Just as the economic strategy for development is a generalization from the experience of the developed nations, so are the educational arrangements characteristic of development assistance. When one looks at the developed nations, one of the most impressive things about them is the extent of schooling. All developed countries, socialist or capitalist, Eastern or Western, have extensive and elaborate systems of education, vested most visibly in formal, state-supported schools. The
conventional wisdom holds that there is an intimate association between the existence of the schools in the developed nations and the extent of their development. Although this is a largely unexamined belief, it is a tremendously strong and pervasive one. Educational assistance has, in general, attempted to duplicate, in the LDCs, the school systems (but not the comprehensive learning environments) of the developed nations and to clothe the duplication in a rhetoric that links schooling with the development-economic growth process.

My interest here is mainly with the employment of formal schooling as a vehicle of development, since I would argue that, for the most part, when educational programs have emerged from the concern for development, the chosen agency has been the state-supported school. This pattern is probably more a "natural" consequence of the involvement of schoolmen in educational planning than it is the result of careful deliberation and choice-making. There have, of course, been many educational efforts that have taken other forms, particularly programs in health education, nutrition education, population control and agricultural extension. In general, those sorts of programs relate to development by way of seeking to establish the minimum requisite conditions of health, nutrition and restricted population growth without which it is simply impossible to work toward economic growth.
The chief difference between what might be called "service education" and formal schooling lies in placement of the latter within the institution-building effort. The extrapolation of "education" from the concept of development resulted mainly in the notion of building an "educational system," i.e., a system of institutions called schools. The extrapolation has placed greatest emphasis on three general functions.

**MODERNIZATION**

Even those who place almost unlimited faith in the developmental power of GNP recognize that economic practice is inseparable from culture and psychology.

*These are poor societies because they are traditional societies. . . . Typically, the people of an underdeveloped economy have not learned the "economic" attitudes which make for rapid industrialization.*

Economic growth is associated with changes in the attitudes-behavior complex of the people of the LDCs. Those changes customarily are lumped under the rubric of "modernization."

Although the concept of "modernization" is not entirely stable in theory, it is usually taken to involve shifts in learning style, time organization, perception of the social context and the natural world, notions of progress and mobility, alterations of internalized reward structures, acceptance of new ideas and so on. *Operationally,* the educational
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definition of modernization centers on literacy, numeracy and informational learnings—the sorts of things that, in the developed nations, are ordinarily associated with basic primary education.

Economists have debated as to whether education is a prerequisite for development, or vice versa. But there is little question that human resource development and improved standards of education are closely linked: one cannot proceed very far without the other. The experience of the last decade has underlined the fact that illiteracy and insufficient education seriously retard modernization efforts in developing countries.

Given that line of analysis, education in the LDCs has usually centered on the creation of national systems of basic schooling, with primary emphasis on literacy.

MANPOWER TRAINING

If industrialization dominates thinking about development, a crucial question becomes that of finding the workers for new industry. There are—or at least seem to be—important and obvious differences between a traditional, rural work force and a modern industrial one, whether we are talking about workers directly involved in industrial processes or workers in the array of supportive occupations that emerge with urbanization and industrialization. A basic premise of development strategy has been that of the need for systematic effort to create, out of a
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traditional, usually peasant population, an effective modern work force. Some of that imperative has been vested in the modernizing force of conventional primary schooling. In other instances, such non-formal means as on-the-job training and private training programs have been utilized. Another approach—a very popular one and one in which large amounts of money and effort have been invested—is that of technical training dispensed through formal vocational school programs. Here, again, the point of reference is practice in the developed nations, or at least the usual description of that practice. (We are only beginning to realize that our descriptions may be distorted in their failure to take adequate account of non-school technical training.) Technical schooling sometimes proceeds from manpower projections worked out from economic development plans. The preparation of people to satisfy projected manpower needs is then located in technical training schools operating programs of fairly long duration. The actual impact of manpower projections on employment and job-training has probably not been great. Perhaps a more important element has been the separation of labor supply from labor demand. Technical schooling becomes a "supply" agency and it is usually supposed that it can operate effectively as a respondent to "demand," utilizing an application of a free marketplace model. This supply and demand
process has almost certainly been a more important shaping influence in technical education than has manpower planning. As in the case of elementary schooling, the effort has been to build a system of manpower training that mirrors the industrial system planned as the backbone of economic growth.

**THE PROFESSIONAL CLASS**

Developed nations all display a class that seems to be distinctive to them, as against traditional or antique societies. That is a class of professionals, so designated by virtue of educational attainments, who discharge a wide variety of administrative, managerial and service functions. (The LDCs are, to be sure, familiar with the professional class, but, until recently, that familiarity came mainly from contact with colonial administrations.) The invariant association between development and the existence of the professional class established a third educational imperative for the LDCs--to identify, train and install in power a native professional class, either *de novo* or, more frequently, as replacements for the colonial administrators, doctors, teachers, planners, accountants, lawyers and so on.

The pattern of this process has usually been based on the Western model of general secondary education--part preparation for higher education and part screening in its function--and university
education. In most cases, this has meant the dramatic enlargement of decrepit systems of secondary schools and colleges inherited from the colonial powers and, in some cases, the construction of an entire system of secondary and higher education from the ground up.

There are a great many other sorts of educational programs in the LDCs—possibly a great many more than we have, until recently, paid any attention to. Still, the bulk of educational effort, following educational imperatives rooted in the concept of economic growth, has been channeled into modernization education, technical training and the creation of a class of professionals.

4. THE NEED FOR CONCEPTUAL RECONSTRUCTION

The model summarized above is a basically sound one. It is logical, tight, consistent with history and theoretically sophisticated. But, in all too many instances, it has not worked. More precisely, it has often proven to be impossible to apply it. The trouble is not with the assumptions of the model nor in its theoretical explication, but in its incapacity to include a number of fundamentally crucial variables. The first need is for an expansion of the development concept, and, where the introduction of new variables has effect on the conventional ones, a reconstruction of the entire
conceptual domain in light of the relationship between the new variables and the old. Let me turn briefly to some of the major factors that are left out of the economic growth conception, but which must be taken into account if planning and development strategy are to work as well as they should. I will treat several of the general factors and then some of their specific implications for education. The factors I wish to discuss in detail are these:

1. The need to deal with broadly humanitarian and survival needs, always an important part of development strategy, has taken on even greater urgency in recent years.

2. Increasingly, people in the LDCs are insisting on playing a central role in initiation and planning for development—on playing a more decisively proactive role than they have in the past.

3. As the life situations of the general population of the LDCs have begun to figure more importantly in planning, it has become clear that development efforts must give a central place to problems of distribution of wealth.

4. In primarily rural LDCs, it is becoming apparent that comprehensive plans of rural development are often preferable to approaches that build in urbanization.

5. We are coming to recognize that employment is a problem and a goal in its own right and not just a component of the general problem of economic growth.

6. Several factors converge to generate a major imperative for decentralization of planning in the development process.
The problem of economic growth in the LDCs is now drawn in much more somber colors than it used to be. The problems have, quite simply, proven to be much more intractable than had been thought, especially those that fall within the domain of sheer survival—health, nutrition, housing and so on. This realization is, in part, a result of experience and, in part, due to the application of economic measurements to economies for which no accurate figures were previously available. It is not simply that the LDCs lack the "economic attitudes" of which Heilbroner speaks. That lack, real though it is, is compounded by a grinding poverty that has proven to be enormously resistant to our past efforts to allay it. Added in to this equation is the only very limited success of efforts to limit population growth. Improved health services, increased longevity and reduced infant mortality, combined with nearly constant birth rates, have resulted in population increases that, in terms of consumption for mere survival, have placed greater demands on national economies. So great are those demands that even spectacular growth rates in the range of six per cent have been unable to offset them. In practical terms, this has meant that thinking about development—and the allocation of resources—now is beginning to give a more central place to basic humanitarian services.
Furthermore, the meeting of survival needs is beginning to be freed from its ties with economic growth policies. Assistance for survival must be carried out in its own right, and not just as one dimension of programs that have economic growth as their ultimate and formative objective.

The developing countries have built a record of progress and accomplishment. But the lives of most people hover still at the margins of subsistence. . . . Most of the major problems of the developing countries require new types of public and private institutions, new policies for allocating resources, new means for delivering services, new patterns of growth which provide jobs more efficiently, and, in many cases, new technologies.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{NATIONALISM}

During the past 25 years, much of the developing world has emerged from colonial rule to independent nationhood. That emergence has produced, today, a situation quite different from that of the early years of development assistance. The emerging nations, in their early history, were politically volatile and unstable. They still are, but a maturity and stability has been attained in some places and the prospect of continual political turmoil is not so much a fact of life in the LDCs as it once was. Too, the LDCs were caught up in the global power struggle of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, many of the LDCs found themselves in
a client-sponsor relationship with one or the other of the major powers. The sponsor nations had an almost unlimited prerogative to impose their own structure on policies in the LDCs—economic, political, educational and, indeed, social and cultural. The situation at present is quite different. Many of the LDCs have attained a measure of autonomy based in political stability and, as they have done so, they have begun to define their problems in terms that seem to them most in their own interests; banishing, as a primary concern, the strategic interests of the great powers. Those powers, in turn, have made appreciable progress toward a (hopefully lasting) detente and have reassessed their capacities for global, hemispheric and regional hegemony. Nationalism, that great bugbear of the 1950's, is now a common base of policy in the LDCs and, increasingly, it is recognized as a legitimate posture by the assisting nations.

Whatever form development assistance may take in the future, it is almost certain that the LDCs, often operating out of a nationalistic impulse will almost certainly incorporate at least a partial rejection of the conventional doctrines of development. As John Hannah notes,

They (the LDCs) still want foreign assistance. They still require specialized technical advice. But they are appropriately less and less willing to tolerate donor countries attempting to tell
them what their priorities should be; how they should plan; how they should budget and expend resources. The old tutorial relationship which has marked relationships between donors and recipients has become obsolete.¹⁹

Increasingly, the role of assistance will be that of responding to initiatives arising in the LDCs—it will be reactive rather than proactive.

ASPIRATIONS

Much has been said about the "revolution of rising expectations." Construed broadly, this is a complex of two elements. First, the political and social awakening in the poor nations has resulted in a heightened assertiveness on the part of the poor within those nations. (This is, of course, as true in developed nations as it is in the LDCs.) As it is becoming more difficult to maintain a sponsor-client relationship between the wealthy nations and the LDCs, so it is becoming more difficult to maintain such a relationship between the wealthy elites and the poor of the LDCs. The aspirations of the poor have become a central theme in development equations. The second element is the shape of the aspirations of the poor. Several factors—mass media, the spread of socialist practice and doctrine, deliberate programs of "consciousness raising"—coalesce to disseminate among the poor a rather sophisticated vision of what their lives might possibly be like. The absence of a vision of improved conditions, which, historically, has
probably been a more powerful instrument for keeping the poor quiet than any other, no longer holds. As the political and social structure of colonialism has broken down, so has the psychology of colonialism. The fatalism of the poor, so often documented by researchers, is beginning to disappear and they are beginning to believe that things can be better for them. Development policy today will have to provide an important place for the (comparatively) progressive aspirations of the poor.

This poses a special quandary in the area of capital formation, since the conventional formulation relies heavily on the deferral of benefits from increased production. The aspirations of the poor, on the other hand, often demand a fair and immediate distribution of those benefits. The history of the LDCs has shown again and again the social and political price of failing to incorporate distribution as a central parameter of development planning and, as the aspirations of the poor become more progressive and are more vigorously asserted, the necessity for making that incorporation becomes more imperative.

THE LIMITS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

We have always known that there are limits to industrialization; that factors such as availability of capital, markets and labor, place restrictions on how rapidly and to what extent industrialization can
be accomplished. There are, for instance, several notable instances in the U.S. in which job protectionism by organized labor has retarded the industrialization process. What we are finding out now is that the limits of industrialization may be considerably more severe in the LDCs than they were (and are) in the industrialized nations.

A central difference between the industrialization process in the LDCs and that in those nations that built their industry some decades ago is that, in order to be effective, the former must compete successfully with the latter. Industry in the LDCs, even if it is supported with loans, external investments, subsidies and favorable tax and trade policies, must ultimately gauge its success or failure in terms of its ability to compete, both domestically and in world markets, with the industries of the developed nations.

Industry in the developed countries is "capital-intensive"—that is, the ratio between capital inputs and labor inputs to the industrial process is heavily weighted toward capital. This is a highly efficient formula, since capital inputs stay within the system, while labor inputs flow out of the specific system in the form of wages. In the LDCs, however, there is a serious shortage of capital and an abundance of labor. The reasonable pattern of industrialization is "labor-intensive," but the competitive potential of
labor-intensive, as against capital-intensive industry, is quite limited. In effect, the industrial potential of the LDCs is limited to development of those industries that, in the industrial nations, are still relatively labor-intensive. It is probably unreasonable, then, to expect industrialization to carry the major burden of economic growth and more diverse programmatic approaches must be looked for. As E. G. Wedell has pointed out,

*I suppose the safest generalization one can make about developing countries at the moment is that most of them will have a predominantly rural economy for many years to come. It is true that in a number of countries the industrial sector is expanding faster than the agricultural, and the number of countries where this will be so will increase. But in absolute terms the industrial sector will remain small. . . . Accordingly the future for the large majority of citizens of developing countries lies in a better life on the land. Such a better life can come about only if we manage to break the vicious circle of a low rural living standard which causes the drift of the able young people into the towns. This drift reduces the proportion of people with talent and enterprise in the rural areas and thus helps to perpetuate low living standards there.*

Rural development, then, becomes a vital concern in development planning. The implications of this shift are many—to explicate them satisfactorily would take a major essay. It means, essentially, that efforts in the rural sector must place less emphasis on the creation of a surplus—although that remains
important—and more emphasis on the creation (or preservation) of a viable rural culture and a commitment to progress worked out within the framework of a rural society. That means the softening of the conventional model of economic growth to include, in the rural sector, a labor-intensive economy of small holdings, with a high ratio of production for use.

**EMPLOYMENT**

Closely related to the notions of distribution and rural development is the problem of employment. Despite some progress in economic growth, industrialization and so on, the problem of unemployment has remained stubborn. Here, again, we see the impact of the imperative to compete with capital-intensive industry, since that imperative has resulted in a failure of industrialization to produce jobs in the hoped-for quantity.

Output in the modern sector thus seems to have grown much faster than employment, and given rates of output growth have had associated with them less employment growth in LDCs than in advanced countries, when relative factor endowments suggest that the reverse should have been true.  

Furthermore, the bias provided by the conventional commitment to industrialization and its concommitants, such as urbanization, has, while drawing many people to the cities, where there are no jobs for them, also dried up employment in the rapidly mechanizing rural areas.
If policies are not designed to prevent premature "tractorisation" in areas where new hybrid seeds are being adopted, the consequences for unemployment are vastly greater. All of which is to emphasize that despite some tendency—at least until recently—for economists to focus their attention on employment problems in the modern sector, the heart of the problem lies elsewhere.\textsuperscript{22}

Neither has economic growth produced very much redistribution through the wage market. Although wages in the urban modern sector have risen, the cost of labor has contributed to an emphasis on capital-intensive industry and a consequent increase in unemployment. Economic growth has pretty much proven inadequate as a distribution strategy. Berg, while arguing for the economic necessity of wage restraint policies, points out the need for other policies that are focused on the distribution imperative.

When scarcities appear the policy response would be to increase supplies not raise wage rates . . . by price control measures it might be possible to reallocate some of the benefits of wage reduction from profit receivers to consumers . . . complementary policies are required . . . which involve basic matters of development strategy such as the relative priorities to be given to agricultural and industrial development.\textsuperscript{23}

Development policy can neither ignore the problem of distribution, assuming that employment and wage mechanisms will take care of it, nor carry too far the control of income in the interest of forming capital. Instead, dynamic and systematic arrangements for more equitable distribution of wealth,
goods and services will have to be made and incorporated into development schemes, even if it is at the expense of maximum economic growth.

PROBLEMS OF CENTRALIZATION

The necessity of central planning in the successful application of the conventional model has already been mentioned. As in the case of other requisites of economic growth, the development and operation of effective centralized agencies has proven extremely difficult and, in some cases, impossible. There are, of course, many reasons for this, including the sensational ones of corruption and dishonesty of central officials. Those, however, are probably not as important as some others, nor as difficult of solution.

One important element is the resistance, in diverse, traditional societies, to centralized authority. (I suspect that what is usually termed "resistance to change" is often more nearly resistance to centralized authority or to the authority of some historically distrusted group.) A second element is inherent in the structure of conventional development. Centralization locates authority, prestige and income in the urban centers, drawing off, for the countryside, the most competent and progressive people—that is, just those people best suited to administering and advocating centrally-determined policies in the countryside.
Waterston discusses two other major difficulties with central planning. First, the more centralized planning is, the more the real situation must be abstracted and simplified in order for it to be conceptually manageable.

Because they usually stake out and lay claim to a very limited field, planners make it intellectually manageable to deal with; but because they exclude so many variables which enter into actual decision making, they diminish the relevance and usefulness of the results they have obtained. . . . Planners' preference for internal consistency over practicality or feasibility also helps explain why, at the national level in most countries, economic planning goes forward without anything like adequate attention to social, political, spatial, and ecological aspects of the choices being made.24

Second. the massive amounts of accurate and carefully structured data that are essential to the central planning process is often simply unavailable or too incomplete to be relied upon.

Not only are parameters often little more than guesses, but basic data for population, population growth and migration, households, businesses, production, income, and standards of living, as well as many of the components of national and regional income accounts, are at best suspect and often nonexistent.25

What becomes apparent, then, is that, in many cases, planning needs to be done at those levels at which the problems of centralization are minimized. That is, there will have to be a much wider
acceptance of decentralization of planning, even though decentralization may not, in the abstract, be as economically efficient as centralized planning.

While broad strategies and policies must be centrally determined, the widest authority must be delegated to local communities and bodies to plan for themselves. . . . Where the delegation of authority has been accompanied with enough resources to get a program started and with the appropriate kind of technical assistance to show the local people how to organize themselves to do better what they want to do (and not, as often happens, how to do what the outside technicians think the local people ought to be doing), the results have been good.26

SUMMARY

In summary, the reconstruction of the concept of development would seem to involve the accommodation of our existing theory to at least the six variables discussed above:

1. Greater effort in the "humanitarian" or "survival domain.

2. A shift, on the part of the developed nations, from a proactive to a reactive construction of their role.

3. The building in of measures that are specifically and deliberately geared to the more equitable distribution of wealth.

4. An emphasis upon comprehensive and fundamental rural development.

5. Efforts directed toward employment, per se, rather than just to employment as a corollary of economic growth.
6. Acceptance of some measure of decentralization of planning and decision making.

The incorporation of those variables into the planning process and its theorization is not a task that can be accomplished overnight, but there are a number of clear signs that the effort is underway.

Let us now turn to a consideration of some of the inadequacies of the conventional conception of education for development.

5. RECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION

The LDCs, along with the developed countries, presently are caught up in what Philip Coombs has called the "world educational crisis." That crisis has several different facets and a number of "causes," some of them internal to the educational systems themselves and some of them rooted in the tight linkages between educational policies and the commonplace concept of development. (In the developed nations, the linkages take a deeper, more mythic form, in which the relationship is not so much between education and a concrete picture of development as it is between "enlightenment" and "progress," both of which assume profoundly normative roles in the basic structure of cultural belief.) I would like to examine some of the facets and putative causes of the "crisis." That analysis, when coupled with the reconstruction of the concept of development,
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discussed above, should provide some fairly clear
directions and foci for the study and practice of
non-formal education

DEMAND FOR EDUCATION

The pattern that has evolved in the developed
countries has, as mentioned previously, married schooling to development. Development, since it is per-
ceived as containing most socially desirable goals, becomes a criterion for reward and prestige. And,
as the handmaiden to development, education—or, more properly, formal schooling—has become a major avenue
to material and status rewards. In societies such as the U.S., where inherited wealth produces only a tiny
elite and where it has become very hard to win elite
status through individual enterprise, schooling has become the primary means by which upward mobility is
possible. The extent to which schooling is identified
with the society-wide reward system is so pervasive
that we scarcely even notice it. It is simply the way
things are. "To get a good job, get a good education." This linkage has been transferred to the LDCs. Educa-
tion—and, in most cases, that means formal schooling—
is a socially and economically valuable commodity; it is the ticket to advancement and an essential part of
a good life. No other criterion so often or so
firmly separates the "advanced" from the "backward"
more than education in general and literacy in particular.
It is no wonder, then, that as the aspirations of people have become more assertive and more progressive, that the world-wide demand for education has increased enormously. It is important to note that demand is quantified in two directions. There is a demand for more people to get education and for those who get it to get more and more of it. Educational development goals take the general form: to move from an average of two years of school for forty per cent of the population to six years of school for ninety per cent. It is also important to notice that the demand is not exactly for "education," broadly conceived, but for schooling, since degrees, diplomas and school-leaving certificates are more valuable as currency than knowledge per se. It is not unusual to find perfectly serviceable educational opportunities unused, because they yield no formal certification, while schooling programs of dubious utility are inundated with applicants. The combination of the conventional conception of development, in its educational formulations, with the heightened aspirations of the masses of people, has produced "the sharp increase in popular aspirations for education, which has laid siege to existing schools and universities."  

COST

Schools, as we all know, are rather expensive things to operate—even those that are minimal and
shabby. As Coombs points out, what evidence there is seems to point to the fact that educational costs tend to increase at a fairly steady rate.

An economist would infer [from available data] that education is a "rising cost industry"—that its inputs (at constant prices) for each similar unit of output follow an upward trend line over the years. If this is the case, as it seems to be, the implications are serious and far-reaching. It means, in effect, that each year, ad infinitum, an educational system needs more finances simply to accomplish the same results as in the previous year. If it wants to do more, and to do it better, it will need a still larger budgetary increase—all this apart from keeping up with inflation.29

The effort to meet rising educational aspirations thus produces increased costs at a geometrical, rather than an arithmetical, rate.

In almost every nation in the world, developed or not, this cost pressure has produced dramatic increases in educational expenditures—in gross costs, in proportion of GNP spent on education and in the educational share of public budgets. Educational costs, as percentage of GNP, already exceed six percent in many countries and, as percentage of public budget, many nations are reaching the level of 25 percent. When one adds the additional compounding factor of population growth, the picture becomes clear: the limits of possible spending for education are being reached, or have been reached already, in most of the nations of the world.30
WASTAGE IN SEQUENTIAL SYSTEMS

An almost universal feature of systems of schooling is their sequential character and their long duration. Arising from the conceptualization of education as a modernizing and elite-producing process, systems are spread out over a period of years, with real "payoff" contingent on the completion of an entire sequence. The lower steps of a sequence have little value, in and of themselves. Rather, their value lies in their status as preliminary phases in the entire process. Thus, a student who completes one year of a six-year primary school sequence takes little more—either in learning or status—than one who never enters the sequence. Loss within the system, through dropping out or repetition of steps, is almost a total loss, both in terms of investment of student time and investment of educational expenditures.

Wastage in all educational systems is high. Although drop-out data, even in the developed nations, is notoriously sketchy and unreliable, most careful studies indicate drop-out rates in the LDCs in the general range of 60 per cent or more. Repetition rates are also high, so that a fairly accurate, typical picture is this: for every student who completes a sequential program, the investment of student time is more than double the years required for the program. Thus, the cost, in student time and
educational expenditure, to produce one graduate of a sequential program, when wastage is considered, is more than twice the per year cost for a single student. It is possible, of course, to reduce wastage, but probably only up to a point, since all sequential systems show some wastage. (The most effective way is more rigorous screening, but that policy runs aground on the growing aspiration for more mass education.) A more promising tactic would seem to be to avoid, where possible, long duration sequences, in favor of short-run, self-contained programs.

THE EDUCATED UNEMPLOYED

Manpower forecasts derived from projections of economic growth and industrialization, when the power of growth to generate jobs has been over-estimated, have led to a paradoxical problem. That is, in both the LDCs and the developed countries, we are now finding a large number of people prepared to do certain kinds of jobs without jobs available to them. We seem to have operated under the assumption that the presence of trained manpower is a prior requirement of economic expansion—if the trained people are available the economic system will expand to accommodate them. Indeed, they will, through using their skills, cause the system to expand. Although there may be some evidence to justify that assumption, it now appears that there are limits beyond which available trained manpower can stimulate growth. As that
limit is reached, many people will find themselves without jobs, despite the possession of credentials. This is especially poignant when the training is for specialized professional and semi-professional jobs, such as teaching, business administration and highly specialized engineering, since many people in those categories have no real chance for lateral transfer into labor-short areas.

The reason for the emergence of a new class of educated unemployed is fairly clear. It lies in tying job-training programs to a supply and demand model in which the "tooling-up" phase--technical education--is so long that there is no effective check on oversupply. This leads to a situation rooted in the wan hope that supply will generate demand, a hope that, while it has sometimes operated in the commodity market, has never been fully realized in the labor market. To a lesser extent, the use of long-range manpower forecasts, often drawn from inaccurate, incomplete or overly optimistic economic projections, is a contributing factor. An important element in reconstructing our concept of development education, then, is to place a much greater emphasis on occupational training that is linked directly to employment needs and not to manpower studies. This becomes particularly important in relationships to some of the elements of a reconstructed concept of development. First, in regard to rural development,
the degree of uncertainty about just what the character of the objective is seems to call for a highly flexible and job-specific approach to manpower training. Second, if we are to accept a greater degree of decentralization in planning, then the correlates of economic planning, such as educational planning, need also to be decentralized. Here, too, there is a need for designing educational approaches that are directly and emphatically related to the immediate problem. The grounding of educational planning in the clearly observable needs of present, concrete situations is perhaps the best antidote to what Coombs calls the "disparity between educational systems and their environments."  

6. POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS FOR NON-FORMAL EDUCATION

Now let us begin to see what priorities for the study and practice of non-formal education can be derived from the preceding discussion. Again, I do not want to give the impression that these are the only legitimate priorities. All I wish to suggest is that an assessment of the development situation provides a fairly solid justification for what follows. Nor do I wish to limit the applicability of these suggestions to new constructions of development. They may also be useful in patterning the application of non-formal education to conventional development programs. There are several specific points I wish
to make, but let me first cast what seems to me to be an accurate conclusion in a summary statement. In fitting our efforts in non-formal education to the needs and emerging patterns of development, we should give serious attention to programs and approaches that have as many as possible of the following characteristics:

1. Low per capita or per instructional unit costs.

2. Limited time duration, with frequent completion points at which students may terminate.

3. A clear base in immediate human needs—whether economic, political, social, health, nutritional, etc.

4. A recognition of, and responsive accommodation to, the aspirations of the participants.

5. A solid linkage to real employment opportunities, especially those such as labor-intensive agriculture and industry.

6. A working provision for decentralized planning and alteration at the level of use.

7. A high potential for distribution of whatever commodities are associated with the program—education, economic gain, improved health, better nutrition, etc.

I am not interested, at this point, in assigning priorities among these seven characteristics, nor even in suggesting that programs can be evaluated in terms of how many of the characteristics they contain, since high intensity in one or two characteristics may give considerable interest to an otherwise restricted case. All I want to do is to provide a
list of program attributes that can serve to focus our attention as we try to clarify and refine our understanding of non-formal education. Perhaps, as we go along, we can develop techniques and models that will allow us to describe and evaluate programs along some or all of the dimensions listed here (and possibly others) with some degree of precision. For the moment, however, my interest is more in exposition than in quantification.

Before moving on to a more detailed treatment of a few specific issues, I would like to inject, without recounting the reasons for my holding it, a personal bias. It has become my conviction that, for a great many reasons, the problem of rural development lies at the heart, not just of development in the LDCs, but of reform in the developed countries as well. I think we must, deliberately, turn our attention to the encouragement of decentralized community life, having, as a major component, a working symbiosis between man and his physical environment. If the concept of non-formal education, as an organizing rubric for inquiry and action, can give a high priority to rural development, it will, I think, enhance its potential for making an important contribution to social thought and human betterment.

Non-formal education is not a magic solution to problems. It is, at best, and then not always, a somewhat more promising approach to some problems.
than formal schooling has proven to be. It should be thought of as a specific and not a general remedy for educational shortcomings, with its utilization to be determined by contextual conditions and its effectiveness conditional upon its proper use. One of the things we must do, in our study of non-formal education, is to form as clear a picture as possible of what its best potentialities are and what conditions make it most effective. There are several issues related to that question. I would like to discuss four of them that seem to be of central importance.

**EMPHASIZING THE INABILITIES OF FORMAL SCHOOLING**

It is finally becoming clear that the educational capabilities of formal schooling are limited. Simply put, schools cannot perform all of the educational functions that are important to life. If this is so, then one way of exploiting the potential of non-formal education most efficiently is to emphasize non-formal procedures in the case of objectives to which the school is ill-equipped to respond. There are a number of these, but I will concentrate on only one, and that is the inability of the school to build its programs on a foundation of authentic activity. By that, I mean that the school is, by its very character, a cloistered situation. The authentic materials within the school, no matter how carefully they may be chosen or constructed, are, at best,
derived from and not a primary part of the authentic life situations of the learners. (I am not suggesting that that is always a liability. In some cases, it is advantageous to learn about life situations at a distance, especially when such learning requires an expansive objectivity that may not be attainable within the life situation itself.) In schools, for example, one may learn the techniques of a job, but what it is like, what it means to do a job, can only be learned by doing it. Non-formal education would seem to have a particular force in the case of educational objectives that seem to require participation in an authentic situation for their full realization.

UTILIZATION OF THE ORAL TRADITION

Earlier on, I pointed out the central identification between schooling and literacy. That identification is historically uniform. The school, in all of its historical instances, is a literate institution. However, as we all know, illiterates learn a great deal and there are non-literate modes of education. Every culture, even such a highly literate one as the U.S., contains a large and educationally potent oral tradition—a complex of communication networks and substantive matter than exists quite apart from the literate tradition. This tradition, long the object of study by folklorists, has enormous educational potential, but that potential has seldom
been systematically used for explicit educational purposes. The possibility of so using it, especially in regard to problems of great urgency, such as those within the domain of survival, should not be overlooked. There are a great many educational objectives that can be accomplished without literacy and I would suggest that, within the domain of non-formal education, we might give emphasis—and a positive emphasis—to the oral tradition as a potent and valuable educational medium.

This is true, as well, of other kinds of agencies that, although not technically part of the oral tradition, are already "in place." Farmer co-operatives, trade unions, religious institutions, political clubs and so on are already extant in many environments and might well be utilized as transfer agencies.

**RELIANCE ON LOCAL RESOURCES**

The attainment of several of the characteristics listed above would seem to depend pretty heavily upon maximum utilization of local, as against external, resources. Certainly one of the major factors in the cost of educational programs lies in the training of teachers and the logistical support costs of bringing programs into a location—especially an isolated location. If non-formal programs place heavy reliance on local resources, it might be possible to achieve fairly dramatic reductions in costs. Too, if
non-formal programs are to be adapted to local needs and situations, that adaptation should be more accurate if there is substantial participation on the local level. I do not intend by this the highly "romantic" notion that only locals are qualified to plan and make decisions, but only that planning should be more effective if there is a solid provision for local inputs.

**REVISING REWARD STRUCTURES**

Finally, the success of non-formal programs is likely to be highly dependent on the extent to which the relationship between schooling and the society-wide reward and status structure can be broken. That relationship is a powerful one and, if it is maintained, will almost certainly provide a great deterrent to acceptance of and participation in non-formal programs. It is simply silly to suppose that non-formal education can compete with a formal system if the latter is the wellspring of status and income. There are two ways to approach the reward structure problem. One is to downgrade the status-related character of schooling by limiting the rewards of schooling to those things to which schooling is relevant. It is one thing to bestow income and favorable working conditions on, say, an accountant, because he has been to school and acquired the skills of an accountant. It is more questionable, however, to give him a
social and political status in regard to affairs for which he has no special competence, just because he has been to school. The second way is to take care, when implementing non-formal programs, to assure that tangible and strong rewards are available upon their completion. In many cases, the assurance of employment has been a potent way of securing participation in non-formal programs. Certificates, licenses and titles could also be used, especially in cultures where such things carry a great deal of weight. Social approval, if properly orchestrated, can also provide a status basis for non-formal education. However the problem may be attacked, it must be attacked, since the tyranny of the formal school is buttressed more strongly by its status as the exclusive avenue for social and economic advancement than by anything else.

7. SUMMARY

I have argued here that the concept of non-formal education can be given focus by relating it to the emerging reconstruction of the notion of development and assistance strategy. Having characterized the directions in which that reconstruction seems to be heading, and after discussing some of the shortcomings of past patterns of formal schooling, I suggested that one way of establishing priorities within the effort to study and implement non-formal
education would be to give special attention to programs that are low-cost, short-duration, need-based, aspiration-accommodating, employment-linked, decentralized and highly distributive. Further, programs that undertake objectives not usually accomplished by the formal school, that make wide use of local resources, that exploit the oral tradition or take particular cognizance of the problem of reward structure are of special interest.

It should be possible to derive quite a large number of fruitful study projects from this discussion. To mention but a few: It should be of value to look at any available case studies of non-formal programs in terms of the ways in which and the extent to which they display the characteristics listed. This might be particularly valuable in determining the degree, if any, to which the possession of the listed characteristics contribute to the success or failure of the programs. If the emphasis on rural development presented here is accepted, it would be helpful to have one or more fairly comprehensive discussions of what rural development could be and what dynamics might operate to produce it. In relation to that, it might be useful to study in some detail the mechanics that have operated in the formation of societies that might be classified as "rurally developed." More specifically, instances of educational programs specifically directed toward rural development (such as, possibly,
the Scandinavian folk school movement, American education prior to 1940 or recent Cuban education) should prove useful. If the oral tradition is to be employed as an educational medium, an examination of how that system works, in educational terms, might be useful. Further study of the effects of duration on success, retention and so on might well be undertaken, as well as studies of the relationship between educational costs and such factors as duration, the degree of reliance on local resources and so on. In many countries, it would be helpful to have a carefully formulated picture of the precise relationship between schooling and the reward structure, as well as a notation of the relationship between non-formal programs and rewards.

There are, I am sure, a great many other kinds of inquiries that would be helpful or necessary to the full development of the focus on non-formal education presented here. I have tried to articulate a conceptualization for inquiry into non-formal education and while I regard it as a fruitful one, others may not. Perhaps the most important thing is not the acceptance of a single focusing strategy as it is an acceptance of the fact that some focus is needed if "non-formal education" is to be a useful concept.
FOOTNOTES

1 Much of the work that has been done at Michigan State University on the analysis and taxonomy of the concept of non-formal education will be presented in a later number of this series.


6 Hannah, op. cit., p. 11.

Ibid., pp. 109-110.

Ibid., p. 209.

Ibid., p. 208.

What is true of countries where agriculture is the primary resource base is true, as well, with modifications, of those countries that find their basic industry in natural resources, such as metal and petroleum.


Ibid., p. 209.

Ibid., p. 218.

Ibid., p. 203.


Ibid., contains several interesting descriptions of non-school technical training programs.

Hannah, op. cit., p. 9.

Ibid., p. 10.


22. Ibid., p. 105.

23. Ibid., pp. 122-123.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 41.


28. Ibid., p. 4.

29. Ibid., p. 47.

30. Ibid., pp. 52-60.


32. Ibid.