This practicum attempts to correlate the militant attitude of Fresno City College (FCC) faculty with a high level of frustration resulting from a nonparticipatory type of governance, and to compare the militancy of the faculty senate at FCC, an elected body, with what are considered the traditionally militant faculty groups. A review of the literature on collective bargaining, nonparticipatory governance, and faculty senate militancy is given as background for the study. Survey 1 polled 50 faculty members on their frustration with the college governance structure; 43 (86 percent) responded. A high degree of dissatisfaction with the campus governance structure was indicated. Seventy-five percent or more of the respondents agreed that: (1) governance is clearly in the hands of the administration; (2) faculty are not widely involved in important campus decisions; and (3) faculty reluctance to participate on committees stems from the committees' lack of institutional power. Survey 2 polled all 225 faculty; 150 responses were elicited. Ninety-two percent of the respondents favored collective bargaining. Vocational faculty were slightly less militant than academic faculty, but the faculty senate was just as militant as traditionally militant groups: faculty under 41, academic faculty, and members of AFT. Faculty senate executive officers were even more militant than younger faculty or academic faculty. Although no correlation could be established between militancy and frustration, it is inferred that they are correlated. (AH)
NON-PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AS AN INFLUENCE ON
FACULTY SENATE MILITANCY

BY

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IlandtalMTHE PROBLEM

Two investigations are carried out.
The first tries to ascertain whether a high degree of faculty frustration over ineffective faculty participation in college governance structure is matched, whether by accident or by design, by a high degree of faculty militancy at Fresno City College. Faculty perceptions of the college's institutional committee structure, based on simple percentages on a 1-4 scale are sampled.

Militancy is measured on a second survey in terms of the simple percentage of faculty in favor of collective bargaining, faculty right to strike and faculty willingness to strike.

The second investigation also attempts to prove that the faculty senate and the faculty senate executive are just as militant as those faculty traditionally considered most militant: faculty under 41 years of age, faculty in the academic divisions and faculty members of AFT. There is one dependent variable, faculty militancy, which is judged as the proportion of each group which favors the right of teacher-strike action. There are five independent variables - faculty senate membership, senate executive membership, the age of the faculty, the faculty in academic versus vocational divisions and membership in the AFT.

In this way it is confirmed that at one particular community college, at the end of the school year, the faculty senate and the faculty senate executive are actually just as militant as any one of these traditionally militant groups. It is not proven however, that the militancy resulted from a non-participatory governance structure, but there are inferences that the two may be related.
HYPOTHESES

FIRST HYPOTHESIS

The militant proportion of the faculty senate is not significantly less than the militant proportion of (1) faculty under 41 years of age; or (2) faculty in academic divisions; or (3) faculty members of AFT.

A. HYPOTHESES WHEN THE MILITANT PROPORTION OF ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE GROUPS IS GREATER

I use the z test for difference of proportions. Since the z test is designed to determine whether the difference between two proportions is great enough to be significant, there is no direct way to test an hypothesis postulating a lack of difference. Therefore, since my hypothesis is that the difference, if any, is not significant, I have to test it in an indirect manner. This is done by postulating an hypothesis which is contrary to my first hypothesis. The contrary hypothesis is that the militant proportion of the corresponding group is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate. When the contrary hypothesis is true, then my first hypothesis is clearly false. When the contrary hypothesis is not proved to be true, then my first hypothesis, that the difference, if any is not large enough to be significant, is confirmed. Please note that I would not be concluding that the null hypothesis is true.

Therefore, when the militant proportion of any of the above three groups is greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate, I attempt to prove that the proportion is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate (Contrary Hypothesis). When the militant proportion of the group is not significantly greater, then,
TABLE ONE

EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS

P1 Faculty Senate
P2 Non-Faculty Senate

P3 Faculty Senate Executive
P4 Non-Faculty Senate Executive

P5 Faculty under 41
P6 Faculty over 40.

P7 Faculty in Academic Divisions
P8 Faculty in Vocational Divisions

P9 Faculty Members of A.F.T.
P10 Faculty who are not AFT members.

QUESTIONS CONSIDERED:

17. Simple percentage of faculty willing to go out on strike.
18. Simple percentage of faculty in favor of faculty right to strike. *

* (This was used as a measure of militancy for hypothesis testing.)
19. Simple percentage of faculty in favor of collective bargaining.

P= Proportions.
by deduction, the militant proportion of the faculty senate is not significantly less than the militant proportion of the corresponding group. In this case, the militant proportion of the faculty senate may in fact be less than the militant proportion of the corresponding group but the difference, if any, would not be large enough to be statistically significant.

**NULL HYPOTHESES**

- $H_{01} : p_5 = p_1$
- $H_{02} : p_7 = p_1$
- $H_{03} : p_9 = p_1$

**ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES**

(Contrary Hypotheses)

- $H_1 : p_5 > p_1$
- $H_2 : p_7 > p_1$
- $H_3 : p_9 > p_1$

(See Table One for explanation of symbols.)

**B. HYPOTHESES WHEN THE MILITANT PROPORTION OF ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE GROUPS IS SMALLER**

When the militant proportion of any of the above groups is smaller than the militant proportion of the faculty senate there is no need to test the hypothesis. In fact, an attempt is made to prove that indeed, the militant proportion of the faculty senate is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the corresponding group. When it is significantly greater, then the first hypothesis that it is not significantly less, is necessarily true.
NULL HYPOTHESES

\[ H_{0,4} : P_1 = P_5 \]
\[ H_{0,5} : P_1 = P_7 \]
\[ H_{0,6} : P_1 = P_9 \]

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

(Contrary Hypotheses)

\[ H_4 : P_1 > P_5 \]
\[ H_5 : P_1 > P_7 \]
\[ H_6 : P_1 > P_9 \]

SECOND HYPOTHESIS

The militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is not significantly less than the militant proportion of (1) faculty under 41 years of age; or (2) faculty in academic divisions; or (3) faculty members of AFT.

A. HYPOTHESIS WHEN THE MILITANT PROPRTION OF ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE GROUPS IS GREATER

Again, I use the z test for difference of proportions. Since the z test is designed to determine whether the difference between the two proportions is great enough to be significant, there is no direct way to test an hypothesis postulating a lack of difference. Therefore, since my hypothesis is that the difference, if any, is not significant, I again have to test in an indirect manner. This is done by postulating an hypothesis which is contrary to my original hypothesis. The contrary hypothesis is that the militant proportion of the corresponding group is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive. If the contrary hypothesis is true, then my second hypothesis is clearly false. If the contrary hypothesis is not proved to be true,
then my second hypothesis, that the difference, if any, is not large enough to be significant, is confirmed. Please note that I am not concluding that the null hypothesis is true.

Thus when the militant proportion of any of the above groups is greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive, I attempt to prove that each one of these proportions is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive. If the militant proportion of each of the above three groups is not significantly greater, then by deduction, the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is not significantly less than the militant proportion of the corresponding group. In this case, the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive may, in fact, be less than the militant proportion of the corresponding group, but the difference, if any, is not large enough to be statistically significant.

**NULL HYPOTHESES**

\[ H_{0,7} : P_5 = P_3 \]

\[ H_{0,8} : P_7 = P_3 \]

\[ H_{0,9} : P_9 = P_3 \]

**ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES**

(Contrary Hypotheses)

\[ H_7 : P_5 > P_3 \]

\[ H_7 : P_7 > P_3 \]

\[ H_9 : P_9 > P_3 \]

**HYPOTHESES WHEN THE MILITANT PROPORTION OF ANY OF THE ABOVE THREE GROUPS IS SMALLER**

When the militant proportion of any of the above groups is smaller than the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive, there is no
need to test the hypothesis. In fact, an attempt is made to prove that the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the corresponding group. When it is significantly greater, then the second hypothesis, that it is not significantly less, is necessarily true.

**NULL HYPOTHESES**

\[ H_{0,10} : P_3 = P_5 \]
\[ H_{0,11} : P_3 = P_7 \]
\[ H_{0,12} : P_3 = P_9 \]

**ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES**

\[ H_{10} : P_3 > P_5 \]
\[ H_{11} : P_3 > P_7 \]
\[ H_{12} : P_3 > P_9 \]
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

NON-PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE AND FACULTY SENATE MILITANCY

Faculties have always had their traditional militant groups. Bender (1972) contends that "the myth that faculty as professionals would not resort to strike tactics has been shattered as large numbers of young faculty questioned the sanctity of 'service to mankind' as sufficient reward for teachers." Young teachers are frequently more critical of the status quo. They are more locationally independent, have fewer children, own less property and have more negotiable vocational objectives.

A second traditionally militant group consists of those teachers from the liberal arts tradition. Academic as opposed to vocational-oriented instructors are, by definition versed in free enquiry and critical thought. To them, the inadequacies of a non-participatory governance system are painfully apparent. Vocational instructors divide into those teaching business or technical skills. Business principles emphasize employee discipline, the autocratic tradition and the virtues of protestant ethic and vertical mobility. Technical instructors are generally craftsmen or small businessmen already disenchanted with big union tactics. Vocational teachers may also share the opinion that union membership represents a step down in status.

Members of the American Federation of Teachers, as dues-paying members of AFL-CIO are generally the most militant campus group. They endorse the use of strike action as a labor weapon and many consider compulsory arbitration not in their best interest.

These three groups, the young, the academics, and the AFT are considered the three most militant groups on any college campus. The
hypothesis is advanced in this investigation that the militancy of those faculty who have participated in college governance through membership of the faculty senate is just as great as those groups of instructors traditionally considered most militant.

Baldridge (1974) contends that the degree of faculty participation permitted in college governance varies directly with environmental factors. When environmental factors are positive, faculty influence on college governance is high. When environmental factors are negative, then faculty influence becomes repressed. With the increasing economic pinch from inflation, the desire of boards to trim budgets as lagging enrollments deplete revenues, a teacher oversupply and great pressure from state governments for fiscal accountability (Duryea & Fisk 1974:114) these external developments have placed enormous pressure on college economic and governance conditions. Faculties have therefore become more militant for greater self-protection.

At the same time strikes and other forms of political pressure by public employees are forcing state legislatures to look more favorably on the issue of formal collective bargaining as a means of settling disputes. Florida, Oregon and California may be among the most active areas for collective bargaining in the next two or three years (Lombardi: 1974). A total of 28 states are presently considering collective bargaining rights for teachers. Twenty-five are expected to unionized by 1980 (Mortimer: 1974). Permissive legislation in 10 states has expedited bargaining and stimulated an interest for this type of relationship (Duryea & Fisk: 1972). The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining (1974) reports that there are now 115 collective bargaining contracts with two-year colleges across the country spread over 14 states.
Baldridge (1974) also relates the degree of faculty influence in governance to institutional type. The higher the institution ranks in institutional typology, (e.g. private prestigious multiversities like Harvard or Yale) the greater the participation of faculty in governance. The lower the institutional rank, (e.g. the rural public junior college) the smaller the role in college governance. For the two year college Baldridge forecasts unprecedented conflict over resources, budget and governance practices. He considers collective bargaining and unionization as inevitable.

It comes as no surprise therefore that the AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations (1967) reports that, "The main centers of faculty discontent are in the public junior colleges." Both Duryea (1972) and Lombardi (1974) found that "collective bargaining is making headway in the community colleges at a faster pace than in other segments of higher education".

Why are the faculties of community colleges the most militant of all higher institutions of higher learning? One AAUP (1972) report suggested, "Faculty have two essential and related needs: an effective voice and proper compensation." Begin and Browne (1974) suggest that the expansion of collective bargaining into the two year colleges is a product of the faculty search for professional autonomy." Park (1971) suggest that "the movement toward collective bargaining may . . . be an indication of faculty discontent with the teacher-administrator relationship." Garrison (1967) contends that "historically junior colleges have been 'administrator colleges'. For the most part, program initiation and development, curriculum patterns and offerings . . . have been decided by deans and presidents. Public junior college administrators [used to]
have close contact with community leaders . . . . and therefore able to design the local college's offerings to respond to community needs. However, faculty are having increasingly direct relationships with the community through personal contact and advisory committees."

Richardson, Blocker and Bender (1972, p.73) forecast "increased levels of expertise among our professional staffs combined with a growing dis-enchantment with authoritarian and paternalistic administration. Bender continues: "There will be a tendency for faculty to assume greater responsibility for decision-taking and to turn increasingly to professional organizations for the machinery to implement such involvement. Professional organizations, with their promise of security will encourage greater faculty militancy." Garrison (1967) concludes that the traditional idea of the faculty role in college governance needs rethinking."

Duryea and Fisk (1972) observe that "ineffectual and repressive administrations have stimulated unionism as a counterforce to authoritarian presidents or governing boards. The emergence of unions relates significantly to the changing nature of college government." Morris Keeton (1971) reports that "insofar as . . . . the community college faculty puts any sets of problems to the forefront, it was not problems of physical and financial resources . . . . but problems of decision making in academic affairs . . . . " This evidence is corroborated by the AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations (Campus Governance Program, 1967). "The main sources of discontent are faculties' desire to participate in the determination of those policies that affect its professional status and performance." The report continues: "Economic factors, such as salary level and salary structure have contributed to faculty discontent, but appear to be of
secondary importance. Formal bargaining relationships between the faculty and the administration are most likely to develop if the administration has failed to establish or support effective internal organizations for faculty representation.

Of major significance in the New Jersey report by Begin and Browne (1974) was the sense of faculty powerlessness generated by unilateral administration - decision making which was often characterized by the faculties as being arbitrary as well . . . . . Collective bargaining was seen as a means of enhancing faculty participation in a wide range of decisions, including collegial participation in personnel decisions. Begin and Browne further report that "While dissatisfaction in a number of areas led to faculty organizations in the thirteen two-year colleges, the reasons that one of the county colleges has remained unorganized for several years provides an illuminating contrast. Unlike other county colleges in New Jersey, a viable committee system at this college, as well as basic economic satisfaction, appear accountable for the absence of negotiations. In conjunction with these characteristics, the administration is perceived as being highly sensitive to faculty attitudes and concerns." Baldridge (1972) however disagrees: "The contention that participation in governance will decrease the demand for collective bargaining is not supported."

Presumably faculty pressure for better economic rewards and state pressure for greater accountability would force negotiations always toward a collective bargaining contract. Nevertheless, highly participatory governance structures seem to have had a retarding effect, at least in New Jersey.

In a study of North Carolina community colleges, Barrett (1969) found that power and job satisfaction seem to be related. "When the faculty
perceived an increase in their ability to make decisions concerning their college, their degree of job satisfaction was increased." This would tend to confirm the theories of Herzberg (1959) and Maslow (1963).

**SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS:**

Hickman (1967) working as a member of the AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations (Campus Governance Program) concluded that "an evaluation of the essential functions of administrators and faculty leads to the judgment that an effective system of faculty governance would be built on the concept of "shared authority" between the faculty and administration." Shared authority should involve such issues as educational and administrative policies, personnel administration and budget!" AAHE concludes that faculty should actually control the balance of power. "A concept of shared authority can best be implemented through the establishment of an internal organization, preferably an academic or campus senate." The campus senate referred to is a unicameral legislative body sometimes called a campus council or college senate, which has decision-making authority. It normally should include faculty members and administration, although "faculty members should comprise a clear majority of the senate."

Both Baldridge (1974) and Edelstein (1974) warn of the disintegration of the campus senate if there is no effective redistribution of power. "However, campus senates can work," continues Edelstein, "if the college is mission-oriented, if purposes are commonly held and accepted by the total institution." An effective campus senate therefore may take several years of preparation. However they result in better communication, a franker consensus of opinion, a greater awareness of direction and purposes. If a viable campus senate is not established before the onset of collective
bargaining, then Edelstein sees a participatory governance structure eventually becoming part of the union contract. As part of a contract, Edelstein thinks the campus senate could become stabilized, as already suggested by Baldridge (1974).

Shared authority, as defined by AAUP means the colleges "afford to their faculties a genuine voice in all matters of educational policy and academic concern and likewise provide adequately for the economic interests of their teaching personnel." Lombardi (1974) contends that "College administrators and boards have not been overly eager to grant faculty a large share of participation and proper compensation - the two major causes for the appearance of collective bargaining in education."

"Collective bargaining upsets a long-held theory of governance as a co-operative endeavor among the professional staff involving the faculty and administrators .... Under collective bargaining, the adversary employer-employee relationship carried over from the industrial world replaces 'shared authority'". Begin and Browne (1974) report that in their New Jersey study "In spite of committee structures and/or college senates or assemblies at most of the six institutions, the faculties believed they had little effective participation in governance. The ineffective advisory role to which faculties were relegated and the perceived arbitrary decision-making by administrators alienated faculty members." As Lombardi points out "the adversary relationship was not introduced by collective bargaining ... adversary relationships were [already] common in many colleges. ... Probably universally in community colleges, faculty have been given as much authority as they could obtain from administrators or that the administrators believed they could grant without endangering their prerogatives and control."
Most college administrators and board members view the advent of collective bargaining with trepidation. They herald polarized personnel relationships and stultified governance procedures. A study made by the California School Board Association (Community Colleges) (1974) of 263 districts using some form of collective bargaining, concluded that "collective bargaining indicates a longrange negative impact on governance." Ron Campbell (1974), President of Monroe County Community College, Michigan, states: "Collective bargaining is a tough grueling business. Survival in the jungle of labor welfare is difficult. This applies to management as well as the union team." Livingston (1969) agrees: "We seem destined to move increasingly towards relations of an adversary type, characterized by confrontation and bargaining, backed by force, by threat, and intimidation." Many local administrative officials and teachers, in view of the acceleration in bargaining, will feel less competent to deal with the bargaining process and increasingly this responsibility will be delegated to professional specialists at a state level.

Victor Baldridge, (1974), of the Stanford Project on Academic Governance (1974) points to regularized procedures in college governance as a result of collective bargaining initiation. Joanne Frankel (1973) points out three studies, one by Blackburn and Blysm (1970), another by Lombardi (1971) and a third by Macomb Community College (1969) which suggest that collective bargaining is emerging as a mechanism to increase the faculty's role in governance. "... It has resulted not only in increased participation in decision making, but also, in some cases, of improved relations with the administration." Duryea and Fisk (1977) also suggest:"A contractual basis for faculty government could make a senate's role more independent and positive. Conversely, they warn, a contract may shift the real basis for
participation in governance to the bargaining agency, largely or totally supplanting the senate."

Paul Rickman (1974) argues: "Educational policy must stay within the perimeters of professionalism in order to retain the freedom necessary for realistic quality standards." "Whatever the outcome," continue Duryea & Fisk (1972), "these governing arrangements can become contractual and thus beyond the authority of boards to alter except at the time of formal negotiations." During the period of contract faculty members will find themselves far less vulnerable to deliberate, or innocent, vagaries in administrative and board policies such as those resulting from changes in leadership or from external pressures. Simultaneously, board members and major administrative officers may anticipate a more stable situation in that faculty members and professional staff cannot turn nearly so readily to new issues or to personal appeals and claims of special privilege." One further outcome "will be the increase in the potential for consultation between administrators and professional staff members, an interchange established by explicit requirement rather than by personal disposition, acquaintance, expediency or tradition."

In 1968, New Jersey legislation was passed granting collective bargaining for public employees. In 1974 Dr. Lawrence Winchell Jr., President of Atlantic Community College, Mays Landing, New Jersey, commented on his change in administrative style: "I recall an early slogan which characterized my management style. 'If you want to get something done - do it yourself'. Now I realize if you try to do everything yourself - you can't get anything done. I now believe that to get anything done you must involve as many people as you possibly can." Currently at this particular institution, the system of governance is pretty much one of involvement.
and completely intertwined personal relations." Another president, Ron Campbell (1974) of Monroe County Community College, Michigan, which is also unionized, states: "A properly negotiated contract tends to eliminate paternalism and allows the group a voice in determining the aspects of conditions relating to the welfare of the group. A well balanced collective bargaining agreement agreed to at the negotiating table and ratified by the membership of the collective bargaining group and the board of trustees can be a boon to the administrator of a college..... I believe this.....because a negotiated contract defines and holds accountable both the faculty and administration."

In summary, to solve the problem of faculty militancy, to stimulate greater faculty professionalism, and possibly to reduce the bitterness of the onset of collective bargaining, the literature is suggesting greater faculty participation in community college governance structure. It suggests the all-college senate as one means of achieving this. Where collective bargaining has been instituted, there appears to be evidence of a surfacing of underlying hostility which takes time and flexibility to come to terms with. Once faculty collective bargaining is well established, a more participatory form of governance structure seems to emerge and a more stabilized, more open relationship ensues. A few examples of experience from this or that college of course, can only serve as tentative indicators. The whole realm of shared governance in community colleges, with or without collective bargaining, is still largely virgin country.
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

1. The Academics: Those faculty who primarily teach transfer courses in the Humanities, Social Science or Math, Science and Engineering divisions, as part of a four year program leading to a bachelor's degree.

2. The Vocationalists: Those faculty who primarily teach in the Business or Technical & Industrial division, training students mostly for immediate employment.

3. AFT Members: Those who have primarily been members of the AFT during their service at Fresno City College.

4. Non-AFT Members: Those who have primarily been non-members of the AFT during their service at Fresno City College.

5. AFT Bargaining Agent: Those faculty who chose the AFT or the AFT and other bargaining agents, e.g. AFT and FACCC.

6. Non-AFT Bargaining Agent: Those faculty who signalled any agent other than the AFT as a bargaining agent, e.g. CTA, CJCA, FACCC, NEA or some combination.

7. College Standing Committee: One of the fifteen or so institutional committees established by the college president to serve an administrative or governance function. Usually each committee consists of administrators, supervisory personnel, faculty, and sometimes students; e.g. curriculum & instruction, facilities planning, student personnel.

8. Faculty Senate: Those who have ever served on the Faculty Senate since its inauguration in the fall of 1965.

9. Faculty Senate Executive: Those who have served as president, vice president, or secretary during any of their years as senators.

10. Full Time Faculty: One who teaches an average load of fifteen teaching hours per week or more.

11. Part Time Faculty: One who teaches less than 50% of an instructional load.

12. Participatory Governance: A system of college governance based on shared authority between faculty and administration. This can be implemented through the establishment of a campus council with decision-making authority.

13. Non-Participatory Governance: A system of college governance based on unilateral administration decision-taking; generally characteristic of authoritarian or paternalistic administrations.
14. The Sample: 150 out of 225 faculty - instructors, counselors, FOP and librarians replied to the survey. This sample represents 66 2/3% of the faculty population.

15. Sample Average: The mean of those faculty who replied to the survey.

16. Young Faculty: Those faculty under 41 years of age.

17. Old Faculty: Those faculty over 40 years of age.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

1. While the faculty may be concerned about their emasculated role in the institutional committee system of college governance, there is no direct statistical relationship established between militancy and the governance structure by these two investigations. Faculty militancy could just as easily derive its origins from dissatisfaction with economic affairs, low wages and fringe benefits, or poor physical working conditions. This is the greatest drawback in this study and further research is obviously called for.

2. When dealing with two different samples of the same population, only inferences can be made. Certainly the two samples do not disprove that a relationship exists between militancy and the lack of shared authority in governance.

3. This study can only refer to faculty attitudes at Fresno City College.

4. The sample of returns received may well reflect the attitude of the instructor to the soliciting researcher, to the Nova program in general, to his disposition of the day, or to the number of surveys in which he had already participated. Results may be skewed toward the philosophy of the researcher, since "friends" are more likely to reply than "enemies".

5. The presumption of the researcher is that the faculty senate will be highly militant in its attitudes because of its experience with a committee structure dominated by the administration. In fact the faculty senate could be relatively non-militant, on the basis that no self-respecting militant would waste his time on such non-productive effort.

6. The faculty senate, because of tenure requirements for membership, is somewhat older than the general faculty, which may tend to make the
faculty senate less militant in its institutional stance, or more representative of the views of older faculty.

7. Research data only measured attitudes of the faculty sample for June, 1974. It is entirely possible that the senate or any of the other college groups mentioned could vary their degree of militancy as personnel or particular circumstances change.

8. It would be highly desirable to conduct a survey on militancy at several community colleges. The survey should clearly separate faculty militancy which derives from economic factors from faculty militancy which derives from an emasculated role in the college governance structure. In this way a better relationship between the degree of militancy caused by one or the other could be obtained. Moreover, the Baldridge thesis (more militancy where less governance participation) would then be more thoroughly investigated.

9. In the first sample, while returns reached 86%, only 43 persons were included in a judgment sample. The faculty numbers 225.

10. Sometimes statistics are hampered by small numbers. Those faculty who have been on the faculty senate executive (10) is a relatively small number considering the 150 faculty in the second sample.

11. AFT members who also belong to the CTA are considered in with the AFT group. The presumption is that no one would endure "harassment" of being an AFT member unless he felt some philosophical sympathy with the group. The dual membership in the CTA would presumably be for membership benefits such as insurance, travel, etc. This is a presumption that could be open to challenge.

12. Professional association membership is determined by what the faculty signals it has primarily been member to since coming to the college.
This does not allow for any recent change of professional association membership.
BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1. The assumption is that when 42 senators are elected by the faculty at large, they are no more militant nor less militant than the faculty which elects them. Actually extremist faculty at either end will tend to be defeated.

2. It is assumed that most faculty place themselves up for senate election on a sincere basis to serve as faculty representatives in college governance decisions. A glance at the annual senate report to the college president (Appendix) would support this assumption.

3. Some of the more militant faculty refuse to stand for election on the basis that senate membership is a waste of time. "A number of studies have pointed to the community college heritage of secondary school attitudes toward faculty, and the relatively undeveloped patterns of professionalism among the faculty in these institutions." (Morris Keaton, Shared Authority on Campus, AAHE publication, 1971, p. 81)

4. It is assumed that faculty senate executive officers, past and present, because of their experience working with several of the major campus institutional committees, including (1) the instructional administration committee, (2) president's cabinet, and (3) the college board of trustees, will be more familiar with the workings of college governance than will senators or faculty in general.

5. It is assumed that most faculty, after several months working as senators, will be more cognizant of the limited role the faculty play in the college governance structure. This may tend to make senators more militant.

6. Significance: If A is not significantly greater than B, then B is not significantly less than A. A may be greater than B, yet not significantly greater than B if the difference is not at the .05 level.
PROCEDURES FOR COLLECTING DATA

1. A survey was made of 50 selected instructors requesting their perceptions of the college's institutional committee structure as a form of participatory college governance. The perceptions of the faculty were summarized showing the data on a percentage basis for each relevant question. (Survey I)

2. A second, larger, survey was distributed to all faculty to ascertain their degree of faculty militancy. Information was also requested on age, professional affiliation, teaching division, faculty senate and senate executive membership and promotional aspirations. (Survey II)

3. The "Faculty Senate Annual Report to the College President" is used as an exhibit of senate agenda and as an indication of the sincerity and cooperation of the senate to the institution at large. (See Appendix).
1. Committee assignments are more often chores to be tolerated than opportunities to bring about institutional change.

(SA = strongly agree, A = agree, D = disagree, SD = strongly disagree, NA = no answer)

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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Too many committees do little meaningful work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Committee work is more often a device to give the appearance of faculty participation than a genuine opportunity to bring about change in the college.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Committee work is too often rendered ineffective by the actions of other committees or administrative bodies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Most faculty are reluctant to spend much of their time in committee assignments because they realize that committees have no real power in determining institutional direction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Governance at this institution is clearly in the hands of the administration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. There is wide faculty involvement in important decisions about how the institution is run.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. A concept of "shared authority" (by which faculty and administration arrive at decisions jointly) describes fairly well the system of governance on this campus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. It is not easy for new ideas about educational practice to receive a hearing at the committee level in this institution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Classified staff members should have a role in the institutional committee structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>NA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TO: ALL FACULTY
FROM: GERRY STOKLE
SUBJECT: ANOTHER NOVA SURVEY. This one analyses faculty attitudes on collective bargaining and participation on major college committees. I would like to use it as part of our work on educational statistics. I would really appreciate your assistance.

Please complete and return to me as soon as you can. If you are interested in seeing a copy of the tabulated results, please contact me later.

PLEASE DO NOT STATE YOUR NAME. PLEASE CIRCLE EACH APPROPRIATE ANSWER.

1. CLASSIFICATION: I am primarily A) an instructor; B) a supervisor; C) in counseling or student personnel; D) other e.g. EOP, library, tutorial, media
2. GENDER: I am A) male; B) female
3. AGE: My present age is A) 21-30; B) 31-40; C) 41-50; D) 51-60; E) 61 or over
4. TENURE: I am A) full time tenured; B) full time non-tenured or temporary; C) part-time
5. DIVISION: I work primarily for A) Business; B) Social Science; C) Humanities; D) MSE; E) Technical and Industrial
6. TEACHING EXPERIENCE: My total yearly school experience amounts to A) 1-5; B) 6-10; C) 11-15; D) 16-20; E) 21 or over
7. F.C.C. EXPERIENCE: My total yearly experience at F.C.C. amounts to A) 1-5; B) 6-10; C) 11-15; D) 16-20; E) 21 or over
8. ADMINISTRATION: I hope to move into a college administrative or supervisory position eventually. A) Yes; B) No; C) Undecided; D) Don't know
9. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION: During most of my time at F.C.C., I have primarily been a member of A) CTA; B) FACCC; C) AFT; D) AAUP; E) No affiliation
10. CULTURAL BACKGROUND: My primary cultural background is A) European; B) Non-European, e.g. Mexican, Chicano, African, Negro, Oriental, Indian; C) Decline to answer

Since coming to F.C.C. about how many years have you served in the following capacities:
11. FACULTY SENATE: A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3-4 years; E) 5 years or more
12. FACULTY SENATE EXECUTIVE: (as president, vice president, or secretary) A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3 years; E) 4 years or more
13. CURRICULUM COMMITTEE: A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3 years; E) 4 years or more
14. STUDENT PERSONNEL COMMITTEE: A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3 years; E) 4 years or more
15. SALARY COMMITTEE: A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3 years; E) 4 years or more
16. FACULTY ASSOCIATION EXECUTIVE: (President, Vice-president, secretary, treasurer) A) none; B) 1 year; C) 2 years; D) 3 years; E) 4 or more years
17. STRIKE PARTICIPATION: Would you ever be willing to go out on strike to force the board to raise salaries or impose better working conditions? A) Yes; B) Maybe; C) Never; D) Don't know
18. RIGHT TO STRIKE: Are you in favor of teachers having the right to strike? A) Yes; B) No; C) Don't know
19. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: Are you in favor of collective bargaining rights for teachers? A) Yes; B) No; C) Don't know
20. BARGAINING AGENT: Of the following, which would you most prefer to act as your bargaining agent? A) local salary committee B) a state bargaining agent like CTA or AFT or FACCC
21. Of the following choices, which would you most prefer to act as your bargaining agent negotiating with board representative on your behalf? A) AFT; B) NEA; C) FACCC; D) CTA; E) CJCA

Thank you for your time.

Gerry Stokle
PROCEDURES FOR TREATING DATA

1. In order to prove that there is a high degree of faculty frustration over the college governance structure, the survey of faculty responses on the subject is compared on a 1-4 scale using simple percentages.

2. In order to prove that there is a high degree of faculty militancy a second survey of faculty responses on the subject is analyzed using simple percentages.

3. It is important to emphasize that the two surveys are entirely separate and that conclusions for one survey must not be related or ascribed to the other except through inference.

4. With regard to the second survey on which major conclusions are drawn, a test of the significance of the difference between two sample proportions is used. The critical z value is calculated to test whether the proportion of the faculty senate (P₁) favoring the right to strike is not significantly less than a similar minded proportion of each of the following faculty groups: the young (P₅), the academics (P₇), the AFT members (P₉). The same process is used to test whether the proportion of faculty senate executive (P₃) favoring the right to strike is not significantly less than a similar minded proportion of each of the three groups of faculty mentioned above (P₅, P₇, P₉).

5. Procedure

I. The Faculty Senate
   A. When the faculty senate proportion is smaller:

   \[
   \begin{align*}
   &H_{0,1} : P_5 = P_1 \\
   &H_{0,2} : P_7 = P_1 \\
   &H_{0,3} : P_9 = P_1 \\
   \end{align*}
   \]

   \[
   \begin{align*}
   &H_1 : P_5 > P_1 \\
   &H_2 : P_7 > P_1 \\
   &H_3 : P_9 > P_1 \\
   \end{align*}
   \]
**B. When the faculty senate proportion is larger:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypotheses</th>
<th>Alternative Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,4.}$ : $P_1 = P_5$</td>
<td>$H_4 : P_1 &gt; P_5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0.5.} : P_i = P_7$</td>
<td>$H_5 : P_i &gt; P_7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,6.} : P_i = P_q$</td>
<td>$H_6 : P_i &gt; P_q$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II. Faculty Senate Executive**

**A. When the faculty senate executive proportion is smaller:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypotheses</th>
<th>Alternative Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,7.} : P_5 = P_3$</td>
<td>$H_7 : P_5 &gt; P_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,8.} : P_7 = P_3$</td>
<td>$H_8 : P_7 &gt; P_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,9.} : P_q = P_3$</td>
<td>$H_9 : P_q &gt; P_3$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**B. When the faculty senate executive proportion is larger:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypotheses</th>
<th>Alternative Hypotheses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,10} : P_3 = P_5$</td>
<td>$H_{10} : P_3 &gt; P_5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,11} : P_3 = P_7$</td>
<td>$H_{11} : P_3 &gt; P_7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{0,12} : P_3 = P_q$</td>
<td>$H_{12} : P_3 &gt; P_q$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. I establish the critical z value by referring to a table of areas of the normal curve. The critical z value for a one-tailed test is 1.645. Therefore, I reject $H_0$ and accept $H_a$ when $z \geq 1.645$.

7. I apply the formula:

$$Z = \frac{p_1 - p_2}{\sqrt{\frac{pq}{n_1} + \frac{pq}{n_2}}}$$

8. After testing for significance, I accept or reject the null hypotheses dealing with the faculty senate and (1) young faculty under 41 years of age (2) academic faculty (3) AFT members. Similarly, for the faculty senate executive, after testing for significance, I accept or reject those hypotheses dealing with the militancy of (1) young faculty (2) the academic faculty and (3) the AFT faculty.
The militancy of the faculty senate and its executive in relation to other campus groups.

Table 2: Those favoring collective bargaining

Table 3: Those in favor of teachers having the right to strike (actual numbers).

Table 4: Those in favor of teachers having the right to strike (percentages)

Table 5: Willingness to go out on strike

Table 6: Table of difference of proportions - Faculty Senate

Table 7: Table of difference of proportions - Faculty Senate Executive
# Table Two

The militancy of the faculty senate and its executive in relation to other campus groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19. Those favoring collective bargaining</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Total responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P₁</td>
<td>Faculty Senate</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₂</td>
<td>Non-Faculty Sen.</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₃</td>
<td>Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₄</td>
<td>Non-Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₅</td>
<td>Faculty Under 41</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₆</td>
<td>Faculty Over 40</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₇</td>
<td>Academic Div's.</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₈</td>
<td>Vocational Div's.</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₉</td>
<td>A.F.T.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P₁₀</td>
<td>Non-A.F.T.</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample average: 92 | 2 | 6 | 131
The militancy of the Faculty Senate and its executive in relation to other campus groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Actual Numbers</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Militant Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1: Faculty Senate</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2: Non-Faculty Sen.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
<td>.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3: Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4: Non-Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
<td>.725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5: Faculty Under 41</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>.754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6: Faculty Over 40</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P7: Academic Div.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
<td>.773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P8: Vocational Div.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P9: A.F.T.</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P10: Non-A.F.T.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample Average</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE FOUR

**THE MILITANCY OF THE FACULTY SENATE AND ITS EXECUTIVE IN RELATION TO OTHER CAMPUS GROUPS.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18 IN FAVOR OF TEACHERS HAVING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>DK.</th>
<th>TOTAL RESPONSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p_1$ FACULTY SENATE</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_2$ NON FACULTY SEN.</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_3$ FACULTY SEN. EXEC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_4$ NON FACULTY SEN. EXEC</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_5$ FACULTY UNDER 41</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_6$ FACULTY OVER 40</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_7$ ACADEMIC DIV'S.</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_8$ VOCATIONAL DIV'S.</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_9$ A.F.T.</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p_{10}$ NON-A.F.T.</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAMPLE AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whenever the faculty senate percentage is more than the comparison group, (as with $p_5$ FACULTY under 41 and $p_7$ academic faculty above), then obviously the faculty senate is not significantly less militant than the comparison group.
### Table IVE

The militancy of the Faculty Senate and its executive in relation to other campus groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. Willingness to go out on strike</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Maybe</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( P_1 ) Faculty Senate</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_2 ) Non Faculty Sen.</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_3 ) Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_4 ) Non-Faculty Sen. Exec</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_5 ) Faculty Under 41</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_6 ) Faculty Over 40</td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_7 ) Academic Div's.</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_8 ) Vocational Div's.</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_9 ) A.F.T.</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_{10} ) Non-A.F.T.</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sample Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE SIX

TABLE OF DIFFERENCE OF PROPORTIONS

FACULTY SENATE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>d = .05</th>
<th>MILITANT PROPORTION</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL Z: 1.645</td>
<td>TEST GROUP</td>
<td>FAC. SENATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDER 41</td>
<td>.754</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACADEMIC DIVISIONS</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFT.</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>.782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the faculty senate proportion is higher than that of the test group, then the first hypothesis is obviously confirmed, since there is no way that the proportion can be significantly smaller when it is in fact larger. This occurs in line 1 and 2 above. Where the faculty senate proportion is less than that of the test group (line 3 above) it is necessary to calculate z to test for significance. The calculated z is 1.2879, which is less than the critical z value of 1.645 (one-tailed test, .05 level of significance). Therefore the difference is not significant, the contrary hypothesis is not accepted, and my first hypothesis is confirmed.
TABLE SEVEN

TABLE OF DIFFERENCE OF PROPORTIONS

FACULTY SENATE EXECUTIVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \alpha = 0.05 )</th>
<th>MILITANT PROPORTION</th>
<th>TEST GROUP</th>
<th>FACULTY SENATE EXECUTIVE</th>
<th>DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>CALCULATED ( z )</th>
<th>RESULT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRITICAL ( Z ): 1.645</td>
<td>#1: UNDER AGE 41</td>
<td>.754</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.246</td>
<td>1.766</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2: ACADEMIC DIVISIONS</td>
<td>.773</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>1.690</td>
<td>EXECUTIVE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3: AFT.</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>1.209</td>
<td>NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where the faculty senate executive proportion is higher than that of the test group, then the second hypothesis is obviously confirmed, since there is no way the proportion can be significantly smaller when it is in fact larger. This occurs in all three cases. To further strengthen my argument, I calculated \( z \) even in cases where the faculty senate executive militant proportion was greater than that of the test group. \( z \) was found to be significant in lines 2 and 3 above. If the proportion is significantly greater, it is impossible for it to be significantly less. A significant \( z \) here is more than adequate confirmation of my second thesis.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DATA

The results of Survey I indicate that of the 50 instructors polled, 43 replied: an 86% response. The faculty replies indicate a high degree of dissatisfaction with the campus governance structure. More than 3 out of 4 replies consider that college governance is clearly in the hands of the administration. Four out of every five replies disagree with the notion that there is wide faculty involvement in important campus decisions. Four out of five responses consider that most faculty are reluctant to spend much of their time on committee assignments because committees have no real power in determining institutional direction. Three out of four consider that committee work is too often rendered ineffective by the actions of other committees. Less than one in five agree that "shared authority describes the system of governance on the campus." Perhaps saddest of all, 63% - i.e. 2 out of 3, agree that it is not easy for new ideas about educational practice to receive a hearing at the committee level. This sample of about 18% of the faculty indicates a high level of dissatisfaction with the college governance system by those participating in the poll.

The results of Survey II were equally as revealing. Out of 225 faculty polled, i.e. the total faculty, 150 replied. This indicates a 66 2/3% return. Ninety per cent of those replying indicated they were in favor of collective bargaining, and about three out of four considered that instructors should have the right to strike. The faculty from the vocational divisions were less militant on both counts: only 87% favored collective bargaining and only 66% were convinced that teachers should have the right to strike.

In response to the question on willingness to go out on strike if
necessary, 40% of the faculty replies said they would be so willing. The survey indicated that 51% of the academic faculty members who replied were willing to use strike action and 62% of the AFT members were so willing. For a public service industry which has, as yet, no collective bargaining rights, where strike action is illegal, and where no strike at least in our area has ever taken place, these results seem to indicate a high degree of faculty militancy.

If we restrict our judgements to the narrower hypotheses advanced, the replies infer that indeed there is no significant difference between the militancy of the faculty senate and the traditional militant groups on campus - the young (under 41), the academic faculty and the AFT members - judged by views on the faculty's right to use strike action. Favoring the right were 100% of the faculty senate executive member replies, 87% of the AFT member replies, 78% of the faculty senate replies and 75% of those replies from faculty under 41 years of age.

Perhaps most revealing of all is what the survey reveals about the militancy of the faculty senate executive. Calculations show that this group is significantly more militant than either the younger faculty (under 41) or the academic faculty. The militancy of the faculty senate executive is not significantly less than the militancy of the AFT membership.
CONCLUSIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE

There appears to be indications of a high degree of faculty dissatisfaction with the institutional committee structure at Fresno City College. Moreover, one survey infers that the militancy of the faculty senate is no less significant than those groups on campus traditionally considered most militant; i.e., the young, the academic faculty and AFT faculty members. Nevertheless, the relationship between senate militancy and a feeling of frustration developed from experience with the college governance structure cannot be established based on the evidence presented from this research. We however cannot ignore that militancy and non-participatory governance, both of which are in strong evidence, may be related. Certainly further studies are urgently needed to test for this potential relationship.

Evidence certainly indicates there is a need to examine our governance structure to help establish more representative forms of governance to dissipate at least one of the two traditional areas for faculty irritation. If collective bargaining comes, and of course there is no guarantee that it shall, then at least the hours of preparation necessary for a better governance structure will not have been wasted.

If shared governance can be made a reality before the advent of collective bargaining it would certainly smooth the transition, because a participatory governance structure would already have been established and in operation. That bond of toleration and cooperation forged through hours of shared governance procedures could cushion the campus through this most
difficult period. Their accumulated experience would dictate that general policy negotiations should be kept out of a rigid contract. Antagonisms could be resolved early. Participatory governance would focus emphasis on college aims and objectives vis-a-vis the needs of the community.

If not shared governance now, what is the alternative? The administration could retain every fiber of its decision-taking muscle to add to its arsenal of bargaining trophies to be bartered for future faculty concessions. If the basic criteria is the best educational service for the community, any delay in inaugurating a plan for granting greater participation in college governance will unnecessarily delay higher quality instruction. We believe that a happier faculty is also one that strives harder.

If collective bargaining does not come, then the college would still be richer for its experience of wider communication, more representative governance, a greater sharing of goals, as well as mutually shared responsibility for their implementation. In that case, collective bargaining may just not be necessary, because the militancy which precedes it would already have been dissipated.
RESIDUAL FINDINGS

FROM SURVEY I
Seventy-six percent of the faculty surveyed considered that classified staff members should have a role in the institutional committee structure.

FROM SURVEY II
There was very little difference between the responses of males and females on the survey except for one: while 44% of men were willing to participate in a teacher strike if necessary, only 24% of the women were willing to participate.

Only 7% of the faculty hoped to move into supervisory or administrative positions. Of these, 70% believed in the teacher's right to strike; 18% would choose the AFT as their bargaining agent, and none were willing to participate in any strike action.

Only 12% of the 150 faculty replies indicated that they have ever served on the faculty senate. Only 30% had ever served on the curriculum committee.

In the event of the establishment of collective bargaining rights for teachers, 33% of the group would choose the AFT as their bargaining agent; 28% would choose CTA, and 10% would choose FACCC. Over 28% did not know whom to choose.
FURTHER STUDIES

It would be highly desirable to conduct a survey on faculty militancy which would clearly separate militancy which derives from economic factors from militancy which derives from an emasculated role in the college governance structure. In this way a better relationship between the degree of militancy caused by one or the other could be obtained.

It would also be highly desirable to conduct a survey on militancy at several community colleges. In this way the Baldridge thesis (more militancy where less governance participation) could then be more thoroughly investigated. In a limited study of eleven California community colleges done by the author for a concurrent governance practicum, preliminary indications confirm that college governance structure is least participatory in more rural, non-university communities. However, no measure of faculty militancy was attempted.

There is a need to investigate more thoroughly the background and experience of faculty senate members. How does their degree of militancy at the beginning of their term of office differ from their militancy after one or two years? A longitudinal study to ascertain whether the senate experience really makes senate members more militant is desirable.

All of these suggested surveys would make interesting studies for further investigation.
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APPENDIX

1. Calculations: Problems 1→6

2. Faculty Senate Annual Report 1973-74
CALCULATIONS

PROBLEM #1: To prove that the militant proportion of the Faculty Senate is greater than the militant proportion of those faculty under 41 years of age, on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0,4}: p_1 = p_5 \quad H_{A}: p_1 > p_5 \]

\[ z = \frac{p_1 - p_5}{\sqrt{p(1-p)\left(\frac{1}{n_1} + \frac{1}{n_5}\right)}} \]

where \( p_1 = \frac{61}{78} = .782 \quad p_5 = \frac{43}{57} = .754 \)

\( \bar{p} = .7704 \quad \bar{q} = .2296 \)

\[ z = \frac{.785 - .754}{\sqrt{(.7704)(.2296) + (.7704)(.2296)}} \]

\[ z = .4218 \]

Conclusion:
Since the calculated \( z \) does not exceed the critical \( z \), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no significant difference between the militant proportion of the faculty senate and the militant proportion of the faculty under 41 years of age on the subject of the faculty right to strike.
PROBLEM: To prove that the militant proportion of the faculty senate is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty from the academic divisions on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0.5} : p_1 = p_7 \quad H_5 : p_1 > p_7 \]

\[ \alpha = .05 \quad z = 1.645 \]

\[ z = \frac{p_1 - p_7}{\sqrt{\frac{pq}{n_1} + \frac{pq}{n_7}}} \]

Where \( p_1 = \frac{61}{78} = .7821 \quad p_7 = \frac{75}{97} = .7732 \)

\[ \bar{p} = .7771 \quad \bar{q} = .2229 \]

\[ z = \frac{.7821 - .7732}{\sqrt{\frac{(.7771)(.2229)}{78} + \frac{(.7771)(.2229)}{97}}} \]

\[ z = .1408 \]

Conclusion: Since the calculated \( z \) does not exceed the critical \( z \), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no significant difference between the militant proportion of the faculty senate and the militant proportion of the academic faculty on the subject of the faculty right to strike.
To prove that the militant proportion of the AFT members is not significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0,3} : \hat{p}_q = p_1 \quad \quad H_{3} : \hat{p}_q > p_1 \]

\[ \alpha = .05 \quad \quad z = 1.645 \]

\[ z = \frac{\hat{p}_q - p_1}{\sqrt{\frac{p_2}{n_q} + \frac{p_1}{n_1}}} \]

Where

\[ \hat{p}_q = \frac{47}{54} = .8704 \quad \quad p_1 = \frac{61}{78} = .7821 \]

\[ \bar{p} = .8182 \quad \quad \bar{q} = .1818 \]

\[ z = \frac{.8704 - .7821}{\sqrt{(\frac{.8182)(.1818)}{54} + (\frac{.8182)(.1818)}{78}}} \]

\[ z = 1.2879 \]

Conclusion: Since the calculated z does not exceed the critical z, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no significant difference between the militant proportion of AFT faculty and the militant proportion of the faculty senate on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

The militant proportion of AFT faculty is not significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty senate.
To prove that the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty under 41 on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0.01}: \quad p_3 = p_5 \quad H_{0.01}: \quad p_3 > p_5 \]

\[ z = \frac{p_3 - p_5}{\sqrt{\frac{pq}{n_3} + \frac{pq}{n_5}}} \]

where \( p_3 = 1.0 \) \( p_5 = 0.754 \)

\[ \bar{p} = 0.7910 \quad \bar{q} = 0.209 \]

\[ z = \frac{1.0 - 0.754}{\sqrt{0.7910(0.209) + 0.7910(0.209)}} \]

\[ z = 1.766 \]

**CONCLUSION:** Since the calculated \( z \) exceeds the critical \( z \), the null hypothesis can be rejected. On the subject of the faculty right to strike, the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the faculty under age 41 years of age. The faculty senate executive is significantly more militant than the faculty under 41 on the subject of the faculty right to strike.
**PROBLEM #5**: To prove that the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the academic faculty on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0,11} : p_3 = p_7 \quad H_{1,1} : p_3 > p_7 \]

\[ d = .05 \quad z = 1.645 \]

\[ z = \frac{p_3 - p_7}{\sqrt{\frac{p_3 \cdot q_3}{n_3} + \frac{p_7 \cdot q_7}{n_7}}} \]

Where \[ p_3 = 1.0 \quad p_7 = .7732 \]

\[ \bar{p} = .7944 \quad \bar{q} = .2056 \]

\[ z = \frac{1.0 - .7732}{\sqrt{(0.7944)(0.2056)} + (0.7944)(0.2056)} \]

\[ z = 1.69 \]

**CONCLUSION:**

Since the calculated \( z \) exceeds the critical \( z \), the null hypothesis can be rejected. On the subject of the faculty right to strike, the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the academic faculty (at the .05 level).
To prove that the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive is significantly greater than the militant proportion of the AFT members, on the subject of the faculty right to strike.

\[ H_{0,12} : P_3 = P_q \quad H_{1,2} : P_3 > P_q \]

\[ d = .05 \quad z = 1.645 \]

\[ z = \frac{P_3 - P_q}{\sqrt{\frac{P_q}{n_3} + \frac{P_q}{n_q}}} \]

Where

\[ P_3 = 1.0 \quad P_q = .8704 \]

\[ \bar{P} = .8906 \quad \bar{Q} = .1094 \]

\[ z = \frac{1.0 - .8704}{\sqrt{(.8906)(.1094) + (.8906)(.1094)}} \]

\[ z = 1.209 \]

Conclusion:

Since the calculated z does not exceed the critical z, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no significant difference between the militant proportion of the faculty senate executive and the militant proportion of the AFT membership at the .05 level, with regard to the faculty right to strike.
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE 1973-74 ACADEMIC YEAR

FACULTY SENATE
FRESNO CITY COLLEGE

J. Gerald Stokle
Faculty Senate President
It is my pleasure to present to you the achievements and recommendations of the Faculty Senate for the academic year 1973-74. This is the first time that the faculty senate has participated in an annual report to the college president.

ACHIEVEMENTS

This year the faculty senate has dealt with the following matters:

1. Recommended the establishment of a credit-no credit grading policy.
2. Recommended the consideration of a forgiveness policy.
3. Recommended the establishment of the student-initiated withdrawal date from the ninth to the tenth week of semester to permit publication of mid-term grades.
4. Made a thorough study of administrative re-organization and the presentation of an initial and a final report within the established time limits to the President and Superintendent of the district.
5. Made an appraisal of the advisability of establishing an early academic calendar. We conducted two major faculty surveys.
6. Investigated the idea of establishing academic rank.
7. Recommended that the University-Warner treed area be retained as an open parkland rather than as a parking lot.
8. Suggested fenestration for the mailroom in the new administration building.
9. Recommended the compromise position of a colonnaded garden as a solution to the problem of retaining a historical remnant of the old administration building.
10. Established an ethics committee to investigate problems and recommend procedures.
11. Following a Reedley initiative, concurred and encouraged the establishment of emeritus status for retired faculty.
12. Examined and recommended changes in district Nepotism Policy H029.
13. Recommended the establishment of mail boxes in the mailroom for T and I faculty.
14. Recommended the re-establishment of the "President's Tea" at the beginning of the year. The Science "Open House" resulted.
15. Attempted to achieve better counselor-faculty relations through a faculty-counselor committee. "Guidance Show" resulted.
16. Developed a new faculty senate budget.
17. Assisted the Dean of Instruction to establish a student grade review petition.
18. Senate members individually have served on all campus committees. The Senate President has met with the superintendent and college president to discuss business matters.
19. Established administrative representatives on the Faculty Senate and Senate representation on the instructional administrative staff.
21. Concurred in the recommended changes in B.P. 6131 and 6134.
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE 1973-74 ACADEMIC YEAR

FACULTY SENATE
FRESNO CITY COLLEGE

J. Gerald Stokle
Faculty Senate President

UNIVERSITY OF CALIF.
LOS ANGELES
APR 4 1975
CLEARINGHOUSE FOR
JUNIOR COLLEGE
INFORMATION
19. Recommended separation of two conflicting proposals: a child development laboratory and a student child care center. Because both of these items have been confused in the past, no action could be taken.

20. Endorsed the establishment of Scan-Tron Corporation test scoring computer.

21. Issued a monthly senate bulletin informing faculty of the major problems and decisions emanating out of the weekly cabinet meetings.

22. Reproduced and distributed the monthly ASCCC bulletin informing faculty of the major developments in education at the state level.

23. Made suggestions on making parking procedure simpler.


25. Petitioned for institutional membership of ASCCC.


**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

1. The operation of a senate executive to prepare agenda in depth has been a considerable success and should be continued.

2. The presence of Administrative officers at Senate Meetings has been very valuable and rendered considerable assistance with deliberations. This practice of having administrators on call as resource personnel should be continued.

3. The presence of certain non-faculty representatives on a permanent basis has worked well. (the Dean of Instruction and the President of ASB) It is recommended that representation be sought from the Dean of Student Personnel and from classified staff on the same basis. This process of increased communication between differing college factions should be encouraged.

4. A fully informed faculty is one that can participate more fully in college governance and administrative advisement. There is need for greater clerical assistance to function effectively.

5. Divisional and departmental representation on faculty senate is not always proportional. It is recommended that some reform be made in faculty elections.

6. There has been considerable assistance received from ASCCC in keeping the faculty apprised of the progress of education law. Back-up information has also been available on many topics through our participation in ASCCC conferences. It is recommended that this college seek institutional membership in ASCCC.

7. In view of the increased expectations of the Senate President regarding campus communication, agenda preparation in executive session, and attendance at all cabinet, all board and CPC meetings, it is recommended that the released time allowance for the Senate President be increased from 3.0 units to 4.25 units of a 15 unit load. This is the average released time allotment for the 56 California colleges which give released time.