The international system exhibits very sharp phase boundaries, the most striking of which is the boundary between war and peace. A phase boundary for water would be the difference between water and ice, influenced by pressure and temperature. Similarly the phase boundary between war and peace is influenced by national strength and stress. Although the measure of strength and stress is difficult, stress- and strength-related variables can be identified and studied. Also, examined over a long period of time, the system shows four "phase conditions," distinguished by the probability of peace or war: stable war, unstable war, unstable peace, and stable peace. A categorization of variables not completely analogous to stress and strength, but of use conceptually, are (1) the components of a threat system—size of war industry, use of threats in international communication, for instance; (2) integrative patterns of trade, communication, tourism, or diplomatic relations. Yet, the dynamic processes which carry the system from one point to another must be considered. All these processes involve a change in perception of the world. A widened area of stable peace has been the result of a long cumulative learning process about the nature of community and the strength of integrative bonds. This process is facilitated by all intellectual attempts to understand it. (JH)
The international system, like most significant chunks of the universe, is easier to identify than it is to define. We can think of it spatially as the division of the world by national boundaries, although there are tricky problems here like the little pieces of France and Portugal scattered around the world that these countries claim are provinces or departments. There are also dependencies of ambiguous status: the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, or New Caledonia. For the most part, however, we know pretty well where one nation ends and another begins on the map, and the international system is primarily the interaction of nations. Nations, however, are not the only actors in it. We may want to include the intergovernmental organizations, the international nongovernmental organizations, and the international corporations as significant actors in the system. Furthermore, the governments of nations themselves tend to be specialized into those aspects such as the armed forces and the diplomatic service which are specifically related to the international system, and those "domestic" organizations which may be influenced by and may influence the international system but are not primarily concerned with it.
Perhaps the greatest peculiarity of the international system is that it exhibits very sharp phase boundaries, unlike most other segments of the social system which exhibit fairly continuous changes of condition. The most striking of these phase boundaries is the one between peace and war. If we pick at random two countries and a date from the record of human history, there is likely to be quite wide agreement among historians as to whether these two countries were at war or at peace on this particular date. Thus, on December 5, 1941 the United States and Japan were not at war, even though the probability of their being at war was very high and increasing. On December 8th they quite clearly were at war, and the whole set of behavioral patterns and preferences had changed. As in any phase system there may be some slightly doubtful cases on the phase boundaries, as in physics there may be supercooled liquids and noncrystalline solids like glass. It may not be wholly clear, for instance, at what date the United States became at war in Vietnam. With a decline in the legitimacy of a war indeed there is a strong tendency not to declare wars and to have informal intervention in local civil wars in varying degrees. Nevertheless, most people would agree that in 1970 the United States was at war with North Vietnam and was not at war with the Soviet Union.

It is not always realized how peculiar the sharp distinction between peace and war is by comparison with most other conditions and states of the social system. The distinction between the rich and the poor, for instance, may be drawn by an arbitrary line, as we do, but everybody recognizes that the line is completely arbitrary and that there is in fact a continuum of states whether of individuals, families, or nations between poverty and riches. It is likewise quite impossible to draw a
sharp line between justice and injustice. Here we lack even a social indicator like GNP per capita, which gives us at least some clue as to the difference between riches and poverty, imperfect as it is as a measure. Here will be no agreement, however, as to whether the United States is a more or less just country than the Soviet Union, or whether Sweden is a more just society than Canada. When it comes to peace and war, however, the distinction is almost as clear as the distinction between water and ice, or water and steam.

A very interesting question is the extent to which these phase boundaries are a construct of the social system, which arise because we find continuity in some sense threatening or uncomfortable. We see this, for instance, in certification, such as the awarding of diplomas and degrees, which creates, as it were, a wholly artificial phase boundary between the undergraduate and the graduate. In terms of knowledge, skill, and personality these certification boundaries are completely arbitrary. The difference in terms of accomplishment between 119 credit hours and 120 is very small, but it makes a remarkable difference in the certification. We find somewhat the same problem in criminal law. A person is "certified" as a criminal by processes of examination which are not wholly different from the processes by which he becomes certified as a graduate. Here again, the division of the human race into criminals and non-criminals is a fairly arbitrary division in a very continuous field. Few of us have not broken some laws at some time and the continuum in terms of anti-social behavior between the respectable banker and the hardened criminal has few striking gaps in it.
Some might argue that the convention of declaration of war is as arbitrary as graduation. I am inclined to think, however, that there is something quite real in the phase character of the international system and that there is a genuine alternation between two states of the system—peace and war—which are widely different in terms of what is acceptable behavior. The difference between peace and war is not necessarily a difference in basic hostility or in the extent of conflict, both of which may be rather continuous. It is, however, a striking difference in behavior patterns. We do things in war we would not do in peace, at least on so large a scale. Before we can bomb a city or even fight a battle there must be a definition of the situation, as war rather than peace.

In physical systems phase boundaries are usually drawn in some continuous field. Figure 1, for instance, shows the phase boundaries for water and different forms of ice on the field of pressure and temperature, each of which varies continuously. The essence of a phase system is that for each set of variables in the continuous field we know which phase we are in. Thus, at a pressure of one atmosphere if the temperature is -1° Centigrade, we have ice; if it is +1° Centigrade, we have water. The slope of the phase boundary is of some interest. In the case of water and ice this is particularly interesting because of changes. If we are at point A, where we have water, we can get ice either by lowering the temperature to A₂ or by increasing the pressure to A₁. If we are at point B, we can get ice either by lowering the temperature to B₂ or by lowering the pressure to B₁.

One of the most interesting, but still somewhat unresolved, problems of the international system is the nature of its continuous field on which
Figure 1

Figure 2

we could draw a phase boundary between peace and war. The situation is complicated by the fact that we have a many-dimensional field and also large numbers of actors. If we are to reduce the model of the system to manageable proportions, we have to reduce the dimensions of the field and perhaps have to begin with a simple two-actor model. One of the simplest phase models is that of a breaking point—if you put enough stress on a system it will break, which is a new phase. The concept of the transition from peace to war as a breaking point has some attractiveness. In this case we would want to try to identify two field variables, one which could be labelled "stress" and the other which could be labelled "strength," as in Figure 2. Dotted line OB is then the breaking boundary. I have drawn this through the origin, as where there is no strength a very small increase in stress is likely to produce breaking. The breaking line does not have to be linear, but it seems likely to be reasonably linear over a substantial range. If there is an immovable object, the line will curve down and become horizontal, that is, there is some strength that no amount of stress can break; if there is an irresistible force, the line will curve up and become vertical, that is, there will be some stress that no strength can withstand.

Suppose now that we are at position A in peace. If there is an increase in stress that carries us beyond the stress line, from A to A₁, then at B₁ there is a sudden transition from peace to war. If there is a diminution in strength that takes us from A to A₂, there will be a transition from peace to war at B₂. Most pairs in the international system could be placed somewhere in this figure. Thus, C might represent the situation between the United States and Canada, where it would take a very
large increase in stress to cross the boundary. \( M \) would be the condition as between Israel and Egypt, where a small increase in stress will cross the boundary into war. The problem of peace is then seen as how to move towards the top left-hand part of the field, where strength is high and stress is low. This may be difficult if stress and strength are related, as they may be. By "strength" here I do not mean military strength in the conventional sense, but rather the "strength of peace," that is, the ability of peace to withstand stress. This may be a function of the structure of military strength, but it is a very complex one. One suspects that the major relationship is between the strength of peace and an imbalance of military strength, which has to be coupled, however, with an image on the part of the militarily stronger party that its interest is to preserve the weaker party. If an attempt to increase the strength of the system in some sense increases the stress, that is, as the system moves, say, from \( A \) to \( A_3 \), the system may break at \( B_3 \) in spite of the increase in strength.

There are quite severe empirical problems in measuring and identifying either strength or stress, even in physical systems. Thus, the strength of materials can only be found by stressing them until they break. One might almost think the same of the international system in the past, as war has been a method of testing the system by increasing the stress on it until it does actually break. The method is only workable in the case of materials, however, because we can take a very small sample, which in the international system we cannot do. The international system is rather like the testing method of the cathedral builders, which was to build towers higher and higher until they fell down. Even modern engineers
are not wholly immune from this principle, as witness the Tacoma Bridge and the John Hancock Building in Boston, where the engineers shaved the safety factors until they fell over the edge.

The cost of testing depends not only on the possibility of getting small samples, but also on the extent to which the system is reversible. The phase system of Figure 1 on the whole is reversible, as we can go from water to ice just as easy as we can from ice to water, simply by raising or lowering the temperature or pressure, though even in this case there are interesting "costs" of crossing the phase boundary in terms of latent heat. Once we get ice up to the melting point we have to put a lot of heat into it before it melts; when we get water down to the freezing point we have to take a lot of heat out of it before it freezes. In the case of Figure 2, however, these latent costs can easily become infinite. Once the unbroken is broken there may be no way of putting it together again. This might be called the "Humpty Dumpty" principle. Thus, Figure 2 might represent a marriage situation, where OB is the divorce line. As we move from, say, A, where the marriage is unbroken, towards A₁ under increasing stress, or perhaps even to A₂ under diminishing strength, we will cross the divorce line. Once we reach it we are likely to stay there for awhile while social heat is being applied in order to turn the crystal ice of marriage into the lose flowing water of divorce. Once the marriage is broken it is quite rare for it to be put back again. Moving from A₁ to A is much more difficult than from A to A₁. In this case the latent social heat of crystallization is much greater than the latent social heat of melting.
We might indeed postulate another boundary, OR, which is the reconciliation, or the mending, line, which is significant for passage from the broken phase to the unbroken one. Thus, if the system moves from A to \( A_1 \), from the unbroken to the broken phase, it may have to move right back beyond \( R_1 \) in order for the broken pieces to be put together again. This pattern is common in the international system. Once a peace is broken war often increases the hostilities to the point where it becomes much more difficult to reestablish peace than to break it. Under the stresses of war, also, the line OB itself may swing to the left, so that even if peace is reestablished it becomes easier to break. The long record of traditionally hostile nations, like France and Germany, Russia and Germany, and in earlier days England and Scotland, England and France, Burma and Thailand, and so on, suggests patterns of this kind. On the other hand, once peace has been established for a long time it becomes a habit and the war boundary OB may swing downward and to the right, so that the system can stand more stress without breaking.

The empirical problem of measuring both strength and stress in the international system is so severe that the politicometricians among us may reject this whole paradigm as unworkable. We do have to be careful, however, to avoid one of the real traps of scientific inquiry, which is that of concentrating on things that are easy to do rather than on those which are important. Up to a point this may be a reasonable strategy, as once we have done the things that are easy to do the things that are hard may become easier, but this is not always true and there is much to be said for having somebody at least to worry about the important things which are hard, otherwise they may be lost sight of. Furthermore, problems which seem very
difficult can sometimes be made easier by breaking them down along appropriate lines. Thus, even though the measurement of strength and stress may defy us in any exact form, we can identify strength-related variables and stress-related variables and study these. A very good example of this would be Alan Newcombe's study\(^1\) of the relation of changes in the proportion of GNP going into the war industry in different countries, to the probability of their engaging in war. Other possible indicators would be hostility measures as reflected in official publications and newspapers, the withdrawal of diplomats, the imposition of trade barriers, a decline in tourism, and so on. If, of course, we could find a single one-dimensional index which would combine both strength and stress, then we might be able to discover a breaking point. The question would still remain, however, as to what determined the position of this breaking point, which would depend on other variables of the system.

Outside the dramatic and obvious boundary between peace and war, if we look at the system over longer periods of time we can perhaps distinguish four "phase conditions" or general states of the system, distinguished roughly by the probability of peace or war, which in turn may be roughly measured by the frequencies.\(^2\) At one end of the scale we have stable war, outside

\(^1\) Alan Newcombe and James Wert, An Inter-Nation Tensiometer for the Prediction of War (Oakville, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1972).

in which there is continual fighting with virtually no intermission. Of course, the location of the fighting may shift and war may oscillate between more active and less active periods. The relations between North and South Vietnam are probably as close as we get to this in the last twenty-five years, but there are not infrequent historical examples. Just how long a period of protracted warfare we have to take to regard the situation as stable is a matter of judgment, but certainly when war goes on long enough so that the majority of people in society have never known anything else, which is the case now in Vietnam, the appellation of stable war seems not inappropriate. One gets something like this internally in family feuding, in brigandage, in guerilla fighting, and it may be indeed that stable war is more characteristic of internal war in disorganized and weak states than it is in international war, simply because states are often better organized at the international level than they are internally, and international war tends to follow a more structured logic of organization and convention.

In the international system proper indeed stable war is rare and tends to pass over into unstable war, in which war is broken by intermittent periods of peace. One could almost say indeed that the very concept of the international system develops only as the relations between hostile groups become sophisticated enough to permit periods of peace. Over most of human history peace and war have alternated, as we have suggested, in the relations of states. Within the condition of alternating peace and war we might want to define unstable war as the condition in which war is regarded as a norm and peace as an interruption. The Middle East seems close to this condition in the last twenty-five or thirty years. By contrast,
we might define unstable peace as the situation in which peace is regarded as the norm and war as an interruption, designed to reestablish peace on more favorable terms to one or the other of the contending parties. The European international system and its extensions around the world seems to have conformed to this condition since about 1648.

Finally, there is a condition of stable peace in which the probability of war is so low between two nations that it does not enter significantly into their policies. We can certainly identify North America as having had stable peace at least since about 1870, Scandinavia since about 1815, and we may be very close to this in the whole temperate zone. I have suggested that an operational definition of stable peace between two countries might be derived from an examination of the layer of dust on the plans for invasion in their respective defense organizations!

Again, the question arises, what kind of continuous field can we postulate with enough variables to describe the dynamics of the system and some hope eventually of identifying the phase boundaries which divide the various conditions mentioned above? In an earlier essay I postulated a field of two broad variables, one somewhat analogous to pressure, measured perhaps by the size of the war industries, the threatening or non-threatening posture of the armed forces, and the use of threats in international communications, and the other somewhat analogous to temperature, in which we might devise some index of the integrative patterns of the system in terms of trade, correspondence, communication, tourism, expressions of solidarity and friendship, good diplomatic relations, in earlier days royal marriages, and so on. I am not quite sure whether high integrative structures are analogous to the warmth of friendship or the coolness.
of rationality! We should not press the analogies too far.

What is clear is that the lower the level of the threat system and the stronger the integrative structure, the better the chance of stable peace. With a high threat system and a weak integrative structure, we are likely to get stable war, and at intermediate levels we are likely to get unstable war and unstable peace. What is important here is that the phase boundary into stable peace may be crossed either by diminution of threat or by an increase in integrative structures, or by some combination of the two. There are some parallels between the threat dimension and the stress dimension of Figure 2, and some parallels also between the integrative structure and the strength dimension of Figure 2, though the strength dimension may have some elements of threat, especially legitimated threat, included in it. The stress element includes not merely the threat system as such but also the hostilities, the intensity of conflicts, and the incompatability of national images.

What we need, therefore, is a general n-dimensional model in which we can cross the phase boundary into stable peace by the movement of a large number of different variables, which may include disarmament, change in national images towards compatability, the diminution of economic conflicts, the increase in trade and tourism, the growth of international organizations both governmental and nongovernmental, the development of transnational networks, agreements either tacit or explicit on what constitute the agenda of the international system, what should be taken off the agenda, and so on. The direction of movement into stable peace depends of course on the slopes of the phase boundary and these may differ in different parts of the field. We certainly should not assume linearity. There may
even be some discontinuities. Thus, it is not wholly inconceivable, although I confess I think it unlikely, that under certain circumstances an increase in certain armaments, a diminution of contact, withdrawal into isolation, and so on, may approach or even cross the boundary into stable peace. These are empirical questions which are, unfortunately, very hard to answer. We are, however, used to this in the study of international systems where both experimentation and sampling are extraordinarily hard to do, where the price of knowledge is often catastrophe.

Once we have postulated a field with phase boundaries the next question is that of the dynamic processes which carry the system from one point in the field to another. We cannot facilitate the movement over a phase boundary, especially the one into stable peace, unless we understand the dynamic processes which move the position of the international system from one point in the n-dimensional field to another. There are many such processes, some of which are likely to lead away from stable peace and some which may lead towards it. All these processes, however, involve learning, that is, change in the image of the world, especially in so far as the dynamics of the system involves a succession of decisions. Decision is always a choice among learned images of imagined futures, made according to some system of valuation which is itself learned, for beyond the most elementary genetic values we learn our preferences just as we learn our geography, our history, and our images of possible futures.

Interests are preferences and are learned just like everything else. One of the most important conclusions of international systems theory indeed is that the national interest is a variable of the system and not a constant. For the national interest is simply what the nation is
interested in, and this is capable of quite sharp variations under pressures of disappointment and changes in images of the world. The idea that there is some "objective" national interest is a gross fallacy unless it is interpreted to mean a wide range of possible preferences. It should by no means be assumed, for instance, that nations always want to increase their power, especially in the international system, where being a great power is frequently a handicap economically and a sure recipe for moral deterioration. In a realistic appraisal of the world indeed national greatness is seen as a mental disease and a modest realism as health.

When the payoffs of peace are so high and the payoffs of war are to meager and miserable it is a very important question as to why the dynamics of the system does not lead quite rapidly into stable peace. The answer is to be found largely in perverse dynamic processes such as those illustrated in the prisoner's dilemma, in which there is an invisible fist rather than an invisible hand, in which everyone acting to increase his own welfare reduces the welfare of all, including his own. Thus, with two nations A and B, each would clearly be better off if both were disarmed. If both are disarmed, however, it pays one to arm, at least in the short run; if one arms, it pays the other to arm, so they end up both armed. In this condition they are both worse off than they would be if both were disarmed. These kinds of processes recur constantly in social life. If everyone is honest, everybody is better off; if everyone is honest, it pays me to be dishonest; if I am dishonest, it pays everyone else to be dishonest, so we are all worse off. There seem to be only two answers to the prisoner's dilemma. One is the learning of a sense of community which permits both parties to remain in a mutually advantageous position, in spite of the fact
that one might get a temporary gain by breaking this "social contract." The other answer is the development of some third party who will change the payoffs of the two-party relationship so that it will not pay either party to break the mutually beneficial behavior. This, of course, is what is involved in the law and in the sanctions of the law. If there is a legal system and a police system then it does not pay to be dishonest; if there were a world disarmament agency with sufficient powers, it would not pay any one country to arm even if all the others were disarmed. A stable peace, however, and even stable disarmament, can occur in the absence of superior authority, as indeed it does in North America, simply because of the acceptance of compatible national images on the part of all parties.

One very important element in the establishment of stable peace is a mutual agreement to take international boundaries off the agenda. Unilateral attempts to change boundaries are perhaps the most important single stress in the system which is apt to carry it over the boundary into war. There is indeed a paradox of boundaries in the sense that it was probably only the establishment of boundaries in the first place which permitted transition from stable war into periods of peace, for the very concept of a boundary, especially an agreed boundary, implies a level of organization at which stable war is no longer necessary. On the other hand, just as in exchange there is a community of interest between the exchangers in the fact of exchange and a conflict of interest over the terms, so in the case of boundaries there is community of interest between two parties in establishing a boundary and a conflict of interest in deciding just where it should be. This conflict can be controlled by
boundaries becoming arbitrary and less significant. One of the major sources of international war is thereby eliminated. One reason indeed why the United States is such a large area of internal peace is that the state boundaries are so preposterous that no one has any strong interest in changing them. Europe has been the seat of war for so long precisely because the national boundaries have been passionate sources of conflict.

Here again, there is something of a paradox—the boundaries to be a source of peace should either be arbitrary, like the boundaries of American states, or should be cultural boundaries which enclose relatively homogeneous areas. The fact, for instance, that largely as a result of several centuries of war the boundaries of Europe today do enclose relatively homogeneous areas is a good omen for the peace of Europe. Nearly all the Frenchmen are in France, the Poles in Poland, the Germans in Germany, and with one or two exceptions like the Italian Tyrol or the Hungarian region in Rumania, there are very few irredenta left in Europe. This is not true of course of Africa. If the African states ever begin fighting about their boundaries, the chances of peace are very slim. Fortunately, for the moment at any rate, the great principle of the absurdity of boundaries seems to be predominant and the African states for the most part have decided that the boundaries, ridiculous as they are, are not worth fussing about.

In the history of the human race there has been a continual widening of the area within which stable peace prevails—from the band, to the tribe, to the clan, to the city state, to the national state, beyond this to groups of states. This has been primarily the result of a long cumulative learning process in the extension of community and the strength of
integrative bonds. Both the threat system and the exchange system have played a role in this, for all the structures of the social system are interrelated. The widen of man's image of the world itself, the increase in communication and travel, the development of political institutions and structures, the development of law—all these things represent a constant increasing complexity of human images of the world and the values which are put over it. Just why the evolutionary process produces complexity is a bit of a puzzler. The process by which it produces complexity in social structures is not very different from the process by which it has produced complexity in biological structures. It may be simply, as my friend Alfred Kuhn says, that there is always room at the top, that is, there is always a niche beyond the present structure of niches. Peace, therefore, is the result of a relentless evolutionary dynamic of social learning, the ultimate course of which seems to have a high degree of probability, even though that probability is not 1. Peace is anti-entropic. Like all evolutionary processes it comes about by the segregation of entropy and the building up of a learned order.

For this reason the International Studies Association as a learned society and as an instrument for the promotion of learning cannot help being an instrument for the increase in the probability of peace, in spite of the fact, or perhaps even because of the fact, that it is not committed to pacifism or to militarism, or to any political or other ideology except pursuit of testable knowledge about international systems. It is surely significant that one of the most interesting recent essays on peace has
come from John P. Lovell, Chairman of the Military Studies Section of ISA.

It has been a classic argument against pacifists that they have wanted peace at any price. I remember the Reverend H.R.L. (Dick) Sheppard, founder of the Peace Pledge Union in England in the 1930s, countering this by saying that what he believed in was love at all costs, which at least is sound Christian doctrine. An economist like myself, however, seeing development as a process of getting good things cheaper, that is, at less real cost, sees the great problem of development in the international system as how to lower the price of peace, as perhaps the task of the moral system is how to lower the cost of love so that we can have more of both peace and love. The transition from peace to war comes when somebody, or at least two parties, regard the price of peace as too high. These initial estimates often turn out to be wrong, as they did for a lot of people in 1914, and on many other occasions, and there is a lot of evidence to suggest that the organizational structure of the international system results in a persistent overestimate of the price of peace.

One thing that one hopes will emerge, therefore, out of international systems research is a better information system and more realistic appraisals on the part of the decision-makers of the system of the relative real costs of peace and war. Even when the costs are properly estimated, however, there is still the problem of "development," which is precisely that of diminishing the cost of the good. And like all development it takes place essentially through a learning process, which is almost the same thing as

\[ \text{See John P. Lovell,} \]
saying an evolutionary process. We build up our little castles of complexity and goodness in the face of the vast generalized second law of practically everything, which says that things run down and go from bad to worse.

Even though I have argued that the boundary between peace and war is a sharp one, this does not mean that peace is homogeneous. We can make a desert and call it peace, we can have a peace that is imposed by unshakable tyranny, or we can have a peace that conforms to the demands for freedom, dignity, justice, and all the other good things in life and society. The peace research movement has been going through a period of considerable soul searching in regard to the question of the quality of peace. Johan Galtung, for instance, has argued that what he calls "structural violence," which amounts to almost any diminution of human life beyond the allotted span, or of human happiness below the maximum, is just as much a matter of concern for peace research as overt violence. I have criticized this view somewhat severely on the grounds that it substitutes a vague and presently unobtainable objective, which is the establishment of the ideal society, for a clear and attainable one, which is the abolition of war, and at the present moment this may be a dangerous diversion of attention.

Nevertheless, the problem which Galtung raises is a real one and it should never be forgotten, though I confess I do not have much optimism about its immediate solution. If the price of peace indeed were unshakable tyranny, one would have grave doubts about it. Nevertheless Tennyson's vision, where "The common sense of most shall hold a fretful realm in awe, And the kindly earth shall slumber, lapped in universal law" I think is
fairly realistic, as I must confess to great faith in the rising common
sense of most. Even this cheerful vision, however, raises the question
as to whether the price of stable peace in terms of dullness may not be
noticeable. The problem that William James raised in The Moral Equivalent
of War is also a very real one.

Nevertheless, I am optimistic enough to think that these problems are
soluble, and that a world is possible, and indeed not too far off, which
has enough community—and it doesn't have to be very much—to maintain
stable peace. In such a world the requisite variety of particular national,
religious, and cultural identities could be sustained in the matrix of a
wider human identity, and the pursuit of justice and disalienation could
go on without suffering the retrogression that lapse into organized violence
almost invariably brings. It seems to me neither unreasonable nor unreal-
istic to want a better world than we have now, or at least to want a
direction of development that is improvement. We want to go up rather
than down. We may not all agree which way is up, but we would be grossly
unrealistic if we thought that the intellectual labors of the members of
this organization were irrelevant to the question of human betterment.