Given in this publication are two studies on political development. The first study focused on the progress toward local self-government and decision-making on Canadian reserves as compared to the neighboring resource frontier communities. The second study examined the role of the company administrator in the development, especially the political development, of Canadian single-enterprise communities and the problems which have arisen in the administration of townsites by company administrators and the effectiveness of attempted solutions. Both studies were conducted in the framework of progress toward a high quality of local public services distributed on the basis of decisions made through local self-government. Each study expands the concept of local political development and extends the circle of knowledge about how local government operates on the resource frontier. (NQ)
Two Studies in Political Development
on Canada's Resource Frontier:
Political Development on Canadian Reserves

The Administrator's Role in Single Enterprise Communities
by P.H. Wichern

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The University of Manitoba
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TWO STUDIES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ON CANADA'S RESOURCE FRONTIER:

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT ON CANADIAN RESERVES

THE ADMINISTRATOR'S ROLE IN SINGLE ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES

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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

Two studies make up this volume. The first assesses the progress toward local self-government and decision-making on Canadian reserves, many of which are located in close proximity to single enterprise communities, and thus share the potential and problems of Canada's resource frontier with their neighbours. The second study focuses on the role of company and provincial administrators in achieving local self-government, as well as high quality in local public services.

Both studies are conducted in the framework of progress toward a high quality of local public services distributed on the basis of decisions made through local self-government. This progress I call "political development". A previous study examined a number of single enterprise communities in which political development has taken place. In these studies the analysis is extended to neighbouring reserve communities and to the particular role of administrators in stimulating such development.

In the first study we find that the residents of Canadian reserves are making progress as far as participation in local government is concerned (actually the participation on some reserves is greater than that in municipalities). In addition, the scope of local decision-making has been increased in recent years.
through grants-to-bands, community development, and other programs. However, we do not find a parallel change in the basic framework created by the Indian Act for reserve local government. This framework, in effect, creates one form of governance for reserves -- administered -- in contrast to the Municipal Acts which allow most other communities to progress from an administered form to a municipal form of local self-government. Thus, residents on reserves are denied a basic political right (that of local self-government) available to other citizens. There are some signs of change in this unfortunate situation. These are discussed in the study and recommendations are made for the development of local government on reserves. It is suggested that reserve residents should be provided the right of equal participation in regional local governments. These regional bodies should be designed to assure local determination of overall development, and a suitable quality of life in resource frontier areas.

The second study finds that the role of town administrator has declined in single enterprise community government over the last twenty years. The peak period of company administration of towns appears to have been the 1920's and 1930's. Even during the 1940's a new policy of provincial administration, and provisions for local self-government emerged (especially in Quebec and Ontario -- the latter having a number of self-governing communities throughout the period of resource frontier
development). During the fifties and sixties the trend was toward local self-governance in single enterprise communities. British Columbia created a number of such communities, including Kitmat. The experience in various provinces is compared with that of Thompson, Manitoba where a provincially appointed administrator (a former company executive) was in charge. Finally, visits to several communities presently, or until recently, administered are reported. Local self-government is found in no case to emanate from efforts of the administrator in the town, whether company or provincial representative. Local self-government appears to arise only as it is demanded by citizens (sometimes against the opposition of the administrator), and provided for in provincial legislation. It should be noted, on the other hand, that a good quality of local public services was found to be characteristic of administered single enterprise community government, whether past or present. However, in and around the administered community, endemic problems arise. In the community complaints about administration are common, no matter how good the services, and apathy characterizes citizen participation. This causes a vacuum in the political side of social life present in other communities. Outside the community, squatter settlements develop which share neither the tax-base (or service source), or quality of services found in the administered community. Though some of these communities attain self-governing status, they remain low in provision of the public services which are available in abundance nearby. One solution is that followed in Red
Lake, Ontario where the townsites (and enterprises) have become part of the regional (or district) governments. Unfortunately, company interests, and townsite residents, may still dominate the local government in such a situation unless provincial laws require equality of representation for local residents, wherever they live, minimum standards of public services everywhere in the district, and participation of the enterprise in providing an adequate tax-base for the region (rather than for a townsite, or in some cases, a totally inadequate grant-in-lieu-of-taxes which provides no tax base). These guarantees of local self-government and financial support by the enterprise in the area appear to be illustrated in the building of one of the most recent of the resource communities, Leaf Rapids, Manitoba, which is being formed under a provincial administrator. This experience is contrasted with the newest (and self-governing) resource community, Logan Lake, British Columbia.

It is recommended that all single enterprise communities be guaranteed the right of local self-government and adequate tax base (so long as they remain single enterprise), and that the local government always include the whole region, rather than just a townsite.
FOREWORD

The two studies in this volume continue the work begun in The Production and Testing of a Model of Political Development in Resource Frontier Communities (Center for Settlement Studies, 1971). Each study expands the concept of local political development, and extends the circle of knowledge about how local government operates on the resource frontier. Thus, this volume may be valuable for both theory-building and description. In addition, practical recommendations which arise from the research are developed. These recommendations should be of value to all concerned with the quality of government and public services on Canada's resource frontier.

Mr. Sirkis and Miss Stowell carried out basic research on the reserve study. Mr. Weiss visited the Pine Falls and Red Lake communities, and provided background for the administrator study. My thanks to them and to all who made these studies possible. The Manitoba Indian Brotherhood co-operated with the Center for Settlement Studies on the reserve study. The Settlement Studies staff, especially Professor Len Siemens, has been both co-operative and patient. I hope all these contributions will be fully justified in the final product for which I must assume sole responsibility.

P. H. Wichern, Jr.
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ON CANADIAN RESERVES
INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1970, the Settlement Center, with the co-operation of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, provided me with two research assistants (one appointed by the Brotherhood). The research question investigated by these assistants, and by myself since that time, is "what is the nature and extent of political development on Indian reserves?"

This study was an outgrowth of the previous study I directed for the Center: The Production and Testing of a Model of Political Development in Resource Frontier Communities. In that limited study, we identified and described a common process of political development in four Manitoba single-enterprise towns. The crucial factor, in our model, was citizen involvement which led to changes in the form, role, and scope of local government in these communities.¹

During the course of that investigation, we could not help but notice that native peoples were an integral

¹I also provided suggestions as to an ideal process of local political development, and a guide to citizen participation in community development.
part of the resource frontier towns' existence. Since we could not study all of these people, I selected what appeared to us (at that time) to be the most obvious "other" settlement on the resource frontier: the reserve.

Across Canada, there are over 2,400 reserves or Crown lands which are "home" to 80% of the Indians registered under the Indian Act. Many of these reserves share the resource frontier (land and resources which native peoples once freely used) with towns and industries. Some of these "nearby" reserves are as prosperous as their neighbouring communities perhaps, but most are not. On some of them are found "the poorest of the poor", in conditions immeasurably worse than those found in the neighbouring resource frontier community. Recent spokesmen have claimed that such conditions can

---

2I have yet to find an adequate discussion of reserve local government in any of the standard national, provincial, or local government descriptions. Dawson's fifth edition of The Government of Canada (updated by Ward), for example, contains only one brief reference to Indians, noting that their treaty rights (as over against Federal legislation) are not upheld in the Courts. Are we like the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in that "Our terms of reference contain no allusion to Canada's native populations"? (Report, Book I, p. xxvi) This study does not include non-registered Indians, Metis, or Eskimo peoples whose form of political participation--local, provincial (or territorial) and federal--deserve much more attention than our discipline has afforded them.

3The number is close to 250,000 (total).

4Special Senate Committee on Poverty, Poverty In Canada (1971), p. 35.
only be changed through reserve community action and leadership. Since the Canadian Bill of Rights guarantees equality under the Law, and the Canadian political ethos extols the virtues of local self-government, it is logical to ask what political development is taking place (or can take place) on reserves, as compared to the neighbouring resource communities.

This question is not only important in terms of conditions on the reserves, and in terms of the guarantees of Canadian citizenship: it is also important in terms of the common future which all citizens on the resource frontier must forge together (for they must all share in the blessings or curses of the future in one way or another). Thus, this study has an additional research question related to the first: "How can reserve and resource communities establish co-operative political relations which foster mutual growth and higher qualities of life than those possible now?".

RESEARCH DESIGN

I undertook to answer these two research questions with a particular strategy based on the agreement with the Brotherhood that I would not attempt to add to the volume of indigenous research done during summers on reserves. My strategy was to fully exhaust available Center and University resources, as well as materials made available by the Brotherhood and the Indian Affairs Branch (Department of Northern and Indian Affairs).

This strategy has meant that the focus is quite broad: nation-wide. I discovered no satisfactory method of separating all resource frontier reserves for the purposes of the study. On the other hand, the fact that the research assistant appointed by the Brotherhood was familiar with various reserves meant that a number of case studies could be included in this study without violating the agreement.¹

Since I can find little in the literature of political studies which even pertains to reserve government, much less examining it in a comparative framework,

¹I would like to make it clear at the outset of this study that no two reserve communities are alike, just as no two single enterprise communities are alike. I try to respect this uniqueness as much as possible. However, it is just as clear that certain patterns of participation and public decision-making are similar, if not the same, in many of the communities. These similarities provide the basis for generalizations, as shown below.
such as political development, I do not believe this strategy is out of line with the state of our knowledge. In pursuing it, I assigned one assistant to examine existing patterns of reserve government and political life, and one assistant to examine the importance of cultural and historical factors. To these I have added my own analysis, relying quite heavily on the published results of the major primary research study conducted by a team of scholars under the direction of H. B. Hawthorne. Their reports, A Study of the Contemporary Indians of Canada, Volumes One (1966) and Two (1967) remain an excellent source of data which, as far as I can find, have not been carefully examined and interpreted by members of my profession. So one contribution I have attempted to make is the interpretation of existing data in a framework (local political development) which gives meaning to what has been found. In addition, I have consulted many other (independent) research studies, individuals, and sources, most of which are listed in the bibliography.

I hope this survey will stimulate more research on the political life of all native peoples in relation to their fellow Canadians. This is important to the growth of Canada as a multi-cultural nation.
THE FRAMEWORK: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In the previous research effort cited above (Wichern, et al., 1971), we created a heuristic model of local political development which postulated that changes in the form, role, and scope of local government in a community would be related to levels of citizen participation. I will not undertake to make a detailed review of the basis or various aspects of that model, except to reaffirm its validity and usefulness as shown in that study.

In this study I undertook an examination of various other definitions of political development as well as various approaches to the study of political development, particularly in comparative politics which emphasizes cross-national comparisons. I did this because I recognized early in the project that we were dealing with a cultural problem we did not have to face in single-enterprise communities, i.e. the problem of a minority group with "traditional" values, practices, experiences, etc. in the midst of a much larger "modern" society and political system.

In addition, I wished to improve the rigour of our model, and explore the nature of reserve government as a political system.\footnote{The possibilities of this approach were suggested to me by a friend and student at the University of Winnipeg, Gordon Ternowetsky, in a paper synthesizing Easton's systems model (A Framework for Political Analysis) with the functionalism of Parsons (An Outline of the Social Systems), and applying the resulting model to reserves as Clark had suggested should be done for local communities (Community Structures and Decision-Making). I spent some time working with these models and Ternowetsky's ideas. In the end I decided that the model used above provided a much better perspective for this report than these others. Mr. Ternowetsky is now a graduate student in sociology at the University of Calgary.}

The model of policy-making suggested by this literature is as follows: the political system of the reserve is viewed as a combination of functions and structures designed to respond to the environment so that public services are provided for the community. The political system is related to the environment by the inputs from it into the political system—participation, revenues, etc. The political structures are designed to convert these inputs into policies and public service outputs which affect the environment, as the following diagram indicates:
The essence of political development, according to Pye, is contained in three variables: the degree to which equality before the law and in political participation is possible, the capacity of a political system to respond to its environment in making and executing public policies, and the degree to which the various parts of a political system perform distinct and limited functions in a co-ordinated manner (differentiation and specialization). The development patterns of societies are traced by identifying how they responded to their environment in terms of these aspects of "the development syndrome". Equality may be observed in terms of political culture and the shared attitudes toward the political system--legitimacy, commitment, alienation, rejection. Capacity may be measured by observing the organization performance of authoritative structures. Differentiation may be observed by investigating the general political process, including non-authoritative
structures. Thus, the analysis of political development may be focused around relationships between political culture, authoritative structures, and the general political process. Of course, the theory presupposes that the structural and cultural patterns of political systems and their related behaviour in their domestic and international environments can be explained by the way they encountered and solved (or failed to solve) certain problems of political growth.10

These problems are bound up in assuring the equality, capacity, and differentiation necessary for survival and success in governing. In this paper I will not attempt to elaborate on the political development problems, many of which may be applicable at the local level as well as at the level of macro-systems, national and international. However, it may be helpful to draw from this literature a number of observations salient to our discussion. First, the form and content of a political system in a society will tend to vary with the form and content of the other social systems--religious, family, etc.--in a society.11 In other words, the political culture in which the political system operates is crucial to the manner in which the problems cited above are solved. Related to this is the fact that

At a higher level of differentiation, executive, legislative, and adjudicative structures may have been developed in specialized form, but the political functions of communications, interest articulation, and aggregation may be

10 Almond, op. cit., p. 23.
11 Almond, op. cit., p. 88.
intermittently performed by lineage, status, religion, and similar groupings. We may find differentiated governmental and political structures operating along with intermittent ones. The traditional and intermittent structures are not regulated by the modern ones, but continue to operate inside and outside the bureaucracy. The traditional and intermittent structures are not penetrated or used by the modern ones. They continue to function autonomously and legitimately. The modern political system does not eliminate intermittency and traditionality; it tends to regulate and control it. It can penetrate, regulate, translate its particularistic and diffuse impacts into the modern political language of interest articulation, public policy, and regulation.12

I submit that the above description correctly analyzes the current situation on most, if not all, reserves in Canada where custom and family ties continue to dominate the political system in spite of imposed "modern democratic" structures and administrative regulations of almost all political activities. This is the first hypothesis I will seek to demonstrate below.

There is a broader point to be made, however. The mixture of modern and traditional culture, which is characteristic of both modern Western and non-Western political systems, has been complicated in almost all political systems over the last generation by "the integrative revolution".13 Critical problems of nation-

12 Ibid., p. 99.

13 The phrase and concept were suggested by Clifford Geerty in "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States," in Geerty (ed.) Old Societies and New States (1963), reprinted in Finkle and Gable, op. cit.
building and divisions, guerilla uprisings, and wars result when the traditional ties based on kinship, language, region, custom, or religion become the basis for group assertion of claims to political power and cultural rights which were not previously recognized, but are now asserted as the price of unity in the name of equality. 14 Conflicts in Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Malaysia, U.S.S.R. (Ukraine), and North America (Indians, Negroes, French, Chicanos, etc.) appear to exhibit at least to some degree similarities as political phenomena of the integrative revolution. They also display a range of responses and counter-responses which range all the way from suppression to civil war and separation.

I submit that the analysis on the following pages is actually a case study of a particular integrative political process. In it, the native people become aware of what the Canadian political culture says are their rights, discover the significance of political activity for asserting these rights, and proceed to assert their right to political and cultural independence at various points in the national political system which affect them most directly. 15 In this case, it is the

14 This follows closely the characterization by Charles Woodhouse in the introduction to Minorities and Politics (edited by Woodhouse and Henry J. Tobias, 1969).

15 I am not concerned with Quebec here, but it seems to me that a similar process has been taking place there. One study of this is "Quebec: From a Minority Complex to Majority Behaviour," by Marcel Rioux, in Tobias and Woodhouse (1969), op. cit., pp. 39-52.
reserve political system, the Indian Affairs bureaucracy, and the current government to which demands are made, and with which conflict takes place.16

This paper will examine whether the above is indeed the case in terms of the reserve political systems. If it is the case, the conflict over Indian affairs may well be interpreted as a manifestation of the more general phenomenon of integrative revolutions, and certain conclusions and predictions may be drawn on the basis of experience elsewhere. Whether the reserve systems represent such a case or not, it is evident that a careful analysis must be made of the relationship between indigenous and external decision-making in the reserve political system of local government.

Up to this point, the macro concepts of political development and the integrative revolution have been introduced. It is now imperative to place local political systems within these broader frameworks of political structure and process. I have not found what I consider to be an adequate exposition on this subject within the

16 For example, a front-page newspaper article in the Winnipeg Tribune of January 14, 1972, was entitled "Culture Plans Rile Indians" and began: "The latest in a series of confrontations between some of Canada's Indians and the Federal Indian Affairs Department once again points up. . . ." In this case, the conflict was over the Trudeau government's transfer of "the lion's share" of a $42 million program for cultural education centres from the Secretary of State's Department to Indian Affairs.
framework I am applying.\textsuperscript{17} I would like to suggest that in most national political systems, the regional ("State," "Province," etc.), and the local (municipality, city, metropolitan area, etc.) political systems provide the flexibility needed for the larger system to adapt its outputs to differing physical and social environments, and therefore to accommodate differing inputs. The local level thus provides one channel (sometimes the only one) in which particular needs can be met in particular ways. This has led to "decentralization for development," which may mean either

Deconcentration—the delegation of authority adequate for the discharge of specific functions to staff of a central department who are situated outside headquarters (Hierarchical), or

Devolution—the legal conferring of powers to discharge specified or residual functions upon formally constituted local authorities (non-Hierarchical).\textsuperscript{18}

It should be clear that devolution inevitably implies some measure of autonomy—the freedom to behave outside the constraint of direct control, . . . (and) . . . "a system integrity in the sense that a system must have boundaries and therefore identity."\textsuperscript{19} This means

\textsuperscript{17}The best exposition I have found is an article by Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organization Strategy," in Robert T. Poland, \textit{Comparative Urban Research}, pp. 60-87, from which I draw for the following section. Also helpful was Wicker, \textit{The Theory of Local Government} (1970).


\textsuperscript{19}Sherwood, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 69.
that autonomous local government attained by devolution is . . .

. . . self-contained, has generally agreed upon functional and real limits of activity, and is in transaction within an environment to which it provides outputs and from which it receives inputs . . . it will have its own capabilities to receive messages from the environment, to process those demands, and to direct its outputs toward the functions it seeks to fulfill.  

It is my hypothesis that while Canadian municipal government reflects devolution of responsibilities as a characteristic of the national political culture, reserves are governed under a deconcentration system which is at variance with another characteristic of the political culture: equality (which, it will be recalled, refers to participation and equal application of laws). This, then, may explain why some Indians speak of "the unjust society."  

The cultural promise of devolution may exist beside a reality of deconcentration. The following sections will examine politics on reserves, in an attempt to discover to what degree this situation actually exists; and if so, what impact it may have on the resource frontier.

---


21 Consult Harold Cardiral, *The Unjust Society* (1969), p. 6ff., and p. 168ff. It should be noted that the devolution of responsibilities to Provinces may solve nothing at all in terms of this problem, as Cardinal and others correctly point out.
THE SETTING

CANADIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Canada is generally viewed in the above framework as a "stable democracy," an "anglo-american" political system, characterized by "a homogenous, secular political culture." Homogenous refers to the sharing of political ends (i.e. freedom, mass welfare, security) and means (rational bargaining, compromise, trade-offs). Secular refers to the granting of semi-autonomy to various roles, structures, and sub-systems (e.g. Provinces). That is, the political structures are highly differentiated (Parliament-Cabinet-Civil Service), bureaucratized, and stable. Power and influence are diffused throughout the system.

Like other countries in this category, Canada's political culture emphasizes the idea of equality, both in status before law (Canadian Bill of Rights, Part I, 1[B]), and in participation in government at all levels. As in the United States and Great Britain, local self-government has been referred to as "... the cornerstone of democracy."24

It is through participation in the affairs

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22 Almond, op. cit., p. 37.

23 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

of the immediate community that individuals
can most easily be brought to perceive that
their public matters can most readily be
awakened, maintained, and made effective.
nowhere else can the citizens be so com-
pletely identified with their own government.25

Thus, within the constitutional devolution of power
over municipal functions to Provinces (B.N.A. Act,
Section 92.8), the Provinces have created their own
systems of self-government to carry out local responsi-

bilities.26 Within this devolution, various ethnic
groups, such as the Hutterites, have been allowed to
maintain their cultural or religious forms and systems
of governance.

In contrast, while the same political culture of
local self-government is proffered to the registered
Indian people,27 the legal framework is completely

25H. McD. Clokie, Canadian Government and Politics,

26These vary from Province to Province. An up-to-
date summary may be found in the Canada Yearbook, 1970-71;
consult also D. C. Rowat, The Canadian Municipal System
(1969), Chapter One. The governing law in each Province
is the Municipal Act, except where special charters of
incorporation have been passed.

27I refer throughout this study to the approxi-
mately 250,000 persons registered as Indians by the
Department under the Indian Act. (See below.) I do not
deal with an almost equal number who have given up or
lost this designation, and the membership in the legally
defined reserve community. It should be noted that the
extension of the basic rights in the 1960 formulation
to these people, as over against Act of Parliament, was
only declared by the Supreme Court ten years later in
the Drybones case. See D. R. Smiley, "The McRuer Report:
Parliamentary Majoutarian Democracy and Human Rights," in
Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May, 1970),
pp. 8-9, for a discussion of the significance of the
Drybones case.
different. The B.N.A. Act allocates sole control over the reserves to the Federal government (Section 91.24). There is no legal doubt about this delegation of power:

... Parliament alone has authority to regulate the lives and affairs of Indians on a reservation; provincial laws are inapplicable on a reservation (save as they may be referentially introduced through Federal legislation).28

This allocation of power may seem to be as inflexible as it is final; that is not necessarily the case, as may be seen in other Provincial-Federal cost and administration-sharing agreements. The development of Indian policy, however, has led to the assumption of responsibilities—including welfare, health, community development, local government, and education—which are not the result of treaty or constitutional imperatives. The result has not been favorable for the Indian people. According to the respected report of H. D. Hawthorne:

... there is a remarkable degree of potential flexibility or "play" in the roles which have been, and in future could be, assumed by either level of government. For the entire history of Indian administration, this play has been exploited to the disadvantage of the Indian. The special status of the Indian people has been used as a justification for providing them with services inferior to those available to whites who established residence in the country that once was theirs. ...29


29 Ibid., p. 253.
Thus, for example, the decision to reject eligibility of Indian reserves for Provincial grants-in-aid programs, upon which other local governments partially depend, cannot be justified solely as outside the "play" of the law. Other Provincial-Federal agreements have bridged such constitutional chasms. This has happened with the Provincial enfranchisement of Indians (in all Provinces except Quebec). But it has not happened in terms of local government. This has meant that Indians continue to be governed inside the sole jurisdiction of the Indian Affairs Branch operating under the provisions of the Indian Act, and the direction of the Minister (now the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Hon. Jean Chretian). Concerning the effect of this constitutional framework on reservation political development, the Hawthorne group comments:

... Their community existence has been characterized by a century of dependence on the Federal government for financial support, and by the direct administration of matters of local concern by officials of the Indian Affairs Branch. ...30

Thus, it may be concluded that Indian reserve communities have had neither the access to Provincial resources, nor the opportunity for obtaining the municipal status which characterize most of Canada's local governments. 31


31 Some are administered, or "deconcentrated" Provincial systems, such as local government districts in Manitoba which are mostly devolved. Deconcentrated federal-local units also include towns serving government installations such as Pinawa, Manitoba. For further information, consult Wichern, et al. (1971).
TRADITIONAL INDIAN POLITICAL CULTURE

The Canadian setting is also characterized by the presence of the traditional Indian political culture. This culture antedates the arrival of Anglo-Europeans. It continues, in spite of the reserve experience, to be an important factor in the operation of the reserve political system: it cannot be overlooked. Jenness provides the following description of the migratory tribes of eastern Canada (and later the Prairies):

In the absence of chiefs and of any legislative or executive body within the tribes and bands, law and order (sic) depended solely on the strength of public opinion. There were no written laws, merely rules and injunctions handed down by word of mouth from an immemorial antiquity, and more temporary taboos operative during the lifetime of any individual. In comparison, the plains Indians had a more differentiated and social political system:

Families . . . scoured the country in small groups or in larger bands. The band was a stable body governed by an informal council of its leading men, one of whom acted as chief.


33 Jenness, op. cit., p. 125.

34 Ibid., p. 127.
The chief's power could range from nominal to absolute, depending on the willingness of the other members of the group to respect their leadership. In the plains' tribes, there were also societies whose number, organization, and function varied, but generally served as a social (and political) acculturation. These may, however, have been a product of the coming of the horse (used particularly in hunts and skirmishes).  

From these observations, it is clear that the form and the content of the political system varied with the social structure of the various groups. In these traditional-political systems, the society itself was "omnifunctional" in performing the output functions, especially in the migratory tribes of eastern and northern Canada. In the plains' tribes, we see some differentiation and secularization, but the culture is still traditional; in all cases, it is organized about the family.

In order to identify this element clearly, let us focus on the Ojibwa, a migratory group who resided along Lake Superior and later in northern Ontario, and some in Manitoba.

According to Rodgers, at the time of the first arrival of the French in Canada, there was no large group of Indians known as the

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35 Jenness, op. cit., p. 129.

36 The following report is edited from a research report prepared by Mr. Sirkis for me.
Ojibwa. Thus, a problem arises as to how indigenous any observed behaviour patterns might be. Anthropologists suggest two main elements of indigenous life were individualism and supernaturalism. Hallowell also noted a sharing of food and "economically productive tasks," undertaken without forming close community bonds. The synthesis of these elements led to mechanisms of social control quite different to those of Western society. In the small scattered bands (which in the summer consisted of a dozen or so families) there was no organized council, no chief, no policing system, no military societies (as in some other tribes). The power of a leader rested on his character and ability in a particular situation, and the individualism precluded the development of a powerful chief. Because of the supernaturalism, Medicine men were important persons, and often leaders. Dissatisfaction with leadership was not expressed openly, but covertly through rumour, gossip, and sorcery. The leaders had little authority (besides receiving delegations) apart from the agreement of all the adult hunters (the "council") in the band, whose will he would summarize and express. The men held "council meetings" when they gathered spontaneously to gossip or at someone's request. Decisions were always made by consensus reached through discussion, not voting. Social control was exercised through metaphysical means (fear of disease, ill

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health) rather than through physical coercion, judicial institutions, etc. Thus, each person could determine his own individual actions, subject only to the supernatural sanctions of curses and punishments for deeds. The ill-health punishments included open conflict, such as that found in the elections and politics of European society.

If this brief description may be accepted as accurate, one may conclude that the political culture of the Ojibwa was one of consensus, avoidance of open conflict and competition, acceptance of leadership, and communal sharing. These norms were enforced through metaphysical, rather than physical, threats and punishments. Situational leadership was the fulcrum of the local political system, which was neither secularized nor differentiated.

Perhaps more significant than the existence of the traditional systems is the fact that the patterns of political culture and decision-making did not die with the assignment of this free-roving people to the physical and social bounds of the reserves. Mr. Sirkis continues:

More recent studies indicate that while outward cultural trappings and cultural interactions have been forced to change drastically during the reservation period, the personality of the Ojibwa retains its former orientations. In addition, traditional beliefs remain important, even for those reservations connected by roads to urban centers. One researcher reports, for example, that "... it is now possible to say that magic and sorcery remain important in the thoughts of the Northern Ojibwa people living

40 Landes, for example, claims the medicine-man, not the chief, is most influential on many Ojibwa reserves, "Ojibwa Sociology," p. 86.
on the road system... Many individuals would prefer to take a mentally ill child to a shaman for treatment rather than a psychiatrist in the city. People still get very ill thinking that some evil person is using bad medicine against them."41

The political power of the shaman is very difficult to gauge today. In the past, when elections were forced upon the Ojibwa by the Dominion Government, the shamans were often elected. Today they may not be chief, but they still may exercise power. The chief may be only a titular position. Like the chiefs of old, he may have no authority. A core of individuals, perhaps belonging to the same family, usually including the shaman, may wield the power in the community decision-making. But still consensus is valued and those who object to a project may leave a meeting rather than bringing divisions into the open.42

This view of the continuation, rather than the passing, of traditional society is supported by reports of various Indians of their life in reserve society.43 An Odawa Indian, Wilfred Pelletier, explains this continuation of traditional society very well:

Going back as far as I can remember as a child in an Indian community, I had no sense of

41 Barnouw, op. cit., p. 155; also Landes and Jenness, op. cit.


43 Compare with other areas, such as those reported in Daniel Leiner, The Passing of Traditional Society, and Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society.
knowing about the other people around me except that we were all somehow equal; the class structure in the community was horizontal.

... In these communities what existed was a sharing of power. In spite of what everybody says, we really didn't have chiefs, that is people who were bosses. We had medicine men, who were wise men. The rest were leaders in particular ways ... the person who was leader had special abilities, say in fishing or hunting. He took the leadership that day, and then discarded the leadership when he was finished with the job. He had power only for the time he wanted to do something. ... Only in times of war and disaster was a vertical structure used. The war chief would designate various jobs to various people and use that vertical structure. This was only in times of danger. Otherwise, it was horizontal.44

In a "healthy" tribal society, religious sanction is applied to individual behaviour by the religious leaders, and religious institutions control deviant behaviour. ... Disorganization and crime rate in certain Indian communities is a symptom of the lack of this much needed sacred-social control.45

Thus, we find that the Indian tribal culture included the political functions of law and leadership through the use of supernatural sanctions and consensual social relations, and that this culture lives on in reserve life and in the personality orientation of those who grew up with it as part of their lives. It should be

44 Wilfred Pelletier, "Childhood in an Indian Village," in Two Articles, no page number.
45 Pelletier, "Some Thoughts About Organization and Leadership," in the same pamphlet, no page number.
noted that this is not an uncommon phenomenon, but characterizes many of the North American Indian tribes whose pre-reserve life has been fathomed.46

An understanding of these cultural factors, we contend, explains much of the supposed inability of Indians to fit into the culture of our dominant society's political system. The primary fact is that Indian culture was not, and is not, the same as that brought to Canada by European immigrants. What these immigrants brought were a set of differentiated political structures based upon a secular, less traditional political culture. It is to these institutions our attention must now turn.47

THE HISTORY OF RESERVE ADMINISTRATION

In order to compare the traditional and modern settings of reserve government, this section will explore the transitional, or early administration.

46 For discussion of this consult E. Adamson Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man, Chapter Seven and references cited there; and Peter Farb, Man's Rise to Civilization (1968).

47 I have omitted a section on treaties, due to the length of this report. The Hawthorne report effectively summarizes the significance of the treaties:

The discrepancy between the relative unimportance of treaties as determinants of government policy and Indian perception of the treaties as basic items in self-identity constitutes an important complicating factor in Indian-government relations (sic). Hawthorne (1966), p. 248.

In other words, treaties represent the promises of the government to respect Indian political and cultural rights; cf. with Cardinal (1968), p. 28.
period of reserve governance, when the structures which still characterize the reserve political system originated.

Historical records indicate that one of the first acts of white officials (from 1841 to 1867 Provincial and British) was to identify "chiefs," whether they actually represented their fellow "citizens" or not, in order to conclude the treaties which vested their rights in the power of the Crown. In order to fill this political role, the members of the reserve community were directed to follow the English-European recruitment process of voting or nominating, whereby one of their number became a titular head, or "chief," for the purposes designated by the representatives of the outside society, including the signing of treaties. Others became members of a new structure called "the band council" which was supposed to make decisions and assist the chief. "For the greatest majority of Canadian Indian groups, there was no precedent for offices and structures such as these."48 These structures originated with the policy-makers who apparently . . . assumed that the model of the European or Canadian village with its elected local government majority rule, a body of citizens identifying strongly with the community, and so on, would be adopted by the Indians. . .49

These structures were made the only form of local government for all Indians when Parliament, having been

48 Hawthorne, 1967, p. 177.
49 Ibid.
granted sole jurisdiction over the reserves, passed the first Indian Act in 1874.

The result of the wholesale imposition of this political system from outside the local community was predictable:

Many Indians did not perceive their communities as viable bodies ... and continued to orient themselves primarily to family, extended kinship or other groupings that either cut across the residential community or were but one of several segments within it. ... Where interest was shown in local government it was frequently dissipated by lack of real power to make meaningful decisions at the local level. With the elaboration of rules and regulations designed to protect Indian interests, as then defined, very many matters had to be sanctioned by the Indian Affairs Branch. There was a paucity of important matters about which decisions could be made in their communities.

Band councils persisted in Indian communities, not because they were perceived as responding to important local government needs, but because the government insisted on dealing through them. ... 50

The imposition of this form of local government established the level of political development which would characterize reserves for almost one hundred years. This is the administered stage, characterized by a "deconcentrated" political arrangement. In this stage, the traditional culture remains strong, and is at variance with a differentiated, secularized (or "modern") system of governance imposed from the outside. Under

these conditions, it is not surprising that Indian Affairs could not get the people to adapt fully.

Examination of historical records indicates that the last hundred years of Indian reservation community experience have been characterized by "... the direct administration of matters of local concern by officials of the Indian Affairs Branch."\(^{51}\) This was carried out through the following political system, created under the Indian Act. In this diagram, the reserve system may be compared with the municipal system.

![Diagram of political systems]

It will be noted that the crucial difference is found in the political role and policy functions of the reserve (Agency) Superintendent,\(^ {52}\) and the administration

\(^{51}\)Hawthorne, 1966, p. 263.

\(^{52}\)The old title was "Indian Agent." It is no longer used. For a favorably biased assessment of early Canadian Indian administration, compared to that in the United States, consult Frederick Abbott, The Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (1915), pp. 21ff., 45ff.
which he provided in the place of normally functioning local democratic structures.

Unfortunately, this administration was not always satisfactory or honorable. Corruption in office was frequent; the practice of patronage resulted in appointments for political reasons, nepotism, even dishonesty. The Indian Department administering lands and funds of ignorant, helpless, poverty-ridden wards of government was no shining example of honour or honesty, nor were their supervisors able to enforce efficiency and rectitude.53

In many cases, the superintendents undertook to "civilize" the Indians into our cultural patterns through administrative policies. For example, a report in 1903 by the Superintendent of a Blackfoot agency recorded:

It may be remembered that in my last report I expressed thankfulness that there had been no plural marriages during the preceding year. That report was barely out of my hand when I learned that three members of the band were dissatisfied with one wife and had taken another. I immediately directed that the rations of these families be withheld until such time as they saw fit to obey the rules in this respect. One family missed one ration and then decided that it was better policy to abide by the rules. The other two families held out for several rations, and then they succumbed and put away wife number two. The rationing of able-bodied men and women had many objectionable features to me, but I must confess that, in these three

53 Ella Cork, The Worst of the Bargain (1962), p. 117. Quoted in an unpublished paper by Mr. Charles Beale. The following examples of Indian administration are also taken from Mr. Beale's paper.
instances, it gave a leverage to settle an objectionable custom, for the time being at least.54

This purpose of "civilizing" was carried through in terms of the political system. Note the perspective reflected in the following account by an American:

In the reserves of western Canada, the real work of civilizing the Plains Indians in settled communities began scarcely 40 years ago, and this fact explains why the Indians of these reserves have not reached the point in their development when, through their band councils, they may exercise the large functions of local self-government (sic) exercised by the bands in the eastern reserves. But they have begun their march upward. . . . The form of the old tribal machinery is retained, but its functions are changed, as the Indians, themselves, become educated and prepared to assume responsibilities in conformity with the standards of civilization. . . . its functions gradually changing and increasing until the Indians, after several generations, unconsciously, by processes of evolution, may take on the characteristics of self-governing, white communities and become part and parcel of the state.55

Superintendents also attempted to introduce agriculture as an economic base for many reserves, in spite of the facts that the reserves were smaller per capita than homesteads, poorer land in many cases, and that agriculture was completely foreign to the Indians' way of life. Cultural activities, such as summer festivals, were discouraged or denied. The Indian Affairs

54 Department of Indian Affairs, Annual Report (1903), p. 147. Also quoted by Mr. Beale, p. 12.
55 Abbott (1915), op. cit., p. 49.
Department noted in 1931:

It may seem arbitrary on our part to interfere with the native culture. The position of the department, however, can be readily understood as it is pointed out that Indians will spend a fortnight preparing for a sun dance, another fortnight engaging in it, and another fortnight to get over it. Obviously, this plays havoc with summer ploughing.56

The result of such administration and decision-making was not only a policy of denying practices of the traditional cultures by the Agents, but also a lack of food and income on the reservations. In other words, the very administrative structure designed to implement the policy of self-sufficiency only served to worsen the conditions it was attempting to ameliorate. Because the situation of the Indians was so desperate, welfare rations were issued to keep them alive until the farms were able to support the tribe. However, the Indians soon realized that they could exist without suffering the indignities of agriculture.57

Thus, the era of Indian welfare was born, and Indian communities slipped further into administrative paternalism.

The length and scope of this paper does not permit a more extensive description of the history of Indian Affairs administration and its effect on the Indian

56 D. C. Scott, The Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada (1931), p. 25. This book may be consulted for a survey of conditions on reserves, and in Indian Affairs, just prior to the Depression.

57 Beale, p. 10-11.
people. It is sufficient to note that "... this system of administration ... is now generally recognized to be inappropriate to contemporary needs which stress Indian participation in local decisions which affect them."  

To what extent has the reserve political system been modified to allow participation (decision by consensus, floating leadership, etc.) which is meaningful in terms of the traditional political culture?

CHANGES IN THE INDIAN ACT

In 1951 the Indian Act was revised to allow for more local participation. The band council was specified as consisting of one Chief and one councillor for every 200 residents, provided that each band has a minimum of two councillors or a maximum of twelve. The Chief and councillors may be chosen by election, or according "to the custom of the band" if the former method is not enforced. This latter alternative is not the prerogative of the band, it should be understood. The Minister can initiate the election procedure "whenever he deems is advisable for the good government of a band." (Section 73(1), p. 24). The "custom of the

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58 The record is not a good one. According to Mr. Beale's paper, the Government did not appropriate welfare funds until 1912, or set up a public health service until 1929, explaining why diseases (especially tuberculosis) took heavy tolls. At the end of World War I, only about 100,000 of the estimated 1850 population of 200,000 remained.

band" is allowed, according to the Indian Act, only "in the case of a band to which Section 73 does not apply" (Section 2(c), (ii), p. 1). Thus, the legal arrangements for election to band councils place primary responsibility upon the Minister and his agents who decide upon the method of political recruitment.

The "Governor in Council" also is given the power to decide whether the Chief is elected by (a) a majority of the votes of the band electors, or (b) a majority of the votes of the elected councillors of the band (in which case he remains a councillor). The Government also retains the authority to decide whether the councillors will be chosen by an electoral majority at large, or by an electoral majority in wards.

The 1951 changes also were said to have expanded the policy-making powers of the local band councils. Let us briefly examine these sections. The legal basis for policy-making by band councils is provided in Sections 80 and 82. This power of passing bylaws is

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60 The administration of schools (Sections 131-121) is the legal jurisdiction of the Minister of Indian Affairs to the present day. Schools are presently operated by Indian Affairs, by a Provincial School Board, or by a Province through an agreement with Indian Affairs. Recently Manitoba reserve residents have moved toward new arrangements. Several (such as Roseau River and Brokenhead) have become part of an existing School Division. Others have combined to form a new School Division operating under Provincial legislation (with costs borne by the Federal Government). Other alternatives are being explored, according to Indian Affairs Officials. Some Alberta reserves were in the news recently, boycotting white schools off their reserves. A national conference concluded that the answer to
delegated within three other acts of screens created by the Act: the provisions of the Act itself, the regulations made by the Governor in Council, and the regulations or decisions disallowing band bylaws made by the Minister. The subjects listed as those upon which the Governor in Council may make regulations include many municipal government prerogatives, including the making of rules

(a) for the protection and preservation of fur-bearing animals, fish, and other game on reserves.

(c) for the control of the speed, operation, and parking of vehicles on roads within reserves.

(d) for taxation, control, and destruction of dogs.

(e) for the operation, supervision, and control of pool rooms, dance halls, and other places of amusement on reserves.

(g) to provide medical treatment and health services.

(h) to provide compulsory hospitalization and treatment of infectious diseases among Indians.

(i) to provide for the inspection of premises on reserves and the destruction, alteration, or renovation thereof.

(m) for empowering and authorizing the council of a band to borrow money for band projects or housing projects and providing for the making of loans out of monies so borrowed to members of the band for housing purposes. 61

problems of Indian education is"... the development of an Indian school system which would place Indian parents in charge." Ben Tierney, "Comment from Ottawa: Indian School Crisis Grows," Winnipeg Tribune, Dec. 29, 1971, p. 7. This is an excellent survey of this problem, and the specifics about the Alberta situation. Consult also Native People, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sept., 1971); Vol. 4, No. 6 (Jan., 1972), p. 13 for Harold Cardinal's involvement in the issue.

61 Indian Act, Section 72, p. 24.
The reader will notice that these powers are the first prerogative of the Federal Government and its agents. However, the Band councils share the policy-making power for a number of them. This produces the following anachronisms which I have identified:

They do not share the powers to destroy dogs, although they can operate a pound. They do not share in the power to provide compulsory hospitalization or treatment (72:h). Although the local bands have the powers of setting zoning, building, and occupancy regulations (80(y), (h), (i)), they do not have the powers of inspection, destruction, alteration, or renovation given in 72:i to the Governor-in-Council. They have the sole power to pass laws regarding the observance of law and order (80:c), but they don't have the power to prevent overcrowding. The band council is given power to regulate the construction and use of public wells, cisterns, reservoirs, and other water supplies in Section 80:e, but the Governor-in-Council is given in 72:k the power to provide for sanitary conditions. Similarly, the control and prohibition of public games, sports, races, etc. is given to the band council (80:m); but the Governor-in-Council is given authority to make regulations over "pool rooms, dance halls, and other places of amusement." (72:e). In other words, the Law appears to give authority over amusements to the local bands, but authority over the places they are held to the Governor-in-Council.

In addition, some original jurisdiction is given to the band: the construction and maintenance of public works (80:f), the regulation of peddlers (n), removal and punishment of trespassers (p), and the prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances (d). Thus, although the band is given some of the positive powers usually given to municipal councils, it is specifically limited...
to those listed in this section (or Section 82). The Governor-in-Council, on the other hand, has the prerogative of much broader powers, mostly of a negative nature. Positive authority for economic and social development is not mentioned at all; and there is no general grant of policy-making, except as the Governor-in-Council may make all regulations necessary to enforce the Act (72:3).

The Governor-in-Council retains the power over band finances (72:1(m)), and this power is not included in the grant of specific powers, as is normally the practice in the case of municipalities. He may delegate authority to raise and spend money where he "... declares that a band has reached an advanced stage of development" (Section 82:1). He may revoke the declaration and any laws made under it which he specifies (Section 84). Even if this section would give band councils real legislative power, it must be remembered that the only form of legislation is the band council bylaw, and all band council bylaws must be sent for review to the Minister, and any can be disallowed by him (Section 81:2).

A number of other changes in other sections of the Act have been cited as expanding the possible policy-making scope of band councils: Section 60 provides that bands may be granted the right to exercise control and management of reserve land; Section 68 permits management of revenues. Both of these functions are carried out, however, only through and with the scrutiny of Indian Affairs officials.
On the basis of my analysis of the Indian Act, I am forced to conclude that relatively little more legal opportunity has been afforded Indians for the development of meaningful local self-government through 1951 changes in the Indian Act. The form of local government, the scope of local policy-making, and the possibilities for citizen participation are carefully limited and followed only under the supervision of the Indian Affairs administrators using rules and regulations created in Ottawa.
THE RESERVE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The reserve political system operates under the Indian Act, as revised in 1951 (and in several minor points since then). All Indians within scope of the Act are registered as members of bands.62 Unlike municipal citizens who participate in the political system as a part of residence in a community, the reserve Indian is legally bound to a band community from birth to either death or enfranchisement.

Band membership also means the use of (and possible profit from) reserve lands, and other resources which are designated as legal property of the band by the Indian Act.63 Thus, while membership in local communities, or citizenship in municipalities, has no legal bearing on the residents' property ownership, on reserves the two—band or community membership and

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62Except in special cases. When a person "voluntarily gives up her or his status as under the Act, they are said to be "enfranchised" (The Indian Today (1967), p. 4). The most common enfranchisement has been that automatically given registered women who marry non-registered men. This has been successfully challenged only recently in the Canadian Supreme Court. Up until 1960, enfranchisement was necessary for Indians to vote.

63Since the title to reserve land is vested in the Crown, no individual may dispose of it as an individual. In addition, no band may use or dispose of it without the permission and supervision of Indian Affairs.
property ownership—are one in the same.

In these two legal aspects, bands are more carefully defined communities than are the communities surrounding the reserves. The additional facet of band membership, that the band is "the basic unit of Indian Administration,"\textsuperscript{64} means that the band defines political, legal, and social boundaries for various reserve political systems. In eastern Canada one band usually lives on one reserve. In western Canada a band may occupy or "own" more than one reserve. For example, in British Columbia, 190 bands possess 1,625 reserves. The largest band is Six Nations (8,200) located near Brantford, Ontario.\textsuperscript{65} Tables I and II on the following pages indicate reserves and Indian population.

CONVERSION STRUCTURES

The form of the external political environment is that which we have previously diagrammed when describing reserve administration (p. 32). From the Bureau in Ottawa, the administrative lines of responsibility are connected with seven regional offices. These in turn are connected to eighty-seven agencies, the administrative unit responsible for one or more bands. The Superintendent is the official in charge of the agency. The local political unit is the band council and chief. The political system of reserve government in Canada (as prescribed by the Indian Act) is diagrammed in

\textsuperscript{64} The Indian Today, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
Table I  Indian Land in Reserves and Settlements and Number of Bands, by Province, as at March 31, 1969.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province or Territory</th>
<th>Bands No.</th>
<th>Total Reserves and Settlements No.</th>
<th>Total Area (approx.) Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25,552</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37,579</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>118,191</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td>1,541,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>541,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1,256,886</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,607,478</td>
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<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>1,603</td>
<td>814,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon Territory</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.W. Territories</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>556</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,263</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,983,072</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table II  Indian Population by Province, Selected Years 1949-68.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Province or Territory</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>4,411</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>4,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>20,453</td>
<td>26,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>17,549</td>
<td>23,658</td>
<td>33,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>16,308</td>
<td>23,280</td>
<td>33,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>13,805</td>
<td>19,287</td>
<td>27,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>27,936</td>
<td>36,229</td>
<td>46,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon Territory</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>2,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>6,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>136,407</td>
<td>179,126</td>
<td>237,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Recently, a differentiated administrative unit, band administration, has been added to these differentiated structures. The roles of officials in these structures has been described as operating as follows:

The Chief is the elected, or traditional, leader of the reserve. He represents the Band at public functions, and presides over all council meetings. In the absence of the Chief, the Council elects one of its own members to act in his place. The Chairman, whether the Chief or someone acting in his behalf, does not vote on resolutions of the Council, except in the event of a tie vote. In this case, he is obliged to vote, and the majority of the Council is binding.

The Chief does not, in his own right, make policy for the Council or for the reserve. He is responsible for ensuring that policies approved by the Council are properly carried out by those responsible. When there are representations to be made to government or other agencies, they are, when possible, made by the Chief and the Council, or by the Chief alone at the request of the Council. These representations are, however, made with the approval and consent of the Council through majority decisions.

The 'Council of the Band,' made up of the Chief and the elected councillors, is the policy-making body for the reserve. Decisions implementing policies and programs affecting the welfare of the Band members or with respect to the expenditure of Band monies are recorded in the minutes of the Band meeting. All decisions of the Council are dependent on majority vote, and such decisions are binding until recorded by Council.

The administrative staff of a Band is usually composed of a Band Manager and such other staff as are required. The purpose of this administration is to provide a consistent, non-political and administrative arm for Council.
Figure 2 The Reserve Political System
A second function of the administration is to advise the Council of policies already established, and to recommend new policies and programs for Council consideration.

Generally, Reserve administration is divided into several divisions, which, in large part, are based on the way in which funds are provided by Indian Affairs Branch.

It should be obvious that the structure described here is differentiated in a manner similar to that found in municipalities with the council-manager forms of government, as is characteristic of modern political systems.

The next question is "to what degree are the various input and output functions performed at the local level?" In other words, to what degree do capability and equality characterize reserve government, as distinct from Indian Affairs administration. Or to put the question in different terms, to what degree are band councils assuming various political functions?

OUTPUT FUNCTIONS

One way of measuring the assumption of rule-making by the band council is to examine to what degree the opportunities provided in the 1951 changes have been assumed by the councils. These opportunities including passing of their own bylaws (Section 80), raising and spending money (Section 82), managing their

66 Miss Stowell, daughter of an Indian Superintendent, supplied this report. The administrative branch expands as programs previously administered by the Indian Affairs are taken over by the Bands, and as funds are transferred to the Bands.
revenues (Section 68), and lands (Section 60). The following tables indicate the quality and quantity of local rule-making by band councils (as measured by the type and number of bylaws passed).

Table III  Bylaws Passed, by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted that this legislative output (rule-making function) cannot be said to be high by any standards. One of the major reasons for the dearth of rule-making is the rule-making path a band-council by-law must follow in order to become law.

... In the initial stage a bylaw will be formulated and discussed among band council members. If the bylaw requires enforcement by the R.C.M.P. or other police force, these officials will be approached on their views. The superintendent('s) function is to report the proposed bylaw to the regional office of the Indian Affairs Branch Regional officials who check the purpose and adequacy of the bylaw before sending it to Indian Affairs Branch Headquarters. Here financial and technical aspects are investigated prior to the signing of the approval. At any stage the proposal may be referred back to a previous procedural stage for changes or for more information. ... The Indian Affairs Branch is a large and complex administrative organization.
Table IV  Bands and Bylaws*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of Bands</th>
<th>Passing Bylaws</th>
<th>% Passing Bylaws</th>
<th>Section 80</th>
<th>Section 82</th>
<th>80 &amp; 82</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33-1/3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>528</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes all Bylaws passed from 1951 to May 16, 1967.

Table V  Bands Administering Own Revenue Monies, Section 68 (As of April 27, 1967).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Per Cent of Bands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>139</td>
<td>28% (Average)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:  *Indian Affairs*, 1967, p. 11.
Table VI  Types of Bylaws Passed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Matter</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Traffic and traffic signs</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Curfew</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Garbage and waste</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Water supply</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Animal rounds</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Fish and game</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hawkers and peddlers</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Licensing</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sanitation</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Weed Control</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Appointment of Band officials</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Disorderly conduct</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Expenditure of money</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Recreation program</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Electric power</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Fencing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Raising money</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Zoning</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes all Bylaws passed from 1951 to May 16, 1967.

. . As a consequence, the processing of information and the responses to queries from the field is often slow. We could provide many examples of delay in the processing of band business. . .

I know of no other type of local political system in Canada which has such a tortuous legislative-administrative process to follow. It is no wonder that Indians become discouraged with the process. In addition, stringent policy limits are imposed on the subject-matter and scope of such bylaws, as we noted above.

The rule-application function may or may not be carried out by the reserve administration. On many reserves there are constables and administrators. In the past the jobs were delegated to outside authorities or individuals in practice; today more reserve administration is encouraged, including land management of finances.

The rule-adjudication process, the court system, is almost always in operation outside the reserve community. Nowhere, that I can find, does the Indian Act mention the creation or operation of local courts on


68 Responsibility for education, as noted previously, is only beginning to come within the legislative or the administrative scope of local Indian decision-making. The omission of education from powers delegated to reserves is probably the most serious injustice in the Indian Act (and Indian Affairs today), since it directly inhibits the development of a self-reliant and independent cultural dimension to reserve life.
the reserve. Yet indigenous justice has been shown time and again to lower crime rates and encourage social control. There are few, if any, Indian judges or lawyers; yet it is through the judicial system that many, if not most, Indians are introduced to Canadian government.

INPUT FUNCTIONS

In order to measure the assumption of dominant society's patterns of political recruitment, we may examine the adoption of the elective system, which was also part of the 1951 changes in the Indian Act. It will be noted that most tribes adopted the elective system in the two years after it was announced.

Table VII  Adoption of Elective System by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Tribes Adopting</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Tribes Adopting</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The current status (1967) of elective versus "custom"
is indicated in Table VIII.

Table VIII  Band Councils (as of June 6, 1967).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province or Territory</th>
<th>Elective System</th>
<th>Traditional Custom</th>
<th>% Elective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>134*</td>
<td>57+</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yukon Territory</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Territories</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>382</strong></td>
<td><strong>169</strong></td>
<td><strong>71%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes one band from Yukon Territory.
+Includes two bands from Yukon Territory.


It is clear from Table VIII that a higher proportion of Indian bands have opted for the modern election system, in preference to the traditional system (heredity). The bands remaining traditional are those farthest from the rest of Canadian society, including some of those on the resource frontier. However, many reserves on Canada's resource frontier are linked by transportation and economics to single enterprise or other communities there.
RECRUITMENT

Study of the recruitment function leads to analysis of the degree to which reserve residents are participating in the recruitment and selection of band council members and chiefs. If we rely on impressions, such as those in Reservations Are for Indians, we may suppose that participation in the reserve political system is minimal. In order to examine this crucial variable, I have carried out secondary analysis of a sample survey conducted by the Hawthorne researchers. This analysis includes turnout to band council elections, the contesting of those offices, tenure in those offices, background of candidates, etc.

The Hawthorne study found that: the proportion of eligible voters voting in the last three elections ranged from 24% to 83%; the average turnout was 57%. Over half the sample had average turnouts greater than 50%. Compared to single, or multi-enterprise communities, these statistics suggest more citizen participation in voting on Indian reserves than in these other communities (except those in which changes in the political system's nature are being sought). This

69 The information for this section has been drawn from Chapter Eight of the second volume which was produced by the Hawthorne study group (Hawthorne, 1967, pp. 203-229). In that chapter, a statistical analysis of a sample of thirty-four bands (6% of all bands) was reported. The statistical data was obtained from Indian Affairs files which varied in quality from band to band. The sample was skewed toward bands within fairly easy reach of non-Indian towns and cities (Ibid., pp. 206-7).
conclusion based on statistics is supported by our discussions and observations.

In addition, the Hawthorne project obtained data on voting rates over a ten-year period (ending in 1965) for twenty-seven of the thirty-four band councils in the sample. Not surprisingly, they found that there had been a rise in average voter participation from 19% in 1955 to over 50% in 1965. As far as the Hawthorne study and this present study can measure political participation, the widespread view that Indians are apathetic and politically inactive must be declared to be totally incorrect. Furthermore:

To the extent that the percentage of eligible members voting is an index of participation and interest in local government, it seems that Indian participation and interest is greater than that of non-Indians.

Another measure of the citizen participation variable is the degree to which elective offices are contested. The Hawthorne group reported an average turnover of 46%, which means that almost one out of every two positions had a new person in it at every election. The average number of different candidates per post came to two in the last five elections. This is not surprising, as high turnover rates indicate

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70 Compare this with the impressions given by Heather Robertson in Reservations Are for Indians (1970), passim.


72 Ibid., p. 211.
an interest in competing for office, which in turn leads to a higher turnout.

Our studies of single-enterprise communities indicate that the contesting of office is high in the emergent and early developed stages of political development, but that this drops off after the community becomes established politically. The Hawthorne study also found "that there has been a steady increase over the last three elections in the proportion of candidates who are new to those who are not new." As might be expected, many of these new candidates are younger than the previous office-holders.

Another indication of change in the recruitment process on reserves is the role of women in Indian local affairs. Until 1951, they could neither vote nor run for band council offices. Although the voting statistics could not be divided into categories by sex, the Hawthorne study of female participation indicated "... there is clear evidence of growing participation (of women) as candidates in our sample."

The vast majority of candidates in the reservation elections appear to have a background of regular employment (as laborers, farmers, or trappers), and from five

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73 Consult Wichern, et al. (1971), Chapter Two (Flin Flon) for an example, and discussion (Chapter Three).
74 Ibid., pp. 211-212.
75 Ibid., p. 214.
to seven years of school. Thus, the nature of political participation on reserves appears to follow the pattern elsewhere: those with social and economic advantages are more likely to be candidates. We agree with the Hawthorne study conclusions from field work notes and secondary sources: kinship affiliation appears to be a significant factor. This is the case because band membership is determined through kinship (in some bands the hereditary principle is legally recognized) and one sibling group's sheer numerical size in a band may determine election outcomes. Thus, there tends to be a kinship linkage of people in official positions, without kinship "... serving as a deliberate and openly recognized principle of recruitment and support."  

However, the Hawthorne study and our investigations indicate that there is a trend toward expecting the people who obtain office to hold their offices for

\[76\] Ibid., p. 217.


the benefit of the whole tribe, rather than a kinship or sectional group. This indicates a trend from traditional to more modern political culture and interest articulation patterns. This trend is supported by the quantity of complaints:

... the fact that so many complaints are made can be taken as evidence of a widespread rejection of the particularist norms of putting first the interest of one's relatives and letting the rules of kinship prevail in office, and the support of the universalist norms of putting first the interests of the band and letting the rules of office prevail over those of kinship. ..

The former norms, the particularistic, are more characteristic of the reserve experience and the traditional patterns of leadership selection on isolated reserves. The latter norms, the universalistic, are more characteristic of reserves near towns and cities. At this point, the traditional political culture factor, which we have documented, becomes especially important to an understanding of reserve politics. It is the bands, large or small, which are more isolated and disadvantaged (more "enclaved"), and more traditionally oriented, that display "sectional interests" and kinship affiliation.

THE POLITICAL COMMUNICATION FUNCTION

Our research indicates that the band council tends to be pushed from a rule-making role toward an intermediary role between the officials and community residents. This is true because the Band Council is dependent

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upon the Indian Affairs Branch for information, instructions, approval of major economic or political decisions. The Hawthorne study comments:

... The flow of suggestions about solutions to problems tends to be channelled narrowly from the Indian Affairs Branch official in the early to the individual band. ... The Branch employs experts who originate suggestions. ... However, it is unusual for the Band Council itself to be in direct contact with these sources of ideas about solutions. By the time the ideas have been processed in the system, they reach the agent in a fixed or distilled form. A further distillation takes place at his level and he passes them on to the Council, typically in a one-alternative form.80

In this intermediary function of channelling information about policies between community and administrator, the Chief and the Band Council are supposed to represent the wishes of those Indians in the band. On

80 Hawthorne, op. cit. (1967), p. 243. In Manitoba, three agencies or districts have been phased out recently in an effort to deal with this problem. Under the new arrangement, a "Local Government Adviser," who reports directly to the Indian Affairs regional director, works in the band office "helping" the Chief and Councillors identify needs of the electors, and is supposed to be "a partner in trust of the Band Council with whom he works." Sixty percent of the bands in Manitoba are in direct liaison with the Regional Office under this arrangement: t. Indian Affairs staff is designed to be supportive and consultative to the bands they serve. This program was developed by the Regional Director and a private consultant, reviewed by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood officials, and presented to Ottawa. It is indicative of the attempts of Indian Affairs officials to expand local decision-making, but in itself was not a product of the reserve residents.
the other hand, they serve as the channels of policies from Indian Affairs (through the local Superintendent), and thus legitimate those decisions for the band. A previous study of the bands in British Columbia (circa 1952-1954) had indicated that "... the Band Councils there and at that time were primarily legitimators of measures and decisions from the outside" (Hawthorne, 1967, p. 192). The 1967 (national) study found "... an increase in concentration on personal and physical plant maintenance and on adoptive measures" (Ibid., p. 193). In other words, the role of band councils appeared to be shifting away from solely an "intermediary" role to effective rule-making and application functions.

The former role of "intermediary" is most often the case where the band has limited control over its funds, or more often, simply limited resources; where revenue-producing projects are Branch subsidized. In cases in which the band controls its own revenues from a substantial band-owned resource "... the council assumes the look of a municipal government rather than that of a bureaucratic appendage" (p. 194). In other words, where resources are available, political development (in terms of local government) takes place on Indian reserves.

... the strength of the band council in the total Indian Affairs Branch superstructure is determined more than anything else by the
band-owned wealth and the degree of control over that wealth enjoyed by the band.\footnote{Ibid., p. 195. In Manitoba and other Provinces more funds are being made available through the "grants-to-bands" program. In addition, training programs, budget forms and guides, and other aids to local decision-making have been developed by Indian Affairs officials in consultation with band managers and consultants. The basic problems still remain, however.}
CASE STUDIES OF RESERVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN MANITOBA

No two reserve political systems are at the same stage of development. As previously noted, Heather Robertson, in Reservations Are For Indians, describes several Manitoba reserves which seem to lack any real coherence as political systems.82 What was not mentioned in that book was the fact that reserves, like other communities, vary in their forms of political activity. Furthermore, one reserve, or community, varies in this respect from one point in time to another. In order to capture the picture of actual political development on reserves, I had an assistant describe the political and socio-economic conditions on a number of reserves in Manitoba in the summer of 1970. Her report is as follows:83

Training courses are provided by the Indian Affairs Branch whereby Indian leaders and band staff may learn the financial, legal, technical and other skills necessary for the management of community affairs. In addition, provision is made for Indian leaders to meet with each other to discuss common problems and concerns, and to meet with non-Indians for the purpose of mutual understanding and co-operation. This program is administered in each region by the

82 Robertson's descriptions have received a great deal of criticism from native peoples as not being either representative or entirely accurate. My research tends to support those criticisms.

83 This section was written by Miss Marlene Stowell.
Regional Community Development Training Officers. These training courses allow the Indian leaders to become more aware of the political and social environment within which they must function, as well as equipping them with the knowledge required to carry out their duties and responsibilities. The interaction when the leaders meet with each other results in an increased awareness of the situations on other reserves and also from these meetings comes a feeling of unity of purpose. The meetings with the non-Indian segment help to build an awareness of that environment external to the reserve and helps the leaders in learning to cope with that political situation.

Example No. 1: The Pas ("The Big Eddy Reserve")
Population: 1,005

(a) Political

On this reserve major decisions are made by the chief and council, yet with an eye to the various other power-holding groups. The chief and council are acutely aware of political factions on the reserve, and they therefore tend to make their decisions accordingly. Use is made of family ties and geographically centered groups who either have representatives on council, or have close friends on council. The council members are fairly evenly representative of the different groups on the reserve. Thus, most of the power groups have some representation. There is no truly defined party system on this reserve, but various family groups do vie for political power.

On the reserve, there is an "in" group and an "out" group, but there is no overt favoritism for the "ins". This in itself is only good politics, and it keeps feuding on the reserve to a minimum. There is not what may be called a 'miniature political system' on the reserve, although there is a fairly clear power system operating behind the scenes.

In regard to the participatory structures, this varies depending upon the issue. Band council meetings are not well attended, and consist mostly of local business and dealing with requests from band members. This may be partially because of the large credibility gap between the council and the people.

Some years ago, there was a change in the election
results. There was a major turnover from the old to the young, with the current average age of councillors at about forty-three years. There is currently a turnover of about one-third when there is an election.

(b) Social-Economic

This reserve is located close to The Pas, where the Churchill Forest Industries provided a source of employment for a time. However, there are economic opportunities on the reserve itself for willing workers. Some of the band projects which are either currently underway or are to be so in the near future are a source of employment for band members. These projects, undertaken by the band itself, are mainly under the direction of the band council. Some of these projects are as follows: there is currently underway a "gravel project" which is a source of income for the band and for individuals employed on the project. The gravel pits are located on the reserve itself, and the gravel and dirt are sold mainly to Churchill Forest Industries and to the town of The Pas for various construction projects. Land on the reserve is also leased out for grazing, agricultural purposes, etc., and provides a source of income. A boarding care home in the townsite area of the reserve is also in operation, and is at the moment used to billet expectant mothers who are from out of the area and are awaiting the birth of their children. The "Carrot River Project" has also been proposed; as well as providing employment, it will better the scenery on that particular part of the reserve. A recreational area is also planned to be built near the proposed town site, as well as a sewage and water project to be established on the proposed town site, to be completed in early 1971. There is thus ample economic opportunity both on and off the reserve for employment, and the band council is endeavouring through its various projects to improve the economic status of the reserve.

There are also numerous committees on the reserve, most of which are functioning well. The ones which are not are a result mainly of poor attendance. Examples of the committees found in this reserve are a Women's Auxiliary, Health and Welfare Committees, a Hall Committee (regarding the band hall), an Industry and Commerce Committee, Sports Committees, and Public Works and Finance Committees.

The band council on this reserve, under the strong
and capable leadership of Chief Gordon Lاثalin, appears
to be functioning well. The majority of the band
members are satisfied with the way that things are
being administered, and especially that they are con-
sulted about major decisions made by the band council.

The social interaction on the reserve itself is
good, with excellent attendance at such functions as
dances and bingo games held on the reserve. Most of
the people think that the proposed town planning is
good, and are willing to stand behind the band council
to bring it about. This should improve the social
interaction even more, as opposed to cases where the
majority of the people are not in agreement with town
planning and townsites.

Example No 2: Hole River (Hollow Water)
Population: 359

(a) Political

This reserve, located north-east of Winnipeg near
Manigotogan on Lake Manigotogan, may for technicality's
sake be classified as an "isolated-accessible" reserve.
That is, although it is easily accessible by air,
water, and road, it is far enough from the city of
Winnipeg that it has retained many of the unpolluted
aspects of isolated life.

The reserve has, besides the Chief Arnold
Williams, three councillors: Garry Raven, Norman
Marias and Adolf Bushy. However, one of the main
powers on the reserve is George Barker, who was chief
of the reserve for forty-two years, as well as being
past-president of the M.I.B. He still maintains a
position of great authority among the members of the
band. Although he holds no political position on the
reserve, he is one of the five senators of the Manitoba
Indian Brotherhood. Although this is an honorary posi-
tion, he acts not only in an advisory capacity and as a
representative at various functions, but also as an
important link between the people of the reserves and
the M.I.B. He still holds some province-wide authority
because of his past and present association with the
M.I.B., and this accentuates his authority on his own
reserve. This authority, though it is only informal,
is still powerful. As a respected elder of the band,
he is in a position to support or oppose band council
policies and programs with some considerable measure of
support from the band members.
(b) **Social-Economic**

Since this is a semi-isolated community, the nearest large industry is located at Pine Falls (80 miles north-east of Winnipeg): the Abitibi Pulp and Paper Company. Most of the employment is seasonal. While there are some who are employed by Abitibi, mainly as pulp cutters, one could not say this is the mainstay of the reserve economy. Most find employment in fishing, hunting, and trapping. Some are employed by the Department of Mines and Natural Resources to fight forest fires. There is also some employment to be found in the construction of new houses on the reserve.

Although there does not appear to be a stable economic base for the community at first glance, this does not really result in an unstable social environment. There is social interaction with such events as bingo games, and the community is situated near enough to other centers (such as Manigotogan, Biset, Pine Falls and Fort Alexander) to have some social interaction with those communities. As the land is not overly large, it appears to be more internally, rather than externally, socially oriented.

Example No. 3: Fort Alexander
Population: 2,023
Chief: George Guimand

This reserve, located eighty miles north-east of Winnipeg at the mouth of the Winnipeg River, can readily be identified as accessible. Not only is there a paved highway leading directly to Winnipeg, but the reserve is bordered on one side by the town of Pine Falls. The band membership is large, and the reserve itself, through band programs, is attempting to become economically independent. This can only be accomplished through co-operation between the band council and the band members in a collective effort to better their conditions.

(a) **Political**

The reserve has an elected council of a chief and four councillors, in addition to an administrative staff. The band council offices are found in the town-site, which is on the south side of the river.

On this reserve, numerous factions are vying for
political power, but the struggle is particularly visible among various family groups. These could almost be likened to political party groups. The "in" and "out" groups are more obvious here than on, for example, the Big Eddy Reserve. Here, it is more probable that a member of the "in" power group, or a friend or relative, will receive a new house, rather than a member of the "out" political group. Cultural and family ties are more potent here than overt "politicking", and it may require some time before the political aspects and policy and decision-making settle down.

In part, the political intricacies of the reserve may result from the fact that this reserve has recently been coming into the limelight. The current president of the M.I.B. was a former chief of this reserve, and a reasonable number of the M.I.B. staff are drawn from this reserve or the surrounding areas. Another part may be the physical proximity of the town of Pine Falls, which is organized and managed under the auspices of the Abitibi Paper Company. Thus, the nearest community on which the reserve could pattern some of its political development is one without a municipal form of government; it is rather like a privately-owned town. However, the village of Powerview, on the opposite side of Pine Falls to the south side of the reserve, does have a municipal form of government. The reserve is thus presented with two neighbouring communities, one with and one without a municipal form of government, as examples of the possible direction which the policy-making body of the reserve could take.

(b) Social-Economic

For the past few years, the main aim of the band and the council for the reserve has been diversification of economy. For many years the paper mill in Pine Falls has provided a source of employment, both for workers in the mill itself, and in the "woods" operations, cutting pulp, etc. Now, however, the band council has undertaken various on-reserve projects to help diversify the economy and stabilize the economic status of the reserve. There is an agricultural farming project, with certain band members who are farming the land. This year, a new development has been undertaken—the domesticated planting of wild rice. If this project succeeds, it will be not only a source of employment, but also a source of considerable income for the
reserve—as the picking of wild rice has long been a source of income.

The reserve is physically split by the Winnipeg River. Most of those who live on the north side are Catholic, and most who live on the south side are Anglican—with the exception of the townsite area on the south side which is a mixture. More and more people are moving into the new townsite where there are sewage, water, and heating facilities. This townsite is having an effect upon the social interaction of the people, although there is still not the desired north-south interaction which is possible. There are committees on the reserve, such as the school committee, which are working for the betterment of the reserve as well as increasing the interaction among the people. There is very good attendance at such events as bingo games, with a large number of people attending those held within the town of Pine Falls. The reserve has a privately owned store, a skating arena and an outdoor recreation area of its own, but reserve residents can also take advantage of the shopping and recreational (such as a theatre) facilities in Pine Falls.

The social-economic conditions are better than they were a few years ago, and are continuing to improve. This is especially true for the economic conditions, due to increased band council activity, and projects and programs initiated for this purpose.

It is important to remember that since conditions and people on the various reserves differ, there is no "typical" reserve. However, the above may give some indication of what reserves are and can be like. It is also necessary to keep in mind the importance of culture in the lives of these people regarding the form of current social and therefore political processes.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The Indian Act has not been amended since 1951, although it has been claimed that the present Minister would be happy to change it. It has come to represent the treaty and other rights to Canada's Indians. However, in recent years, Indian Affairs has loosened its administration, decentralized responsibility for the arrangement of programs, has initiated a policy of continuous consultation with Indian peoples, has subsidized Provincial and national Indian organizations, has turned over several programs (such as community development) to the Indians themselves, and has allowed bands to allocate funds for projects and programs themselves under the "grants-to-bands" program.

On October 1, 1969, the Federal government and the Manitoba government agreed that the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood should assume the responsibility for community development on reserves in this Province. The structure of this arrangement is of particular interest in terms of reserve political development.

The Indian Affairs Branch instituted a "grants-to-bands" program in 1965, which allows budgeting decisions without an item-by-item, day-by-day accounting to the Branch, and loosens the restrictions of the Indian Act. The expenditures for this program have risen from
$71,065 in 1965 to $2,023,059 in 1969-70. Further-
more, a program of community development was instituted
in order to stimulate local involvement.

The national Indian Affairs community development
program was initiated during the 1963-64 budget year,
actually receiving its public debut in 1965 through the
Social Programs Division, Community Services Section in
Ottawa, and through similar organizational arrangements
in the Indian Affairs regional offices.

In 1968 the staff of this Section numbered fifty,
twenty of whom were community development workers (one
at each of the six regional offices serving as super-
visors, the others in the field). In 1969-70 (the
latest information available), there were six regional
superintendents, forty-six community development
workers (eighteen of whom were Indians), four workers
on special contracts. In addition, thirty-six workers
hired by the provincial government were also included,
on the basis of Federal-Provincial community development
agreements in Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskat-
chewan.

84 Canada Yearbook, 1970-71, p. 246, as well as
communications from Indian Affairs officials, whose
comments I gratefully acknowledge.


information on community development and participation
may be found in James A. Draper (ed.), Citizen Partici-
pation: Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1971), Section
Six, "Indian Participation," pp. 331-369.
Interviews with various personnel in the Community Development Offices indicate that the program is effectively providing extensive services to reserve government, especially in leadership training and social animation.

In 1970, the community affairs superintendents allocated $9,966,808 cf their program funds for Indian band administration.87

Across Canada in the late 1960's, provincial Indian organizations were reborn and replaced the Advisory Councils which had served as communication channels between the Indians and Government during the mid-sixties. These organizations have tended to

87Ibid.
challenge the Government and seek more authority in the administration of Indian Affairs.

For the purposes of this study, the metamorphosis of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood is exemplary:

Although established in 1934, it was not until 1967 that it obtained the support of all fifty-four bands in the Province and replaced the Advisory Councils. During the summer of 1968, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood consulted with most Chiefs in the Province to know what their problems and hopes were. These were pulled together and were the subject of a December 5, 1968 paper presented to the Minister of Indian Affairs entitled "Future Relationships Between The Government of Canada and the Indian People." Apart from telling the Minister the Indian view on amendments to the Indian Act, it also summarized what the Chiefs were saying at the reserve level. These can be summarized as follows:

(1) We have been elected by our people to run our communities but we do not have a structure nor the resources that allows that to happen.

(2) We want to set our own goals.

(3) We want to make our own decisions.

(4) We want to be involved and to participate in planning and administration at every level (regional, district, agency, local).

(5) We want planning from the grass-roots up, not from the top down.

(6) We want an administrative structure designed to enable and not to restrict local programming.

(7) We want Indian Affairs to be a support to us, not a bureaucracy.

(8) We want Ottawa to decentralize financial and program authority to the field to avoid long delays.
(9) We want a partnership relationship with the Government, where planning and decisions are made together.

The paper concluded by saying "we sincerely believe that we as Indian people have much to offer in the solution of our problems and in fact will find solutions provided we are allowed to deal with our problems realistically . . . within the content of our own capability and our own aspirations."

The Minister, the Hon. Jean Chretien, approved the request made and the "Manitoba Project" or "Partnership Concept," as it is sometimes called, was the result. It was reflected in delegations of increased financial authority to the Region (from $7,500 to $50,000), in a more flexible grants-to-bands program, and generally in more ability to respond in the Region to changing needs.

Also during 1968, with the help of the A.R.D.A. grant, the M.I.B. established a communication program designed to inform the Indian people as to their rights, privileges and responsibilities, and to acquaint them with the Provincial organization, its functions, and its objectives. In 1969 the M.I.B. was incorporated under 'The Companies Act' of Manitoba. This culmination of organizational development strengthened grass roots participation in two ways—by the establishment of a Board of Directors made up of representatives from the fifty-four Bands of Manitoba, and by establishing five regions in the province and employing five regional vice-presidents as full-time communications workers to maintain contact and liaison with the local level.

This diagram of the selection channels illustrates how the reserve residents are represented in the M.I.B.:
Executive . . . . . President
5 Vice-Presidents
Secretary-Treasurer

Board of Directors
(one from each Band). 54 Members

Band Council. . . . . 54 Lands

People on the
Reserve . . . . . . . 34,000

In late 1969, the Brotherhood took over control of community development programs, which in 1970-71 included forty bands.

In October, 1971, the Brotherhood issued an extended reply to the Government White Paper. This comprehensive survey of conditions and policies entitled Wahbung: Our Tomorrows contains extensive recommendations concerning reserve local government. Some of the recommendations most relevant to this study are as follows:

General

Experience since 1968 has clearly demonstrated that the system of local government is neither consistent with the demands of a Federally structured department nor with the local government as practised by municipal government throughout the province. It is the belief of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood that if true and effective advancement of people is to be achieved, then the means by which the community

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88 Information supplied by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood.

can identify its own priorities, consistent with its diversity of needs must be at least equal to the freedom to plan and the freedom to practice enjoyed by other forms of local government.

There is a need on the part of the Federal Government to free itself from its inflexible constraints so as to permit us to enjoy all of the privileges and prerogatives of local administration, to plan on the basis of our needs, to establish our own priorities consistent with those needs and to implement a program that will provide opportunity for all through local action and local commitment...

The principal change required of the Federal Government is that it recognize that it is the facilitator of a social change process designed to enhance and to facilitate equality of opportunity by the economically deprived and the socially dispossessed. Its role must shift from one of administrator to one of consultant and facilitator, and it must divest itself of the mantle of paternalism and decision-making that has imposed its desires upon us for the past century...

It is the belief of the Manitoba Indian people that immediate steps must be taken by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development to facilitate a change in orientation and to develop a responsiveness to local initiative based on flexibility of concept and program support. To free ourselves from the bonds of regimentation and administrative rigidity to pursue a future based on progress and responsibility would be to achieve the objective of self-determination often pursued by successive governments hesitantly and tentatively, seldom courageously and imaginatively...

The establishment of a program of reserve responsibility centres comparable to local government units designed to provide to us both the opportunity and the wherewithal to achieve in our own right and in our own way...
equality with our fellow man must be initiated now.

The Indian people of Manitoba are pleased to note that the Department of Indian Affairs has accepted the principle of the establishment of responsibility centres and is now beginning to take action designed to eliminate the middle tier of administration by dissolving the district office concept. This in itself is a major step forward, but will not by itself be completely successful without the involvement of our people in the decision-making responsibilities of the regional office. We feel that it is important that we not only define at the local level our objectives and priorities but that we also have some voice in and share the responsibility for the decisions that are made in response to our own initiatives.

The Indian Act

The Indian Act must be amended, not abolished. Some of the contents of the Indian Act have become restrictive, and contradictory to the progress of the Indian communities not only in Manitoba, but in Canada as well. It must become a document providing opportunity to overcome the conditions of poverty under which Indian people are forced to live. It must also become a document which clearly ensures treaty and aboriginal rights, as well as protecting our land base.

The Act should be entrenched, constitutional protection of Indian rights.

The Act must contain an atmosphere to allow meaningful social development for Indian people according to their own guidelines.

Ibid., p. 25-33. I have selected relevant recommendations, and rearranged their order of appearance.
Responsibility Centres

Define
1. Needs
2. Policy
3. Resources

Boards and Commissions (MIB & IAB)

Governments
- Federal
- Provincial
- Municipal

Private Sector, Churches, Organizations

Provincial Representation
- MIB Board
- MIB Assembly
- Committees

Education
- School Com.
- Teachers
- Training, etc.

Community Services
- Roads
- Bridges
- Water & Sewer
- Garbage, etc.

Legal
- Policing
- Jury
- Contracts

Health
- Hospital Board
- Community Health Worker
- Transportation

Economic Development
- Development Projects
- Agriculture, etc.

Policy
- Health
- Education
- Economic Development
- Social Development, etc.

Social Development
- Recreation
- Housing
- Culture
- Welfare

CHIEF COUNCIL

Band Administration

Source: Nahbung: Our Tomorrows, p. 169

Figure 4. Local Government Community Organization as Proposed by Manitoba Indians
(Specific Recommendations):

1. The system of band government should be at the discretion of each community, and this right must be ensured.

2. The sections of the Indian Act dealing with reserve community government should recognize the responsibility which rests with the leaders. These leaders are unable to fulfill their day-to-day activities because they must devote time and effort to their new positions in the community. Consequently, the principle should be set out in the new Indian Act that the leaders, however chosen by the community, should be paid a salary, salary to come from government not Band funds. Regulations should set forth the uppermost limits of the salaries.

3. The method of elections must be left at the discretion of each community, except that it is recommended that the terms of office of elected Chief and council be extended to four years. Further, we submit that a mediation board be available to communities consisting of:
   1) a representative of the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood,
   2) one lawyer,
   3) a representative of the Indian Affairs Branch.

   The board would be responsible for adjudicating charges brought by a majority of band members against any elected member or members. If charges are proven, then the board may take appropriate steps for the removal of the offending member from office.

4. Welfare is not mentioned in the existing Indian Act to a substantial degree. It should be an entrenched benefit to be exercised in the manner deemed best by the community.
5. There should be community laws, police, courts—benefits should go to Band not to the Canadian sector.
CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have attempted to analyze political development on reserves as a continuing process of adaptation, whereby a political system responds to its environment in terms of equality (expanding participation and local self-government), capacity (expanding the scope of local policy-making and administration), and differentiation (the local involvement in separate executive, legislative, and administrative structures).

The following are some of the specific conclusions we may make:

1. The input (citizen participation) part of political development is well-developed and increasingly significant on reserves. This participation is evident by:
   a. high rates of adoption of participatory options (elections, grants-to-bands, etc.) made available in the Indian Act (1951) and through Indian Affairs programs.
   b. high rates of voter turnout, contesting of offices, turnover in offices, involvement by women, etc., in the reserve selection process.
   c. the willingness (and, increasingly, the demand) of chiefs and councillors to self-govern their own communities' affairs, including education.
   d. the participation in government and Indian sponsored programs of local leadership training and community development.

2. The Indian Act does not grant reserve communities the opportunity of local self-government available in other communities, in spite of (or, allowing instead) the participation above.
The basic framework of the Indian Act governs all reserves, separating them constitutionally from other communities which come under the jurisdiction of the Provinces. It provides that the Indian Affairs officials (and ultimately the Minister and Government) retain at least supervisory control over local governance through the Superintendent. This means that everything from bylaws to elections must be approved by Indian Affairs if they are to be local law. Many areas, such as education, courts, welfare, etc., are excluded from indigenous councils by the Act, and delegated to the Superintendents by Indian Affairs. In addition, Provincial grants-in-aid and other programs are not generally available.

3. Because of this framework, political development on reserves (and on the resource frontier) is hindered, and a dangerous situation (apoliticized people without proper outlets for their activity) is created. Indian Affairs has broadened the scope of local participation and decision-making through local liquor options, community development programs, grants-to-bands projects, and other arrangements during the 1960's. In spite of these developments, the basic framework, which places final responsibility on Indian Affairs, has not changed. It is this change—the granting of local municipal authority without loss of basic rights under treaties—which is the crux of current conflicts between Indians and the Federal government.

4. In terms of policy-making structure and scope of policy-making delegated to the local unit, the single-enterprise communities had much more autonomy of decision-making, in spite of the fact that participation rates (voting, etc.) on reserves for which we could obtain data indicated almost as high (in some cases higher) participation rates as those rates found in the single-enterprise communities.

5. In our model for local political development we hypothesized that increases in participation, education, etc. would lead to increases in the scope of local policy-making and more autonomous forms of local policy-making. While this tended to be correct for single-enterprise communities which desired such a change, this development was found
to be impossible and not occurring to any great extent on Indian reserves.

6. The model we developed for single-enterprise communities assumed inherent political rights and cultural norms indigenous to Anglo-Saxon, white Canadian society, which are not shared by Indians on reserves. A study of pre-reserve and reserve history shows that the dominant white society, in imposing the reserve experience, has encouraged:
   a. dependency upon paternalistic administrative policy-making by the white officials in the place of viable local reserve decisions.
   b. the erosion of the indigenous patterns of, and social bases for, group leadership and collective decision-making (to be specific, shared leadership and consensus decision-making).
   c. removal of natural economic and physical resources, strong pressures toward removal of human resources (such as potential leaders) into the patterns of white society).

7. We found many reserves moving from the relatively undeveloped stage of policy-making (highly dependent on external, administrative decisions by government agents) toward more autonomy in public decision-making by Band Councils, development of competing leadership groups, and general involvement and interest in collective decisions.

8. This development, occurring relatively recently in reserve history—over the last few years in Manitoba—appears due to at least two main factors:
   a. The development of the Province Brotherhood into a politically effective force which strengthens and stimulates local Band leadership obtaining recognition of them in the dominant society, distributing sizable economic and social benefits through them, holding training courses, and supplying technical assistance of community development workers.
   b. The Federal government's support for "participatory democracy" (i.e. participation) in Indian Affairs programs, such as community development, grants-to-bands, and administration of economic development enterprises on reserves.
We have observed the changing role of Indian Affairs from administering reserve community government to facilitating and supporting local self-government. In terms of the total process of political development, it is clear that only a fraction of the power to make public decisions has been turned over to the Indian reserve residents. In spite of all the programs mentioned in the preceding sections, the policy-making force continues to be reserved to the Indian Affairs chain of command which we have identified as outside the reserve community (the agency, regional and national offices of Indian Affairs).

The only answer to this dilemma would appear to be the conversion of the pressures from outside the reserve community into support for pressures toward solving local problems within the reserve. Buttressed by the support from Indian Affairs and Provincial Associations, the local council can begin to function in response to the pressures from the electorate. As observed above, this pressure is now a primary factor in Indian local politics. In order to allow this pressure to produce meaningful forms of local self-government, the framework of the Indian Affairs administration must continue to evolve from deconcentration to devolution of authority to bands.

In this light, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood recommendations (previously enunciated) regarding the Indian Affairs role should be followed: first, the Indian Act must be changed to allow for meaningful
local government on local public services, including education. Second, the band-council government, rather than the Superintendent, agency, or district office, must become the local administrative centre of policy-making. Financial authority should continue to be centralized in the Regional Office leaving skilled specialists (without management or control functions) available as advisers to band councils on a request basis. Reserves should negotiate directly with the Regional Office for funds, as municipalities do with the Department of Municipal Affairs.

In addition, guidelines for governance, such as those provided in Municipal Acts, are needed as basic rules and techniques by which reserve government may be run effectively. Co-operation between Indian Affairs officials and brotherhoods (such as those in Manitoba) are now producing these basic tools for local self-government. This does not solve the problem of the Indian Act, however. The reserve should adopt, organize, staff, and budget practices which have become the common forms of municipal administration throughout the nation. They should be allowed to formulate their own local system of councils, bands, commissions, or

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91 Currently, Local Government Advisers have replaced Superintendents in some places. They are supposed to serve the wishes of the band, as described above (footnote 88). However, they are directly responsible to Indian Affairs. This is hardly adequate self-government.
agencies.\footnote{Consult, for example, the suggestions for local government structures by the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood in \textit{Wahbung: Our Tomorrows} (1971), p. 158.}

Recently in British Columbia, eight years of talks between the Quinsom River band council and the Provincial and Federal governments culminated in an agreement to give the 255 Indians in two villages full municipal status without the loss of any rights. Ninety-one of the 101 voters turned out to the January 17 referendum which required a three-fourths majority. Unfortunately, the bid to become the first Indian municipality failed by four votes. Nevertheless, the occurrence demonstrates the path of the future for many Indian bands: incorporation subject to provisions of the Municipal Acts without termination of the benefits of federal legislation and services.\footnote{For further information, consult "No Municipality For Cape Mudge," in the \textit{Vancouver Sun}, January 18, 1972, p. 15; and "Indians Veto Municipality" in the \textit{Winnipeg Tribune}, January 18, 1972, p. 5.} In Manitoba, Henry Spence, Vice President of Manitoba Indian Brotherhood presented a brief on behalf of the chiefs of several Manitoba reserves to Jean Chretien, Minister of Indian Affairs, on March 1, 1972. Spence explained to reporters that Indians are ready to take a more important role in government. "It's time that the Indian begins to govern himself through a mayor and a council," said Mr. Spence.\footnote{"Indians Ask Chretien For Bigger Role," in the \textit{Winnipeg Tribune}, March 1, 1972, p. 3.} This research supports that contention.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Reserve residents should be provided with the same opportunities for local self-government that non-reserve citizens already enjoy. This must include the opportunity to achieve municipal status without loss of rights guaranteed by treaties and the Indian Act. It must also include community control of Indian schools and welfare, and establishment of local court sessions on the reserves wherever possible.

2. Reserve officials must be included as equals to single enterprise and other officials in area or regional development organizations. We must recognize that the development of the quality of life on the resource frontier can only be attained by co-operation between residents of reserve, single enterprise, and other communities, acting as equals.

3. Single enterprise and reserve community leaders should establish joint boards designed to assure native peoples' rights, and to foster co-operation and understanding in solving common problems. These bodies can assist community development workers and serve as a basis for development of regional councils.
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THE ROLE OF THE TOWN ADMINISTRATOR IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SINGLE ENTERPRISE COMMUNITIES
INTRODUCTION

Across Canada's resource frontier (Map 1) are sprinkled hubs of human and economic activity, the single enterprise communities which serve as staging and support bases for mining, forestry, hydro, atomic power, and other industries. The number of these communities continues to grow, though many of them are products of earlier generations of Canadians. Each one has some type of government and political system; and is either administered by company or province, or is governed by a locally-elected council.\(^1\) As Robinson has noted, the governing of these communities involves much more than setting up boundaries and signs welcoming visitors to the communities.\(^2\)

In spite of this fact, few, if any, studies have focused upon the political dimension of the development process through which single enterprise communities progress, though attention is given to social and

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\(^1\)The most recent single enterprise communities illustrate these two different approaches to local governance. Leaf Rapids, Manitoba, is to be administered, at least initially, by a Provincial civil servant. Local governance is planned for the community in the future. Logan Lake, British Columbia, started as an incorporated municipality with mayor and council. (Winnipeg Free Press, December 30, 1971, p. 1; Northern Miner, November 18, 1971, p. 1.)

\(^2\)Ira Robinson, New Industrial Towns on Canada's Resource Frontier. (University of Chicago, 1962, p. 145.)
Map 1: Location of Canadian Resource Development Towns Cited in This Report
economic conditions. For example, a recent, otherwise excellent, book on life in Canadian single enterprise communities mentions town government only briefly except where discussing the problems of transition from company control to more community control of housing, government, etc. In this section, a generalization is made that the companies prefer to allow citizens to solve community problems and adjust conflicting social aims:

... It prefers that the conflicting social aims be decided by citizens, councillors, and mayor within a community budget according to provincial requirements for municipal affairs. This inclination on the part of the company is supported by the provincial legislatures who have made local self-government mandatory.³

Not only is this generalization incorrect, but the treatment hardly provides a proper description of the role of local government, company administrators, or citizens in single enterprise town governance. In our previous study we examined political development in four such communities.

In assessing available literature such as the above, it became clear that more intensive study should be given to the crucial role which the company administrator often played in the political (and total) development of single-enterprise communities. Such study was suggested at the end of that first effort. In the meantime, attention was given to reserve

³Rex A. Lucas, Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities of Single Industry. (University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 73. Other references are found on pages 78, 80, 81, 83, and 104.
communities which often share the resource frontier with single-enterprise communities. In this report, the subject of company administrators is given the attention which initial research indicated it should have, though the scope has been limited by available resources.

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RESEARCH DESIGN

Several research questions will be answered by this report. First, "What has been the role of the company administrator in the development, especially political development, of Canadian single-enterprise communities?" Second, and related to this question, "What problems have arisen in the administration of townsites by company administrators, and how effective have attempted solutions been?"

Both of these questions will be answered by examining a number of excellent publications on Canadian single-enterprise communities: first, Single-Enterprise Communities in Canada, the report of a study conducted for Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation by the Institute of Local Government at Queen's University (1953); and second, New Industrial Towns on Canada's Resource Frontier, a well-known study conducted by Ira M. Robinson, and published by the University of Chicago (1962). In addition, two communities were selected for primary research. These communities were Pine Falls, Manitoba, and Red Lake, Ontario. Their selection was based on the proximity to the University, their length of administrator government, their typical single-enterprise characteristics, and their accessibility. These criteria were imposed by the nature of the project's resources, and the conclusions drawn on the basis of primary research should not be generalized to
all company administered towns in Canada, since those selected are not simple random samples. In spite of this, the primary research reveals many of the problems and peculiarities cited elsewhere as being characteristic of such communities.

In each community, the researcher, a student, conducted interviews with local officials and company personnel, workers, and housewives, and others. Information on the local government was collected, and observation was made of the towns' life and public services. On the basis of all this the case studies in this report were prepared. 5

Finally, this report attempts to answer the question, "what is the trend in administration of single-enterprise communities?" This section is based on all the research conducted in the project, and on information available from the Settlement Center.

5 Mr. Lorne Weiss carried out this aspect of the research. I have taken the liberty of up-dating, editing, and developing Mr. Weiss' work which appears in this report.
FINDINGS

THE QUEEN'S STUDY

Much of the development which has taken place in Canadian single-enterprise communities has been characterized by company oversight. In fact, the Queen's study found townsite management common from the smallest to the largest townsite, with a few exceptions. Where the townsite was small (in a few communities which were visited), its administration was part of the local mill manager's functions. In larger communities, some aspects were found to be delegated, and separated from plant administration: sometimes through the personnel manager and his staff, sometimes through a separate department. Finally, in a few communities, the townsite administration had been completely separated from the main company and delegated to a subsidiary company (Espouda, Ontario, and Lynn Lake, Manitoba, are cited), to the Province (e.g. Ajax, Ontario), or to the

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6 I am relying here on the Queen's study, Single-Enterprise Communities in Canada, op. cit., Chapters Five and Six. Two-thirds of the communities studied lacked municipal status. No province, other than British Columbia, had special legislation providing for single-enterprise government (p. 55), although Quebec required Provincial controls on townsite development through its Mining Act, Mining Villages Act, and Mining Towns Act (Robinson, op. cit., p. 55). Notable exceptions to the company developed and managed townsite were Iroquois Falls (1915), and Kapuskasing (1921). For further information, consult the Queen's Report, op. cit., pp. 63-65.
citizen-inhabitants of the townsite (Devon, Alberta and Ketonat, British Columbia). 7

For all of these townsites, housing was the primary company provision. In this circumstance, the company acted as landlord as well as employer (and still does in many communities), requiring an arrangement to deal with tenant problems and housing maintenance. Often such maintenance involved provision of utilities. A broader scope of services included such non-industrial facilities as a hotel, retail stores, and recreation facilities. This scope tended to require streets, schools, hospital facilities, churches, and other social facilities. This required planning and decisions beyond the normal scope of Canadian municipal government, from which school boards, hospital commissions, social and religious bodies are usually quite separated. The report commented that, "In reality, the company's administration may be so all pervasive as to resemble the domination of a feudal estate by the lord of the manor." 8

Happily, the record of public administration by companies appears in general to have been quite a reputable one, characterized by a "... general policy of benevolent paternalism which has been one of the leading traits of traditional company towns," 9 although

7Ibid., pp. 34-35.
8Ibid., p. 33.
9Ibid., p. 120.
the report noted that "... there has been a slow but steady trend in recent years away from the quasi-feudalistic management of company townsites towards administration based upon sound business principles and economics rather than sentimentality."

Housing and company-owned stores, although not without their problems, were found to be providing key services with generally good success. Participation in recreational activities was noted as a conspicuous characteristic of single-enterprise life, including bowling leagues, Boy and Girl Scouts, Rod and Gun clubs, voluntary associations of a fraternal and a social nature, and community clubs. According to the report, the community hall and hockey rink were among the first points of interest shown to visitors to the communities (the other being the company hotel).\textsuperscript{10} The report also noted that most companies had been "exceedingly generous" in their provisions of financial assistance, and in their contribution of building materials for recreational structures and facilities.\textsuperscript{11}

In spite of a decidedly good quality of local public services, a number of problems were observed by the report to characterize the single-enterprise communities. First, "Even in the smallest communities... management officials have admitted that townsite management interferes seriously with the ordinary industrial

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 173.
operations of the plant."\textsuperscript{12} Second, "... with a few exceptions, the supervisors (of townsites) interviewed admitted that their specialized technical training and outlook had not prepared them for the administrative tasks confronting them. ... most of them had ... learned a great deal about public administration by the costly method of trial-and-error."\textsuperscript{13} It is not surprising that the Report later comments that, "... almost all services of a community nature by the company administration had taken place under criticism."\textsuperscript{14}

Another problem was "... a lack of individual initiative and the prevalence of a spirit of Let-the-company-do-it which has been so frequently observed to dominate the Canadian one-enterprise communities."\textsuperscript{15} Related to some degree is the discontent of wives of employees with shopping choices, personalities of salespeople or store managers, etc. Because the company is responsible for the services, the administrator becomes the object for dissatisfactions, complaints, and demands.

Children who lived in the community found themselves with extensive opportunities to participate in recreational activities. As they grow older they may

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 200.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 222.
work for the company; but if they choose to work elsewhere, there is little choice but to leave home.

The report noted "A general tendency for many of the companies to relinquish their ownership and operation of townsites... as well as (a) trend towards co-operation with provincial governments and agencies in the planning of townsites." The final recommendations include the suggestion that:

The company should take early steps to convert the company town into a regularly incorporated municipality, according to the laws of the province in which it is situated. The ultimate objective should be administration of townsite affairs by a democratically elected council.

Where it is not feasible to incorporate the townsite as a municipality, a townsite advisory committee should be set up, composed of representatives from the labour unions, churches, schools, and commercial enterprises to confer with the townsite administrator on community problems.

COMPANY ADMINISTERED COMMUNITIES TODAY

In order to investigate the role of the company administrator in the political development of company towns today, primary research was carried out in the six settlements in and around two single-enterprise communities.

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16 Ibid., p. 252.
17 Ibid., p. 285.
18 Ibid., p. 286.
The first area to be studied was the Pine Falls-Powerview communities which lie approximately seventy miles north-east of Winnipeg. The parent industry in this area is the Abitibi Pulp and Paper mill which established a pulp and paper plant here in 1927.19 Directly adjacent to the town of Pine Falls is the incorporated village of Powerview. Powerview has a number of service industries such as grocery stores, service stations, a hotel, and the like. This appears to be largely an overflow from Pine Falls, where, due to geographical and political reasons, there is no land left for development.20 Most of the people living in Powerview work at the mill as hourly wage workers and thus Powerview can also be said to be dependent on the mill and the decisions of that industry. The populations of Pine Falls and Powerview are 1,170 and 850 respectively.

After research in this area was completed, the first hand study moved to the Red Lake Region of Northwestern Ontario, an historic area which was the scene of the 1906 Canadian gold rush.21 This area can be

19 The plant today employs 400 persons year around. Its annual capacity is 150,000 tons of newsprint, produced primarily for the American markets. Manitoba Department of Industry and Commerce, Community Reports, 1971, n.p.

20 Pine Falls is hemmed in on all sides by the golf course, the mill, the Winnipeg River, Powerview, and Indian reserves. For further information, consult Wichern. et al. (1971), p. 44ff.

21 This area has had twelve major producing gold mines, and produced over $260 million in gold since 1930, according to The Northern Miner, March 2, 1972, p. 10.
approached either by plane over a flying distance of 170 miles from Winnipeg, 22 or by car via the Trans-Canada highway to Vermillion Bay and then north along Route 105—a distance of approximately 300 miles. Four communities make up the town in the Red Lake area. These are Red Lake itself, Madsen (approximately six miles to the west of Red Lake), Balmertown (about four miles northeast of Red Lake), and Cochenour (about two miles further). Red Lake had a population of 2,114 in 1970. 23

Although generally included as being part of the Red Lake region (an indisputable geographic fact), Balmertown and Cochenour are politically separate from the other two communities in that they make up the Improvement District of Balmertown.

With the exception of Madsen there is a marked difference in the physical appearance of those communities which were planned, developed, and governed in their infancy by the parent company, in contrast to those communities which have sprung up, unaided, almost spontaneously to serve the needs of the "non-key" personnel employed by these parent industries.

Pine Falls, Balmertown, and Cochenour fall into the former category while Powerview and Red Lake are

22 This region has two sea-plane bases and one land air strip suitable for small planes.

23 Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs, Directory (1971).
representative of the latter.

Pine Falls is perhaps the most physically attractive of the three. The town is laid out in crescent-shaped residential streets which radiate away from the business district on one side. On the other side of the commercial area stands the mill site and the railway tracks. Abibi, which hires the town manager, also provides water and maintenance for the town. Maintenance of the town is of a very high calibre and the visitor is immediately impressed with the neatness and good state of repair all roads and buildings in the town are in. Garbage is collected three times a week by the maintenance department and streets, which are all paved, are washed three times a year. On the homes that the company owns (about fifty percent of all the housing in Pine Falls) the company provides full maintenance beyond cutting of lawns and shovelling of snow.

Both Cochenour and Balmertown are readily recognizable as being in the same classification. Both are laid out in orderly fashion and clean in appearance (Balmertown, the newer, was laid out by professional planners), although not to the same extent that Pine Falls is. This may be due to the fact that the mining companies have not been prone to invest money in non-productive functions due to market conditions for the gold which they extract from the area. Since January of 1970, servicing of both towns has been taken over fully by the Improvement District of Balmertown, of which they are both part. Prior to this, Cochenour was
maintained and serviced by the parent mine. Both town-sites are fully serviced.

On the other hand, both Powerview and the town of Red Lake show ample evidence of scattered, unorganized growth. Because these areas are forced to provide housing and a whole spectrum of services for people employed by the companies but have no substantial source from which to tap the required resources, they are hard pressed to provide them. As a result, both towns are characterized by thinly stretched-out and unplanned central business districts. Residential areas are even more disorganized with large gaps appearing frequently. Roads are unimproved and in a poor state of repair. In Powerview, many of the houses rely on outdoor sanitation.

Madsen, the exception singled out earlier, is probably the worst of all the communities, although it is a closed company town. There is no commercial district and houses are almost on top of the mine and its plant (which also serves to separate the single-men's barracks from the rest of the community). Many of the streets are little more than trails and appear to be the fruits of labour of an intoxicated miner rather than connecting routes for traffic.

Both the non-company towns, Powerview and Red Lake, are incorporated villages and as such have elected councils and regular elections. However, because of their proximity to and dependence upon the companies,
local politics take second place to the interest in the welfare of those industries. As neither of these communities have local papers or radio stations, there is no vehicle for political mobilization other than by word of mouth.

In unincorporated single-enterprise communities in which there is a town administrator, that person is naturally highly in favour of such a system and Pine Falls is no exception. W. Jackson, the town administrator, has held that office for nineteen years. He is an Abitibi employee hired by that company to supervise all aspects of town management. When questioned about whether or not he felt that this was an abnormal existence for a community in a country where the principles of democracy are valued, Jackson answered the question in terms of tangible benefits. He stated that this was the only practical form of government in a small town and cited Powerview as an alternate example. He claimed that costs in Powerview were higher and services were provided at a much lower level. However, he neglected to mention that Abitibi supplies labour and equipment to Pine Falls at cost or even at a loss, whereas Powerview must purchase its services on the open market and pay a higher price. Throughout this phase of the interview, there was no indication that the company felt any responsibility to its employees which live in Powerview. Because those employees who are forced to live in Powerview are for the most part men whose skills (or lack of skills) place them in a sector of the labour market in which supply is equal to or exceeds demand,
there is little impetus for the company to grant them any benefits.

As indicated earlier, Balmertown and Cochenour (since 1950) have been politically united in the Improvement District of Balmertown. The area is governed by three trustees appointed by the Ontario Provincial Government who in turn appoint a manager for the district. All four appointees have to meet with the tacit approval of the mines in the area. The Improvement District is also required to submit their annual budget for inspection to the provincial government. Until January of 1970, however, although Cochenour was under the jurisdiction of the Improvement District, the Cochenour-Williams Mine provided all services and maintenance for the townsite. In addition, the mine owned most of the houses, provided the schools, and also provided the recreational facilities for the residents. Since then, the mine has reversed its position: houses have been turned over to private individuals, all maintenance and provision of services is done by the Improvement District, the District looks after the provision and financing of recreational facilities, and both Cochenour and Balmertown have amalgamated with Red Lake to form the Red Lake District School Division. At first glance, this is a step in the right direction. But after closer inspection, it can be seen as a move toward less responsible government. Under an arrangement

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24 The Cochenour-Williams Mine is the only producing mine in Cochenour. In Balmertown, there are the Campbell-Red Lake and Dickinson Mines.
such as Pine Falls, the townsite administration is closely associated, in fact and in the minds of the residents, with the company. As a result, any decision made by the town manager would have to be weighed in terms of the effect on morale and the ultimate result on production. Under an improvement district system, the company is able to exercise almost as much influence on the trustees without as strong a risk. In addition, there are no official access channels which are open for concerned private citizens to make their views known or to gauge public opinion (i.e. local newspapers, local radio stations, advisory channels, etc.). The Cochenour-Williams Mine's relinquishment of its firm control over Cochenour last year, or its encouragement of the formation of an Improvement District in 1950, may be due to the fact that the Mine's management realized that reduction of real property (houses), elimination of district involvement in the social administration of the townsite, and removal of the burden of municipal servicing would be eliminating a tremendous financial investment in non-productive functions. At the same time it achieved a very significant morale and psychological gain with the loss of extremely little real political power.

On the other hand, although Powerview and Red Lake are incorporated villages, and as such must hold regular elections in accordance with the statutes of the Provinces of Manitoba and Ontario respectively, the total situation is not a great deal better (and actually worse in terms of services) than in the administered
communities. The main reason is financial: these communities must provide services for a greater population-to-business-area ratio than is normal for most centres (due to their role as dormitory towns for the mine or mill workers) and because of legal limitations on the amount of money they can borrow they are hard pressed to meet these requirements and fall far short of the standard set by single-enterprise communities in provision of services. Thus, it would seem that self-government is of little consequence if a community is unable to influence the factors which govern its existence.

For the most part, single-enterprise communities are conspicuous by the quality and quantity of recreational facilities which they supply for their employees.

Pine Falls, perhaps due to the long term planning of the mill and the age and stability of the town, has the best facilities of the communities studied. There are a number of parks, a swimming pool, a first-rate nine-hole golf course, baseball diamonds, skating rinks and curling facilities in addition to the natural surroundings in the immediate vicinity which lend themselves to swimming, fishing, hunting, and camping. There is no full-time recreation director, although one is hired for the summer months. All the man-made recreational facilities were developed and paid for by the company. They are run by the local recreation corporation on whose board the company is represented. Funds for operation come from membership and are subsidized by Abitibi.
The Balmertown Improvement District is in charge of providing recreational facilities to the towns of Balmertown and Cochenour. Money is raised through taxation (the mines in the area are taxed on their real property) and a budget of $65,000 was set aside this year for the provision of recreational services. Originally, these facilities in Cochenour were built by the mine but have since been turned over to the Improvement District.

Powerview, aside from a skating rink, has no recreational facilities due to its inability to find the necessary funds. The situation is aggravated by the fact that due to sociological factors, families are larger in Powerview and therefore there are large numbers of children who are deprived of the same opportunities as their contemporaries in Pine Falls.

Red Lake is in a somewhat better position than Powerview having an improved beach on the outskirts of the community, provided by a local service club, but it in no way can compare in quality or range of facilities to the Improvement District of Balmertown.

The situation with young people was similar in all the communities visited regardless of the quality of the lifestyle in the town. Because of the limited resources of the young people, even the relatively short distance to large urban centres is too great for them for regular trips. As a result, they feel isolated from the world and for the most part anxiously await
the time when they can leave. Limited employment opportunities hasten their departure, especially that of the girls. Drinking under age and use of drugs is common. Whether it is of a greater frequency than in urban centres is difficult to ascertain. Both the O.P.P. in Red Lake and Mr. Jackson in Pine Falls claim that the incidence of these violations is similar to that of most small communities.

Both the towns of Red Lake and Pine Falls have large concentrations of Indians in them due to the proximity of reservations to these communities. Also, in both areas, the situation is serious! Neither the mines nor the mill employ Indians in any reasonable proportion to their relative size in the total population. The reasons given are unreliability and the blame is put on the reserve and welfare systems. The result of this has been a breakdown in traditional Indian values and mores without adequate substitution of others. Consequently, there is a high level of promiscuity and severe drinking problems among the natives. There is a large missionary operation in Red Lake and, although it wasn't studied in depth, it appeared to be of a paternalistic nature: instead of helping the Indians to become self-sufficient, it seemed to be merely substituting one dependence for another. In general, the Indians are not treated as second class citizens: they are treated as non-people, totally ignored by all but the lowest socio-economic whites who are the second class citizens.
The Red Lake district is patrolled by the Ontario Provincial Police who have a detachment of fifteen men based in Red Lake. Their salaries are paid by the Province of Ontario and are in no way directly answerable to mine management. The greatest problem in the area, according to one O.P.P. constable, is drinking. From January to the end of July in the Red Lake District, there were arrests on 1,400 liquor violations, the majority of the violations being by Indians. The incidence of liquor violations and calls to stop family quarrels increases as one descends in socio-economic class. The greatest white pocket of these minor violations occurs in Madsen, or, as it is often called by the population of the area, "tin town". As mentioned earlier, Madsen is the poorest of all the communities and has no recreational facilities.

In conclusion, the towns here studied exhibit both the advantages—the adequate services, maintenance, and management—which accompany company administrated local government. On the other hand, the extra-townsites communities of Powerview and Red Lake demonstrate some of the main problems which have developed in the course of such administration. The recent experience of the communities in the Balmertown Improvement District illustrate the trend toward Provincial and local (rather than company) oversight in single-enterprise government and administration.

Although the company-run communities appeared to have well-planned schools, recreation programmes and
facilities, well-kept houses, a good quality of public works and safety services, the problems of the young people, the Indian people, and the poorer people in the areas around the townsites are often neglected. In addition, the communities which have sprung up in the vicinity of the company communities exhibit a much lower quality of life, problems of public financing and public servicing of their unfortunate residents, many of whom are directly, or indirectly, tied to the operation and economy of the central resource industry. The following section examines how officials have dealt with this problem since the early 1950's.

NEW INDUSTRIAL TOWNS OF THE FIFTIES

All of the preceding towns were realities before the second World War. The Queen's Report was published in 1953. Since that time, a measure of development has taken place in the whole concept of starting a new industrial townsite on Canada's resource frontier. With this development, the role—and existence—of the company administrator underwent changes. These changes may be observed by examining Ira Robinson's descriptions of four communities developed after World War II: K'tmat, British Columbia; Elliot Lake, Ontario; Drayton Valley, Alberta; and Schefferville, Quebec.25 The other community studied will be the much-heralded Thompson, Manitoba.

Kitmat illustrates the most radical departure from the traditional "company town" concept. The townsite was planned by leading experts, including Clarence Stein. The expense of this and early townsite development (estimated at over $10,000,000) was assumed by the company, Alcan. But the company did not assume management of the town. Instead, "Alcan displayed a keen desire to create a democratic, 'free enterprise' community and avoid the aspect of a company town as much as possible from the outset of Kitmat's growth." In March, 1953, a special Act of the British Columbia Legislature incorporated Kitmat as an incorporated municipal district, governed by an elected Council and Reeve, and endowed with all the powers and responsibilities of other municipalities in the Province. This was, of course, what the Queen's Report recommended, as we have demonstrated on previous pages. According to the Queen's Report, the Special Act and subsequently issued letters patent prescribed a municipal manager for the town ". . . who shall be appointed by the Council and shall exercise such powers as may be delegated to him. . . ."

The Elliot Lake development was carried on under

26 For further details, consult Robinson, op. cit., pp. 44-47.

27 Ibid., p. 46.

28 Special borrowing privileges were extended, in view of the special demands facing the new community.

a 1954 amendment to the Ontario Mining Act, providing that the government could preserve areas of mining claims for townsites by Orders-in-Council. A Cabinet Committee on mining townsites, through an administrative subcommittee, apportioned the responsibility for the development of local government and services.

In September, 1955, the Ontario Municipal Board formed the Improvement District of Elliot Lake. It followed the improvement district form of municipal organization first introduced in the Municipal Amendments Act of 1943. The governing body consisted of a board of trustees composed of three men, Chairman, Vice Chairman, and member appointed by the government. This chairman was likely to be a representative of the company's local management, the vice-chairman non-company interests, and the member a company employee. Authorized to appoint a Secretary-Treasurer for the district as well, the board was charged with carrying out municipal functions, as well as the functions of a school board, and public utilities, for which it was responsible to the Provincial Department of Municipal Affairs. The Provincial government was soon petitioned for assistance in providing utilities and housing. Between 1955 and 1958, $19 million was spent on public works and facilities by the Province, and another $40 million was advanced by Central Mortgage and Housing

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30 For further details, consult Single-Enterprise Communities in Canada, op. cit., pp. 66-70.
31 Ibid., p. 67.
Corporation for first mortgages on homes and apartment blocks. Businessmen contributed three hotels, a hundred stores, and seventy service buildings. In addition, nine churches, a television and a radio station, a newspaper, and a community centre were established. 32

A variation on this Provincial administrative model for creation of new resource communities was the Alberta New Towns Act which Robinson also described. Under this Act, any area of the Province could be designated as a new town by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, upon the recommendation of the Provincial Planning Advisory Board. Upon approval of the new town’s establishment, a one-to-seven member Board of Administrators could be appointed by the same method, and would undertake development of the new town. The Board members could be civil servants, non-company residents of the new towns, and/or company and business representatives. 33 This approach was that followed in the case of Drayton Valley and other Pembina oil development townships.

Robinson also investigated the situation in Quebec, describing Schefferville as a "government-sponsored 'company town'." 34 As noted previously, Quebec had been noted for its control of townsite development through the Mining Act, Mining Villages

33 Ibid., p. 53
34 Ibid., pp. 54-57.
Act, and the Mining Towns Act. Under these Acts, the Provincial government was given the authority to establish villages or towns on Crown land by selling land, establishing services, surveying and sub-dividing land, providing public works and utilities. Under the Mining Villages Act, governing powers were vested in a province-appointed manager for five years, after which the municipal council might be elected. Under the later (1952-53) Mining Towns Act, the townsite was called a "town municipality," to be governed by a council made up of mayor and four aldermen, appointed by the Province for the same length of time as the manager appointed under the Mining Villages Act. It should be noted that provision was made in the case of the council for appointment of a municipal manager, a form of administration common to Quebec. Robinson notes that Schefferville was built under the latter Act, but that the company carried out most of the development, including land ownership, the building of houses, schools, and the community centre. In this case, the government did little more than supervise development in spite of having greater authority.

Robinson concludes that:

... since the early 1940's, there has been a noticeable change in attitude on the part of both the sponsoring industrial enterprises and the Provincial governments concerned with the building of new resource towns. While the companies admit some responsibility for creating new townsites, they wish to minimize their involvement in the actual operation of these townsites. Fortunately, the provinces now recognize they must assume some of the burden with respect to the creation of the new resource
towns. On the one hand, they have to assist the development company, and, on the other, they must provide an effective system of day-to-day administration of townsite affairs. Above all, they now acknowledge an overriding responsibility to ensure that in achieving both of these objectives, the welfare of the residents of the townsites is protected.35

An example of the struggle with these responsibilities is the political development of Thompson, Manitoba.36 Manitoba had passed a Local Government District Act in 1944, and amendments had been added in 1945 which provided specific authority to create such districts adjacent to mining or other resource operations.37 This Act provided for local government by a resident administrator appointed by the Province and responsible to the Department of Municipal Affairs. This arrangement was supplemented by agreements reached between the company and the Province, and by the practice of appointing as administrator a man either suggested or strongly confirmed by the company. This process was followed not only in the Lynn Lake and Snow Lake developments in the forties, but also in the case of Thompson.

36 Thompson is named after a former President of International Nickel Company. A more comprehensive and detailed description of Thompson's political development may be found in Wichern, et al., op. cit., pp. 26-37. It now also contains the largest integrated nickel mining complex in the free world.
37 Single-Enterprise Communities in Canada, op. cit., p. 71; also Manitoba Local Government Districts Act, passim.
Agreement was reached between the Province and International Nickel Company in December, 1956, which included development of the townsite, Thompson, and the surrounding area in the Mystery Lake Local Government District. Planning and development was to be the Province's and local citizens' responsibility, not the company's job. According to the town planner, a provincial civil servant, "... they did not want to build a company town."

What they did want was a town of which people would be proud; which the Manitoba provincial government would consider an asset, and in which they, the company, would ultimately be nothing more than a corporate citizen--the biggest such, perhaps, but still just a corporate citizen: not the landlord, not even the benevolent parent.38

The agreement delegated the planning to the Province. The company agreed to provide public works and services, clear land for building sites, and build a hospital (Part 23). On the other hand, the Province agreed to give the company exclusive surface rights to the area within the District (Parts 3-5), appoint an administrator acceptable to the company (Part 10), sell or lease land only to the company (Part 12), allow free company use of area lakes and waters (Parts 18-19), release the company real and personal property from local taxes (Parts 25 and 35[2]) in return for a per capita payment not to exceed $148.50 for each year (Part 31).39


39This has been since modified to a grant in lieu of taxes determined at 55% of the municipal tax assessment, less any capital expenditures, in Wichern, et al., op. cit., p. 28.
In addition, the Agreement stated that the boundaries of the townsite would not be altered without the company's consent (Part 33[1]), that no new townsite or town district would be established in the Local Government District without similar consent, and that no townsite could be incorporated without both Province and company agreement (Part 35[1]).

One of the first steps in implementation of the agreement was the appointment of Carl Nesbitt, an International Nickel Company executive, as the Resident Administrator of Mystery Lake. His role has been described by the chief planner in the following way:

... For six years he was to be in effect mayor, council, town clerk, magistrate, and general factotum of the district. Although a company employee originally, he in fact showed a dedication to the principle of creating a new non-company town and always put Thompson and the interests of its residents first. He was as tough with his former employer as he was with us, the planners, and with the provincial government.

Mr. Nesbitt came to Manitoba from the Sudbury area. He originally joined the Company in its accounting department in the 1940's. Like many previous company town managers, he did not have a strong background in public administration, but rather a strong background of experience with company administration. The request for his appointment was made by International Nickel Vice-President and General Manager, R. Parker, in a letter of February 13, 1957, to the Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, R. Fischer, according to an unpublished study of the Company-Province roles. As resident administrator, 60% of his salary was paid by the company, 40% by the Provincial government.

Ibid., p. 18.
Of course, this powerful role, coupled with his previous ties, made some observers suspicious of the orientation of policy-making during the first ten years of Thompson's existence. Newspaper writers during the period of development used different, if favorable, interpretations of Nesbitt's role: "A benevolent dictatorship is necessary at the beginning," one reporter quoted him as saying. Yet both the company and the Province appeared well-satisfied with the role of the Provincially appointed company administrator. The power of his role was recognized by the administrator himself in an interview in 1958:

> A: times, the amount of authority I have almost frightens me, but the ones who will be the best judges are the people who will make their homes in Thompson.

Whatever the job description might be, it is quite clear that in Thompson's early days the old pattern of company administrator government (paternalistic oversight) was conducted under the guise of new town development. This does not mean that there was mismanagement, or that the company dominated the town. It is quite clear, on the other hand, that the arrangement in Thompson for local government was not that found in the other new towns we have studied, nor that suggested by the Queen's Report.

For eight years the single-man administration of

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Thompson continued, sometimes arousing controversy and accusations, but never causing change. Furthermore, during this period, the Province refused no bylaws promulgated by Nesbitt, and appeared pleased with his work.

During a general strike in 1964, the issue of self-government was raised as a grievance by mine employees. As a result, meetings by the Province with Company officials were begun in September, 1964, on the issue of self-government. Agreement in principle was announced in January, 1965; but it was not until March, 1965, that the announcement of the appointment of a resident advisory committee for the townsite was announced. This fell short of the demands of elective participation in townsite and District affairs, and was projected for "... a period of not less than two years." Also in the agreement was an elected school board to be elected in late 1965 and take office in 1966. During the early months of 1965, seventeen persons were nominated by residents for the advisory council, from which the Province selected five. In April, 1965, a certain Mr. Joe Borowski came to Winnipeg with a 2,000-name petition for six members to be elected to the council. Pressure on the Provincial government for self-government during 1965 resulted in a special bill (94) for the incorporation of Thompson as a municipality being passed and assented to in April,

In October of that year, elections were held for a mayor and six aldermen who assumed office in 1967. Mr. Nesbitt remained resident administrator for the Mystery Lake Local Government District, and became the new community's first town manager, a post which he has continued to hold, in spite of management consultant studies suggesting separation of the positions.

It is difficult to evaluate this experience in itself, or to compare it to the more democratic development processes we have studied elsewhere in Canada. However, it is clear that such an arrangement as was made for the strong role by company administrator (appointed by the Province) does create tensions and provide basis for doubts, accusations, and rumors, in spite of an excellent record of service.

It is, therefore, not surprising to find writers who have studied the situation to suggest that a Provincial administrator should not have any tie to the company. That this is not the ultimate answer can be shown in cases such as that of Lynn Lake, Manitoba. In this town, the Provincial administrator has been viewed as withdrawn from the community, and demands for self-government were heard in 1971 by the author.

45 The local union was extremely critical of the process by which the Bill was written without local participation, and some clauses, such as one not allowing changes of town and school district boundaries without company approval (3.2), and one clause preserving the terms of the 1956 agreement (10). Winnipeg Free Press, April 15, 1966.

46 Wichern, et al., op. cit., p. 31.
This raises hopes that Leaf Rapids citizens may enjoy democratic local government at an earlier date than those in Thompson who obtained it after eleven years, and those in Lynn Lake who do not yet have it.

In contrast to this experience is that of the newest British Columbia resource community, Logan Lake, which has been created as a full-fledged municipality with its own powers of governance and development. A similar community is Gold River on Vancouver Island. It was formed by a group that petitioned for a charter in 1965. A company engineer who was in that group was elected Mayor, and saw the town grow from plans into a thriving community, while he moved from assistant project engineer to assistant manager for production.

CONCLUSIONS

The trend in the establishment of single-enterprise communities in the last generation has been away from the company administration of previous years (which had its heyday in the thirties), toward more provincial involvement in administration.

The company administration allocated to the company administrator the crucial role of local governance. The evidence available, both the Queen's study and primary research in Pine Falls and Red Lake, indicates the company administrators were successful in their jobs within the jurisdictional limits placed on them, and in spite of lack of training for town administration. However, common problems appear to be part of the company administrator's role: criticism from residents disliking their conditions or services, periodic demands for self-government, a general apathy and "let-the-company-do-it" attitude amongst residents, and sometimes conflicts of company and community interests. In addition, research indicated non-administered communities grew up around the single-enterprise towns which were more democratic, but poorer in finances or services.

These problems have been confronted in the last twenty years by the Provinces taking a greater role in new resource community development which normally includes not only townsites, but districts surrounding
townsites. The degree to which the traditional role of the company administrator has changed varies from Province to Province. In all provinces, company personnel are still crucial to the development of single-enterprise communities. As we have seen, in British Columbia the role of local administration is transferred to an elected Mayor and Council from the community's creation (e.g. in Kitmat, Logan Lake, and Gold River). Under such circumstances, company personnel are likely to serve as Mayors, Councilmen and (where appropriate) as appointed managers. On the other hand, in Thompson, Manitoba, where the Province took the initiative of appointing an administrator, the appointee was a company executive who played the role of company administrator under the guise of provincial control. Similarly, Red Lake, Ontario found the inclusion of townsites in an Improvement District did not seem to change the strong role of company participation.

It was interesting to find in this research that the role of the company administrators studied (including Thompson) did not include promotion of greater self-government for the communities, which we have defined as essential to political development. As far as services, townsites developed under the company administrator arrangement were more developed than the democratic (but non-company supported) settlements which grew up around them.

In answer to our initial question then, our findings indicate little contribution by company
administrators to citizen participation and democratic local self-government, but very impressive contributions in the provision of services. The same generalization appears to apply to the Provincial administrator arrangement (e.g. in Lynn Lake and Leaf Rapids).
RECOMMENDATIONS

If citizen participation through local self-government is to be developed in single-enterprise communities, it must be included in agreements creating new towns, and protected by Provincial supervision. It cannot be expected to emerge from administrator arrangements. All single-enterprise communities should be guaranteed the opportunity for political development without loss of enterprise tax base, services, and other contributions. Local government on the resource frontier should always include whole Regions, not just townsites, and should include all citizens no matter who they might be.
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