At the second annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, upper division and graduate students from 17 colleges and universities presented papers on the theory, history, and criticism of rhetoric. Panels of faculty members from the same colleges and universities, serving as editor-critics, judged the six papers in this volume as commendable. The titles and authors are "Critics of 'Declamatio'" by William Glen Freeman, "Nomination Acceptance Addresses of Eisenhower and Stevenson: A Study in Contrasts" by Stephen W. Littlejohn, "Ethical Criticism: The Listener as Good Man" by Jerry Patch, "Saint Augustine and the Christian Influence on Rhetoric" by Carol S. Ramsey, "Nixon as Poor Richard" by Edward A. Schwarz, and "Medium: A Neglected Dimension of Rhetorical Criticism" by Iris N. Yamaoka. The conference address by Dr. Bower Aly, "Rhetoric: Its Natural Enemies," is also included in the volume.
CONFERENCE IN
RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Address of the Conference and Commended Papers

Harold Barrett, Editor
Bruce D. Loebs, Assistant Editor
Robert L. Ivie, Student Editor

California State College at Hayward, 1967
Professor Karl F. Robinson encouraged new endeavors, new ideas for useful experience in learning and teaching. He was excited about the potential educational value of a conference in rhetorical criticism, and he gave full support to its development. Moreover, his counsel and good offices were indispensable to the planning and execution of the first Conference in 1966. We had frequent questions for him, to which he responded with suggestions and answers drawn from his deep reservoir of thought and experience.

In planning this and other departmental pursuits, we listened to this wise and gently effective man; we learned from Karl.

To his memory, we dedicate this volume.
Cover Design
by

Ivan Hess
On May 20, 1967, the Speech-Drama Department and Creative Arts Division Council of California State College at Hayward, held the Second Annual Conference in Rhetorical Criticism. In attendance were professors and twenty-six upper-division and graduate students from seventeen colleges and universities of the western states. The students read papers on rhetorical history, theory, and criticism in six sections to panels of editor-critics—the participating professors. The six student papers in this volume are those given commendation by the editor-critics.

The Conference was honored with the attendance of Bower Aly, distinguished professor of speech at the University of Oregon. His address, delivered at the Conference banquet, is reprinted in this journal. To Professor Aly we owe a debt of gratitude for his important contribution to our conference and to mankind’s available supply of significant thought on rhetoric.

The Editors
Student Participants

Eugenia Bernstein, UCLA, "The Artistry of Audience Adaptation in Winston Churchill's World War II Oratory"

David T. Burhans, Jr., Pepperdine College, "The Ghost Writer: Stumbling Block or Stepping-Stone?"

Steve Chambers, University of California at Davis, "The Reformation of English Rhetoric"


Terry W. Cole, Fresno State College, "Alcuin's Theory of the Positions as the Basis for Modern Argumentation"

William Freeman, Fernando Valley State College, "Critics of Declamation"

Virginia L. Gross, Sacramento State College, "Dialogue of the Schoolmasters"

Roger Hite, University of Oregon, "An Essay on Applying Burke to Drama"

Robert L. Ivie, California State College at Hayward, "Ronald Reagan Before a Hostile Audience"

Stephen W. Littlejohn, University of Utah, "Nomination Acceptance Addresses of Eisenhower and Stevenson: A Study in Contrasts"

Victoria Markarian, Stanislaus State College, "Renaissance Rhetoric: Its Development and Influence in Europe and England"

Mike McCoy, Sacramento State College, "The Speech Not Given"

James C. McFarland, San Francisco State College, "Textual Analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Yalta Conference Address"

Judith A. Milchen, San Diego State College, "Emotional Appeal in Legal Oratory"

Elsaree Murray, Stanislaus State College, "The New Rhetoric of I. A. Richards"

Allan Nettleton, Washington State University, "Protest Then and Now: 1916 and 1967"

Dennis M. Ogawa, UCLA, "Quintilian's Perfect Orator and the Roman Empire, First Century, A.D."

Jerry Patch, San Fernando Valley State College, "Ethical Criticism: The Listener as Good Man"

Carol S. Ramsey, California State College at Hayward, "Saint Augustine and the Christian Influence on Rhetoric"

Anthony L. Rausch, Fresno State College, "A Comparison Between the Rhetoric of Hitler and Le Bon's The Crowd"

Larry Reid, Central Washington State College, "A Burkean Analysis of Adolf Hitler's Address to the Reichstag on January 30, 1934"

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Student Participants (continued)

Edward A. Schwarz, California State College at Los Angeles, "Nixon as Poor Richard"

F. Eugene Scott, University of Wyoming, "The Debate on Repeal of Suffrage in Wyoming Territory (1871)"

Carolyn Smart, University of California at Davis, "Uncut Diamonds, Untilled Acres"

Linda Squires, San Jose State College, "The Dilemma of Effects"

Iris N. Yamaoka, University of Hawaii, "Medium: A Neglected Dimension of Rhetorical Criticism"

Faculty Participants

Editor-Critics

Bower Aly, University of Oregon
Phillips R. Biddle, Sacramento State College
John Cambus, California State College, Hayward
Fred L. Casimir, Pepperdine College
Robert S. Cathcart, California State College, L.A.
Phil Dolph, San Jose State College
Ernest Ettlich, Washington State University
Gary Hawkins, San Francisco State College
Jack Kingsley, University of Wyoming
Dale G. Leathers, University of California at L.A.
Albert L. Lewis, Central Washington College
Bruce Loobs, California State College, Hayward
Robert C. Martin, California State College, Hayward
Jack Mills, San Diego State College
Gerald P. Mohrmann, University of California, Davis
Mary McEdwards, San Fernando Valley State College
David Natharius, Fresno State College
Brenda Robinson, California State College, Hayward
R. C. Ruechelle, Stanislaus State College
Philip C. Wander, San Jose State College

Director of the Conference

Harold Barrett, California State College, Hayward
Schedule of Events

10:00  Briefing

10:30  Critics' Silent Review of Papers in Sections

LUNCH

1:00  Section Meetings
Presentation of Papers
Comments of Editor-Critics
Decision for Commendation and Publication

4:00  Presentation to the Conference of Commended Papers

7:30  Dinner — Cal State Dining Room

Master of Ceremonies: Dr. Robert C. Martin, Chairman, Department of Speech and Drama, California State College at Hayward

Introducing the Speaker: Dr. Harold Barrett, Associate Professor, Department of Speech and Drama, California State College at Hayward

Speaker: Dr. Bower Aly, Professor of Speech, University of Oregon

"Rhetoric: Its Natural Enemies"
# PAPERS OF THE CONFERENCE

---CONTENTS---

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## Address of the Conference

| Dr. Bower Aly | "Rhetoric: Its Natural Enemies" | 1 |

## Commended Papers of the Conference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>William Glen Freeman</th>
<th>&quot;Critics of Declamation&quot;</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stephen W. Littlejohn</td>
<td>&quot;Nomination Acceptance Addresses of Eisenhower and Stevenson: A Study in Contrasts&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerry Patch</td>
<td>&quot;Ethical Criticism: The Listener as Good Man&quot;</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carol S. Ramsey</td>
<td>&quot;Saint Augustine and the Christian Influence on Rhetoric&quot;</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward A. Schwarz</td>
<td>&quot;Nixon as Poor Richard&quot;</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iris N. Yamaoka</td>
<td>&quot;Medium: A Neglected Dimension of Rhetorical Criticism&quot;</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ADDRESS OF THE CONFERENCE
RHETORIC.... ITS NATURAL ENEMIES

by

Bower Aly, University of Oregon

Of course I must admit that the flattering words I have just heard fell pleasantly on my ear. I am reminded of the response made by the late James A. Winans, long the Dean of our profession, on a similar occasion: "Disgusting flattery," he said, "Flatter me again."

Let me say to all of you what I have already said to Chairman Martin: The enterprise in which you are engaged is highly intelligent. I applaud your efforts and hope you will maintain them. You must have observed also the excellent management, even to the smallest detail, of the function we have enjoyed here today. Did you note, for example, doubtless thanks to Dr. Barrett, that the 'happy hour' was scheduled cleverly to prepare you for the 'unhappy hour' now about to begin?

Inasmuch as this occasion calls for what is known in our profession as an after-dinner speech, I shall endeavor not to be profound. I see here some of my former students who can assure you that this effort to avoid profundity will cause me no trouble. In obeisance to our common interest in rhetoric, however, I suppose I should begin with appropriate definitions.

By the term 'rhetoric' I mean, without undue deference or reverence, and with as much understanding as I can bring to bear, what Aristotle meant. In the current literature, as well as in historical perspective, the Aristotelian definition appears to be the most nearly stable. Even Korzybski, in his revolt against rhetoric, avowed his acceptance of the Aristotelian concepts. Only the revisionists, the running dogs of evil rhetoric, received his disapproval. I ought to acknowledge, however, that the Aristotelian definition is one that I employ in my own thought. I am well aware that there are other definitions; and I know that the lady rhetoric is also sometimes referred to as the harlot of the arts.

As for the term 'natural enemies' I suggest that every art and discipline has its detractors. This competition among the arts is a condition of life; it is as natural as the arts themselves, and it grows from the variant interests and aptitudes of different kinds of men. In this discourse I hope merely to identify some, not necessarily all, of the natural enemies of rhetoric.

The Business Man

It is now nearly thirty years since Joseph Wood Krutch, then Professor of English at Columbia University, where I was a graduate student, told me that in the United States rhetoric is employed chiefly by advertisers. Perhaps he was right; I do not know. But I suggest that if Professor Krutch was right thirty years ago he could hardly be challenged today. The advertiser, agent of the business man, enters our homes regularly through the media of radio and television. What is the rhetoric? Does it not, in large part, exhibit a rather shoddy reliance on the arts once employed by the pitch man, the patent medicine salesman? Apparently its chief utility, aside from its main business of pushing cigarettes, is to sell drugs, soap, and allied products. The appeals are to fear, immediate or remote: If you don't use our soap, you won't smell good. If you don't smell good, people won't love you. If people don't love you, you will dry on the vine. Perhaps there is a socrates here, but if so it is rather too subtle for me and is, I suspect, unplanned. Another bit of the advertiser's rhetoric that fascinates me is a little gem I heard just the other day: "If he kisses you once, will he kiss you again?" As so often happens in the study of rhetoric, an insight into the art provides a key to the culture. In my view, the rhetorical appeal to fear would have been reversed: if she kisses you once, will she kiss you again? O tempora! O mores!

My concern with the advertiser, the business man's rhetorician, is not the common plaint that he is vulgar, although vulgar and sometimes disgusting he often is. Surely there is a better way to sell drugs than to picture their course through the abdominal tract! My concern is that the rhetoric employed by the soap and drug peddlers debases those who consume it a part, exhibit a rather shoddy reliance on the arts once employed by the pitch man, the patent medicine salesman. Apparently its chief utility, aside from its main business of pushing cigarettes, is to sell drugs, soap, and allied products. The appeals are to fear, immediate or remote: If you don't use our soap, you won't smell good. If you don't smell good, people won't love you. If people don't love you, you will dry on the vine. Perhaps there is a socrates here, but if so it is rather too subtle for me and is, I suspect, unplanned. Another bit of the advertiser's rhetoric that fascinates me is a little gem I heard just the other day: "If he kisses you once, will he kiss you again?" As so often happens in the study of rhetoric, an insight into the art provides a key to the culture. In my view, the rhetorical appeal to fear would have been reversed: if she kisses you once, will she kiss you again? O tempora! O mores!

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twice, God damn it, NO." His grammatical usage may have been open to question, his profanity may have been objectionable, but he employed the choicest rhetoric. His meaning could not be mistaken.

Is it futile to hope that men of business and public affairs will cease to be the enemies of rhetoric?

The Historian

Once upon a time I put to Sir Maurice Powicke, the distinguished British medievalist, the question, "What relation should rhetoric bear to history?" After a moment's reflection, Sir Maurice replied unequivocally, "I should hope, sir, none at all." I did not pursue the matter with Sir Maurice, but I must surmise that he had in mind only that misshapen form of the art of rhetoric known as sophistry. For if rhetoric has no concern with history, how is one to account for Thucydides, still one of the greatest of historians, to whom Cicero paid the highest compliment, as he wrote, "The number of his thoughts almost equals the number of his words?" And even if one's view of historiography is less rhetorical than that of Thucydides, one must observe that as soon as the historian begins to write a narrative, he is rhetorician as well as historian. To tell the truth, as well as to tell lies, requires the aid of rhetoric. Indeed, even before the historian begins to write, he will presumably employ the rhetorical art of invention to discover the policy, the lines of his discourse. I must thus beg leave to doubt whether Sir Maurice must be listed among the enemies of rhetoric. His own distinguished discourse serves as an adverse witness to that indictment.

That enemies of rhetoric can be found among historians, however, I have no doubt. Among them are the historians who do not regard speeches (as did Herodotus) as "veritable transactions in the human commonwealth; in fact, very greatly influential transactions," but simply as a mine or storehouse of data from which an account can be drawn; or as a compendium of cynical protestations to be explained only by the true history that regards speeches as appearances only, whereas realities are economic. Perhaps a useful judgment concerning any given historian may be gained by the test question, "What does he think of speeches?" If speeches represent to a historian one form of human experiences worthy in their own right of investigation and report, then he is certainly not a member of the same guild as his brother who sees in speechmaking only an attempt, deserving either pity or scorn, to obfuscate the truth that the historian must somehow disclose. In my own endeavor to understand the history of speechmaking, and even now and then to teach and write a bit about it, I have taken comfort in the words of a friend of mine, a great historian and a great gentleman, whose name I shall not pronounce here lest my doing so should embarrass him with his colleagues. I once heard him remark: "It is better for the speech people than for historians to write the history of public speaking, because it is easier for them to learn history than for historians to learn rhetoric." Perhaps the right conclusion is that some historians are the enemies, and some are the friends, of rhetoric.

The Literarian

I ask you to believe that I have rescued the term "literarian" from the depths of my dictionary not from a preference for inchoate terms but rather from a genuine dissatisfaction with any other term—e.g., literateur, literato, literator, belle-lettres—" to designate those who regard poetry as a refuge, and for that matter—as a mystery to be exalted only to the faithful and only by those high priests known as critics. In our day, in contrast with former times, literature tends to become an esoteric rather than a communicative art. To the degree that a poet is obscure, he appears to satisfy his own needs and to achieve acclaim among the literarians. If one accepts the dictum that the artist father wrote to his poet son (That which can be understood is not poetry) and contrasts that dictum with the lesson that may be drawn from the Bly Haw lectures of I. A. Richards (That which can be misunderstood is not rhetoric) then one may view the chasm between the literarian and the rhetorician. That the narrative poet, the epic poet, if you like the rhetorical poet enjoys no vogue in our day is as much a commentary on the times as on the poets and poetry. Human beings, not excluding Americans, are in desperate need of declarations of courage that will enable them to confront a future filled with nameless terrors. That they do not often find these declarations coming from the poets may be owing in part to the poet's own fears but also, I suggest, to the curriculum placements on non-communication in poetry, as in the arts generally. I reflect sometimes on the rhetorical criticism of the lady who, on being asked how she thought of the new preacher, replied, "He can't be much of a preacher: I could understand everything he said."

If the rhetorician finds an enemy, or at the least a stranger, in the modern literarian, he may console himself by calling the roll of the friends of rhetoric among the poets of former times. In the English language he may begin with Chaucer, Milton, and Shakespeare—who understood rhetoric as well as poetry.

The eminence of the literarian toward rhetoric is doubtless unwitting. Indeed, residing as he often does in a Department of English, the literarian may honestly consider himself to be a friend to rhetoric. "Rhetoric," he may have been told by the boomer heard by one of my colleagues at a convention of the National Council of Teachers of English, "is the hot test thing on the market." Only the blind could overlook the spate of articles and textbooks coming from Departments of English under the rubric "rhetoric" or "the new rhetoric." The so-called "new rhetoricians" have doubtless done some service in rescuing the term "rhetoric" from oblivion or obloquy in Departments of English. Can you not remember when a good many Departments of English banished the term "rhetoric"—as the substance had been banished long before—even from the lowly freshman course? Now they strive to be foremost not only in restoring the term to the freshmen but even in admitting it to respectability in upper-class courses. To be sure, even in such departments of English, rhetoric does not enjoy the status of literature or even of linguistics. Shall we observe that in Departments of English rhetoric is no longer a third-class citizen but is now almost a first-class citizen of the second-class?

The current prosperity of rhetoric in Departments of English would delight me if I could be convinced that our colleagues are secure in the faith. Believing, as I do, that no generation of men has ever had greater

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The current prosperity of rhetoric in Departments of English would delight me if I could be convinced that our colleagues are secure in the faith. Believing, as I do, that no generation of men has ever had greater
need than ours for the wisdom and utility to be found in a complete and honest rhetoric, I would wish to see studies in rhetoric prosper everywhere. But alas, I see little pieces called "the rhetoric of the paragraph," and "the rhetoric of the sentence;" and I see textbooks refurbished with the major change to be found in the title page with the addition of the word "rhetoric," doubtless a concession to "the hottest thing on the market;" and I see the full-bodied rhetoric confused incessantly with stylistics--much as rhetoric was once confused with elocution. I despair. I judge him to be a wise politician who observed, "I will defend myself against my enemies if only Heaven will protect me from my friends."

Is it not likely that in Departments of English, where rhetoric has for years been regarded as beneath the notice of scholars, the current interest will soon pass? Is it not probable that the ardor for the lady rhetoric, like that expressed not long since for general semantics and more recently for structural linguistics, will yield to still another passion? Can you not hear the refrain: "I could not love thee dear so much loved I not English more?"

I despair, and I recall the innocence of the young instructor in English to whom I was introduced not long ago. On being told that I admit an allegiance to the art of rhetoric, the young lady remarked sweetly, "Isn't that nice. You know, I had a professor at Yale who was interested in figures of speech."

Very well. The lady rhetoric will always find refuge in the House of Speech, where she sits at or near the head of the table rather than far below the salt or out in the kitchen. As Schwartz and Rycenga observed in their introduction to The Province of Rhetoric, one of the few praiseworthy books in rhetoric to come recently from Departments of English:

Scholars in speech have, of course, always been aware of the importance of rhetoric, and they continue to urge that its systematic and thorough study now be merged with an awareness of new developments in the field... . .

The Communicologist

The latest enemy of the art of rhetoric is the communicologist, who, bringing with him the heavy artillery of statistics and computers, is preparing to provide formulas and equations that will explain what have heretofore been the mysteries. I would not have you think that I am an enemy of the communicologist, even though I believe him to be quite probably an enemy to the art of rhetoric. For he means well, and well meaning people should always be encouraged. There are so few of them,

I do deplore the term communicologist--it is not of my coinage--as I deplore equally the term communication employed as synonymous with speech or rhetoric. Once I told my friend Elwood Murray, who was at the time engaged in establishing the National Society for the Study of Communication, that I could not join his Society, because I was waiting for him to start the National Society for the Study of Rhetoric, of which I would gladly be a charter member. I believe Professor Murray thought me frivolous, as perhaps I was; yet I suggest there was sense in my frivolity. An organization entitled the National Society for the

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Study of Conception would doubtless be open to misunderstanding; but so also, I suggest, is an organization entitled The National Society for the Study of Communication. Both words--conception and communication--suggest too much or too little. Not to bother with the term conception--since I was never offered the charter membership--I will observe that the term communication suggests to many people telephones, telegraphs, satellites, and Alexander Graham Bell. To many people the term does not at once, and to some I daresay it never does, convey the idea of a whole discourse, including what you and I are wont to call inventio and dispositio. Here is no more semantic difficulty. I tend to believe that the communicologists are in grave danger of repeating in the twentieth century--with computers--the sixteenth-century errors perpetrated by Petrus Ramus. A dwarfed and crippled rhetoric can be dangerous, particularly if its practitioners further the illusion that their art encompasses the whole of discourse; and what rhetoric requires today is not only a concern for communicatio but especially a searching, a scholarly, and in so far as possible a scientific investigation into the ways in which the conception of ideas, argument, and lines of policy actually occurs--and should occur--with attendant investigation of dispositio. I here refer not to the antithyme but to what precedes it. I refer not to the metaphor but to what "causes" it. Perhaps the communicologists believe themselves to be engaged in this delicate enterprise. I beg leave to doubt that they are. In so far as I am competent to understand them, I believe that they--like the literarians--characteristically take inventio for granted. I fear that in taking the part for the whole they may be enemies to rhetoric and hence to man whom they lead astray.

But I daresay I should not grieve for the lady rhetoric. Having survived Petrus Ramus, she is proof against misfortunes and will doubtless outlive the communicologists, even with computers. For the lady rhetoric has in her keeping the two great imponderables of this planet: humanity and futurity. And in every one of her suitors, in every rhetorician, there is a bit of the poet; for like the poet the rhetorician must wonder and he must ponder. And like the poet he deals in language applied to those ineluctable verities that make life itself uncertain.

The Rhetorician

A. The Witnesser

You may be shocked to find the rhetorician named as an enemy of rhetoric. Yet if you will bear with me I will endeavor to demonstrate that two kinds of rhetoricians today are truly enemies of rhetoric.

As we have seen, what the literarians call the "new" rhetoric is not new at all: it is simply a branch, an adaptation, of alocutio. If there is a new rhetoric, it is not found in alocutio but in the current practices observed in the streets, on the highways--from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, for example--and, alas, on television. The witness rhetoric has as its first law the adage taught to children: "Actions speak louder than words."

The technique of the witness rhetoric appears to be simple and, so far as one can tell, highly effective, up to a point: Go out into the streets, the highways, or the public buildings. Chant a message...
"We won't go. We won't go. We won't go." Or coin a slogan—the more outrageous the better: "L.B.J., L.B.J., How many babies have you killed today?" Stage a demonstration. The demonstration is itself a valuable instrument: it testifies to all the world of the anger, and the will of the people. To sit on a demonstrator, attacked, perhaps injured, or even killed, by an anti-demonstrator, so much the better for the persuasion. It is noteworthy that—so far as I have observed—the violence attendant on the witness rhetoric has been instigated, or appears to have been instigated, by the anti-witness. Yet the instrument is not passive resistance. It might be described as non-violent action, as near to violence as possible. In the street demonstrations, for example, the witnesser, either consciously or unconsciously, may employ forces deep in the psyche of the presumed antagonist. Even though the street on which the witness demonstrates belongs technically to the city, the dweller in the block responds to the primordial impulse: They are on my street. You must have seen, as I have, a puppy flee from the threats of a larger dog until he reaches his own back yard, whereupon he turns and barks furiously, secure in the knowledge that he is on his own territory. And the larger dog is likely to respect the puppy's prerogative. My cave, my tree, my wigwam, my home have developed mechanisms to seem to imperil them is an incitant, whether the incitement be legal or extra-legal. What weight should be given to provocation, to the goading of the anti-witness, even to the martyr-witness's wish that he will be violated—I am not prepared to say, even though I am constrained to suggest that this element exists in the witness rhetoric. The witness rhetorician counts on gaining the sympathy, the allegiance, and eventually the votes, of those who read about and perhaps even more of those who see the action that speaks louder than words. In a kind, limp, and permissive society the spectacle of police dogs confronting people in the streets, of policemen pulling young women bumpety-bump down stairways of a great university, of children with burned and misshapen faces—whether from phosphorous or from the explosion of a kerosene stove in which stolen gasoline has been poured—is manifestly rhetorical under Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the discovery of all the means available in a given problem of persuasion. Those of us who have a preference, as did Aristotle, for the persuasion of the enthymeme, may regret that the modern witness rhetoric appears, so far as one can tell, to circumvent the enthymeme in favor of "the arousing of prejudice, of pity, of anger, and the like feelings of the soul." The witness rhetoric thus appears to return to the rhetoric of Syracuse, so reasonably and eloquently deplored by Aristotle in his enthymemes are indubitably reasonable.

Is the witness rhetoric really new? I doubt it. I believe it to be new only in its manifestations and in its current adaptation. The newness is not in the witness but in the television set that makes millions of persons immediate spectators, if not participants, in persuasive events. For instance, if some demonstrator is attacked, perhaps injured, or even killed, by an anti-demonstrator but to the in now so frequently found in compounds, such as teach-in, lie-in, sleep-in, and so I have been recently informed, lock-in. The latest lock-in to come to my attention, however, I believe to have been invented at the University of Oregon, where a group of student doves are now singing a fanfare. They are fasting as a protest against American involvement in Vietnam; but the force of their witness rhetoric is somewhat impaired by a group of student hawks, who, employing a counter-rhetoric, are staging a competitive in a feast-in—much more popular with undergraduates than a fast-in—with proceeds from sales of hamburgers and coca-cola to go to needy children in Vietnam. In my professional capacity as rhetorician, I can hardly wait to get back to Eugene to see which in is in.

The witness rhetoric has always been a witness, his own best or worst witness, or both. From this observation flow the doctrines of ethical proof. Is the witness rhetoric really new? I doubt it. Yet it is possible to discover a on which the witness demonstrates is not only the formal orator has served as witness rhetorician. Archbishop Cranmer's body burning at the stake, Sir Thomas More's noble head raised high on London Bridge, Crispus Attucks shot down on a Boston street: all were witnesses. Not many years ago the Nazis massed their legions at Nuremberg and throughout the Reich to bear witness to the Fuehrer. In our day we observe the lesser politician rushing to have his picture taken with a Kennedy—any Kennedy; we observe the relevance of Lyndon Johnson's phrase, "press the flesh." We recall the wonderful folksy progress Harry Truman made across the country in 1948.

What are the prospects for the witness rhetoric? Is it not yet clear whether the witness-rhetoric or the word-rhetoric will prevail. Yet we hardly avoid the judgment that they are in conflict, for at the heart of the word-rhetoric for a hundred generations has been the enthymeme. Can an enthymeme be presented effectively on the television screen in close competition with a spectacle? I doubt it. To one educated in the word-rhetoric the witness-rhetoric must obviously seem inferior; yet the witnesses are within their legal if not their moral rights to practice their art to achieve purposes they believe to be worthy. Whether the exercise of these rights will serve them well in the long run remains to be seen. If the witness-rhetoric should bring our so-called civilization more and more to resemble life in Nature, as envisioned by Thomas Hobbes—nasty, brutish, and short—then the witnesses along with the rest of us—will suffer. If the affluent barbarian, the vertical invader of Ortega, learns to employ the witness-rhetoric to the detriment of the enthymematic rhetoric, he may lose more than he gains.

Yet it is possible to discover a wry hope for the future in the limitations of the past. If one were able truly to get behind the enthymeme, one might discover that its source—particularly in popular oratory—is not in rationality but in rationalization. Perhaps only the intellectual (perforce a literate person), whose self-portrait is normally that of the man of reason, has been deluded into believing that his enthymemes are indubitably reasonable.
counterfeit enthymemes have always been coined, and passed, and accepted as pure gold by those whose conclusions have been predetermined by their prejudices. Perhaps the great mythologists—Frazer, Freud, and Sapir—have been riding the wave of the future rhetoric. Perhaps the accessories of proof will tend more and more to become the presumptive. If not the substantive, proof and will thus relegate the enthymeme and the syllogism to that museum called the classroom.

I would not have you utterly despise rationalization. It may possibly be, for example, a better vehicle for governing the turbulence of the human race than forthright and designing prejudice. Is not rationalization the obedience that passion pays to reason?

Please understand that I do not argue that the development of the witness-rhetoric is a triumph to be celebrated. I want merely to suggest that the transition, if it comes, may not be catastrophic, even to the true believers in the word-rhetoric. Perhaps the new rhetoric will not be easily distinguishable from the old. Perhaps it will be a new instrument fashioned from the old materials: Half word and half word. Moreover, my favorite rhetorician and devotee of the enthymeme—Mrs. Bower Aly—offers us some hope for the survival of the enthymematic rhetoric, even in competition with the witness. She opines that people become inured to spectacle, that they more and more respond to a battle in Viet Nam or a race riot in Tennessee as though it were a fight in Gunsmoke or an episode in Bonanza: the unreality, rather than the reality, supervenes; or the two unrealities so infuse each other that the testimony of the witness is lost in Never-Never Television Land. Thus television develops its own peculiar credibility gap, and leaves more of the field than might have been thought possible to its competitor, the enthymeme.

B. The Scholliast

The other enemy of rhetoric among the rhetoricians I shall call "the scholliast," meaning you and me. The scholliast, as you know, is the perennial annotator, the writer of marginalia. I suggest that as enemies without enmity, we professors of rhetoric are oftentimes guilty of the crime described by Oscar Wilde: "Each man kills the thing he loves." With our sometimes pedantic concern for ethos, pathos, and logos, for proofs artificial and inartificial, for eloquence forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, do we not kill the lady rhetoric with smother love? We rhetoricians need now and again to remind ourselves that we have in our keeping the most human of arts; that people become inured to spectacle, that they more and more respond to a battle in Viet Nam or a race riot in Tennessee as though it were a fight in Gunsmoke or an episode in Bonanza: the unreality, rather than the reality, supervenes; or the two unrealities so infuse each other that the testimony of the witness is lost in Never-Never Television Land. Thus television develops its own peculiar credibility gap, and leaves more of the field than might have been thought possible to its competitor, the enthymeme.

As an honest rhetorician, however, I should note that there are here this evening some young people whom I have heard read some excellent papers. Let them be not tad astray by my advice, I think I should tell them the other side of the story. Hence I shall endeavor to explain to them how to succeed in rhetoric without really trying. Perhaps I can do so by reference to my paper called "Enthymemes: The Story of a Light-Hearted Search" to which Dr. Barrett has already referred. After reading this paper in Ithaca, Pitts- burgh, and Honolulu, with (I trust) suitable disposition, I was indiscreet enough to let it go into print. Ever since, I have suffered the worst fate that can come to a scholar or a politician: I am controversial. My older friends among the scholars—e.g., James McBurney, Kenneth Burke, Harry Caplan—profess to think the little piece wonderful. But the solemn younger scholars—whom I shall not name—are shocked that a professor should read—let alone permit to be published—an article so light-hearted, so irreverent, so—shall we say—sacriligious concerning the enthymeme. Hence I said by way of preface that I only proposed to give you Aly's four rules on how to succeed in rhetoric without really trying:

1. Always be dull, especially about rhetoric. The old scholars won't notice you, and the young ones will think you profound.
2. Bite your tongue rather than put it in your cheek.
3. Run, don't walk, to the nearest undertaker and learn how he conducts a funeral. Apply his attitudes toward all your professional appearances.
4. Never crack a smile—until you have tenure.

For myself, I think this occasion appropriate to announce that, as in the case of my light-hearted sins against the enthymeme, I promise hereafter—beginning with my next incarnation—to conduct a serious, heavy-handed, scholarly, scientific search for metaphors. I shall let none escape me.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman: After naming so many enemies of rhetoric, I am happy at last to be able to tell you that rhetoric has a friend. As you know, ever since Plato's indictment of the sophists, and since the almost open warfare between the philosophers and rhetoricians in ancient Rome, the philosophers—doubtless not without reason—have characterized rhetoric as suspicious, heavy-handed, scholarly, scientific search for metaphors. I shall let none escape me.
In any event, we find Gilbert Ryle, one of the most distinguished of modern philosophers, writing very much like I. A. Richards, who (although he may also qualify as a philosopher) is indubitably a rhetorician. Gilbert Ryle declares:

I conclude, then, that there is, after all, a sense in which we can properly inquire and even say 'what it really means to say so and so'. For we can ask what is the real form of the fact recorded when this is concealed or disguised and not duly exhibited by the expression in question. And we can often succeed in stating this fact in a new form of words which does exhibit what the other failed to exhibit. And I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy. But I do not want to argue this point now.

I find another evidence of the friendship of philosophers for rhetoric, if not for rhetoricians, in an event now transpiring at the Pennsylvania State University, where a group of philosophers and rhetoricians have joined forces to found a new learned journal devoted to the scholarly trusts they hold in common. The new journal, to be published by the Pennsylvania State University Press, is entitled Philosophy and Rhetoric. To all of you rhetoricians here I bespeak for the new venture your generous consideration. Surely you will agree that with all the enemies it has made, rhetoric deserves a friend; and there is no better friend than philosophy! Indeed, if I were to offer a toast, as is sometimes permitted on after-dinner occasions, I would suggest that we drink, in water or in wine, to rhetoric—and to rhetoric's ancient enemy and new friend!
COMMENDED PAPERS
OF THE CONFERENCE
CRITICS OF DECLAMATIO

by

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The declamation taught by the rhetors in the Roman schools of the late Republic and early Empire has been denigrated from that time until the present; its ornamentation and unrealistic themes have drawn sharp criticism. But educational practices in most societies are aimed at perpetuating rather than changing that society. Disapproval of a society's goals should not cause condemnation of the schools that prepare students for that society.

Critics of declamatio have allowed their personal judgments of the societal values to influence their evaluation of the schools. In order to make a legitimate criticism of a society, a critic must project himself into the context of that society. A failure to acknowledge the factors that formed the object of the criticism makes an objective criticism impossible. Declamatio must be judged for its worth to the society that spawned it. If we have reason to study public address in historical and social perspective, should we not also study rhetorical training in the same perspective?

We find many instances of opposition to declamation that indicate a religious indictment of wrongdoing. Charles Sears Baldwin calls controversiae:...that particular application of the ancient schooling which in the generation before Quintilian was already infecting the old rhetoric, and through which the teaching of both Greek and Roman schools was to be dwarfed and perverted.1

Tacitus, speaking from the vantage of contemporaneity, is just as critical:

But nowadays our boys are escorted to the schools of the so-called "professors of rhetoric,"...the place has nothing about it that commands respect,...no one enters it who is not as ignorant as the rest; there is no profit in the society of the scholars, since they are all either boys or young men who are equally devoid of any feelings of responsibility whether they take the floor or provide an audience; and the exercises in which they engage largely defeat their own objects.2

Before continuing this discussion of attitudes towards declamation in the modern and ancient world, we should understand the procedure of a Roman school of rhetoric practicing declamation.

The rhetorical school of Rome offered an advanced course of study. By the time the student reached the rhetor, he had already been taught by the litterator and the grammaticus.

The litterator of the primary school was the first teacher to confront the beginning student. The child began school at about age seven and has usually completed this first step by eleven. Donald Leman Clark tells us,

In this primary school, boys and some girls as well, sat on the backless benches or forms, memorized the alphabet backward and forward, learned to write with a stylus on wax tablets held on the knee and with a reed pen on papyrus.3

The concern of the grammar school was literature, grammar, and rhetorical exercises in speaking and writing known as progymnasmata. The progymnasmata were a well structured series of exercises that progressed in degree of difficulty as the student advanced. The writing assignments involved rewriting well known fables and tales; the process involved a study of commonplace, encomiums, conclusions, and other rhetorical elements. When the secondary training was completed, the student was recognized as a Roman citizen and received his toga virilis. He was now prepared to enter the school of rhetoric and continue his studies for four or five more years.

During the period of the Empire, the pedagogical core of the Roman school was declamation. The topics of the school declamation were either suasoriae (delegative) or controver siae (forensic). The controver siae involved unlikely and sensational situations such as rape, kidnapping, tyrannicide, and incest. The suasoriae usually concerned a reenactment of an historical decision of policy and quite often used a form of role playing called prosopopoeia.

The daily school session began with the rhetor proposing the theme to be worked on by the class. Along with the theme he suggested methods of approach or analysis called the sermo. Each student then

prepared a declamation using the assigned theme. The students were given classroom help in preparing their themes as well as general lessons in composition. The declamations were then committed to memory and performed for their fellows and the rhetor. The student's attitude toward rhetorical study is observed by Juvenal:

> Every schoolboy who worships Minerva with a modest penny fee, attended by a slave to guard his little satchel, prays all through his holidays for eloquence, for the fame of a Cicero or a Demosthenes.  

Among the recorded commentaries on declamation there is little to be found that speaks well for the rhetorical schools of Rome during the Empire. Among the Ancients, Tacitus and Petronius were highly critical; Quintilian, who approved of the concept, was disappointed in the way it was taught. Among modern scholars, Brother E. Patrick Parks and Donald Leman Clark appear to be the only defenders of the system. Parks restricts his approval to forensic oratory and sees the schools only as a preparation for the courts. Clark finds a value in controversiae as training for evaluative thinking.

Charles Sears Baldwin speaks out quite strongly against declamation, and interprets Quintilian and Tacitus as having attitudes consonant with his own:

> Both the scorn of the historian and the reservations of the teacher spring from the older, larger tradition of rhetoric. To this tradition of rhetoric both Tacitus and Quintilian discerned in declamatio a menace.

Aubrey Gwynn objects to the practice of using fantastic themes and reducing declamation to a "mere competition in extravagance." Gwynn also contends that a lack of content in declamation, as judged by today's standards, renders the practice unacceptable. He states:

> Legal argument and historical truth were both neglected by the rhetors, the latter to a degree which modern taste would find intolerable.

The teachers and parents are attacked by Petronius; he objects to the parent pushing the student so rapidly that he enters the courts as an "unripe schoolboy" who is unqualified for "the noblest of callings." His most venomous attack is aimed at the teachers:

> I must tell you the truth, that you teachers more than anyone have been the ruin of true eloquence. Your tripping, empty tones stimulate certain absurd effects into being, with the result that the substance of your speech languishes and dies.

Quintilian approved of the concept of declamatio, but disapproved of the teachers and their goals. In Book II of his Institutes of Oratory, he explains his attitude toward declamation:

> ...I must say a few words on the theory of declamation, which is at once the most recent and most useful of rhetorical exercises....On the other hand the actual practice of declamation has degenerated to such an extent owing to the fault of our teachers, that it has come to be one of the chief causes of the corruption of modern oratory; such is the extravagance and ignorance of our declaimers. But it is possible to make a sound use of anything that is naturally sound.

Although he disapproved of the artificiality of many of the rhetors, he approved of their use of prosopopoeia:

> ...it is a most useful exercise because it demands a double effort and is also of the greatest use to future poets and historians, while for orators of course it is absolutely necessary.

Most of Quintilian's criticism questions whether the teaching led to a useful end. In one of his final comments on misuse of declamation, he says:

> But eloquence has in her turn, nothing but derision for those that insult her thus, and speakers who wish to seem learned to fools are merely regarded as fools by the learned.

It is generally believed that there was a decline in oratory under the dictatorship of the Empire, and that this decline can be attributed to the danger of speaking publicly on affairs that concerned the state. But to blame the decline of oratory on the suppression
of free speech is ridiculous, says Parks. He points to the increase of court activity as an indicator of free speech:

Imperial suppression of free speech through direct intervention or through the threat of less maleste with its concommitant deletion, has long been charged with dealing oratory the coup de grace. Limiting oratory to forensic eloquence we find the necessity for accepting such a theory.

It appears that most critics would have preferred a less colorful type of training in the schools. But in the welter of disapproval over declamation, an important factor is overlooked: any school that would have trained people in a less ornate fashion would have supplied the courts with ineffective advocates. As Parks comments:

Cases, especially in the literary age of the Empire, were not won on legal knowledge exclusively, but on the advocates ability to color his facts, to appeal to the emotions of the judge, and to set forth persuasive arguments, couched frequently in the rhetorical conceits of the day.

Donald Lemen Clark points out the educational advantages of controversies for the student:

Even a youth who was not planning to take up the practice of law as a career would gain a great deal from arguing on both sides of such a controversy. He would at least learn to take the first steps toward the attainment of wisdom. He would learn that he need not believe a thing just because someone says it is so.

After briefly explaining the schools and their themes, he says,

I have chosen to seek out what seemed good and useful and true—what might prove of value to modern teachers in modern schools.

In the final paragraph of the article he gives a familiar but persuasive argument:

Could a school exercise which Cicero, Brutus, Cato, Seneca, and Quintilian approved be so completely wrong-headed?

IV

What sort of consensus can be gleaned from these scholars and historians? Parks excluded, it is believed that suppression of free expression under the Empire tended to dilute the content of most oratory. With little of great import that could be said, the orator turned to richness of language when richness of content was not safely available. As Tacitus said,

Hand in hand with the importance of the theme goes the growing ability to cope with it, and it is a sheer impossibility for anyone to produce a great and glorious oration unless he has a theme to correspond.

One of the important considerations in studying the Roman schools of declamation is the setting in which they operated. Far too many critics evaluate by standards of contemporary taste. A judgment must be made in terms of the society in which the schools of declamation operated. William Edward comments that the decline in oratory was: "...in keeping with the decline in style, in subject matter, and in national taste in everything else."

The orateness of the public performance is not surprising; for with appeal to friends in attendance, the student could be expected to ornament his speech as much as possible. The public declamations of the rhetors were equally ornate. The elaborate and lush declamation was expected and rewarded. Applause after a particularly striking passage was common. The literature of the period was in the same taste and the tinselled phrase was the mark of an educated man. As mentioned previously, the courts expected opulence of expression; it became a component of persuasion. Also, learning by doing was consonant with the practical Roman mind. The Roman, in the words of Boissier, considered that the most efficient method to accustom young men to speaking was to make them speak, and with this there was universal agreement.

Declamation is not unique to this period. The elocutionists of the 18th and 19th centuries used declamatory exercises, and the modern version can be found in the forensic program of most schools.

Declamatio and competitive debate are similar in concept. Debate is intended, as was declamatio, to prepare the student for real-life situations. Societal pressure to win has caused most debate programs to emphasize winning. Acquiring argumentative skills and improving the ability to analyze objectively, have become secondarily important for the student. Nevertheless, he is being prepared to function successfully in a winner-oriented society.

The schools of declamatio were faithful to the demands of their societies' goals. Schools teach students to work toward societal reform only when reform is a value of the society. Teachers of rhetoric should be especially aware of societal structure. The necessities of persuasion demand a rhetorical theory that is consonant with the taste of the society. Great

15 Parks, Roman Rhetorical Schools, p. 112.
16 Ibid., p. 93.
18 Ibid, 283.
19 Ibid.
20 Tacitus, Dialogues, p. 115.
speakers can cause countries to change ideological directions, but they do so in the rhetoric of the day. Persuasion is not always attractive, most particularly in retrospect, and must be evaluated in terms of the time and place of the practice.

For almost 2,000 years, critics have examined declamatio with some degree of disdain. This negative attitude has been based on a moral and ethical evaluation of the Roman Empire. Let us re-examine these schools of rhetoric rhetorically. If we can examine the work of the rhetors objectively, we may find pedagogical concepts that have contemporary value.
An investigator in search of common characteristics among contemporary American political speeches may find what is similar to a complicated fabric with many colors and weaves. Certainly there are common traits among even the most different political addresses, but our investigator would have little trouble in noting many gross contrasts in the closest of political speeches. The purpose of this paper is to describe such contrasts. The paragraphs following present the results of a study of the Presidential nomination acceptance addresses in 1952 and 1956. There are significant differences not only between the speeches of Stevenson and Eisenhower, but also among the individual speeches of each.

I have chosen nomination acceptance speeches for two reasons. The first is that they are traditional political speeches, given always at a standard function to similar audiences. Since the speaking occasion is nearly the same, one can more accurately make comparisons. The second purpose in using these speeches is that they are important campaign speeches. The purpose of the speeches is generally the same. A book published by the New York Times summarized that purpose in these words:

A Presidential candidate's acceptance speech is automatically an important campaign document, for not only are the basic issues set forth for the coming months but also the candidate's style, his manner, his point of view are on full display.

Eisenhower's first address was unique. It differed from other acceptance speeches in fundamental respects. In the first place, it was extraordinarily short. Acceptance speeches of recent years have been of various lengths, but this one was by far the shortest. Compared to Nixon's address in 1960 of over 5,000 words, Eisenhower's 800-word speech seems minute. The second trait, an obvious one considering the brevity of the speech, is that he did not elucidate possible issues of the campaign. Stevenson spent much of his time discussing and building a case around potential issues. But the only hint of issues in Eisenhower's speech is found in this short paragraph:

Our aims—the aims of this Republican crusade—are clear: to sweep from office an administration which has fastened on every one of us the wastefulness, the arrogance and corruption in high places, the heavy burdens and anxieties which are the bitter fruit of a party too long in power.

These differences are probably not attributable to a haphazard approach or neglect. The General presented many speeches after the war and became, in Haberman's view, one of the most popular speakers in the world. In addition, he was a meticulous speech writer. He pondered over his manuscripts for hours and revised parts of his speeches at least four times before delivery.

The significance of these two points of difference lies, I believe, in Eisenhower's ethos. It was evident that he possessed an attraction for the American public enjoyed by few previous Presidential candidates. In a detailed study of the 1952 election carried out by the Research Center of the University of Michigan, some interesting facts about Eisenhower's ethos appeared. He was seen as a man with qualities of leadership and the ability to solve some pressing foreign problems. Both among the total sample and the Republican sample, a comparatively high percentage was attracted to the Republican party because of its candidate. The Center reported that this personal attraction was "a dramatic appeal rarely encountered in American Presidential candidates."

Eisenhower probably recognized this asset at the time he was nominated, and although other factors may have motivated the shortness of the speech, its major purpose was probably to sustain his ethos among voters. His victory seemed probable even at this early stage, and there was perhaps no need to deal with issues at all if such would have complicated the continuance of his image.

An examination of Stevenson's first speech reveals a major difference from Eisenhower's. The important contrast between the Democratic and Republican addresses stems from Stevenson's own humility. It is important to understand that Stevenson was nominated on a draft. When Truman announced in March

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1. The Road to the White House (New York, 1965), p. 70.
5. Ibid., p. 17.
of 1952 that he would not run for a second full term, the "draft-Stevenson movement" gained impetus. Stevenson himself made it clear from the beginning that he was not interested in the nomination. He became so emphatic, it almost appeared that he was shunning the nomination. His first loyalty was to the government of Illinois, and he refused until the end to indicate whether he would accept or reject the nomination if it came. Finally he was nominated, still as an undeclared candidate.

The fact that he was nominated despite his own efforts to avoid the nomination is indication of his high ethos among strong party members. The University of Michigan study quoted above indicated that Stevenson was attractive, but that Eisenhower's ethos was much higher.

The important connection with the speech is that Stevenson maintained his humility in the acceptance address almost to the point of self-degradation. The whole speech seems to possess the mood of defeatism. Of course, the usual phrases of victory appear. Still, one gets the impression that Stevenson neither wanted to win nor thought he could win. For instance, consider the following passages:

I accept your nomination—and your program. I should have preferred to hear those words uttered by a stronger, wiser, better man than myself.

I have not sought the honor you have done me. I would not seek it because I aspired to another office, which was the full measure of my ambition. I underscore mine.

I would not seek your nomination for the Presidency because the burdens of that office stagger the imagination.

But I feel no exultation, no sense of triumph. Our troubles are all ahead of us.

These words speak for themselves. Considering Stevenson's previous refusal to campaign for the nomination, these words in his acceptance address would tend to defeat his prestige in the eyes of many voting citizens. There is a major contrast between this ethical proof and that of Eisenhower in 1952.

A second difference between this speech and that of Eisenhower was Stevenson's attempt to reason with the audience. This was a tactic he used throughout the campaign. Walter Johnson, one of the chiefs in the draft-Stevenson campaign, said: "His Presidential campaign, with its theme of talking sense to the American people, revealed to the nation his dedication to reason." His success or failure to win support through reason does not diminish the fact that he was sincere. Previous critics from the field of speech corroborate Professor Johnson's statement.

6 Ibid., pp. 58-61.
8 Ibid., p. 646.
9 Russel Windes and James A. Robinson, "Public Address

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Before going on to examine the speeches in 1956, it would be well to discuss yet another contrast in 1952. This does not involve Eisenhower at all. Rather, it is the major difference in the quality of Stevenson's acceptance address and the other speeches of his campaign. Of course, it is not within the scope of this paper to examine the other campaign speeches; however, previous speech critics have done so, and their reports differ from my judgment of the acceptance speech. Windes and Robinson agreed with the Encyclopedia of American History that Stevenson's 1952 speeches were "among the most distinguished oratorical efforts in United States political history," but it is my judgment that the ethical proof in the acceptance address was poor. Haberman, however, believed that Stevenson's ethical proof in the campaign in general was effective. Thus the comparison of other critics' judgments about Stevenson's campaign speeches with my judgment of the acceptance address reveals another important contrast.

Eisenhower's second speech presents another contrast for study. If the speaker's name were removed from texts of the 1952 and 1956 speeches, it would be difficult to believe that both were delivered by the same person. The first speech was short and contained little development of issues. However, the best quality of the second address was its fine internal development. Particularly noteworthy is Eisenhower's attempt to build the Republican party as a party for the future. The Republicans are constantly rebuffed as a stagnant, status quo party, and the President tried here to combat that image. Thus his central theme was that Republicans are for the future, and he clearly supported that single idea throughout.

The organization of the speech was clear. The ideas were built around one central theme, with five points in support, each clearly stated. Therefore, the speech was easy to follow. Also, most points were supported by evidence, a practice rare in this type of speaking. The speech was filled with examples of accomplishments, and Eisenhower used many embellishing materials such as quotations and stories.

Likewise, the contrast between Stevenson's addresses in 1952 and 1956 is startling. He no longer maintained a humble posture. Instead of shunning his opportunity, he stated these passages at various times in the speech:

Four years ago we lost. This time we will win!

Tonight, after an interval of marking time and aimless drifting, we are on the threshold of another great, decisive era.

11 Haberman, p. 405.
These are the things I believe in and will work for with every resource I possess. These are the things I know you believe in and will work for with everything you have. These are the terms on which I accept your nomination.1

Such language ran throughout the speech. Stevenson attacked the administration vociferously. He stated his confidence that the Democrats would win in 1956 and that the people would not follow the empty leadership of the President. The contrast between this approach and that of 1952 is obvious.

Of course, the critic must admit that Stevenson's situation was considerably different in 1956. He was now on the offensive. He no longer had to defend keeping one party in power over twenty years. And his political experience had evidently increased his ambition, since he campaigned actively for the nomination in 1956. In addition, he had gained considerable experience in public speaking since the earlier campaign. Prior to his nomination in 1952 he had done relatively little speaking. However, since his governorship expired in 1953, he had a great deal of time to travel and speak. Windes and Robinson reported that he delivered 111 speeches from his defeat in 1952 until November of 1955. His increased experience may have been a factor in his speech improvement.

It is clear that in many respects the study of the four nomination acceptance addresses in the 1950's is a revelation of contrasts. In 1952 the contrast between the candidates is that between a confident man with extraordinarily high ethos and a defeatist who, although he won the respect of strong party members, failed to build his image in his address. But in 1956 the Democratic candidate delivered an entirely different kind of speech, a confident discourse. The Republican candidate in 1952 gave a short, almost shallow statement, one probably designed to promote his image and not issues. Yet in 1956 the same person presented a well-developed speech stressing the issues of the campaign. Some of these changes were undoubtedly caused by the need to adapt to new situations. But the critic, bearing this in mind, cannot overlook the second factor of political maturation on the part of both Eisenhower and Stevenson between 1952 and 1956.

13 Windes and Robinson, p. 227.
ETHICAL CRITICISM:
THE LISTENER AS GOOD MAN
by Jerry Patch, Graduate in Speech, San Fernando Valley State College

Ever since Plato denounced the Sophists in particular and rhetoric in general in his Gorgias, rhetoricians have been most sensitive to charges that their is an immoral or amoral art, and have sought to impose an ethical system on their rhetorics and orators. Today's rhetorical critic is particularly plagued by this problem, since most of the ethical standards proposed through twenty-five centuries have been speaker-centered, whereas his critical method, emphatically stated by Herbert A. Wichelns in 1925, is largely audience-centered.

1. Aristotle believed truth and justice to be more powerful than their opposites, and that a speaker, by employing rhetoric vigorously, could assure victory for good over evil. Quintilian, who equated excellence with purity of character and defined an orator as a good man, thought it impossible that a bad man should be worthy of the name orator. George Campbell, like Aristotle, stresses character and intelligence in the speaker, and affirms Quintilian's "good man" theory. Richard Whetely demands that the speaker establish an ethical relationship with the audience, through logic rather than emotion, and supports Quintilian's "good man" proviso.

Modern rhetoricians have more or less echoed the beliefs of earlier scholars. William Norwood Brigance proposed a "Hippocratic Oath for Public Speakers," wished to establish a licensing examination for oratorical competence, and sought an "oath of responsibility" of every orator. Continuing in this approach,

Richard Murphy decries the lack of professional standards in the speech "profession," and the absence of an ethical standard and enforcing agency, but Murphy fails to formulate the principles to be followed in establishing this standard. Franklyn S. Holman, like Plato and Whately, condemns ethos and pathos for being irrational proof, and questions the morality of using persuasion in a democracy. Karl Wallace perhaps synthesized the speaker-centered ethical view of modern rhetoricians in citing four "moralties" of speaking: 1) duty of search and inquiry, 2) allegiance to accuracy and fairness, 3) expression of individual motive, and 4) toleration of dissent.

While the foregoing rhetoricians have aimed their ethics at the speaker's means, as Wayne C. Minnick notes, other scholars have sought to construct an ethic dealing with a speaker's ends as applied to his society. Hadley Cantril writes:

The correctness or righteousness of any action, then, is to be judged in terms of the degree to which it includes and integrates the purposes and provides for the potential development of those purposes of all other people concerned in or possibly affected by it.

Robert Oliver and Thomas R. Nilsen forward similar systems of "social effects" ethics which parallel Cantril, but both men also advocate several speaker-centered ethical practices. Winston L. Brembeck and

3 Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, trans. H. E. Butler (London and New York, 1922), I, xili, 1, 4, 8, 357 ff.
This "social utility" camp of Cantril, Oliver Nilsen and Brembeck and Howell outlined above, aside from being in part speaker-centered, is not totally satisfactory for the rhetorical critic, for as Minnick notes:

When men do not agree, as they will not most of the time, about the degree to which a proposed act is scientific and valuable to society; when they will not agree about the extent to which an act revalues life, or allows for the greatest potential of all people affected; whose judgment is declared to be right? What jury will pass on the rightness or wrongness...?15

From the evidence above, one is assured that there has been considerable effort to apply ethical standards to rhetoric. In light of this it is perhaps puzzling that today's rhetorical critic finds it difficult to formulate an adequate ethical standard to employ in evaluating oratory. Whereas the foregoing textbooks of rhetoric all offer ethical standards, extent statements on criticism do not afford an ethical standard for judging speakers. Thonssen and Baird warn of ethical excesses by the speaker,16 but offer no standard; nor does Edwin Black.17 Anthony Hillbruner suggests the use of a standard gleaned from Aristotle's ethical "criteria," and modified by the cultural milieu in question; but since I am unable to discern his "criteria," or exactly what he means by "criteria," I am unclear as to how his standard is to be met.18

The twelve ethical standards in the rhetorical textbooks cited previously are all more or less speaker-centered, yet, paradoxically, we are reminded that our ethical system is audience-centered. Aristotle's assertion that rhetoric is the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion are to be found. Since Wichels, this audience-centered emphasis has moved the critic to weigh the means of persuasion employed against the available means to determine the speaker's effectiveness. The problems resulting from the imposition of a speaker-centered ethic on audience-centered criticism are clearly seen in examining two pieces of ethical criticism.

15 Minnick, p. 279.
17 Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism (New York, 1965).
Ethics, then, in its Greek sense, is no more than what values are approved or disapproved of by a particular society. Because a society is ever in flux, the ethic of society is similarly inconstant. Our ethical standard for rhetorical criticism must then be broad enough to encompass, as Murphy says, the premise that in America beef is a desirable food, while the reverse is true in India.44

Since a society establishes its own ethical system, we must look to the particular society for details of that system. And since, as Minnick notes, the society is often at odds over what is or is not ethical, the audience to which the speech was addressed must be considered. I submit that the rhetorical critic must examine the speeches of the particular society and their impact on their particular audience to determine the ethical standard of that particular speaking situation. This is the appropriate ethical standard for the rhetorical critic.

As Edward Rogge notes, the speaking situation determines the ethical standard. Rogge says:

"The ethics of a speaker cannot be estimated except by determining whether his objectives coincide with the objectives and goals of his auditors, and how these goals compare with the aspirations of the larger society."

It is useless, then, for a critic to compose a rhetorical ethic on his own, for the ethic he seeks is tacitly or vociferously stated and revised by each particular society. The critic need only study a particular speech and its effect on its particular audience and society to determine what is or was ethical at that particular time. Rogge concludes:

As a citizen, the critic may lament the state of public morals, and he may seek to alter public standards, but as a critic, unless he is convinced that an audience has become a crowd, he must agree with Cicero: "It is plain that what the multitude approves must win the approval of the experts."27

In answer to Minnick's query,28 the jury who passes on rightness and wrongness is the audience. Thus, Plato's Gorgias, at least until the Greek "audience" he addressed shared his repugnance of sophistry in rhetoric, was but one citizen's opinion and not valid ethical criticism.

By utilizing this audience-centered rhetorical

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24 Murphy, p. 141.
25 See n. 15.
27 Ibid., p. 425.
28 See n. 15.

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ethic, ethical criticism no longer stands as an ill-defined aspect of criticism to be approached with vague references to honesty and goodness. Rather, a speaker's ends must be consonant with his audience's, or he will be rejected. Similarly, his means will be examined by an attentive audience to be accepted or rejected. If, for example, the critic finds accepted violations of Wallace's four "morailties," he must conclude either Wallace's standard does not apply in this particular case, or, as Thomas R. Hilsen, such excesses are the chance that freedom takes.29 Ethics becomes an aspect of ethos, thoroughly dependent upon or derived from the recognition by the audience of the speaker's character, intelligence, and good will.

IV.

This approach to ethical criticism will find disfavor with some rhetoricians, especially those who attempt to divide an ethic from a society's traditions or alleged goals, or those critics, who through the use of their own self-formulated ethic, see themselves as "guardians of democracy." These critics might protest that the delegation of ethical criticism to the audience paves the way for a Sophistic revival. Yet this concept of the audience as ethical watchdog has its advocates. Halsey, in concluding his article on the "Hidden Persuaders," says the duty of ethical policemen must be assumed by the audience, for they, through their rejection of the speaker's message as unethical, are the ones who hold the power of judgment over ethical violations by the speaker.30 Nor is this concept new. Plutarch's essay, "On Hearing," which asks the listener's "modest and unwearied attention" that he "more readily discover what is false or impertinent," further advises the listener to shed his biases towards the speaker.31 Plutarch continues:

"We ought to use all the candor imaginable in praising the speaker, yet withal as great a caution in yield ing our assent to what he says; to look upon his expression and action with a favorable construction, but to inspect the usefulness and truth of his doctrine with the nicest and most critical judgment; that speakers may cease to be malicious, and that what they say may do no mischief."32

Edward R. Murrow, in his peroration to the March 9, 1954, See It Now television broadcast on Senator Joseph McCarthy, stated:

"There is no way for a citizen of a republic to abdicate his responsibilities...The actions of the junior Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay amongst our allies abroad and given considerable comfort to our enemies, and whose fault is that? Not really (the Senator's); he didn't create this situation of fear; he merely exploited it, and rather successfully. Cassius was right; "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves."33
Murrow implied that responsibility for the anti-Communist vendetta of the early 1950s was not McCarthy's, but rather his "audience's" for giving him ethical approval.

This paper is concerned with rhetorical criticism. I have tried to avoid confusing scholarship with pedagogy. I do not propose that students of speech now be instructed to "never mind what's ethical--just do whatever you can get away with." Students of rhetoric should be made aware of their ethical responsibilities as speakers. But should they not also receive instruction, as Plutarch suggests, on hearing, so that as members of an audience they might serve as ethical critics and apply their censure, if needed, where it does the most good? This responsibility belongs, and has always belonged, to the listener, for the critic, if he is to remain a scholar, can only judge a speaker in relation to his audience insofar as ethics are concerned.

By way of summary, I have identified four approaches to ethical criticism. Of these, a speaker-centered ethic is inadequate because it fails to recognize the then acceptable ethic of the society to which the speech was addressed; a critic-fashioned ethic is often too personal to afford scholarly investigation; and society-centered ethics are usually too vague to account for disputed ethical standards in a particular society. In audience-centered criticism only the audience-centered ethic, because it allows the audience to make an ethical evaluation of the speaker, serves the rhetorical critic.

For 2500 years rhetoricians have been sensitive to charges that theirs is an immoral art. But to say "sensitive" is to be overly kind. Rhetoricians and rhetorical critics have been "running scared," flinching at assorted snickers from the philosophy department and blushing at charges of "second class discipline" and "cookery." The rhetorical critic, rather than condemning as irresponsible the rightful assigning of ethical evaluation to the audience, should perhaps breathe a sigh of relief at having been unharnessed from a misapplied burden he has carried for 100 years.
The Age of Greece was a glorious one, and rhetoric thrived under the influence of the Athenian culture. However, a short three hundred years after the height of that period—after the decline of Greece and the growth of Hellenism in Rome—Christianity was born in the catacombs of Rome. As Christianity grew in strength and took root in the Roman Empire, it had a definite influence upon the Hellenistic culture and its institutions in the early Medieval period. In this paper I will discuss the influence Christianity had upon rhetoric, from its rejection of that institution as a part of early Christianity to its acceptance by Saint Augustine, and some of the basic philosophical considerations underlying the breach between classical rhetoric and its Christian successor.

In the early Christian period, speaking became the characteristic form of oratory, and it was to remain so throughout the Middle Ages. And yet, when the early church fathers were intent upon preaching the Word of God, they consciously rejected traditional rhetorical forms and turned instead to a relatively simple and unsophisticated homiletic form of sermon. This rejection was not due to any ignorance on the part of the Patristic fathers, for all these men—Jerome, Cyprian, Ambrose, Tertullian—had studied classical rhetoric.

One basic cause for the rejection of rhetoric by the early Christians was rhetoric's tie with pagan Greco-Roman culture. Lactantius, an early church father, spoke of pagan literature as "sweets which contain poison." Cyprian, who had been a teacher of rhetoric at Carthage, after his conversion renounced profane letters completely, and, for the rest of his life, never again quoted a pagan poet, rhetorician, or orator. Tertullian, a theologian in Carthage from A.D. 150-230, directed an attack against Greek philosophy and other pagan writings. In the treatise On Prescription Against Heretics he outlines the problem as he and Christian contemporaries saw it: "What have the Athenians to do with Jerusalem? What have the Academy with the church? What heretics with Christians?" Historian Pierre de Labriolle observes the antagonism that existed among the Christians toward pagan culture in the following passage:

There emerges, therefore, the fact that we can state that during the first centuries of the Empire there is hardly a Christian writer in whose case there does not intrude or show itself more or less sincerely, more or less diplomatically, a hostility in some regard to the different forms of pagan learning. Nor was this antipathy short-lived, for in A.D. 342, the Emperor Theodosius formally abolished paganism by decree seventeen years after the first ecumenical council at Nice had outlined twenty canons for the government of the Church. And even while Saint Augustine was engaged in writing the first books of his De Doctrina Christiana, the fourth Council of Carthage in A.D. 396 forbade bishops to read libros gentiliae unless absolutely necessary.

In surveying history and the nature of some aspects of pagan culture, we find that antagonistic attitudes toward that culture were not entirely unfounded. What the Academy had been guilty of many persecutions from the Christian point of view. James J. Murphy points out several reasons behind such attitudes. Rome had been guilty of many persecutions which left terrible memories in the minds of Christians. But more specific objections were based on Roman literature that was filled with mortal-like gods and goddesses who were forever parading what many Christian writers saw as a virtual gallery of sins, such as the fable in which Mars and Venus were caught in adultery. Another reason for the rejection of pagan culture was that heresies often used logical argument to attack doctrines of the Church, and there was a corresponding tendency to fall back upon fidelism...and decry reason itself. And still another aspect of pagan Greco-Roman culture that alienated the Christians was the rhetorical excesses of the Second Sophistic. The rhetorical theories and oratory that characterized this period emphasized form at the expense of content and relied heavily on universal topos, proposed by such men as Apthonius and Hermogones. The Christians adjudged this form of rhetoric, prevalent during the Hellenistic revival of Greco-Roman institutions, as unworthy of study or imitation.


3 Pierre de Labriolle, The History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boethius (New York, 1924), p. 18.

The basic issue was whether the Church should adopt the contemporary culture which Rome had taken over from Greece. The fate of rhetoric, as a part of the Greco-Roman culture, was involved not only in the debate over the larger issue, but in more limited controversies over its own parts. Indeed, the contrast between Verbum (Word of God) and verbum (word of man) was stressed from the very beginnings of the Church, long before the broader cultural issue was joined.

The contrast between the Word of God and the word of man played a large role in the Christians' evaluation of rhetoric. The essence of Christianity lay in the Scriptures, and the basic doctrines of the Church were not based upon discovering human virtue by utilizing principles of humanity; but rather, these tenets rested upon the divine revelation of the Will of God. Since the Word of God was most important, many felt that rhetorical forms were unnecessary when preaching the words of the Divine Spokesman. This belief was revealed in the Apostle Paul's first letter to the Corinthians:

When I came to you, brethren, I did not come proclaiming to you the testimony of God in lofty words of wisdom. For I desired to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness and in much fear and trembling; and my speech and my message were not plausible words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and Power, that your faith might not rest in wisdom of men but in the power of God.

Other Christians of the period also tried to show that the possessors of the Word of God did not need man-made principles of rhetoric to spread the message of the divine revelation to the world. For example, Basil of Caesarea said, "The School of God does not recognize the law of encomium." And Cyprian, in the middle of the third century, revealed his evaluation of rhetoric as the mere eloquence of men:

In courts of justice, in the public meetings, in political discussions, a full eloquence may be the pride of vocal ambition, but in speaking of the Lord God, a pure simplicity of expression which is convincing, depends upon the substance of the argument rather than upon the forcefulness of eloquence.

Professor Murphy succinctly summarizes the considerations made by Christians in evaluating pagan institutions when he states:

The view of Cyprian and the other Patristic Fathers echoed the Platonic notion that a man possessed of the truth would ipso facto be able to speak effectively; it held that rhetorical forms were irrelevant in preaching the Word of God. However, examination of the homilies preached by the early fathers of the church reveal heavy reliance upon mere ethos—a reliance not taught in the schools of classical rhetoric attended by these men. In their minds, this reliance upon ethical proof constituted a pure and simple expression of the truth independent of rhetorical forms.

To understand better the nature of the Christians' antipathy toward pagan culture and rhetoric, and to appreciate better their concept of the efficacy of the Word of God over the word of man, it is important to understand the Christian view of the good, of God, and of man, and its relation to Hellenistic and pagan Greco-Roman views on the same subjects.

To the Athenians, God manifested himself as "The Idea of the Good." In building an ethical system, Aristotle started with the conceptions of the good prevalent among men. In his Rhetoric (and in the Nichomachean Ethics) he equates happiness with the highest good, since it is the basis for all human action, and proceeds to list those constituents of happiness which were held in highest esteem by men in his day: good birth, many children, wealth, fame, etc. Also, as a good, happiness falls into the category of things which are chosen in and of themselves; that is, those things which are desired for their own sakes.

The Greeks believed that man should live a rich life and develop fully his human gifts and faculties, especially the faculty of reason, which Aristotle considered to be the noblest part of man. In all things the Greeks were governed by a natural morality and natural religion which was an expression of their view of man.

Christianity, on the other hand, filled men with the sense that behind the shows of life there existed an ultimate reality which held the key to their destiny and the clue to right conduct. To the Christians, Jehovah was absolute goodness, and working through men as his instruments, He brought to pass on earth all events in accordance with His righteous will. The Christian faith love was the virtue regarded highest in life; it was love to which Saint Paul subordinated even reason itself:

Though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge...and have not charity, I am nothing...Charity never faileth; but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there shall be knowledge, it shall vanish away.

In the passage, "The Lord God hath spoken, who can but prophesy?" we find the beliefs of the
Christians epitomized. We also find this belief giving "definiteness, conviction and urgency to their message which no abstract argument could have given, and that made them propagandists as well as preachers. The zeal of thine house has eaten me up." (Ps. lixiv, 9). Yet, with this message to spread to the people, traditional rhetorical forms were rejected by the Christian faith until the middle of the fourth century.

In spite of the widespread and violent opposition to pagan culture and its institutions, rhetoric began a slow revival after A.D. 426. This was the year in which Saint Augustine wrote his fourth book of the De Doctrina Christiana. This work, written by the former Professor of Rhetoric of Milan, was to introduce rhetoric into the Christian world and affect profoundly the reinstitution of classical theory into the course of human events.

This same century was considered by Christians to be an age of selection, "a time to examine the splendid speculum to extract from a thousand-year-old heritage whatever would aid in the work of the Lord." And it was during this period that former teachers of rhetoric—Jerome, Basil, and others, as well as Augustine—believed they must decide whether their former profession deserved a place in the new order.

Augustine decided that the art of rhetoric should be put into active service, and he added Book Four to his De Doctrina which he "intended as a ratio eloquentiae Christianae." In this work, Saint Augustine's justification for the inclusion of rhetoric in Christian culture is extremely pragmatic:

Now, the art of rhetoric being available for the enforcing either of truth or falsehood, who will dare to say that truth in the person of its defenders is to take its stand unarmed against falsehood? For example, that those who are trying to persuade men of what is false are to know how to introduce their subject, so as to put the hearer into a friendly or attentive, or teachable frame of mind while the defenders of the truth shall be ignorant of that art?

However, the De Doctrina is much more than merely a justification for rhetoric. In addition, it puts forth some applicable principles of rhetoric. In fact, Augustine's work has been called "the first manual of Christian rhetoric."17

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In Saint Augustine's work we find many evidences of classical rhetorical theory. Although most critics find the Ciceroan influence the strongest in Augustine's theory, there are definite Aristotelian elements and Athenian points of view as well. For example, we can see that Augustine's prescription that once the audience is favorably disposed to the speaker and the subject, "the remaining objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case requires," (Chapter Four, Section 6) is merely an operational statement of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, which he states is "the faculty of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion."16

Augustine also concurs with Aristotle in at least two of the uses of rhetoric that it may be used to support the truth, and that it is suited to the popular audience, especially for the function of teaching. In respect to the second use, Saint Augustine recommends omitting from sermons Scriptural passages that are too obscure for the average audience.

Throughout Book IV of his De Doctrina, Augustine emphasizes the importance of wisdom over eloquence in oratory. His emphasis is always upon informing the audience of the meaning of Scripture. However, in emphasizing the conveyance of knowledge and wisdom, he does not disregard the use of emotional appeal:

I am speaking of the mode in which men who desire to learn ought to be taught. And the best mode is that which secures that he who hears shall hear the truth, and that what he hears he shall understand and when this point has been reached, no further labor need be spent on the truth itself, as if it required further explanation, but perhaps some trouble may be taken to enforce it so as to bring it home to the heart. (Chapter Ten, Section 25).

A Ciceroan concept of style is also a great concern of this fifth-century writer. The entire last one-fourth of his Book IV is spent in explaining the sub-delicatus, temperate, and majestic styles and their applications. Augustine's point of view in justifying his concern with style is stated metaphorically: "the very food without which it is impossible to live must be flavored to meet the tastes of the majority." (Chapter Eleven, Section 26).

So we see that Saint Augustine preoccupies himself with making the Word of God intelligible and palatable to men. He encourages those who would preach to study the great orators and the Scriptures, to learn eloquence, and to imitate their techniques in their own speeches. He urges the Christian rhetorician to gain eloquence as we...as wisdom so that he may achieve the ends of oratory prescribed by Cicero: "To teach, to delight, and to persuade."18

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13 James J. Murphy, p. 407.
14 Ibid.
17 James J. Murphy, p. 408.
19 Cicero, Orator, 21, "Est aquatur eloquentus qui dicit ut prolat et dilicat et flatus," quoted inaccurately by Saint Augustine in De Doctrina (Chapter Twelve, Section 27).
Throughout the De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine points out the responsibility of a preacher to be wise and eloquent in order to purvey the message of God to the people. The adequacy of this purveyal clearly rests on his own resources—Augustine is peculiarly Hellenistic in approaching the capabilities of man. Yet, at one point, Augustine reverts suddenly back to the Christian view of God's all-pervasive role in human existence. He shows how eloquent preaching is actually achieved, and for a moment rhetoric leaves the realm of the cosmos and takes on mystic qualities:

And so our Christian orator, while he says what is just and holy, and good (and he ought never say anything else), does all he can to be heard with intelligence, with pleasure, and object, and so far as he succeeds, he will succeed more by piety in prayer than by gifts of oratory; and so ought to pray for himself, and for those he is to address, before he attempts to speak.

For, as in regard to every matter of faith and love there are many things that may be said, and many ways of saying them. Who knows what is expedient at a given moment for us to say, or to be heard saying, except God who knows the hearts of all? (Chapter Fifteen, Section 32).

It is here that the largest breach between classical rhetoric and Christian rhetoric occurs, reflecting, of course, the major theoretical differences in the Greco-Roman and the Christian ways of looking at the good, at God, and at the nature of man.

The De Doctrina Christiana played an important part in the construction of a preaching theory. James J. Murphy finds evidence that it "provided the basic statement of Christian homiletic until the emergence of the highly formalized 'thematic' or 'University Style' sermon about the beginning of the thirteenth century."20 However, because Augustine's rhetorical system deals strictly with Scriptural matter, and is preoccupied with the pervasive role of God in oratory, the De Doctrina can only be interpreted as a strictly Christian theory of rhetoric. Yet, we are indebted to Saint Augustine for giving rhetoric life in Christian culture, and for his utilization of (and giving sanction to) classical rhetorical theory. While the conflict between pagan and Christian philosophy and ways of life raged, Saint Augustine played the most influential part in reconciling rhetoric with the Christian culture in the early Middle Ages.

20 James J. Murphy, p. 407.
NIXON AS POOR RICHARD
by Edward A. Schwarz, Graduate in Speech, California State College at Los Angeles

Normally, critics focus their attention on speeches which display universal qualities and timeless values or produce a significant response in an audience. Richard M. Nixon's "Fund Speech" of 1952--often called the "Checkers Speech"--does not exhibit such universality but does produce immediate effects which are worthy of the critic's attention. Criticism, however, reveals that the immediate results of Nixon's speech are less significant when compared with the long range harmful effects.

In the 1952 Presidential campaign General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, capitalized on the out-party position by condemning the Democrats for their mismanagement of government affairs. He based a significant part of his campaign on his promise to "clean up the mess in Washington." The public opinion polls showed that Eisenhower was leading Adlai E. Stevenson by a safe margin.

On Thursday, September 18, 1952, a string of events began to unfold which made this campaign unique. A story in the New York Post charged that Eisenhower's running mate, Richard Nixon, had a "Secret Fund" amounting to $16,000 or $17,000 contributed by bankers, industrialists, and real estate brokers in California. The implications were serious. The story of the fund could undermine Eisenhower's promise to clean up the "mess" in Washington. Nixon, in response, proclaimed his innocence and accused the opposition of a smear attempt. General Eisenhower did not quash the story. He first responded that he had "confidence in Senator Nixon," but later indicated that the expected "report on the expense account raised by Senator Nixon's constituents in California must be as clean as a hound's tooth--or else." It became obvious through these vague replies that Eisenhower "could not suppress an uneasy feeling that somehow his crusade had been tarnished.

The Democrats were quick to capitalize on the report of Nixon's secret fund and Eisenhower's seemingly weak reply. Stephen Mitchell, the Democratic National Committee chairman, called for Nixon's resignation from the Republican ticket. Many prominent people, including some solid Republican newspaper editors, agreed with Mitchell; the opinion spread that the Republicans should drop Nixon in the middle of the campaign. Most Republicans remained silent, but it was clear that Eisenhower and the Republican National Committee members were considering the unprecedented step of dropping Nixon from the ticket.

Realizing the situation had become critical, Nixon met with his advisers and agreed that the best answer to this threat would be a direct appeal to the voters on a nation-wide television and radio broadcast. Breaking off his campaign tour of the western and southern states, Nixon flew to Los Angeles to prepare for his address. He spent the next twenty-seven hours in seclusion.

Reacting in an unprecedented manner to this unique series of events, Nixon requested his audience to express their sentiments concerning his candidacy by sending telegrams and letters to the Republican National Committee. While he acknowledged the Committee's right to decide whether or not he would remain on the ticket, he obviously wanted emphatic support from both the voters and the Committee. Moreover, he wanted Eisenhower to declare him "clean as a hound's tooth" so that any doubts about his moral character would be eradicated.

He correctly determined that his problem centered around his ethos; his audience felt he lacked the character and good will which a politician of his ambition needs. Therefore, through a demonstration of his integrity and honesty, he set out to gain the overt support of the voters, the solid support of the Republican National Committee, and the unqualified support of Eisenhower. However, while he met his problem head-on and accomplished these immediate goals successfully, he ultimately created an image which led to a decline in his political career.

In the speech itself, Nixon realized that direct statements describing his moral character and good will would make him appear boastful. Therefore, what he implied about his character was more important than what he said about it. Throughout the speech he utilized invention, arrangement, style, and delivery in an attempt to establish ethos.

He devoted the first two-thirds of the speech to a defense of the fund as being not only legal but moral. The implication from the beginning was that Nixon was a man of such high ethical standards that he was not satisfied with discussing the legality issue alone. He established the necessity of the fund by asserting that a Senator makes only $15,000 a year plus expenses for limited purposes, but this did not
include necessary political (as opposed to official) speeches to keep the taxpayers informed. Nixon thus inferred that he was both generous, by operating on a limited salary, and honest, by keeping the best interests of the taxpayer in mind.

Having asserted that additional money is necessary, Nixon elaborated on the possible sources of these funds. One source was personal wealth, but he was not rich. A second source was a wife on the payroll. He stated that his opponent "does have his wife on his payroll and has had her on his payroll for the past 10 years."

But Nixon claimed he was not critical of Senator John Sparkman; he just didn't feel justified in putting his own wife on the payroll (although he worked many hours with him) because there were so many deserving secretaries in Washington who needed the work. The inference was that putting your wife on the payroll is somehow immoral--and a thing Nixon would never do. Because he was a lawyer, Nixon also claimed he could get needed funds by continuing to practice law, as others did. However, he refused because he morally could not represent a client who might have occasion to contest a case with the government. But he went on to accept the morality of a fund contributed by a select group with special interests. Nixon neglected the possibility that a fund could be just as immoral as a law practice when the contributors or clients request special favors. Yet he defended the fund as an ethical source because, as he said, the money was used only to expose Communists and a corrupt government.

In attempting to demonstrate his high moral character, Nixon used assertion primarily. Then he turned to "proof" that the fund was both legal and moral. A legal opinion, by a law firm in Los Angeles stating that Nixon was innocent of any illegal act in the use of the fund, was produced. But to "prove" that he was morally innocent, he gave a personal financial history of his income and expenses since his birth in 1913. Even after many years of public service, he had not accumulated a fortune and was, in fact, still deeply in debt. The implication was clear; if there had been any shady dealings, Nixon would have been better off financially than he was.

However, he was unwilling to let these facts stand for themselves when still another stone could be turned. Nixon humbly admitted that he did receive one gift, a "little cocker spaniel dog." And he kept it for his children because "the kids, like all kids, loved the dog," which they named Checkers. The insinuation here was complex. Nixon implied that opponents attacked him for such things as accepting this gift, really quite innocent and moral. His audience could conclude from this innuendo that Nixon was a warm person with emotions just like theirs, while his opponents were vicious in their attacks. Thus Nixon built his ethos by casting aspersions on his opponents as well as by establishing his own character.

The last one-third of the speech resembled a traditional campaign speech. He attacked Chairman Mitchell

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6 ibid., p. 68.
7 Ibid., p. 68.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Nixon had properly assessed his rhetorical problem and he developed his speech to meet it. Within two days he received 128,522 telegrams and 110,000 letters supporting him in the ratio of 200 to 1, and more came later. With such an overwhelming and unprecedented response, the Republican National Committee voted unanimously to retain Nixon. He was completely vindicated. Eisenhower announced there would be no change in the Republican ticket, and Nixon was back in the race.

Furthermore, his speech probably gained many votes, especially in California. Nixon challenged the positions of Stevenson and Sparkman. They eventually explained their funds, but never received the publicity or response which Nixon had achieved. Thus, the immediate positive effects may have gone even beyond Nixon's expectations. But what about the long-range effects? The campaign fund speech lived on after the election. Nixon himself reported ten years later in his book, Six Crises:

A distinguished political science professor, after making a thorough study of the 1960 election, stated his considered judgment that if it had not been for the fund broadcast I would have been elected President of the United States. It was a neat theory, brilliantly supported by facts and figures, but like most classroom theoreticians he had not faced up to the hard reality of the alternative. If it hadn't been for that broadcast, I would never have been around to run for the presidency.2

What Nixon did not consider in evaluating the theorist's judgment is the difference between the speech which he did give and the one he could have given. Nixon failed to make the speech which would have given him both immediate and long range success. As it was, the "Checkers" speech created an unfavorable image of Nixon. Combined with his performance in other elections, the fund speech so epitomized the image of a poor Richard that his ability to command trust and respect in later campaigns was affected.

The residue of the speech has stuck with Nixon to form an unchanging image. His personal style, for example, typified the "plain folks" approach. He directed his appeals to the common people through anecdotes about his children's dog and his wife's coat, and by employing phrases such as "My fellow Americans..." and "believe me, folks...." In the 1960 Presidential campaign he continued his simple, direct appeal to the plain people; as Theodore White observed in his The Making of the President: 1960:

Nixon seemed obsessed with appearing "just plain folks;" his press releases, like Kennedy's were standard political prose--but when he was talking freely to his admirers, it seemed that Nixon sought above all to reach the "regular fellow."3

While this approach can be effective, it may well lack the sophistication and maturity which even the common people prefer in their leaders. Barnet Baskerville attributes Nixon's poor image to the fundamental immaturity of this approach:

If this skill in making his own position attractive and plausible, and that of his opponent ridiculous or sinister accounts for Nixon's popularity in some circles, how may we explain the "I don't know why, but I just don't like him" reaction reported by the probers of public opinion? One important cause of this antipathy may well be the man's fundamental immaturity--a characteristic which is accentuated by the eminence of his official position.4

Nixon's speeches failed to show growth from an inexperienced politician who is entitled to make mistakes to a competent statesman capable of rising above the petty attack of his opponents. Stewart Alsop noted that his speeches often displayed debating techniques which he had learned in college. As a debater, Nixon apparently learned that "the object of college debating, after all, is simply to win the debate, without regard for the merit of the issue, using against the opposition whatever debating points come to mind."5

Through these techniques Nixon's eagerness to win seemed to overpower his integrity and humility. He was satisfied, as Baskerville says, with producing only the "illusion of proof" in the fund speech:

More than two-thirds of his dramatic speech (unquestionably the part which many listeners regarded as the most convincing proof) had nothing at all to do with the case.... It was this array of evidence--of facts, figures, and testimony regarding mortgages, salary, dogs, and coats--this melange of praise and blame, of attack and defense, which was accepted by millions as indisputable proof. And proof of what? Not proof that he was an unusually talented young man who had risen far and fast, but proof that he was innocent, that he stood vindicated of the specific charges made against him.6

Thereafter, many of the plain folk began to agree with those who disliked Nixon and who, according to Alsop, explain their dislike by pointing to "that tearjerking soap opera about the fund." And some of those who cannot explain their dislike for Nixon except in terms of his jowls probably have the fund speech tucked away somewhere in their subconscious.7

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Even Variety, a New York trade paper of the performing arts, "reviewed the broadcast as a super-slap-opera, with the headline 'Just Plain Dick' ...."18

Nixon rose quickly to a position of political prominence, but he has gradually lost the confidence of the people since then. He has "a record of not winning an election for himself since 1950."19

Defeated by a narrow margin in 1960, Nixon lost decisively to Governor Edmund G. Brown in the 1962 California gubernatorial race. Robert D. Kully analyzed the gubernatorial campaign and found that the Nixon image was one of the reasons he lost:

Nixon seemed to be trapped by the familiar but vague charge "there is something about him that troubles me." Or as Herb Caen asked, "Why does Nixon always seem to be explaining something?"20

Kully did not connect these statements to the "Checkers speech; however, it is my contention that it produced damning effects. That speech contained the complete almanac of appeals which poor Richard used in almost any situation. Without the fund speech, which captured the attention of 60,000,000 people, the question might never have been asked: "Why does Nixon always seem to be explaining something?"

In spite of its immediate persuasive effects, the fund speech was a major influence in bringing about Nixon's eventual political ebb. As he attempted to build an image of "honest Dick," he created the image of "poor Richard"—poor Richard who had to struggle financially, who was always being attacked through a vicious smear, and who was always the innocent victim. And as he would explain his actions, using over and over the same ideas and appeals, he built up an almanac of stock retorts and counterattacks which created an image of poor Richard. Even yet the results of the speech are not final. In 1968, Nixon may be a contender for the Presidency, but he will be fighting against the image created in the 1952 speech. Potential candidates for 1968 are being examined, and Nixon has not left his past behind. Time magazine pictured him on a recent cover with the other Presidential hopefuls in a cartoon by Paul Conrad. Each of them appeared in the colorful silks of a jockey preparing to enter a political horse race. Nixon, of course, wore checkered silks which recall "the once famous dog Checkers"21 and the fund speech of 1952.

MEDIUM: A NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF RHETORICAL CRITICISM
by
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Forty-five years ago, James Joyce baffled his readers with his stream-of-consciousness technique of writing. "In Ulysses," he pointed out, "I have recorded simultaneously what a man says, sees, thinks, and what such seeing, thinking, saying does, to what you Freudians call the subconscious." He juxtaposed the "dramatic" forms as a conscious effort to express the simultaneous process of acting and reacting. Through the "lyrical" frame, he could present images in immediate relation to himself; through the "epical" frame, he could present images in immediate relation to himself and others; and through the "dramatic" frame, he could present images in relation to others. This change to a multiperspective structure not only extended the readers' sensibilities but also brought into their awareness the interaction of these sensibilities.

Sensibility, cognitive and physical, differs in different persons, cultures, and subcultures more radically than we are aware. Each age or culture tends to find understanding of itself through a particular set of senses which tend to favor the logical or the emotional, the functional or the aesthetic, the legal or the moral, the spiritual or the material, the simple or the complex. Modern technology has sharpened our sensibilities toward an "integral awareness" of process around us by providing channels which are more total extensions of our "human faculty—the psychic and physical." We are now aware that the Joycean lyrical-epical-dramatic frame and scope is a better model of our perception process than the single perspective contrived by linguistic grammar.

As a culture dependent on print for communication, we assumed the characteristics of the spatial structure of our medium—an abstract, linear, fragmented, sequential type of movement. We shaped our organizations and societal institutions in the same way. But, the electronic media have broken this monopoly. We are now in an age of radio, television, telephone, stereophonic sound, electronic and jet age speed. Media dissolve the arbitrary boundary lines of subject matter into the complexities and fluidity of experience. Our concern is contingencies rather than components. The media allow us to exteriorize and materialize our own cognitions more fully so that, in a sense, "the medium is the message."

The interplay of media demands the attention of all our senses. We see more clearly, hear better, and feel more intensely the images presented to us. The different media acting together allow us to have more total experience.

Medium is structure. Structure has meaning. "Messages are transmitted in codes." These codes or symbols "take virtually any form, so long as and to the extent that there exist shared meanings and that they are transmissible. Such shared meaning surrounding symbols can be either affective or cognitive." And we might add, both the affect and cognition occur simultaneously.

Message lies in these structures very much in a "Jabberwocky" sense. Just as one linguistic structure cuts up reality differently from another, other media translate experience into new forms. That "something is lost in the translation" becomes significant when we consider that there is "something" in the medium that contributes to meaning. The question of "How does a medium mean?" in a modern sense must be a dimension of rhetorical criticism in discovering and analyzing the available means of persuasion. The synoptic comprehension afforded by the media alters the process of influencing and decision making. Each medium records, distributes, and programs information differently which affect the sense ratio or patterns of our logical, pathetic and ethical perceptions.

In the "someone says something somehow to someone with some effect" communication complex, the "something somehow" is inseparable relative to the "effect" on the "someone."

O body swayed to music, o quickening glance,
How shall I tell the dancer from the dance?

In contemporary rhetorical criticism, the critic must be able to accept such inclusive definitions of communication as the following: Communication is "all of the procedures by which one mind may affect another. This, of course, involves not only written and oral..."

speech, but also music, the pictorial arts, the theatre, the ballet, and in fact all human behavior. The proofs of persuasion ride on the patterning of interaction of verbal and non-verbal media. The media give ideas greater power and tangibility. Persuasive communication can no longer be viewed purely by argumentation's appeals based on the value of man's rational orientation. Nor can it be discriminated as advertising techniques based on the value of man's non-rational orientation which assumes that people live merely by the benefits and satisfactions they obtain. How the media affect the steps of intentional interpersonal interaction must be scrutinized, for effective communication is a matter of structuring to produce intended effect.

In considering the interposition of media between the intention and effect, the critic may raise these questions.

What is the grammar of a particular medium? Mode encompasses the total event. Any analysis of mode is a matter of separating out the attributes and showing their system of interconnections. Thus, the critic must first look at the vocabulary or the symbols available to a medium. Then he must be able to determine syntax, or the rules for structuring the vocabulary. Finally, he may evaluate the style, the choice of vocabulary and syntax. At present, we need to know more about the syntax of radio and television, which are basic media of public affairs information. Now does syntax vary from an audio medium to an audio-visual medium? We need to delineate the organizing principles of media.

Every medium has its bias. The range of viewpoints differs from medium to medium. Kurt and Gladys Lang point out that technological broadcasting reflects the choices of television personnel as to what is important. The coverage of an event is structured by the commentator, the changing inclusions and exclusions of the camera's focus, the magnifying close-ups, the shifting perspectives and juxtapositions and the contrapuntal interplay of words, sound, and music. The organization of space and time are important variables.

How much information can be disseminated through a medium? In a sense, the medium determines audience. No two media will say the same thing about an event. To illustrate, we can look at the difference in the coverage of an event by a newspaper, a radio newscast, a television documentary, a magazine article and a speech. Contemporary mass media can convey information to various levels of a society as well as to different cultures simultaneously. The medium can expose its large audience generally to information as well as "carve out" its audience by identifying with the ideals and opinions of a particular segment of the population.

The mass media have brought about the "corporate communicator." The mediators of the amount and type of information conveyed are the editors, producers, directors, financiers, distributors, and retailers of the communications team. Often in American television, the more money invested means the less said, since the risk is greater.

On the other hand, the intensity of content has increased in modern media so that wretched experience and direct experience have become at times something indistinguishable. There have been drastic alterations of space and time so that we are familiar with many things which lie beyond our personal lives. We are able to transform abstractions like "poverty" into such tangibility that we feel compelled to cope with it via VISTA or the Peace Corps. We are now able to reinforce attitudes and rally approval or dissent "coast to coast" through the media.

Certain channels are better than others by virtue of their structure in terms of spatial or temporal organization, allowance for audience participation, speed and timeliness, and permanence. To determine effective strategies of communication, the optimal combination of media is also a factor.

What is the flow of communication in relation to a medium? The mass media's "immediate" audience is a composite of "remote" audiences. Various studies have shown that the mass media have no direct relationship to the decision making process of the audience. The mass media's major functions have been in disseminating information and reinforcing ideas of the audience. The American mass audience tends to be group-oriented when confronted by the mass media with decisions to be made. As a group-oriented audience, they make decisions with respect to their group affiliations and expectations, whether these be familial, social, religious and/or economic. The media must reach the person or persons able to decide on change and direct group interchange.

How are people capable of processing any message provided expectations of a medium are met? Every communication is conditioned by the fact that it is received in a particular state of feeling and expectation. Studies on the effect of American television programs in Latin American countries, for example, have shown that many programs interpreted as "entertaining" by Americans were "educational" and persuasive for the Latin Americans. The multi-dimensionality of the medium may yield choices of information both within and beyond the communicator's intent. The choice of information is made consciously and unconsciously according to the receiver's interests and

11. Melvin M. Mann, Cognitive Processes (Belmont, California, 1966), pp. 77-78.
needs. To what extent the media focus and reveal "reality" (i.e., what is out there) varies with the perceiver. The medium often serves also as our "standard of credulity, the standard of reality."[13]

In answering the question, "How does a medium mean?," the rhetorical critic may use these approaches: What is the grammar of a particular medium? How much information can be disseminated through a medium? What is the flow of communication in relation to a medium? How are people capable of processing any message provided expectations of a medium are met?

When a President addresses a nation or the world; when political candidates debate; when a documentary "sells" a war; when a Huntley-Brinkley news team covers the event "live" via radio, television, Telstar or Lenn Bird; and interaction results via telephone, telegraph, seminar or conference, how does the medium shape both the communicator's intent and the perceiver's experience and opinion? The persuasive speaker no longer is limited to the face-to-face speech as his major medium. His thoughts are translated by a variety and interplay of media. The critic must know more about the translators of experience. Translations have no one-to-one relationship but are only approximations. The accuracy and cogency of these approximations depend on the translators. The basic decisions behind communication strategy may be out of the hands of the communicator. This is audience analysis via media analysis.

The available means of persuasion in any society vary with the times. We now have many kinds of media with varying capabilities which our predecessors did not have. The contemporary communicator is forced to select which one or combination of media can best convey his purposes and reach his audience. Moreover, the rhetorical critic in our society cannot take medium for granted in assessing communication but must consider the medium as an available means of persuasion.