At the third annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, 22 upper division and graduate students from 16 colleges and universities of the western states presented papers on rhetorical theory, history, and criticism. Panels of faculty members from the same colleges and universities, acting as editor-critics, rated four of these papers as superior and they are included in this volume. The titles and authors are: "Some Questions Regarding the Facts and Circumstances of Logan's Speech" by James Johnson, "I. A. Richards: Rhetorical Prospector: The Miner, His Mines, and His Metaphor" by Richard S. Lucas, "Rhetorical Analysis of Drama: A Critical and Creative Process" by Louis B. Queary, and "The Relationship of Substance and Form in Richard Whately's Logical Proofs" by Charlene G. Wasserman. (TO)
CONFERENCE IN RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Commended Papers

Harold Barrett, James Johnson, Bruce Loebs. — Editors

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California State College, Hayward — 1968
—Foreword—

On May 11, 1968, the Speech and Drama Department and Creative Arts Division Council of California State College at Hayward held the Third Annual Conference in Rhetorical Criticism. In attendance were professors and twenty-two upper-division and graduate students from sixteen colleges and universities of the western states. The students read papers on rhetorical theory, history, and criticism, in six sections to panels of professors—the editor-critics.

Departing from our usual plan of ranking to select papers for commendation, we used a rating system: good, excellent, or superior. The four papers in this volume are those rated superior by the editor-critics.

This year's Conference was favored by the participation of Harry Caplan, Goldwin Smith Professor of the Classical Languages and Literature at Cornell University from 1941-1967. His banquet address, "The Classical Tradition: Rhetoric and Oratory," was followed by a standing ovation. Professor Caplan is unable to release his address for printed distribution at this time, believing it not ready for such publication. We respect his wishes—and at the same time look forward to his one day finding means of making his rich and illuminating survey of classical theory and practice available to all students of rhetoric and the classics.

Standing in his immense shadow we would presume to dedicate this volume to Professor Caplan, interpreter of classical tradition to generations of students—to the scholar who, in the words of Everett Lee Hunt, found his "academic niche in the study and the teaching of Greek and Latin, but instead of deserting rhetoric...continued to make notable contributions in that field, and to enlist the interest of classical scholars who might otherwise never have concerned themselves with the implications of Greek and Roman rhetoric for modern life."

The Editors
Student Participants and Faculty Participants

Dorothy M. Bennett, University of Oregon, "Rhetoric Today."

Steve Chambers, University of California at Davis, "The Rhetorical Tradition and American Periodicals, 1800-1850."

Ron Clausen, University of California at Davis, "War and Peace: Crisis in Western Rhetoric."

Jerry L. Daniel, University of Wyoming, "Rhetoric in C.S. Lewis' Modern Theology and Biblical Criticism."

Dan Freedland, San Jose State College, "The Success of the Isocratean Method of Rhetorical Instruction."

Teruo Fujii, University of Utah, "A Study in Message Modification: Rhetorical Influence by Restrictions."


Robert Ivie, Washington State University, "William McKinley on the Philippines."

James Johnson, Cal State, Hayward, "Some Questions Regarding the Facts and Circumstances of Logan's Speech."

Robert Johnson, Sacramento State College, "A Rhetorical Criticism of 'The Russians are Coming'."

Shirley G. Jones, University of Utah, "Success Despite Defeat: Edmund Burke's Character."

Barbara Keener, University of Wyoming, "Adam Smith's Rhetorical Theory in Wealth of Nations."


Richard Lucas, Sacramento State College, "I.A. Richards; Rhetorical Prospector: The Miner, His Minos and His Metaphor."

Margaret Morrison, Cal State, Hayward, "William Jennings Bryan and the 'Naturally Good' Man."

Rebecca Nobles, University of Oregon, "Wendell Phillips and Martin Luther King: The Rhetoric of Agitation."

Judy Ovadenko, U.C.L.A., "The Rhetorical Philosophy of the Fuehrer."

Lynn Padilla, Cal State, Los Angeles, "Woodrow Wilson's Use of Light-Dark Metaphor."

Joan Quell, Whitworth College, "Audience Analysis as a Basic for Argumentation."

Louis B. Quayle, University of California at Berkeley, "Rhetoric Analysis of Drama: A Critical and Creative Process."

Perry L. Walker, Humboldt State College, "Charles Sumner's 'The Crime Against Kansas'."

Charlene Wasserman, Cal State at Los Angeles, "The Relationships of Substance and Form in Richard Whately's Logical Proofs."

Editor-Critics

John Baird, California State College, Hayward

John Cambus, California State College, Hayward

Harry Caplen, University of Washington

Robert Carnwath, California State College, L.A.

Phil Dolph, San Jose State College

Albert Lewis, Central Washington State College

Ernest E. Ettlich, Washington State University

Thomas A. Hannen, University of California, Berkeley

L. Ralph Hennings, University of Wyoming

Roger Hite, University of Oregon

Dale G. Leathers, University of California, L.A.

Mark W. Lee, Whitworth College

Bruce Loeb, California State College, Hayward

Robert C. Martin, California State College, Hayward

Mary G. McEdwards, San Fernando Valley State College

C.P. Mohrmann, University of California, Davis

D.F. Moore, Sacramento State College

Director of the Conference

Harold Barrett, California State College, Hayward
Schedule of Events

9:30  Briefing

10:00 Critics' Silent Review of Papers in Sections

Coffee Time for Student Participants

LUNCH

1:00  Section Meetings

Presentation of Papers

Comments of Editor-Critics

Decision for Commendation and Publication

4:00  Reading to Entire Conference of Commended Papers

7:30  Dinner:  Dining Room, Cal State Cafeteria

Master of Ceremonies:  Dr. John Cambus,
Acting Chairman, Department of
Speech and Drama, California
State College, Hayward.

Introducing the Speaker:  Dr. Harold Barrett,
Associate Professor, Department of
Speech and Drama, California State
College, Hayward

Speaker:  Dr. Harry Caplan, Goldwin Smith
Professor of the Classical Languages and Literature, Cornell University, 1941-1947

"The Classical Tradition:
Rhetoric and Oratory"
### Papers of the Conference

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Commended Papers of the Conference
SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF LOGAN'S SPEECH

by

James Johnson, Senior in Speech, California State College, Hayward

In October of 1774, near the Banks of the Scioto River in Ohio, the Mingo Indian Chief Tahohajute, whom the whites called Logan, walked with General John Gibson, Gibson had been sent by Lord Dunmore to arrange a peace conference following the unsuccessful Indian attempt to resist white settlement in the Ohio Valley. The two approached a wooded spot close by the Irdian residence, where Logan spoke words in his own language that were to project far beyond that place and time.

Tahohajute early in life began to be called Logan, probably in honor of the Secretary of Pennsylvania, James Logan. Though his father was also a Mingo chief, he was believed to be of full French ancestry and was said to have been captured as a child and brought up as an Indian. This would have made Logan a half breed, but he was thoroughly nurtured as an Indian. The life of Logan was no different from others of his time and race—until 1774, when a mob of white men murdered a group of Mingo, including members of Logan's family. The massacre of his life and children turned Logan's friendship for the colonists to hatred, and he set upon a path of vengeance, allying himself with the British to whom he turned over more than 30 scalps. In order to put down the Indian uprising, the Department of the Interior sent a formal military force under Colonel Cresap which led to a struggle often referred to as "Cresap's War." The war ended in 1774 with the final defeat of the Indians at Point Pleasant.

Interestingly, the words which Logan spoke in reply to Lord Dunmore's request to attend the peace conference have been compared to the world's greatest orations. In years after the speech, Thomas Jefferson stated, "I am challenge the whole orations of Demosthenes and Cicero; pronounce a single passage superior to the speech of Logan, a Mingo Chief, to Lord Dunmore." I

The purpose of this study is to raise questions regarding the facts and circumstances of Logan's speech to Lord Dunmore. My investigation is not designed to answer all relevant questions, but rather, to study and present their historical significance to the field of rhetoric. This investigation must be termed a preliminary study, for it will require further, extensive research to solve the many mysteries that surround this speech.

Following, General Gibson's attempt to persuade the Mingo leader to attend the peace conference, Logan, according to historian J. Washburn, said: "I had even thought to live with you, but for the injuries of one man. Colonel Cresap, the last spring, in cold blood, and unprovoked, murdered all the relations of Logan, not even sparing my women and children. There runs not a drop of my blood in the veins of any living creature. This called on me for revenge: I have sought it: I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance: for my country I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear Logan never felt fear. He will not turn on his heel to save his life. Who is there to mourn for Logan?--Not one." Washburn, in his study of Logan, has stated, "Logan's history is, in microcosm, the history of the Indian-white relationship." The outline of the speech recapitulates a conventional pattern:

1. Initial befriending of the whites by Indians—"Such was my love for the whites, that my countrymen pointed as they passed, and said, "Logan is the friend of the white man.'"

2. Personal outrage against the Indians by frontier outlaws—"Colonel Cresap, the last spring, in cold blood, and unprovoked, murdered all the relations of Logan, not even sparing my women and children."

3. Seeking of violent revenge by the Indians—"This called on me for revenge: I have sought it: I have killed many: I have fully glutted my vengeance."

4. Final retaliatory military expedition to "put down" the "Indian uprising"—"For my country I rejoice at the beams of peace. But do not harbor a thought that mine is the joy of fear Logan never felt fear."


Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States (New York, 1940), p. 119.

Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1943), p. 913.

Wissler, p. 170.


6 Ibid., p. 62.

7 Ibid., p. 63.
5. The defeat of the Indians, followed by their loss of land and spirit--Who is there to mourn for him?--

The earliest known copy of Logan's speech--first in manuscript and first published--was that of James Madison. In January 20, 1775, Madison wrote to William Brant, his most intimate friend, the following letter: I have not seen the following in print. It seems to me too good a specimen of Indian eloquence and eloquent feeling, that I think you will be pleased with it. Acknowledging the copy of Madison, Bradford wrote in reply:

I thought it a pity that so fine a specimen of Indian eloquence and nobility should be lost without being printed. Just call it "attributes of Indian eloquence" and therefore give a copy of it to my brother who inserted it in his papers; from which it has been transcribed into the others and has given the highest satisfaction to all that saw and felt the noble declamation of facts; and an apology for publishing what I believe not to be made public.

Madison's work, and Logan's speech were published in the Pennsylvania Journal, the Philadelphia daily newspaper, on February 1, 1775, under the heading, "Extract of a Letter from Virginia." It was reprinted in the New York Gazette on February 14, 1775. Meanwhile, on February 4, 1775, the Virginia Gazette published an article-and perhaps a corrected version which has been called the first in print. In 1775, with the publication of historical material in the American archives, Logan's speech was included as it appeared in the Virginia Gazette of February 4.

The language of Logan's translated speech, with its expressions of biblical power and direction, made a strong impression on the people whose principal literary inheritance was the Bible. The impact of the speech was immediate. Jefferson's retelling of the story was further impetus. His account was widely reprinted in school readers throughout the last half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. When Logan's speech appeared in the early editions of Dr. James Madison, "The Virginia Revolutionist," (New York, 1841), p. 282.

Jefferson published the speech in his Notes on Virginia to refute the assertions of the French philosopher Buffon, who argued, "There is something in the soil, climate and other circumstances of America, which occasion animal nature to degenerate, not excepting even the man, native or adoptive, physical or moral." Jefferson used Logan's speech as evidence of the high talents of the aborigines of the country.

The language of Logan's translated speech, with its expressions of biblical power and direction, made a strong impression on the people whose principal literary inheritance was the Bible. The impact of the speech was immediate. Jefferson's retelling of the story was further impetus. His account was widely reprinted in school readers throughout the last half of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century. When Logan's speech appeared in the early editions of Dr. James Madison, "The Virginia Revolutionist," (New York, 1841), p. 282.

Boorstin, p. 60.
12 Ibid., p. 60.
13 Ibid., p. 62.
1. Logan's speech was to be "fully engraved in quilt letters on said monument." 25 Other monuments were erected at Logan's presumed birthplace in Auburn, New York, and under the elm near Circleville, Ohio, where local tradition assumed his speech to have been made.

The character of Logan and his people is romantically described by Washington Irving in his Sketch Book. Irving, like Jefferson, rejected the theory of the Indian as being an inferior human and wrote:

There is something in the character and habits of the North American savage, taken in connection with the scenery over which he is accustomed to range, its vast lakes, boundless forests, majestic rivers, its trackless plains, that is, to my mind wonderfully striking and sublime.

This much can be said with certainty, authentic or
I. A. RICHARDS; RHETORICAL PROSPECTOR: 
THE MINER, HIS MINES, AND HIS METAPHOR

by Richard S. Lucas, Graduate in Speech, Sacramento State College

A literature of its own has been growing up in various fields of knowledge paralleling the development of science, mathematics, psychology, and many other fields. This literature has been concerned with the nature of meaning, the structure of language, and the character of thought. It has been developing in the last two decades under the general rubric of "semantics," which has been described in various ways in the literature of criticism and communication. Richards has been one of the most important and influential thinkers in this area, and his influence is widely recognized.

Richard S. Talvacus, Graduate in Speech, Sacramento State College

The impressive body of writing produced by Richards does not wholly account for the impact his life has had. His teaching activities and continual concern for education have also left their mark.

A brief, explanatory paragraph of Richard's "Theory of Metaphor" should prove interesting, for Mostel, who has spent many years in teaching and critically appraising his writings, finds them "trick with ideas." For Richards, a metaphor is a constitutive part of language and the view of metaphor is widely inclusive, the only prerequisite being the conjunction of two ideas, for

in the stylistic formulation, when we use a metaphor we are using thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction.

A note for detection: a metaphor introduces two of Richards's two terms and in his exposition:

"... a metaphor is being used literally or metaphorically is not... an easy matter to settle, and inevitably will be decided whether the word given as two ideas or one... whether it presents both a tenor and a vehicle which cooperate in an inclusive meaning."

The term is the underlying idea to which the vehicle and the tenor characterize. For example, in the statement, "He was a lion in battle," the term, the

... Richards's first book of poetry was Canopy and the other (1929). He also has published The Scene and Sound, 1932, and a novel, The Cecilia, 1939, as well as two plays. Richards is known primarily for his work in the area of language, the

1. Talvacus, Language, p. 159.
2. Richards, Philosophy, p. 91.

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12
underlying idea, is "man in battle," while the vehicle,
"lion," lends certain lion-like characteristics to the
idea of man in battle and the inclusive meaning is the
result of the interaction between the two ideas.10

Metaphor is so vital because of what the mind does
when confronted with ideas which belong to different
'orders of experience' since:

The mind is a connecting organ, it works
only by connecting, and it can connect
any two things in an indefinitely large
number of different ways. Which of these
it chooses is settled by reference to
some larger whole or aim. . . . In all
interpretation we are filling in connections.11

The importance of metaphor, then, is due, in part, to the
fact that its presence does not disrupt the usual mode of
thought.

Richards holds that the 'problem of communication' is
one of obtaining 'clear transmission' through a complex
vehicle:

How to obtain clear transmission is pre-
cisely the problem of communication. We
have seen that it is a matter of avail-
ability of common experiences, the elic-
tation of these by a suitable vehicle, and
the control and extrusion of irrelevant
elements . . . through the complexity of
the vehicle.12

Metaphor contributes to this complexity by the multiplica-
tion of contexts relevant to the underlying ideas.
Richards points out that:

In difficult cases the vehicle of communi-
cation must inevitably be complex. The
effect of a word varies with the other
words among which it is placed. What
would be highly ambiguous by itself be-
comes definite in a suitable context . . .
To this is due the superiority of verse to
prose, . . . poetry being by far the more
complex vehicle.13

Any attempt to examine Richards' practice in the light
of his theory should start with his view of communication
in which 'language transaction . . . may be defined as a
use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur
in a hearer which are similar in all relevant respects to
those which are symbolized by them in the speaker.'14

Because no speaker and hearer can ever have identical
"contexts," the symbolization must be complex enough to
facilitate the desired interpretation by 'making available
common experiences,' by the "extrusion of irrelevancies," and
by the introduction of varied elements.15 It is in
these capacities that metaphor is expected to serve.

Metaphor is a semi-surreptitious method by which
a greater variety of elements can be

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10 Richards, Philosophy, p. 96.
11 Ibid., p. 124-5.
12 Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 188.
14 Ogden and Richards, Meaning of Meaning, p. 205-6.

---
Hero the questioning (or quest) was made a moral issue in which the individual is submerged. Also, his bringing modern man's reputation for sophisticated indifference out in plain view made it a less desirable refuge.

Another metaphor added urgency to the thesis by linking the message of the Old Testament to the contemporary hearer as a player in the "perpetual human tragedy":

The Old Testament...is an unparalleled exhibition of titanic questionings followed by wooden-minded formalism and miscomprehension. It ensues before us, on the grandest scale, the perpetual human tragedy - the transformation of originative inspiration into the most note and devout observance of the make-the-grade examination.

Thus metaphor served to define the idealistic aspects of the thesis and then turned to the practical. The "business world" metaphor quoted previously was well suited to this purpose. The "vehicle" consisted of the practical, workaday, competitive values of economic enterprise and contrasted with the underlying idealistic "quest" for a general education. This result was a limiting of the proper interpretation to the idea that if the quest were to be productive one would have to ask meaningful questions about valid samples.

Another facet of the use of metaphor which may be profitably examined concerns the "dependence of the effects upon one another." One thread of interdependence was in Richards' use of the Old Testament. It was one source of Eastern Man's tradition in the "watershed" metaphor, an exhibit of "perpetual human tragedy" in the next, and an example of what general education is and is not in a third metaphor. Because the Old Testament holds a place of general esteem, the several uses of it were probably effective in controlling references about traditional, humanistic, and practical individual involvement.

In another sense, all of the metaphor used pointed toward the need for personal involvement in this questioning about general education. The issue of morality, the importance of tradition, the compromise of the 'make-the-grade' student, the 'pursuit' of the goal, the necessity of the 'business' approach - the resultant of all these metaphor-vehicle interactions emphasized the need for individual involvement.

It seems, then, that Richards' use of metaphor in this short talk made more complex, i.e., expanded, the thesis, by the introduction of common experiences, by the extrusion of irrelevancies, and by the control of interdependencies. The simple "questioning" became the complex message which made relevant "references" about moral obligations, tradition flowing from the ancients, the indifference of moderns, "the perpetual human tragedy," the "pursuit" of a moral, and pragmatic procedures subordinate to desirable ends.

I have not intended to convey the idea that Richards' practical use of metaphor was a conscious effort to fulfill the tenets of his thesis. The myriad factors which impinge on the communication process legislate against the successful combination of theory and practice in any narrow,

"What connections, if any, hold between poetry, and I believe it holds true (perhaps to a lesser degree) in persuasive prose. In his preface to The Scarecrow, he writes: "What connections, if any, hold between a critic's theories about poetry and his practice when he professes as a poet? My own view has been that no such connections should be discernible. The duties of good critical theory...are analogous to those of a good police in a society as nearly anarchic as possible. Good theory is not there to tell the poet what he shall do, but to protect him from gangster-theories...Critical theory does this best by observing the actualities of inspiration and composition..." I suggest, are complex enough to make inferences as to how a poet should write ridiculous," p. 7.

23 Richards, Philosophy, p. 90.

24 ibid., p. 94-5.
Rhetorical Analysis of Drama: A Critical and Creative Process

by
Louis B. Queary, Senior in Speech.
University of California, Berkeley

Most of the public and a great part of the literary world think of rhetoric pejoratively. A passage in a text is dismissed as "just rhetoric," or a poet's work is down-graded as "basically rhetorical." Rhetoric in literature is thought of as a collection of devices which are incidental to, and probably detract from, the work. In fact, rhetoric is a systematic tool which can be universally applied to both creation and criticism.

Rhetorical theory, assumes that creator both understands where his work is going and is in control of the process. From this assumption, it must be granted that interpretation lies within the text itself. Once this is established, it is obvious that it is unfair to look at the work with a preconceived idea of its meaning. That is the prerogative of the creator: the critic's responsibility is to discern the author's intention from the work as it develops, or, conversely, to be the ideal audience. The ideal audience brings to the text only the tools of reading.

That is, he accepts the work as an entity and looks for the author's intention as the author develops it in time, not with the aid of hindsight or already established viewpoint.

One kind of literary criticism starts with a view of the overall work and works down to the level of the individual words only after the interpretation has been set. Where this approach leads is best evidenced by the continued misreadings, not of obscure works, but of King Lear. As You Like It and Coriolanus, of Keats, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, of Melville, Conrad, and Hawthorne. Obviously, it would be foolish to say that ten generations of literary critics are wrong about the most studied literature in the world. That is patently untrue; but what is true is that their incorrect interpretation lies within the text itself. Once this is established, it must be granted that rhetoric is a systematic tool which can be universally applied to both creation and criticism.

Language in context is indicative of the author's intention. Or, conversely, that language in context is what affects the audience. Language, from the overview, can be misconstrued, but the assumption is that if the creator has control of the work, he must be sure that his hypothesis about the work, the language says what he wants it to say from start to finish.

Rhetorical analysis of drama has two broad bases: character and structure. Unlike in conventional analysis, character comes first. Rhetorical analysis mirrors the creative process. From language, character is built; from the interaction of character comes structure; the structure contains the art. Implied in the language of a character in context is how he will act in a given situation, if the artist is to control the work, he must be sure that his characters are their language, that they do not contradict it.

When a character speaks in a certain way, whether in real life or on the stage, we make certain assumptions about him and about his relationship to other people. Thus, from her characteristic rhetoric, we can identify a character as the "Jewish Mother" because it has become a pure form, a convention. Similarly, there are many other conventional stances which we recognize immediately: the bully, the braggart, the simpering virgin, for example, have all become burlesque. Such textual analysis is based on the assumption that the rhetoric of complex, three-dimensional, "real" characters such as Edmund and Lear, Rosalind, or Coriolanus determines their character. In other words, the character of Edmund can be established immediately, not only by what he says or does; but by how he says what he says, in the first scenes in which he appears. Context is meaningful; hyperbolic, for example, does not fix a character in a stance role, but the sum of characteristic figures does. Just as the rhetorical question can call forth the Jewish mother, and heroic litoates the bully, each figure implies both by its presence and by its absence, something about the character who uses it.

Rhetorical analysis is basically simple. A text is read closely for rhetorical figures, without direction or bias based on any concept of the work, but simply for identification. There is no way to learn to discriminate the figures except by practice; theoretical definition and knowledge of the figures is useful only when solidified by practical application. Now figures are not significant out of context. Once noted, figures fall into categories; some will recur continually, both soliloquy and dialogue, some will exist in dialogue only, some in soliloquy only. Many figures will occur occasionally, but not in a pattern. Obviously the characters are the vehicles basic to the character; they tell us something specific about him. So do figures which are absent. And if a character speaks one way in dialogue and another in soliloquy, do we not suspect him of duplicity? In a glossary of Rhetorical terms compiled and edited by Professors William J. Brandt and Leonard S. Nathan of the University of California at Berkeley, the
The second half of the analytic process is rhetorical structure, which can be said to be an extension of the dictum that a banana peel which appears in the first act should be stepped on in the third. Two elements work together in structure: static elements such as Jacques and Orlando in "As You Like It," and the Plebeians in Coriolanus are constants, not so much as characters, as blocs of stance. Kinesthetic elements, Lear, Edmund, Rosalind, and Coriolanus undergo a change. Rhetorical structure is that, the reaction of the kinesthetic elements against each other and against the static, stance blocs. All of these larger figures are evident in structure. Antithesis is common; structural distributive is often used to establish hierarchy; structural antitheses can be used to make the audience see a logical progression, and other figures can be used in similar ways. The kinesthetic relationship of Rosalind and Orlando reacts against the stance of Jacques; perspective, stylized, is played off against the static stance of the court. In King Lear, Gloucester and Cordelia polarize the stance bloc, the stable axis of the play. Around which the interaction of Lear, himself, and Edmund takes place. The point is that once character is established, once we know which characters are stance and can place them through the fundamental tool of the figurative analysis, we can form expectations and look for relationships implicit in the characters.

In Coriolanus, we find two fundamental stance blocs. Menius has a triple role; he is the interlocutor between Coriolanus, the Tribunes, and the Plebeians; he is the state of problems delineating the three known to traditionally herald the tragedy; and he is the suave foil to the painfully shy Coriolanus. The second stance bloc is the Plebeians, collectively. They can be characterized, "homme et crieure." Throughout the play, they demand pacification, and pacification from the power structure that they are important. Their stance is established in the opening speech by one commoner when he states that Coriolanus is the chief enemy of the people because he thinks he is better than they are. The commoner's proof of this is his statement that Coriolanus is against the dote.

The fundamental question of the play is posed solely through the interaction of two stance blocs, the changing character of Coriolanus which is further played off against the stance of his mother. The play calls into question the validity of vox populi and at the same time the insanity of the equation: military success equals political competence. Without the knowledge of the stance and the character, the question of the line, without the character analysis it is difficult to identify the stance. Looking at the play as a whole and working backwards to character, it is easy to go wrong about both the characters and the play. But, starting with the rhetoric of the individual, proceeding to the structural interaction, and ending with the play as a gestalt, it is hard to go wrong.

Briefly stated, that is the case for rhetoric as the tool for literary criticism, particularly drama. It is not necessary to point out the small adaptation necessary to make the two apply to the novel, the short story, and to poetry. In every genre there are at least two voices, the author and the speaker, no matter what the convention, they can never be one. All literature contains interaction conveyed by rhetoric and directed to an audience. The tool can be applied anywhere, and works anywhere, because it follows the development of the statement rather than moving backwards from the end product to the parts.

The final criterion for discerning conventional literary criticism is that it leads nowhere. The best of literary criticism makes only a statement about the work in question, and it is seldom an open-ended statement. That is, it may explicate beautifully, it may deal
definitely with the "what" of something, it may even
answer the "why" and the "how", but it is not capable
of translation into the creative process. All of the
methods of critical study--examination of vocabulary, verb
form studies, image cluster counting--are self limiting;
they occur after the fact, in the same sense that political
pundits can always tell us why X won the election after
he has won it.

Rhetorical analysis is not subject to that limitation.
It is as useful to the creator as it is to the critic. The
author starts with intention, and using rhetoric, he has
the means to implement it. The tools in terms of the
figures are universal. The author is still free to invent.
The critic has access to the same process, where the
author began with his intention and used rhetoric to
implement it. The critic is able to begin with the rhetoric
and follow the whole process of implementation to the
author's intention. Aside from the obvious gains in
simplification of methodology, this analysis forces an
absolute integrity to the text on the part of the reader.
It is an open-ended system: it works from intention
for the author, giving him a method to control the creative
process; it works to intention for the critic, enabling
him to follow the creative process to intention.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSTANCE AND FORM IN
RICHARD WHATELY'S LOGICAL PROOFS

by
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As numerous writers in the speech field testify, we are well aware that many of the ideas and beliefs adhered to in rhetoric today are directly traceable to the rhetorical theory of Richard Whately. Douglas Ehninger states that although Whately is "not the only force influential in shaping the theory found in most of our textbooks and courses," in argumentation today, Whately's influence is certainly a major one—major enough to persist and to set the dominant pattern for nearly two centuries.1

Many of those writers also remark about the religious undertones which Archibishop Whately intended his Elements of Rhetoric. Wayland Parrish describes the book as an "ecclesiastical rhetoric"-"one which divides its attention almost equally between the pulpit orator for his task of demonstrating the revealed truths of religion to a non-literally congregation and equipping the Christian apologist who is called upon to defend his faith against the attacks of unbelievers."2 The implication of such statements is that there is a connection in some way between Whately's interest in religion, the subject matter with which he is dealing, and the rhetorical aids or forms he develops as a consequence of this interest. However, these statements for the most part stand relatively unsupported and neither the implied relationship of substance and form in Whately, nor the importance of this relationship is developed.

It is therefore the purpose of this paper to examine specific instances of the relationship between substance and form with which Whately is dealing, that is, truth, and his proposed form for dealing with the substance, that is elements of logic and rhetoric. Following this examination, the extension of this relationship to his concept of rhetoric as a whole and its modern implications will be explored.

First it is necessary to examine more closely the implications of Whately's interest in religion, before enumerating examples of the relationship between substance and form.

The basic assumption underlying statements which refer to the influence upon Whately's rhetoric of his interest in defending religion is touched on by the phrase "the revealed truths of religion." The truths of religion are revealed through nature as witnessed by the Scriptures. Intuitive truth exists in the nature of things and is immediately perceived through sense, and therefore God-given, faculty of the mind when one is confronted through direct experience, the memory, or the imagination with the evidence of such truths.3 The resulting truths are absolute in the Platonic sense of that term. The truths of Christian religion as revealed through nature are thus perceived by the intuition. Consequently, the belief that truth for Whately is derived intuitively is the basic assumption underlying the statements by theorists attempting to evaluate Whately's rhetorical theory.

Although Whately does not state this assumption in the Elements of Rhetoric, the he does indeed believe that truth is derived intuitively and is apparent in his discussion of the privilege of deduction over induction of his Elements of Logic. Whately contends that the process of induction is "made possible only by a previous deduction. The conclusion of this deduction he turns to the "principle of adequacy," which, in turn becomes the "great major premise" or assumption behind all induction. This premise states that the instances taken as a sample are adequate to warrant an inference to the whole class. Thus, Whately's chain of reasoning is from intuitive evidence based on observation, to intuitive truths formulated by innate or God-given and self-evident laws of reason, to the premises of a deduction which results in a conclusion that in turn justifies induction.

One of the most fundamental intuitive truths pertains to the constancy in nature. Whately states that it matters little whether this truth is learned or intuitive. However, if belief in the operation of a universal is learned, then it is the result of a series of experiences which then


2 Ibid., p. 366.

3 By substance I am referring to a concept that is more basic or fundamental than specific subject matter or content. This concept underlies content. Substance as I shall use it relates to philosophical concepts and the system of knowledge and truth. The basic or underlying subject matter with which any rhetorical theory must deal is a definite belief as to how we can or perhaps cannot know that a statement is true or certain.

4 By form I am referring to that which might be termed method, technique or structure.


6 Richard Whately, Elements of Logic (Boston, 1856), pp. 257-258.
used as a basis for reasoning result in a conclusion by induction. Whately could not make his statement that deduction is primary to induction. If, on the other hand, the operation of a universal is a truth arrived at intuitively, then it is the result of immediate perception by the mind of that truth. Because intuitive truths compose the original premises from which all other truths are inferred, the precedence of the deduction is primary to the induction. Therefore, in order to strike the primary of deduction Whately did not believe that the conclusion of a truth is necessarily derived from the premises. Hence, for Whately, the result of immediate perception by the mind is what he calls intuitive truths. However, Whately's statement that intuitive truths compose the original premises from which all other truths are inferred, makes it clear that the premise of a truth is primary to the deduction. Deduction is the result of the premise, and therefore the process of a deduction. Deduction is the primary to the induction. Whately's criterion for testing induction is argument from analogy. Whately further subdivides, into argument from example and argument from analogy. Within this classification of argument from analogy, the relationship of substance and type is used in his omission of a discussion of causation and his criteria for judging the effectiveness of such an argument. Although Whately does extend this classification in his discussion of a priori argument and argument from analogy, he does not relate cause and induction. To do so would be to view the conclusions of induction as predictions. However, Whately's truth, having been established prior to the inference process, does not allow for prediction. He is only interested in proving or establishing these intuitive truths. Whately's choice of sufficiency as a criterion for induction again illustrates the influence of substance on form.

The second subdivision of argument from induction is argument from analogy. In argument from analogy, the analogy is more remote from the case in point than in the former. Whately distinguishes further between these two classes by pointing out that resemblances in example are direct and concrete, while in analogy they are more abstract. The analogy in the case of Whately's system, Whately's notion of a basis in intuitive truth, the number of examples used in an induction is sufficient for Whately because the induction is preceded by a deduction, based on the intuitively derived truth that there is a constancy in nature and stating in its conclusion that the number of examples in the induction is sufficient. The number of examples in the induction is sufficient. This notion of a basis in common sense comes close to Whately's notion of a basis in intuitive truth. The number of examples used in an induction is sufficient for Whately because the induction is preceded by a deduction, based on the intuitively derived truth that there is a constancy in nature and stating in its conclusion that the number of examples in the induction is sufficient. Thus, Whately's choice of sufficiency as a criterion for induction again illustrates the influence of substance on form.

The second class of arguments includes argument from example and argument from analogy. The classification of a posteriori arguments is the last step in the process of reasoning. If an argument is to be considered as a posteriori, it must be derived from a deduction. Deduction is the primary to the induction. Therefore, in order to strike the primary of deduction, Whately did not believe that the conclusion of a truth is necessarily derived from the premises. Hence, for Whately, the result of immediate perception by the mind is what he calls intuitive truths. However, Whately's statement that intuitive truths compose the original premises from which all other truths are inferred, makes it clear that the premise of a truth is primary to the deduction. Deduction is the result of the premise, and therefore the process of a deduction. Deduction is the primary to the induction. Whately's criterion for testing induction is argument from analogy. Whately further subdivides, into argument from example and argument from analogy. Within this classification of argument from analogy, the relationship of substance and type is used in his omission of a discussion of causation and his criteria for judging the effectiveness of such an argument. Although Whately does extend this classification in his discussion of a priori argument and argument from analogy, he does not relate cause and induction. To do so would be to view the conclusions of induction as predictions. However, Whately's truth, having been established prior to the inference process, does not allow for prediction. He is only interested in proving or establishing these intuitive truths. Whately's choice of sufficiency as a criterion for induction again illustrates the influence of substance on form.

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Whately bases both his definition of analogy as his criterion for the effectiveness of an analogy on an intuitive truth— the consistency of nature. This intuitive truth is demonstrated more forcefully by a comparison between different classes than by a comparison within the same class. In like manner, the mere remote analogy to the case, the more forcible the argument because the basic intuitive truth is more clearly demonstrated. Thus, an egg and a soft bear are like a fruit to the future nesting of a bird and a young plant, and are more effective to the parent bird and the old plant (pages 90-91).

Conventionally, analogy and especially figurative analogy, is considered to be less rigorous than other forms of reasoning. However, Whately places analogy as a separate form of argument and gives great weight to its value. Again, these principles are the result of Whately’s belief that analogy is a clear demonstration of an intuitive truth. Again, the form of the proof, this time of analogy in its definition, its criterion, its emphasis and its worth, is directly influenced by substance or intuitive truth.

The last area to be considered is that of testimonial evidence. Whately removes testimony from inartistic proofs, where it is placed by Aristotle, and gives it new status by making it a species of sign. He contends that the existence of testimony can be taken as a mark or indication of the event attested to, since testimony is a direct consequence of the event attempted to.

A matter of fact is something which might conceivably be submitted to the senses, and about which there can be no disagreement among persons present. Thus, if the witnesses are confronted with the same facts they cannot by definition disagree. Therefore, testimony is a sign that an event occurred (pages 58-59).

In his work Historic Doubts, Whately attempts to show in what way the Scriptures as testimony may be regarded as providing valid historical evidence for Christian beliefs or intuitive truth. This he does by interpreting testimony in light of his purpose.

Thus, Whately’s conclusions concerning his general classification of arguments, argument from example and argument from analogy, and testimonial evidence are the result of the relationship of substance or intuitive truth and the form taken by his logical proofs. The extension to Whately’s entire concept of rhetoric of this relationship results in what has been termed a managerial rhetoric. Rhetoric for Whately is “the finding of suitable arguments” and their “skillful arrangement” in order to prove to someone else a truth arrived at through the intuition and before the process of rhetoric begins (page 40). Thus, rhetoric manages the materials used in support of a previously derived truth. Invention in Aristotle’s rhetoric entails the discovery of matter, or what is to be said, and is distinct from disposition, which entails deciding how best it can be said. Within Whately’s system, however, invention is reduced to the finding of forms, or the means by which truth may be established, and becomes fused with disposition or the arrangement of these forms. Douglas Ehninger states that Whately brings "together invention and disposition and adds them into one general body of doctrine directed toward biblical and historical interpretation..."10

In light of the relationship of substance and form in Whately’s theory, and the major influence of his theory on today’s rhetoric, what is needed is a re-examination of the direct applicability of his concepts today. Much of Whately’s theory may still be of use. However, the conclusion of many of today’s epistemological concerns, or the search for the "truth," differs radically, for Whately’s epistemological conclusions, and it may be of the forms proposed by Whately, in use today include forms affected by, or belief in, intuitive truth, then they may no longer be applicable.

At a more general level, the evidence of a relationship between substance and form in Whately substantiates the absolute necessity for the consideration of a rhetorician’s epistemological concerns in conjunction with a consideration of his rhetorical theory. These concerns involve discovering a rhetorician’s definition of such concepts as knowledge and truth, determining his source for the criteria by which judgment is made, and establishing the relative probability of the conclusions reached from these ultimate premises. A rhetorical theorist’s concept of the origin of truth is at the most fundamental level the substance with which he is dealing, and it influences to a great extent the form his theory takes. In addition, it is only through a consideration of epistemology that we arrive at the relationship between a specific rhetorical theory and truth. If rhetoric is not involved with the discovery of truth, but is solely the form for transmitting, proving, or clarifying the truth, then we have the problem of justifying and defending an art that is simply instrumental in nature and which is of use only in addressing those who do not have cognitive ability adequate to grasp the truth.11

