The study analyzes the development and implementation of hometown plans in the construction industry, focusing on the efficacy of hometown negotiations in establishing new rules and institutional arrangements regarding minority hiring and training in area-wide construction systems. The procedures include analysis of published data and data collection through field interviews. The principle research findings are reported under four categories: the incidence of hometown plans; the conduct and process of hometown negotiations; the substance of hometown agreements; and the implementation of hometown solutions. The most important implications suggested by the research relate to policy, practice, and program efforts: (1) the faith of planners is discouraged by what they see as inconsistent Federal policy, sporadic enforcement, and lack of local support; (2) the promise of increased minority employment (on a continuing basis) is unrealistic without adequate training programs, followup, and Federal surveillance (with sanctions); and (3) efforts are hampered by a lack of helpful labor-market data at a local level and by a proliferation of agencies and programs. The report includes a particular model of hometown bargaining which attempts to explain the processes involved. Field interviews were conducted in Kansas City, Rochester, New Orleans, and Oakland. (Author/Ad)
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF HOMETOWN PLANS FOR INCREASING
MINORITY EMPLOYMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY OF SELECTED U.S. CITIES

A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION RESEARCH REPORT

The material in this project was prepared under Grant No. 91-17-71-48
from the Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, under the
authority of Title I of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962, as amended. Researchers undertaking such projects under Govern-
ment sponsorship are encouraged to express fully their professional
judgment. Therefore, points of view or opinions stated in this docu-
mment do not necessarily represent the official position or policy of
the Department of Labor.

Respectfully submitted,

C. Robert Tyson

March, 1974
I would like to thank several individuals for their help on my research and on this report. Dr. Howard Rosen and his staff in the Office of Research and Development, U.S. Department of Labor, and the staff of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance gave generously of both personal and financial support. The efforts of my doctoral committee at the University of Chicago, and the patience and guidance of Dr. Robert McKersie (now of Cornell University) were of invaluable assistance. Finally, I wish to thank those hometown planners who graciously gave of their time and information in personal interviews. Their cooperation was essential to this research.

Please note that information on specific cities and organizations quoted in Sections II B and II D is to be treated as confidential to the recipients of this monograph.

Any errors or misinterpretations in this report remain the responsibility of the candidate.
The objectives of this study were to analyze the development and implementation of hometown plans in the construction industry. The incidence, substance, and implementation of these agreements is examined in this report as a function of the comparative industrial relations contexts and negotiation processes in different hometown cases. The primary focus of the research is on the efficacy of hometown negotiations in establishing new rules and institutional arrangements regarding minority hiring and training in area-wide construction systems.

The procedures of the study include analysis of published data and data collection through field interviews. Published data from Bureau of the Census, BLS, EEOC, and OFCC reports and previous scholarly research are used to explain the incidence of hometown plans. Field interviews provided information on the negotiation, substance, and implementation of particular plans. All interviews were conducted by the doctoral candidate. Plans to use mail questionnaires for gathering further negotiation information from other cities proved impracticable.

The principle research findings can be reported under four categories: (1) the incidence of hometown plans, (2) the conduct and process of hometown negotiations, (3) the substance of hometown agreements, and (4) the implementation of hometown solutions. Firstly, the simple incidence of hometown plans cannot be significantly explained by common environmental features of local industrial relations systems, nor do these contexts bear any consistent relationship to the presence or absence of a negotiated
agreement. Aside from the suggestion of population-size and minority-membership effects in the Northeast and Northcentral Census regions, the incidence of hometown plans proved unrelated to SMSA population sizes (both total and nonwhite), unemployment rates, construction employment, nonwhite union membership, and residential segregation patterns.

Secondly, the conduct of successful negotiations in each sampled city was heavily influenced by the initial attitudes of the parties toward one another and their motives for entering this process, by the ability of the minority community to utilize an existing organizational power base rather than rely on an unstable coalition for bargaining purposes, and by the avoidance of extreme positions (non-negotiable demands) on goal and control issues by either the community or the industry. Governmental intervention in some cases hastened and in others hindered the reaching of final agreements.

Thirdly, the substantive provisions of hometown plans exhibited little variation across all OFCC-approved agreements. It appears that most hometown planners simply copied the Department of Labor's "model hometown agreement". The one consistent omission in these agreements is, unfortunately, their lack of training program, placement, and future disposition specifics.

Fourthly, the implementation of hometown solutions has been carried out under at least three different organizational models: a subcontracting model, an organizational-genesis model, and a retained-responsibility model. These are described more fully in Part II(D). There are identifiable issues of control and coordination, start-up and performance associated with each model. No accurate data on actual minority placements
was available, however, to determine whether, once underway, each approach would prove equally successful in reaching its particular manpower targets.

The most important implications which are suggested by this research relate to policy, practice, and program efforts. Firstly, the faith of hometown planners in this particular approach is seriously discouraged by what they see as inconsistent federal policy, sporadic enforcement, and lack of local support. Secondly, the promise of increased minority employment (on a continuing basis) through these plans is an unrealistic hope without adequately designed and staffed training programs, follow-up activities to improve the chances of minority retention post-training and after initial placement, and federal surveillance (with sanctions) to ensure that all parties are living up to the terms of their agreement. In this respect, it appears that federal field offices are seriously understaffed, and local plan participants unable to get consistent and convenient assistance. Finally, efforts such as the hometown-plans program are hampered by a liability and an encumbrance --- by the lack of helpful labor-market data (however accurate) at a local level to guide program choices, and by the proliferation of local and federally-funded agencies and programs all with some responsibility for enforcing equal employment opportunity. Program choice is little choice unless intelligently informed, and of little lasting value in a bargain-basement atmosphere.
I  RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

The original proposal on which this research was funded anticipated a four-stage data-collection and analysis procedure. These stages were: the gathering of structural hometown information from newspaper and other published reports; field interviewing of participants in a stratified sample from the hometown population; mailed questionnaires to non-interviewed cities; and contract analysis of signed hometown agreements provided by OFCC.

The major part of the candidate's time was spent in the first, second and fourth stages. Prior to field interviewing, data were collected from the 1960 and 1970 Census reports, BLS and Manpower reports, EEOC findings, and several other sources in order to develop and test a structural explanation of the incidence of hometown plans. The results of this effort are reported in Part II(A).

During the completion of this first stage, and occupying much of the research time, field interviews were scheduled and conducted with plan principals in several U.S. cities. The original schedule proposed a sample consisting of Kansas City, Rochester, New Orleans, Alameda County (Oakland), Boston, Los Angeles, Providence, Wilmington, Milwaukee, San Francisco, Albany, and Norfolk-Portsmouth. The first four cities were contacted and scheduled, but Oakland was excluded for reasons of local sensitivity at the time. The remaining cities were postponed until further interview data and model specification were completed. Although this report is focused on research findings, Part II(B) also presents a particular model of hometown bargaining which attempts to explain the processes
involved. It is hoped this model may be useful in subsequent research, as the field work in the present study is so limited. Part II(B) --- The Conduct and Process of Hometown Negotiations --- is based on interview data from Kansas City, New Orleans, and Rochester, as well as previous information collected on the Chicago Plan experience.

Concurrently with field research, copies of hometown agreements provided by OFCC were scrutinized for content similarities and differences. It was expected that hometown variations in such factors as population size, union penetration, industry growth, and community resources would show up as variations in the substance of hometown agreements. Such did not prove to be the case. Part II(C) reports on this, and leads into the last section on implementation --- a section composed mainly of research suggestions from field interviews and content analysis of signed agreements. This section may contain some of the most important material in this report.

The remainder of time under this grant was spent in refining models, planning for possible questionnaire mailings, and organizing this research study into a coherent package. Unfortunately, the proposed package could not be completed. This report presents all the relevant information generated during the term of the research grant, and offers hopefully-useful suggestions for further work in this area.
II RESEARCH FINDINGS

A. THE INCIDENCE OF HOMETOWN PLANS

Hometown plans constitute new rules governing particular elements of a local construction system. Specifically, they cover the extent to which minorities are to be represented in the entry, training, and employment (union membership) operations of the industry. Previous scholarly work has treated the rules of the industrial relations system in construction as products of the contexts and ideology of each local system. This section attempts to explain the presence or absence of new hometown rules by using these same environmental variables. The model presented here is a naive model, and is proposed as only one possible specification for relating industrial relations outcomes to environmental constraints. The discussion of "results to date" indicates some of the major problems in using this model, as well as in pursuing the question of environmental influences.

The Model. Hometown plans are hypothesized to be a function of three of the features of any industrial relations system: contexts, ideology, and existing rules. The dependent variable in question is the simple incidence of these plans --- that is, whether a given city has or has not negotiated an acceptable hometown agreement. The operational measure of this variable is the granting of approval by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance to proposed hometown plans submitted to it for review. All cities

1 Dunlop (1958)
2 Dunlop (1961)
of population size 250,000 or greater within the continental United States are included in this analysis.

There are three categories of independent variables: contexts (market, power, and technology), ideology, and existing rules. The main thesis is that the values of these variables will be significantly different between cities with hometown plans and cities without: specifically, hometown plans will occur where these factors favor their development, and will be absent where they do not. Specific variables are subsumed under the following general hypotheses, and are presented (with expected signs) schematically in Figure 1.

1. Market contexts. Hometown plans are more likely to occur where construction demand conditions are favorable (to increased minority employment) and minority labor supply available. The SMSA minority (non-white) population, in absolute figures or as a percentage of total SMSA population is used as a measure of the supply variable. Demand is captured by three operational measures: (1) the SMSA unemployment rate, (2) the change in contract construction payroll employment (over the last 3-5 years), and (3) the amount of new construction put into place (where available).

2. Power contexts. The greater the degree of external pressure imposed by federal, state, and local bodies, and the less resistance offered by the local industry, the greater the likelihood of a hometown plan. While pressure cannot be measured directly, it can be translated into the existence of favorable climates for eliminating employment
FIGURE 1.

Environmental factors in the Development of Hometown Plans

1. MARKET

(+) nonwhite population
(-) unemployment rate
(+) change in construction employment
(+) new construction

2. POWER

(+) city size
(+) state FEP legislation
(+) city political style (partisan/mayor-council)
(-) degree of unionization
(+) civil disturbances

3. TECHNOLOGY

(+) construction/total employment
(+) number and average size of locals and contractors

4. IDEOLOGY

(+) nonwhite trade penetration
(-) residential segregation
(-) geographic location (South)

5. EXISTING RULES

(-) construction wage rates (or changes)
(+) Apprentice Outreach programs

HOMETOWN PLAN:
OFCC approval of negotiated agreement
discrimination. The following variables are chosen as operational indicators of such a climate: (1) city size (total SMSA population, as a proxy for governmental scrutiny of local employment practices), (2) state FEP laws, and (3) city political style (mayor-council vs. city-manager systems, and partisan vs. nonpartisan elections). The political variable is suggested by Aiken and Alford's finding that innovation in urban renewal is related to mayor-council structures and partisan elections among American cities.

The degree of SMSA unionization in construction (building trades' membership as a percent of total SMSA construction employment) indicates the local industry's power to resist or ignore the encouragement of hometown plans. Counterbalancing this is the extent of prior civil disturbances in the city as the operational measure of minority-community militancy.

3. **Technological contexts.** Hometown plans are more likely to occur where the local construction industry is a major community employer, and where contractors and unions can absorb and distribute the required minority-trainee hiring goals. These variables are measured in each city by: (1) contract-construction payroll employment as a percent of total nonagricultural employment, and (2) the number and average size of building trades union locals and construction contractors.

4. **Ideology.** The ideology of the system which defines the relationships of actors to one another is both developed within the system and partly adopted from the system's environment. Thus, a hiring plan is more

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likely where present union attitudes and general public opinion favor integration. The former is measured by the percentage nonwhite membership in the mechanical trades in the specific SMSA. Two measures are used for the latter: (1) the index of residential segregation in the city, and (2) a geographical location (North-South) variable.

5. Existing rules. Existing rules of the system which point to union domination are likely to discourage the development of hometown plans, while rules which evidence system efforts to recruit nonwhites act in the opposite direction. Construction wage rates (or rate increases) measure the first factor; where these are high, unions are likely to be very powerful in the system and reluctant to share their benefits with others. Existing efforts of each system are measured by the presence or absence of an Apprenticeship Outreach Program (run by the Urban League, Workers Defense League, a local industry council, or other local bodies) in the particular area. The existence of previous outreach activity should facilitate the development of a hometown plan.

6. RESULTS TO DATE. Very simple cross-tabulation and mean-difference tests have been done with selected variables shown in Figure 1. The universe of American cities of 250,000 population or greater was split into the four Census regions of Northeast, Northcentral, South, and West. This was done as a test of the geographical location variable and because many hometown agreements exhibited a regionality in their incidence and form. Regional differences are reported where these occurred in the data.

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Taeuber and Taeuber (1965).
Three market variables were tested. First, nonwhite SMSA population was highly positively related to the incidence of hometown plans in both northern regions, slightly so in the West, and of little importance in the South. In all regions there was evidence of a nonwhite population threshold—that is, once past a minimum nonwhite population figure, the probability of any city's developing a hometown plan increased by approximately thirty or forty percentage points. Second, the mean 1970 SMSA unemployment rate showed no differences between cities with and without hometown plans. There was only a slight suggestion of curvilinearity—that is, cities with high or low unemployment rates showing less incidence of hometown plans than those cities with mid-range unemployment rates. Third, the change in SMSA construction employment (contract payrolls) was not positively related to the incidence of hometown plans. In fact, the evidence suggests that many plans in each region were negotiated in the face of declining employment in local contract construction.

Only one power variable was tested. SMSA population size was highly positively related to plan incidence in the two northern regions, only slightly so in the South, and not at all in the West. One possible reason for these findings is the intercorrelation of nonwhite population with total population in the different regions of the country. Another interpretation, however, is that this population variable is a poor specification of power and that it is confounded by many other effects. Although city size may be a reasonable proxy for federal interest in, and pressure on, local construction systems, city size may also be correlated with other variables such as new construction, city political style, civil disturbances, trade union size, construction wage rates, and Outreach activities. Of
even more importance, it may be an indicator of the organizational resources or potential "interfaces"\textsuperscript{5} available for negotiating and implementing a hometown plan. In any case, it is difficult to interpret this size variable with much confidence.

Two ideology variables were examined. First, nonwhite union membership was positively related to plan incidence in the Northeast and Northcentral, and especially so when only the Negro membership percentage was used. This supports the contention of Lipsky and Rose\textsuperscript{6} that the success of minority training programs mirrors the prevailing pattern of craft integration—in other words, the "rich get richer". In the South and West, however, this pattern was not apparent; no clear relationship existed between craft integration and the incidence of hometown plans. Second, the residential segregation data did not differentiate approved-plan versus no-plan cities. This test is highly suspect, however, for close to half the sample had to be eliminated due to missing observations.

The overall conclusion one can draw from these limited tests is that pursuing this type of model is of limited value in explaining the incidence or development of hometown plans. Not only is there a problem of small-sample size (124 cities and 34 plans), but also the data is unreliable for several variables\textsuperscript{7} and incomplete or unavailable for others.\textsuperscript{8} A more serious problem (and criticism) is that the specification of the

\textsuperscript{5}Aiken and Alford (1970).

\textsuperscript{6}Lipsky and Rose (1971).

\textsuperscript{7}For instance, the EEO-3 reports on minority union membership are notoriously inaccurate.

\textsuperscript{8}For instance, for many cities data is missing on the residential segregation, craft integration, and wage rate variables.
dependent variable--OFCC approval--leaves much to be desired. The model does not include the intervening stages of negotiation and agreement submission, so that the nonapproval category embraces cities which have not even begun negotiations, cities which have reached negotiating impasses or failed to conclude agreement yet, and cities which have submitted plans but not received OFCC approval. Correcting these deficiencies, however, would turn this study into one of the political science of urban and government-agency decision making.

There is one further argument for treating this model as only background information. Even if it gave clear results, it would reveal nothing about how these variables are translated into hometown plans. One would learn nothing about the intervening process by which some cities develop and implement minority hiring programs, while others fail to entertain such rules changes. A similar argument has been raised in the analysis of innovations in urban renewal.9 These criticisms seem strong support for laying aside this type of model, and instead emphasizing the hometown elements of negotiation processes and agreement provisions and implementation. These are treated in the two sections which follow.

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B. THE CONDUCT AND PROCESS OF HOMETOWN NEGOTIATIONS

This section reports on a study of hometown negotiations which is exploratory in nature. It does not presume to test hypotheses derived from any general theory of bargaining, for existing bargaining models seem stronger in their descriptive character than in their theoretical rigor. Rather, the approach described here utilizes these existing bargaining models to build a framework particularly appropriate to hometown negotiations. These models really consist of different perspectives on the process of bargaining—whether it is viewed as an exercise in power,\(^\text{10}\) a problem in attitude change,\(^\text{11}\) or a question of decision-making.\(^\text{12}\) Each of these perspectives raises different negotiating issues. This framework of issues is then used to generate, organize, and understand data on the process of hometown negotiations.

The focus and value of this approach, then, are two-fold: first, to utilize bargaining models to organize and understand hometown negotiating processes; and second, by examining this information, to develop more appropriate process frameworks where our models are presently weak (in this case, in the areas of tripartite bargaining and racial negotiations). A knowledge of the specific negotiating processes also helps in tracing the development of particular provisions in hometown agreements, and the reasons for their inclusion (or exclusion). Negotiations thus serve as both a legitimate study in their own right, and an intervening mechanism between system structures (or environmental constraints) and new hometown rules.

\(^{10}\) Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965).


The following framework recognizes three elements in the process of accommodation among contractors, unions, and the minority community in the development of hometown plans: (1) the racial character of negotiations, (2) the tripartite structure of bargaining, and (3) the manpower-planning aspect of increasing minority participation in the skilled trades. Each of these elements raises unique issues for hometown negotiations. The discussion to follow describes these issues in an exploratory fashion, and concludes with a report on research completed thus far.

1. **Racial negotiations.** Racial negotiations pose a new field of study for industrial relations. General models of bargaining and negotiations have emphasized the elements of power and of decision-making. In this study of negotiations, the power issues are dealt with under the tripartite structure of bargaining, and the decision-making issues under the treatment of negotiations as an exercise in manpower planning. The racial nature of hometown negotiations spotlights attitudinal issues between the parties.

These attitudinal issues fall into two categories: (1) attitudes of the parties toward one another, and (2) attitudes of the parties toward the process of negotiations. In the former, the issue for the construction "establishment" is likely to be the bargaining legitimacy of the minority-community representatives, while for these representatives it is the racist

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15 See Walton and McKersie's (1965) "attitudinal structuring" argument, and Walton's (1969) "attitude change" discussion.
nature of the construction industry practices and officials in denying minorities jobs and union membership. These issues will be the first raised in all negotiations, and will have a continuing influence on the parties' decision-making process. What this study proposed was to gather information on the extent to which these issues are prevalent in negotiations, their effect on the duration of negotiations, and the manner in which successful negotiations resolve them. For instance, one manner in which a minority coalition may deal with its "racist" arguments is through a division of labor, allowing its extremist faction to berate the industry while its moderates suggest methods by which the parties may resolve their differences amicably on specific manpower issues.

The second set of attitudinal issues is that of the parties toward the process of negotiations. Prior work has suggested that the parties to racial conflict will come to the table with greatly different ideas about what is to take place in negotiations. Two underlying issues—the familiarity of the parties with negotiating processes and the motives of each party for entering into this bargaining relationship—influence the effectiveness or viability of the negotiations mechanism. First, union and contractor parties are familiar with the give-and-take of bargaining relationships, with the almost ritual proposal/counter-proposal moves of negotiators. Negotiations for these actors are a method of finding compromises which are then referred to their constituents for ratification. Minority protestors, however, are generally inexperienced in negotiations, and enter these proceedings emphasizing their non-negotiable demands for shared control.

16 McKersie et al. (1970).
over the decisions of the establishment.\textsuperscript{17} Of interest in this study are the processes by which successful negotiations manage an accommodation between these conflicting attitudes toward hometown bargaining, and if indeed these attitudes are present at all where successful bargains are achieved.

Second, the motives of each party will be on the ease or difficulty of reaching agreement and the climate of negotiations. Bargains may be struck for personal reasons (to increase one's status in the community or share in the spoils of government), for reasons of organizational defense (to prevent governmental interference in the construction system), and/or as sincere efforts to establish programs for equal employment opportunity in that system. These various motives will influence the amount of time consumed by negotiations, as well as their relative success. They will also certainly influence the subsequent effort which the parties put into the implementation of their agreement. This study therefore proposed to include the impact of party motives on the duration and successful completion of negotiations and on the implementation of negotiated agreements.

2. Tripartite bargaining. Collective bargaining has been described as an exercise in relative power.\textsuperscript{18} Tripartite bargaining can be regarded in the same light, with the addition of a third party. Hometown negotiations can be argued, then, to involve two categories of issues: (a) those related to the power of the parties, and (b) those related to the three-party character of the process.

\textsuperscript{17}See Chalmers and Cormick (1970), (1971), and Barrett (1967).

\textsuperscript{18}Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965).
a. Assuming that final agreements are influenced by the relative power of the parties, each is then faced with the task of establishing, managing, and maintaining his respective power base. First, establishing power involves mobilizing sufficient resources to potentially affect an opponent’s welfare. For the minority community, the issue is thus one of forming coalitions of community groups and organizations to present a united front for their demands, for single minority organizations are likely to present little threat to the industry. Thus, more approved hometown plans are expected to be negotiated with minority coalitions than with a single minority organization.

However, coalition formation presents a particular dilemma for the minority community. While it is an effective way of building a power base (through demonstrations, threats of violence or bluffing in negotiations, and/or the connections and ability to "deliver" on a promised minority labor supply), it raises problems in maintaining that coalition as a united power group. The issue here is the intra-organizational bargaining required to satisfy all coalition members while concentrating leadership in one or more principals. The same issue faces union and contractor parties, for they too have to satisfy their constituents about the progress and content of negotiations. The respective abilities of the three parties to maintain their power bases (coordinating and committing their members), while at the same time limiting negotiations to a workable forum, will influence both bargaining duration and successful agreement. This study gathered data on the parties' methods of establishing their power bases and the intra-organizational problems of maintaining these, with the expectation that hometown negotiations which suffer the growing pains of a minority
coalition will be likely to experience more impasses in negotiations, take a longer time to reach agreement, and witness a disintegration of that coalition as a positive function of the time consumed in bargaining.

Lastly, managing power involves the issue of strategy. Four factors were included in studying the strategies pursued by hometown parties: (1) whether the party taking the initiative in negotiations is more likely to see his proposals adopted; (2) whether the opening proposals of the parties follow a pattern of ambitious minority demands, moderate contractor goals, and minimal union proposals offering little change; (3) whether the convergence profile shows a final agreement which compromises and avoids extreme positions; and (4) whether militant, extreme minority demands or moderate, compromising minority positions are more effective in gaining concessions from the other parties to the final agreement.

b. The three-party character of hometown negotiations adds the possibility of coalition formation within the triad. This process is called "pairing" or "partnership" to avoid confusion with the term "minority coalition." There are three sets of common interests in hometown negotiations which make any of the three possible partnerships equally likely: (1) the unions and contractors are the joint architects of the present system, and must continue their relationship in the future; (2) the unions and the minority-community representatives both are agents of present and potential craft journeymen; and (3) the contractors and the minority community are both interested in expanding the construction work force, the contractors to increase labor supply and keep wages down, the community to increase minority participation and employment. The partnership which does form

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19 See Montague (1970), ch. 10.
will depend on the strength of these interests, will control negotiations and will have the most influence on the final settlement. This study examined the prevalence of each type of partnership and the different conditions under which they form.

3. **Manpower planning.** Hometown cities vary considerably on several dimensions: their total size, minority population, community organization, existence of present training programs, unemployment, etc. In this respect, hometown negotiations can be viewed as decision-making processes by which the parties, faced with different sets of environmental constraints, select from among several alternatives the most appropriate solution for increasing minority participation in that construction system. There are two basic issues which must be decided in this planning: that of **goals**, and that of **control**. To some extent these issues represent trade-offs in negotiations, especially for the minority community.

The minority representatives can encourage decisions on specific numeric or percentage goals (or minority employment) to be included in the agreement. This issue invites resolution by appeal to factual information on minority population percentages vis-a-vis minority trade membership percentages. Goal-specification is likely to be emphasized by minority coalitions which intend to remain independent of the achievement of these goals, or by single minority organizations which intend to operate as adjuncts to the industry in recruitment and training of minority workers. In other words, where existing organizational channels are to be used for the achievement of hiring goals, the specification of these goals will take on major importance in negotiations. As the parties will be later judged
on the success of their goal attainment, the final goals decided upon will likely be not equal to the minority population percentage, but adjusted downward to reflect realistic judgments of the number of new workers which the industry can absorb and to provide a margin of error for the implementing organization.

Where goals are not the primary issue in decision-making, the distribution of control over the mechanisms for implementing a hometown plan will be. This issue involves the distribution of voting power among the three parties (union, contractors, and minority representatives) over the administration of the final agreement. The more the parties (especially the minority representatives) plan to establish a new program and new institutions to implement the program in which they will share responsibility for recruitment, training, and employment decisions, the more importance will be attached by the parties to the decision issue of relative control and voting powers. This issue is expected to dominate the majority of hometown planning sessions, for each party will want assurance of his share of control over new institutional machinery which in all cases threatens the existing arrangements. The party most threatened, and thus most vocal in negotiations, is hypothesized to be the one who is "odd man out", who perceives the other two parties as forming a partnership against him. In some cases this party will be the minority coalition, and in others the union representatives, for the contractors will be the pivotal party in forming partnerships.

The over-riding concern with goals and control—with negotiating a job-purchase agreement or new institutional mechanisms—means that hometown negotiations really avoid the basic manpower-planning issues of
recruitment, training, and placement specifications. Plans may be silent on these issues for different reasons—for instance, a minority assurance that trainees will prove themselves capable as opposed to a union belief that few applicants will show up to be processed anyway. But this discussion is premature, for the question of training components leads into considering the substantive provisions of different hometown plans—which is the focus of Section C.

4. RESULTS TO DATE. The proposed exploratory model of hometown negotiations is presented in Figure 2. It was intended as a guide for field research, and does not presume to be a definitive model. The research findings which follow are based on interviews conducted with plan negotiators and program staff in three cities with approved hometown plans—Kansas City, New Orleans, and Rochester. These interviews are supplemented by data collected on the Chicago plan, a vaguely-worded hometown agreement which never received formal OFCC approval and suffered crippling administrative difficulties.

Racial negotiations. The question of legitimacy, while present in all four negotiating cases, became an issue only where the minority coalition was a loose amalgam of community organizations under the leadership of no one or two dominant, cooperating individuals. This was the case in Chicago, and it may be significant that the Chicago Plan never really got off the ground. Minority coalitions were also present in Kansas City and New Orleans negotiations, but they were controlled by established organizations (the Urban League and NAACP in both cases) which stressed cooperation and kept militant community voices muted. The Rochester Plan
FIGURE 2

Bargaining Processes in the Negotiation of Hometown Plans

1. RACIAL NEGOTIATIONS
   a) Attitudes toward parties:
      legitimacy
      racism
   b) Attitudes toward process:
      negotiating familiarity
      motives for agreement

2. TRIPARTITE BARGAINING
   a) Power bargaining:
      establishing power (coalitions)
      maintaining power (intra-organizational bargaining)
      managing power (tactics of strategy: initiative, opening proposals, and convergence profile)
   b) Three-party bargaining:
      prevalence and characteristics of pairing

3. MANPOWER PLANNING
   a) Decisions on goals
   b) Decisions on control
   c) Decisions on implementation issues

PROCESS EXPERIENCES
   Impasses
   Concession patterns
   Avoidance of extremes
   Coalition decay

OUTCOMES: THE SIGNING OF A HOMETOWN AGREEMENT
   Signatory parties
   Substantive rules: goals and administration
was negotiated with a single influential community organization, selected by the construction establishment as its implementation arm.

Similarly, charges of racism plagued negotiations only in Chicago. Agreement was reached only when the coalition had lost or managed to control its vocal members, and could work on agreement with a smaller committee. This committee technique was used successfully in Kansas City and New Orleans also. The opening negotiating sessions, during which everyone on each side wanted his say, were exercises in catharsis. Very little progress was made. The real work was done outside these sessions in committee meetings involving smaller numbers of representatives from each side. In New Orleans it was a conscious strategy by these representatives to use "open" negotiating sessions to allow militant minority organizations and suspicious union members to voice their feelings and encourage their later acceptance of the plan. With large numbers of participants and/or attitudinal problems, this division of labor seems necessary to the resolution of differences and the reaching of an agreement.

Differential attitudes toward the process of negotiations troubled only the Chicago experience, in which the coalition insisted the industry meet its demands for 10,000 (later revised to 4,000) jobs plus decision-making control over the administration of the program. Many of the coalition organizations (such as the street gangs involved) were inexperienced in negotiations and unfamiliar (if not objectionable) to the construction establishment. By contrast, the Kansas City and New Orleans negotiations proceeded from already-existing relationships which the three parties had established for jointly-administered Outreach activities. The patterns of compromise in these cities differed in relation to the different motives
and pairings among negotiators, but there were none of the negotiating impasses or acrimony that Chicago experienced. And in Rochester, when the minority organization initially negotiating with the construction establishment insisted that certain concessions be granted to it, the unions and contractors simply invited a different community organization to join with them in signing the Rochester Plan.

These differences in demand and concessions patterns were heavily influenced by the motives of the parties in seeking agreement on entering negotiations. In the three cases of Kansas City, New Orleans and Rochester, the industry partners were motivated by a desire to safeguard their federal contracts and future work. As well, the unions saw a voluntary plan as a way of either avoiding federal prosecution or organizing nonunion journeymen. In Chicago, by contrast, the industry establishment had no such feelings; its basic motives for negotiating an agreement were to end construction-site demonstrations and satisfy Mayor Daley's requests. The negotiation and implementation of the Chicago agreement were also burdened by the mixed motives of the minority coalition; some members wanted a purchase agreement from the industry for a certain number of jobs, while others wanted to negotiate shared decision-making. The three other cities did not experience this problem; the minority-community representatives seemed more interested in establishing some type of training-hiring program than in protracting negotiations over goal or control details.

While this overview omits many details of the different negotiations, the general conclusion about these three successful racial negotiations seems that the parties, while in initial disagreement over specifics, entered this process in an attitude of cooperation. The negotiations
characterized by impasses and subsequent administrative failure (such as in Chicago) initially begin and continue in an atmosphere of conflict and containment, in which racial differences continue to dominate attitudes and negotiations.

**Tripartite bargaining.** Rochester was the only city where the minority community was represented by a single organization rather than a coalition. In Kansas City and New Orleans these coalitions were formed by one or two leading organizations to encourage community participation, rather than to build any type of power base. Only in Chicago was it necessary (or felt to be so) for the coalition to build a body of approximately sixty minority organizations to confront the construction establishment and pressure it into making concessions. The growing pains of the Chicago coalition therefore caused more intra-organizational problems for itself and more impasses in negotiations than in the two cities where the coalitions were really dominated by their leaders. At the time of this writing, in none of the three cities had the coalition maintained itself as an active body supporting the administration of that city's plan. In New Orleans this makes little differences, for the local Urban League graduated from its role as chief negotiator into chief administrator of the New Orleans Plan. In Chicago, however, the collapse of the coalition has been accompanied by failure to implement the negotiated agreement. In Kansas City preliminary research showed the implementation staff to be without much central direction or support for establishing training and hiring programs.
In only one case, New Orleans, did the concessions gained in negotiations significantly favor the initial proposal of the minority community. In every other case the final agreement more closely resembled the initial proposals of the union and contractor parties. It is significant that New Orleans brought together three factors that were absent elsewhere: first, there was a strong and continuing minority-contractor partnership; second, that partnership's initial demands were moderate rather than extreme, proposing hiring goals considerably below the total community population percentage; and third, several unions were currently under threat of Title VII suits or court-imposed referral programs.

In the other cities the minority representatives negotiated on their own; in at least two of the three cases they faced a united union-contractor partnership which held out either for its initial proposals or for final agreements granting it continued control over the union entry routes. In Rochester, as has already been mentioned, when one minority organization insisted on extreme hiring goals, the industry partners simply discontinued negotiations and found an experienced community organization which did accept the industry's moderate hiring proposals and administrative control over the program. Without alternative community organizations in competition with one another for status or influence in the minority-employment arena, this tactic would have been impossible in Rochester. It is debatable, however, whether the outcome then would have been additional concessions from either party, or no agreement at all.

Manpower planning. There was no apparent trend for goal or control issues to dominate negotiations. In Chicago both issues were
present, a result of the mixed motives and composition of the coalition. The control issue seemed most important to those members of the coalition who felt no agreement would be implemented if left up to the discretion of the industry. In New Orleans, control was also the most important issue, but for another party. The unions insisted on majority representation, for they feared minority-contractor joint voting, and held up negotiations for some time on this point. Neither issue seemed of great importance in negotiating the Kansas City or Rochester plans, possibly because the former was a hastily-negotiated agreement to forestall federal intervention and to upset existing Outreach programs as little as possible, while in the latter the agreement included a healthy training contract for the minority organization. All hometown agreements likely include some form of "side payments" of this sort.

While goal and control issues varied across negotiations, all agreements had in common a silence on manpower-planning details—that is, on the type of training to be provided minority applicants, both classroom and on-the-job, on the assurance of job placements, and on the route to journeyman status and union membership. Each agreement contained vague guidelines that "appropriate training shall be provided," and that applicants could advance to journeyman status through the trainee or advanced trainee categories, but the hard details of training specifics, length of training and work experience, and relationship to existing apprenticeship programs were smoothed over in negotiations. In Chicago this proved to be the undoing of implementation efforts, for individual unions were under little pressure and had no central direction to set up training programs or accept trainees. The same problems can be expected in the other cities,
where the unions accepted these new entry categories presuming that operational difficulties could be overcome later. The experience in these cities so far suggests, however, that most plan placements are in the journeyman and apprentice categories, and that no plan has yet successfully devised new training programs as alternatives to the traditional routes to journeyman status in the construction trades. This is especially disappointing because the trainee and advanced-trainee categories were the crucial rules changes for attracting minority applicants and facilitating their progress to journeyman certification and union membership.
C. THE SUBSTANCE OF HOMETOWN AGREEMENTS:
MAJOR RULES CHANGES AND COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE TO DATE

Hometown plans contain, as a rule, the following general provisions for increasing minority participation in construction.

1. Purpose of the agreement.
2. Signatory parties.
3. Geographical scope of the work covered.
4. Eligibility of minority residents.
5. Goals.
6. Duration of the agreement.
7. Administration (composition and voting of administrative and operations committees).
8. Recruitment.
9. Training (programs and staff).
10. Classification of workmen (journeyman, advanced trainee, trainee, and apprentice).
11. Grievance procedures.
12. Financing.
13. Record keeping.

Most of these provisions were specified in Secretary of Labor Shultz's "model hometown agreement." Although that model was not intended to be a "boilerplate" copy to be followed, it appears that most hometown agreements have in fact done so. A contributing factor to the similarity

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of hometown agreements is the scrutiny of OFCC approval. To gain this, an agreement must include minority participation on its staff, apply to all construction (public or private) performed within the jurisdiction of the system, include all minority groups, specify goals and timetables for each signatory craft, etc. — in other words, fit a standard form. The only categories in which there are measurable rule differences are the goals specified in the agreement and the voting composition of the administrative and operations committees which have overall responsibility for directing the plan.

Preliminary field work indicated that even these two categories were determined more by compromises in negotiations than by any labor-market or other contexts prevailing in the system. The one exception to this is the impact of existing minority membership in each signatory trade on the goals specified for that trade in the agreement. It has been suggested that those trades with the lowest minority memberships will be most likely to maintain the status quo. This argues that their commitments to minority hiring will be lower than other unions signatory to a plan, or if they are somehow encouraged to commit themselves to share equally in accepting minority placements, their actual placement record will fall short of the other (more integrated) trades. Unfortunately, the EEO-3 union membership data are not specific enough to test this "rich-get-richer" proposition; figures are not released on each union.

The negotiated hometown agreements, then, as recorded and approved documents, seem to offer little variance of interest to explain. Each hometown web of rules is, on paper, greatly similar to every other hometown

21Lipsky and Rose (1971).
document. It is in the implementation of these rules, as it is in their negotiation, that hometown systems exhibit significant differences.

The similarity in hometown rules can be put into perspective by noting the three outcomes of hometown negotiations: (1) the new rules expressed in a signed document, (2) a reorganization of industrial relations actors, agencies, and procedures to effect these new rules, and (3) changed minority employment patterns. There is a temporal ordering to these outcomes, with rules preceding reordered structures, and structures preceding employment changes. There seems little variance across hometown documents, and employment patterns will require some time before they reflect hometown hiring and training changes, but there is merit in examining the reordered hometown structures as the intermediary between the rules and their employment effects.

Further to the specifications of the research proposed, therefore, it was decided to examine the organization of implementation of selected hometown plans. Preliminary research indicated three implementation models in operation: (1) "farming out" the implementation (recruitment, training, and placement) to an existing minority organization; (2) "hiring on" personnel to staff a specially-created agency; or (3) allowing the industry (unions and contractors) to take full responsibility for the operation of the plan. The following section expands on these impressions.
D. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HOMETOWN SOLUTIONS

One of the outcomes of hometown negotiations is the set of procedures for administering the new employment rules. The test of any agreement is in the application of these rules. Accordingly, this study tentatively examined the organization of implementation and the institutional experiences in different local systems. Figure 3 arranges these outcome factors in terms of the implementation models and questions to be asked of these new institutional arrangements. Prior developmental factors are also noted in Figure 3.

Hometown negotiators can select from three possible organizational models for administering their plan. The first is a subcontracting model which "farms out" the implementation functions of recruitment, training, and job referral to an existing minority organization with experience in this field. The third is a retained-responsibility model which allocates to the industry partners (unions and contractors) full responsibility for the implementation of the plan. Between these two lies the second approach, which is an organizational-genesis model. Here the three parties share the responsibility of creating a special agency and hiring personnel to staff this body and to carry out the implementation functions.

Two of the four cities examined so far--New Orleans and Rochester--have chosen the first approach. The other two--Kansas City and Chicago--have selected the second model. Only one city with a hometown plan--Boston--seemed to be shifting to the third model of implementation from an initial subcontracting arrangement. Whichever choice negotiators make--and there

\[22\] Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965), p. 133.
FIGURE 3

The Development, Substance, and Implementation of Hometown Agreements

1. DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS
   A. Environmental variables
   B. Negotiations processes

2. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OUTCOMES
   1. Substantive rules changes
   2. The organization of implementation
      a) Implementation models:
         subcontracting
         organizational-genesis
         retained-responsibility
      b) Research questions:
         correlates of different models
         operational problems of different models
         placement performance of different models
   3. Changed minority employment patterns
are no a priori reasons for predicting one model over another--there are serious issues of control and coordination, start-up time and performance associated with different models. These issues arise from the assumption that the procedural goal of every hometown plan is to recruit and place qualified minority applicants into the employment process presently managed through the apprenticeship system and the union hiring hall. More control is retained by the industry under the third approach than if it either shares responsibility or subcontracts; the reverse is true for the minority community. Problems of coordinating administrative policies and operational practices between the hometown plan and the existing industrial relations system increase as one moves from a retained-responsibility model to an organizational-genesis or subcontracting model. The organizational-genesis model involves a lengthy start-up time to hire and orient new personnel, which delays the implementation performance of that body. Start-up time is minimized under the retained-responsibility and subcontracting models, but there are no a priori reasons to expect differential performance of the implementation functions under the two approaches.

Preliminary interviews indicated definite start-up problems and performance difficulties in the two cities--Chicago and Kansas City--which followed the organizational-genesis model. Coordination with the construction training and hiring-hall functions in these cities also delayed and hampered the implementation of these plans. In Rochester and New Orleans, where the subcontracting approach was followed, there were different experiences. New Orleans had no start-up problems, and also few instances of conflict in the areas of control and coordination between the subcontracting agency and the construction establishment. A major
reason was the actors involved—the subcontract was awarded to the Urban League and directed by the former Outreach (LEAP) administrator who knew the industry and its leaders well. In Rochester, although there were no start-up problems and the industry was having difficulty coordinating its policies and practices with those of the subcontractor. The minority organization was allegedly referring unqualified applicants for construction jobs and failing to perform its recruiting functions; as well, that organization appeared to be referring construction applicants to manufacturing openings in local industries. This was an effective manpower-utilization technique, but it diminished possible construction placements under the Rochester Plan. In fact, the contractor parties indicated that, if they had it to do over again, they would opt for a retained-responsibility model.

Although the present study cannot do so, any further research should examine three general questions regarding the organization of implementation among hometown plans. First, are these different implementation models related to different developmental conditions? That is, are system elements such as contexts, negotiation actors and proposals, and existing (pre-plan) institutional resources related to the choice of a given implementation model, and if so, in what way?

Second, are there identifiable problems and operational difficulties associated with different models? These problems and difficulties will include such items as start-up time under the organizational-genesis approach, control and coordination under the subcontracting approach, and operational coordination among administrative committee members, operations committee members, and implementation staff under all approaches.
Third, what are the placement experiences under different models? Does any one model appear superior in terms of reaching its goals or building towards these goals? Of particular importance to this question is the use of the trainee and advanced trainee categories. These are the unique rules of hometown plans. Do these implementation models succeed in opening and filling these new entry routes, or are hometown construction placements concentrated in the traditional apprenticeship and journeyman categories?

The nature of hometown-plan experiences and the state of industrial relations "theory" in this area and in this study discourage taking a formal hypothesis-testing approach. Rather, further hometown-plan information would best be gathered and organized through an exploratory research design and case studies. In spite of the shortcomings of this method, it is ideally suited to investigating the actual organization and operation of minority employment programs in large urban areas. As well, in the absence of reliable labor-market data at the local (city) level across the country, case studies seem at this stage an unavoidable research choice.

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III IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

The important implications of this research have already been indicated in the PROJECT SUMMARY. They relate to policy, practice, and program efforts. This section will reiterate and expand on these points.

Firstly, the faith of hometown planners is seriously discouraged by what they see as inconsistent federal policy, sporadic enforcement of that policy, and lack of local support for effectuating policy. Our interviews indicated that:

1. Some hometown interviewees complained about the federal authorities' changing ground rules on equal employment opportunity requirements. They distrusted any federal policy statements, and felt that the hometown approach was either a smokescreen to avoid enforcing EEO regulations or a token offering to precede the imposition of hiring plans. One particular industry representative complained of unclear directions and inconsistent advice from a federal consultant supposedly assisting that city's hometown negotiations --- and how could he trust the agencies if he couldn't trust the agents? Some justification for suspicion could be found in the funding of the first Chicago Plan; it was clearly an inadequate and incomplete document, but was apparently supported and funded for purposes of political expediency.

2. Whatever the policy of the moment, it suffered from sporadic enforcement. It was a fact at the time of this research that few federal construction projects had been shut down for EEO violations, and that hometown planners were justified in feeling that their program too would
lack the teeth of strong enforcement. One industry representative indicated a lack of anxiety even if sanctions were applied; the demand for schools, hospitals, office buildings, and other construction would be temporarily postponed but not eliminated.

3. Policy effectuation appeared significantly hampered by lack of local-level support. Federal assistance is spread in a thin average across the country, concealing the fact that it is concentrated in some urban areas and non-existent in others. The Chicago Plan suffered through various forms and stages of federal intervention, whereas negotiations in New Orleans apparently profited from less visible assistance. Kansas City and Rochester indicated a lack of continuous and consistent contact and support from federal field personnel. It is important to note, however, that a federal agency in this area walks a tightrope. Policy obviously is on the side of the minority community in hometown programs, and any federal intervention generally will be regarded as supporting that party. This is especially true where the minority community needs advice and some additional "clout" to bargain from strength. This renders impartial third-party assistance a practical impossibility for federal agents. If hometown plans were truly intended to be voluntary grass-roots efforts, anything less than a federal "hands-off" practice is bound to be viewed by industry representatives with suspicion.

The second set of implications relates to the practical aspects of ensuring desired policy results. In the case of hometown plans, these results should focus on a continuing supply of, and jobs for, qualified minority tradesmen. To secure these results and the success of the hometown
program requires organizational commitment to any hometown plan, ade-
quately designed and staffed training programs, assurances of post-train-
ing placement and follow-up, and effective complaint procedures and sanc-
tions (with teeth in them). In these respects, hometown practices must,
at the time and on the basis of this research, be given poor to failing
marks. Parties to hometown agreements were, in most cases, only partially
committed to and supportive of implementation efforts. Even where funding
had been granted or assured, hometown specifications and initial staff
hiring provided little assurance of training success. Placement activi-
ties were minimal and sporadic, and many recruits were dropping out at
various stages along the way. Effective complaint procedures are lack-
ing in almost all agreements; few grievances can be refereed by impartial
third parties, and the federal record in applying sanctions to EEO vio-
lators provides little reason for optimism regarding hometown experiences.

Finally, federal programs such as the hometown-plans effort are
hampered by a liability and an encumbrance. The liability is the lack
of helpful labor-market data (however accurate) at a local level to guide
program choices. (More will be said about this in the RECOMMENDATIONS to
follow.) The encumbrance is the proliferation of local and federally-
funded agencies, programs, and individuals all with some responsibility
for enforcing equal employment opportunity and some interest in acquir-
ing a share of further funds. The experience of the first Chicago Plan
and that of at least two-thirds of our sample indicated that various local

24This is a

ial problem with the hometown program, where trainee
and advanced-train
gories conflict head-on with the traditional appren-
ticeship-to-journeyman route of the industry.
parties were more dedicated to the pursuit of the federal buck than the achievement of hometown-plan goals. Federal policy in this area must, therefore, consider some integration of enforcement efforts and the removal of dysfunctional program duplications.
IV CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The conclusions one can reach on the basis of this research leave little room for optimism. With respect to hometown-plan substance and implementation, the lack of specificity and multitude of program problems have already been noted. With respect to developmental processes, hometown plans seem guided by little structural logic; they have even been negotiated in the face of falling construction demand. Plans seem to be developed mainly among highly visible cities — large urban centers with substantial minority populations. One pessimistic possibility is that the structural results of Part II (A) may indicate that the "rich-get-richer" — that the success of the hometown program simply mirrors the prevailing patterns of union integration.

With respect to the conduct of hometown negotiations, these processes were most influenced by the motives and the relative power of the participants. One might conclude from this that the hometown program had two divergent effects. On the one hand it provided formal help and an impetus to those parties who might have developed such a program anyway. On the other, however, it simply added frustration and wasted resources among those parties and cities where equal employment opportunity efforts have had the least historical success.

The recommendations of this report for future research are two-fold. The first is to pursue the implementation issues raised in Part II (D). The heart of the hometown program clearly consists of the placement results it achieves, and the organizational machinery established in particular
cities to provide for a continued flow of minorities into the crafts. The research completed under this grant has been unable to deal with these issues of implementation, but the strategy for effecting this research recommendation has been outlined earlier in this report.

The second recommendation is to establish a data base of labor-market information on the local (city) level which would encourage and assist this type of research, as well as guide future program choice. The data base itself should include major labor-market supply indicators (gathered from age, sex, racial, etc. characteristics of the working-age population) and demand variables (wage rates, unemployment rates, payroll employment, etc.) across major industry groupings and important population sub-groupings. Both an integration and reconciliation of the various figures now collected and published by diverse agencies of the government and private industry, and an extension of the data base to include a more comprehensive sample of cities (both inner cities and SMSAs) would be helpful to much present research activity, as well as invaluable for future work. The problems encountered in this research project on hometown plans are testimony to such a need.
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