ABSTRACT

With survey data from college and noncollege youth and their parents collected in the spring of 1969 for CBS News by Daniel Yankelovich Inc., this investigation evaluates existing theories of the youthful protest involvement of the 1960s. The analysis shows that youthful alienation, critical perspectives on society, and rejection of traditional values, contribute to the protest behavior of youth, and that these personal dispositions are, in turn, encouraged by various factors in the social backgrounds, family environments, and educational contexts of young people. These findings are generally consistent with theories that hold that the social backgrounds and family experiences of young people predispose them toward protest involvement. However, the analysis also reveals that the social class backgrounds of youth and academic standing of the colleges and universities they attend strongly encourage protest activity independently of personal dispositions, such as youthful alienation, social criticism, and traditional values. The sizable independent contributions of family SES and school quality lead to alternative interpretations of the protest movement in terms of the "dynamics of disorderly politics" and the "political incorporation of the student status," and to suggestions for further analyses of these data. (Author)
FINAL REPORT

Project No. 1-A-038
Grant No. OEG-1-71-0013 (509)

William J. Bowers
and
Glenn L. Pierce

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For Applied Social Research
Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts 02115

STUDENT UNREST
AND THE IMPACT OF EXTRA-INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS

August 1974

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HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

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With survey data from college and non-college youth and their parents, collected in the spring of 1969 for CBS News by Daniel Yankelovich Inc., this investigation evaluates existing theories of the youthful protest involvement of the 1960s. The analysis shows that youthful alienation, critical perspectives on society, and rejection of traditional values, contribute to the protest behavior of youth, and that these personal dispositions are, in turn, encouraged by various factors in the social backgrounds, family environments, and educational contexts of young people. These findings are generally consistent with theories which hold that the social backgrounds and family experiences of young people predispose them toward protest involvement. However, the analysis also reveals that the social class backgrounds of youth and academic standing of the colleges and universities they attend strongly encourage protest activity independently of personal dispositions such as youthful alienation, social criticisms, and traditional values. The sizable independent contributions of family SES and school quality lead to alternative interpretations of the protest movement in terms of the "dynamics of disorderly politics" and the "political incorporation of the student status," and to suggestions for further analyses of these data.
PREFACE

In the spring of 1969, CBS News engaged Daniel Yankelovich Inc. to conduct a survey of college and non-college youth and their parents for a three part television documentary on the conflict between the generations in American society. The design of this survey is uniquely suited to test a number of ideas about the roots of youthful protest in the late 1960s. We are grateful to CBS News for making these survey data available for secondary analysis, to the Yankelovich organization for the quality and richness of the data, and, of course, to the young people and their parents whose participation in the survey makes them the subjects of our analysis.

The data were initially obtained from CBS News in 1970 when the principal investigator was a Visiting Fellow at the National Institute for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. The Fellowship provided for a preliminary analysis of attitudes toward and contact with the police among college and non-college protesters. Some findings of this first phase of our work are incorporated in Chapters 2 and 3 of the present report. For their assistance in this preliminary work, I would like to thank Alex Seidler and Karen Ohlin.

The present analysis is a fully collaborative effort. Glenn Pierce and I have jointly planned each step of the analysis, studied the results of each set of tabulations or computer runs, decided on the next step to be taken, and so on. The analysis has profited enormously from Glenn's sensitivity to the underlying story in the data and from his patient but relentless pursuit of leads which I might have otherwise missed or mistakenly dismissed. And, I am especially indebted to him for time and effort far beyond what the available funds could support.

Others have provided us with valuable assistance. Richard Carter and his staff at the Northeastern University Computation Center have responded with dispatch to our requests for service. Robert Mackler has taken on the task of preparing this manuscript with remarkable patience and good humor. David Kamens and John Meyer have contributed useful leads for the interpretation of findings in response to my soundings. I am glad for this opportunity to express my thanks for their various contributions.

We trust that the further work we have in mind with these data will profit from the insights, criticisms, and suggestions of those who read this report.

WILLIAM J. BOWERS
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INTRODUCTION

Between the 1950s and the 1960s, observers of the American college scene went from lamenting the apathy and conformity of college students by acquiescing their unreflective and unrestrained protest activities. Studies conducted during the 1950s characterized students as "status-oriented," "other-directed," and complacent about social and political issues (Hesman, 1956; Jacob, 1957; Goldsen et al., 1960.) A decade later, the range and vehemence of protest activity among college students not only attracted considerable public attention, but also generated serious concern among educators (Special Committee on Campus Tensions, 1970; Carnegie Commission, 1971) and among officials of federal and state government (President's Commission on Campus Unrest, 1970; New York State Temporary Commission, 1970) about the place and consequences of political activism on the college campus.

This abrupt change in the political mood of young people, which began to be apparent in the early 1960s, was undoubtedly encouraged by the emerging Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s and the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s. The profoundly moral appeal and open leadership structure of the Civil Rights Movement provided a stimulus to direct political action and opportunities to learn organizational skills and protest tactics. The election of a youthful President from America's Catholic minority in 1960 signaled a turn toward liberalism at the national level. The subsequent creation of programs such as the Peace Corps and VISTA represented an invitation specifically to young people to enter the realm of government and to undertake the serious business of political and social reform. The recruitment of academics from the nation's leading universities to serve as advisors and office holders in the national administration clearly marked a new role in government for intellectuals--a dramatic turning away from the oppressive (Joe) McCarthy era of the early 1950s. These developments drew the attention of many young people to America's most serious and urgent social problems and to the roles they might play in solving them.

Behind these recent historical developments observers have seen several long-term social and cultural trends in American society. These include: (1) changes in the relationship between the generations, involving increased discontinuity and conflict in values and experiences between youth and their elders (Mannheim, 1940; Eisenstadt, 1956); (2) changes in the status of youth in society, involving the prolongation of adolescence and delayed entry into marriage and occupational markets concurrently with earlier physical maturity and acquisition of social skills (Mead, 1969; Douglas, 1970); and (3) changes in the structure and functions of higher education in America, involving the development of the "multiversity," the impersonalization of the educational process, growing federal investment in university based research, and shifting faculty interest from undergraduate to graduate education (Kerr, 1963; Blau,
These general trends have been viewed as sources of mounting frustration and alienation among youth which may have served as an important ingredients, if not prerequisites, in the development of the protest movement of the 1960s.

Social analysts have framed a number of more specific explanations for youthful protest activity, in terms of societal "socialization" (Katz, 1967). The ascendency of a "feudal culture" in most of our cities, the alienation of the "modern child" in many urban areas, and the alienation of students (both socially and politically) from the broad structure of society (Neuberg and Walker, 1969), to mention just a few. These and other theories vary in the importance they ascribe to social origins and class, family relations, youth culture, and occupational commitments, as well as the contexts in which socialization or status articulation processes contribute to protest activity. Some stress the development and transmission of values and attitudes which dispose young people towards protest, while others emphasize socialization processes as a result of recruitment and selection processes in higher education. Others acknowledge that institutions of higher education have played an active, but indirect part in the protest movement through their effects on the forms of youth culture that emerge and the kinds of occupational commitments students develop in college. Still others argue that colleges and universities have independently and directly generated protest activity. They assert that the college experience has encouraged the kinds of personal dispositions that lead to protest and has confronted students with frustrations, opportunities, and relationships that promote such activity. The role of the educational context in the protest movement of the 1960s is, of course, crucial in determining whether it is or was a "youth movement" or more narrowly a "student movement".

The most general aim of our upcoming analysis will be to evaluate and explain the theories of youthful protest involvement in the 1960s. This will involve examining the effects of various extra-institutional factors which have been advanced as important contributors to the protest activity of this period and assessing the influence of educational contexts where the protest activity was organized and carried out. This overall aim can be translated into several more specific research objectives:

1. To examine the ways in which factors involvement, social Origins, class, youth culture, and occupational commitments contribute to protest activity among youth in higher education.

The overall approach of this analysis will be to evaluate the relative importance of these various factors in accounting for the occurrence and persistence of protest activity among young people in the 1960s.
particularly in what Flacks has referred to as the "mass intelligentsia," will actually contribute to protest behavior by promoting a critical perspective on society and its institutions. Family involvement may, on the other hand, tend to mitigate against protest activity by reinforcing commitment to traditional values and subjecting the youngster to normative constraints within the family context. Youth culture, in contrast with the family, may encourage a sense of alienation or separation from society and a disregard for established adult authority. Finally, post-employment contexts or social occupational commitments might be expected to create social bonds to the established order. In effect, we shall try to establish whether and how such extra-institutional factors contribute to involvement in protest behavior.

2. To analyze the relationships among these extra-institutional factors and to evaluate their relative impact on youthful protest behavior. We anticipate that these extra-institutional involvements will be associated with the family and involvement in the youth culture, particularly the youthful "counter-culture" are apt to be relatively incompatible— one leading to protest by promoting disregard for established authority and the other inhibiting protest by reinforcing respect for such authority. As another example, social class and employment contexts may be causally linked. Youngsters from higher status backgrounds may less often be required to work as college students and more often be committed to high status future occupations. These probable connections among the various extra-institutional factors make it clear that we will want to examine separate and joint effects of these factors in contributing to protest activity.

3. To examine the relationships between institutional and extra-institutional factors contributing to protest activity and to assess their independent and joint contributions to such activity. Institutional and extra-institutional contexts are not likely to be altogether independent in their effects. As we have noted above, colleges and universities are apt to have some effects on students' occupational commitments and on the kinds of youth culture or counter-culture that emerges on campus. Or again, social background and family values are likely to determine whether a youngster goes to college and, if so, what kind of college he attends. Thus, protest predisposing values which appear to be associated with social class may actually be acquired in the kind of colleges and universities which upper social class youngsters are more likely to attend. Or, what appears to be parental influence on the attitudes of youngsters may actually be the result of "reverse socialization"— the transmission of attitudes acquired by youngsters in college to their parents.

Our analysis will be based on data collected in the Spring of 1969 for CBS News by Daniel Yankelovich Inc. In this survey, young people across the nation were interviewed on a broad range of political and social orientation, their attitudes and reactions to the behavior and styles of the youth culture, their relations with their families, and their social backgrounds. Moreover, as a part of the CBS News survey, interviews were also conducted with the parents of many of these young people. Many of the questions asked of the
youngsters were repeated in the interviews with their parents. These data therefore provide an especially rich source of information on the family backgrounds and social contexts in which the youngsters grew up and were more or less involved at the time of the survey.

In addition, the CBS News survey included sizable samples of both college and non-college youngsters, thus enabling us to specify the effects of being in college or participation in protest activity. Furthermore, among both youngsters, the interviews were conducted in college and family milieu institutions, thus permitting us to make the impact of social background characteristics on protest activity. In effect, these data are extraordinarily well suited for the evaluation of a number of prevailing theories of protest behavior---explanations which emphasize various extra-institutional contexts and those which stress the role of the college context relative to extra-institutional factors.

We provide further detail of the research design and sampling procedures of the CBS News survey in the final section of this chapter, but first it will be useful to review some of the more important results and methodological issues in the previous research on youthful protest in the 1960s.

Overview of Previous Research on Activism, Militancy, and Protest

Few subjects have received as much empirical investigation from as great a variety of social scientists in so short a period of time. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that protests and demonstrations struck at universities where social scientists work and involved youngsters who were their students. Keniston (1973) has recently identified some 300 empirical investigations of student political activities and attitudes conducted since World War II---the overwhelming majority of them concerned with the protest movement of the 1960s. In this brief overview of the existing research, we shall be able to touch only a few of the more pertinent and influential of these investigations.

Individual Analyses

Most of the empirical research on student activism has centered on the personal characteristics and commitments of campus protesters (Kerby and Beam, 1966; Flacks, 1967; Treat and Grase, 1967). These and other studies (summarized in Keniston, 1968: Appendix B; Lipset, 1969; and Braungart, 1973) typically focused on the most politically active students at schools where protests erupted. They developed a profile of the student activist as a highly articulate, academically capable, and intellectually oriented young person with non-sectarian social and moral concerns. They revealed that activism was certainly the product of personal inadequacies or of frustrations associated with failure in academic work.

Most of these studies show, in addition, that activists tend to come from
relatively high status backgrounds. And, this relationship has been documented not only for the leaders and organizers of protest activity (Westby and Braungart, 1966; Flacks, 1967; Keniston, 1968; Liebert, 1971), but also for followers and rank-and-file participants (Kahn, 1968; H. Astin, 1969b; Geller and Gary, 1969; Gergen and Gergen, 1970). In particular, their parents tend to be highly educated; their fathers often occupy professional positions, more commonly in science and education than in business or engineering; their families tend to be liberal in politics, favoring the Democratic over the Republican Party; and they come disproportionately from non-religious and Jewish backgrounds. Clearly, for the majority of those involved in the protest movement, their participation cannot be explained in terms of social deprivation or disadvantaged position in society. While they have been sympathetic with the most disfavored elements of society, they themselves appear to have come from the ranks of the relatively privileged.

Moreover, some of these studies revealed that the activist's moral sensibility, political liberalism, and intellectual orientation was generally shared by his parents. In his study of seventeen activists who participated in the "Viet Nam Summer" program of 1967, Keniston (1968) concluded that they were "living out" the values learned from their parents. Solomon and Fishman (1964) arrived at a similar conclusion about civil rights and peace demonstrators. And, on the basis of interviews with anti-draft protesters and their parents, Flacks (1967) stated that "activism is related to a complex of values, not ostensibly political, shared by both students and their parents." He argued that "the great majority of these students are attempting to fulfill and renew the political traditions of their families." This interpretation is also consistent with findings of other investigators (Haan, Smith, and Block, 1968; Watts, Lynch and Whittaker, 1969; Yankelovich, 1969; Braungart, 1971).

These findings led Flacks (1967) and Keniston (1968), among others, to argue that the protest activity of the early and middle 1960s had strong roots in the values and commitments of activists' parents. In their views, socialization in upper middle class families, as opposed to generational conflict or "deauthorization," was primarily responsible for the emergence of this protest movement, or at least for individual involvement in it. Furthermore, evidence of a general pattern of value continuity rather than discontinuity between the generations—between the vast majority of non-activists and their parents as well as protesters and their parents—casts serious doubt on explanations of the youthful protest movement in terms of a broad "generation gap." In fact, there is more variation in political and social values within the younger generation, even within the more homogeneous college population, than between generations at a given social class level (Yankelovich, 1970; for a further elaboration of this point, see Lipset and Raub, 1970).

Yet, some measure of structural isolation from the adult generation may be important for the emergence of such a youth movement and for individual participation in it (Eisenstadt, 1956). The development in recent years of a relatively separate and autonomous youth culture with its own life styles, modes of dress, music, etc., at odds with the prevailing norms of the broader society,
would seem to insulate youngsters as they move from adolescence to adulthood in our society (Coleman et al., 1974). What limited research there is on the youth cultural involvement of activists and protesters has shown them to be relatively liberated in their sexual attitudes and in their acceptance of drug use by comparison with other youth (Dorssus, 1968; Katz, 1968; H. Astin, 1969a; Smith, 1971). And, at least one investigation has established a close relationship between modes of dress and radical political commitments (Kelley and Star, 1971). While such youth cultural involvements have commonly been seen as a by-product of radical political commitment, they may also have helped to support and to sustain these political commitments. And, moreover, the youth culture may have served as a recruiting ground from which protesters and demonstrators were drawn as the protest movement grew, particularly in the late 1960s.

Another element of structural isolation may be found in the delayed entry of youth into the occupational structure of society. Studies have shown that protest activity is less common among non-college youth who are more likely to be gainfully employed (CBS News, 1969), among college students who work at least part time during their schooling (Pierce and Bowers, 1974), and among recently employed ex-college students (Maidenberg and Meyer, 1970). Moreover, activists tend to have rejected the more conventional occupational commitments characteristic of youngsters of their social backgrounds and academic abilities. They more often seek creativeness, self-expression, relevance, and meaning in their future occupations; they tend to de-emphasize material gain and security in favor of helping others and changing society (Mock and Heist, 1969; Gurin, 1971). Again, these less conventional occupational commitments may be a consequence of radical political involvement, but they are also very likely to support and to sustain such involvements because they leave the individual free of the constraining influences of conventional occupational requirements and responsibilities.

Efforts have been made to link these various findings into a more general explanation for the youthful protests of the 1960s. For example, Flacks (1970a; 1970b) has argued that socialization within permissive family environments of the growing American intelligentsia has not only made increasing numbers of young persons responsive to the historical and social developments of the 1960s, but also has liberated them from conventional life styles and occupational commitments. Yet, such explanations virtually ignore the institutional context in which the protest movement developed. Colleges and universities are simply taken for granted as the places where protest prone youth found opportunities to express themselves and to organize politically. The level of protest at an institution is seen as merely a function of the kinds of youngsters who congregate there. Are these assumptions consistent with the research literature on institutional differences in the nature and extent of protest activity?

Institutional Analyses

With the spread of campus disruptions and protest activity after the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, research began to focus on the characteristics of the colleges and universities where it occurred. Typically, in these studies,
informed campus representatives (e.g. college presidents, deans of students, study body presidents, student newspaper editors, etc.) provided information on the nature and extent of protest activity at their institutions (Peterson, 1966; 1968; Sasajima, Davis and Peterson, 1968; Astin and Boruch, 1970; Bayer and Astin, 1971; Scott and El-Assul, 1969; Hodgkinson, 1970; Blau and Slaughter, 1971).

These studies documented what casual observers had pointed out— that student protest was concentrated at the nation's leading institutions of higher learning, colleges and universities of the highest academic quality and reputation. They found, in addition, that larger schools appeared to have more organized and disruptive protest demonstrations (Peterson, 1968; Astin and Boruch, 1970; Bayer and Astin, 1971), perhaps because they could provide a "critical mass" of concerned, articulate, intellectually oriented students (Peterson, 1966; cf. Hodgkinson, 1970) and possibly also because of the impersonality and unresponsiveness likely to characterize large, bureaucratic institutions (Scott and El-Assul, 1969; cf. Marwell, 1970).

Aware that institutional differences in protest activity might simply reflect differences in the kinds and numbers of students that institutions enroll, several investigators have tried to incorporate information on the characteristics of students into their analyses of institutional differences in protest activity. The earliest and most influential study of this kind (Astin, 1968) found only slight variations in protest involvement by institution after removing the effects of aggregated student background characteristics in a two step regression analysis. Unfortunately, when individual and institutional characteristics are highly correlated, as in this case, first removing individual background factors in a stepwise regression analysis has the effect of assigning the joint or common variance to the individual characteristics, and may therefore grossly underestimate the institutional effects (see, Werts, 1968; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969; Creager, 1970; Feldman, 1971; Farkas, 1973). Astin himself notes in a revised version of his original paper:

"... our failure to find many environmental characteristics which affect student protest behavior may be due in part to the methodology employed; the use of the institution as the unit of analysis for controlling differential student input characteristics, will tend to obscure peer group effects since the nature of the student peer group is to some extent reflected in the mean characteristics of the entering class." (Astin, 1970a: 100)

It should also be noted that Astin measured protest involvement of freshmen after only one year of college. It seems likely that institutional effects would be more pronounced with a longer exposure to college.

By contrast, a later study by Blau and Slaughter (1971) which controls for "student intellectualism" by including an estimate of it (developed by Astin, 1965) in regression equations with other college characteristics, found that serious protest demonstrations were more common at schools with large faculties and high levels of computer use for administrative purposes, and less common
at those where students evaluate teaching performance and academic departments are innovative. These investigators argue that institutional size and complexity, especially as they are manifested in impersonality and unresponsiveness to students, make a significant contribution to the occurrence of serious protest demonstrations, apart from the intellectualism of the student body. However, this effort to control for student characteristics is also subject to criticism. In particular, the single dimension of student intellectualism may be insufficient as a control for the effects of student characteristics. And, perhaps more problematic, this measure of "student intellectualism" (which incorporates freshman SAT scores, plans for graduate work, to get Ph.D.'s, to enter scientific careers, and the like) may tap academic quality of the institution as well as, or better than, it does student backgrounds.

But beyond the methodological problems of separating individual and institutional effects in these comparative institutional studies, is the difficulty of specifying the particular mechanisms which may be activating different kinds of students in different types of schools. Just as studies of the social backgrounds and personal characteristics of protesters from one or just a few institutions tended to ignore institutional differences in protest activity, so too, these comparative institutional studies which take the university as the unit of analysis, tend to overlook internal processes which may activate specific subgroups of students within different organizational contexts. Thus, to see how specific kinds of institutions— for example, the nation's most prestigious colleges and universities—may activate students, we need to examine the experiences and behavior of various kinds of students within the contexts of interest. This means focusing on the individual student as the unit of analysis and examining the influences he is exposed to as a result of being at one rather than another type of college—what has come to be known as "contextual analysis."

Contextual Analyses

The only investigations which have examined factors associated with individual protest activity in varying institutional contexts clearly suggest that the nation's leading institutions directly encouraged student protest behavior during the 1963-1966 period. Using data on some 946 seniors from 97 colleges and universities, Kahn and Bowers (1970) found that the proportion of students involved in protest behavior was much higher at top ranking colleges and universities than at other categories of schools, apart from the social class backgrounds, academic commitments, fields of study, intellectual orientations or absolute numbers of their students. Further, they show that involvement in the academic side of campus life— as reflected by good grades and long hours spent studying— was related to protest involvement only among students at the more selective and prestigious institutions. This latter point prompted the following interpretation:

At the nation's leading colleges and universities, apparently the academic context itself encourage activism among the more academically committed students. More than others, these schools are supposed to
promote high academic standards and to encourage a critical perspective in a wide variety of areas, including the institutions of contemporary society. Their best students should be those most affected by these environmental influences and, hence, the most perceptive social critics and reformers. Furthermore, as noted above (reference to Ladd, 1969), the most activist faculty members also tend to be found in the nation's high ranking educational institutions; presumably, the top students at these college and universities have the closest contact with faculty members and are the ones most influenced by their attitudes and activist behavior. (Kahn and Bowers, 1970: 46).

In a more detailed examination of these data, Pierce and Bowers (1974) found that student intellectuals, as a campus subgroup, become more politically active than other students over the period from 1963 to 1966 in all college contexts. However, this process of politicization among student intellectuals was especially pronounced at high quality colleges and universities. Moreover, the politicization was intensified by academic commitment, organizational participation and faculty contact at these prestigious institutions. In other words, participation in protest activity was most highly associated with specific student roles and commitments within the organizational contexts of the top ranking schools. The social backgrounds of youngsters naturally play a part in the kinds of roles they assume in college and in the kinds of colleges they attend, but without adopting these roles and commitments at the leading institutions, youngsters of a given social class background were much less likely to become involved in protest activity.

On the basis of these further findings, the investigators suggest that an essential ingredient in the development of youthful protest in the 1960s was the growing articulation between the leading universities and the national political structure which established expectations and opportunities for politically relevant involvements and careers among young people. No doubt, the ascendency of the "new intelligentsia" and the growing autonomy of youth in society were contributing factors, but, they argue, the formative condition was the "chartering" of educational institutions to provide politically relevant careers for young people especially those of distinguished ability and accomplishments. Of course, some measure of protest especially in the mid 60s and later may have been the result of expanding expectations for political involvement without the accompanying opportunities. Notably, this view on the growth of the protest movement also has the virtue that it is consistent with the movement's demise. That is, with the changeover in national administration in 1968 and the ensuing elimination of programs that afforded opportunities for youthful involvement, young people began to become aware that their reformist concerns were no longer welcome in government and the youthful protest movement began to subside.

These contextual analyses have been conducted with rich data on intra-institutional contexts at a large number of colleges and universities. The investigators have been able to examine the effects of curriculum, faculty contact, organizational membership, peer group influences, and so on, in conjunction with college characteristics such as quality, size, residentiality,
and type of control. They have also been able to incorporate information on extra-institutional factors such as social class backgrounds, relations with family, youth cultural involvement and occupational commitments, into the analyses. However, the program of research from which these data came was not designed to focus primarily on questions of student political involvement. Thus, detailed information on the attitudes and orientations of young people toward politics, their desires for social and political reforms, their acceptance of traditional values and established authority, their sympathy for the aims and tactics of protesters, etc.—information that would make it easier to interpret many of the observed effects—is conspicuously lacking. And, of course, these data are restricted to an early period in the development of the protest movement.

The data we will be examining here, by contrast, were explicitly collected to investigate youthful political attitudes, commitments, and behavior. They cover specific aspects of youngsters' social backgrounds and family relations which have come to play an important part in the theories of youthful protest activity, and they cover these issues with data from both young people and their parents. In addition, the diversity of youth in American society is represented with data from students in a number of different college contexts, and with data from non-college youth as well. In some ways, then, these data can serve as a complement to existing research. With information from college and non-college youth and from their parents, these data provide an unusual opportunity to refine the picture of protest involvement which has emerged from previous studies. And, in another way, these data can supplement the existing contextual analyses, since they pertain to a later period in the protest movement of the 1960s, when perhaps the seeds of its demise had already begun to germinate.

The Setting and Data for this Analysis

The protest movement of the 1960s had undergone a number of changes by 1969—the year in which the data we shall examine were collected. The focus of protest activity had shifted from civil rights to the war in Vietnam, the draft, and university policies (Peterson, 1966; 1968). By this time, protests and demonstrations had grown enormously in number and spread from a few of the leading institutions to a very much larger number of colleges and universities across the country. The tactics of protesters were becoming more disruptive, destructive, and violent. Activists were rejecting the movement's initial emphasis on nonviolence in favor of the destruction of property, holding authorities captive, and striking back at the police.

By 1969, the sense of optimism and hopefulness that characterized the movement in the early days was displaced by sentiments of frustration and anger. Politically involved youth found that they were unwelcome at the 1968 National Democratic Party Convention in Chicago, and many others witnessed on television their reception at the hands of the Chicago police. Furthermore, the results of the 1968 election revealed that the country was in no mood for the basic
social reforms that activists and their sympathizers advocated. In the face of the mounting and intensifying conflict between demonstrators and the establishment—of the kind experienced on the Columbia University campus in the Spring of 1968—the public voted for law and order rather than reform.

Yet, protest was still on the rise in 1969. The National Student Association reported that demonstrations had occurred at less than 10 per cent of the nation's colleges in the first six months of 1968 (cited by Bailey, 1970). A survey by the American Council on Education in the 1968-1969 academic year revealed that disruptive protests had occurred in 22 percent of the more than 400 representative institutions surveyed, and that violent demonstrations had erupted in 6 per cent of these institutions (Astin, 1970b).

The high water mark in protest activity came a year later in the aftermath of the Cambodian invasion and the killing of Kent State and Jackson State students by authorities attempting to control student demonstrations. About 30 percent of the nation's campuses experienced some form of student protest in 1970; approximately 100 student strikes were started in each of the four days immediately after the Kent State killings; a march on Washington involving some 60,000 young people was organized in less than a week's time (President's Commission, 1970). The 1970-1971 academic year saw student protest activity recede to about the 1968-1969 level, with slightly fewer disruptive demonstrations but slightly more institutions involved; and by then, press coverage of such demonstrations had fallen considerably below earlier levels (Bayer and Astin, 1969).

The data for this analysis were gathered in the Spring of 1969 by Daniel Yankelovich Inc. for a CBS News television documentary on the "generation gap" in American society. The survey was designed to measure the attitudes, values, and behavior of youth in the age range of 17 through 23. In order to represent the general population of all young people in this age range, both college and non-college youth were sampled. To assess the "gap" between youth and their elders, the parents of many of these youth were also interviewed. A number of the major differences and similarities between young people and their parents were aired in two hour-long television specials in May of 1969 under the program title "CBS Reports: Generations Apart." A more detailed tabulation of these data was also published by CBS News in a pamphlet entitled Generations Apart. For further details of the sampling and data gathering procedures, we quote directly from this pamphlet (CBS News, 1969: 2-3; not copyrighted).

For the purpose of efficiency, two sampling frames were established. The first was a sample of youth on college campuses, and the second was a general household sample. The frames were unduplicated by eliminating from the household frame any college youths living at home.

The college sample was selected in two stages. The first stage consisted of selecting college campuses. All campuses in the country were stratified by geographic region, by public or private type of institution, and by total enrollment over or under 10,000 students. Campuses were selected from each stratum with a probability proportionate
to current enrollment. At each of the 30 campuses selected the interviewer was provided with a general procedure to select approximately 33 students from the available listing of students. The interviewer was then told to screen the names selected to determine the age and current enrollment status, and to interview only those students meeting these criteria. Interviews were completed with 723 students.

The non-college enrolled youth were selected from an area probability sample of the country. Altogether there were 72 segments of approximately 200 housing units each. The sampling procedure was designed to under-represent rural areas. Rural segments were weighted to account for the difference in the sampling rate. All of the housing units in the 72 segments were canvassed by the interviewers and all youth between the ages of 17 and 23 not currently enrolled in college were interviewed. Interviews were completed with 617 youths.

The parents included in the study were designated by a random selection of one-half of the entire youth sample. Once the parents were selected, an attempt was made to interview the parent of the same sex as the youth interviewed. Of the college youth group, 362 parents were interviewed, and of the non-college youth group 301 parents were interviewed.

All youth were questioned by personal interview. The parents were interviewed by personal interview when they had the same residence as the youth. When they lived apart the parent was interviewed by telephone. All interviewing took place during March and April 1969.

In addition (CBS News, 1969:46):

"...the Yankelovich organization selected 100 students known to hold radical views. After subjecting them to the questionnaire [and examining their responses] 24 students among the 100 qualified as 'Revolutionaries.' These additional cases were added, not to the overall totals, but to the tabulations for responses by revolutionaries in order to have a sufficient number of cases to make these responses somewhat meaningful."

For our purposes, this small sample of extremely radical students will be examined in instances where their responses can serve to validate our measure of protest activity or to augment the analysis of extremely radical college youth as a campus subgroup.

Before turning to the analysis of information or data provided by the various samples of youngsters and their parents, we must take a closer look at the samples with which we will be working. In Table 1.1 we present the samples of college and non-college youth and their parents broken down into three age categories of youth--pre-college age, normal college age, and post-college age. For the record, the table also shows the same breakdown for the college "revolutionaries."
Table 1.1

NUMBERS OF YOUTH AND THEIR PARENTS SAMPLED
BY AGE LEVEL AND COLLEGE STATUS OF YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of:</th>
<th>Percentage of Youth with Parents also Sampled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the College Sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-College Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17 years old)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal College Ages</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18 to 21 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-College Ages</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22 and 23 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the Non-College Sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-College Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17 years old)</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal College Ages</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18 to 21 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-College Ages</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22 and 23 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the College &quot;Revolutionaries&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-College Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(17 years old)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal College Ages</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19 to 21 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-College Ages</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22 and 23 years old)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that there were four fewer cases in the data supplied to us by CBS News than indicated in Generations Apart (CBS News, 1969; 2-3, quoted above). Specifically, one case appears to have been lost from the sample of college youth, one from the parents of college youth, and two from the non-college youth sample.
The table shows that in both the college and non-college samples the largest number of respondents come from the normal college age range from 18 to 21 years. However, 38 percent of the non-college sample were of pre-college age, 17 years old in the Spring of 1969; whereas this was so for only 1 percent of the college sample. Hence, the non-college sample is decidedly younger than the college sample by virtue of the fact that it alone contains a significant number of 17 year olds.

One implication is that the non-college sample includes a number of college-bound young people. Although the interview schedule contained no direct question about the college plans of those who had not yet attended college, it will be possible to distinguish college-bound youth from those who do not intend to attend college in an approximate way by their answers to questions about their occupational plans. That is, we may identify those who realistically expect to enter occupations that require a college education as college-bound youth.

A related implication is that many youth of college and post-college ages in the non-college sample may have once attended college. Again, the interview schedule contains no question asking specifically about past college attendance. There is, however, a question that asked all respondents to indicate the extent to which they have been influenced by "your college experience (if any)." Unfortunately, the coding of this question does not permit us to distinguish between those who never attended college and those who attended but experienced little or no influence. We can, however, unambiguously identify non-college youngsters who were influenced by college experience.

One further point to be noted in Table 1.1 is that younger respondents in the non-college sample were more likely than older ones to have their parents interviewed. Since the younger members of this age group are more likely to be residing with their parents, it may have been easier to interview the parents of younger respondents in reaching a quota of one parent for every two young people. Whatever the reason for this disproportionate sampling of parents by age of youth, Table 1.1 makes it clear that any analysis of the data from parents of non-college youth will over-represent the younger age brackets within the non-college sample, just as the sample of non-college youth over-represents the younger age brackets relative to the sample of college youth.

We note these points because they could be a source of difficulty if we were unaware of the need to take them into account in the subsequent analysis. Thus, in strict comparisons between college and non-college youngsters or their parents, it will be desirable to examine the sample within comparable youth age categories. And, in instances in which we wish to assess the effects of college attendance per se, it will be necessary to remove youngsters from the non-college sample "who have been influenced by college experience." Furthermore, these were only minor difficulties since the primary focus of our investigation will be on the college youth among whom most of the youthful activism and protest activity is concentrated. For this sample, as shown in Table 1.1, we have a substantial number of youngsters within the normal college age range, and parents were evidently sampled quite independently of the age of their offsprings. As the
table also shows, parents of the small sample of revolutionaries were not interviewed.

With this background in mind, we are now ready to begin the empirical analysis of youthful protest behavior. Our first step, the task of Chapter 2, is to develop and validate an index of protest activity that can serve reliably to measure the extent of protest involvement among young people. Next, in Chapter 3, we attempt to determine differences in perspective among youth at various levels of protest activity by comparing their political beliefs, the tactics they advocate, the rhetoric they use, and the reforms they propose. Then, in Chapter 4, we examine how institutional characteristics contribute to youthful protest activity, both directly and through the impact they may have on the personal dispositions and values of students. And finally, in Chapter 5, we see how extra-institutional factors--class and status, family context, youth culture, and occupational commitment--operating alone and in conjunction with institutional characteristics contribute to individual involvement in protest activity.

Notes to Chapter 1

1. As a qualification, Kenniston (1973) has recently noted... evidence of similarity in attitudes and values between young and their parents may have tended to divert research attention from the presence and effects of intergenerational differences and conflict.

2. As evidence that the academic quality of the institution plays a relatively minor role in serious protest activity, Blau and Slaughter (1971:483) report that various indicators of faculty quality (proportion Ph.D.'s, orientation to research, scholarly publications, etc.) which have relatively strong zero order correlations with protest demonstrations show negligible effects when they are introduced into the regression equation with other institutional characteristics. However, this may occur because school quality is already strongly incorporated in the other variables in the equation, especially student intellectualism and faculty size which have the strongest effects on student demonstrations (beta weights = .24 and .32, respectively). As noted in the text, student intellectualism undoubtedly incorporates aspects of school quality as well as student backgrounds, and the use of faculty size rather than student enrollment to represent institutional size surely introduces a further element of school quality in the equation. Notably, Blau and Slaughter (1971:483, footnote 11) report that one of the indicators of faculty quality--proportion of Ph.D.'s on the faculty--reduces the effect of student intellectualism noticeably (the beta weight drops from .24 to .16). Apparently the effect of student intellectualism is not wholly due to characteristics of the student body. With a composite index of faculty quality instead of six indicators examined separately, and with student enrollment as the measure of institutional size in the regression equation, it seems quite likely that institutional quality would emerge as a significant independent predictor of serious protest demonstrations.
CHAPTER 2
THE MEASUREMENTS OF PROTESTS ACTIVITY

Our first task is to develop a measure of protest activity that differentiates youngsters according to the number and kinds of protests they have engaged in. Care must be taken to select indicators that unambiguously reflect protests behavior. Thus, we wish to avoid conventional forms of political involvement that may lead to subsequent protests involvement, but do not, in themselves represent such political or social protests behavior. Likewise, we wish to avoid radical ideological commitment which may result from prior protest involvement or be linked with a desire for further activity but not actually constitute such behavior. In other words, the first and foremost concern of this chapter will be with a measure of protest activity not with its causes, consequences, or correlates. Indicators of conventional political involvement and radical ideological commitment will be helpful in the present context to the extent that they enable us to validate the measure of protest activity to be developed.

A second concern of this chapter will be comparisons between college and non-college youth. Most research on the protest movement of the 1960's has focused exclusively on college students; and indeed, there has been a tendency in the literature to define it as a "student" rather than a "youth" movement. By contrast, in this chapter and the next one, college and non-college youngsters will share the stage equally. And, in later chapters when the spotlight focuses on the college sample, non-college youth will continually reappear as a reference point or comparison group. Our analysis will thereby permit us to isolate and assess the impact of the college context in promoting and sustaining the youth protest movement of the late 1960's.

We begin this chapter by examining the involvement of college and non-college youngsters in a number of protest-related activities—conventional political involvements and radical ideological commitments, as well as specific forms of protest behavior. We then turn to the selection of indicators for our measure of protest activity and examine how the resulting index is associated with the other protest-related involvements in both the college and non-college samples. We conclude with evidence designed to establish the inter-sample comparability of our protest index, and to draw attention to differences in sympathy and support for the goals of protesters within and outside of the college context.

Protest-Related Involvements

Although most of the CBS news survey was concerned with opinions about social and political issues, one battery of questions asked youngsters about their protest-related involvements as well. Specifically, the question
asked: "Which of the following have you yourself been involved in?"

Table 2.1 presents the nine protest-related involvements as they were listed, and shows the percent who report having engaged in each for both college and non-college samples.

It is immediately evident from the table that such involvements are much more common among college than among non-college youth. Everyone of the nine involvements is reported by a greater percentage of the college youngsters. In fact, with the exception of "been arrested," the last one listed, college students were more than twice as likely as their non-college counterparts to have engaged in each of these activities.

A closer look at the table reveals that while they differ in extent of involvement, college youth are alike in the kinds of activities they became involved in. Thus, "organizational meetings" and "political campaigns" rank first and second respectively in both samples and they are far ahead of "marches," the third ranking involvement in both samples. At the other extreme, "joining organizations like SDS and YAF" and "riots" rank last and next to last respectively in both samples.

Table 2.1

PER CENT OF RESPONDENTS ENGAGING IN EACH OF NINE PROTEST-RELATED INVOLVEMENTS AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest-Related Involvements</th>
<th>non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization meetings</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights protests</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining organization like SDS and YAF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been arrested</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>(615)</td>
<td>(722)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To get a better idea of the comparability in profiles of protest-related involvements between the two samples, we present each activity as a percentage of the total number of such activities reported in each sample in Table 2.2. With the two samples so adjusted, the remaining differences between the distributions are exclusively a function of differences in patterns of such involvement between college and non-college youth.

The distributions are now remarkably similar. Five of the nine involvements are separated by no more than three points. The largest discrepancy (five percentage points) occurs in "been arrested." As a proportion of all involvements, having been arrested is twice as prevalent in the non-college sample. (It remains true, of course, that having been arrested is more often reported by college youth, as shown in Table 1.) "Marches" and "civil rights protest" comprise a slightly greater proportion of the involvements among college students. Yet, these differences are overshadowed by the general comparability in pattern of protest related activity between the two samples.

Clearly, the main difference between college and non-college youth is not in the pattern but rather in the extent of such involvements. As the bottom row of Table 2.2 indicates, college students reported 1.70 involvements per student as compared to .62 involvements among the non-college youth—almost a three to one ratio in the extent of such involvements.

Table 2.2
EACH PROTEST-RELATED INVOLVEMENT AS A PER CENT OF ALL SUCH INVOLVEMENTS REPORTED BY COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest-Related Involvements</th>
<th>Non-college Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational meetings</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights protests</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining organizations like SDS and YAF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been arrested</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Involvements</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>1222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Involvements per respondents</td>
<td>(.62)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fact that the difference is primarily one of extent rather than kinds suggests that the college environment may primarily play a facilitating role for those who wish to engage in such activities. It may be that college and non-college youth are equally desirous of becoming involved in such activities but that the college context provides opportunities for organizing and mobilizing protest activities which are unavailable to non-college youth. (Cf. Keniston's, 1968: 310, on the "protest conducive environment" and Peterson, 1968: 17 on "critical mass.") The data from the CBS news survey provide an opportunity to test this possibility. Each respondent was asked for those activities he had not yet been involved in, "which of these would you like to be involved in?" In Table 2.3 we present the percent desiring to engage in each activity among those who have not yet done so for college and non-college youth.

Once again there is a substantial difference between college and non-college youth. For eight of the nine actions the percentage of college students desiring to become involved is more than twice that for the non-college sample, despite the fact, shown in Table 2.1 that many more college than non-college youngsters have already become involved in such activities. Indeed, the differences between the two samples in desire for future involvement are quite comparable to those in extent of previous involvement. Whatever additional opportunities for protest related activity the college campus may provide, it would seem also to stimulate the desire for such activities.

Table 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest-related Involvements</th>
<th>Non-college Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>9(594)</td>
<td>23(636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>6(587)</td>
<td>15(643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>1(599)</td>
<td>4(677)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>9(575)</td>
<td>26(553)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>28(529)</td>
<td>55(448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization meetings</td>
<td>15(496)</td>
<td>28(349)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights protests</td>
<td>10(590)</td>
<td>29(618)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining organization like SDS and YAF</td>
<td>4(608)</td>
<td>8(696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been arrested</td>
<td>1(577)</td>
<td>3(655)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, the pattern of desire for future protest-related involvements is, with one notable exception, quite similar to the pattern of past protest-related involvements. The major difference is that "political campaigns" is by far the most desired involvement for both college and non-college youth who have not yet done so. Twice as many youngsters in each sample would like to become involved in political campaigns than any other of the other activities on the list. Thus, while organization meetings were the most common protest-related activity in both samples, political campaigns are by far the most desired activity. Otherwise, the rank order of desires and previous involvements are quite close. Perhaps the only other notable change is that civil rights protests have moved ahead of marches in terms of desire for further involvement in both samples, perhaps because of their issue-related content.

Thus, it would appear that among both college and non-college youth the kinds of activities youngsters have become involved in are, for the most part, the same kinds of things they wish to engage in. The fact that political campaigns rank far ahead of other involvements in terms of desire, suggests that the youngsters in both samples are looking toward conventional forms of political activity as a means of achieving social reform. This particular involvement represents a commitment to working within the political system for social change.

*Indication of Protest Activity*

Just as the nine protest-related involvements were not all equally prevalent, neither are they all equally suitable as candidates for an index of protest activity. While some items refer to specific forms of social and political protest, others are only vaguely associated with such protest activity. For instance, some reflect political commitment without any protest component, some refer to memberships which imply a commitment to protest but do not explicitly indicate protest activity, some indicate protest involvement but do not specify the particular form the protest has taken, and finally, some reflect the possible consequences of protest activity without necessarily indicating such involvement. Let us consider these specific items in more detail as candidates for our index of protest activity. We turn first to those we have decided to exclude from the index, beginning with the most obvious exclusions and moving to the more ambiguous or problematic ones.

**Been arrested:** This item has no necessary protest or even political content. It is quite possible that some youngsters have been arrested as a result of their protest activity, but certainly others have been arrested for quite different and unrelated activities. Thus, having been arrested may be, at best, a partial reflection of protest activity because it is sometimes a consequence of such activity.
Political campaigns: This item is clearly political in nature but it lacks protest content. Those involved in political campaigns may have worked for social change and may have supported candidates who oppose the "establishment." No doubt, some who indicated such involvement were referring to participation in the 1968 McCarthy campaign in which students played an important role. Yet this is institutionalized political activity, not the politics of protest involving uninstitutionalized tactics of confrontation or direct action on behalf of a social cause.

Organization meetings: This item is perhaps the vaguest one on the list since it leaves the nature and purpose of such meetings unspecified. Perhaps most would infer that the item makes reference to political meetings of some sort, and it might be argued that organizational meetings of any kind are essentially a political activity. But, in any case, there is no necessary connection between such involvements and protest activity. Organizational meetings may lead to specific form of direct protest behavior.

Civil rights protests: This item and the next one clearly reflect a commitment to protest; in this respect they are closer to the mark than the three we have already considered. However, this particular item refers not to a specific form or protest action but to an issue that serves as a basis for various protest activities. Thus, it is possible for a respondent who has engaged in sit-ins as a part of a civil rights demonstration to indicate both "sit-ins" and "civil rights protests" in characterizing his involvement. This item is therefore redundant with specific protest activities included in the battery. It is a general category of involvements under which the more specific actions can be subsumed. To include it with other specific forms of protest activity in our index would bias the index in favor of this specific issue or basis for protest activity.

Joining organizations like SDS and YAF: Perhaps this item, more than any of the other eight, reflects extensive protest involvement. It obviously indicates a commitment to radical politics of the left or right and to confrontation tactics in the pursuit of political goals. For many youngsters such membership undoubtedly comes about through progressive involvement in protest activity and provides opportunities for further protest involvement. However, all this does not mean that it is protest activity per se. Instead, it is an organization membership which is apt to be a product of and a stimulus to protest activity; it is a correlate of such activity but not the activity itself.

Marches, strikes, sit-ins and riots: The remaining four involvements all meet our criteria of protest activity. Each item refers to a specific form of behavior designed to directly express discontent and/or a desire for social and political change. They are uninstitutionalized political tactics designed to cause disruption and disorder in as effort to draw attention to and/or force a response to the needs, interests, or goal of a particular group or social cause.
In Table 2.4 we present a formalization of the foregoing discussion of the various indicators of protest-related activity in the form of a typology that reflects the criteria used in our selection of the specific indicators of protest activity. On one dimension we distinguish between activity which neither is political nor has protest content, activity which is political but has no protest content, and activity that is or strongly implies political protest. On the other dimension we classify involvements in terms of whether they are action, issue, or membership specific. A cross classification of these two dimensions yields the ninefold typology shown in Table 2.4.

The table shows the nine indicators falling into five of the cells. "Been arrested," like most of the other items, refers to an action, but it is distinguished from the rest, as we have argued above, by the fact that it implies no necessary or even likely political or protest involvement. "Political campaigns" and "organizational meetings" are actions of conventional political character, without any particular implication of protest.

The remaining items, including SDS/YAF membership, civil rights protests, and the four indicators we have selected for our index, all reflect or imply a commitment to uninstitutionalized protest. "Joining an organization like SDS and YAF" is distinguished as a membership specific involvement; "civil rights protest" is distinguished as an issue specific involvement. The remaining four items we have selected for our index are distinguished from other indicators of protest involvement by the fact that they are action specific - that they refer to specific forms of protest behavior.

An Index of Protest Activity

Ideally, an index of protest activity would incorporate the various forms that such activity may take and reflect the extent of involvement in the specific actions. It might also assign greater weight to the most serious or extreme forms of such involvement. We might then score an individual in terms of the variety, number and/or seriousness of protest actions he has engaged in.

Obviously, the available protest indicators restrict these possibilities. There are undoubtedly forms of protest activity such as building blockades, and boycotts, which are not included among our specific indicators, nor do we have any indication of the number of times a respondent may have taken part in specific protest activities. Fortunately, however, the available items refer to relatively broad categories of protest activity which subsume many, if not most, of the specific actions protesters engage in. As we shall see shortly, these four items contribute in a comparable way in both samples to an additive index of protest activity. And, by excluding other protest-related involvements, we avoid several biases that would reduce the inter-sample comparability of such an index.
Table 2.4

TYPOLOGY OF PROTEST-RELATED INVOLVEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Political Institutionalization</th>
<th>Neither Political Nor Protest Involvements</th>
<th>Institutionalized Political Involvements</th>
<th>Uninstitutionalized Protest Involvements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of Commitment</td>
<td>Action Specific</td>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>Marches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Been arrested</td>
<td>Organizational meetings</td>
<td>Sitins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Riots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Issue Related</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil rights protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Membership Group</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joining organizations like SDS and YAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus, our index of protest activity is simply a count of the number of these four activities a respondent has engaged in— from none to all four. Table 2.5 shows the distribution of college and non-college respondents in terms of their index scores. For reference purposes, we have also included the sample of "college revolutionaries" in the last column of the table. Although this sample is small and probably not representative, it gives at least some idea of how avowed radicals scored on our index of protest activity.

Table 2.5

DISTRIBUTION OF COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH AND COLLEGE REVOLUTIONARIES ON THE INDEX OF PROTEST ACTIVITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Protest Activities</th>
<th>non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
<th>College Revolutionaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>(615)</td>
<td>(722)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of activities per respondents</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>2.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of activities per protest</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that only a minority of youngsters either in college or outside of it have taken part in overt protest behavior. As we should expect from Table 2.1, protestor is much more common among college than among non-college youth—31 per cent of the former as opposed to 13 per cent of the latter have engaged in such activity.

Moreover, the table shows that college protestors are more likely to have engaged in several forms of protest activity than are their non-college counterparts. Of the college protestors almost half have engaged in at least two forms of protest activity, whereas fewer than a quarter of the non-college...
protestors have been involved in more than one form of protest. These differences between the two samples are reflected in the bottom two rows of Table 2.5. The mean number of protests per respondent is three times greater in the college sample. Among those who have protested at least once, additional forms of protest behavior are twice as common among the college youth.

Interestingly enough, the college and non-college samples are separated almost exactly by one category on the protest index. That is, the proportion scoring none and one among college students is virtually identical to the "nones" among the non-college youth. The college student scoring two are comparable in proportion to the non-college youth scoring one. The college "threes" are comparable to the non-college "twos" and so on.

The college revolutionaries, it will be recalled, were selected from a group of one hundred students who were known by their peers to have "radical views." From this pool of 100, the twenty-four revolutionaries were chosen on the basis of their agreement with statements in the interview indicating that they believed that revolutionary change was needed in American society. (For a further description of this sample, see Chapter 1).

The most common (modal) index score for revolutionaries is "all four" of these specific protest activities. With decreasing scale scores the number of revolutionaries drops off consistently. Notably, the mean score for revolutionaries is almost three; when we eliminate the one individual who denies having engaged in any of these specific actions it becomes 3.00 exactly. The fact that this group of revolutionaries score so high on our index may be regarded as initial validation for the protest activity index, albeit crude validation in view of the ambiguities surrounding the sampling of college revolutionaries. We shall return to this question of validation in the next section where we examine how the index distinguishes youngsters in terms of desire for further protest-related involvements and self concept as an activist, and in a number of other ways to be developed in Chapter 3. But first we must examine the distribution of index scores in somewhat more detail.

We observed in Chapter 1 that the sample of non-college youth aged 17 to 23 actually includes pre-college, post-college, and ex-college youngsters--17 year olds too young for college, 22 and 23 year olds already graduated from college, and 18 to 21 year olds with some college experiences—as well as truly non-college youngsters who never attended a college or university. A simple question asking those not in college at the time of the interview if and when they had ever attended a college or university would have enabled us unambiguously to classify non-college youngsters according to their exposure to the college environment. In the absence of such a question, we have used a question on the effect of "your college experience" to identify, in an approximate way, youngsters who are likely to have spent some time in college. The proportion engaging in protest activity and the mean index score for the specified groups are presented in Table 2.6. For both samples we distinguish
three age groupings: pre-college youngsters (17 years old), college age youngsters (18 to 21 years), and post college age youngsters (22 and 23 years). For the sample of non-college youth, we further distinguish between youngsters with "some exposure" and those with "no exposure" to college, by their responses to the question about the effect of the college experience on their lives and values.

Table 2.6 clearly demonstrates that exposure to the college environment is associated with protest activity. The lowest levels of protest activity appear among those with no exposure to college. Those with some exposure but not currently enrolled in college have higher levels of protest activity. And the level of protest activity is still higher for those presently attending college. (Those presently in college will, on the average, have more exposure than ex-students for a given age grouping.)

Furthermore, the effect of exposure is also evident in the relationship between age level and protest activity. Among students and ex-students, protest levels are higher at the post college than at the normal college ages. (Exposure to college will have been greater, on the average, at the post college ages.) Among those who have never attended college, on the other hand, there is little variation in protest activity by age. That is, where age is not associated with greater exposure to college, it is also relatively unrelated to protest activity.

Still another indication of the effect of college contact is to be found in the protest levels of pre-college youngsters. Although as many as half of them may enter college in the fall, their level of protest activity closely approximates that of youngsters without college exposure. And, indeed, what difference there is may reflect the indirect efforts of college exposure. That is, college-bound youngsters in the pre-college group may begin to become involved in protest activity while they are still in high school because they see it as something that college students do. Unfortunately, because the survey lacked any question about youngsters' plans to attend college, we cannot directly distinguish the college-bound youngsters from those who do not intend to go to college. In any case, the relatively low level of protest activity in the pre-college group, together with the fact that as many as half of them will go on to college, suggests that differential recruitment or anticipatory socialization play only a minor role in accounting for the differences in protest activity between college and non-college youngsters.

Now, it is evident from Table 2.6 that by grouping those with some exposure and those with no exposure to college under the heading, "non-college youth" we tend to underestimate the differences in protest activity between those presently in college and those who have never been in college. It could be argued that in order to get a more accurate statement of the effect of the college experience on protest behavior, we should eliminate those who appear to have had some college experience from the non-college sample. According to this logic, we could obtain an even more precise
Table 2.6

PER CENT PROTESTING AND MEAN PROTEST SCORE BY AGE LEVEL FOR COLLEGE YOUTH AND FOR NON-COLLEGE YOUTH SUBDIVIDED BY EXPOSURE TO COLLEGE

**Age Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Level</th>
<th>Pre-college Age (17 years old)</th>
<th>Normal College Ages (18 to 21 years old)</th>
<th>Post College Ages (22 and 23 years old)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent protesting</td>
<td>percent protesting</td>
<td>percent protesting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean score</td>
<td>mean score</td>
<td>mean score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>number of cases</td>
<td>number of cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-College Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No exposure to college</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some exposure to college</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College youth</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(226)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Too few cases for reliable percentages or means
assessment of college effects on protest activity.

Yet, a single minded effort to "purify" the non-college sample by removing those with some exposure to college ignores the fact that college youngsters are by no means uniform in their exposure to college. Indeed, exposure as measured by year in school among those presently in college is highly variable (the distribution is relatively flat at least for the four years of undergraduate education).

More to the point, our purpose in comparing college and non-college youth is not simply to assess the effects of the college experience, but rather to examine two identifiable and socially distinct groups of young people with respect to their involvement in protest activity. Basically, we are concerned here with the multiplicity of factors which contribute to protest activity among youth, and which may therefore explain the differences in protest activity between those presently inside and outside of college. The fact that some non-college youngsters have been exposed to college or, for that matter, that college students vary in the extent of their tenure in school, does not invalidate comparisons between these two groups. Rather, as we have seen in Table 2.6, it helps in some measure to explain the differences that exist between these two categories of youth. As the analysis proceeds we shall gain a better picture of the effects of the college experience in absolute terms and in relation to other factors that contribute to protest behavior.

We must, however, keep in mind that when we speak of non-college youth in the upcoming analysis we are referring to youngsters aged 17 to 23 who were not in college at the time of the survey. This includes some youngsters who will be going to college, some who once attended college, and even some who have graduated from college; although most of them have not and will not attend college.

Validation of the Protest Activity Index

Having constructed our index of protest activity, the next task is to establish its validity and comparability as a measuring instrument in the two samples. We have seen that protest activity, as measured by our index, is more common among college than among non-college youngsters. We must now determine whether a given score on the index has essentially the same meaning both inside and outside of college.

This entails examining and comparing the responses of college and non-college youngsters at specific scale scores. Because there are relatively few non-college youngsters at advanced stages of protest activity—only 18 have engaged in two or more forms of protest activity—comparisons between college and non-college protesters will have to be restricted to just two
levels of protest involvement: the initial stage (those having engaged in one of the four specific protest behavior) and the advanced stage (those having engaged in two or more of these behaviors).

The process of validating and establishing the intersample comparability of the protest activity index is organized in four steps in this section. First, we examine the responses of initial and advanced protesters in the two samples to the four component items of the index. Next, we look at the other five protest-related involvements that were omitted from the index. After examining youngsters' involvements, we then move to their desires for such involvements. And we conclude this section by examining their responses to a question about their own personal roles in seeking to bring about needed social changes, particularly whether they see themselves as "activists."

The Four Components of the Protest Activity Index

When we examine the relationship between the protest activity index and its component items, as shown in Table 2.7, several points should be kept in mind. First of all, non-protesters are excluded from the table for, by definition, none of them have engaged in any of the four specific forms of protest activity. Again, by definition, for initial protesters the four components items are mutually exclusive, and hence the number of involvements will be equal to the number of respondents. (The column therefore sums up to 100 per cent, give or take some for rounding.) Since advanced protesters will, by definition, have engaged in at least two forms of protest behavior, the number of involvements will be at least twice the number of respondents. (The column therefore sums to more than 200 per cent.)

Table 2.7 shows the percentage who indicate having engaged in each of the four specific forms of protest behavior at the initial and advanced stages of protest activity in both the college and non-college samples. As a reference point, we have also included the responses of the small sample of college revolutionaries in the rightmost column of the table. With the preceding comments on the idiosyncrasies of Table 2.7 in mind, let us now consider what the data shows.

Overall, the table shows a high degree of consistency between initial and advanced protesters and between college and non-college youth. Within each sample the pattern of specific protest activities is similar, though not identical, for initial and advanced protesters. Of course, the level of involvement in each form of protest is much higher among the advanced protesters. Between the two contexts the patterns of protest involvement are identical at the initial and the advanced stages of protest involve- ment. Indeed the actual levels of specific forms of protest are quite comparable inside and outside of college. Within these broad dimensions of comparability, let us take a closer look at the discrepancies that do appear
Table 2.7

PER CENT ENGAGING IN EACH OF THE FOUR COMPONENT ACTIVITIES BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH AND FOR COLLEGE REVOLUTIONARIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Activities</th>
<th>Non-College Youth One</th>
<th>Non-College Youth Two+</th>
<th>College Youth One</th>
<th>College Youth Two+</th>
<th>College Revolutionaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing initial and advanced protesters in the two samples, we find a slight but consistent difference in the pattern of involvements. The difference comes in the relative positions of strikes and sit-ins at the two stages of protest activity. For initial protesters strikes are more common than sit-ins; for advanced protesters the opposite is true. College revolutionaries, as might be expected, follow the pattern of advanced protesters. Thus, it could be that sit-ins are relatively likely to follow or be followed by other forms of protest activity, or that strikes are relatively unaccompanied by other forms of protest. Both tendencies are probably at work, though the former is more evident. (The greatest percentage difference between initial and advanced protesters in both samples occurs for sit-ins, while the least difference does not consistently occur for strikes.) In any case, this change in the relative positions of strikes and sit-ins with increasing protest activity means that initial and advanced protesters differ slightly but consistently in the kinds of protest activities they have engaged in. It would not, however, divert attention from the elements of consistancy between initial and advanced protesters; in particular, that marches are the most common and riots the least common involvements at both levels of protest activity inside and outside of college, and for that matter, among college revolutionaries, too.

Comparing college and non-college youngsters at each level of protest activity, we find that the percentage engaging in specific protest activities are quite similar in most cases. Thus, of the eight possible comparisons...
between corresponding cells of the two samples, in only three cases do the percentage differences in level of specific protest activity exceed ten percentage points, in only one case does it exceed fifteen points. Let us briefly consider these discrepancies for the insights they may provide about the meaning of a given protest index score in each sample.

The greatest discrepancy between the two samples (21 percentage points) occurs in the percentage of initial protesters who have marched. As Table 2.7 shows, marching is definitely more common among initial protesters in college than outside of it. In fact, a majority of those at the initial stage of protest activity in college are there because they marched. By contrast, strikes are relatively more common (by 12 percentage points) among initial protesters outside of college. Yet advanced protesters are not significantly more likely to have marched in the college context nor to have struck in the non-college context. The fact that these two discrepancies tend to disappear among advanced protesters, suggest that they are not "routes" to increased protest involvement which are characteristics of the respective contexts. Rather they appear to be characteristic "stepping off points" of the people who engage in one form of protest activity and stop there.4

The one form of protest activity that does distinguish advanced protesters in the two contexts is their involvement in riots. Advanced protesters in the non-college context are more apt (by 12 percentage points) to have taken part in riots. The discrepancy could mean that forms of protest activity such as sit-ins or marches are more apt to "degenerate" into riots in the non-college context (thus producing an index score of two—i.e., one for the sit-in or march, and one for the ensuing riot). It could also mean that advanced protesters outside of college are more likely to adopt tactics of a relatively spontaneous or unorganized character than their counterparts in the college context. However, the fact that riots are not disproportionately more common among initial protesters in the non-college context, suggests that riots are not simply a more common expression of dissatisfaction or political unrest among non-college youngsters.

In summary, the pattern of specific protest involvements for initial and advanced protesters in the two samples are the same. In addition, the levels of specific protest activity for a given index score in the two samples are also quite similar, in only three cases do the differences between corresponding cells in the two samples exceed 10 percentage points. Where the discrepancies do occur, they are confined to either the initial or the advanced stage of protest activity. Since the discrepancies that do appear are relatively small in magnitude and well outnumbered by the consistencies in behavior, for the most part, the index of protest activity developed in the previous section reflects relatively comparable patterns and levels of protest activity in the two samples.
The Five Protest-related Involvements Omitted from the Index

Earlier in this chapter we distinguished among protest-related involvements in terms of their institutionalization as forms of political commitment. Specifically, we argued that "been arrested" has no necessary political content, that "political campaigns" and "organizational meetings" are conventionally institutionalized political commitments. These distinctions appear to be reflected in the patterns of association between these five items and our index of protest involvement, as shown in Table 2.8.

This table includes "non-protesters" as well as "initial protesters" and "advanced protesters," since those who have engaged in none of the four forms of protest behavior may, nevertheless, have taken part in the five protest-related involvements. Once again, we have included "college revolutionaries" in the rightmost column of the table for purposes of comparison.

Looking first at the conventional political involvements--organizational meetings and political campaigns--we find that both are considerably more common among college than among non-college youngsters. In five of the six possible comparisons college youngsters are at least 10 percentage points higher in these conventional political involvements.

Table 2.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest-Related Involvements</th>
<th>Non-college Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
<th>College Revolutionaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Two+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Meetings</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political campaigns</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights protests</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining organizations like</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS and YAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been arrested</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This suggests that the college context sponsors or promotes conventional political involvements as well as the politics of protest.
Moreover, the differences in conventional political behavior between the contexts are most pronounced among those with the least protest involvement. This suggests further that conventional political involvements develop independently of protest activity in the college context. That they may precede or possibly lead to protest activity is suggested by the fact of increasing conventional involvements with increasing protest activity—both reach a high point among the college revolutionaries. In the non-college sample, on the other hand, the relatively low levels of conventional political involvement among non-protesters suggests that such activity becomes salient only after the individual has become involved in non-conventional forms of political behavior. The fact that the college context appears to stimulate political interests and involvements of a conventional as well as a non-conventional nature suggests that it may be serving relatively general functions of political socialization. We shall have more to say about the college environment as a political socializing context and about the inter-relationship between conventional and non-conventional political involvements as the analysis proceeds.

It is evident at this point that to have included these two relatively conventional forms of political involvement in our index of protest activity would not only have produced a greater overall difference between the two samples in terms of index scores, but would also have grossly biased the college sample in the direction of these conventional political involvements, especially so because the differences are greatest between the large bulk of non-protesters in the two samples.

Turning to the two uninstitutionalized forms of political activity—civil rights protests and joining organizations like SDS and YAF—we find that college and non-college youngsters at a given level of protest activity display strikingly comparable responses. The average percentage difference between corresponding cells for the six comparisons is 2.3 points, none of the differences reach ten points. In terms of these two unconventional forms of political activity, then, a given scale score would appear to have virtually the same meaning in both samples.

Moreover, the item about civil rights protests shows the strongest association with our index of protest activity of any of the five in Table 2.8. The difference between protesters and non-protesters in the two samples is almost 50 percentage points; the difference between college revolutionaries and non-protesters in college is 85 percentage points. The fact that virtually none of the non-protesters in either context report having engaged in civil rights protests undoubtedly reflects the redundancy of this item with the specific forms of protest activity that comprise the index. That is, nearly everyone who claims to have participated in civil rights protests also indicates at least one of the four specific protest activities.

The item about joining organizations like SDS and YAF is much less
strongly related to our protest activity index (in terms of percentage differences) simply because such memberships are so rare in our samples of college and non-college youngsters. Very few belong to such organizations until they have reached the advanced stage of protest activity on our measure, and even among advanced protesters less than one in five have joined such protest oriented organizations, either inside or outside of college. A further breakdown of the advanced protesters in college shows that there is a tendency for such memberships to increase with increasing scale scores to the point where 44 per cent of those scoring "four" on the index belong to SDS/YAF type organizations. But, as the table shows, the level of such memberships is still higher among the college revolutionaries.

Notably, the college revolutionaries exceed the advanced protesters by more in the uninstitutionalized than in the institutionalized forms of political commitment. On both items reflecting uninstitutionalized protest involvement college revolutionaries are very nearly 40 percentage points higher than advanced protesters in either sample, as shown in Table 2.8. This has two important implications. First, it tends to confirm our use of the college revolutionaries as a high reference point for uninstitutionalized political behavior. They are clearly distinguished from other youngsters primarily in their commitment to such uninstitutionalized forms of political activity.

Secondly, it draws attention to the fact that our advanced protesters should not be viewed as extremists or forerunners in the protest movement of the 1960's. Although some are undoubtedly among the most outspoken and radical youngsters in the protest movement, the group of advanced protesters as a whole are decidedly less likely than college revolutionaries to be involved in most of the specific forms of protest activity that comprise our index (Table 2.7) or in the issue- and membership-specified forms of institutionalized political behavior that were omitted from the index (Table 2.8).

In any social movement, very few persons can assume leadership roles and act as spokesmen for the movement. These data and subsequent evidence on youngsters roles in bringing about needed social change lead us to regard our advanced protesters as followers, supporters and participants in the protest movement rather than leaders, organizers, or spokesmen. They are therefore "advanced" protesters only by comparison with our "initial" protesters.

From the evidence in Table 2.8 it might be argued that civil rights protests and joining organizations like SDS and YAF could have been incorporated in the index of protest activity without seriously altering its comparability for the two samples. Intersample comparability is not, however, the only issue. We have argued above that to include either or both of these two items in the index would effectively broaden its scope.
beyond our interest in protest behavior per se. It is now evident from Table 2.8 that the principal effect of including the item on membership in organizations like SDS or YAF would be to raise the index scores of those who are already classified at the advanced level of protest involvement. Since college students far outnumber non-college youngsters in this category, it would have the effect of further differentiating the two samples in mean scores on the index of protest activity. It would have little effect, however, on the proportion of respondents classified as protesters in either sample. In our judgement, this item can serve a more useful purpose as an independent measure of organizational commitment in the realm of uninstitutionalized protest, than as a component of the protest activity index.

The item about civil rights protests was perhaps the most likely candidate among those excluded from our index of protest activity. And, we have just observed in Table 2.8 that it is more strongly associated with the index than any of the other omitted items. Although it, too, would not reduce intersample comparability as a part of the protest activity index, as Table 2.8 shows; to include it would have the effect of racially biasing the index, as we shall see in Table 2.9.

| Table 2.9 |
| PER CENT ENGAGING IN CIVIL RIGHTS PROTESTS BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AND RACE AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH |
| Non-college Youth | College Youth |
| None | One | Two+ | None | One | Two+ |
| Blacks | 4 | 21 | 100 | 10 | 66 | 73 |
| (50) | (14) | (6) | (10) | (12) | (22) |
| Whites | 0 | 20 | 27 | 3 | 25 | 46 |
| (473) | (45) | (11) | (479) | (108) | (84) |

Table 2.9 shows the relationship between civil rights protests and our index of protest activity, broken down by race of respondent within each sample. Although the numbers of blacks at most levels of protest activity are quite small, the table shows that civil rights protests tend to be much more common among blacks than among whites at a given level of protest activity. It is, of course, reasonable to suppose that many of the specific protest actions of blacks were taken in the interests of civil rights, and might, therefore, be described as "civil rights protests" as well as "marches," "sit-ins," and the like. The point is that the civil rights items is not only apt to be redundant with the specific protest activities which comprise the index, as we have argued earlier, but it is more redundant among blacks than among whites.
The table also reveals that black youngsters are substantially more involved in protest activity as measured by our present index than white youth. That is, blacks become a larger proportion of the respondents at increasing levels of protest involvement in Table 2.9. This pronounced difference in protest involvement between black and white youngsters will have important implications for our subsequent analysis (see Chapter 3 final section). In the present context, however, it means that including the civil rights protest item would not only tend to give blacks a higher score than whites at a given level of our current index, but it would also tend to give greater weight to the extreme categories of the index where blacks are disproportionately found. To include this item on civil rights would, quite obviously, bias our index in favor of the kinds of protest that black students are more apt to have engaged in. As in the case of the item about SDS and YAP membership, we will reserve the civil rights protest item for purposes of distinguishing the substantive orientations of protesters as currently defined.

"Been arrested" the final item in Table 2.8 was never a serious candidate for our protest activity index, but its relationship to protest activity is noteworthy. Like the conventional political activities, been arrested also shows a greater percentage difference by level of protest activity for non-college than for college youth. But in this case, the reason for the greater association in the non-college sample is different; it is due to the discrepancy between advanced protesters in the two samples. Indeed, advanced protesters outside of college are twice as likely as those inside college to have been arrested. And, this is not simply the result of a greater tendency among non-college youngsters to be arrested. In fact, among the non-protesting majorities of both samples it is the college rather than the non-college youngsters who are more likely to have been arrested. The implication is that protest activity subjects the protester to a greater risk of being arrested outside of the college context. It would appear that the college context affords protection against arrest for those involved in protest activity. The fact that even college revolutionaries are less likely to have been arrested than advanced protesters in the non-college context lends further credence to this interpretation. Perhaps the disciplinary machinery of the college is used in lieu of the police. In a number of instances, campus authorities have been reluctant to call in the police to break up student protests; they have done so only after "all other measures have failed." And they very often suffered harsh criticism for doing so on the grounds that the use of police on the college campus contradicts fundamental precepts of the academic community. This suggestion that the police lack a mandate as agents of social control on the college campus will reemerge in the analysis of the upcoming chapter. It is now time to move from the analysis of protest-related involvement to the desire for such involvements.
Desire for the Nine Protest-Related Involvements

After observing in Table 2.1 that all protest-related involvement was much greater in the college than in the non-college environment, we suggested that this may simply reflect greater opportunities for such activity in college—that youngsters in the two contexts might be equally desirous of engaging in such activity but that college youngsters are more likely to have opportunities to do so. We then examined this possibility in a crude way with the data in Table 2.3 which showed that college youngsters who have not engaged in a particular form of protest behavior were consistently more apt to say they would like to do so than non-college youngsters. We tentatively concluded that the college context provides greater opportunities for protest involvement and stimulates greater desires to take advantage of these opportunities.

The data in Table 2.8 indicate, however, that individuals who have engaged in one kind of protest-related behavior are more apt to have taken part in others, as well. Perhaps engaging in one form of such activity stimulates the desire to take up others. In terms of this logic, it is possible that the difference in desire for further protest-related involvements between the two samples simply results from the fact that there are more protesters in the college sample.

Now that we have a measure of the extent of protest involvement, we can make a more discriminating test of the possibility that the college environment independently stimulate the desire for such involvement. We are still restricted by the fact that only those respondents who have not engaged in a specific activity were asked whether they would like to become involved in that activity. This has the effect of reducing the base figures for respondents at the more advanced levels of protest activity. Consequently, we must forego the distinction between initial and advanced protesters in Table 2.10. Needless to say, we have too few college revolutionaries (after removing those who have engaged in a particular activity) to be included in the table. We present the four components of the protest activity index in part A of the table and the five items omitted from the index in part B.

There can be no doubt on the basis of 2.10 that the college context stimulates a desire for protest behavior and protest-related involvements—among protesters and nonprotesters alike. It is true that protesters who have not engaged in a particular action are generally more desirous of doing so. But this tendency by no means accounts for the difference in desire for these activities between the two samples.

Among the components of the protest activity index (Table 2.10, part A)
Table 2.10

PERCENT WHO WOULD LIKE TO ENGAGE IN SPECIFIC PROTEST RELATED INVOLVEMENTS (OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT YET INVOLVED) BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

A. Four Components of Protest Activity Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marches</td>
<td>9 (535)</td>
<td>18 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>7 (536)</td>
<td>26 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>6 (536)</td>
<td>16 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riots</td>
<td>1 (536)</td>
<td>2 (63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Five Items Omitted from the Protest Activity Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Campaigns</td>
<td>27 (477)</td>
<td>33 (52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Meetings</td>
<td>13 (446)</td>
<td>38 (50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights Protests</td>
<td>8 (532)</td>
<td>29 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joining SDS/YAF</td>
<td>3 (533)</td>
<td>13 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been Arrested</td>
<td>1 (518)</td>
<td>0 (59)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
controlling for level of protest activity has little impact on the difference in desire for such actions between the two samples. Non-protesters in college are twice as likely as those outside of college to say they would like to engage in each of the four protest activities. And protesters in the college context are also much more likely to want to engage in such activities than are non-college protesters.

The rank-order of desires for these protest activities follows quite closely the order of actual involvement in such activities among advanced protesters, as shown in Table 2.7. For non-protesters in both samples and for college protesters, marches are the most desired, sit-ins next, then strikes, and finally riots. Among the non-college protesters, sit-ins actually become the most desired activity, displacing marches. Sit-ins are also a close second to marches among college protesters. Thus it would appear that sit-ins are relatively more common as a desire than as an actual involvement among protesters.

For the protest-related involvements omitted from our index (Table 2.10, part B), the differences in desires between protesters and non-protesters and between college and non-college youngsters are far less consistent. Thus, in the college sample, non-protesters are actually higher in desire for political campaigns than are protesters. It is not the case that college protesters have given up on these conventional involvements—political campaigns remain the most sought after of the nine involvements, among college protesters—but rather it appears that non-protesters in this context are particularly eager for such activity. More than half of them would like to engage in political campaigns, and this is twice as many as desire to participate in any of the other protest-related involvements. In the non-college context, protesters remain more desirous than non-protesters of engaging in political campaigns, although it again appears that such campaigns are especially attractive to non-protesters since they are more than twice as popular as the next most attractive involvement here too. The difference between non-protesters in the two samples is not therefore in the relative attractiveness of campaigns over other political involvements, but rather in their absolute levels of desire for such institutionalized political activity. Organizational meetings show comparable differences between non-protesters in the two samples. In effect, the substantial differences in conventional political involvements between non-protesters shown in Table 2.8 are here mirrored by equally substantial differences in the desire for such involvements. Evidently the college context stimulates the desire for conventional political behavior, quite apart from involvement in such activity. This implies that it is serving as a political socializing context, not just an opportunity structure for conventional political behavior.

In the case of organizational meetings, on the other hand, the story is in the difference in desires between protesters in the two samples. Among college protesters the desire for such meetings drops to a poor fifth in the
rank order of desires for protest-related involvements from a strong third in the college samples as a whole. College protesters appear not to be especially concerned about finding opportunities to organize protest activities and demonstrations. Among non-college protesters, by contrast, the desire for organizational meetings is especially pronounced.

Indeed, not only is this the most sought after of the nine involvements among non-college protesters, but it is also one of the two cases (the other one also involving organizational involvement) in which a larger proportion of non-college than college protesters express a desire for such involvement. Thus, while the data in this table generally suggest that the college context does more to stimulate desire for protest-related involvement than the non-college environment, in the case of organizational meetings, non-college protesters appear to be especially eager for such activity perhaps because of what their context fails to provide—the opportunity to organize and mobilize protest demonstrations.

Of the two uninstitutionalized forms of political involvement, the desire for civil rights protests behaves very much like the desire for the components of the protest activity index. Thus, it is considerably more pronounced in the college than in the non-college context at a given level of protest activity, and protesters in both contexts are more likely to want such activity than are non-protesters in their respective contexts. The desire for SDS/YAF membership, on the other hand, follows a different pattern—one close to that of organization meeting. Thus, the desire for SDS/YAF membership is actually stronger among non-college than among college protesters, though the difference is quite small. In other words, the data once again suggest that non-college protesters more than college protesters feel the need for organizational involvement. Thus, the desire for SDS/YAF membership is definitely not the case for the two items which reflect organizational participation.

Finally, as might be expected, the desire to be arrested is generally low. Curiously, however, college protesters are something of an exception. While one per cent or fewer of all other groups would like to be arrested, the figure is eleven per cent for college protesters. The fact that college protesters depart from the desire of nearly everyone else to avoid arrest may reflect the possibility noted earlier, that being arrested on the college campus has a special meaning. If the mandate of the police to enter the campus and make arrests in response to student demonstration is in doubt, as we have suggested it is, to be arrested challenges the rightful exercise of authority by police and hence the use of police by college administration. Evidently, non-college protesters see no opportunity to take advantage of such normative ambiguity.

Self-defined Role as an "Activist"

Thus far, we have sought to interpret the meaning of our index categories in terms of specific protest-related involvements and the desire for such involvements. At this point, we shall turn to a more subjective indicator—
the youngsters' role in the protest movement of the 1960s, as he sees it. Specifically, the CBS News survey asked about the respondent's "own personal role in seeking to bring about needed social changes in colleges and other institutions of our society." He was asked to indicate which of five statements (presented below in Table 2.11) best describes his own position. The first of these allows him to identify himself as an "activist." The remaining statements express varying degrees of interest in and support for the objectives of activists.

Table 2.11 shows that very few young people in either sample identify themselves as "activists." Even among advanced protesters, only about one in five said that he was an activist. Furthermore, this reluctance to see themselves as activists is quite comparable in both samples. Only a few percentage points separate college and non-college youngsters at a given protest level in terms of self-image as an activist.

Notably, Responses to this item about activist self-image correspond quite closely to those for the item about membership in organizations like MYS and YAF, shown in Table 2.8. We observed in our discussion of the earlier table, that the youngsters classified as advanced protesters by our measure cannot, for the most part, be regarded as leaders, organizers, or spokesman of the protest movement. These data on activist self-image tends to confirm our earlier interpretation. Most of those we refer to as "advanced protesters" have not made the kinds of commitments that would cause them to think of themselves as activists or to identify themselves as activists to others.5

Instead, both initial and advanced protesters in each sample typically characterize themselves as supporters of activists' goals. In the college sample, a majority of the protesters say that they are "in sympathy with most of the activists' objectives, but not with all of their tactics." While this is also the most common response of non-college protesters, it holds only for a plurality of them at each stage of protest activity in the non-college context. The non-college protesters appear to have been more disinterested in the protest movement—"not emotionally involved" or "not...[they] approve of what activists are trying to do"—at the time of the survey. Perhaps, some have drifted away from or lost contact with the protest movement after having participated in protest activities at an earlier time. In any case, it is in their support for the aims of activists, and not in their self-images as activists, that college and non-college protesters differ the most.

Very likely the most important difference in Table 2.11 occurs between the majority of respondents in each context who have not engaged in protest activity. Among non-protesters in college, sympathy for the aims of the protest is the modal response; among their counterparts outside of college, on the hand, the most common response is "I am not emotionally involved, one way or the other."

This difference in the climate of support for the aims of activists has...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself to be an activist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am in sympathy with most of the activists' objectives, but not with all of their tactics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not sure I approve of what the activists are trying to do, but I have no strong objection to letting them try</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not emotionally involved, on my way or the other</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am in total disagreement with the activists</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**T. 1**
several important implications. The greater depth of the aims of protesters among non-protesters in college has undoubtedly made them rank more receptive to opportunities and urgings to get involved in protest activities. It may therefore be responsible, in some measure, for the differences in the extent of such activities between the college and non-college contexts. This difference in the climate of support may also have an effect on the attitudes and orientations of those who do become involved. Where support is lacking, as in the non-college environment, we might expect protesters to feel a greater gulf between themselves and their peers, or the rest of society. Where social support is present, as in the college environment, protesters may feel free to adopt more radical or extremist ideological positions, or to endorse more disorderly or disruptive rhetoric. In fact, these and related possibilities will be the primary subject of the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have developed and validated an index of protest activity. Using items that reflect four different kinds of protest activity, we have formed a simple additive index that displays considerable uniformity in its association with other protest related involvements among both college and non-college youth. That is, comparable levels of the protest activity index reflect quite similar kinds of protest related behavior in both college and non-college contexts.

Our index explicitly incorporates behavior or activity designed to produce disruption or disorder in existing social institutions. It specifically excludes indicators of ideological commitment, organizational affiliation, or activist self-concept—although, as we have seen, it bears a close relationship to each of these factors. Nor does it incorporate a measure of leadership in the protest movement. There are, of course, a few leaders and organizers of protest activity among those we have classified as "advanced protesters," but since there are few of them in the population of youth at large, they are quite rare in this sample drawn to represent that population. Indeed, by comparison with a small sample of "college revolutionaries" even our "advanced protesters" must be regarded as supporters, followers, and participants, rather than leaders, organizers, or spokesmen of the protest movement.

In terms of this index, activity is much more prevalent in the college than in the non-college context. More than twice as may college youngsters have engaged in some form of protest activity, and the average number of involvements is considerably greater among college protesters. Moreover, among non-college youth, those who appear to have had some exposure to college, specifically those saying they have been "influenced" by college experience, show distinctly higher levels of protest involvement than those non-college youngsters who have not been exposed to or influenced by college experience.

The data suggest, further, that the higher levels of protest activity
among college students are not simply a function of greater opportunities for such activity in the college environment. Thus, at a given level of protest activity, college youngsters more often want to engage in forms of protest they have not yet been involved in, and more often sympathize with the goals of activists. In effect, these data suggest that the college environment stimulates interest in further protest activity and sympathy with the objectives of activists, quite apart from the greater opportunities for protest involvement it would seem to provide.

The same goes for conventional political involvements such as taking part in political campaigns and attending organizational meetings. These activities, and the desire to engage in them among those who have not yet done so, are much more common among college than non-college youngsters. What is more, differences are most pronounced among those who have not yet engaged in protest activity. Thus, the college environment appears also to stimulate conventional political involvements, and to do so independently of its effect in promoting protest activity. To the extent that conventional political involvement led to more disruptive and disorderly forms of political behavior during this period, the college experience would appear to have contributed both directly and indirectly to higher overall levels of protest activity.

On the basis of this first step in our analysis, then, it would appear that the college environment was a broadly politicizing context. Higher education, at least in the late 1960s, seems to have conferred a general sense of political efficacy upon those attending college. They appear to have had greater opportunities and motivations for both institutionalized and uninstitutionalized political behavior.

Yet, these differences in protest activity, and in broader political involvement, between the college and non-college contexts may not be attributable to the college experience itself. Other differences between youngsters in these two contexts may be responsible for the observed differences in protest activity. As suggested in the preceding chapter, the differences in protest could reflect the social backgrounds or family relations of youngsters who go to college as compared with those who do not. Or these differences could reflect youth culture involvement or occupational commitments which may be affected by college attendance, but are not the result of any direct politicizing effects which colleges exercise upon their students. But before we begin our examination of the effects of such extra-institutional factors, we shall take a closer look at the political perspectives and orientations of these young people.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. College and non-college youth also have essentially the same hierarchy of desires for further protest related activities. With the exception of a few ties, the rank order of desires for future protest related involvements are
identical in the two samples.

2. These indicators are by no means immune from criticism. For example, "riots" refers to an often spontaneous and unorganized form of collective behavior without specific or well articulated goals. Yet, "riots" unlike "been arrested" are generally assumed to be overt expressions of dissent and dissatisfaction which takes the form of disruptive behavior. Without this item, perhaps our index should more properly be labelled "organized protest activity." "Strikes" are also subject to several interpretations. In particular, we have no way of knowing the extent to which respondents who have participated in labor union strikes responded to this item. Certainly some youngsters in the non-college sample have participated in trade union strikes and may have interpreted this item to refer to such activity. Likewise, "marches" are not always protest demonstrations. However, in the context of this battery of questions and in the present historical context, we assume that most respondents who indicated such an involvement were referring to protest marches of the kinds that became a permanent part of protest activities in the 1960s. "Sit-ins" are perhaps the least subject to varying interpretation. This is a form of protest behavior that was "invented" during the civil rights movement and especially designed to challenge the segregated character of many public facilities. It has subsequently been adopted by protesters as an effective way of blocking and disrupting various aspects of our complex, interrelated, urban society.

3. We have seen in the analysis of Table 1.1 that this method of identifying ex-college students tends to underrepresent their numbers in the population as a whole and to overrepresent those who were "more influenced by college among the ex-students, since those who have attended college but indicate that it had "little or no effect" on their lives and values remain in the "no exposure" group. We estimate on the basis of census data that this method of identifying ex-students may miss as many as one out of three. In effect, there are probably another 21 ex-students in the "no exposure" group.

4. Earlier in this chapter we noted that some of those who indicated having engaged in strikes may have been referring to trade union activity rather than behavior associated with the protest movement of the 1960s. This tendency may be reflected in the fact that strikes are relatively more common among advanced protesters and that the pattern is more evident in the non-college context.

5. By contrast, 83 percent of the college revolutionaries define themselves as "activists." This high level of activist self-concept undoubtedly reflects the selection process. These 24 students were selected as the most revolutionary oriented youngsters among 100 students known to have "radical views" by their peers. It is also possible that the college revolutionaries knew they were being selected to represent the most activist students on the college campus. The report on data collection procedures (CBS News, 1969) is not clear on this point. This latter circumstance might have encouraged these youngsters to characterize themselves as activists.
CHAPTER 3
THE PERSPECTIVES OF PROTESTERS

What began as youthful involvements in efforts to secure civil rights and economic opportunities for blacks and poor people in America in the late fifties and early sixties, became what many have described as a "youth movement" by the middle and late sixties. During this period the focus of protest activity shifted from civil rights to a number of other issues including America's involvement in the war in Viet Nam, the pervasive role of the "military-industrial complex" in American society, and the "co-optation" of the university as an instrument of the "establishment." The tactics of protesters also changed from exclusively non-violent demonstrations and forms of civil disobedience to the use of force in resisting police, holding authorities captive, and destroying public and private property.

As the movement grew and incorporated new issues and tactics, it seemed to develop "self-consciousness" as a youth movement. Identifiable spokesmen emerged, political organization formed, the assumptions and understandings common to those involved in the movement found expression in an emergent rhetoric, and participants began to see fundamental differences between themselves and the mainstream of American society. And the mainstream, for its part, reciprocated with labels and social definitions that would serve to distinguish and perhaps to stigmatize youngsters with these commitments.

In this chapter, we examine the ideological commitments of protesters and their sense of distinctness or estrangement from other groups in society. In effect, we shall be asking how different the political ideas and beliefs of protesters are from those of non-protesters and whether protesters feel separated or alienated from the rest of society as a consequence of these commitments.

We shall continue to examine the college and non-college samples separately for further evidence of intersample comparability among protesters. Essentially, this chapter extends the analysis of the preceding one to the political ideology and commitments of protesters and to their perceptions of differences between themselves and other social groups. We have reason to expect ideological similarities between protesters in the two samples, in view of the overall comparability in the kinds of actions they engage in and would like to engage in, and in their self concepts as activists.

Yet there are also grounds for expecting systematic differences. We have seen evidence of greater support among non-protesters in the college context for the objectives of activists, suggesting that protesters in this context may adopt more radical or extremist positions without being constrained by unsympathetic peers. Lacking such support, non-college protesters at a given level of protest involvement may display a greater sense of alienation from the rest of society. Thus, we will be interested not only in the ideas
and feelings of protesters but also in those of non-protesters who constitute, in some measure, the social context within which protesters operate.

Ideological Commitments

We turn at this point to youngsters' thinking about protest; that is, the kinds of tactics they believe are justifiable, the areas in which they feel institutional reform is needed, and the way they express their commitment to protest activity. We have seen that even among advanced protesters in both samples, only a small minority regard themselves as "activists" or belong to organizations such as SDS or YAF—a distinct contrast with the small sample of college "revolutionaries" selected by Yankelovich Inc. to augment the data on radical or extremist students. This raises a question about the extent of ideological differences between protesters and non-protesters in our samples. Is it possible that protesters have become involved in such activity more by circumstances than as a result of ideological commitments? Are there real and substantial differences between protesters and non-protesters as distinguished by our index? In this section, then, we address ourselves to the differences between protesters and non-protesters in each sample, and between youngsters at corresponding levels of protest activity in the two samples, with respect to their attitudes toward protest tactics, institutional reforms, and extremist rhetoric.

Protest Tactics

To ask about protest tactics may on the face of it seem redundant. The tactics of the protesters as we have defined them are sit-ins, strikes, riots, and marches. We know therefore that the protesters differ from the non-protesters in these specific forms of behavior. We have also seen in the previous chapter that they are more apt to desire further involvement in such activities than non-protesters. What we do not know, however, is how these youngsters feel about a wide range of tactics which have been employed as a part of the protest movement of the 1960's.

One question in the CBS news survey listed a number of specific protest tactics and asked respondents to indicate whether they thought these tactics were "always justified," "sometimes justified," or "never justified." The proportion saying that each of these specific tactics are always or sometimes justified is presented by level of protest involvement among college and non-college youth in Table 3.1. The items in this battery have been ordered from least to most justified in the eyes of our respondents. Notably, in addition to specific protest tactics, the battery also contains several items referring to "counter tactics" involving the use of police for various purposes.

The least justified protest tactics according to Table 3.1, are those involving the use of force against persons and property. Thus, destroying or mutilating property, assaulting the police or civil authorities, or holding an
Table 3.1

PERCENT SAYING SPECIFIC PROTEST AND COUNTERPROTEST TACTICS ARE JUSTIFIED
BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest and Counterprotest tactics</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction or mutilation of property</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaulting police</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding an authority captive</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assaulting other civil authorities</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockades of buildings</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using draft resistance as a political weapon</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting or disobeying police</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ultimatums to those in authority</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sit-ins</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of police to evict those participating in sit-ins</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of police to control demonstrators</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of police to prevent destruction of property</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
authority captive as reflected in the first four items of Table 3.1 are acceptable to only a minority of youngsters in either sample, whatever their level of protest involvement. Non-protesters are clearly less accepting of these tactics than either category of protesters; for all four items in both samples the difference between non-protesters and advanced protesters is close to 30 percentage points. Moreover, the pattern of responses to these four items are quite comparable between the two samples; only in one of twelve comparisons does the difference between corresponding cells exceed ten percentage points. The one exception—a greater acceptance of assaulting police among initial protesters in college—will prove interesting momentarily.

The next five items reflect obstruction and active resistance to authority, but they do not imply the use of force against persons and property, except in response to repressive measures by those in authority. For items five, six and seven—blockading buildings, resisting the draft, and disobeying or resisting the police—differences between protesters and non-protesters are even greater than they were for the first four items involving the use of force against property and persons; at least 34 percentage points separate advanced protesters and non-protesters on each of these tactics in both samples. These are the tactics which most distinguish protesters from non-protesters in both college and non-college contexts. Items eight and nine—ultimatums to authorities and sit-ins also show substantial differences by level of protest activity in both samples. But, since both these tactics are seen as justified by more than two thirds of the non-protesters in each sample, the maximum percentage differences between protesters and non-protesters are obviously restricted. Again, the one item among these five referring to police—resisting or disobeying the police—shows the greatest discrepancy between the two samples. At every level of protest activity, college students are more apt to see this tactic as justifiable than are their non-college counterparts.

Finally, we come to counter-protest tactics. The bottom three items in Table 3.1 refer to the use of police to evict sit-iners, to control demonstrations, and to protect property. The pattern of relationships with protest involvement tends, of course, to be reversed for these items; with increasing protest involvement, respondents generally see less justification in these counter protest tactics. This pattern is most evident for the use of police to evict sit-iners; it is weaker and not fully consistent for the use of police to protect property. The only notable discrepancy between these two samples among the counter tactics is that initial protesters in college are decidedly more likely to reject the use of police to evict sit-iners than are their non-college counterparts.

By and large, the responses of college and non-college youngsters are quite similar. The exceptions, however, appear to provide some important insights into the differences between the two social contexts. Among protesters the greatest discrepancy occurs, as we have noted, with respect to items referring to the police. College protesters are more likely to justify assaulting the police, resisting or disobeying the police, and to reject the use of police to evict sit-iners. That this difference between protesters is restricted to
tactics vis a vis police is highlighted by the fact that protesters in the two samples gave identical responses to item four refers to assaulting civil authorities other than the police.

We found in the previous chapter that college protesters were much less likely to have been arrested than non-college youngsters at a comparable level of protest activity (Table 2.8). We now see that they feel more justified in resisting or assaulting police than their non-college counterparts (Table 3.1). Together these facts may reflect a fundamental difference between the college and non-college contexts; namely, that the police lack a mandate as agents of social control within academic walls. Certainly the use of police to control student demonstrations and uprisings during the 1960's met with dubious success. Indeed, in many cases police are suspected of having aggraved or escalated the turmoil. Thus, social definitions of the police mandate are likely to affect the kinds of tactics protesters are willing to advocate and adopt.

Among non-protesters, who, of course, comprise the majority of respondents in each sample, discrepancies appear to have a somewhat different focal point; namely, civil disobedience. As with protesters, the non-protesters in the two samples differ on the item about resisting or disobeying the police. The other two notable discrepancies, however, relate to draft resistance and sit-ins. Thus, non-protesters in college are decidedly more likely to accept resistance and disobedience to police, the use of draft resistance as a political weapon, and sit-ins as legitimate forms of protest activity than are their counterparts outside of college.

These items would seem to reflect a commitment to civil disobedience and non-violent forms of protest as legitimate and appropriate devices for achieving social change--a commitment expressing idealism and perhaps requiring a certain measure of insulation from conventional social life. Such is the kind of commitment that the college experience might be expected to promote. It is quite possible that resorting to more forceful tactics in the late 1960's deprived protesters of the sympathy and encouragement of many non-protesters.

The tactics and counter tactics involving sit-ins have special relevance since our measure of protest activity incorporates sit-ins as one of the four components. We noted previously that engaging in sit-ins and the desire to engage in sit-ins are both decidedly more common among college than non-college youths, and we showed that the desire to engage in such activity appears to be stimulated by the college environment quite apart from the individual's previous involvement with protest activity. Now we see that there is a greater climate of acceptance of sit-ins among non-protesters inside than outside of college. This more favorable normative climate is apt to encourage greater participation in sit-ins among college youngsters, whatever their personal attitudes toward sit-ins, and it is also apt to be what encourages the participants in such activity to reject the use of police to evict sit-iners--as Table 3.1 shows they are more likely to do in the college environment.
In general, this examination of protest tactics tends to provide additional validation for our measure of protest involvement. For the most part, there is a close correspondence between the responses of college and non-college youngsters at given levels of protest involvement. Thus, of the thirty-six possible comparisons between corresponding cells in the two samples, only half a dozen diverge by as much as ten percentage points. By far, the more substantial and systematic differences occur between protesters and non-protesters within the two samples. Indeed, for the various protest tactics (the first nine items in Table 3.1) percentage differences between protesters and those at the advanced stages of protest activity average about thirty points and seldom drop below twenty points.

Institutional Reform

The protest tactics we have just examined give some indication of how protesters would achieve the changes they want. However, these items make no mention of what these changes should be, the areas in which change is needed or of the extent of change required. There is, however, a battery of items in the CBS News Survey that ask respondents about the extent of change they felt is needed in each of six major social institutions. Respondents could indicate that the institution needed "no substantial change," that it needed "moderate change," that it needed "fundamental reform," or that it should be "done away with." In Table 3.2 we show the per cent indicating they favor fundamental reform or elimination of each institution, at the various levels of protest activity among college and non-college youngsters. The institutions are ordered from most to least in need of change according to our respondents.

The data reveal that college youngsters are consistently more apt to feel the need for fundamental reform or elimination of these institutions, regardless of protest involvement. In fact, they are more likely than non-college youth to say that such change is needed in seventeen of the eighteen possible comparisons, and the difference is at least ten percentage points in ten of the eighteen comparisons.

In addition, the data show that advanced protesters in college are much more change oriented than those outside of college. In advocating fundamental reform, they average more than fifteen percentage points above their non-college counterparts; they are at least ten percentage points higher with respect to every one of the institutions under consideration. Since we have relatively few advanced protesters in the non-college sample, these differences are less reliable than the others in the table. Yet, the absence of consistent differences between advanced protesters in the two samples in Table 3.2 indicates that the differences we find here are not attributable to some general sampling bias reflected in all the correlates of protest activity.

In the college context, protest activity is most strongly associated with the desire for reform of the military and big business—in both cases the percentage difference between non-protesters and advanced protesters...
Table 3.2

PER CENT ADVOCATING FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OR ELIMINATION OF SPECIFIC INSTITUTIONS
BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political parties</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade unions</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big business</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mass media</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The universities</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
exceeds thirty percentage points. It would be hard to miss the implication that these two institutional areas reflect what has come to be known as the "military-industrial complex," a favorite target of protest activity and rhetoric in the middle and late sixties. It is also significant that reform of the universities shows the next strongest association with protest activity in the college sample. This could reflect the quest of activists for greater student power and participation, or it might reflect the belief that the universities are implicated with the military-industrial complex through activities such as conducting secret research for the Department of Defense and the weapons industry.

Among non-college youngsters, only the military shows such a substantial association with protest activity. Evidently, non-college protesters are not as concerned about big business and the universities. Perhaps the "military-industrial complex" is not as much a reality in their minds. Their substantial interest in fundamental reform of the military, however, may reflect a very realistic concern about being drafted for those not exempted by college enrollment.

Interestingly enough, "the political parties" stand very near the head of the list of institutions needing fundamental reform in both samples. While they fall slightly behind the military on the college students' list of priorities, they are at the top of the list for non-college youths. This relatively widespread desire for fundamental reform of the political parties may be linked with the events surrounding the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in the summer of 1968. Television coverage of the convention made it evident that politically active young people were not welcome as participants in the decision making of the Democratic Party.

"Trade unions" are the one exception to the tendency of protesters to see more need for institutional reform than do non-protesters. Historically, labor unions have been outspoken proponents of confrontation tactics as an instrument of social change, at least in labor-management relations. It would appear that the presumed reformist tendencies of the trade unions outweigh the desire for their reform, particularly among protesters in college.

These data on desire for institutional reform lead to several general observations which in some way contrast with our findings on the justifiability of protest tactics. First, college youngsters--both protesters and non-protesters--are more likely to be change oriented than non-college youths. This may reflect the effect of college in encouraging critical perspectives on existing institutions. Secondly, the feeling that fundamental reform is needed, especially in the military, big business, and the universities, is particularly pronounced among advanced protesters in college. In contrast with their non-college counterparts, they appear to have a more articulated and extremist perspective on institutional reform--one that seems to see the locus of difficulty in the so-called "military-industrial complex." Although our evidence on the justifiability of various protest tactics revealed some
specific differences between the two samples, there was no consistent or pervasive difference of the sort we find with respect to institutional reform. In effect, the intersample comparability in protest tactics is not here replicated with respect to needed institutional reform.

**Extremist Rhetoric**

The battery of questions in the CBS News survey contained a number of statements of the sort heard at political meetings and protest rallies. They range from expressions of relatively conventional political wisdom to calls for radical change often by revolutionary methods. We have selected five of these statements -- the more radical or extremist ones -- for examination here. Table 4.3 shows the percentage of college and non-college respondents at various levels of protest involvement who express either strong or partial agreement with these statements. We have ordered the statements from least to most acceptable.

The table shows that non-college youngsters are generally more responsive to these items of protest rhetoric. They are more likely than college youth to agree with these rhetorical statements in eleven of fifteen possible comparisons; by more than ten percentage points in four instances. Moreover, this difference in receptivity between the two samples is concentrated primarily among those who have not protested. In particular, non-protesters outside of college are distinctly more willing than those in college to agree with statements to the effect that disruption is preferable to discussion in effecting change, that authorities must be forced to respond with repression, and that destroying society must precede rebuilding it.

The differences in response suggest that non-college youngsters may feel a greater sense of alienation from society -- one which they are not able to translate into specific institutional reforms or protest tactics, but nevertheless, reflects itself in response to rhetorical statements about the need for change and for extreme measures to achieve that change. Of course, it might be argued that their greater receptivity to these statements simply reflect a lack of sophistication among non-college youth.

Generally speaking, we find less association between protest involvement and these statements of extremist rhetoric than we did with the items reflecting needed institutional reforms or justifiable protest tactics. With the exception of college students' responses to the item about a "mass revolutionary party" which we shall consider momentarily, the differences between non-protesters and advanced protesters only reach about twenty percentage points at most in Table 3.3. For the most part, then, these rhetorical statements are less satisfactory than the items we have examined earlier in distinguishing between those who have and those who have not engaged in protest activity.

The least popular of these statements -- about the need for a mass revolutionary political party -- is the one most strongly associated with protest..
Table 3.3

PER CENT AGREEING WITH STATEMENTS OF POLITICAL RHETORIC BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A mass revolutionary party should be created</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption is preferable to discussing issues for changing our society</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorities must be put in an intolerable position so they will be forced to respond with repression and thus show their illegitimacy</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Today, rebuilding society is of less immediate importance than destroying it</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Establishment&quot; unfairly controls every aspect of our lives; we can never be free until we are rid of it</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
activity. And, the relationship in the college sample is extraordinary--a forty-five percentage point difference--where more than half of the advanced protesters advocate such a party. Thus, once again we find that protesters are distinguished from non-protesters in their desire for change in the American political party structure. It now appears that the fundamental reform in political parties which many protesters, especially advanced college protesters, had in mind in response to the previous battery of items was the creation of a new type of political party that would more directly and more effectively represent the interest of "the people."

The least popular of these rhetorical statements is the one asserting that we cannot be free until we are rid of the "establishment." Unlike the other four statements which elicit the agreement of only a minority of youngsters, this one reflecting anti-establishment sentiments receives the assent of a majority of the youngsters at every level of protest activity in both samples. Moreover, there is approximately a twenty percentage point difference between non-protesters and advanced protesters in both samples. In effect, it ranks second in discriminatory power to the one about the need for a mass revolutionary party.

Terms like "establishment" and "mass revolutionary party" have entered the political arena only recently; they reflect the thinking and influence of the youth movement of the 1960's. "Establishment" refers to the forces of resistance to change within American institutions and the term has been adopted fairly widely by the press and the public in the late sixties. "Mass revolutionary party" is a concept that has remained more exclusively the province of organized protesters; its meaning is laden with ideological connotations. The commitment to this concept among a substantial proportion of the more advanced protesters may reflect the frustrations they encountered in trying to work within the existing political party structure together with the early commitment of the New Left to "participatory" democracy and grass-roots political involvement.

To summarize: Protesters are distinguished from non-protesters most by the protest tactics they feel are justified, next by the areas in which they would like to see institutional change, and least by the rhetoric they accept. Protesters in both college and non-college contexts display quite comparable attitudes toward specific protest tactics, the only notable difference being a greater inclination toward tactics involving confrontation with the police among college protesters. Non-protesters in the two contexts also show quite similar attitudes towards these tactics, though we do find somewhat greater support among non-protesters in the college context for those tactics involving civil disobedience.

When it comes to the desire for institutional reform and the use of extremist rhetoric, intersample comparability is less apparent. Both institutional reform and extremist rhetoric are more strongly associated with protest activity in the college than the non-college context, although apparently
not for the same reasons. Desire for institutional reform, particularly of the military, big business, and the universities, is more common among college youngsters, and especially so among college protesters relative to non-college protesters. College protesters, in particular, appear to have a much clearer vision of the specific institutional reforms they would like to see than do their counterparts outside of college.

Like institutional reforms, extremist rhetoric also discriminates better between protesters and non-protesters inside than outside of college. But in this case, the difference is, for the most part, owing to a lack of comparability between non-protesters in the two contexts. Outside of college, non-protesters appear to be more receptive to rhetorical statements about the need for disruption, destruction, and the use of force against authorities. It may be that this group, comprising a substantial majority of the non-college youth, harbors a latent sense of alienation from society which is tapped by these rhetorical statements. This theme of alienation will reappear as we turn to the data on value orientations and reference group identifications.

Social References and Identifications

Alienation from the mainstream of society is widely viewed as a source of protest activity among youth. In one form or another, such alienation is a current theme in current theories of youthful protest. Some see its roots in the historical discontinuity between the generations (Mannheim, 1940; Eisenstadt, 1956), others find it in rapidly changing social, economic, and technological conditions of society (Flacks, 1970a; Mead, 1969) and still others locate it in the conflict that arises when the older generation affirms its authority and the younger generation denies it (Feuer, 1969). In varying degrees all of these theories share the assumption that youngsters, particularly those involved in protest activity, will display a sense of alienation from the mainstream of society, from the generation of their elders, and even from their own parents.

This is not to say that protesters will be alienated from all social groups or reference points in society. Indeed, to compensate for their alienation from the adult generation, youngsters may share a sense of identification with people of their own generation. Moreover, with the prolongations of the pre-adult stage of life cycle, the growing distinctness of their own status (Douglas, 1970), and especially the "formulation" of the student status (Meyer, 1971), youngsters may be expected to show a greater political self-awareness and efficacy. And to the extent that the protesters among them are espousing the causes and interest of youth, they, in particular, may be expected to identify with the members of their own generation.

Of course, alienation from the mainstream of society may be a consequence as well as a cause of protest activity. Thus, people who advocate
employ uninstitutionalized tactics to achieve social reform are apt to encounter the disapproval and disdain of those around them. The racial "backlash" to civil rights protests and the "hard hat" reaction to anti-war demonstrations serve to illustrate how society separates itself from those of its members who assail the established practices, traditions, and institutions. Thus, to the extent that the social context in which the protester finds himself is unreceptive to his actions or commitments, we might expect to find him alienated from most social groups, with the possible exception of the members of his own generation.

Let us examine the degree to which college and non-college youngsters at various levels of protest activity identify with social groups representing their parents and elders, people from their national, racial and religious origins, members of selected political groups and persuasions, and other persons of their own generation.

Reference Group Identifications

Listing ten status or reference groups in one question, CBS News survey asked "With which of the following groups, if any, do you feel a sense of identification?" Youngsters' responses by level of protest activity for college and non-college youth are presented in Table 3.4. Since the rank order of the ten groups is not precisely the same in the two samples, we have ordered the groups in Table 3.4 on the basis of college youngsters' responses.

The Younger Generation: The top two identifications on the list are students and "people from your own generation." At least eight out of ten college students identify with each of these reference groups. For non-college youngsters, "your own generation" is almost equally as strong an identification with about three-quarters of the non-college sample choosing it. Not surprisingly, identification with "students" is considerably lower in this sample since by definition they are not students. Even so, more than half of these non-college youngsters do identify with students and this identification ranks above most others in the non-college sample. In effect, among youngsters in general-- both college and non-college-- there is a high level of identification with their own generation. The strength of this identification is particularly impressive when we consider that it ranks above identification with one's own family in the college sample and on par with it in the non-college sample. Whether this represents a newly emerging status group self-consciousness we cannot tell for we have no comparable data from earlier cohorts of youth. But it does imply that youth has become more than simply a transitional status between childhood and adulthood.

In relation to protest activity, an important difference emerges between the two samples. Among college students there is a modest but consistent decline in generational identification with increasing protest activity; among non-college youngsters, on the other hand, there is a consistent and even stronger increase in generational identification with increasing
Table 3.4

PER CENT EXPRESSING A SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE GROUPS
BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Groups</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other people of your generation</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The middle class</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of your race</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of your nationality</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of your religion</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Left</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Old Left</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
protest involvement. Moreover, this pattern holds exclusively for the broader generational category; identification with "students" is unrelated to protest activity in both samples. Apparently, protest activity is associated with generational alienation in the college context and with generational solidarity outside of college. The non-college protester seems to be looking towards his peers as a reference point; he may feel that he is acting in their interests or on their behalf. The college protester, on the other hand, seems to be looking beyond his peers; he may feel that he is acting on behalf of some other social group or cause that is not identified with any particular social group.

We shall have more to say about this disparity between the two generations a little later on. Let us now move to the next most common identifications.

The Older Generation: Identification with "your family" and "the middle class" would seem to reflect the youngster's orientations and attitudes toward the established adult generations as he has come to know it, both personally and in the abstract. Between two thirds and three quarters of the respondents in each sample identify with their own families. And a majority in each sample identify with the middle class, although such identifications are understandably lower among non-college youngsters who tend to come from lower social class backgrounds. Thus, there is little evidence of a gulf between generations in either sample. In fact, the relatively high proportion of respondents in both samples who identify with their family and middle class suggests that there are strong integrative forces in society binding the generations together. (For further evidence in these data of greater value homogeneity between the generations than between social classes see Yankelovich, 1970.)

Identification with "your family" tends to drop off with increasing protest activity in both samples. The pattern is slightly stronger among the non-college youngsters, when we consider the difference between those scoring one on the protest index in the two samples. Perhaps non-college youngsters are more likely to live at home and therefore to have the protest activity known to their parents. Daily contact with parents may tend to crystallize differences between the generations and provides occasions for disagreements and disputes. Yet, the modest nature of this relationship suggests that parental identification is neither a serious constraint on protest activity nor a pronounced consequence of such activity. These data certainly do not support intense antipathy or alienation from parents as a result of protest involvement.

Identification with "the middle class" shows a relatively strong (negative) relationship with protest activity among college youngsters and essentially no relationship with protest involvement among non-college youngsters. Actually, there is not much difference in identification with middle class between protesters in the two samples. The difference lies in the identifications of non-protesters. Among college youngsters who have not engaged in protest activity, almost eighty percent identify with the middle class; whereas, only a little more than half of the non-protesters outside of college do so. As we noted above, differences in identification with the middle class between the two samples makes sense as a reflection of objective reality;
the college youngsters are more likely to come from middle class backgrounds. The fact that the college youngsters do not, however, retain this greater sense of identification with the middle class as they become more involved in protest activity—there is a drop of some 34 percentage points between non-protesters and those scoring two on the protest index—strongly suggests that protest involvement in the college context is associated with a sense of alienation from the middle class.

The evidence of a gap between protesters and their elders in terms of reference group identifications is somewhat ambiguous at this point. Protesters in both contexts are somewhat less likely than non-protesters to identify with their own families, but these differences are small by any standard (16 percentage points over the three categories of protest activity.) College protesters are much less likely to identify with the middle class—a more impersonal representation of the adult generation—than are non-protesters in college, but outside of college there is no relationship between middle class identification and protest activity.

Ethnic Origins: The next three items on the list of identifications (five, six and seven) reflect the individual's attachment to his social origins—race, nationality, and religion. Among college students these identifications all decline consistently with increasing protest. Perhaps, feeling independent of these social origins enables the individual to engage in protest activity, or having engaged in such activity liberates him from these aspects of his social background. His protest seems not to be in the interest of or on behalf of any of these reference groups.

Among non-college youngsters, however, each of these ethnic identifications show a different relationship with protest involvement. As in the college sample, religious identifications is progressively weaker among those at the more advanced stages of protest activity. Considering both samples, the pattern here comes closest to the one for identification with "your family." Identification with nationality shows no association with protest involvement in the non-college sample. The pattern here is very much like the one for middle class identification. Identification with race actually increases substantially among advanced protesters in the non-college sample. The pattern in the two samples is somewhat comparable to that for generational identifications, in that the two run in opposite directions. However, since the increase in racial identification comes only at the more advanced stage of protest activity in the non-college sample, relatively few individuals are involved. For this group, nevertheless, it would appear that racial identification is a strong supportive force behind their intense protest activity.

Perhaps the racial identification among advanced protesters outside of college reflects the presence of black youngsters whose protest involve issues of black racial identity—black power and black pride. We have already seen in the previous chapter that blacks are more prominent at the more advanced stages of protest activity particularly in the non-college sample and that
they are more apt to be involved in the kind of protest that serves their
interest as a racial group; namely, civil rights protests (Table 2.9.) We
have reason, therefore, to wonder whether the greater racial identification
of advanced protesters in the non-college sample is not associated with the
racial composition of this group. To pursue this point we will examine
selected identifications and perceptions of black and white protesters sepa-
ately in the next section of this chapter. First, however, we must com-
plete our discussion of the relationships in Table 3.4.

Political Persuasions: As a group the political identifications (items
eight, nine and ten) are definitely the weakest of those in Table 3.4. The
"conservative" identification is actually more common in both samples than
either identification with "the New Left" or the "Old Left." But this may
reflect the fact that "conservative" refers to a broader spectrum of political
orientations than either "New Left" or "Old Left," which may be reserved for
relatively specific ideological commitment. Thus, if the broader category
"liberal" had been included in the list, it might have well outranked the
conservative identification.

Identification with the New Left, and the Old Left to a lesser extent,
is associated with increasing protest activity in both samples. The New Left
identification is definitely more common among protesters in the college con-
text than outside of it. At the same time, it is certainly not the case that
protesters, even those at the advanced stages of such activity in the college
context, overwhelmingly identify with the New Left. As in the case of activist
self-concept (Table 2.11), only a minority of the advanced protesters in col-
lege identify with the New Left. Thus, while protesters tend to identify
with the New Left more than non-protesters and those in the college context do
so more than those outside of it, such an identification is confined to a dis-
tinct minority of these protesters and ranks well below most other identifi-
cations on the list.

The conservative identification follows the earlier pattern of identi-
fication with the middle class and with nationality. That is, there is a
negative association in the college sample and no relationship outside of col-
lege, and the difference between the two samples is due primarily to the higher
level of conservative identification among non-protesters in college. The fact
that three out of ten non-protesters in college identify with conservatives
implies that the social context in which college protesters find themselves is
not uniformly supportive of their goals. This identification with conserva-
tives does not necessarily mean opposition to protest, however. Thus, a good
many more college youngsters identify with conservatives in response to this
question than say they are opposed to the aims of activists as reported in
Table 2.11.

To summarize: We anticipated that non-college protesters would experi-
ence a greater sense of alienation or separation from other social groups than
would college protesters because of the relative lack of sympathy for the ob-
jectives of activists on the non-college context as shown in Table 2.11. The
data on reference group identification, however, contradict this expectation. Protest activity in college is associated with an alienation from one's social origins in terms of race, nationality and religion, from the mainstream of society as represented by the middle class, one's own family, and one's own generation. Only leftist political orientation, particularly identification with the New Left, is positively associated with protest activity among college youth.

Among non-college youngsters, on the other hand, alienation among protesters is evident only in identification with religion, and to a lesser extent with one's own family. And, for non-college protesters, these areas of alienation are offset by their greater identification with people of their own race and of their own generation. On balance, among non-college youth, protesters are no more alienated than non-protesters from the reference groups in Table 3.4.

The major difference between the two samples actually comes in the identification of those who have not protested. For every reference group in Table 3.4, non-protesters in college show higher levels of identification than do their counterparts outside of college. In fact, non-protesters in college show the highest levels of identification in the table for six of the ten reference groups. Specifically, they feel more identified with the middle class, their own religion, their own nationality, their own generation, students, and conservatives.

In other words, what evidence there is on alienation in this battery of items on reference group identifications points to the following generalizations: 1) college protesters are alienated from social reference groups relative to non-protesters in the college context, 2) non-college protesters are not generally more alienated from social reference groups than non-protesters outside of college, and 3) non-protesters outside of college are generally alienated from all reference groups by contrast with non-protesters in the college context. Certainly, the differences we find between college and non-college protesters in their reference group identifications do not seem to support the notion that social constraints are causing protesters outside of college to be more alienated. There is definitely less protest activity among non-college youngsters, but those who engage in it do not seem to feel especially alienated, marginal, or estranged from those around them.

Specification by Race

Perhaps for some protesters, their activities are a source of social integration rather than alienation—an experience which brings them a sense of affiliation with their social origins, their families, and their communities. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that protesters will be alienated from those around them if their protests represent the interests of the social groups from which they come. Thus, while white youngsters may experience their protest
as a form of defiance that separates them from the "white establishment" and, in many instances, from their own families; the same protest activity on the part of blacks may well express social solidarity with reference individuals and groups in the black community.

In the preceding chapter, we saw that there are proportionately more blacks than whites among the protesters in both samples, and that black protesters in both samples are more likely than whites to be involved in "civil rights protests" (Table 2.9). Furthermore, we observed in the preceding section of this chapter that advanced protesters in the non-college sample are particularly likely to identify with their own race (Table 3.4). We might expect such racial identification to be especially likely among black protesters who regard "black power," "black capitalism," and "black pride" as essential ingredients in the movement toward greater equality and independence for black people in America. Perhaps, then, our failure to find relatively high levels of alienation, in terms of these reference groups identifications, among protesters, particularly in the non-college sample, reflects disproportionate presence of blacks who are not in fact alienated from their principal reference groups.

To explore this possibility, we need to examine the reference group identifications of blacks and whites separately. Unfortunately, to begin with, we have relatively few blacks in each sample; there are only 44 black college students and 70 black non-college youngsters (only 7 and 12 percent of their respective samples.) When these black youngsters are broken down by level of protest activity, there are very few non-protesters, or even one time protesters among college blacks, and very few advanced protesters among non-college blacks. (There are also very few advanced protesters among non-college whites.) While these small numbers of cases make it difficult to generalize about the reference group identifications of black respondents, we can, nevertheless, get an idea of the extent to which the patterns of alienation and protest activity shown in Table 3.4 are a real product of racial differences in reference group identification, at least within this sample of American youth. Thus, Table 3.5 shows selected reference group identifications of blacks and whites inside and outside of college by level of protest activity. For this further analysis by race, we have selected identification with "other people of your generation," "your family," "the middle class," and "other people of your race."

Looking first at the racial identifications of black and white youngsters, we see that blacks are indeed much more likely than whites to identify with people of their own race at all levels of protest activity. Notably, this racial "consciousness" among blacks is quite pervasive, except in the group of non-college blacks who have not protested. Among white youngsters, identification with their own race appears to be less common with increasing protest activity, except among a small number of advanced protesters in the non-college sample.
Table 3.5

PER CENT EXPRESSING A SENSE OF IDENTIFICATION WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE GROUPS
BY LEVEL OF PROTEST ACTIVITY AND RACE AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Group</th>
<th>Level of Protest</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>Two+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of your race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other people of your generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your family</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The middle class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 65 -
With respect to generational identification, we anticipated that it would be more intense as youngsters become more involved in protest activity, and that this would be particularly so in the less supportive non-college context. In fact, we found some indication of generational identification with increasing protest involvement among non-college youngsters, but curiously the opposite was true in the college context. When we examine generational identifications separately for blacks and whites, we find quite different patterns. For white youngsters, the variations in generational identifications by protest involvement either inside or outside of college are essentially negligible. For black youngsters, on the other hand, the associations between generational identification and protest activity are substantial and contrasting in the two samples. But before discussing the variations among black youngsters inside and outside of college, let us gain a more complete picture of the patterns of identification shown in Table 3.5.

The next item, identification with your family, displayed only a modest pattern of decline with increasing protest activity in both samples in Table 3.4. We were surprised not to find a greater negative correlation between family identification and protest activity in view of the importance attributed to the generation gap in discussions of youthful protest. When we introduce race of respondent in Table 3.5, we find that white protesters as compared to non-protesters outside of college experience a greater sense of alienation from their families in conjunction with their protest activity. As in the case of generational identification, the difference between protesters and non-protesters among white college students has dropped to a negligible level. At this point, then, the only indication of alienation we have among white protesters is this evidence of lesser identification with family among the non-college white protesters.

The pattern for college and non-college blacks with respect to family identification looks very much like their patterns of generational identification. Protest activity is related to greater alienation among college blacks and lesser alienation among non-college blacks. It is as if black college protesters feel that their protest involvement takes them away from their parents and peers, perhaps because their perspectives and ideological commitments have developed to a point where they are no longer compatible with those of the broader black community. By contrast, non-college black protesters appear to feel closer to their parents and peers by virtue of their protest involvement, perhaps because it more often takes place in their own home communities and has direct observable implications for the black communities in which they live.

Concerning identification with the middle class, we noted earlier that such an identification was related to protest activity only for college students. Table 3.5 now reveals that the relationship only holds for white college students. Obviously, failing to separate blacks and whites in the earlier analysis tended to mask the strength of this relationship among whites and to obscure the fact that it occurs with increasing protest activity exclusively among college whites.
Examining blacks and whites separately, then, helps to isolate apparently distinct patterns of alienation among college and non-college protesters. White protest activity appears to be relatively unrelated to generational identification in either sample. It is, however, somewhat related to alienation from the family among non-college protesters, and strongly associated with alienation from the middle class among college protesters. Thus, white protesters in both samples show a measure of alienation from the older generation but they differ with respect to specific reference points. White college protesters seem to choose a more abstract reference point—the middle class—which is intellectually familiar to them and the subject of their ideological formulations. White non-college protesters, on the other hand, choose a concrete reference point—their own families—in which disapproval of their protest activity can produce direct conflict between them and their elders.

Moreover, the control for race pinpoints distinct differences in alienation between blacks in the two samples. Black protesters in college are considerably more alienated from their own generation and from their families than any other group inside or outside of college. And, non-college black protesters, though there are few of them, show higher levels of identification with their own generation and their families than any other group under consideration.

Evidently, then, protest activity bears a different pattern of association with reference group identifications for each of the racial groups in each context. These data on identifications suggest that it might be wise to separate black and white youngsters, as well as college and non-college youngsters, in subsequent analyses. The need to deal with blacks and whites separately in accounting for protest activity has been recognized in other studies (Kahn and Bowers, 1970; Orum and Orum, 1968). In the present context, with relatively few blacks in our college and non-college samples, the choice is between including and excluding blacks in the subsequent analysis. With this question in mind, let us consider one further piece of evidence relating to the orientations of black and white protesters in the college sample.

Orientations Toward College Among Blacks and Whites

In research using these data, Yankelvich (1972) has distinguished between two basic orientations of college students—"career-minded" and "post-affluent." (He used the term "fore-runner" to characterize the post-affluent group in an earlier investigation; see Yankelvich, 1969.) These two groups of youngsters were distinguished on the basis of their responses to a question asking them to indicate which of two statements comes closest to their own points of view. The statement indicating the career-minded or practical orientation reads:

"For me, college is mainly a practical matter. With a college education I can earn more money, have a more interesting career, and enjoy a better position in the society."

The statement indicating a post-affluent or fore-runner orientation reads:
"I'm not really concerned with the practical benefits of college. I suppose I can take them for granted. College for me means something more intangible; perhaps the opportunity to change things rather than make out within the existing system."

Post-affluent orientations among college youngsters have been credited as critical factors in the emergence of the youth protest movement of the 1960's. Thus, in their research on white college protesters, Flacks (1967) and Keniston (1968) found that youngsters who become committed to and involved in protest activities are relatively free of the economic pressures experienced by previous generations of college youngsters. Without such concerns, they can more readily adopt values of egalitarianism and participatory decision making which are, according to these investigators, encouraged by an upbringing in educated, professional, upper middle class families. The findings of Flacks and Keniston do not, however, pertain to protest activity among black youth. Moreover, what research there is on black student protest shows little variation in protest activity by social class background (Orum and Orum, 1968.) Indeed, there is reason to believe that black protesters will be rather practically minded, since their protest activity may be a matter of practical politics for themselves and the broader black community.

When we examine the relationship between this measure of orientation to college and protest involvement separately for black and white students (the question does not apply to non-college youngsters) a dramatic difference appears, as shown in Table 3.6. Among white students, the proportion of post-affluent youngsters increases substantially with increasing levels of protest activity; among black students, on the other hand, the proportion giving a post-affluent response drops off even more substantially with increasing protest activity. Thus, in contrast with the high level of post-affluent orientation among white college protesters, there is a high level of practical minded orientation among black protesters.

Table 3.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Protest Activity</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>Two+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(462)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The pattern among blacks is, of course, based on a relatively small number of respondents and may, therefore, reflect sampling peculiarities. Only 44 blacks were included in the college sample and almost half of them (20 in number) come from a single all-black college which experienced a serious protest demonstration not long before the CBS News survey was conducted. Yet further analysis of these data reveals that the same relationship between orientation and protest activity shows up not only among students from the all-black college but also among the blacks drawn from the remaining colleges in our sample.

In effect, the data on reference group identifications and orientations to college suggest that the protest involvement of black youth in general, and black students in particular, may have different roots or sources than does the protest involvement of white youngsters. The implication is that whites and blacks should be examined separately for an understanding of the dynamics of protest involvement among these groups. Since we have too few blacks to permit extensive analysis, our subsequent investigation of youth protest will focus primarily on white youth.

Conclusion

The first half of the chapter extends our earlier examination of protesters and non-protesters inside and outside of college to the area of ideological commitment-- the justifiability of specific protest tactics, the need for a reform of various institutions, and the receptivity of rhetorical language.

Youngsters' acceptance of specific protest tactics is strongly related to their protest activity within each of the two samples and there is little discrepancy in acceptance at a given level of protest activity between the two samples. The only notable discrepancies are that college protesters tend to favor tactics involving confrontation with the police more than do non-college protesters, and that non-protesters in college tend to favor tactics involving civil disobedience more than do non-protesters outside of college.

With respect to needed institutional reforms, we find a more articulated pattern of felt need for institutional reform among protesters in the college context than among those outside of it. The pattern of differences between protesters and non-protesters, particularly in college, suggests that these protesters feel the need for reforms that would alter the nature and power of the "military-industrial complex" in society.

In terms of extremist rhetoric, we find that non-protesters outside of college tend to be more receptive than non-protesters in college to inflammatory statements advocating the use of force and disruption to achieve political or social ends. Among protesters, those in the college context appear to be more responsive to the call for a "mass revolutionary party" than their
counterparts outside of college.

On questions of institutional reform and extremist rhetoric, then, we find less difference between protesters and non-protesters within each sample and less uniformity of response between the two samples than we do in the case of protest tactics. Yet, in perspective, these are minor variations within a broader pattern of consistency within and between samples. In particular, there are no cases in which the ideological commitments of protesters vis-a-vis non-protesters show opposing tendencies in the two samples. The same cannot be said for the reference group identifications or for orientations toward college in the two samples.

Our examination of reference group identifications in the second half of this chapter was intended to reveal the nature and extent of alienation that protesters may experience from various reference points in society. We anticipated that non-college protesters would show a greater measure of alienation, in view of the evidence in the previous chapter that there is less sympathy or support for the aims of activities in the non-college context. Contrary to our expectation, we find that alienation is actually more evident among college than among non-college protesters relative to non-protesters in their respective samples. However, these differences appear to be due, in large measure, to a relatively high sense of identification with various social groups and reference points among the college youngsters who have not engaged in protest activity. Thus, the identifications among college and non-college protesters are not very different, with a few notable exceptions.

One of these exceptions—identification with other people of your race—suggested the possibility that some of the differences in identifications between the two samples might be attributable to differences in the racial composition of the two samples. Controlling for race on a selected group of identifications with peers and elders tended to clarify and pinpoint areas of alienation for the various groups of youngsters. There appears to be a strong sense of alienation among the white college protesters, and a moderate sense of alienation from their own families among the non-college white protesters. Neither group, however, manifests alienation from the members of their own generation, once race is controlled.

Based on many fewer cases, the patterns of identification among black youngsters are quite discrepant between the two samples. Thus, black college protesters show considerable alienation from both peers and elders, whereas black non-college protesters show relative identifications with peers and elders. Moreover, the fact that the patterns of identification for blacks and whites differ within each sample led us to consider the possibility of removing blacks from our analysis of protest involvement.

To this end, we examined the relationship between protest involvement and orientation to college among black and white college students. The data show that the post-affluent orientation to college is strongly associated with
protest activity among white college youngsters, but that its alternative, a practical or career-minded orientation to college, is even more strongly associated with such activity among black college students.

In view of these divergent patterns of orientation to college and identification with social reference points between blacks and whites, we have decided to exclude the black youngsters from the upcoming analysis. The investigation to follow, therefore, will be concerned primarily with the roots of protest activity among white college youth. Non-college youth, college revolutionaries, and black youngsters both inside and outside of college will serve only as comparison groups or reference points in our upcoming analysis.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the least accepted protest tactic and the most accepted counter tactic both involve property, apparently reflecting the sacredness of property rights in American society.

2. This pattern is consistent with research indicating that the college experience promotes a critical perspective on existing social institutions (for a review of these findings, see Feldman and Newcomb, 1969).
CHAPTER 4
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND PROTEST ACTIVITY

College undoubtedly provides a young person with occupational opportunities that would be closed to him without a college degree. By the same token, attending college in 1969—indeed throughout the middle and late 60s—would appear to have provided young people with opportunities and social support for political protest which they would not have encountered outside of college. Chapter 2 has shown that opportunities for involvement in protest-oriented organizations, the desire for further protest involvement, and support for the aims of protesters are all greater among youth in the college than in the non-college environment. Indeed, this activating effect of the college environment appears to be reflected among non-college youth who have been exposed to college.

Now, if the college environment is conducive to protest activity, it would seem only natural to suppose that the environments of some colleges are more conducive than those of others, especially in view of the widely recognized diversity of college environments in American higher education (Riesman, 1956; Astin, 1968b; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969). As noted in Chapter 1, efforts to identify and isolate institutional effects on protest activity have met with methodological difficulties, but recent investigations have begun to disentangle individual and institutional effects and to find that institutional characteristics make a substantial and independent contribution to youthful protest activity.

Several contextual studies have begun to unravel the effects of institutional quality (Kahn and Bowers, 1970; Pierce and Bowers, 1974). Specifically, these investigations have shown that students of a given social background and academic ability have a greater likelihood of becoming involved in protest activity if they attend institutions of high academic standing. Within a given college, or colleges of a given quality level, social background and ability level appear relatively unrelated to protest involvement. Furthermore, within top ranking institutions, they found that serious academic commitment, as reflected in the amount of time students spent studying and the grades they receive, is associated with protest involvement, but not so at institutions of lesser quality. In addition, faculty contact at these institutions, though not at lower quality schools, is associated with protest activity independently of grades and time spent studying. Perhaps for these reasons, the top ranking institutions activate a larger fraction of their potential protesters—those who are sympathetic with or do not disapprove of protest activity.

Thus, at least for the early period from 1963 through 1966 of the youthful protest movement, it appears that institutions of exceptional prestige and quality tended to politicize students. Through serious academic commitment and contact with faculty at these schools, students appear to have become sensitive
...and concerned about major political and social issues. At institutions of lesser academic quality, on the other hand, students showed no increased political concern or awareness between 1963 and 1966 that could be attributed to the institutional context. When students did become involved in protest activity, it seemed to be more a function of their personal contacts and commitments and less a function of contact with or involvement in the academic programs of the institution.

The role of institutional size is perhaps more ambiguous, especially as it may affect individual involvement in protest activity. Studies have repeatedly found that size is associated with the incidence of demonstrations (Peterson, 1968; Hodgkinson, 1970; Scott and El-Assul, 1969; Blau and Slaughter, 1971) and in several instances (the last two citations) they have concluded that institutional size is the most important determinant of such protest demonstrations. Following Peterson (1968) investigators have interpreted the effects of size by suggesting that it provides a "critical mass" needed to mobilize and organize effective protest demonstrations. According to this logic, the larger the school, the greater the absolute number of potential protesters, and hence the greater the likelihood that a sufficient number can be mobilized to mount a disruptive demonstration.

Yet this argument says nothing about the effects of size on the level of individual involvement in protest activity or the proportion of students at an institution that will become involved; it is framed exclusively in terms of the occurrence of collective disturbances. Others have argued (Scott and El-Assul, 1971) that the association between size and protest demonstrations really reflects the effects of bureaucracy in educational institutions and the attendant frustrations, impersonality, and lack of individual attention that students experience. This argument suggests that disruptive demonstrations may result from mounting levels of protest involvement among individual students at larger, more bureaucratic institutions. Empirical data show, however, that size bears little or no relationship to protest activity, at least during the period for 1963 to 1966 (Kahn and Bowers, 1970).

In addition to quality and size, several other college characteristics have been examined for their association with youthful protest. These include regional location of the college, the size of the community in which it is located, the level of curriculum or degrees offered, the type of institutional control, etc. Yet the available studies have not consistently established that these factors have an independent effect on the incidence of protest demonstrations, and there is no research examining the relationship between such variables and the level of individual involvement in protest activity.

Our purpose in this chapter will be to assess the effects of institutional characteristics on the level of protest involvement among college students. We begin with institutional quality which previous research suggests as an important determinant of protest activity. We then explore other institutional characteristics in conjunction with quality for their independent contributions.
to protest involvement. Once we have a picture of the relative effects of the various institutional characteristics, we shall attempt to interpret these effects in terms of the personal values and dispositions of students— their commitment to traditional values, their critical perspectives on society, their orientations toward college, and the like—which are strongly related to protest activity and may be affected by the kinds of colleges they attend.

The Measurement and Effects of Institutional Quality

The academic quality of colleges and universities is perhaps the most fundamental dimension of institutional stratification in higher education. Essentially it refers to an institution's ability to contribute to the development of knowledge in various academic fields and to offer exceptional programs of study to students in these disciplines. More specifically, top ranking institutions will have extensive educational resources including library and laboratory facilities; they will have instructors of established accomplishment and reputation; they will attract students of exceptional ability and motivation; and they will apply exacting standards of academic performance to the work of their students. In short, the best colleges and universities will be those with the best resources, programs, teachers, and students. Graduation from such institutions is typically regarded as a mark of distinction, and these schools are often said to leave their imprint upon a student.

Investigators have used any number of specific indicators to reflect school quality. Such measures as the number of books in the school library, the number of books per student, the number of Ph.D.'s on the faculty, the faculty/student ratio, the college board or intelligence test scores of entering students, the proportion of merit scholar winners in the student body, the proportion of students on honors or independent study programs, the proportion of students going on to graduate work have been used singly and in various combinations. Subjective ratings of the prestige or reputation of the school in the eyes of knowledgeable educators throughout the country have also been used to identify the very top ranking institutions.

For present purposes, we have selected three readily available measures to comprise an index of institutional quality. They are measures of: (1) environmental pressures toward academic performance (Cass and Birnbaum, 1969); (2) selectivity of admissions (Cass and Birnbaum, 1969); and (3) academic ability of entering liberal arts students (Mazel, 1970). Two of these three measures are themselves indices consisting of various component indicators.

Environmental pressures for academic performance is a composite measure developed by Cass and Birnbaum to characterize the academic emphasis and competition at a school. It is based on the nature of academic requirements, the minimum passing grade average, the amount of time expected in outside preparation for class, requirements for comprehensive or qualifying examinations, and the proportion of students going on for advanced study. Cass and Birnbaum
do not indicate precisely how these elements were combined to form their index. They classify schools as "rigorous," "quite intense," intense," "moderately strong," "moderate," and "weak." We have collapsed the top three distinctions into a category we refer to as "strong," the next two into a category we have called "moderate," and we have adopted the "weak" category as designated in Cass and Birnbaum.

The measure of selectivity of admissions, drawn from Cass and Birnbaum, is based on the number and quality of students applying to the institution and the proportion accepted among those who apply. The authors note that a simple ratio of the number accepted to the number who apply can be misleading since some schools reduce the number of applications by charging an application fee, or becoming known as highly competitive. In this case as well, the authors do not explicit about the formula used to combine these elements. Their final categories are: "most selective," "highly selective," "very selective," "selective," "not selective," and "not selective." We have again reduced these distinctions to three basic categories: "very selective," combining the first two, and the "selective" and "not selective" adopted as is.

The data on entering freshmen ability scores come from the admissions offices of the respective institutions in response to a questionnaire circulated by Hazen (1970). The information is published by her in five categories: "ACT 28 or above, SAT above 625"; "ACT 26-27, SAT 575-625"; "ACT 24-25, SAT 525-575"; "ACT 22-23, SAT 475-525"; and "ACT 21 or below, SAT under 475." We have reduced these five categories to three by collapsing the top two and the bottom two.

Our index of academic quality is the sum of an institution's score on these three dimensions. In Table 4.1 we present the 30 institutions sampled in this research, their scores on the three components of our index and their composite index scores. (The list of institutions serving as sampling points in this survey has been previously published in Yankelovich, 1972: 191.)

Although Table 4.1 lists 30 schools, not all of them will be included in an subsequent analysis of institutional effects. Central State College at Wilberforce, Ohio is an all-black institution which had wide protest not long before it students were surveyed by Yankelovich Inc. As we observed at the end of Chapter 3, the factors that account for protest involvement are likely to be different for black and white college students. A thoroughgoing analysis of protest involvement among college-going blacks cannot be undertaken here in view of the relatively small number of black students in this sample and the fact that about half of them come from only one institution. It should be clear, then, that to group Central State College with other institutions at comparable levels on our quality index would confound rather than clarify the causes of protest involvement low-quality institutions.

It should also be noted that six of these institutions listed in Table 4.1 are junior colleges. The data on academic pressures, institutional selectivity and entering freshman ability levels were not available from these
Table 4.1

ACADEMIC QUALITY INDEX SCORES FOR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Institutions</th>
<th>competitiveness</th>
<th>Selectivity</th>
<th>Mean Ability</th>
<th>Index score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 Univ. of Pittsburgh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Nassau Community College(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Harvard University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Kansas State University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 University of Minnesota</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 University of Nebraska</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 University of Wisconsin (Madison)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 University of Arkansas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 George Washington University</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Univ. of California (Berkeley)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Los Angeles City College(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Arizona State University</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 University of Rhode Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 University of Rochester</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Amherst College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Elmira College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Delta College(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 University of Missouri</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Hanover College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Central State College, Ohio(^b)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 St. Gregory's College, Oklahoma(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Georgia State College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 McNeese State College(^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Asheville-Biltmore College</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Delmar College(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Furman College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Western Washington St. College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Portland State College, Oregon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Rio Hondo Jr. College(^a)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Walla Walla College</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Junior College  \(^b\) All-Black institution  X data not available
sources for junior colleges. These schools are, therefore, unranked in terms of academic quality according to our index, and consequently must be excluded from the analysis of quality effects.3

Thus, our analysis of the effects of academic quality will include only 23 of the 30 schools listed in Table 4.1 These 23 schools are grouped according to their scores on our index of academic standing in Table 4.2. For each level of academic quality, we then present the percentage of students involved in protest activity, the mean number of involvements per student, the number of students on which the statistics are based, and the number of schools falling into the specific quality category.

Table 4.2

LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT BY INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score on Institutional Quality Index</th>
<th>Percent of Students Involved in Protest Activity</th>
<th>Mean Number of Protest Activities Per Student</th>
<th>Number of Students</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(High) 3</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Low) 9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the small number of schools and students in some quality categories, the relationship between institutional quality and student protest involvement is strong and consistent. With each step down the quality ladder, the percentage involved in protest activity and the mean number of involvements per student drops off consistently until we reach the very lowest quality level.

Clearly, the schools in the top two categories on our quality index have rates of protest involvement well above the remaining schools. These represent the colleges of high reputation and prestige, essentially the nation's
leading colleges and universities. Five institutions are tops on all three dimensions and two public universities, probably because of admissions policies set by law, fail to meet the top criteria in selectivity or mean ability of entering freshmen. We shall therefore subsequently group those schools scoring "three" and "four" on our index of institutional quality and refer to them as the nation's leading or top ranking institutions.

At the other extreme we have schools which are low on all three or on two of the three dimensions of quality. These schools show the lowest proportions of students involved in protest activity and the lowest rates of involvement per student. Unlike the nation's leading institutions where a majority of students have engaged in some form of protest, less than one in five students have done so at these relatively low quality institutions. Again, the levels of student protest involvement at schools in these two index categories are very comparable. We shall group them together and henceforth refer to them as institutions of low academic quality.

As Table 4.1 shows, there is considerable congruity among the scores an institution receives on the three basic dimensions of academic quality. For instance, no institution received "one" on one dimension and "three" on another. Thus, all schools scoring "six" did so by having intermediate ranks on all three dimensions. And, all of those scoring five again did so by ranking intermediate on two and high on one dimension. It seems fair, then, to regard these schools scoring "five" and "six" on our index as truly intermediate in terms of academic quality. As Table 4.2 shows, they are intermediate as well in level of protest involvement -- decidedly below the top ranking schools, but clearly above the low quality institutions in this regard.

Quality Vis-a-Vis Other College Characteristics

Our purpose in this section is to ascertain whether the relationship between institutional quality and protest involvement is independent of other characteristics of the colleges and their broader social environments. Let us turn first to characteristics of a broader institutional environment; namely, the region of the country and the type of the community in which the school is located. Then we shall examine characteristics of the college itself, including type of control, level of offerings, and size of enrollment.

Previous research (Hodgkins:1, 1970) has indicated that student protest is least common at schools in the South. Similarly our data show the lowest rates of protest involvement (16%) in the South, as compared to the Northeast states (31%), the North Central states (29%), and the Western states (30%). To what extent do regional differences in protest activity among institutions account for higher levels of protest involvement at high quality institutions? Table 4.3 answers this question.

The percentage and mean differences among the cells of the tables in this
section must be interpreted with caution since the values are sometimes based on data from only one institution (indicated by an asterisk in the tables.) Consequently, we should be looking for general patterns in the data and not attributing too much importance to particular cells which may be out of line because of idiosyncrasies of a single institution.

**Table 4.3**

**LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS BY INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Location</th>
<th>Institutional Quality</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top Ranking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(125)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(18)*</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(149)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(22)*</td>
<td>(23)*</td>
<td>(77)</td>
<td>(122)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(26)*</td>
<td>(19)*</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages and means based on students from only one institution.

Generally speaking, the effects of school quality remain clearly evident in each region. The top ranking institutions have the highest rate of protest involvement within each region. In other words, the effects of school quality shown in Table 4.2 hold up when we control for region although the pattern is somewhat less consistent within regions than overall owing to idiosyncratic variations produced by individual schools. For example, the exceptionally high level of protest involvement for the intermediate quality level in the South is attributable to a single school.

In addition, the regional effect continues to be evident. The lower level of protest involvement in the South holds up even when we control for academic quality. Indeed, this region shows the lowest levels of protest involvement.
each quality category. Hence, the Southern regional environment would seem to have an inhibiting effect on protest activity, apart from institutional quality.

Another aspect of a school's environment is the community setting in which it is located. There is some evidence that schools in larger communities and urban settings have higher incidence of protest demonstration (see Table 4.3). The latter variable of institutional quality categories and the regional variables, including metropolitan status, urbanization levels, community setting rates of crime and delinquency, and institutional influence on protest. Indeed, the urban setting may have caused students at urban institutions to become more involved in protest.

The data presented in Table 4.4 show that overall the highest levels of protest involvement occur at schools in metropolitan areas (32%), but only in the central city (32%). Schools in the non-metropolitan area have the lowest rate (21%). However, these overall differences in the percentage of students involved in protest activity by community setting tend to disappear within categories of institutional quality. Apparently, the overall pattern of protest activity by community setting is largely a function of differences in the locations of institutions of varying quality. Thus, the base figures in Table 4.4 show that the metropolitan, non-central city setting has a disproportionate number of students at top-ranking schools, that the non-metropolitan setting has a lower proportion coming from leading institutions, and that the central city setting falls in between in this respect.

Interestingly enough, when we examine the mean level of protest involvement, instead of the percentage of students involved, there are small but consistent differences within quality categories; the mean level of protest activity is lowest in the non-metropolitan schools and highest in the central city schools within each of the quality categories. Evidently, the urbanization of the location of an institution does contribute slightly to the level of protest involvement among its students--not so much to the proportion who become involved as to the proportion who reach the advanced stages of protest activity among those who do become involved.

On the basis of Tables 4.3 and 4.4, then, it seems that the only environmental characteristic which has a noticeably independent effect on student protest is location in the South. The conservative political tradition of the South seems to have an inhibiting effect on student involvement in protest activity at all levels of school quality. Otherwise, urbanization of the community settings appear to be slightly associated with mean level of protest involvement but not with the percentage of students involved. The quality of school quality, on the other hand, are distinct and independent of these broader environmental factors.

Now, it has been argued that it is not the quality of schools alone, but its bureaucratic complexity--the fact that it is a multiversality--which...
Table 4.4

LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS
BY INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND COMMUNITY SETTING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Setting</th>
<th>Institutional Quality</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top Ranking</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Mean Cent</td>
<td>Per Mean Cent</td>
<td>Per Mean Cent</td>
<td>Per Mean Cent</td>
<td>Per Mean Cent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central City</td>
<td>56 .101 (77)</td>
<td>24 .39 (46)</td>
<td>20 .27 (118)</td>
<td>52 .55 (241)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Metropolitan area</td>
<td>52 .89 (44)</td>
<td>--- (0)</td>
<td>22 .22 (18)</td>
<td>44 .69 (62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Metropolitan area</td>
<td>52 .82 (27)</td>
<td>21 .31 (94)</td>
<td>19 .14 (77)</td>
<td>21 .31 (198)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentages and means based on students from only one institution

is responsible for the high levels of alienation and dissatisfaction (Kerr, 1964) and protest involvement (Scott and El-Assul, 1969; Blau and Slaughter, 1971). It also seems to be the case that private universities afford a more favorable climate for academic freedom and political expression (Williamson and Cowan, 1966; Lazarsfeld and Theilens, 1958). By cross classifying type of control (public/private) and level of offering (college/university) we can identify specific types of institutions, such as private universities, which might be expected in terms of these considerations to have particularly high levels of protest involvement.

Our data do indeed show that private institutions in this sample have a relatively high level of protest involvement among students (51%). The rates of involvement at private universities, public universities, and public colleges are decidedly lower (22%, 32%, and 19%, respectively). Private universities are typically high quality institutions. Is their relatively high rate of protest involvement a function of their academic quality or of the fact that they are private and complex educational structures?

Table 4.5 shows clearly that it is institutional quality and not type of control or level of offering that accounts for the high level of protest involvement among students at private universities. As it turns out, all of our private universities fall into the top ranking categories of institutional qua...
Compared with other institutions of the same quality level, however, their rate of protest involvement is no higher.

Table 4.5

LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS BY INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND TYPE OF CONTROL/LEVEL OF OFFERING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Control/Level of Offering</th>
<th>Top Social</th>
<th>Middle Social</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Total Currancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Mean</td>
<td>Per Mean</td>
<td>Per Mean</td>
<td>Per Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cent Score</td>
<td>Cent Score</td>
<td>Cent Score</td>
<td>Cent Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public University</td>
<td>51.82</td>
<td>18.22</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>22.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(27)*</td>
<td>(30)*</td>
<td>(150)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public College</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>19.52</td>
<td>35.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private University</td>
<td>57.67</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>16.21</td>
<td>52.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(114)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private College</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>17.25</td>
<td>19.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages and means based on students from only one institution.

There is a suggestion in Table 4.5 that private colleges tend to have ... levels of protest activity than other types of institutions. Thus, the private colleges in this sample have the lowest proportion of students involved in protest activity and the lowest mean score on the protest activity index in the low and intermediate quality categories. To be sure, only four private colleges are involved in these comparisons and the differences between them and the other types of schools are not great. So, we can suggest quite tentatively that private colleges may have an inhibiting or restraining effect on protest activity, perhaps because they tend to have relatively conservative orientations to attract students who are committed to relatively restricted educational purposes.

And, what about size? Perhaps more than any other institutional characteristic, as we have noted, size of enrollment has been regarded as a contributing factor in student unrest. Owing to the method of sampling, which gave schools a likelihood of being included in the sample according to their size, this sample grossly overrepresents large schools with enrollments of 10,000.
and over. Investigations of Peterson (1966; 1968) and Pierce and Bowers (1974) are based on samples of institutions which are reflective of the population of colleges and universities, these data, like those of Scott and El-Assul (1969), overrepresent larger institutions. Thus, when examining the effects of institutional size in this sample, we will be concerned with the upper extremes of the size continuum.

Our data in Table 4.6 show that the level of protest involvement definitely increases with school size. It is lowest (19%) among schools with enrollments of 5,000 or less, intermediate (20%) among schools with 5,000-20,000 students, and highest (23%) at schools of more than 20,000 students. Is this because the larger schools tend to be of higher academic quality? The columns of Table 4.6 provide the answer.

Table 4.6

LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT AMONG COLLEGE STUDENTS
BY INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND SIZE OF ENROLLMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Enrollment</th>
<th>Institutional Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5,000 students</td>
<td>52 .82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(27)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000 - 20,000 students</td>
<td>51 .82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 20,000 students</td>
<td>57 1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages and means based on students from only one institution.

The effects of school size are reduced but not altogether eliminated within categories of institutional quality. The very largest institutions with 20,000 or more students have slightly higher proportions of students involved in protest activity than do institutions of lesser size in each of the quality categories. However, the differences are only a few percentage points except...
the intermediate level of quality where there is only one very large institution. At the other end, schools of less than 5,000 students tend to have the lowest proportions of students engaging in protest activity, but again the differences are small, only reaching 10 percentage points in the low quality category. At least in terms of the percentage of students involved in protest activity, then, institutional size shows a weak but fairly consistent relationship to protest involvement.

Data has recently been developed (Pierce and Powers, 1974) showing that protesters at larger schools in the 1965-1966 period seem to be a more cohesive, organized and hard-core group than activists at smaller schools. Although their proportions were no greater at larger schools, they have, on the average, engaged in protest activity over a longer period of time or reached more advanced stages of protest activity than their counterparts at smaller schools. We noted a slight but consistent pattern of this sort in Table 4.4; mean scores on the protest activity index were related to the urbanization of the institutional setting although the proportion involved were not. Does a similar pattern of variation in mean protest scores show up with respect to size in Table 4.6?

However, the mean differences in protest involvement follow closely the pattern of percentage differences in Table 4.6. Although the magnitudes of the mean differences and the percentage differences are not directly comparable, there is little justification in the table for arguing that size contributes more to the extent of protest involvement than it does to the proportion of students who become involved. In view of the relatively small number of schools in this sample and the relatively slight association between protest involvement and size, these data cannot be said to indicate a significant relationship between institutional size and individual protest activity. What the table does clearly show, as have the four preceding it, is that quality has by far the strongest independent effect on protest activity among the various college characteristics we have examined.

A Multivariate Assessment of Institutional Effects

We are now ready to make a more comprehensive assessment of the effects of institutional characteristics on individual protest behavior. Up to this point, we have examined the effects of college characteristics individually and in conjunction with academic quality in a series of cross tabulations. In this section, we shall assess the effects of each of these characteristics independently of the other four, we shall determine how well these five college variables, as a group, account for the residual variability in protest activity among the 23 colleges and universities under examination.

For these purposes, we turn to regression techniques. In contrast with cross tabulation analysis, regression will enable us to bring a larger number
of variables into the analysis and to estimate their effects by statistically adjusting for their associations with the other variables under examination. Of course, the reliability of these estimates depends upon sample size, the number of variables under consideration, and the strength of the intercorrelations among them. We shall indicate the statistical significance of the individual effect parameters in the upcoming regression analysis and also the magnitude of these effects by the standardized coefficients associated with the individual variables.

Regression analysis also requires that the variables selected for measurement have an essentially linear relationship to the dependent or criterion variable. On the basis of the relationships revealed in the foregoing tabular analysis, we have, in some instances, been able to recode the college characteristics in order to maximize their potential for independent effects on protest activity. Thus, we have made the following changes to the variables examined in Table 4.3 through 4.5 for use in the subsequent regression analysis.

**Region—South:** The only aspect of regional location consistently associated with protest activity within categories of quality is southern regional location, as shown in Table 4.3. This recorded form of the regional variable therefore, scores South as "1" and the other regions as "0".

**Setting—Urban:** There is slight but consistent relationship between the urbanization of the setting and level of protest involvement within categories of institutional quality; however, the overall relationship is curvilinear as shown in Table 4.4. To maximize this variable's potential effect on protest activity, consistent with its independent effect as shown in Table 4.4, we have scored "central city" and "metropolitan" as "1" and "non-metropolitan" as "0".

**Private/College:** Of the type of control/level of offering combinations in Table 4.5, the private college category appeared to have slightly lower levels of protest activity than the other combinations, although not altogether consistently so. We, therefore, scored the private college combination as "1" and the other combinations as "0".

Table 4.7 shows the correlations of each of the institutional characteristics with protest activity (column 1) and the standardized regression coefficients or "beta weights" of each of these variables in three slightly different regression analyses (columns 2-4). The beta weights are estimates of the independent effect of three variables. The multiple correlation coefficients presented at the bottom of columns 2 through 4 show the extent to which the five college characteristics jointly account for the variation in protest activity.

The full extent of the institutional variability in protest activity is represented by the multiple correlation coefficient of a regression analysis.
in which each of the specific colleges (except one as a reference category) are entered into the regression equation as (dummy) variables. As shown at the bottom of the table, the multiple correlation coefficient for the equation with each school as a variable is .45 which is equivalent to saying that 20.2 percent of the variance in protest activity ($R^2$) occurs between or among institutions.

**Table 4.7**

**College Characteristics as Predictors of Protest Activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College Characteristics</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>Beta Weights with Protest Activity Using Various Measures of Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Quality $A^a$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Quality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index A</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index B</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index C</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Enrollment</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting-- Urban</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region-- South</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/College</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation for the five college characteristics</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation for the specific colleges as dummy variables</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$Index A distinguishes the following quality categories: "top ranking" (scored 1), "intermediate" (scored 1), and "low" (scored 0), the distinctions used in Tables 4.3 through 4.6.

$^b$Index B collapses the "intermediate" and "low" quality categories, leaving "top ranking" (scored 1) and all others (scored 0).

$^c$Index C subdivides the "top ranking" category into "outstanding universities" (scored 2) and "leading institutions" (scored 1). All other schools are scored 0.
In Table 4.7 we examine the results of three regression analyses which differ only in the measurement of institutional quality employed. The first regression (column 2) uses the three category measure of quality precisely as it appeared in Tables 4.3 through 4.6 above. The beta coefficients show that institutional quality is by far the strongest determinant of protest activity among the five college characteristics under consideration. Southern regional location shows a small but significant effect on protest activity, and the remaining three institutional characteristics have inconsequential effects.

The direct effect of quality drops only slightly below its initial correlation (from \( r = .34 \) to \( b = .31 \)). On the other hand, school size loses virtually all of its initial correlation with protest activity in the regression analysis (\( r = .22; b = .01 \)). Thus, the regression indicates not only that institutional quality dominates as the predictor of protest activity, but also that the effect of school size is almost altogether attributable to its association with quality and the other three institutional characteristics in the equation.

As a group, these five college characteristics show a multiple correlation of .38 with protest activity, which means that they jointly account for 14.4 percent of the variance in scores on our protest activity index. This is not far below the full institutional variability of 20.2 percent derived from the regression equation with each college (save one) as a dummy variable (\( R = .45 \)). Notably, school quality alone accounts for 11.6 percent (\( r = .34 \)), or more than half of the institutional variability in protest activity.

In view of the important role of institutional quality as a determinant of individual protest activity, we have repeated the regression analysis shown in column 2 with somewhat different measures of institutional quality in columns 3 and 4 to see whether alterations in the measurement of quality will change the estimated effect of quality and the other institutional characteristics to any substantial degree.

In column 3 we have collapsed the "low" and "intermediate" levels on our measure of quality to form a dichotomous variable which distinguishes only between the "top ranking" institutions and all others. Note in column 1 that the effect of this change is actually to increase the zero order correlation of quality with protest activity (from \( .34 \) to \( .36 \)). Obviously, distinguishing between the low and intermediate quality categories added to the variance in the quality measure without a corresponding differentiation in protest activity. Reference to Table 4.2 shows a rather sharp difference in level of protest activity between the top ranking schools (scoring "3" and "4" on our quality measure) and the others. Review of Tables 4.3 through 4.6 shows that differences in level of protest activity between the intermediate and low quality institutions are often small and sometimes inconsistent.

The use of this dichotomous quality measure in the regression equation, however, produces only very minor changes in the estimated effects of the various college characteristics. Quality and southern regional location retain
virtually the same effects, and the other three college characteristics show only minor changes which do not alter their status as insignificant predictors of protest activity. Furthermore, using the dichotomous quality measure adds only slightly to the variance accounted for in protest activity (increases from .38 to .39).

Finally, in column 4, we present the results of a regression analysis with still another version of the quality measure. Here, the top ranking schools have been subdivided into "outstanding universities" (Berkeley, Harvard, and Wisconsin) which rank among the five or so best universities in the country (Carter, 1969), and "leading institutions" (George Washington, Pittsburgh, Oberlin, and Rochester) which score in the top two categories on our measure of quality but are not generally included among the very best in the country. The "low" and "intermediate" quality categories are collapsed on this measure, as in the case of the dichotomous measure of quality.

This measure of quality shows a very slightly higher correlation and beta weight than do the other two measures. However, the effects of the five independent variables are very close to those shown in column 3 with the dichotomous quality measure and there has been no increase in the multiple correlation coefficient. Thus, separating the "outstanding universities" and placing them in a category above the "leading institutions" contributes only slightly to the effect of quality and not at all to the variance accounted for by college characteristics. And, with only three schools in the top category, the effect is obviously contingent on the behavior of a relatively small number of students.

By exploring these alternative measures of academic quality, we have demonstrated that the effects of quality are relatively unchanged by efforts to purify or refine the quality measure. The essential distinction is between what we have referred to as the "top ranking" institutions and all others. Quality measures which further differentiate the top ranking institutions (Quality C) or the others (Quality A) have barely noticeable effects on the beta weights associated with quality or with the other institutional characteristics in the equation.

In effect, these data replicate the findings of earlier research (Kahn and Bowers, 1970) showing that the effects of quality on student activism are not so much a continuous relationship as a discrete difference between top ranking institutions and those of lesser quality. The distinct separation, if not polarity, in protest activity between the top two and bottom five scale points on our quality index in Table 4.2, the repeated evidence of widest difference between the top ranking and the other two quality categories in Tables 4.3 through 4.6, and the results of the three regression analyses in this section all bear this out.

The implication is, as we have argued elsewhere (Pierce and Bowers, 1974) that the effects of institutional quality are not to be understood in terms...
of factors which show a continuous relationship to quality, such as the educa-
tional resources of schools, the ability scores of students, or the income
levels of their parents, but rather in terms of the distinction that top
quality institutions have as members of the elite corps of American college.
and universities. As nationally recognized institutions, these schools
draw faculty and staff from all sections of the country, and although they
may recruit students largely from one region, their educational programs are
designed to prepare students for leadership positions in society at large.
It is this "charter" to contribute to a national elite and to be concerned
with national issues and problems which may have given these institutions
their distinctive power to activate and mobilize youthful protest in the
1960s (Pierce and Bowers, 1974).

In the next step of our analysis, we attempt to interpret the effects
of institutional quality by examining the personal dispositions and values of
students which are likely to be affected by school quality and which, in turn,
are likely to affect their involvement in protest activity. In subsequent
analyses which employ a measure of institutional quality, we shall hereafter
use the dichotomous measure which distinguishes only between the top ranking
institutions and those of lesser quality--Quality Index B. Further refine-
ments afford no significant improvement in the power of quality to predict
protest activity; they can only tend to obscure the fact that the quality
effect comes about primarily as a result of the distinction between top ranking
schools and all the rest.

The Role of Personal Dispositions

The way in which institutional quality contributes to protest activity
is undoubtedly complex and intricate. We have tried in previous research to
trace some of the institutional processes through which top ranking institutions,
as opposed to those of lesser quality, promote protest involvement among their
students (Pierce and Bowers, 1974). We have noted, for example, that involve-
ment in the academic sphere of college life, as reflected by good grades, long
hours spent studying, and faculty contact, appears to have stimulated protest
activity at the leading schools. In this previous research, however, the data
did not allow us to see just how such institutional processes may have influenced
individual values and dispositions that contribute directly to protest involve-
ment.

In contrast with previous contextual studies, the CBS News survey included
a number of questions about the values and attitudes of young people that might
be expected to dispose them toward protest behavior; and virtually no questions
about the campus social relations of students, their interests and activities
in college, or their involvement in academic work. Thus, our focus here will
be on the personal dispositions of students which are likely to be affected
by their exposure to various institutional processes in higher education.
Although these data will not permit us to identify the specific institutional processes which may affect personal values and dispositions, they will enable us to ascertain the extent to which institutional quality, and other college characteristics, contribute to such values and dispositions.

We begin by examining two basic value orientations or dispositions—"traditional values" and "social orientations"—for their effect on protest activity. We expect that institutions of high academic standing, in contrast with lower status schools, will tend to weaken students' commitments to traditional values associated with religion, family, work, and the like; and to strengthen students' critical perspectives on the social, political, and economic institutions of society.

We shall also examine the effects of students' "orientations toward college"—a factor shown to be associated with protest activity in Chapter 3. We expect that high quality colleges will be more likely to promote an intellectual orientation that emphasizes the "opportunity to change things rather than make out well within the existing system"; whereas, the lesser quality institutions will be more likely to encourage a practical orientation which stresses the value of education to "earn more money, have a more interesting career, and enjoy a better position in society."

Traditional Values

To tap students' adherence to economic and social values which have played a traditional role in American society, the CBS News survey included a battery of eight statements about the importance of hard work, savings, self-reliance, strength of character, competition, private property, and so on—items that might be described as the core of the "Protestant Ethic." Respondents were asked whether or not they "personally believe in" each of the statements. The specific statements are listed in Table 4.8 in the order in which they appeared in the interview schedule. The table shows the association between belief in each of these statements and protest involvement, as indicated by correlation and regression coefficients. For purposes of comparison, we also show these associations for non-college as well as college youth.

Note, first of all, that the relationship between belief in these statements and protest activity is negative in every case. Evidently, adherence to these traditional values does tend to inhibit protest activity. The correlations with protest activity are clearly higher among college than among non-college youth; half of them exceed .20 in the college sample, but none do in the non-college sample. Since the higher correlations in the college sample could conceivably be a result of the difference in level of protest activity between the two samples, we have also included regression coefficients as measures of association which are not biased by differences in distribution between the two samples. As the table shows, the regressions, like the correlations, are substantially stronger in the college than in the non-college sample.


## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIOUS TRADITIONAL VALUES AND PROTEST ACTIVITY AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional Values</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correlations</td>
<td>Regressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard work will always pay off</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyone should save as much as he can regularly and not have to lean on family and friends the minute he runs into financial problems</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Depending upon how much strength and character a person has, he can pretty well control what happens to him</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to some organized religion is important in a person's life</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition encourages excellence</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The right to private property is sacred</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society needs some legally based authority in order to prevent chaos</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Compromise is essential for progress</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Items excluded from traditional values index*
The only item which shows a weaker association with protest activity in the college than in the non-college sample is the one that refers to "strength of character" as a factor which enables the individual to "pretty well control what happens to him." Perhaps this is a sentiment which inhibits protest activity in some, but encourages it in others. In other words, the act of protesting may be undertaken by some in the belief that they can individually affect what happens to them and to others, if they have sufficient "strength of character" to engage in such unpopular behavior. To the extent that this reasoning is correct, however, it appears to apply only, or primarily, to college youth.

One other item in this battery—"compromise is essential for progress"—may also be questioned as a statement of traditional American values. On face value, this item would seem to be at variance with other statements which tend to express a rather single minded adherence to uncompromising standards or objectives. In effect, this item seems to express recognition of the need for political expediency perhaps in opposition to the hard-nosed personal standards reflected in most of the rest. Empirically, it shows a relatively low level of association with protest activity in both the college and the non-college samples.

To form an index of "traditional values" we have selected six of the eight items in Table 4.3 (excluding the two items marked by an asterisk, for the reasons outlined in the preceding two paragraphs). Students are scored from 0 to 6 according to the number of these traditional values they "believe in." For the scale points on this index of traditional values, Table 4.9 shows the percent engaging in protest activity and the mean number of protest involvements among college and non-college youth.

The table confirms that the relationship between traditional values and protest activity is definitely stronger in the college than in the non-college context. Notably, the level of protest involvement among those with the highest scores on the traditional values index are quite comparable in both samples; indeed, among those who strongly adhere to traditional values, there is little protest activity in either sample. With decreasing commitment to traditional values, however, the level of protest activity increases more markedly among college than among non-college youth. Apparently, as the inhibiting effects of traditional values decline, influences tending to encourage protest activity are more strongly felt on the college campus than off of it.

Social Criticisms

In Chapter 3, we reviewed students' responses to a set of relatively rhetorical statements that were highly critical of American society. These statements of "radical rhetoric" were, however, more inflammatory than critical, more rhetorical than objective. For this reason, we have examined them as a
reflection or concomitant of protest involvement, and not as a set of personal values or dispositions that may be said to encourage protest activity.

In addition to these statements of "radical rhetoric," however, the CBS News interview also included a number of criticisms of American society stated in more objective language. Together, these latter statements would appear to represent an objectively critical perspective on society and its institutions that may dispose young people toward protest. The latter listed some thirteen statements referring to foreign policy, the profit motive in business, the isolation of the individual in mass society, racism and poverty at home, economic imperialism abroad, and so on. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they "strongly agree," "partially agree," or "strongly disagree" with each statement. The thirteen statements are presented in Table 4.10 in the order in which they appeared in the interview schedule. Like Table 4.9, it shows the association between responses to each item and protest activity as measured by correlation and regression coefficients, for both college and non-college youth.

Again, the associations between adherence to these statements and protest activity are much stronger among college than among non-college youth. In this case, the correlations with protest activity exceed .20 for eight of the thirteen statements in the college sample and for none of them in the non-
### Relationship between Various Social Criticisms and Protest Activity Among College and Non-College Youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Criticisms</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our foreign policy is based on our own narrow economic and power interests</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business is overly concerned with profits and not with public responsibility</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The individual in today's society is isolated and cut off from meaningful</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relationships with others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is more concern today for the &quot;welfare bum&quot; who doesn't want to work than</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>work than for the hard-working person who is struggling to make a living</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic well-being in this country is unjustly and unfairly distributed</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basically, we are a racist nation</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Most of what is taught in universities is not relevant to today's needs</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morally and spiritually our country has lost its way</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The war in Vietnam is pure imperialism</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Today's American society is characterized by "injustice, insensitivity, lack of candor and inhumanity"

*There is too much concern with equality and too little with law and order

The whole social system ought to be replaced by an entirely new one; the existing structures are too rotten for repair

*Computers and other advanced technology are creating an inhuman and impersonal world

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlations</td>
<td>Regressions</td>
<td>Correlations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regressions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Today's American society is characterized by &quot;injustice, insensitivity, lack of candor and inhumanity</strong></td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>There is too much concern with equality and too little with law and order</em></td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The whole social system ought to be replaced by an entirely new one; the existing structures are too rotten for repair</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Computers and other advanced technology are creating an inhuman and impersonal world</em></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Items excluded from the social criticisms index*
college sample. At least in terms of correlations, the differences between these two samples appear to be stronger with respect to social criticisms than in the case of traditional values. Furthermore, for every statement, the regression in the college sample is more than twice that in the non-college sample; the same cannot be said for the statements of traditional values in Table 4.8. (The generally lower level of regressions in Table 4.10 than in Table 4.3 is due to the wider variance of responses to the social criticisms than to the traditional values items.)

In the case of social criticisms, the correlations and regressions are generally positive. The two exceptions appear to be "conservative" criticisms of society. Thus, one of these complains about there being more concern for the "welfare bum" than for the "hard working person." And in a similar vein, the other asserts that there is "too much concern with equality and too little with law and order." These two statements excepted, the remaining ones may be regarded as essentially "liberal" criticisms of society and its institutions and policies.

This battery of social criticisms provides a wealth of items with which to form an index. We shall exclude the two "conservative" criticisms which are relatively uncorrelated with the other items in the battery. We shall also exclude the item that states "most of what is taught in universities is not relevant to today's needs" on the grounds that college and non-college youth are apt to respond to this item from quite different orientations or experiences. And, we shall also exclude the final item in the table, "computers and other advanced technology are creating an inhuman and impersonal world," on the grounds that it is relatively unrelated to protest activity among both college and non-college youth; indeed, it shows the lowest correlation and regression coefficient in both samples.

The remaining nine items (excluding those marked with an asterisk in Table 4.10) have been scored "2" for strongly agree, "1" for partially agree, and "0" for strongly disagree. Additively, they form an index ranging from 0 to 18. Scale scores grouped in four categories are presented in Table 4.11 with the percent involved in protest activity and the mean number of protest involvements for each sample.

For the college youth, the relationship in Table 4.11 is very much like that in Table 4.9, except, of course, that protest is associated with rejection of traditional values and acceptance of social criticisms. Indeed, the patterns are enough alike to suggest that the rejection of traditional values and the acceptance of social criticisms are opposite sides of the same coin. Among non-college youth, however, social criticisms show only a weak and not altogether consistent association with protest activity. Either they do not find the opportunities or they do not feel the need to translate their objections into overt protest. Being detached from traditional values, and perhaps from environments in which these values are highly respected, appears to have a more liberating effect on protest involvement in the non-college context.
Table 4.11
SOCIAL CRITICISMS AND LEVEL OF PROTEST INVOLVEMENT AMONG COLLEGE AND NON-COLLEGE YOUTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Criticisms Index</th>
<th>Non-College Youth</th>
<th>College Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 5 (Low)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(109)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(145)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 18 (High)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College youngsters have, of course, traditionally held critical views of society, but in the past they have typically done so without translating such views into overt protest behavior—such as appears to be the case for non-college youth in Table 4.11. The strong association between social criticisms and protest behavior among college students during the late 1960s may very well be as a consequence of the influence of historical events—a link which was not nearly as strong in the 1950s and which has again weakened in the 1970s.

The Independent Effects of Personal Dispositions

In order for these personal dispositions to interpret the effects of institutional characteristics on protest behavior, they must have effects which are independent of their associations with one another or of their variability by college. Our objective at this point will be to assess the independent effects of the indices of traditional values and social criticisms developed earlier in this section, and of the measure of orientation toward college employed in Chapter 3. We shall proceed much as we did in assessing the independent effects of college characteristics in the preceding section of this chapter.
Table 4.12 presents the results of a regression analysis with personal dispositions as independent variables and protest activity as the criterion variable. In addition to the indices of traditional values and social criticisms, we have also included the measure of orientation toward college, which has previously been shown to have a strong relationship to protest activity (Table 3.6). For each of these three variables, the table shows its overall association with protest activity (column 1), its effect on protest activity independent of the other personal dispositions (column 2) and its effect independent of other personal dispositions and institutional variability in protest activity (column 3).

Table 4.12

PEERSONAL DISPOSITIONS AS PREDICTORS OF PROTEST ACTIVITY WITH COLLEGE CHARACTERISTICS CONTROLLED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Dispositions</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>For Personal Dispositions Only</th>
<th>With Colleges Added As Dummy Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Criticisms Index</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Values Index</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward College</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.10*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Correlation = .49

Significance levels: * = .05; *** = .001

By adding colleges as dummy variables to the regression equation with personal dispositions (or other independent variables, aside from college characteristics themselves) we control completely for institutional variability in protest activity. Any effects of personal dispositions which remain after institutional variability has been controlled in this way are altogether independent of college characteristics such as quality, size, and the like. The use of colleges and dummy variables, therefore, provides a simple method of removing institutional effects from the analysis of individual level variables. We shall take further advantage of this technique for removing institutional variability in Chapter 5 where we examine the effects of social background, family context, youth culture, and occupational commitments.
Traditional values and social criticisms are strongly associated with protest activity ($r = -0.43$ and $0.39$, respectively). Each of these variables shows a stronger association with protest involvement than did any of the measures of institutional quality we examined in Table 4.7. Orientation toward college shows a lower but respectable association with protest activity ($r = 0.27$). When we examine the effects of each disposition controlling for the other two, we find that both traditional values and social criticisms retain strong independent effects on protest activity ($b = -0.25$ and $0.26$, respectively). Orientation toward college shows a much weaker independent effect ($b = 0.10$) but one that continues to be statistically significant, at least at the .05 level. Note that the multiple correlation for the three personal disposition variables ($R = 0.49$) exceeds the institutional variability in protest activity ($R = 0.45$) shown in Table 4.7. Jointly, these three variables thus account for 24 percent of the variation in protest activity.

With colleges included as dummy variables in the regression equation, the independent effect of traditional values and social criticisms are reduced a bit further, but remain strong and statistically significant at the .001 level. There is no further reduction in the effect of orientation toward college which continues to be significant at the .05 level. Thus, the effects of personal dispositions in this analysis are independent of one another and of institutional variability in protest activity--necessary conditions for them to serve as intervening factors which may account for the effects of institutional characteristics on protest activity.

They will not, however, be sufficient as interpreting variables. We have seen that the full extent of institutional variability accounts for 20.3 percent of the variance in protest activity (Table 4.7). The three personal dispositions jointly account for 24.0 percent of the variance in protest activity (Table 4.12, column 2). However, these two dimensions are by no means fully overlapping as indicated by the fact that personal dispositions and institutional factors together account for 33.6 percent of the variance in protest involvement (Table 4.12, column 3). Our final objective in this chapter will be to examine the independence and the overlap between these two categories of variables--institutional factors and personal dispositions--in their effects on individual protest behavior.

**A Causal Model of Institutional Effects**

We are now ready to examine how institutional effects come about. This will consist of analyzing the institutional effects established in Table 4.7 in conjunction with the effects of personal dispositions established in Table 4.12. For this purpose, we shall employ the technique of path analysis, in order to describe and assess the interrelationships among college characteristics and personal dispositions which proved to have statistically significant effects on protest activity in the preceding analyses.
Path analysis involves the use of diagrams with arrows and associated path coefficients to represent the direction and strength of postulated causal links between variables. Like multiple regression analysis, it is a method of estimating the effects of some variables on others from the matrix of correlations among them. Unlike a single regression analysis which distinguishes only between a dependent and a set of independent variables, path analysis permits a more complex causal ordering of the variables to be analyzed. This makes it possible not only to assess the direct causal links between variables, as in regression analysis, but also to infer the indirect and spurious links between them. Thus, the zero order correlation between two causally ordered variables in a path analysis is decomposed into direct, indirect, and spurious effects.

Among college characteristics, institutional quality and southern regional location were the only two to emerge with independent effects on protest activity that were sufficiently strong to be statistically significant. Among personal dispositions, all three showed significant independent effects on protest activity. In the upcoming path analysis, then, we consider quality and Southern location as antecedent or exogenous variables; traditional values, social criticisms and orientation toward college, as intervening or endogenous variables; and protest activity as the final endogenous or dependent variable in the path model, as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1

CAUSAL MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL DISPOSITION VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY
Note first the effects of quality on personal dispositions. As expected, quality shows a relatively strong positive effect \( (p = .22) \) on social criticisms and an even stronger negative effect on traditional values \( (p = -.32) \). It does, indeed, appear to encourage the former and discourage the latter orientations among college youth. The relatively weak positive path \( (p = .12) \) from quality to college orientation means that quality also tends to encourage an intellectual as opposed to a practical orientation toward college, but not strongly so.

Yet, despite its effects on the personal dispositions of students, institutional quality retains a strong independent effect on protest activity \( (p = .22) \). In fact, the direct effect of quality is quite comparable to those of traditional values \( (p = -.22) \) and social criticisms \( (p = .21) \). Indeed, quality has stronger direct than indirect effects on protest activity in Figure 4.1. According to the axioms of path analysis, its zero order correlation with protest activity of .36 is partitioned into a direct effect of .22 and indirect effects totalling .14. About half of its indirect effects occur through its association with traditional values \((- .32 \times - .22 = .07\)\). Slightly more than a third of its indirect effects occur through its relationship with social criticisms \((.22 \times .21 = .05\)\). Quality achieves very little of its indirect effects through its association with college orientation \(.13 \times .10 = .01\) or through its correlation with Southern regional location of the college (which adds another .01 to the indirect effects of quality.)

The effects of Southern regional location contrast with those of quality. Its strongest effect \( (p = .18) \) is to encourage traditional values, its next strongest \( (p = -.13) \) is to discourage social criticisms, and its weakest effect \( (p = -.10) \) is to contribute to a practical as opposed to an intellectual orientation toward college. In further contrast to the pattern for quality, the effect of Southern location on protest activity is totally absorbed or accounted for by its association with these personal dispositions. The fact that there is no direct path linking Region—South to Protest Activity in the model means that once personal dispositions are controlled the indirect effect of Southern location on protest activity becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, the effect of Southern location which is independent of other college characteristics, as shown in Table 4.7, is not independent of personal dispositions leading to protest activity, as demonstrated in Figure 4.1.

In sum, the three main determinants of protest activity among the five causally prior variables in Figure 4.1 are institutional quality, social criticisms, and traditional values—each showing a direct path to protest activity of at least \( \pm .20 \). Furthermore, the strongest causal links among the five variables other than protest activity occur between quality and these two personal dispositions. By contrast, college orientation makes a relatively weak contribution to protest activity and is itself only weakly related to quality and southern location. As we have just noted, southern location makes no independent contribution to protest activity.
In view of the relatively minor roles of college orientation and southern regional location, a simplified causal model excluding these two variables may provide an adequate representation of the effects of institutional factors and personal dispositions for the purposes of our analyses in the next chapter. Figure 4.2 shows the model without Region--South or Orientation toward College.

**Figure 4.2**

**Simplified Causal Model of Institutional and Personal Disposition Variables Affecting Protest Activity**

Dropping these two variables produces only minor differences in the remaining parameters. First, the effects of quality on social criticisms and traditional values are increased slightly (by .02 and -.03, respectively) because some of the countervailing effects of southern region are absorbed into these parameters when southern region is negatively correlated with quality is dropped from the model. Secondly, the direct effects of social criticisms and traditional values are increased slightly (by .01 and -.04, respectively) primarily because they absorb effects which would otherwise pass through orientation toward college. Thirdly, the direct effect of quality on protest activity is absolutely unchanged; dropping college orientation and southern region simply caused the indirect effects of institutional quality to be redirected through social criticisms and traditional values. Finally, the elimination of these two variables does not reduce the predictability of protest activity to any noticeable degree (as indicated by the arrow to protest activity emanating from outside of the model).

In effect, dropping college orientation and southern location caused some minor changes in the paths to and from social criticisms and trad-
tional values. There is, however, no noticeable change in the direct effect of institutional quality on the overall prediction of protest activity with these two variables absent. Since our analysis in the next chapter will build on the model developed here by adding a number of extra institutional variables from social backgrounds, family contexts, and so on, we will need to work with a model stripped of all but the relevant variables. Therefore, employ the simplified model in order to isolate the direct effect of college characteristics and personal dispositions on protest activity, as far as we have been able to establish them with the available data.

The foregoing analysis makes it clear that there is considerable variation in protest activity among institutions, that school quality is the college characteristic which predominates as a predictor of protest activity, and that the effects of quality come about, at least in part, through its power to encourage adherence to traditional values and to encourage a critical perspective on society among students. At the same time, the analysis suggests that much of the effect of quality occurs through mechanisms other than social experiences and traditional values, as indicated by the fact that quality's direct effect on protest activity is greater than its indirect effects through criticisms and values.

One implication of this is that there may be other values, orientations, or attitudes falling under the general rubric of personal dispositions which are affected by institutional quality and, in turn, contribute to the protest behavior of youth—dispositions for which measures are not available in the present data. Another possibility is that quality may achieve its effects on protest activity by contributing to extra institutional contexts which independently or autonomously influence protest involvement. In the next chapter, we examine two such extra institutional contexts or influences—youth culture and occupational commitments—which may serve to interpret the relationship between institutional quality and protest activity. Still another possibility is that the apparent effect of quality is simply a reflection of the workings of other factors which shape the dispositions and orientations of young people and which also determine who goes where to college. To explore this possibility in the next chapter, we examine the effects of two other extra institutional contexts or influences—social background and family context—which may, in some measure, render the effects of school quality spurious.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. By having many demonstrations, large schools may provide more opportunities for protest involvement, and thus encourage students to become involved who would not do so in schools with fewer demonstrations. Yet, large schools typically have lower levels of extracurricular participation than small ones; they appear to be less successful in motivating students to take advantage of available opportunities for involvement. Perhaps, the same goes for oppo-
tunities to become involved in protest activities at large institutions.

2. Jenks and Kiesman (1967) have noted further difficulties in equating black and white institutions in terms of academic quality.

3. We have indicated those instances in which data were not available on a particular dimension of quality with an "X" in the appropriate cell in Table 1.1. The six junior colleges and two of the four senior colleges are given the notation on all three dimensions of quality. Schools scoring equally on one of the three dimensions were given a score on the matching dimension equal to the average of its scores on the other two in computing its final index score.

4. It might be noted at this point that the gap in level of protest activity between quality scale scores "4" and "5" would have been still greater if the University of Minnesota had scored "4" instead of "5" on the quality index (see Table 4.1). Certainly, by other indicators of academic quality, this university is likely to be included among the top ranking institutions in the country.

5. The causal priority or ordering in a set of variables is often a matter of theoretical determination in cross-sectional data. With time series data the timing of observations will set limits on the possible causal orderings among the variables. When the empirical estimates associated with a postulated causal ordering prove unreasonable or untenable, it may be an indication that the ordering is incorrect.

6. For the reader unfamiliar with path analysis, the following set of definitions may be a helpful reference for our subsequent discussion. A direct effect is represented by a single headed arrow from a prior to a subsequent variable in the causal ordering. An indirect effect is represented by a sequence of two or more arrows leading from a prior to a subsequent variable through one or more intervening variables, thus creating a "causal chain" from the former to the latter. The strength of a particular indirect effect is the product of the path coefficients in the specific causal chain linking the two variables. The total indirect effect of one variable on another is the sum of all distinguishable causal chains between the two variables. The total causal effect of one variable on another is the sum of its direct and all its indirect effects on the other. Path models also include double headed curved arrows that represent the correlations among exogenous variables and arrows emanating from outside the model leading to endogenous variables that indicate the amount of variance not explained by the variables within the system. (For further discussion of the principles of path analysis, see Land, 1969; and for examples of the use of path analysis in sociology, see Duncan, 1966.)

7. It should be noted at this point that the effect of southern regional location of the college (which seem to occur through its relationship with personal dispositions) may actually be spurious. Perhaps, being born and brought up . . .
the South is what has a "conservative effect" on these personal dispositions which, in turn, are related to protest activity. Since youngsters are apt to attend colleges in the regions where they grow up, the regional location of the college would appear to have an effect on personal dispositions and through them on protest activity, unless region of birth and upbringing were introduced as a prior independent variable in the causal model.
CHAPTER 5

EXTRA INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS AND PROTEST ACTIVITY.

The stage is now set for the examination of extra institutional factors which may affect the involvement of students in protest activity. In the preceding chapter, we have evaluated the effects of such institutional characteristics, explored student opinions and values about which institutional effects appear to hold true, and developed a general model of institutional effects with estimates of the strength of specific causal connections between college characteristics and protest behavior.

The foregoing analysis makes it clear that there are strong and consistent relationships between the kinds of institutions young people attend and their protest involvement. What it does not tell us is whether or to what extent these relationships are a product of institutional processes to which students are exposed as opposed to the effects of extra institutional influences which young people may experience before or during their tenure in college.

In this chapter, we shall examine the effects of four major areas of social commitment which we have previously referred to as "extra institutional contexts" that may lead to protest involvement. Specifically, these are:
(1) the social class and status backgrounds of students; (2) their family environments and relations with parents; (3) their involvement in youth culture; and (4) their occupational commitments. In each of these areas, we shall examine various factors which, on the basis of previous research, might be expected to contribute to protest activity among young people. Our purpose will be to identify the factors in each of these four extra institutional contexts which make substantial and significant contributions to protest activity, both independently of, and through their association with, the other individual and institutional determinants of youthful protest behavior.

In the course of this chapter, we shall incorporate the major extra institutional correlates and predictors of protest activity into the model of institutional effects developed at the end of the preceding chapter. In this way, we will be able to establish how extra institutional factors contribute to youthful protest independently and in conjunction with the kinds of institutions young people attend. It is the development of this general causal model which incorporates both institutional and extra institutional factors contributing to individual protest activity that will give us the clearest overall picture of the dynamics of youthful protest involvement in the late 1960s.

Social Background

At this point, we begin to take advantage of a relatively unique feature of the CBS News survey; namely, the fact that information on the social back-
grounds and family relations of the young people in our sample is available in detail from their parents. Thus, in this section and the next one, we employ data from youngsters' parents to characterize the social backgrounds and family contexts of the young people in our sample. Since interviews were completed with the parents of only half of our youth sample, in these sections we have reported in this section and the succeeding one will be based on data from a reduced sample of college youth and their parents (see Table 1.1). Since the sampling of parents was essentially random (COS News, 1969, p. 12 above p. 12), the reduced working sample for this and the next section should not be biased.

The interview schedule for parents included a number of questions about their social positions and involvements, and it also repeated many of the questions asked of their offspring. Thus, it included items about the occupation of the father, income of the family, and the educational attainment of the responding parent. In addition, parents were asked about their religious preferences, their political party affiliations, their labor union memberships, and the like. Parents were also asked about their identification with various social reference groups, such as the "middle class," "people of your religion," etc. (the same battery of reference group identifications asked of youth and examined in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 above).

We have selected a number of these social class and background variables for analysis in Table 5.1. The table includes class and background variables which have correlations of at least .10 with protest activity or have been identified in previous research as possibly important contributors to youthful protest activity. The table presents zero order correlations of each of eleven class and status variables with protest activity (column 1); beta weights associated with each of these background variables as predictors of protest activity controlling for the other ten in the set (column 2); beta weights for each of these variables controlling for the other ten in the set and for institutional variability in protest activity by also introducing colleges as dummy variables into the regression equation (column 3); and beta weights controlling for the other background variables, colleges entered as dummy variables, and the three personal dispositions analyzed in the preceding chapter (column 4).

Clearly, the strongest association between social background characteristics and protest activity occur with the three socioeconomic status variables—father's occupation, family income, and parent's education—the only social background characteristics to have correlations with protest activity of .20 or greater. What is more, parent's education appears to have an effect on protest activity which is independent of the other class and status variables of the kind of institution a young person attends, and of his own personal values or dispositions (the beta weights for parent's education are statistically significant at the .05 level in columns 3 and 4, and almost so in column 2).

Since father's occupation and family income do not show statistically
Table 5.1
SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF PROTEST ACTIVITY
WITH VARIOUS CONTROLS ADDED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Background Variables</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>Beta Weights with Protest Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>With Other Background Variables</td>
<td>With Colleges as Dummy Variables Added</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's occupation</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent's education</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class Identification of Parents</td>
<td>- .12</td>
<td>- .12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Identification of Parents</td>
<td>- .12</td>
<td>- .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religious Preference of Parent</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Religious Preference of Parent</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic (versus Republican) Political Party Preference of Parent</td>
<td>- .02</td>
<td>- .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Union Membership of Parent</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family's economic security as perceived by youth</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>- .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People</td>
<td>- .06</td>
<td>- .03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
significant effects in Table 5.1, it is tempting to attribute an especially
important causal role to parental education among the indicators of socio-
economic status in stimulating youthful protest activity. Such an inter-
pretation is consistent with previous findings of the importance of paren-
tal sophistication in the protest activity of youth (Flacks, 1967). How-
ever, the tendency in regression analysis for the effects of a set of inter-
related variables to be concentrated in the one with the highest zero-
order correlation with the criterion variable (Rosen, 1966) may tend to
inflate the effect of education at the expense of occupation and income.

An examination of these three SES indicators in cross-tabulation form
suggests that each makes an independent contribution to protest activity.
Furthermore, if we combine these three indicators to form an SES index, its
independent effects are decidedly stronger than those of parent's education.
Such an SES index shows a zero order correlation of .32 with protest activity,
a beta weight of .28 in a regression equation with the other eight class
and status variables, of .26 with colleges as dummy variables added, and of
.24 with personal dispositions added (all significant at the .01 level or
higher). Thus, it appears that social class background as reflected in a
combined index of father's occupation, family income, and parent's education,
is an important determinant of the protest behavior of youth, quite apart
from the other social background characteristics of their families, the kinds
of colleges they attend, and indeed, their own dispositions and values.

Attempting to explain such an association between social class and pro-
test involvement, some (e.g. Flacks, 1970a; 1970b) have argued that young-
sters reared in the affluence of upper and upper middle class families have
been spared the experience of economic insecurity and deprivation which has
in the past made young people more concerned about their own future economic
well-being and less conscious of the social and economic problems of others.
In fact, it is true that youngsters from lower socioeconomic status back-
grounds are more likely to report that their families experienced economic
insecurity during their childhoods ($r = -.19$ with the SES index) and, for
this reason, we have included this item about young people's perceptions of
the economic insecurity of their families as the only variable drawn from
the interviews with youth in the analysis presented in Table 5.1. However,
this item shows little initial association with protest activity ($r = -.06$)
and virtually no effect independent of other class and status variables.
Evidently, economic deprivation or insecurity during childhood, or at least
the recollection of such an experience, has no bearing on the protest activity
of youth in college.

Another, perhaps related, explanation for the association between socio-
economic status and protest activity is that people from lower social class
backgrounds are more likely to be striving for membership in the middle class
and to feel that such membership requires conformity to middle class stan-
dards of belief and conduct. As shown in Table 5.1, identification with
the middle class on the part of parents does have a modest (though not sta-
tically significant) inhibiting effect on the protest behavior of their off-
springs, one which is not reduced much by controlling for other social back-
ground or other institutional characteristics. When we add personal dis-
positions to the equation, however, the independent effect of this variable 
drops to a negligible level. Perhaps, then, parental identification with 
the middle class conveys to their offsprings a sense of respect for educa-
tional values or a reluctance to question or criticize the activities 
and policies, which, in turn, inhibit their protest involvement. In one 
case, the middle class identification of parents is not responsible for a 
lower levels of protest activity among youths from lower SES back-
grounds because there is virtually no correlation (r = -.02) between the SES index and 
middle class identification of parents.

Two other status factors that might be expected to affect the protest 
activity of youth are the political party affiliations and labor union mem-
bership of their parents. Specifically, democratic party affiliation would 
suggest liberal leanings on the part of the parents, and labor union member-
ship would suggest possible involvement in forms of protest such as strikes 
and sit-ins on the part of parents. There is, however, very little association 
between these background variables and the protest activity of youth (see 
column 1 of Table 5.1). Nor are the effects of these variables suppressed 
by the fact that democratic party affiliation and union membership are more 
common in the lower socioeconomic status categories (between SES and demo-
cratic affiliation r = -.17; between SES and union membership r = -.11) 
since controlling for the other class and status variables does not alter the 
negligible relationship between these two factors and youthful protest activity.

On grounds that the female role in American society has traditionally con-
tained unconventional or deviant behavior, we might expect that female stu-
dents would be less likely than males to become involved in protest activity. 
And, in fact, there is a slight tendency for females to have lower scores than 
males on the Protest Activity Index (r = -.06). This relatively weak rela-
tionship is, however, reduced to the vanishing point as we add controls for 
social backgrounds and institutional variability. Evidently, then, females 
are no less liberated than males for participation in political and social 
protest on the college campus.

Next to the three SES indicators, the three variables relating to religion 
appear to be the strongest predictors of protest activity among social back-
ground characteristics. These are parental identification with "people of 
your religion" (r = -.12), no religious preference of parents (r = .17) and 
Jewish religious preference of parents (r = .12). Thus, protest involvement 
appears to be more common among youngsters whose parents do not identify with 
a religious reference group, who do not adhere to one of the major religious 
faiths, and who belong to the Jewish ethnic-religious minority.

Notably, youngsters from families with no religious preference show a 
persistently greater likelihood of being involved in protest activity which
cannot be attributed to other social background characteristics or the kinds of colleges they attend. Indeed, only when we add personal dispositions as controls does the effect of this variable drop to a statistically insignificant level, and even so, its effect is not much below the level required for statistical significance.

In the case of parental identification with "people of your religion," virtually all of its effect on protest involvement disappears when we add the other social background variables into the regression equation. On the other hand, it would appear that the absence of identification with a religious group is of no consequence by comparison with the absence of a religious preference on the part of parents. However, as we noted above in the case of the three SES indicators, it is possible that the effects of religious identification are being absorbed by the religious preference variable. In view of this possibility, and since these two dichotomous variables are conceptually and empirically associated, we shall combine them into a single point "No Religion Index" of parents for use in the next stage of our analysis.

Having reviewed the entire set of social background characteristics, it is fair to say that, with one exception, they do not make an independent contribution to youthful protest activity. The only one to show a significant independent effect under controls for other background characteristics, institutional variability, and personal dispositions, is father's education ($b = .17$). And, as we have noted in the text, if the three SES indicators are combined to form an index of socioeconomic status, the SES Index shows a noticeably stronger independent effect on protest activity ($b = .24$). Otherwise, social background characteristics appear to make their contributions to protest activity through the role they play in channeling young people to various kinds of institutions, and through the effects they have on the personal dispositions of young people. Table 5.1 gives us only a gross idea of the way in which specific background variables achieve their effects. Thus, if the control for colleges as dummy variables reduces the beta weight of a given background variable, we can feel fairly sure that the background factor is having its effect by channeling youngsters to institutions of varying quality (since the effect of quality predominates among those of college characteristics). But, if the beta value is reduced when dispositions are added as controls, we have no way of knowing whether it is owing to the background variable's relationship with traditional values, or with social criticisms, or with both.

Our method for examining such indirect effects in more detail will be to add selected social background factors to the causal model developed in the preceding chapter (Figure 4.2). The background variables to be included are: (1) the SES Index (based on the three indicators of socioeconomic status as described above); (2) middle class identification of parents; (3) Jewish ethnic religious preference of parents; (4) the no religion index (constructed by combining no religious preference and no identification with religious referent groups among parents). These four measures incorporate all of the background characteristics which show correlations of .10 or greater with protest activity.
in Table 5.1. Since these variables can be expected to influence youngster's dispositions and the kinds of colleges they decide to attend, they are entered as causally prior to institutional quality, traditional values, and social criticisms in Figure 5.1. The figure shows the correlations among these four background variables and their statistically significant causal links to institutional and dispositional variables.

The first thing to note is that the background factors are relatively independent of one another. The highest correlation among them is .20. All of them show stronger effects on the endogenous variables in the model than they do correlations with the other background characteristics. They are thus relatively independent dimensions of variability in the social backgrounds of young people.

Turning to the effects of these background factors on quality, criticism, and values, the path model shows that each of the background variables is linked to only one of the intervening variables in the model. Thus, middle-class identification of parents tends to discourage social criticism among college youth. The parent's commitment to or striving for middle class membership does not significantly reinforce traditional values or affect the kinds of college young people select but it does discourage criticism of or alienation from existing social policies and institutions. By contrast, the absence of religious commitment among parents has its effect not by stimulating criticism of society, but by causing young people to withhold their commitment to traditional values. We have noted that the Traditional Values Index is comprised of items that would seem to constitute the core of the "Protestant Ethic." The fact that the No Religion index shows a strong effect on traditional values of youth tends to confirm this interpretation of traditional values as a pattern of beliefs or standards based on relatively strong religious presuppositions in American society.

The remaining two background factors— the Jewish ethnic-religious preference and socioeconomic status— have no direct impact on personal dispositions. Their indirect contribution to protest activity in both cases comes through the role they play in directing young people to institutions of high quality. It is easy enough to understand how youngsters from well to do backgrounds would be able to afford and apt to choose the best colleges and universities. And, it has been documented that there is a high regard for educational excellence and achievement among Jews in American society, and that Jewish youth are especially likely to attend institutions of high academic standing.

Of these four social background variables, the only one to make a direct and independent contribution to protest activity is the SES background of youth. Indeed, the direct path from the SES Index to protest activity ($r = .20$) is about as strong as the paths from quality, criticisms, and values to protest activity. Moreover, this direct effect represents most of the overall relationship of SES with protest activity ($r = .32$).
Figure 5.1
CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, INSTITUTIONAL, AND PERSONAL DISPOSITION: VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY
The addition of these social background variables to the model has altered the effects of institutional and dispositional variables very little. The direct effects of social criticisms and traditional values have been changed only slightly (increased by .01 and reduced by .03, respectively). The paths from school quality to social criticisms and traditional values are also only slightly changed (reduced by .02 and .03, respectively). The largest change is in the direct path from school quality to protest activity, which is reduced by .03. That is to say, in the model in Figure 4.2, the direct effect of quality partly incorporates the effects of SES background of students as well. Controlling for SES in Figure 5.1 is what reduces the effect of quality. Clearly, however, most of its direct and indirect effects of institutional quality remain; only a small portion of its effects are spurious.

Perhaps the most notable addition to the model is the powerful direct effect from SES background to protest activity when we introduce the social background characteristics. While the effects of the other background factors tell an interesting story of the way in which students' background contributes indirectly to his protest activity in college, the direct effect of SES is the only one which adds to the variance accounted for in protest activity. Moreover, the fact that the path is a direct one means that we do not yet know why or how social class background makes this contribution to protest activity. We can see from the path model that it is not by directly discouraging traditional values or encouraging social criticisms. Perhaps, there is something about the family context in the upper social strata of society that stimulates protest activity. Perhaps, these are families in which child rearing practices have been relatively permissive, in which young persons have been encouraged to act and think for themselves, to readily join in outspoken objection and action on the behalf of ideals they believe in. Then, let us see whether aspects of young people's family contexts account for the independent effects of social class background, or add an independent dimension to the explanation of protest activity.

Family Context

The difference between social background factors and characteristics of the family context may seem ambiguous at first. We have in mind the distinction between the position of the family in the broader society and the more particular environment and influences within the family unit. The social background characteristics include the social, occupational, economic, ethnic, religious and political memberships and statuses of the family's principal members. The family context variables include the substantive values and the structure of social relations to which an individual is exposed by virtue of his membership in a particular family. Since the family context variables are more particularistic and specific in their influence upon the individual, we shall treat them as causally contingent upon the class and status variables examined in the preceding section.
In addition to questions about class and status characteristics, the interview with parents also included items about the values of parents, their orientations toward the family, and their relations with their children. In particular, the questions used to measure the traditional values and social criticisms of youth in the preceding chapter were repeated in the interviews with their parents. By scoring parents' responses to these two batteries of items in exactly the same way as we did the responses of their offspring, we have corresponding measures of traditional values and social criticisms for parents.

The interview schedule also included questions about parents' orientations toward the family and about their relations with their children. To measure parental concern or commitment to the family, we have chosen the item from the battery of reference group identifications which asked parents whether or not they identify with "your family." With respect to parent-child relations, both parents and their offspring were asked to characterize the parent's treatment of the child as he or she was growing up in terms of permissiveness and leniency as opposed to strictness and authoritarianism. We have combined the responses of the youth and his parent in a given family to form an index of the family context as more or less permissive.

These four family context variables—the criticisms and values of parents, their orientations toward the family, and their permissiveness toward their offspring—as they affect youthful involvement in protest activity are presented in Table 5.2. Following the format of Table 5.1, for each of the family context variables, this table shows the zero order correlation with protest activity, and the beta weights with other family context variables controlled, with colleges as dummy variables added, and with personal dispositions also added.

Looking first at the substantive values of parents in terms of their social criticisms and traditional values, we find that these two orientations show quite different patterns of effect on protest activity. In the case of parental traditional values, there is a strong association with protest activity (r = -.27) which is relatively independent of other family context variables (b = -.23) and retains an independent effect when institutional variability in protest activity is added (b = -.17). Only when we add the personal dispositions of youth to the equation does the effect of parental traditional values drop to a statistically insignificant level. Perhaps, the transmission of traditional values from parents is primarily responsible for reducing the direct effect of parental values to an insignificant level. We cannot tell from this table whether it is youthful values or criticisms or both which absorb the direct effect of parental traditional values on youthful protest. We shall be able to answer this question when we come to Figure 5.2.

By contrast, parental social criticism shows a relatively weak association with youthful protest activity (r = .13) which is reduced to a statistically
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Context Variables</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>With Other Family Variables Only</th>
<th>With Colleges as Dummy Variables Added</th>
<th>With Dispositional Variables Also Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Traditional Values Index</td>
<td>-.27</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Social Criticism Index</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Identification With Family</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental Permissiveness Index - Perceptions of Truth and their Parents</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: * = .05; ** = .01; *** = .001
insignificant level as soon as we control for other family context variables \((b = 0.05)\) and disappears almost entirely when institutional variability is added \((b = 0.02)\). Thus, quite in contrast with parental traditional values, social criticisms among parents have relatively little bearing on the protest activity of their offspring. Perhaps, the social criticisms index, or what it measures, is not so much a long-standing value orientation as it is a syndrome of attitudes and judgments about recent social events and conditions. Indeed, a number of the items in the index refer specifically to issues or problems against which protests and demonstrations have been directed in recent years. The fact that the association between social criticisms and youthful protest is rendered negligible when we introduce other family context variables means that the effect of this variable is primarily a by-product of its association with other family values, orientations, or relationships.

Turning to our measures of family orientation and relations between parent and child, we find no evidence that parental identification with the family affects youthful protest behavior, but there is a clear indication that a permissive upbringing encourages later involvement in political and social protest. The meaning of the question about parental identification with "your family" is, of course, quite ambiguous. It could reflect the parent's investment of time and effort in rearing his child(ren), his personal interest and involvement in family affairs, his concern for his family's economic well-being, his preference for spending leisure time with his family; or it might simply be a question that is too vague to tap any such patterns. In any case, since the effect of parental orientation toward the family as measured by this item is negligible, this variable will be dropped from further consideration in the subsequent analysis.

Parental permissiveness, by contrast, is definitely associated with protest activity \((r = 0.24)\) and that its effect is independent \((b = 0.19)\) of other family context variables—chiefly the effects of substantive value orientations of parents. The effect of parental permissiveness is reduced but remains statistically significant when we add institutional variability to the equation \((b = 0.14)\). When we add personal dispositions as a control, however, the effect of parental permissiveness becomes statistically insignificant. Thus, a permissive upbringing appears to have its effect on protest activity through the kinds of colleges youngsters with such upbringings are likely to attend and through the effects of such an upbringing on their personal dispositions. We shall have a clearer picture of this process momentarily.

On balance, the family context variables add little to the variance accounted for in protest activity, since none of them show effects which remain independent and significant after we add controls for the personal dispositions of youth. Specifically, the multiple correlation for institutional plus dispositional variables is .56, as shown in Table 4.12; when we add the family context variables it rises only to .59, as shown in Table 5.2. This represents an increase of only one percent in variance accounted
Instead, the role of the family context variables is to provide causal links between the variables already in the developing causal model, and to account more fully for the institutional and dispositional factors which display substantial direct effects on protest activity. This role of family context variables is shown in Figure 5.2.

Note first that the direct effects on protest activity in Figure 5.2 are identical to those in Figure 5.1, with the exception that the path from school quality to protest activity has been reduced from .17 to .10. With this minor exception, then, the introduction of the family context variables leaves this part of the model unchanged. Consequently, the residual variance in protest activity is just what it was in Figure 5.1.

In addition to the very slight reduction in the direct effect of quality (by .01) there has also been a slight reduction in its indirect effects (by .03). Although the paths from youthful values and criticisms to protest activity are unchanged, those from quality to youthful values and criticisms are reduced by .09 and .06, respectively. This reduces the total indirect effects of quality from .12 to .09 between Figures 5.1 and 5.2. Notably, the introduction of the social background variables in Figure 5.1 reduced the direct effect of quality by .05 and its indirect effect by .02 from their values in Figure 4.2. Thus, with both background and family variables in the model, the estimate of quality’s total causal effect on protest activity has dropped from .36 to .25—a sizable reduction, but at the same time, a sizable remaining effect.

Of course, the family context variables provide a number of causal links between social background variables on one side and institutional and dispositional variables on the other. The best example of this articulation between background and foreground variables is provided by parental traditional values. Thus, all four of the background variables contribute markedly ($p$ is at least .20) to parental traditional values. In turn, parental values contributes moderately ($p$ ranges between .14 and .18) to school quality, youthful criticisms and youthful values. In substantive terms, traditional values among parents are encouraged by identification with the middle class and discouraged by high socioeconomic class, Jewish ethnic-religious preference and no religious preference. For their part, parental belief in traditional American values encourage commitment to such values on the part of their offspring and discourage social criticism and attendance at institutions of high academic standing among their offspring.

Parental permissiveness has a somewhat more restricted role in the model. It is affected by only two of the background variables and it affects only two of the foreground factors. Thus, high socioeconomic status and Jewish families tend to provide a more permissive upbring or family environment. In turn, parental permissiveness apparently leads to the choice of a high-quality academic institution for or by their offspring and discourages their.
Figure 5.2
CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FAMILY CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL, AND PERSONAL DISPOSITION VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY
from commitment to traditional values.

Still further restricted is the role of parental social criticisms. It is affected by only one background variable and it affects only one foreground variable. Thus, middle class identification on the part of the parent tends to discourage parental social criticisms and lower levels of social criticism among parents appear to produce correspondingly lower levels of social criticism among their offspring.\(^3\)

What has the introduction of the family context variables done to the direct causal links between background and foreground variables, as shown in Figure 5.1? First, the direct effects of SES and Jewish background on institutional quality have both been diminished because of the emergence of indirect links through permissiveness and traditional values of parents. Secondly, the direct effect of the No Religion Index on youthful traditional values has been reduced only slightly (from .29 to .26) as a result of the intervening role of parental traditional values. Thirdly, the direct link from middle class identification to youthful social criticisms has been displaced altogether, primarily by a link through parental social criticisms and secondarily through parental traditional values.

Finally, it should be noted that for each of the family context variables, more of its original association with protest activity is traceable through its associations with social background characteristics than through indirect causal links. In other words, most of the effect of each of these variables is spurious according to the causal assumptions of our model. These family context variables give a more elaborate and detailed picture of some of the causal links between background and foreground variables; they provide some \(7^2\) (two step) causal links between background and foreground variables. And, they are mechanisms which add in their own right to the variance accounted for in the foreground variables; the residual variances in school quality, youthful values and youthful criticisms are reduced somewhat between Figures 5.1 and 5.2 with the addition of the family context variables. They must, therefore, be regarded as important for their interpretive role between background and foreground variables in our developing model, and for their contribution to variance in the foreground variables, even though they make no independent contribution to the variance in the protest activity of students.

Youth Culture

At this point in our analysis, the focus shifts from background to foreground. This section and the next one deal with current involvements and commitments of young people rather than past experiences and influences on protest activity. This section is devoted to youth cultural involvements and the next one examines occupational commitments and “social institutional” contexts of influences that can be expected to affect protest involvement among youth.
We refer to these two areas of involvement and commitment as "extra institutional" contexts or influences because, while they may be affected by the college experience, they are not explicitly or exclusively the product of the formal educational program of the college. Instead, these are involvements, commitments, decisions, and choices made by all young people, whether or not they have been exposed to the college environment. Of course, both the substance of college education and the non-college social influences on college campus may very well affect such involvements and commitments. That is, we see these extra institutional areas of involvement and commitment as causally contingent on the college experience in the sense that college is apt to provide opportunities and perspectives which contribute to the choice of occupations and involvement in youth cultural activities.

We also make the assumption that youth cultural involvement and occupational commitments are causally contingent upon the traditional values and social criticisms of youth. We assume that these personal dispositions represent relatively enduring value orientations which tend to shape the more immediate actions and reactions of young people to various opportunities and influences, including opportunities for youth cultural involvements and influences toward certain occupational choices. This assumption is, of course, subject to challenge, perhaps more so with respect to social criticisms, which may be more responsive to recent historical events and personal experiences, than in the case of traditional values which appear to be more firmly rooted in the social backgrounds and family contexts of young people. (Notably, the path diagrams will ordinarily provide sufficient information with which to estimate parameters disregarding this causal assumption.)

The assessment of youth cultural involvement presents some difficulties. It is not simply a matter of membership in any formal sense, but rather it is a question of the extent to which young people subscribe to a distinctive or unique set of values, styles, conventions, and normative standards. This requires us to identify basic normative elements of the youth culture which have distinctive social meanings for them. And, it requires us to find indicators of these dimensions among the questions asked in the CBS News survey.

In addition to the distinctive values, attitudes, and behavior that characterize the youth culture, involvement in it also implies a sense of separation or alienation from the dominant culture of established society, from the conventional manners and mores of middle class America. That is, as they become more intensely involved in youth culture, young people are apt to find it difficult to accept prevailing social norms and existing sources of authority within the dominant social structure. Hence, for the assessment of youth cultural involvement, we need to find two kinds of measures within the CBS News survey data: (2) items reflecting the distinctive normative elements of youth culture which are shared by young people who take an active part in the autonomous youth culture, and (2) items which reflect a sense of separation from the dominant society, alienation from existing sources of influence and control, and rejecting of established bases of authority.
From the various batteries throughout the interview schedule, we have selected some fourteen items pertaining, in one way or another, to these two dimensions of youth cultural involvement. These fourteen items have been used either singly or in combination to form the eight youth culture variables which appear in Table 5.3. The first four variables in the table are constructed from items that tend to reflect the adherence of youth to home, style, and orientations distinctive among youth. The second four are either or constructed to reflect the extent to which young people are separable, estranged, or alienated from the dominant society, the middle class, their parents, and established sources of authority in society.

More specifically, to assess the distinctive areas or elements of youth cultural involvement, we have constructed the following four measures: orientation toward drug use; orientation toward sex relations; acceptance of unconventional dress and grooming; and a self-expression index. The first of these variables indexes the respondents' objection to social constraints against the use of marijuana, LSD, and other drugs. The second one combines items which indicate that the respondent would "welcome more sexual freedom" and that he believes "sexual behavior should be bound by mutual feelings, not by formal and legal ties." The third measure coded favorability of responses to an open-ended question about recent changes in styles of dress and grooming among young people. And, the fourth measure combines an item about the importance of "doing your own thing" to the respondent, and one about his desire for "more emphasis on self-expression" in society.

Likewise, to assess the estrangement or alienation of young people from various social reference groups or sources of authority, we also employ four measures: separation from society; separation from parents; rejection of social constraints; and middle class identification. Separation from society is measured by a single item that asks respondents whether their "own personal values and points of view are shared by most Americans today." Separation from parents is also measured by a single item which asks respondents about the "differences between your values and those of your parents." Rejection of social constraints indexes the difficulty respondents have accepting "laws you don't agree with," "the power and authority of the police," and the "authority of the university administration." And, the final measure of identification with the middle class is reflected by a single item drawn from the battery of reference group identifications (examined in Chapter 3).

Looking first at the four variables that reflect distinctive youth cultural involvement in Table 5.3, we find reasonably strong associations with protest activity. This is particularly so for orientation toward drug use (r = .40), and orientation toward sex relations (r = .34). But, when we control for the other youth cultural variables, the beta weights for these measures of youth cultural distinctiveness drop far below their zero order correlations; orientation toward drug use is the only distinctiveness measure that shows a significant independent effect on protest activity (β = .13). When we add the control for institutional variability, none of these youthful distinctiveness variables retain significant independent effects (β no
### Table 5.3

**YOUTH CULTURE VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF PROTEST ACTIVITY**  
WITH VARIOUS CONTROLS ADDED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Culture Variables</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>With Other Youth Culture Variables Only</th>
<th>With Colleges as Dummy Variables Added</th>
<th>With Dispositional Variables Also Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward Drug Use</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation Toward Sexual Relations</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance of Unconventional Dress and Grooming</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Expression Index</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation From Society</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation From Parents</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of Social Constraints</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class Identification</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significance levels:**  
* = .05;  ** = .01
greater than .07). And with personal dispositions added, the beta weights drop a bit further (b no greater than .06).

Among the four youthful alienation variables, the pattern is somewhat different. Their overall correlations with protest activity are about as strong as those of the youthful distinction variables, but they appear to have stronger independent effects on protest activity when their cultural variables controlled, and the alienation variables with statistically significant effects are b = -.17. Greater the value of these variables; when we add colleges as dummy variables, middle class identification retains an independent effect (and b = .35 or greater for three of these variables); and, even with personal dispositions added, middle class identification continues to have a significant independent effect (b = -.17).

Moreover, the three youthful alienation variables which show the strongest independent effect on protest activity are relatively intercorrelated (r = either .35 or .36 for each pair). In effect, these three measures may be different aspects of the same underlying dimension of youthful alienation. To examine this possibility, we have constructed a path model in which the three measures appear as dependent variables, in which all variables except protest activity in Figure 5.2 have been entered as possible predictors, and in which the residual correlations among the three dependent youthful alienation variables are shown with curved arrows on the right hand side of the path model in Figure 5.3.

Notably, only four of the ten predictors in the developing causal model figure at all in the determination of these three measures of youthful alienation; and what is more, two of these have a prominent and comparable role in the determination of each measure of alienation. Thus, traditional values of youth is the strongest predictor of each of the three measures of alienation and youthful social criticisms is the next strongest predictor in each case. The No Religion Index and middle class identification of parents each affects one of the alienation measures, but in each case their effects are relatively weak compared to those of youthful values and criticisms. In effect, Figure 5.3 shows that each of the measures of alienation is predicted by the same principal and secondary determinants, with little or no effect from other variables in the model.

In addition, the figure shows that including these three measures of alienation in the same path model reduces the residual correlations among them to a statistically insignificant level. The fact that they are predicted largely by the same two variables and that they lose their intercorrelations within the causal framework in Figure 5.3 implies that these are, indeed, relatively interchangeable measures of alienation which are a product of the same basic causal processes. In effect, they can be used in place of one another or combined to form a single comprehensive measure of youthful alienation without altering or compromising the basic pattern of effects in the causal model. Our approach will be to combine these three measures into a single index of youthful alienation and to examine its effects in the
Figure 5.3

CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FAMILY CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND PERSONAL DISPOSITION VARIABLES AFFECTING THREE MEASURES OF YOUTHFUL ALIENATION

Diagram showing the relationships between various factors affecting youthful alienation.
developing causal model as shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4 shows the model of factors contributing to protest activity with youthful alienation added as an intervening variable in the causal order between personal dispositions and protest behavior. Note that introducing youthful alienation adds only three new paths to the developing model, but significantly, these three paths are stronger than any of the others in Figure 5.4. Thus, the direct effect of the composite alienation measure on protest activity ($\rho = .30$) is evidently stronger than the effect of any other predictor of protest activity. And, the path from traditional values and social criticisms of youth to youthful alienation itself ($\rho = .30$ and .36, respectively) are quite strong by comparison with the other causal links in the model. (The effects of no religious commitment and middle class identification of parents on specific components of the youthful alienation measure, as shown in Figure 5.3, are attenuated when the components are combined to form the composite alienation measure used in Figure 5.4).

Thus, youthful alienation is quite evidently a mechanism interpreting the effects of personal dispositions on protest activity. In fact, the presence of youthful alienation totally accounts for the effect of traditional values on protest activity; the direct path from traditional values to protest activity is altogether displaced by the indirect path from traditional values through youthful alienation to protest behavior. In substantive terms, then, traditional values appear to inhibit protest behavior primarily to the extent that they prevent young people from developing a sense of separation from the broader society, from withholding identification with the middle class as a reference group, and from rejecting the power and authority of laws, police, and university administrators.

In the case of social criticisms, however, youthful alienation is a less important interpretive mechanism. Social criticisms achieve some of their effect on protest activity indirectly through youthful alienation ($\rho = .30 \times .30 = .09$) but most of their effect on protest behavior occurs directly ($\rho = .17$). Thus, only a minor portion of the effect of social criticisms comes about through their power to encourage a sense of separation, alienation and rejection of established authority.

Nor is the role of youthful alienation limited to that of an interpreting mechanism. This is evident in the fact that including youthful alienation in the model adds to the variance explained in protest activity, increasing it from 31.4 percent in Figure 5.2 to 33.6 percent in Figure 5.4. Within the causal model this is represented by the fact that the substantial direct effect of youthful alienation exceeds the sum of the (two step) indirect effects which occur through youthful alienation. That is, the indirect paths from traditional values ($\rho = .30 \times .30 = .15$) and from social criticisms ($\rho = .30 \times .30 = .09$) are together less ($\rho = .09 = .24$) than the direct effect of youthful alienation ($\rho = .30$). Thus, not only is alienation a mechanism through which personal dispositions, particularly traditional values, achieve their effects on protest activity, but it is also an independent
Figure 5.4

CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FAMILY CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL, PERSONAL DISPOSITION, AND YOUTHFUL ALIENATION VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY

[Diagram with arrows and correlations]

Variables:
- SES Index
- School Quality
- Traditional Values
- Social Criticisms
- Religious Preference
- Parental Involvement
- Parental Alienation

Correlation Coefficients:
- 0.95
- 0.88
- 0.86
- 0.72
- 0.87

Note: The diagram illustrates the relationships and correlations between the variables.
source of variation in protest activity.

The importance of youthful alienation in the developing causal model is apparent. However, its role in the model raises a question about its conceptualization as a youth culture variable. The fact that it is dependent only on personal disposition variables and that it functions largely to interpret their effects on protest activity suggests that it might more appropriately be regarded as an attitudinal or dispositional variable than as an aspect of youth cultural involvement. Furthermore, the substantive content of the measure we have termed "youthful alienation"—perceived value differences from the mainstream of society, lack of identification with the middle class, and the rejection of established authority—has no necessary connection with youth cultural involvement. Such feelings or attitudes may arise as a person begins to lose faith in traditional American values or to develop a critical perspective on society, without his having any contact with or involvement in the youth culture per se. Of course, such feelings and attitudes may also be the outgrowth of youth cultural involvement, but this is not the same as saying that they are an aspect or necessary ingredient of such involvement.

The proper conceptualization of youthful alienation is an issue that is difficult to resolve empirically. And, indeed, its importance can be exaggerated. In order to make an estimate of the unique or independent effect of youth culture as an extra institutional context, we must decide whether youthful alienation is a personal disposition or a youth culture variable. But this choice will not prevent us from elaborating an explanatory model of protest activity in which youthful alienation plays a prominent part. As a matter of fact, by elaborating our causal model in Figure 5.4 one step further, we may gain useful information with which to make the choice.

To this end, we present a further version of the developing causal model of protest activity in Figure 5.5. Specifically, we have added to Figure 5.4 a measure of youth cultural involvement which is based on variables that express or reflect distinctively youthful orientations. This measure of "youthful distinctiveness" has been constructed by combining three distinctively youthful orientations which show reasonably strong intercorrelations: orientation toward drug use; orientation toward sexual relations; and, acceptance of unconventional dress and grooming. (An analysis similar to the one presented in our prior publication provided justification for combining these three measures). This measure of youthful distinctiveness is introduced as causally prior to youthful alienation (since youthful alienation might more properly be regarded as causally contingent upon youth cultural involvement) and on a par with traditional values and criticisms of youth in the causal ordering.
Figure 5.5

CRITICAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FAMILY CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL, PERSONAL DISPOSITION, YOUTHFUL ALIENATION AND DISTINCTIVENESS VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY

[Diagram showing relationships between variables like School Quality, Permissiveness Index, Traditional Values, Social Criticisms, and Parental Influence.]
as shown in Figure 5.5.

Youthful distinctiveness shows no direct effect on protest activity, as we might expect from the analysis of its components in Table 5.3. It does, however, show an independent effect on youthful alienation ($p = .26$) along with traditional values and social criticisms of youth. In fact, introducing youthful distinctiveness as a measure of youth cultural involvement reduces the paths from traditional values to youthful alienation (from .36 to .26) and from social criticisms to youthful alienation (from .26 to .21) between Figures 5.4 and 5.5. This suggests that youth cultural involvement independently contributes to a sense of alienation from the mainstream of established society. At the same time, the association between distinctiveness and alienation as reflected in the path coefficient linking them is hardly strong enough to suggest that they are both aspects of the same underlying dimension. In fact, in terms of the path coefficients, the measure of traditional values is more strongly associated with youthful alienation than is the youthful distinctiveness variable.

Whether the reduction in direct effects of traditional values and social criticisms on youthful alienation in Figure 5.5 is attributed to spurious or to indirect causal links depends, of course, on the location of youthful distinctiveness in the model. Having placed it on a par with personal dispositions causes the reduction to occur through prior causal factors, chiefly institutional quality, and secondarily socioeconomic background. But, whether we place distinctiveness before, after, or on par with personal dispositions, its presence in the model as a determinant of youthful alienation indicates that the direct effect of personal disposition variables on youthful alienation as shown in Figure 5.4 are exaggerated. Thus, traditional values and, to a lesser extent, social criticisms would appear to incorporate the direct effect of youth cultural involvement unless a youth culture variable such our composite measure of youthful distinctiveness is included in the model, as shown in Figure 5.5.

In turn, youthful distinctiveness is affected by social background and institutional factors. Specifically, no religious commitment, middle class identification, and socioeconomic status level of the youngster's parents and the academic quality of the school he attends all show significant effects on youth cultural involvement, as reflected by the youthful distinctiveness variable. A similar analysis of the determinants of youthful alienation shows fewer and weaker links with social background and institutional factors. In short, the measure of youthful distinctiveness appears to have stronger roots in the social backgrounds and college experiences of young people as we might expect of a variable which is supposed to reflect extra institutional involvement in the youth culture; whereas, the measure of youthful alienation is relatively free of background and institutional factors and is more closely linked with traditional values and social criticisms of youth as we might expect of an attitudinal or dispositional variable that contributes more directly to protest activity.
We recognize that placing youthful distinctiveness on a par with personal dispositions, as we have in Figure 5.5, violates the assumption stated at the beginning of this section that youth cultural involvement should be regarded as contingent on personal dispositions. Nevertheless, we believe on the basis of the analysis in this section that model as presented in Figure 5.5 is a more accurate representation of the causal sequence between both youthful distinctiveness and youth cultural involvement as a measure of youth cultural involvement and youthful alienation as an attitude or dispositional variable. The alternative of leaving out the youthful distinctiveness variable, as presented in Figure 5.4, would appear to leave youth cultural involvement largely represented in the model or to require that youthful alienation be regarded as a measure of youth cultural involvement, which seems inconsistent with the developing interpretation of this variable. With these alterations in our assumptions affecting the interpretation of youthful alienation and the causal position of youthful distinctiveness in the model, we are now able to proceed with our analysis of the effects of occupational commitment as a final area of extra institutional influences.

**Occupational Commitment**

Conventional occupational commitment might be expected to inhibit protest activity by establishing links or bonds with the prevailing social structure. Of course, occupations in which people are exploited or oppressed may, as Marx has argued, generate a sense of alienation which, in turn, becomes a source of protest activity, but college students do not typically hold or aspire to such occupations. There are, however, occupations appropriate to college graduates which have the potential for social and political reform: commitment to such work in the future may be conducive to protest involvement in the present. There is also the possibility of making no specific occupational commitment or plans, a condition which may liberate the individual from social bonds that might otherwise inhibit protest activity. Furthermore, apart from specific occupational commitments or plans, the desire for any kind of work that permits the individual to pursue social or political reform might be expected to contribute to or support protest involvement. By contrast, a desire for economic security or personal advancement in future employment might be expected to make a person more reluctant to engage in protest, either because he believes that the prevailing unreformed social structure affords the best opportunities for security and advancement to the college graduate, or because he fears that such involvement could jeopardize his chances for mobility through conventional channels.

In this section, we shall examine young people's employment at the time of the interview, their future commitment to specific occupations, and the more general characteristics of the kinds of work they wish to pursue. Thus, occupational commitment as we consider it here includes both present and, both specific and general commitments for the future. For college students,
however, full-time employment is primarily a future prospect. Our analysis of the effects of occupational commitment will, therefore, be concerned with differences in the kinds and characteristics of occupations to which college youth aspire. Table 5.4 presents the effects on protest activity of various measures of occupational commitment available in the CBS News survey.

If employment generally tends to be a part of the established social structure, we might expect to find that students who are employed on a part-time basis during their college years are less likely to become involved in protest activity than those who are not employed. The first occupational commitment variable in Table 5.4 indicates whether the student was employed at the time of the survey. Note that present employment shows only a very slight negative association with protest activity which becomes even weaker with increasing controls. Thus, at least among college students, we find no evidence that part-time employment inhibits protest activity. Of course, this does not mean that full-time employment, especially as an alternative to being a student, does not discourage protest activity. Thus, it may be that employment has a constraining effect on protest only when it severely restricts the time available for such activity or when it becomes the focal point of the individual's social identity.

What about the rejection of commitment to conventional occupations as a stimulus to protest involvement? The second occupational commitment variable in Table 5.4 identifies students who choose no specific conventional occupations of the set presented to them in the interview. This measure of "no future occupational commitment" shows a significant effect on protest activity which remains independent when other occupational commitment variables are controlled and when colleges are added as dummy variables. However, the effect becomes insignificant with the addition of personal disposition variables to the regression equation. Notably, the number of individuals who indicate no realistic occupational commitment is relatively small, thus limiting the variance in protest activity this variable can account for. In other words, it seems safe to say that rejection of conventional occupations does tend to have a liberating effect, but one which is confined to few students to be a statistically significant source of variation in protest activity.

Another possibility is that commitment to certain segments of the occupational structure may actually stimulate protest activity. Thus, occupations which specifically afford opportunities for social change and political reform may tend to reinforce current reform interests of students. The third occupational variable in Table 5.4 combines the two realistic occupational choices of young people with the highest levels of protest activity. Specifically, the variable combines commitment to social work which has a long-standing tradition of social service and social reform and commitment to politics which, of course, provides various opportunities for political and social reform. As in the case of no specific occupational commitment, the effect of politics/social work is not strong because relatively few students make these specific choices. In this case, the effects on protest
Table 5.4
OCCUPATIONAL COMMITMENT VARIABLES AS PREDICTORS OF PROTEST ACTIVITY WITH VARIOUS CONTROLS ADDED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Commitment Variables</th>
<th>Beta Weights with Protest Activity</th>
<th>Correlations with Protest Activity</th>
<th>With Other Occupation Variables Only</th>
<th>With Colleges as Dummy Variables Added</th>
<th>With Disposition Variables Also Added</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present Employment</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Future Occupational Commitment</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Social Work and Commitment to Politics</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy between Ideal and Realistic Occupational Choice</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Changing Society</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.19**</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to Economic Security</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.55*</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance levels: * = .05; ** = .01
activity are not significant when various controls are introduced, but it is noteworthy that the beta weights are not reduced much with the addition of other occupational commitments, institutional variability, and personal dispositions. Thus, while the effect is limited to relatively few students, among this group it appears to be relatively independent of other sources of variation in protest activity.

What about occupational frustration or disappointment? Since these students have not yet been denied occupations in the marketplace we cannot measure their actual frustration in getting a job, but we can gauge the effect of disappointment in terms of a discrepancy between the jobs they ideally like to have and the ones they realistically expect to get. We have thus far considered only their realistic expectations on the second and third variables in Table 5.4) but students were also asked what occupations they would ideally like to have. The fourth occupational commitment variable in Table 5.4 distinguishes between those whose realistic expectations and idealistic desires are the same and those for whom they differ. The table makes it abundantly clear, however, that the discrepancy between ideal and expected occupation plays no part in protest activity; such frustration or disappointment has no effect on the extent to which youngsters become involved in protest activity. An important implication of this finding is that the rejection of conventional occupations and the choice of politics or social work (as indicated by the preceding two variables) do not achieve what effect they have because they are decisions at odds with what the students who make them would like. Instead, their effects are related to the substantive nature of the commitment.

The final two variables in Table 5.4 reflect not so specific occupational choices, but more general characteristics of the kinds of work young people would like to have. The fifth variable consists of a single item to which respondents indicate how important it is in their lives to have work that will give them an opportunity to "change society," and the sixth variable is an index composed of three items which permit respondents to indicate the importance of economic well-being and job security to them. As the table shows, the desire for work that can change society tends to encourage protest activity and the desire for economic security in one's future occupation tends to discourage such involvement. Furthermore, these two variables show similar effects on protest activity involvement which are independent of the other occupational commitment variables and of college variability in protest activity. With the introduction of personal dispositions as controls, however, the effects of these two variables drop to statistically insignificant levels.

Now, it will be recalled that one of the three personal disposition variables examined in Chapter 4 is the youngster's orientation toward college which distinguishes between those who value college education because it will help them "earn more money, have a more interesting career and enjoy a better position in the society" and those who value college for the opportunities it can give them to "change society rather than make out well within the system."
The choice between these two alternatives obviously incorporates much the same content as do the two occupational commitment variables that refer to "changing society" and "economic security." The fact that we have carried the college orientation variable, as well as traditional values and social criticisms as controls in assessing various extra institutional effects in Tables 5.1 through 5.4, could account for the failure of these two occupational commitment variables to influence significantly effects on protest activity with the addition of personal dispositions to the regression equation. In view of this possibility, we have included "changing society" and "economic security" in the developing causal model of factors contributing to protest activity in Figure 5.6.

The figure shows that a commitment to work which offers opportunities for changing society does contribute independently to protest activity at a significant level (p = .13); whereas, the desire for work that will provide economic well-being and security does not. Thus, the removal of the college orientation variable permits at least one of the occupational commitment variables to become a direct contributing factor in the developing causal model. The fact that the independent effect of college orientation is not large (as shown in Table 4.12) means that it alone could not cause a huge reduction in the effects of either of these two occupational commitment variables. However, its presence was evidently sufficient to alter the statistical status of the changing society variable from a significant to an insignificant contributor to protest activity.

It is interesting to note in Figure 5.6 that the desire for economic security and the emphasis on changing society are by no means opposite ends of the same coin; they have quite different roots in the causal structure of the model. The desire for economic security in future employment is directly affected only by traditional values, but notably by such values on the part of both youth and their parents. The fact that such a commitment is linked not only to traditional values of young people but also to those of their parents suggests that it is deeply rooted in traditional American values and reinforced by family pressures.

An emphasis on changing society in future employment, by contrast, is linked with an altogether different set of variables. Naturally enough, a critical perspective on society and its institutions contributes to the desire for work that will provide opportunities for changing society (p = .15). Also, youth cultural involvement as reflected in the youthful distinctiveness measure independently contributes to a desire for work that can change society, perhaps to conform more nearly to the norms and values of the youth culture to which they subscribe (p = .21). Significantly, socioeconomic status tends to discourage an interest in the kinds of work that provide opportunities to change society (p = .15). Though not particularly strong, this is one of only two direct paths from SES to foreground variables; the other leading to youthful distinctiveness. In Chapter 6, we shall deal at greater length with the implications of the fact that SES has very little effect on the personal values, orientations, or dispositions of young people.
Figure 5.6

CAUSAL MODEL OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND, FAMILY CONTEXT, INSTITUTIONAL, PERSONAL DISPOSITION, YOUTHFUL ALIENATION AND DISTINCTIVENESS, AND OCCUPATIONAL COMMITMENT VARIABLES AFFECTING PROTEST ACTIVITY
At this point, we simply note that the one direct causal link between 
and a foreground variable that directly affects protest activity is one that 
tends to inhibit the kind of orientation toward future occupations which 
promotes protest involvement.

The distinctly different causal roots of the desire for economic security 
and the emphasis on changing society as occupational commitments show in 
Figure 3.6 suggest that the forced choice between similar alternatives in 
the college orientation variable creates a false dichotomy. It would appear that the college orientation variable forces a choice between two relatively independent orientations which have rather different roots 
in the experiences and backgrounds of youth. (Between economic security 
and changing society as occupational commitments it is only $.17). Because 
the college orientation variable covers dimensions quite similar to those 
represented by the two occupational commitment variables and because it 
appears to force a choice between two relatively independent dimensions, it 
will be dropped as a personal disposition in the final section of this chapter where we attempt to partition the variance in protest activity into 
institutional and various extra institutional categories of variables.

Despite the fact that none of the six occupational commitment variables 
show significant effects in the final column of Table 5.4 and that only one 
of them shows a significant effect in the causal model in Figure 5.6, these 
six variables as a group make a definite contribution to the variance ex-
plained in protest activity. Above and beyond the variance attributable to 
institutional variability and personal dispositions (Table 4.12), these 
six variables add 2.4 percent to the variance in protest activity; and, of 
course, slightly more when the college orientation variable is dropped from 
the personal dispositions. Their collective contribution appears to reflect the 
fact that four of the six occupational commitment variables show effects which 
at least approach significant levels even with institutional variability and personal dispositions, including college orientation, entered into the regression equation.

The fact that the occupational commitment variables with the strongest 
independent effect on protest activity is a general characteristic of future 
employment rather than a commitment to a specific occupation or set of occup-
ations, and that making no occupational choice has at least as strong an 
effect as choosing politics/social work, are inconsistent with the argument 
that articulation between the educational and occupational structures accounts 
for much of the effect of occupational commitments on protest behavior. 
Instead, it would appear that young people believe work is available to 
provide opportunities for changing society, and perhaps more so for college 
graduates, but they are relatively uncertain about precisely what occupations provide such opportunities.

Finally, the role of occupational commitment in protest activity may be 
a more important one that the analysis in this section indicates. As we noted 
at the beginning of this section, college and non-college youth are viewed.
distinguished more by their present employment status than by any other of
the extra institutional factors that we have considered here. And, it will
also be in terms of occupational status level that these two groups will be
further separated once the college students graduate and enter the labor
force. Obviously, any attempt to account for the differences in protest
activity between college and non-college youth must reckon with the differ-
ences in occupational commitment between these two groups as a possible con-
tributing factor. The analysis of differences in future occupational com-
mitment among college youth conducted here, thus, covers only some of the
possible effects of occupational commitment on protest activity.

An Assessment of Institutional and Extra Institutional Effects

In the next and final chapter, we shall review the causal model we have
developed in this chapter and discuss some of its implications for existing
theories of protest activity and for further analyses of these data. In the
remaining few pages of this chapter, we shall make an overall assessment of
the effects of the various categories of variables we have examined in this
chapter and in the preceding one. That is, we shall estimate the extent to
which personal dispositions, institutional characteristics, and the various
extra institutional contexts contribute to protest activity among college
youth.

The estimated effect of a given context on protest activity will depend,
of course, upon how well the available data in the CBS News survey cover all
of the factors in a given context which contribute to protest activity. For
the purposes of this analysis, we must assume that the relevant contributors
to protest activity have been covered equally well in each of the contexts
under consideration, and that the survey questions have measured the variables
equally well within the various contexts or categories of variables.

Another problem is the proper classification of the variables in terms of
the contexts or categories used in the analysis. There are, for example, no
sure guidelines for distinguishing between social background and family
environment variables or between youth culture and personal disposition vari-
ables. At several points in the analysis, in fact, we have specifically sug-
gested that our initial classification of variables was mistaken. For example,
in the analysis of youth culture influences, it appeared that "youthful aliena-
tion" may be more properly regarded as a personal disposition than as an indi-
cator of youth cultural involvement.

In the assessment of institutional and extra institutional effects that
follows, we have classified the variables according to our final rather than
our initial judgement of the categories to which they belong. This causes
the following changes in our initial classification of variables:

Among institutional context variables listed in Table 4.7: Social
Regional Location has been dropped from the analysis because it seems quite likely that its effects actually reflect influences which are not specific to the college context (see pp. 104-105 above).

Among Personal Disposition Variables in Table 4.12: Orientation Toward College has been dropped from the analysis because it appears to be substantively redundant with changing values and sociocultural context among the occupational commitment variables and because it appears to have forced a choice between two relatively independent variables – personal orientation toward the future (see pp. 128 above). Four youthful alienation variables have also been added to this category as described immediately below in the discussion of Youth Culture Variables.

Among Social Background Variables in Table 5.1: No change.

Among Family Context Variables in Table 5.2: No change.

Among Youth Culture Variables in Table 5.3: Four youthful alienation variables (numbers 5 through 8 in Table 5.3) have been shifted from the youth culture category to the personal dispositions category on the grounds that they do not specifically measure youth cultural involvement, but rather reflect personal orientations of alienation, separation, and rejection which are more properly an aspect of personal dispositions (see pp. 128 above).

Among the Occupational Commitment Variables in Table 5.4: No change.

With these revised categories of variables, we have performed step-wise regression analysis of the variance in protest activity attributable to each of the six categories of variables under consideration. Specifically for the personal dispositions, institutional contexts, and each of the four extra institutional contexts, the step-wise analysis shows the percentage of variance in protest activity attributable to the variables in each context: (a) with the effects of no other variables removed; (b) with the effects of personal dispositions removed; (c) with the effects of personal dispositions plus institutional contexts removed; and (d) with the effects of the five other categories of variables removed. The results are presented in Table 5.5.

When we consider the contribution that each category of variables makes alone (column 1), we find that personal dispositions are a stronger predictor of protest activity than any of the institutional or extra institutional contexts, accounting alone for almost 29 percent of the variance in protest activity. Next comes youth culture variables which alone account for almost 20 percent of the variance in protest activity. The four remaining categories of variables show quite comparable contributions, they all account for between 11 and 14 percent of the variance in protest activity. It is not surprising, of course, to find that the personal attitudes, and orienta-
tions of young people make the strongest contribution to protest activity, since they are pervasive continuing influences and since they may be expected to act as intervening variables which convey or mediate the effects of various social factors associated with institutional and extra institutional contexts.

Table 5.5

STEP-WISE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE IN PROTEST ACTIVITY ATTRIBUTABLE
SIX CATEGORIES OF VARIABLES

Percentage of variance accounted for after first removing variance attributable to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Variables</th>
<th>No Other Categories of Variables</th>
<th>Personal Dispositions and Institutional Characteristics</th>
<th>The other Five Categories of Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Dispositions</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Characteristics</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Background Variables</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Context Variables</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Culture Variables</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Commitment Variables</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple Correlation = .63

To assess the effects of the social contexts above and beyond their associations to personal dispositions, we have therefore calculated the amount each context adds to the variance accounted for by personal dispositions in protest activity (column 2). With personal dispositions removed, the contributions of the various contexts drop to much lower levels, indicating...
much of their effect is joint with personal dispositions. Social background variables add about 6 percent and institutional characteristics slightly less than 5 percent to the variance in protest activity. None of the other extra institutional contexts adds more than 2.3 percent to the variance in protest activity. Note that the youth cultural variables are now among the lowest contributors to protest activity. Thus, much of the relatively strong overall effect of youth cultural variables occurs through their association with personal dispositions.

Concerning the contribution to variance in protest activity of the four extra institutional contexts above and beyond the effects of personal dispositions and institutional characteristics (column 3), we find that social background variables clearly dominate among extra institutional factors. In fact, the 4.9 percent that they add to the variance in protest activity is greater than the contributions of the other three extra institutional categories of variables put together. It is noteworthy that with institutional characteristics as well as personal dispositions removed, occupational commitment variables now contribute more strongly than either family context or youth culture variables.

Finally, when we consider the unique contribution of each of the six categories of variables beyond what the other five contribute, it is clear that personal dispositions, social backgrounds and institutional contexts have a substantially greater independent effect than do family context, youth culture, or occupational commitment variables. In particular, the contributions of family context and youth culture variables have fallen to less than half of one percent in each case. Thus, what little effect family context and youth culture variables have after personal dispositions and institutional characteristics are removed, all but disappear when the other extra institutional contexts are also removed.

On the basis of this analysis, then, we can safely conclude that social background variables play a relatively important part in contributing to protest activity—a more important part than do the institutional characteristics we have examined here. By contrast, the other three extra institutional contexts play relatively minor roles, with occupational commitments having a stronger impact than either family context variables or youth cultural involvement. Indeed, all three of these contexts together have a lesser independent effect on protest activity than either institutional characteristics or social background factors. Needless to say, personal dispositions show a stronger independent effect than any of the five categories of institutional and extra institutional influences.

There is an interesting parallel between the effects of specific variables in the causal model shown in Figure 5.6 and the independent contributions of the various categories of variables shown in Table 5.3. The strongest independent contributor to protest activity in Figure 5.6 is youthfulness, a personal disposition variable; we see in Table 5.3 that personal
dispositions as a category make the strongest contribution to protest activity. The second strongest independent effect in Figure 5.6 is produced by the SES Index, a social background variable; we see in Table 5.5 that social background factors as a group make the next strongest contribution to protest activity. The third strongest effect on protest activity in Figure 5.6 is attributable to institutional quality, again in Table 5.5, we see that institutional characteristics as a group make the third strongest contribution to protest activity. None of the family context or youth culture variables in Figure 5.6 show a direct effect on protest activity; and we see in Table 5.5 that each of these contexts adds very little, indeed, to the variance in protest activity. And, finally, there is a weak but independent effect from one of the occupational commitment variables on protest activity in Figure 5.6; and we see in Table 5.5 that the occupational variables as a category make an independent contribution that is weaker than personal dispositions, social backgrounds, or institutional characteristics, but stronger than family context or youth culture variables.

In effect, the broad categories of variables examined in Table 5.5 tend to have their effects on protest activity through single dominant variables—the ones with direct paths to protest activity in Figure 5.6. Only in the case of personal dispositions are there two independent contributors—youthful alienation and social criticisms—in Figure 5.6.

Thus, while the results in Table 5.5 provide a useful summary of the contributions of broad categories of variables, the parameters in Figure 5.6 give a clearer and more refined indication of how these effects come about. It identifies the specific variable(s) within a given context which accounts for most of the effect of the entire context. And beyond this, of course, the path analysis presents causal links among variables which do not make direct contributions to protest activity, but nevertheless help to interpret and explain the relationships which indirectly contribute to protest activity. And, perhaps because of the greater refinement and specificity provided by the causal model, it raises some serious questions about existing theories of protest activity and suggests some promising directions for further research with these data—issues that will be the subject matter of our final chapter.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. It should be noted at this point that the beta weight for SES on protest activity with controls for all other background variables, institutional variability using colleges as dummies, and personal dispositions (b = .24) is greater than the path coefficient from SES to protest activity in Figure 5.6 with fewer background variables controlled, with institutional variability represented only by quality, and with only two of the three personal dispositions variables in the equation (p = .20). Further analysis will be required.
to discover specifically which variables among those represented in the regression equation but not included in the path analysis tend slightly to mask the direct effect of SES in Figure 5.1. In any case, it should be clear that with additional control variables from the three categories thus far introduced, will tend to increase rather than decrease the direct effect of SES on protest activity.

1. It is conceivable that this item serves as an "intensified" variable. That is, parental orientation toward the family might come to reinforce whatever dispositions exist as a result of family interactions to encourage protest among those disposed to engage in it, and to discourage it among those disposed to resist it. A brief explication of this possibility, however, turned up empirical support for it.

3. It is at least conceivable that the social criticisms of parents are influenced by the critical attitudes and perspectives of their offspring — through a process of "reverse socialization." This possibility is consistent with the fact that parental criticisms show few links with background or foreground variables and no independent effect on protest activity. (When personal dispositions are controlled, the effect actually turns slightly negative in the final column of Table 5.2.) Evidence of such reverse socialization may be developed by examining the association between social criticisms of parents and youth under varying conditions of communication and comparability within the family.
CHAPTER 6
IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

Our principal focus in this final chapter will be on the implications of the foregoing analysis for understanding the basic processes which move to the youthful protest activity of the late 1960s. As such, several fundamental questions remain to be answered before we can have a consistent theory of recent youthful protest behavior. The present analysis points to the limitations in existing theories and leads to alternative formulations which more nearly account for the protest involvement that occurred. These are, however, formulations which need further elaboration and specification. To this end, we shall outline some of the areas in which further analyses or these data should be conducted.

An Overview of Findings

Much of the foregoing analysis is consistent with previous thinking about the sources of protest behavior in society. In broadest terms, the analysis indicates that adherence to traditional or establishment values in society has an inhibiting effect on protest behavior and that a critical perspective on society and its institutions is conducive to political and social protest. Adherence to traditional values will, according to our analysis, tend to forestall a sense of alienation or separation from society which, in turn, appears to be a potent source—indeed the strongest single predictor in our analysis—of protest activity. Social criticism, on the other hand, appears to be a relatively activating disposition which transforms the individual into a ready participant in protest behavior, and disposes him to project such behavior into the future through a choice of an occupation that can have some role in changing society. And, such a change oriented occupational commitment independently contributes to the individual’s protest involvement, apart from his critical perspective on society.

Our analysis has further revealed that the social backgrounds and family contexts of students make an important contribution to their critical perspectives on society, and especially to their belief in traditional values. Youthful traditional values, for instance, are directly affected by family permissiveness, parental religious commitment, and the traditional values of the parents; they are indirectly linked to all of the social background variables in our model of factors contributing to protest activity. Both traditional values and social criticisms appear to be transmitted within the family context from parents to their offspring, yet this is not the only way in which consistency between the generations comes about. Thus, the traditional values of youth and their parents also tend to correspond because young people from traditionally oriented families are less likely to attend high quality colleges and universities which encourage traditional.
values among students. They also tend to correspond because lack of religious commitment on the part of parents independently discourages belief in traditional values among both youth and their parents. In the case of social criticisms, most of the agreement between youth and their parents comes about directly, but there is some question about whether the direction of transmission is from parent to offspring or vice versa.

Thus, the social backgrounds and family contexts of young people have effects on protest activity through their links with those two self-perceived dispositions or value orientations of youth. Moreover, these effects are generally consistent with existing explanations of protest activity in terms of the transmission of political and social values within the family context and the liberating and alienating effects of marginal background or position in society. Yet, in a very real sense, such processes involving the formation and transmission of values, criticisms and dispositions--we shall refer to them as "value interpretations" of protest activity--are only half the story. These value interpretations leave out two extremely important factors which contribute to protest activity quite apart from youthful value orientations. The other half of the story, as it were, lies in the non-value effects of socioeconomic status and institutional quality.

Investigators have repeatedly found an association between socioeconomic status and protest activity. Some have tried to explain it in terms of structural and historical changes in the nature of social class in American society. They have argued that the upper strata in this recent historical period of post-industrial society have adopted humanistic values which are concerned more with social welfare and equality than with personal well-being and self-interest. This liberal humanistic orientation, they argue, is especially prevalent among young people brought up in the permissive family environment of the educated upper middle class and still free of the constraints imposed by family and career. Yet, our data provide little support for this interpretation of the relationship between SES and protest involvement. It is true that we find no direct links between socioeconomic status and the two major value orientations affecting protest activity. SES does have some indirect effects on traditional values and social criticisms of youth through its associations with family permissiveness, parental traditional values, and the kinds of schools young people select and attend. But all of this is of little consequence by comparison with the strong, uninterpreted effect of socioeconomic status on protest activity--an effect which is apparently independent of the dispositions, orientations or values of young people.

Institutional quality is the other factor which appears to encourage protest activity independently, in large measure, of its effects on the values and criticisms of youth. Good schools have traditionally been thought to encourage a critical perspective on society and to discourage adherence to traditional values by subjecting students to an objective, dispassionate analysis of social institutions and traditions. And, indeed, we have some evidence of such liberating effects in terms from institutional quality to traditional values and social criticisms in our analysis. However, the proc...
for present consideration is that such value effects of institutional quality leave most of the association of quality with protest activity unaccounted for. Good schools have evidently contributed to protest activity quite independently of the value effect they have on young people, or the fact that youngsters with values conducive to protest activity tend to be concentrated at such institutions.

In effect, it appears that a major portion of the protest behavior of young people in the late 1960s occurred for reasons quite apart from their liberal attitudes and values, their alienation from the dominant society, their commitment to occupations involving opportunities to change society, or the values and permissiveness of their family environments. Although all of these factors appear to have contributed in varying degrees to youthful protest activity, they largely fail to account for the protest involvement of the elite of America's youth—young people from the nation's "best" families and from its "best" colleges and universities. The events of the 1960s seem to have made them political activists without making them ideologically committed political liberals, radicals, or leftists.

Alternative Interpretations

Surely a variety of interpretations could be offered for the independent effects of institutional quality and socioeconomic status. In this section, we shall briefly sketch two such interpretations. One stresses the organizational and recruitment dynamics of a direct action political movement; the other focuses on its relevance and implications for the student status in society. These are not mutually exclusive formulations in the sense that the processes postulated by each may be at work simultaneously. They do, however, derive from somewhat different conceptions of the nature of the protest movement of the 1960s, and therefore offer competing, if not incompatible, explanations for the observed effects of quality and SES.

The Dynamics of Disorderly Politics

In the face of increasingly forceful and disruptive demonstrations in the late 1960s, authorities responded with increasingly repressive tactics. The Columbia University takeover in the Spring of 1968 was ultimately ended with a brutal police assault on the students occupying Hamilton Hall. The youthful supporters of Senator Eugene McCarthy's bid for the presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention in the Summer of 1968 were brutalized by the Chicago police while the public watched on television. And, the election of Richard Nixon in the Fall of 1968 appeared to encourage "hard hat" methods for dealing with protesters. These events undoubtedly had the effect of polarizing the attitudes of young people toward protesters; in some quarters they generated a sense of sympathy and support for protesters, in others they provoked feelings of hostility and antipathy toward protesters.
By the Spring of 1969 when the CBS News survey was conducted, there was clear evidence that support for the aims and tactics of protesters was more prevalent among college than among non-college youth. For instance, college students were much more likely than non-college youth to say "I am in sympathy with most of the activists' objectives, but not all of their tactics" (Table 1.1) and to feel that "resisting or disobeying police" was an acceptable protest tactic (Table 3.1). Indeed, a majority of the non-protesters in college felt that such a tactic was justifiable.

There is reason to suppose the climate of support for protest activity was even stronger at higher quality institutions. We have seen that protesters were proportionately much more numerous at the nation's leading schools in 1969; fully half of the students at high quality institutions had engaged in some form of protest activity as compared to only about a fifth of those at schools of lesser quality (Table 4.2, index scores 3 and 4 vs. all others) and about a tenth of the non-college sample (with blacks excluded as they are from the college figures, see Table 2.9). The concentration of protesters at high quality schools during this period of polarization implies that non-protesters and ideologically uncommitted students at such schools are more likely to have friends and acquaintances among protesters, and hence their sympathies are apt to be reinforced in their personal relations.

Furthermore, the presence of relatively large numbers of protest oriented students at high quality institutions can be expected to generate an organizational substructure supporting protest activity (von Eschen et al, 1972). Such campuses will be more likely to have active and effective SDS chapters and more numerous and well-attended meetings to organize and facilitate specific protests. As a consequence, they should provide more opportunities for the ideologically uncommitted to become involved, not to mention the fact the presence of relatively large numbers of protest prone students will probably also subject the uncommitted to more intense informal pressures to participate, regardless of their personal dispositions.

According to this argument, then, the independent effect of institutional quality on protest activity may reflect the dynamics of the protest movement during a period of polarization in which normative support for protest activity and an organizational substructure to facilitate such activity are more likely to develop where protesters are concentrated. Under these circumstances, young people who are not ideologically committed may nevertheless be afforded numerous opportunities, subjected to informal pressures, and liberated by a generally favorable or sympathetic climate to become involved in protest activity.

As for the independent effect of socioeconomic status, studies have previously shown that high SES people are especially likely to be active in voluntary associations, to be recruited and prized as participants, to be influential and effective in organizational activity, and to be less inhibited or prevented by the risk of failure or embarrassment as participants and leaders in vari-
ous campus organizations and activities, students from high status backgrounds may have found themselves under increasing pressure to join in protest activities, regardless of their own ideological positions, as campuses became politicized. For example, fraternities and sororities—not notoriously radical groups—may have become involved in protest activity as responses to requests from other campus organizations to "make a showing" or "interfere in a cause." Students from lower class backgrounds, by contrast, may have been constrained by a prospect of getting in trouble with the police or the university administration. They are more apt to see their future as dependent on their present educational success, and therefore less willing to jeopardize it by becoming involved in sit-ins, strikes, riots, etc., especially if they are not ideologically disposed to do so.

The Political Incorporation of the Student Body

In contrast with most other nations, the system of higher education in America has remained relatively unincorporated at the national level (Meyer and Rubinson, 1972). In this country, higher education is relatively free of regulation by the federal government. Accreditation is primarily a regional function. Curriculum is approved by academic rather than political authorities. College graduates are in no sense guaranteed membership in the national political or social elite, as they are in many countries. Political parties have no well articulated links with student political activity, no branches on campus, which provide direct access to the national political forum or subsequent careers in national politics (Weinberg and Walker, 1969). Political involvement typically begins at the local or state levels in electoral politics. As a consequence of this lack of political incorporation at the national level, according to Meyer and Rubinson (1972), American college students as a whole have been among the least politically interested or active in national affairs in the world. To be sure, there have been periods of student agitation and activism in the past that bear many similarities to the activism of the 1960s (Lipset, 1971), but none have achieved the massive student participation witnessed in the 1960s.

One thing that distinguished the 1960s from earlier periods of youthful protest was a movement toward greater political incorporation of higher education in America. The 1950s witnessed the beginnings of an enormous expansion of higher education with extensive federal support, especially for university based research. In response to the advent of Sputnik in 1957, the educational establishment began to see as an instrument of national policy that would enable the U.S. to catch up with and surpass the U.S.S.R. in space exploration.

The decade of the 1960s began with the election of John F. Kennedy, America's most youthful President, who shortly thereafter invited the best and brightest youth of the nation to join in the work of his administration. In the Peace Corps, with its mission of service to other nations in the interest of peace, he created a form of political involvement and responsibility
specifically designed for young people. This development, perhaps more than any other, symbolically conferred a new political dimension upon the status of youth in our society. In reality, the opportunities for such participation were initially available only to the elite of the youthful generation—relatively few exceptionally talented young people, largely from the nation's leading colleges and universities. But this had the important effect of announcing the need for youthful participation in the affairs of state.

During the early 1960s, then, there was in general a growing incorporation of higher education by the national political structure, and in particular, a growing charter for the political involvement of youth in national affairs. There were other visible signs of the national incorporation of higher education, including the recruitment of academicians from leading universities to positions in the Kennedy administration. There was also indirect evidence in the administration's often implicit backing for the Civil Rights Movement. Furthermore, many of these implications persisted, and some became even stronger, in the Johnson administration with the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the declaration of "War on Poverty," and the creating of VISTA—a domestic counterpart of the Peace Corps. In other words, the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations established and sanctioned a charter for the political involvement of youth which had not previously existed and which could not be constructed and legitimated by young people themselves.

Because the newly created forms of political involvement were endowed with a special meaning and mission and were reserved for exceptionally talented young people, they became high status forms of activity that conferred distinction upon those who became involved. Hence, they are likely to have attracted young people from high status backgrounds who aspired to positions of leadership in society. And, because these newly created involvements stressed leadership, service, and responsibility within the American system of values, they are likely to have attracted high status young people who were not especially alienated or critical of the American system.

Furthermore, this grant of political status established a basis for the more widespread and disorderly protest activity that followed in the late 1960s. The youthful response to the newly established charter went far beyond the capacity of the national administration and established social institutions to absorb the ideals and energies of youth. Although youthful politics became disorderly and more disruptive in the late 1960s, it does not follow that all of those who engaged in such activity, especially over a period of several years prior to 1969, did so out of a sense of alienation or rejection of American values. There were still opportunities for educational service and leadership that might well have attracted young people from high status backgrounds, independently of their ideological positions in terms of traditional values, social criticisms or youthful alienation.
This perspective also provides an interpretation for the non-value effect of institutional quality. High quality colleges and universities claim to provide the skills and orientations required for elite status in society. In effect, the leading institutions are supposed to prepare young people for membership in a national elite. When national political involvement becomes a new right and expectation of youth, and when special forms of such involvement are established for exceptional students who have shown ability and capacity, it follows that the institutions whose mission is to prepare students for elite status in society will encourage such involvement. Special and unique forms of these schools may have in the social context the institutional and orientations of their students. The response of these institutions will be conceived more in terms of the rights and responsibilities of status than in terms of ideological commitment.

This possibility that the leading institutions will independently encourage political activity on a status as well as a value basis suggests further how the non-value effect of SES may come about. Previous research (Kohn and Sennett, 1970) indicates that high status students at institutions of lesser quality, particularly those one step below the leading institutions, show protest behavior which corresponds more closely to the level at high quality colleges than to that of other students in their own contexts. This suggests that high SES youngsters may be oriented to the norms and practices that prevail at the nation's leading universities and colleges. To the extent that their motives are to conform with their peers at the leading institutions, and in so doing perhaps to gain status at their own institutions, their protest behavior should be relatively free of the value orientations and personal dispositions which also contribute to such behavior.

One further argument is implicit in the causal model that we have developed in Chapter 5. One feature of the model we have not discussed in any detail is that both SES and quality contribute independently (along with some other factors) to "youthful distinctiveness," our measure of youth cultural involvement. It will be recalled that this measure combines attitudes toward unconventional dress, sexual freedom, and drug use. While it is clear from the model that youthful distinctiveness does not contribute to protest activity in any substantial or direct way, it may be that both the youthful distinctiveness and the protest activity variables reflect the desire for distinctiveness and, by implication, status among youth. In effect, protest involvement may be sought for its status value among high SES students at high quality schools, as well as for its meaning in terms of the personal values and political ideologies.

Further Directions for the Analysis of these Data

It seems likely that a thoroughgoing explanation of the non-value effects of socioeconomic status and institutional quality may involve some
combination of the processes we have discussed in this section. Indeed, we may find that some students become involved in protest behavior as a result of the dynamics of disorderly politics while others get involved as a consequence of processes associated with the political incorporation of the student status. Moreover, to account for the full range of protest behavior, we will obviously need some combination of what we have referred to as "values" and "non-values" interpretations. It may be, for example, that we need to consider two different motivations for protest activity which result in two distinct types of protesters; namely, the "alienated" protesters and the "status oriented" protesters. These possibilities as well as a number of the issues raised in the preceding discussions point to the need for further analyses of these data and to some of the areas to which such analyses might be directed.

A number of developments and refinements of the analysis presented in this report remain to be done. This information on the disruptiveness of campus political activity in the 1968-1969 academic year (drawn perhaps from school newspapers) and information on the numbers of volunteers to the Peace Corps and VISTA in the early 1960s from the sample schools might be introduced to help interpret the non-values effect of school quality. An examination of the specific components of the SES index and replication of the causal model developed in Chapter 5 for high SES students might reveal factors contributing to their protest activity more clearly.

The model should also be replicated for non-college youth (excluding institutional quality, of course) to see whether the processes that activated students also activated non-college youth. Replication for junior college students and for youngsters who have been influenced by college, as opposed to those who have never attended college, may also help to clarify the extent to which the protest movement of the 1960s was a "student movement" as opposed to a "youth movement." Replication within age and sex categories may also help to specify the working of the model. For example, the non-value effects of SES and quality may be chiefly evident among older or more advanced students, thus suggesting that the working of political incorporation played a more important role in the earlier stages of the protest movement. And, although we have quite small samples of black youth and college revolutionaries, the replication of the model for these subgroups may at least give an indication of broad differences that may exist in the dynamics of protest activity among different segments of the youthful population.

There are also additional data which should be introduced to develop and refine our understanding of the protest movement. The CBS News survey included questions on the impact of various historical events such as the assassination of President Kennedy and the clash between students and police at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. By examining the reported impact of these historical events on the attitudes and orientation of young people in varying institutional settings and between college and non-college youth, we may be able to see how these events were interpreted by young.
people in different social contexts. There is, in addition, somewhat comparable information on youthful orientations and involvements in protest activity from surveys of college students conducted each year from 1963 through 1971 by the Daniel Yankelovich organization. By replicating the model we have developed here, we may be able to chart the changing profile of involvement in protest activity over a number of years in the first one third of the protest movement.

Perhaps the brief sketch of further conditions for replication with this data will serve to announce our plan to continue this work and to provide further support.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. This point implies that we might find stronger non-value effects among more advanced students whose reported protest activity in 1969 may reflect behavior which took place several years prior to that date.

2. It is beside the point that they are not fully effective or that their claims are not fully institutionalized (as discussed in some detail by Meyer, 1971).

3. We should not overlook the possibility that the non-value effects of socioeconomic status and institutional quality may tend to distinguish between protesters and non-protesters; whereas the values effects associated with youthful alienation, social criticisms, and traditional values, may tend to differentiate between occasional and advanced protesters.
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