At the sixth annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism, upper division and graduate students from 11 western colleges and universities presented papers on the theory, history, and criticism of rhetoric. Panels of faculty members from the same colleges and universities selected the three best papers for commendation and publication. These papers were then revised and are included in this volume. The titles and authors are "Seeds in the Garden of Eloquence: Mr. Spectator on Delivery" by Barbara Gamba, "14th Century Peasant Power: A Contemporary Lesson" by Gwen Lundberg, and "The Rhetoric of Women's Lib: Too Much Noise" by Deanna M. Spooner. The conference address by Dr. Barnet Baskerville, "Rhetorical Criticism 1971: Retrospect, Prospect, and Introspect," is also included in this collection. (TO)
CONFERENCE IN

RHETORICAL CRITICISM

Commended Papers

Stephen D. Peat, Editor

John Hammerback, John E. Baird, Assistant Editors

California State College, Hayward—1971
Foreword

Saturday, May 1st, 1971, students and professors from eleven different colleges and universities ranging from Wyoming to Washington gathered for the sixth annual Cal-State Hayward Conference in Rhetorical Criticism. Upper division and graduate students presented papers on the theory, history, and criticism of Rhetoric. In the morning, while the Editor-Critic professors silently reviewed the papers, the students enjoyed a Readers' Theatre performance "Entertainment in Rhetoric" directed by Dr. Melvin R. White. In the afternoon, the students read their papers to panels, from which the three best papers of the conference were chosen for commendation and publication. These papers were then revised at the suggestion of this volume's editors and are herein included.

The evening banquet held at the Doric Motor Hotel featured Professor Barnet Baskerville, University of Washington, speaking on "Rhetorical Criticism 1971: Retrospect, Prospect, and Introspect." Professor Baskerville's comments were well received by a full banquet room; the text of Dr. Baskerville's address is included in this volume. We are especially grateful to Dr. Baskerville for his scholarly contributions to the conference and his overall enthusiasm in this endeavor.
Student and Faculty Participants

STUDENT PARTICIPANTS

Ellis, Donald
Gamba, Barbara
Gage, John T.
Harvey, Robert C.
Hudson, Andrew Jackson Jr.
Lundberg, Gwen
Martin, Deborah M.
Morken, Kristi
Pfister, Nancianne
Reid, Mary Jane
Sarant, Christine
Spooner, Deanna M.
Steers, Thomas A.
Stevens, Pat
Williams, Kathleen Gayle

EDITOR-CRITICS

PROFESSORS:

Dick, Robert C., University of New Mexico
Freeman, William G., San Fernando Valley State College
Fulkerson, William Jr., Fresno State College
Funk, Alfred, University of Wyoming
Hammerback, John C., California State College, Hayward
Hennings, Ralph, Fresno State College
Irvine, James R., Colorado State University
Jones, Dennis C., California State College, Hayward
Keele, Gary, Calif. Poly., Kellogg-Voorhis
Kosakoff, Stephen A., Portland State University
Mohrmann, G. P., University of California, Davis
Queary, Bart, University of California, Berkeley

DIRECTORS OF THE CONFERENCE

Harold Barrett
Stephen D. Peat
Schedule of Events

9:00 Briefing — Music Building

9:30 Critics' Silent Review of Papers in Sections

9:30 "Entertainment in Rhetoric" — A Readers' Theatre Production
Directed by Dr. Melvin R. White

12:00 Lunch

1:00 Presentation of Papers in Sections
Presentation
Comments of Editor-Critics
Decision for Commendation and Publication

4:00 Reading to Entire Conference of Commended Papers

6:00 No-host social hour: Doric Motor Hotel

7:30 Dinner: Doric Motor Hotel

Master of Ceremonies: Professor John Cambus,
Acting Chairman, Department of Speech and Drama
California State College, Hayward

Introducing the Speaker: Professor Harold Barrett,
Department of Speech and Drama
California State College, Hayward

Speaker: Professor Barnet Baskerville,
Department of Speech
University of Washington

""Rhetorical Criticism 1971: Retrospect,
Prospect, and Introspect""
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I should like to appropriate some words of Abraham Lincoln to introduce my remarks to this Conference. They are the words with which he opened a memorable address to the Illinois Republican Convention in the summer of 1858:

If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could then better judge what to do and how to do it.

Well, where are we?

We are in Hayward, California, at a conference called to engage in and talk about something we have agreed to designate as "rhetorical criticism." It is the year 46 A.W. (after Wichelns). Surely it was the publication in 1925 of Wichelns' "The Literary Criticism of Oratory" that marked the beginning of the modern era of rhetorical criticism and set in motion a chain of circumstances which resulted in our being here today for this purpose. That essay cut us loose from our colleagues in the English Department and sent us prospecting down separate paths until their rediscovery of rhetoric in the 1960's gave promise of bringing at least some of us together again. That essay provided a chart to new territory which was assiduously explored for the next forty years, and which some think has now been pretty thoroughly tracked.

The trail from 1925 is strewn with critical artifacts. There are the three venerable volumes of a History and Criticism of American Public Address and similar collections of critical essays on southern oratory, on the oratory of antislavery and disunion, on American pulpit oratory, and on miscellaneous subjects. There are theses, dissertations, and journal articles without number which profess to present "A Rhetorical Criticism of . . ." nearly every man who has mounted the public platform from Jonathan Edwards to George Wallace. In addition to the critical essays, we now have a rapidly growing body of literature about criticism. Thonssen and Baird's Speech Criticism, which held the field alone for nearly twenty years before the appearance of other books on critical method by Black, Hochmuth, Hillbruner, Cathcart, Nilsen, and others, has recently appeared in a second edition - an indication that one publisher, at least, considers the subject a live one.

The journals, national and regional, publish with increasing frequency articles offering new "approaches" to criticism. Convention programs list section meetings on criticism. Conferences, colloquia, and symposia on criticism persist (the Hayward Conference is in its sixth year). The published report on the recent National Project on Rhetoric will undoubtedly have a chapter on criticism.

Where are we? Well, unless I misread the signs completely, we have entered a season marked by a lush flowering forth of criticism and (especially) criticism of criticism - a time when everyone who has ever turned his attention toward speakers, speeches, and speaking regards himself as an accredited "Rhetorical Critic," and strives mightily to come up with some new critical "methodology," or at least with some authoritative dicta on how the job should be done.

If this indeed be where we are (and I am considerably more than half serious), then is it possible to speculate on whither we are tending? At least two tendencies seem to me clearly discernible.

In the first place, I would call attention to the remarkable expansion of the concept of "rhetoric," and consequently of the scope of rhetorical criticism. One evidence is a blurring of the distinction between rhetoric and poetic. Wichelns, you will recall, in pleading for a new attitude toward oratory, emphasized the differences between two kinds of discourse - one utilitarian, practical, instrumental, primarily directed toward persuasion; the other imaginative, mimetic, primarily designed to delight.

This distinction between "the two literatures," preserved for over two centuries, is still made today - perhaps most persuasively by Professor Howell of Princeton. On college campuses until quite recently the English Department has been the chief custodian of poetic discourse; the Speech Department of rhetorical discourse. But the dichotomy is no longer so sharp, nor does it seem quite so important. One breaker of the old molds has been Kenneth Burke. Burke defines rhetoric as "the use of language in such a way as to produce a desired impression upon the hearer or reader." Thus,
in Burke’s view “effective literature – poetry, fiction, drama – could be nothing else but rhetoric.” Burke’s scheme, therefore, seems not to acknowledge alleged distinctions between rhetorical and poetic discourse. Furthermore, in the field of oral interpretation, Tom Sloun and others have been advocating a “rhetorical approach” to imaginative literature – an emphasis upon the persuasive element in poetry and upon the part played by the “audience.” Wayne Booth, a professor of English, in his book The Rhetoric of Fiction argues that the novelist whether he realizes it or not performs a rhetorical function. And Phillip Tompkins writes in a recent TLS article on “The Rhetorical Criticism of Non-Oratorical Works.” This blurring of old distinctions, this extension of the terms “rhetoric” and “rhetorical,” has obvious implications for criticism. Where Wichelns once protested against the literary criticism of oratory, we now enthusiastically advocate the rhetorical criticism of literature.

But we must note a much more dramatic expansion of the concept of “rhetoric.” There are those who would extend its realm far beyond discourse (of whatever kind) and would have it embrace the persuasive effects of sights, fire-hoses, cuttle-prods, and the like. I have heard a prediction that in the future people will persuade less and less with their words, and more and more through their acts. Recently I was permitted to read the preliminary draft of a statement from an important national conference which contains this astonishing pronouncement:

We shall no longer assume that the subject of rhetorical criticism is only discourse...

Rhetorical criticism may be applied to any human act, process, product, or artifact which, in the critic’s view, may formulate, sustain, or modify attention, perceptions, attitudes or behavior.

It proceeds to mention specifically rock music, put-ons, architecture, ballet – anything which has a “sensory effect” – intentional or unintentional. With the acceptance of such a redefinition, the rhetorical critic becomes at a single bound the Universal Man, taking all knowledge to be his province.

If you infer from these remarks that I think we are in danger of biting off more than we can conveniently chew, you are right. I take my stand with Professor Donald Bryant in affirming that rhetorical criticism should not stray too far from the world of discourse, though obviously we often find it necessary to deal with non-verbal manifestations which accompany, precede, and follow discourse. If in my subsequent remarks I seem to speak primarily of the criticism of public speeches, it is because my own interest happens to lie there, and not because I wish to exclude or disparage the rhetorical criticism of other forms of discourse, spoken or written – novels, satirical essays, poems, such works as Darwin’s Origin of the Species, Tom Paine’s The Rights of Man, or even the McCaffrey Readers.

In addition to this great extension of our field of operations, much of which I applaud, I discern a second tendency. It is our tremendous preoccupation with and proliferation of critical methods. We derive keen sensory pleasure from uttering that blessed word “methodology.” We are sharply censorious of something called the “traditional” method of criticism. Our convention programs proclaim the need for “new critical models and methodologies.” Each new issue of our journals heralds a fresh “approach” to rhetorical criticism. We should, we are told, adopt a “culture-related methodology,” or move toward “an intuitive rhetoric” or engage in “sensational, phenomenological criticism,” or analyze “the components of the listeners’ perceptual or cognitive reality.” We should apply the insights and methods of Burke or Richards or Wittgenstein. We have not yet seen the emergence of “schools” of criticism as in our sister field; we are not classified yet as impressionistic critics, or psychoanalytic critics, or ideological, or historical, or existential-phenomenological critics – but we may be on our way.

Of course these safaris into related disciplines for new methods and techniques are often productive, but unless the new methods can be put to use, unless the proposed techniques become part of critical practice, they can become just so many polysyllabic dead-ends. A year ago at the Wingspread Conference I expressed an opinion which I now reiterate: for the past ten years our scholarly efforts have got out of balance because prescription has outrun performance.

I am impressed by the testament of Malcolm Cowley, who wrote a few years ago in the Saturday Review: “Although I have been a literary critic for more than forty years, I must confess that I have not devoted much time to the basic theories of my profession. . . . Instead of dealing critically with the critical critics of criticism, I have preferred to be a critic of poems and novels.” Could there be a message here for us?

III

And now, having adumbrated where I think we are and whether we are tending, it remains for me to venture a few suggestions concerning the immediate future. Lincoln’s words are “What to do and how to do it.” Perhaps I have said enough already to convey the impression that I think we have been over-concerned with “how to do it” and should get on with the job forthwith. At this point in our development as an academic discipline I think it is more important to ask why than how. Why are we doing what we are doing? What is the purpose of all this feverish activity? What is our criticism for? What good is it?

Hopefully we may agree at the outset that the essential purpose of criticism is not merely to illustrate or exemplify the latest “approach,” theory, or methodology. Nor is it even to achieve a moment’s superiority by out-alliterating Agnew or cleverly condescending to Richard Nixon. Perhaps we may profit from the experience of critics in other fields, many of whom have been at this
business much longer than we. The ultimate aim of criticism, they seem to be to be saying, is illumination, the providing of insights into the work which will deepen the reader’s understanding and appreciation. Each of us has gained fuller appreciation of the contemporary theatre from the perceptions of a trained drama critic. Many of us have recently had our eyes opened and our imaginations stretched by the urbane commentaries of Kenneth Clark’s “Civilisation” series on television. Is it too much to ask that rhetorical critics provide the national audience with similar insights into speeches and speaking – into all kinds of “rhetorical transactions,” formal and informal?

Indeed, there is occasional evidence that some of us, at least, are doing just that. A participant in this conference two years ago wrote a paper, later published in Western Speech, on Stokely Carmichael. His thesis: “Carmichael’s oratory . . . contains the elements of content, organization, and style that are analogous to the unique Negro art of jazz.” His conclusion: that white Americans, who in the past have gained insight and empathy for the black man through the jazz idiom, may ponder with profit the analogy between black jazz music and black rhetoric. This kind of thing, supported by a careful analysis of the speeches themselves, seems to me eminently worth doing.

Provocative also is Edwin Black’s idea of “The Second Persona,” the auditor implied by the discourse, “the sort of audience that would be appropriate to it.” In a recent issue of OJS Black subjects the metaphor “the cancer of communism” to close scrutiny, revealing its particular usefulness and appropriateness for spokesmen of the Radical Right. He concludes that

the association between an idiom and an ideology is much more than a matter of arbitrary convention or inexplicable accident. It suggests that there are strong and multifarious links between a style and an outlook, and that the critic may with legitimate confidence, move from the manifest evidence of style to the human personality that this evidence projects as a beckoning archetype.

Such critiques as these (and there are more, of course, though not nearly so many as we would wish) hold up a work of practical art to scrutiny, illuminate it, extend our understanding of it, and so deepen our capacity for appreciation.

All this is very well, some of you are thinking at this point, but are you not forgetting that the ultimate purpose of criticism is judgment? Is not the critic by definition one who makes judgments about better or worse, one who evaluates? Eighteen years ago I wrote an article in which, with considerably more certainty and confidence than I now feel (or had any right to feel then) I made the following assertion:

Strictly speaking, analysis is not criticism; synthesis is not criticism. By its very nature, all criticism is judicial.

This is not the place to open up that old discussion again. I should acknowledge, however, that persons much more distinguished than I have taken quite the contrary view. Mr. T. S. Eliot, for example, says of the critic:

In matters of great importance . . . h must not make judgments of worse and better. He must simply elucidate; the reader will form the correct judgment for himself.

Regardless of your position on the judicial function of the critic, we can probably agree that critics of speakers have of late been more prone than is entirely becoming, to assume the role of judge on the bench, handing down sweeping pronouncements of guilt and innocence, success and failure. For example, while thumbing through the Papers of this conference for previous years, I came upon a critical essay by an undergraduate student, the first sentence of which is as follows: “Eugene V. Debs, spokesman for revolutionary socialism, was a rhetorical failure.” An entire speaking career is swept by a single stroke into the dustbin of history. Another undergraduate student closes his essay with this devastating repudiation of a speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize: “Dr. Bunche was a failure.” Period. The speech, we are told, “was ‘window dressing,’ not only to the Black Community, but to the world as well.”

One cannot help feeling that a critic has an obligation to know a great deal about Eugene Debs or Ralph Bunche – about their rhetorical aims and expectations, about the times in which they lived, the subjects they discussed, the audiences and the difficulties they faced – before he can sustain judgments like those. One needs, in short, to earn the right to judge. Criticism, like speech-making, is as Lawrence Rosenfield has shown us a reason-giving enterprise. The critic, too, is a rhetorician, and he is just as susceptible to extravagant and unsupported generalization as the orator he is judging. One might go farther and suggest that even after he has earned the right to judge, the critic will be more gracious (and probably more effective too) if he regards himself as primarily an evaluator of method, a discriminator among values, and not as a judge on the bench pronouncing the defendant guilty. The discourse and not the discoursor; the rhetorical transaction, not the rhetor, should be the central focus of the judgments made. In dealing with speakers like Spiro Agnew or Roy Brown or George Wallace there is an almost irresistible temptation to engage in criticism by smart crack, to respond to the speaker’s rhetorical excess with excess of one’s own – heaping ever more felicitously phrased abuse upon one’s vulnerable victim. Emerson has some good advice for us here. The scholar’s task, he says, is to serve as discriminating observer, to point out facts amidst appearance. He must declare his belief “that a popgun is a popgun, though the ancient and honorable of the earth affirm it to be the crack of doom.” The critic
need not banish his victim from civilized society, nor blast him from the face of the earth with cleverly-wrought anathemas. It is, moreover, quite possible to imply judgment through careful analysis, or to present materials and interpretations which will enable a reader to form his own judgments.

I have spoken of the need to earn the right to judge. One way to do this, as I have tried to show, is by buttressing one's evaluations with preliminary analysis and by providing "good reasons." Another way is by trying to learn as much as possible about the art one is attempting to evaluate, in this case the art of persuasive discourse. It is common to find critics dismissed as people who have failed at literature or art, and who consequently turn to appraising someone else's creative work. I believe it was Channing Pollock who defined a critic as "a legless man who teaches running." And I once came upon this oblique comment on criticism: "Said the sieve to the needle, 'You have a hole in your head.'"

We need not take too seriously this censure of the critic as a frustrated, unsuccessful artist; it is perhaps no more than the agonized outcry of a wounded artist. To shift the focus to our own field, it is doubtless unnecessary that one be a celebrated orator in order to make competent commentary on another man's speaking. As Henry Mencken once observed, in rejecting the idea that a critic must be a practitioner of the specific art he deals with, "a doctor to cure a belly-ache need not have a belly-ache."

Nevertheless, it is surely not too much to ask that the critic of speaking (as well as the critic of other kinds of discourse) know something of the difficulties of the art — and preferably as the result of actual experience. The speaker before an audience, the pamphleteer, any man who seeks to influence others with words, stands in the center of the real world. There are always limitations to what he is able to do, under the prevailing circumstances. The critic, from his sheltered position on the sidelines, with his "model" of communication and his "critical methodology" before him, finds it relatively easy to pass judgment on what should have been done. Sometimes in reading student papers and even the critical articles in our journals, with their savage condemnation of individual performers and performances, their confident assertions of what Nixon should have said at Kansas State or what Humphrey should have told the Democratic convention, one is led to wonder if the critic himself has ever stood before a real live audience — whether he has any clear conception of the immense difficulties involved in adjusting people to ideas and ideas to people.

If critics of speakers and speeches have sometimes assumed the role of imperious judge-on-the-bench, handing down life and death verdicts, we have also overplayed the pedagogical role and overdone the pedagogical manner. My colleague Professor Mark Klyn has complained in an essay with which many of you are familiar that the tendency to blur the distinction between pedagogy and criticism "has been both the burden and the curse of rhetorical critics; they have purchased the teacher's authority at the cost of the critic's freedom." It is no more the task of the rhetorical critic to teach his readers to make speeches, says Professor Klyn, than it is the task of the critic of literature to teach his readers to write stories.

I agree with Klyn that the distinction should be preserved. Still (as he acknowledges) the two are not unrelated. Criticism can aid pedagogy, and pedagogy criticism. Criticism is a useful pedagogical tool. It is a valuable, yea indispensable, exercise to proceed in a systematic fashion to analyze and evaluate a speaker's style, proofs, organization, "strategies," methods of preparation and delivery, etc. Without such training, without the ability to make such painstaking analyses, a critic runs the risk of flights of fancy and impressionism. It is well always to keep at least one foot on the ground.

Let us not despise the pedagogical function of criticism. Each new scholar must serve an apprenticeship, learning his craft through classroom exercises, term papers, theses and dissertations. But we have reached the point in time when we should no longer conduct our education in public. As a discipline we have passed through our period of apprenticeship. I doubt that we shall or that we should publish for general consumption many more truncated theses, or for that matter many more attempts at complete, all-inclusive, cradle-to-the-grave essays of the type that appeared nearly thirty years ago in the early Brigance studies. They have served their purpose — and well — but they are behind us. When we write for export, as we must certainly begin to do, we shall probably eschew such ambitious attempts to touch all the rhetorical bases in one brief essay, in favor of less global and more focussed, insightful observations leading to genuine appreciation, in all the rich meanings of that word.

In short, we shall be well advised not to confuse the roles of critic-as-pedagogue, and critic-as-artist. In the classroom we shall continue to function without apology as teachers and students. But when we seek to command the attention of our colleagues in the academy or of the intelligent reader anywhere, we shall need to adopt a somewhat different stance.

In this connection, it occurs to me that once again we may profit from the experience of critics in other fields. We are aware that critics of literature and art sometimes produce writings that are creative works in their own right. A critic, reflecting upon a work of fine art occasionally manages to create a work of fine art. What begins as a comment on a book or a painting or a sonata turns out to be an original essay of some distinction. It seems to me possible that the rhetorical critic, reflecting upon a work of practical, instrumental
art, can himself produce a work of practical art – that in dealing with discourse designed to influence human thought and behavior, he may himself assist in directing human thought and behavior through his clarifying insights, perhaps in the direction sought by the speaker or writer, perhaps in an opposite direction. In short, as the literary critic occasionally manages to become a creative artist, so the critic of persuasive discourse may become an effective persuader.

IV

The temptation is great to continue indefinitely to barrage this captive audience with advice on what as critics you should or should not do, but I must terminate this much too didactic discourse. I have tried to suggest where we self-proclaimed rhetorical critics are and whither we are tending. I have called attention to a widening of the range of our inquiries and a multiplication of methodologies. I have urged that we devote some attention to the question of why we are doing what we are doing, that we examine the role of the critic and the function of criticism. I have expressed a personal preference for the critic as discriminating insightful observer over the critic as hanging judge or rule-dispensing pedagogue.

I would venture to say in conclusion that if our criticism has fallen short of our aspirations it has not been for lack of available critical methodologies. We seem to have an ample supply, for the present at least. If Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad is preferred to the classical categories, it is there to use. If Lloyd Bitzer’s perceptive delineation of the rhetorical situation provides a suggestive pattern for discussing discourse, we can use it. If Thomas Nilsen’s notion of the concepts of man, ideas, and society embodied in a speech, or Ed Black’s “alternate frame of reference” to neo-Aristotelianism, or Lawrence Rosenfield’s dissection of the “Anatomy of Critical Discourse” can be used as handles to take hold of a critical object, so be it. If the behavioral scientist through his controlled observations in the laboratory can provide more precise critical tools, that is all to the good.

But in the end it will be the critic himself and not his method that will make the difference. Is he a knowledgeable, perceptive, discriminating human being who has earned the right to pass judgment on the productions of other men? Is he equipped to act as intelligent observer of the critical object, displaying hidden facets, remarking aspects and implications which may have escaped less sensitive observers? Can he impart to the consumers of rhetorical discourse, the listening and reading public, the interpretative clarification and illumination which are so badly needed today? This is a big order. All applicants will not qualify. But it is an ideal toward which we can all aspire.
Throughout history, criticism of the elocutionists has been consistently, though not exclusively negative. Elocutionists have been considered entertaining but ridiculous, and the movement they perpetuated is commonly studied as a perversion of the rhetorical tradition.

Granted, the elocutionists were often entertaining, and many were ridiculous, but that the elocutionary movement was a rhetorical fluke is not a fair hypothesis. On the contrary, it was a natural extension of many European views and principles. The importance placed on the relationship between outward expression and inner feeling – the foundation of the elocutionary movement – is noted so frequently in European scholarship that it cannot be overlooked.

In particular, an examination of one popular form of eighteenth century English literature – the periodic essay as published in The Spectator – clearly reveals that several of the views expressed both adumbrated and influenced the elocutionary movement.

The periodic essay is at its best in The Spectator, a periodical edited by Sir Richard Steele and frequently contributed to by Joseph Addison and other members of the fictitious “Spectator Club” which met on Tuesdays and Thursdays at “Mr. Bickley’s in Little Britain.”

In the first issue of The Spectator, Steele enunciates the purpose of the periodical, stating that “I have often been told by my Friends that it is a Pity so many useful Discoveries which I have made, should be in the possession of a Silent Man. For this reason therefore, I shall publish a Sheetful of Thoughts every Morning, for the Benefit of my Contemporaries; and if I can in any way contribute to the Diversion or Improvement of the Country in which I live, I shall leave it . . . with the Secret Satisfaction of thinking that I have not Lived in vain.”

Actually, The Spectator was published, in essentially the same format, six days a week, for approximately twenty-one months. Each issue customarily began with some pertinent Latin or Greek quotation or motto, which would be followed by a single essay. Occasionally, letters addressed to Mr. Spectator would appear in the paper too, if the members of the “club” agreed in advance that these letters would contribute to the “Advancement of the Public Weal.”

Contributors to The Spectator discussed a montage of subjects, from governmental banking policy, to opera, to education. But of particular interest to the student of rhetoric are Mr. Spectator’s observations of Cicero’s fifth canon – delivery – particularly those essays concerned with physiognomy, gesture, dress, and the precepts of proper delivery. This paper will examine those four topics, and the analysis will show that several of the opinions and concerns expressed in these essays foreshadowed as well as influenced elocutionary thought.

Mr. Spectator declares that “everyone is in some Degree a Master of that Art which is generally distinguished by the Name of Physiognomy,” and devotes two entire numbers to a discussion of that science, which purports to judge of the qualities of the mind by the outward features of the body. Addison warns his readers that a “wise Man should be particularly cautious how he gives credit to a Man’s outward Appearance,” but agrees with later elocutionists that the science of physiognomy is not exact, and that it is possible for the orator to appear to be an “honest, just, good-natured Man, in spite of all those Marks and Signatures which Nature seems to set upon him for the Contrary.”

Addison’s sentiments are echoed almost exactly by “Orator John Henley, as he was commonly called.” In one essay, he too examines the “close Correspondence between the Outward and the Inward Man,” and concludes his letter with a description of several external manifestations of internal qualities; for example, the “over-much Visibility and Pertness of one Ear” is an “infallible Mark of Reprobation.” Among other references to the subject of physiognomy are the frequent allusions to Mr. Spectator’s “short face” and the papers on the “Ugly Club,” that “ill-favored Fraternity which consists of a certain merry Species, that seem to have come into the World in Masquerade.”

Physiognomy, for Addison, Henley, and other writers of their time, is a relatively fixed science. Nevertheless, Mr. Spectator argues, the orator should obtain a good understanding of it. However, Mr. Spectator goes on to contend, there are other external manifestations of inner feelings which are flexible and adaptable. Spectator 407 is devoted almost entirely to a discussion of the speaker’s use of gestures. Addison asserts that
“proper Gestures and vehement Exstructions of the Voice cannot be too much studied by a Publick Orator,” and addresses the remainder of his remarks to the “ridiculous . . . Gestures of English speakers.” He is not sure if “we ought . . . to lay aside all kinds of Gesture,” or “make use of such only as are graceful and expressive,” but he is certain that something must be done to insure that a deaf man does not conclude that a speaker is “cheapening a Beaver when perhaps he is talking of the Fate of the British Nation.”

Like Addison, Steele cautions that gestures can be either “graceful or unconbecming,” and he explains the theory of gesture, arguing that “every Thought is attended with Consciousness and Representativeness,” and that this “Act of the Mind discovers itself in the Gesture.”

This same concern with the external expression of internal feelings is evidenced in Mr. Spectator’s discussion of dress as an outward manifestation of character. Replying to letters about new fashions such as the “little Muff . . . silver Garters buckled below the Knee, and . . . fringed Gloves,” Addison says that “it is not my Intention to Sink the Dignity of this my Paper with Reflections upon Red-heels or Top-Knots, but rather enter into the Passions of Mankind, and to correct those depraved Sentiments that give Birth to all those little Extravagances which appear in their outward Dress and Behavior.” He goes on to explain that “Foppish and fantastic Ornaments are only Indications of Vice, not criminal in themselves.” “Extinguish the Vanity of the Mind,” Addison concludes, “and naturally retrench the little Extravagancies which appear in . . . outward Dress and Behavior.”

Eustace Budgell, a minor contributor to The Spectator, addresses the orator specifically, contending that “few things make a Man appear more despicable, or more prejudice his hearers against what he is going to offer, than an awkward or pitiful Dress.” Budgell opts for the happy middle course, suggesting that “a Man of Sense would endeavor to keep . . . the Medium between Fop and Sloven,” and concludes that “had Tully himself pronounced of the Orations with a Blanket about his Shoulders, more People would have laughed at his Dress than have admired his Eloquence.”

A more comprehensive view of delivery also appears in The Spectator. John Hughes, third most frequent contributor, devotes an entire essay to “some Thoughts concerning Pronunciation and Action . . . chiefly collected from his Favorite Author, Cicer.” While Hughes is primarily concerned with “the British stage,” he argues that “he is very unfit to personate a Roman Hero, who cannot enter into the Rules for Pronunciation and Gesture delivered by a Roman Orator,” and he turns to De Oratore, repeating that “Nature herself has assigned to every Emotion of the Soul, its peculiar Cast of the Countenance, Tone of Voice, and Manner of Gesture.” Hughes anticipates the elocutionists in describing the expression of several varied passions - anger, sorrow, complaint, courage, pleasure, perplexity - and attends his descriptions with excerpts taken from contemporary stage plays for the purpose of practice. He adds that the actor should also study “the right pitching of the Voice.”

In another issue, Steele concerns himself with the rules to be followed and the type of delivery to be avoided by the preacher. “Whinnings, unusual Tones . . . Bawling and Mutterings . . . and Praying and Preaching like the unlearned of the Presbyterians;” these are the common faults Steele finds in most preachers’ delivery. He next relates specific advice as to how preachers could improve this situation, if only the “Gentlemen who err in this kind would please to recollect the many Pleasantries they have read upon those who recite good Things with an ill Grace,” and see “that what in that case is only Ridiculous in themselves is Impious.”

Mr. Spectator’s primary goal is to rescue his audience from “that desperate State of Vice and Folly into which the Age” had fallen, but better delivery is a part of that purpose, and the comments above do not exhaust Mr. Spectator on the subject. Other related topics include the passions (see, for example, numbers 197 and 408), stagefright (231), and the eyes as the mirror of the soul (206, 250, 252). Furthermore, the external display of internal emotional states is discussed in relation to painting (226, 244), acting (13, 39), music (29, 258), and poetry (279, 285), as well as to oratory.

These remarks indicate the elocutionary emphasis on tones, looks, and gestures, and this evidence from The Spectator reveals that the seeds of the elocutionary movement were sown prior to 1750, agreeing with Wilbur S. Howell’s analysis of the origins of that movement. And when we consider that the circulation of The Spectator is estimated to have risen from 3,000 to 4,000, 20,000, and even 30,000 copies - many of which were read in coffee houses and clubs by upwards of twenty people each - it also becomes evident that the elocutionary movement began from a much wider base than most critics, including Howell, allow.

That The Spectator was extremely influential with contemporaries and that this influence lasted well into the nineteenth century is abundantly clear. Its papers have been reprinted regularly, and there were few eighteenth century critics who did not judge “its requisite to point out its beauties and detect its blemishes.” Of these critics Hugh Blair is particularly important, and although he is a rhetorical theorist, Blair devotes four entire lectures to a critical examination of the style followed in The Spectator. He asserts that “the good sense, and good writing, the useful morality, and the admirable vein of humour which abound in it, render it one of those books which have done the greatest honour to the English nation,” and he says that it “is a book which is in the hands of every
one." Of course, Blair, though not an elocutionist, supports the study of delivery (Lecture 33), and it is clear that The Spectator was in the hands of the elocutionists as well. Thomas Sheridan cites Steele when discussing the importance of elocution,15 and Gilbert Austin quotes Addison in his Chironomia.16 Among lesser figures, William Enfield recommends The Spectator and includes many extracts from it in The Speaker.17

Space does not permit an extensive examination of the influence of these essays on elocutionary theory, but it is clear that Mr. Spectator foreshadows attitudes that were to develop into the elocutionary movement, and it is also clear that the papers of The Spectator exerted a direct influence on elocutionary theory.

1Spectator 86.

2Spectator 518. In his articles "Sources of the Elocutionary Movement in England: 1700-1850," Quarterly Journal of Speech XLI (February, 1959), 6, Wilbur Samuel Howell states that "John Henley ... attracted more attention to the elocutionary movement than did anyone else of his time."

3Spectator 66.

4Spectator 38.

5Spectator 16.

6Ibid.

7Spectator 150.

8Spectator 541.

9Spectator 147.


12See, for example, Smith, pp. viii-ix.


16Gilbert Austin, Chironomia, or, a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery (Illinois, 1966), p. xxv.

Revolution was coming. In the words of John Ball, an itinerant preacher for social justice nearly six centuries ago, this was made clear: "Good people, matters go not well in England, nor shall they until all things be held in common and there shall be neither vassals nor lords, but we shall all be united together, and the lords shall be no more masters than ourselves."¹

A self-styled freedom-seeker robed in the vestiary of gentle friar, John Ball ratified revolution and engineered a bloody rebellion, the Great Revolt of 1381 in England. Historians call it the Wat Tyler Rebellion after the man who initially disclosed the peasants' malcontent, but Ball assumed an equally notable leadership. Ball's station in life generated a personal empathy for the peasants' situation, which was reflected in his oratory. Whereas Tyler sought personal aggrandizement and possessed the "ambition, insolent tongue, and gift of magniloquence which a mob orator needs,"² Ball was revered as the peasants' leader, fighting for their cause.

Since "power to the people" is not a contemporary invention, those who may feel inclined to fight under such an ideology today might take a lesson from that revolt 600 years ago. In linking the peasants of the past with people of the present in revolution, Neil Joseph Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior will be employed as the catalyst to explicate and relate the characteristics of both periods of revolt. It is towards the end that those who know history will be less likely condemned to relive it, that this paper is directed.

Smelser offers constituents of revolution. He does not imply that they are absolute "ingredients" in a "recipe" for revolt, but that they are generally present. His formula analyzes evolution of social change from initial tremors of discontent. It also demonstrates how this process can fail, ending in revolution alone, without desirable change. It is the purpose here to investigate the pattern of the 1381 revolt with Smelser's constituents in order to learn a lesson which may be applied to the processes of contemporary revolution.

The rebellion of 1381 had all of Smelser's constituents; however, one was incomplete. It appears that if not for this deficiency, the peasants might have achieved the changes and freedoms for which they fought. But that revolution failed – violence was achieved and little more. Oman says, "the immediate result of the rebellion did not seem to have been any general abandonment by the lords of their disputed rights. Indeed the years 1382 and 1383 are full of instances which seem to prove that the first consequence of the suppression of the revolt was that many landlords endeavoured to tighten the bonds of serfdom, and to reassert rights which were slipping from their grasp."³ This paper contends that absence or fragmentation of any of Smelser's constituents or elements in a revolutionary movement may render it ineffective and in some cases, effect the death of the revolution; 1381 seems to exemplify this hypothesis. Smelser's constituents are:

- Structural Conduciveness
- Structural Strain
- Precipitating Factors
- Mobilization for Action
- Ineffectual Social Control
- Generalized Beliefs (ideologies)⁴

This sixth constituent has five elements:

- Myths or Premises
- Hostility Beliefs
- "If-Only" Beliefs
- Strategies and Tactics
- A Program for Reconstitution⁵

The question is: Why did John Ball's rhetoric of revolution ultimately fail in 1381? The answer can be found in delineation of the first five constituents, as found in 14th century England. This will precede analysis of Ball's rhetoric, for the effectiveness of his oratory hinged upon the social conditions of the day.

"Structural conduciveness," Smelser's first constituent,⁶ is primarily breakdown of governing bodies which permits, and in some cases, appears to invite overt hostility into society. Authority generally responsible for alleviation of social tensions and maintenance of order does not act and the people then assume the responsibility themselves. In addition, the channels for expression of grievances are archaic and ineffective; the people begin communicating grievances among themselves until emotions boil into revolution. Smelser also
The 1381 Revolt was in the summer of that year.

Note the other signs of structural conduciveness in 1381. There was no resistance to the initial rebellion. "The lords... remained quietly at home as though they were asleep." This lack of response was compounded by the communication problems of the day. Richard II, a boy of 14, did not officially denounce the rebels or the revolt nor did he attempt to dissipate rumors that he had countenanced it. But then he had no hot lines, telegrams or special bulletins at his disposal; in fact, Gutenberg was yet to be born. Communication channels between the people and the monarchy, normally unsatisfactory, became even worse at a crucial time and peasants turned to one another for support. With the absence of leadership and lack of communication, devastating insurgency resulted.

The second constituent, "structural strain," is defined by Smelser as tension and pressure created by conflicting norms and values within society. Class traditions, interests and customs clash and breed conflict, the fifth constituent. The landlords, even though relatively rich, were by no means clothed in velvet, much less ornamented in ermine. The landlords, even though relatively rich, were by no means clothed in velvet, much less ornamented in ermine. Ball's myths and premises were revealed when he charged the upper class with extravagance: "They are clothed in velvet and rich cloth ornamented with ermine and other furs while we are cloth in wretched rags." The landlords, even though relatively rich, were by no means clothed in velvet, much less ornamented in ermine. Ball's mythical accusations, wholly accepted by the peasants, embittered them and prepared them to plunder the land. Macabre acts of public torture, arson and decapitation were rampant.

And then the fuse was lighted. A "precipitating factor" in the guise of a massive Poll Tax arrived, the bulk of which fell upon the already burdened peasant, says Oman. Such a factor is the last straw which finally forces release of pent-up emotions. It is the "specific event which sets flight in motion;" it precipitates the fourth constituent, "mobilization for action," or the "outbreak of hostility." Massacre, theft and destruction ravaged English counties. Officials were marked for death who advocated the Tax and who continued to support peasant slavery and ignore peasant demands. Macabre acts of public torture, arson and decapitation were rampant.

As terrors continued, obviously there was "ineffectual social control," the fifth constituent. That is, there were no "counter-determinants (enacted) which prevent, interrupt, deflect or inhibit the accumulation of the other determinants." There was nothing done to reduce the structural conduciveness and strain; nothing was done when revolution initially arose. But after one month of rioting, the first effective social control was instituted. One man, Bishop Henry of Norwich, "showed real presence of mind and single-hearted perseverance" when he clashed with insurgents entering the city's Church. Henry and a band of churchmen fought against rioters thereby setting an example for others to follow; the revolution began to calm - the end of revolt was in sight.

But the death of the Peasant's Revolt of 1381 cannot be attributed entirely to a single, vigorous counter-reaction by one band of determined churchmen. News was slow to travel, yet the Revolt died concurrently across England. Its conclusion must be questioned. Perhaps its death can be attributed to a deficiency within the revolution, wherever it existed. There appears to have been inherent in the sixth constituent, the ideology, (as expressed in Ball's oratory) a weakness which may have rendered the revolution futile. That constituent, analyzed with Smelser's five elements, reveals an omission in Ball's rhetoric which likely prevented attainment of tangible gains for the enslaved peasant population.

The first element, "myths and premises," are the fantastic and usually undocumented stories invented by a movement's leader to foster feelings of discontent. These tales "name" the enemy, for without an object of disdain, the movement perishes. Ball's myths and premises were revealed when he charged the upper class with extravagance: "They are clothed in velvet and rich cloth ornamented with ermine and other furs while we are cloth in wretched rags." The landlords, even though relatively rich, were by no means clothed in velvet, much less ornamented in ermine. Ball's mythical accusations, wholly accepted by the peasants, embittered them and prepared them to plunder at his command.

"Hostility beliefs" are the antagonistic presumptions of the ideology which generate anger and justify acts of rebellion. The peasants had to be convinced of personal suffering in order to uphold vengeance; they had to be convinced to the point of utter hatred for their lords. To do this John Ball said: "It is with our strength and labor that they support their estates. We are called their bondsmen and are beaten if we do not readily perform their services, and we have no sovereign to whom we can complain, nor anyone to hear us or right our wrongs." Ball made them even more hostile when he asserted that all men were created equally by God; if God had wanted slaves He would have created them. He cried: "Are we not all descended from one father and one mother, Adam and Eve? How can they maintain or show that they are more masters than we except that they force us to gain and labor for what they spend?" Incessant reminder of their grass roots status effectively angered the peasants, bred hate towards landowners, and alleviated guilt feelings for violence enacted against them.
"If-Only beliefs" promise a future predicated upon accomplishments in the present: *If only* this now, *then* that later. Such statements imply simplicity in action and absolute guarantee for the effort, overlooking underlying complexities which might be found insurmountable upon examination. Ball said: "If the powerful are destroyed then there shall dwell among you liberty for all, and all shall have the same degree of nobility, dignity and power."18 He failed to recognize that the English class system could not be obliterated simply by getting rid of those in office; merely destroying a man does not destroy an attitude or idea.

Ball's rhetoric also included "strategies and tactics" of revolution. "First kill the great lords of the realm; then destroy the judges, court officials, and those who establish taxes throughout the land."19 The "mad Priest of Kent"20 offered a diabolical and simple solution to a desperate people; they accepted. The peasants, convinced that tyrann, would be crushed with the inception of Ball's strategies, followed his decree of death to the enemy. With final enactment of these violent tactics of revolution, the peasants had been brought from silent submission to active retaliation. But yet that Revolt and others like it which followed, in essence, failed. Oman says, "there can be no doubt that the old system went on; it had received a rude shock but had not been completely put out of gear."21

Ball's ideology was nearly complete, but the "program of reconstitution" was absent. Ball did not lead the peasants to achievement of desired changes; his rhetoric was deficient and there appears to be a connection between this fact and the failure of the Revolt. Ball did not tell how reforms would be structured once the blood spilling and torrent of destruction had ceased. He led the peasants in war but had no succeeding peace treaty. The Revolt released frustrations momentarily and little more. Even though all constituents were present the peasants were unable to continue with the deficient ideology presented to them by Ball. They needed a philosophy to follow which would satisfactorily replace their traditional loyalty to the monarchy, a philosophy which could supplant the attitude of subservience engrained in their lives since birth. They needed a program to reconstitute that which they were denying, once it was destroyed. Freedom was appealing, no doubt, but achievement of it meant loss of security for a time, a condition which they could not tolerate; and there was no other security presented to them as an alternative.

Today there are yet revolutions, uprisings, wars and movements for many causes — all contain ideologies. Possibly contemporary revolutionaries and other seekers of change might take a lesson from the Great Revolt of 1381; though far-removed, it does resemble 20th century revolt.

The realities of 14th century government may have made revelation and acceptance of a program of reconstitution an impossibility for Ball, but six centuries later, what is our excuse when conference tables have even been made to order? If we carefully design our programs to reconstitute our society and then confer with opponents in a spirit of compromising objectivity rather than forceful intolerance, maybe change will be effected not only peacefully, but hopefully violent revolution can be eliminated. It must be worth a try, for mere violence failed in 1381 and we can see that it is failing today.

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3Ibid., p. 153


5Smelser, "Generalized Beliefs," pp. 79-130. Smelser discusses various types of collective behavior. The elements of ideology for each vary slightly; however, for all practical purposes, these five terms will be used as they synthesize generally all of the basic elements of social movement ideologies in succinct terms. (They were assigned by Dr. Herbert Simons, currently of the University of California in Berkeley, for convenience in classroom discussion of Smelser's book, summer quarter, 1970, University of Washington.)

6Smelser, pp. 227-241.


8Smelser, pp. 47-48.


10Oman, p. 29.

11Smelser, p. 16.

12Ibid., p. 17

13Ibid.

14Oman, pp. 128-129.

15*Select British Speeches*, p. 44.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18Ibid., p. 45.

19Ibid.

20Oman, p. 12.

21Ibid., p. 153.
THE RHETORIC OF WOMEN’S LIB: TOO MUCH NOISE
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A characteristic of the communication of human beings is the possibility that a word or phrase can be so embellished with meaning and emotion that it assumes a new status in that communication system. Such is the case of the contemporary term “Women’s Liberation.” The effort of women to liberate themselves to a better, less oppressive life has been greeted with such cries as “They’re a bunch of frustrated hags” and “They act like a bunch of stupid dames.”

Upon closer examination, the rhetoric of the women liberationists and the counter rhetoric of their opponents provide some striking contrasts.

Mrs. Saul Schary, the executive secretary and president-elect of the twenty-three million member National Council of Women, has said, “There’s no discrimination against women like they say there is; women themselves are just self-limiting. It’s in their nature and they shouldn’t blame it on society or men.”

In opposition to Mrs. Schary’s statement are the following words from the manifesto of one of the radical groups, the Redstockings. “Our oppression is total, affecting every facet of our lives. We are exploited as sex objects, breeders, domestic servants and cheap labor. We are considered inferior beings whose only purpose is to enhance men’s lives. Our humanity is denied.”

Two other viewpoints reveal a similar polarity. From the manifesto of the New York Radical Feminists comes the order, “We must begin to destroy the notion that we are indeed only servants to the male ego, and must begin to reverse the systematic crushing of women’s egos by constructing alternate selves that are healthy, independent and self-assertive.”

The philosophy of Helen B. Andelin, a writer and president of the Andelin Foundation which sponsors courses in Fascinating Womanhood, is that “man must be the unconditional leader and the woman should strive to be an unconditional follower.”

It is this writer’s purpose to inquire into the nature of female opposition to the ideas expressed in the radical manifestoes and to hopefully identify the basis for non-agreement with radical feminism. In this writer’s opinion two factors hampering the acceptance of radical feminism by some women in America are the ethos of the liberationists who are the source of the communication and the feminine identity of the women who are the receivers of the communication.

To grasp a picture of the women’s movement is not difficult, nor as Susan Brownmiller, herself a N.Y. Radical Feminist, wrote in the New York Times, “From the radical left to the Establishment middle, the women’s movement has become a fact of life.” The initiation and development of the movement proceeded from two sources: from the National Organization of Women (NOW), begun in 1966 by women active in their professions and desirous of gaining equal pay and opportunity; and from the radical feminists, whose founders in 1968 had previously worked in the civil rights movement and who then sought equality of opportunity for the female in society. The radical feminists were the creators of the concept of women’s liberation as opposed to women’s rights.

If the movement’s origins are not difficult to trace, categorizing the present membership is. Following the August 26, 1970 Women’s Strike for Equality one journalist stated, “There is no way of categorizing the women of the movement except in the most general terms; those who seek to change the existing conditions of life generally are more likely to be liberal.”

Though labels do not exist for the membership there are significant dissimilarities between two types of groups. “Working to achieve the goal of full equality for women in America in truly equal partnership with men,” NOW tries to change the basic social structure through working for such measure as passage and ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment and the establishment of federally financed day care centers. Less concerned with restructuring laws than with changing the social structure by revolutionizing the female and freeing her from male dominated institutions are the radical women’s groups who label NOW and its sympathizers as bourgeois.

Not only are the two groups’ purposes dissimilar but the groups’ approaches to the same problem reveal another distinction. For a New York legislative hearing on abortion law reform in February, 1969, the Redstockings organized an abortion speak-out; when the hearing
was hastily adjourned, the group held its own hearing a month later. About the same time the New York chapter of NOW formed a committee to lobby for repeal of restrictive abortion legislation. The radical approach was one of activism and demonstration in front of society, whereas NOW sought its goal through more conventional means, committee action.

Responses from some women in America toward these two types of groups have been varied. A poll conducted by Good Housekeeping magazine which sampled one thousand members of its Consumer Panel indicated more agreement with the purpose and approach of NOW than with that of the radical groups. The report of the poll results was summarized in the opening paragraph.

If the leaders of the feminine liberation movement depended on the readers of Good Housekeeping for bucking, they would be out of business before nightfall. But on basic bread and butter issues affecting jobs and legal rights, readers of this magazine are in strong agreement with the current feminist drive.

The majority of panelists approved items that were related to discrimination that disadvantages a woman financially, on the job or in public accommodations. Ninety-six per cent voted for equal pay for equal work, 86% said they were in favor of equal hiring and promotion policies, and 75% agreed to the elimination of discrimination in public accommodations (refusal to serve unescorted women in restaurants, hotels). Good Housekeeping panelists agreeing with those matters more appropriately advocated by the radical groups were far fewer in number. Twenty-five per cent said there should be equal sharing of child care by father and mother with father as likely as mother to stay home with a sick child, 17% said there should be pay for housewives so that wives do not have to ask for an allowance or feel guilty about spending money, 9% supported the substitution of Ms. for Miss and Mrs. to remove a disapproving connotation from the older terms, and 6% opposed the use of cosmetics and perfumes because they contribute to making women sex objects.

In terms of a communication context, one might ask why there is this smaller agreement with the message of the radical feminists. One factor hampering the acceptance of radical feminism is the ethos or image of the feminists held in the minds of the receivers. Ethos has been described as corresponding to the psychological concept of attitude toward the source with measurement involving the collection of opinions. Numerous descriptions of the liberationists expressing attitudes that are less than favorable in the receiver's view have appeared in the press. "What puts me off the Women's Liberation Movement is its sweaty virility. They shout, they swagger, they talk tough. Their approach to sex would shame a groom of the stable." One of the most common complaints against the Women's Liberation type is that "she is so 'unfeminine'; that she comes on sounding strident, harsh and fanatical; that she puts people off before they even hear what she has to say." "The extremists in the feminist groups choose a particularly ugly way to make their point. By shouting and bad grooming they cast an aura of vulgarity on the whole movement."

Such attitudes printed in the media indicate that an image of a source is a composite of several elements. One speech theorist and researcher states that extrinsic ethos, or the image that exists in advance of a communication, is influenced by the prior reputation of the source and his behavior and appearance up to the inception of the message. The image of the source created during the message transmission, or intrinsic ethos, is influenced by the message itself, dress, manner and personal appearance and delivery. The above sample of attitudes toward the radical feminists repeatedly revealed behavior, dress, manner, and personal appearance and delivery techniques as the basis for the formation of an image of the feminists. The receivers viewed such dress, manner and personal appearance negatively, therefore the image of the feminists was negative. "In essence as the source becomes identified with behavior, beliefs, actions, appearance and material that are positively evaluated by receivers his image moves to the positive. As he identifies with or is identified by the receiver with negative elements his image becomes less favorable."

What follows from the feminists having been identified with this unfavorable image by the receivers is that the feminists themselves weaken the persuasion effort of their message to those receivers. A housewife-mother in a recent magazine feature said that she believed Women's Lib was just a lot of noise because she had seen one of those Lib women ranting and raving on TV. Also relating the image of the feminists to non-acceptance of their communication, Lenore Romney has written that the "Women's Liberation Movement is not erasing prejudice against women because many members are abrasive and resentful of their own roles in society, and that attitude simply turns people off." The matter of a message source offering direct warrant for acceptance of his message has been understood to be one of the proofs in persuasion. "Viewed more broadly, ethical proof may be defined to include all the ways in which the image of the source operates to produce effects in the persuasion process." Certainly one effect of the image of the radical feminists on those receivers who do not accept the liberationists' message is a lessening interest in listening to the message let alone agreeing with it. This effect is indeed detrimental to the feminists' persuasive effort.

A second factor hampering the acceptance of radical feminism is the feminine identity of the message receivers. The existence of one's identity, or a concept of who one is and who he is going to be, is a concern in our contemporary society. Mrs. Virginia Johnson, female half of the famous sex research team of Masters and Johnson, told a group meeting on the status of women
at the University of Missouri that, "The female needs a sense of identity in order to function at her fullest or to function at all." According to psychoanalyst Erik H. Erickson the concept of one's identity evolves after an identity crisis.

I have called the major crisis of adolescence the identity crisis; it occurs in that period of the life cycle when each youth must forge for himself some central perspective and direction, some working unity, out of the effective remnants of his childhood and the hopes of his childhood and the hopes of his anticipated adulthood; he must detect some meaningful resemblance between what he has come to see in himself and what his sharpened awareness tells him others judge and expect him to be ... In some people, in some classes, at some periods in history, the crisis will be minimal; in other people, classes and periods, the crisis will be clearly marked off as a critical period, a kind of "second birth," apt to be aggravated either by widespread neuroticisms or by pervasive ideological unrest.

What theorists have not recognized in our society is the existence of an identity crisis for a woman, according to Betty Friedan. "In terms of the old conventions and the new feminine mystique women are not expected to grow up to find out who they are, to choose their human identity. Anatomy is woman's destiny, say the theorists of femininity; the identity of woman is determined by her biology." Providing a direct reply to the theorists of femininity, the manifestoes of the radical feminists say that the identity of woman is not exclusively in her biological role. The authors of the manifestoes seek to free women from this notion and convince them that their previously limited role is the end result of a suppressive male dominated society.

To many receivers, appearing to have been conditioned to finding their identity in the traditional sense of womanhood passed down through the centuries, the message of the radical feminists strikes no sympathetic or understanding chord. Evidence of this sense of identity is indicated in opinions that accompanied the poll results in the Good Housekeeping survey.

I am proud to be a woman, I enjoy being a woman and I like all the privileges that are connected with being a woman. I resent being told by frustrated females that I am oppressed and being used as a sex object.

One Hunter College graduate who does part-time work for her husband's company said:

I'm a suburban housewife and I have three children and I like it. I enjoy it. I feel free. I don't think there is a master-slave relationship between husband and wife. I think it's equal. Equal pay and opportunity does concern me because there is definite prejudice in that area. What they say has validity, but not for me.

One effect of the message of radical feminism that these two women may not be willing to concede is that the idea of liberation threatens their concept of identity; it is this threatening effect that prompts them to disregard the liberationists' message. Dr. Shirley D. McCune, an associate director of the American Association of University Women has described the effect for the thirty to sixty year old woman.

She's been in shackles all her life and now girls twenty years younger than she and much prettier are telling her to run. Her whole sense of identity is deeply threatened by the freedom the new woman enjoys because it's a rejection of everything she stands for. No matter how bright or educated she may be she's been conditioned in such a way she's never had the chance to find out who she really is or what she could become. And the point is, she doesn't want to find out.

Thus, the element of the receiver's identity, her concept of who she is, is a significant factor in the communication of radical feminism. Many of the receivers believe they have already found their identity or refuse to question it out of fear of change and the unknown. Consequently, they find the message of the radical feminists not applicable to them and this hampers their acceptance of the message.

The lack of agreement by many women with the message of radical feminism may be explained in a communication context as the ethos of the message source and the feminine identity of the receivers limiting the acceptance of the message. In other words, the rhetoric of Women's Lib generates and encounters too much noise for the message to be accepted.

Though there is this lack of agreement with the purpose and approach of the radical feminists, these same receivers who disregard the message can still acknowledge a contribution by the feminists to an understanding of woman. The liberationists have more accurately defined the effort by women to change and strengthen their status. NOW's approach was described as efforts in behalf of women's rights, which implied that woman's identity was known and she was entitled to certain benefits. The radical feminists initiated the concept of women's liberation, which implied that woman's identity was being sought. Recognizing woman's capacity and right to be a member of society on her own merits rather than for the biological role she performs does not involve giving women their rights, according to two authors. "The problem is the decidedly more complex one of helping both men and women to define anew their identities in the altered context of changing roles and relationships.

In this writer's opinion the radicals' introduction of the concept of liberation into the women's movement has been of benefit to society. The use of the concept has directed attention to the need for
individual identities to be re-defined in our technolog-
cal age. This need has been expressed by Betty
Friedan who wrote that every man and woman must keep
up with the increasingly explosive pace of history to
find or keep individual identity in our mass society.

The identity crisis in men and women cannot
be solved by one generation for the next, in our
rapidly changing society, it must be faced
continually, solved only to be faced again in
the span of a single lifetime. A life plan must
be open to change, as new possibilities open,
in society and in oneself.29

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3"Politics of the Ego: A Manifesto for N.Y. Radical
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4Betty Rollin, "Backlash Against Women's Lib: 'They're
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p. 19.

5Susan Brownmiller, "Sisterhood is Powerful," New York
Times, March 15, 1970, sec. 6, p. 27.


7Ibid.

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9Brownmiller, p. 134.

10The GH Poll: Women's Rights -- How GH Readers
Feel About Liberation and Equality," Good Housekeeping,
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12Kenneth E. Andersen, Persuasion Theory and Practice

13Harriet Van Horne, "Women Liberation Groups Too
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14Mary Wiegers, "Public Reaction to Current Women's
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15Good Housekeeping, p. 36.

16Andersen, p. 224.

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19Rollin, p. 16.

20Lenore Romney, "Men, Women and Politics," Look,
XXXV (April 6, 1971), 11.

21Andersen, p. 234.

22Jean Henniger, "Famous Sex Researcher Tells of Need
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23Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York,
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24Ibid., p. 71.

25Good Housekeeping, p. 36.

26Enid Nemy, "A Meeting Where Nobody Walked Out,"

27Fosburgh, p. 44.

28Cyrus R. Pangborn and Maxine Thornton, "What of this
New Woman, Mr. Jones?" American Association of University

29Friedan, p. 363.