These National Humanities Faculty working papers are presentations from the Question of Authority Workshop. Frithjof Bergmann's "The Logic of Freedom" distinguishes two approaches to the concept of freedom—that freedom is the ultimate good and that freedom is a burden. A theory of freedom is constructed in the second part of Bergmann's presentation. It states that an act is free if the agent identifies with the element from which it flows; it is coerced if the agent disassociates himself from that generating element. This theory requires identification or self-knowledge prior to freedom.

Leon Sinder contributes "What Makes an American an American" and "The Authority of Biosocial Factors." American culture is delineated in the first presentation according to an underlying system of American values. Some of those values are puritanism, efficiency, and the ideal of the man of action. The biosocial factors that exert authority on man, chosen for discussion in the second presentation, include not only requirements common to all living things, such as reproduction, but also those more peculiar to man, such as the need to belong, the passage of time, the will to power, and conservatism. Societal and individual accommodation of these biosocial factors is also considered. (JH)
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The Logic of Freedom
(Part One)
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I

A Preliminary Opening of the Question

Our culture has a schizophrenic view of freedom. Two schools of thought concerning liberty are simultaneously alive in it. The first stark fact is that these schools proceed from utterly different, almost contradictory assumptions to equally different and opposed conclusions. The second, no less unmistakable fact is that they do not argue with each other. The conflict is not brought out into the open. There is no exchange, not much communication. The two go their own separate ways as if there were a gentlemen's agreement to keep quiet.

That freedom is wonderful is axiomatic for the first school: freedom separates man from the beasts and raises him above nature; it is the sine qua non of his distinguished position. Liberty gives a man a unique and incommensurate status which is lost to him when it is forfeited. His claim to it is indisputable for it constitutes and defines his being; it is the essence of his manhood. To gain it is more mandatory than all other conquests; to lose it is final defeat.

This is the more "official" tradition. It views freedom as satisfying, as the natural and obvious object of every man's longing. Men, according to it, want freedom as spontaneously and directly as babies want milk.

All the different now-contending political faiths, no matter how sharply they may disagree on other matters, subscribe to this view -- though, in very different fashions. All sides fight for freedom. Every conquest is a "liberation." Even the Nazis declared that they were for it.

The divergencies between the various political canons seem no greater on this score than those between the sectarian creeds of one religion. All invoke the same ancient text: that freedom is desirable. If politics occupies in the modern age the place that religion held in the Middle Ages -- if it now furnishes the basic framework of orientation, the instruments of salvation, and the only ideas that match the power then possessed by their more theological antecedents -- then freedom holds now in this new framework the place that was formerly occupied by Grace. Only by entering into the Kingdom of Freedom will the new man be born from the old Adam.

From this view of freedom derives also the general picture of history, which still orders the world for us into a drama of progress. We think mankind is becoming freer. It was Hegel who first developed this hope into a system. He depicted history as mankind's difficult advance toward its own liberation and he placed an immense and radiant value upon freedom. He did not see in history a gratifying steady climb but instead thought it addicted to the exploration of blind alleys and the paying of monstrous prices. He thought it, in his own famous phrase, "the slaughterbench on which whole nations are
sacrificed." Yet he believed that it was, in spite of the carnage and the waste, somehow justified and, yes, redeemed. Why? Because it did lead to freedom. Freedom sufficed. It merited the cost.

From this school also, we learned to make freedom the final standard of adjudication for the superiority of "our way of life," the superiority of our institutions, and even the superiority of us as human beings. We are free, that is why we are better. This is rock bottom. It ends the debate. And the defense and the rationalization of many foreign and domestic policies follow the same pattern. The last resort to which one takes recourse is that this or that stratagem promotes freedom. Everyone knows that this invocation is often hypocritical. But that one acts the devotee of freedom when one is not shows only how unquestioned and sacrosanct the value of freedom has become.

"Give me liberty or give me death!" might be the emblem of this first tradition. If one had to choose a single motto for the second, one might pick the phrase "Escape from Freedom." In that school Sainte and Kierkegaard are prominent, though it is of course much older. Its pedigree could be traced back, but Dostoevsky wrote the formulation that became classical for modern writers. It is The Grand Inquisitor chapter of The Brothers Karamazov.

You remember that Ivan tells the parable to Alyosha and that it is set in Spain, in the sixteenth century, at the height of the Inquisition: Jesus returns for one day to this earth, the day after the Grand Inquisitor presided over a large-scale execution of heretics, a splendid, spectacular auto-da-fe in which more than fifty misbelievers were burnt at the stake. The crowd recognizes Jesus and has already burst into Hosannahs when the Grand Inquisitor, knowing that it is Jesus, orders his guards to arrest him. That night the Grand Inquisitor visits Jesus in the inquisitorial prison, and by far the largest part of the story records the conversation that occurs between them, in which the Grand Inquisitor justifies himself and his Inquisition and even his arrest of Jesus to Jesus himself. The heart of his argument is that Jesus tried to set mankind free, but mankind does not want and cannot bear freedom. He, the Grand Inquisitor, therefore took this terrible gift from mankind out of compassion and out of mercy. The freedom that Jesus bestowed upon man was an affliction and a scourge. Man suffers from it and cannot sustain it. It makes demands upon him that he cannot meet. He does not possess the dimensions, the stature, and the strength to endure it. What mankind really wants, what it craves is mystery and authority. "Man strives for nothing so incessantly and so painfully as to find someone to worship."

In essence the Grand Inquisitor poses a dilemma: One can either grant to mankind what it wants, but that dispensation will be degrading, or one can offer noble values to mankind, but then one has to be cruel. One only has a choice between compassion that concedes to mankind the vulgarities for which it hankers -- and a will to raise and lift it, which is ultimately brutal. It is impossible to give both happiness and dignity at the same time. Faced with this either/or the Grand Inquisitor elected to be gentle and grant all mankind the mystery, the authority, the object of worship, the servitude it wanted. He knew of course that what he did and gave was revolting, but precisely that he rendered himself repulsive gauges his compassion. To give, but only what is pure, let alone only what is still consistent with one's own immaculateness,
that is sparing. The Grand Inquisitor lived a more strenuous sacrifice, and Jesus stands accused, charged with indifference and lukewarmness.

That the options open to us are in this way split is for this tradition the first basic ground rule by which this whole hard game has to be played. The terms are: one or the other -- but not both. In the novel Ivan's outrage against this basic given renders him incapable of action. He is too noble to give mankind what it wants, but too sensitive to afflict it with high values. His refusal of this choice holds him in the stocks in which he is tortured. But this same dilemma was faced by a whole line of thinkers, all the way from Plato down to Sartre (especially in "Dirty Hands").

Liberalism looks from the point of this bifurcation like the impossible insistency on having both; according to it happiness and freedom, satisfaction and nobility go together, and there has to be no choice. What is amazing is that Liberalism usually treats this as completely obvious, that it talks as if there never had been any question. But there is, at the very least, a problem which has to be faced.

The choice which Ivan poses runs directly counter to a structural thought pattern that had dominant importance during the Enlightenment and that still governs much of our thinking: in essence it holds that the defects of societies and men are in the last accounting due to man's repression, to one or the other of the ways in which man is held down. Liberation, therefore, is the answer, and the political question reduces simply to the question of how a maximum of freedom can be won. One operates on the assumption that there is no upper limit to the amount of freedom that each individual wants (and that is also good for him), and one believes that the need for limits is entirely external. This means that society should impose only that minimum of restraints required to safeguard other people, and it also means that other people and society are primarily perceived as something that sets limits.

To attack this thought pattern challenges of course not just the foundations on which Liberalism rests. It threatens the whole spectrum of political discussion and crosses sharply even the main hope that underpins most revolutions. Take the famous closing lines of Trotsky's Literature and Revolution. Once the revolution has been won, "man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his body will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Geothe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise."

Why did man not attain these peaks before? Because something actively prevented it. Once he is free and what has so far hindered him has finally come down, the ascent will happen almost by itself. The capacities for it were in man all along; they only needed room in which they could unfold.

This view of man sees him mainly thwarted. It believes that his nobility only has to be released. Now it confronts a very different vision: one which sees in man both more fragility and more evil.
To bring these two traditions into contact with each other settles of course nothing, and the reason for doing it is precisely the reverse. It is only meant to unsettle a few dogmas about freedom. But so far the notion that servitude may be granted from compassion may still strike us as a mere hyperbole. We shrug it off. We know that people basically do want freedom.

But do they?

Dostoevsky obviously did not mean trivial choices. The Grand Inquisitor says that it is the need for miracles, for mystery and authority that concerns him; it was the hunger for an object of worship that he sought to relieve. But is this hunger so great? One measure of its intensity is the fast rise of the psychoanalytic movement. Even if we set aside the content concerning the scientific merit of Freud's ideas (and disregard the fact that many have used them to abrogate responsibility in favor of the mysteries of their own unconscious), even if we consider nothing but the popularity of psychoanalytic treatment, we still get some indication of that appetite. The sheer fact that so many people find it necessary to submit their lives to an inspection, that so many are impelled to display their intimacies for an appraisal, and precisely that they do this in spite of their doubts and reservations -- that fact alone suffices to gauge the painfulness of that need.

It depends on the situation in which one observes people: superficially they seem to insist on their independence; they make a different impression if one listens to their falttering self-revelations.

Or take Totalitarianism! We repeat phrases like people "need an identity" and "want a definition of themselves" in an absent-minded way. Yet the desires are as palpable as those for sex and food. To get some sense of their reality and power one must remember what people are prepared to do -- the kind of hunger, suffering, and denials that they accept for an "insignia," for a "name," a "title" (for a button to pin on their lapel) and also how the whole tone and rhythm of someone's life is changed, how he no longer walks to same, because there now is a phrase, or an image, that applies to him.

Once one has thought about the "need for identity" concretely, one's picture of how Totalitarianism grows may be reversed. Customarily we imagine that two forces pull in opposite directions: the desire for freedom, and the fear of hungers of another class. We think that they otherwise conflict and that freedom sometimes loses out. But often this is not what actually occurs. When someone joins a severely regimented group the picture usually is not that of a cautiously conducted barter. Two things are not weighted against each other. The urgency is all in one direction. There is a feeling of relief, almost of exultation. Independence was not wanted, freedom was feared.

In some contexts we accept this as a platitudinous fact. When suburbia or fraternities are the topic no one needs to be reminded that people in general want "to fit in," want "to be part of the group," want "to be accepted," that there is a herd for every lone wolf. And yet these banalities are barred from
other contexts. Virtually every political, philosophical, or moral discussion of freedom in the abstract assumes the very opposite: that men demand individuality and freedom, that repression and brainwashing are required to curtail it, and that men will rebel if freedom is not granted. We have again the same schizophrenic segregation, and here it is reinforced with semantics. One says that people need a sense of security and of communion; at worst one says that they "conform." One is tactful to say bluntly that they do not want freedom. One prefers other designations for these contrary desires and thus preserves the illusion that the appetite for freedom is unqualified and absolute. One goes to such extremes in this compartmentalization that even the theoretical and historical explanations of modern Totalitarianism rigidly adhere to it. In the analysis of totalitarian movements the major question usually is: what constrained a people at this point to yield up their freedom and to submit to a more dictatorial rule? But this question is probably malposed. It assumes that there is a natural tendency toward freedom and the "explanation" of Totalitarianism becomes in effect a list of the pressures that overrode this tendency. But this may be the wrong way round: if men in general do not desire freedom then the important question would be: what at this point weakened the imposition of individuality and freedom and what allowed the natural drive toward conformity to go unchecked?

One can look at this still more mundanely. There is no reason why a man who dreads retirement cannot be said to fear a kind of freedom, or why a middle-aged mother who clings to her children cannot be said to hold on to a kind of servitude. Part of what makes these crises painful is the discovery that the exigencies of a job or of raising children, which so far were experienced as confinements, in fact provided one's life with structure and coherence. The sense of futility, the exasperation at not having anything outside oneself that demands one's service, the whole experience of having to live "for oneself" -- for nothing but the prolongation of one's own existence -- these are all the effects of a kind of freedom. Precisely the seemingly most hyperbolic dicta sound suddenly straightforward once they are placed into such circumstances. Sartre has said that "we are condemned to be free," and in one of his plays Orestes says that "freedom crashed down upon him." If this were said by a man whose life's work had just been taken away from him we would understand it right away.

One last example. Consider how we invoke for our actions the support and the endorsement of abstractions. We have a penchant for acting "in the name" of something. If nothing plausible is close to hand we reach out for airy, dubious notions: we become the shield-bearers of Progress, of Enlightenment, of Order, and Good Judgment. It is as if we needed something, even if it has to be a half-discarded fancy, to which our act can be subordinated, something that will give it the guise of an instrument that performs a service. It is possible to look at morality in this perspective and to imagine it as a kind of last recourse: if all else fails we still invoke its blank and stony categories and act at least in the name of Goodness. This whole phenomenon constitutes still a different measure of how we avoid freedom. That we become so cunning and palliate the threat of an autonomous bare action with such disguises shows how deep our fear of freedom really is.
The recognition that freedom in any of its definitions is not unequivocally desired moves us one step closer to the possibility of a genuine rethinking. Our next and also still preliminary act must be the shedding of some further equally crude preconceptions that blindfold our eyes.

We posit freedom and slavery as opposites. We imagine a polarity and think that liberty represents the one extremity and slavery the other. That makes the case for freedom categorical and simple. Who wants to be a slave? But is the difference between the master and his slave simply that one has freedom which the other lacks? Doesn’t the master live in a mansion, and the slave in quarters? Doesn’t the slave toil while the master drinks mint julep? Doesn’t the master wield the whip that cuts the other’s back? A preference for the master’s life proves therefore very little about freedom.

It is the requirement of any scientific method to isolate the property that one is testing. This means that one at least should not compare a life that is unfree, but that is also dreadful in other ways to one that includes freedom yet that is also greatly advantaged on other scores. Even the A B C of fairness and of rationality requires that the two lives should be on other counts at least approximately equal. So we should compare to the master someone with an easy life, someone with similar other benefits, and then ask how much better this life would become if we still added freedom and how much worse if the rest were the same and only freedom were subtracted.

Or we could make the comparison to monks. In certain very rigorous orders the rules require not only chastity, but abstinence from most foods, nearly unbroken silence, complete submission to superiors, and a strict disciplining even of one’s private thoughts. There is without question far less freedom in such a life than there is even in the lives of slaves, and yet the lives of monks are at least sometimes impressive.

(The objection that monks choose to forfeit their freedom meets first the counterquestion, do they indeed? How many entered monasteries because their parents took a vow? What of the other- and this-worldly threats? But in any case, even if there was a choice, and even if a Trappist monk were in some sense free to cast off his habit (and on the same terms one could also argue that a slave has the freedom to rebel), this would only reinforce the point: precisely that someone might choose such a life and might choose to forfeit his freedom shows that the loss of freedom alone does not reduce life to a horror.)

This has several implications: for one, it means that slavery is not equivalent to the absence of freedom. The two concepts do not stand at polar opposites, and slavery does not represent the end-point on a continuum of decreasing liberties. It is possible to have less freedom than is possessed even by a slave. One example of this is the monk. Another illustration of it would be your tying me like a dog to a post in your backyard. That again would take more freedom from me than is taken from most slaves -- and it yet would not make me your slave. It is only the deprivation of other things, less equivocal and more debilitating than the diminishment of freedom, that reduces a man to that condition.
The other side of this is very plain: if taking someone's freedom does not make him a slave then equally merely giving freedom back is also not sufficient to terminate that degradation. Setting him free may in fact be the easiest and smallest part of what has to be done to restore a man from that position.

The habit of juxtaposing Master and Slave on the individual level has its counterpart on the level of societies. We pit the worst examples of Totalitarianism (especially Hitler's and Stalin's) against the best representatives of free societies, and freedom wins again without a fight. The point is once more the same: the difference between Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia on the one side and Switzerland or Sweden on the other is not simply that people in the former were "unfree," but are "free" in the latter. Regardless of how freedom is understood there are other and very major inequalities. Hitler's Germany was racist, jingoistic, murderous, militaristic, anti-intellectual, and bent on destruction. These qualities may have had more to do with its horrors than the absence of freedom alone. (And may in fact have been what made that society "totalitarian"; that is, the "totalitarian" may not be the opposite of the "free.") Again, there have been societies that offered little freedom but that did not suffer from these other vices. Why not compare the free societies to those -- for example, to most "primitive" societies, to Sparta or Medieval China?

Another tacit sleight of hand, partial to freedom and performed just as routinely, has to do with causes and effects. In general everyone agrees that ideologies and institutions must be assessed in a historical and social setting. When we appraise religions, say Buddhism or Islam, we do so, and often with subtlety and brilliance; the face value is lifted off from the actual effects, and causal tracks are followed down to distant social consequences. But when it comes to freedom we often drag one foot -- on the side of the benefits we move with confidence but on the disadvantages we put very little weight. How far we lean to one side will become graphic if for once, just as an exercise, we bend the other way and rehearse some of the negative effects that the faith in freedom may have had.

The framework for this would of course have to be very large. To do it at all justly one might have to take a panoramic look at the whole development of Western culture and sketch something like the following picture:

Western, or white man's, civilization was not clearly dominant during Antiquity and the Middle Ages. It was essentially confined to the small peninsula of Europe and was not, all in all, more advanced than the Indian or the Chinese or some South American civilizations. It also did not exercise a political hegemony over these others. In fact for centuries it held its own only with great difficulty, and sometimes it fell short even of that, as when it failed to defend its own territory against extensive Slavic and Mohammedan advances. The fabulous and utterly unparalleled rise of the West to supreme power obviously cannot be nicely dated, but in a general way it did coincide with the evolution and the progressive institutionalization of the ideals of individual independence and with the genesis of the superior technology and of the economic system that were fostered by these ideals and that in turn reinforced them.
Hence, one might have to count this technology and this economic system with both their positive and their negative sides among the more distant consequences of the belief in individual freedom. The same would be true of the diverse phenomena that are now subsumed under the idea of alienation. They, if anything, are more immediately connected, being nearly the other side of the same coin: if individuality is extolled and one insists on the prerogatives of one's privacy and of one's individual inclinations -- if each person conceives himself as ringed around by a fence of rights -- then one is bound to feel isolated. Alienation may be a completely inevitable by-product of "freedom," and discussions of the modern "loss of community" will be mawkish as long as they do not acknowledge that individuality and community do tend to exclude each other, that the space occupied by one will be taken from the other.

One could argue further that the stress on individuality in the modern technological society starves certain fundamental appetites, which then progressively accumulate till they break the gates that dammed them in. Once out of control they glut themselves in an orgy of social coherence and interpersonal integration. An untrammeled sense of communion overcompensates for the exasperations of a hedged-in private life. So Totalitarianism, too, might have to be included in this accounting -- not, of course, simply on the con side of the ledger, but in a way that represents the more extended causative connections. And from Totalitarianism it is only a step to the disastrous wars that began as factional conflicts inside the West before they embroiled most of the world. They, too, could therefore appear in this calculation, and the First World War no less than the Second. For, as many writers have shown, the First World War was actively desired by precisely that large class of people that had been most influenced by the ideals of individual freedom. Much of the European middle class was exultant when that war broke out. As with Totalitarianism later, they saw in it a chance to escape from their confined, cautious individual existence; their impatience had mounted slowly till it finally vented itself with unexpected force.

And with these wars we still have not mentioned the one fact that stands out like a tower for all those who judge this from the outside: the fact that the idea of individual freedom was an organic part of the culture that developed such capacities but also such needs for expansion that it destroyed all other civilizations -- some by annihilation, the rest by making them Western.

To see in these qualities of the West only "temporary aberrations," "accidents," "corrigible imperfections" is precisely the main device with which we slant this whole adjudication. What entitles us to the faith that the dark sides can somehow be omitted, that eventually nothing but what one hoped from freedom, and what one intended with that idea can be realized -- without side-effects, and with no compensating losses? Why assume that the terrifying and daemonic features of the West are only incidental, temporary flaws? Their roots may be as deep as those of its magnificent achievements. Both, the splendid and the appalling, may be tied with equal strength to the idea of freedom.

In the end this could be one of the arch-reasons for the reluctance of other people to receive this gift from us -- they are not apt to see in "freedom" an unalloyed, "pure" value, but to see in our version of it an organic, functional arm of the West. They are right. If it has made its contribution to our glories,
then it also shares the responsibility for our crimes. It is not innocent. It lent a hand when the West made lepers of two thirds of mankind.

Maybe a kind of story will give a first, approximate idea of the whys and wheretos of what is to follow:

Imagine a very isolated, meticulously cared for village. The fields around it look as neat as a good secretary's desk-top. Everything is at right angles and not a stick is out of place. The people that inhabit it are much more civilized than ordinary peasants. Hundreds of years ago they spoke already with very quiet and melodious voices, and now they have reached a point of delicacy that imposes almost complete silence. They do most of their communicating through exquisitely subtle ritual gestures. There are, one says, at least a hundred different ways of shielding one's eyes from the sun and each one of them has its own meaning.

In the center of this village stands an ancient straw-thatched temple, and in that temple hangs an enormous gong of polished brass, large as the surface of a pond. When anything of concern to the whole village happens, if the river flooded, or an enemy has crossed the border, or a cloud of grasshoppers casts a shadow, then someone runs to the temple, and after months and sometimes years of dignified severity and silence there rises then the sky-filling booming clanking of that gong. After a long quiet this noise produces a great shock. Some, admittedly the most refined, fall to the ground, their arms vined round their heads. The rest tremble too much to still execute their deaf-mute language gestures, and whispering in that noise is of course in vain. That makes it very difficult for anyone to find out why the gong is being sounded, and every threat, or enemy, or danger finds the village — an easy half-lame prey.

The point is that the sound of "freedom" deafens us, like that gong those peasants. If we want a general denominator, something that gathers up the multiple deficiencies of our own society, then to declare that "we are oppressed" has the same effect that the gong noise has in this story: it fills our ears till our minds go blank. Though our better knowledge may still tell us that this is somehow the wrong verdict, that it is at any rate not central, or not the diagnosis that we need, the force of it already ends the possibility of any genuine thinking. And it is the same if we want to know what we should aim for now, in what direction we should move. Then, too, the answer "toward greater freedom" does not tell us. Again that sound merely rises. Everyone joins in and deafened our mouths still shape that word, yet everyone means different things and no intelligence or information is communicated.

It should be understood that it is not the intention of this writing to put a few grains of salt on the idea of freedom, nor is it to pull out of another hat yet another definition of what freedom "really" means. Leading, rather, is a hard suspicion that the concept of freedom is not a fit instrument for thought. The effort to come to a workable understanding of social matters is snared in the tangles of this notion. A guiding "theory" of society or of the state cannot be built upon the base of that idea. The point is therefore not to argue for or against the value of freedom. Instead we want to lead up to the
recognition that this intellectual contest is malposed, that it is a futile and tiresome rope-pulling. The goal in short is just the opposite from that of taking sides in the disputes embroiling freedom. It is rather to prepare for a way of thinking that does not stretch itself between the opposites that it marks out.

This, of course, does not mean that many of the things advocated, fought for, and conceived under the idea of freedom were not good and great, and that likewise much that was conceptualized and understood as "oppression" was not really evil. It means rather that this idea serves no longer as a basis or criterion and that we therefore need a new coordinating matrix in which things will receive their place. It does mean that the old reasons are no longer telling and that what is Up and what is Down has to be rethought.

In the present situation social thinking does not trust itself. Most of us know in a numb and addled fashion that the foundations shift, that our feet keep sinking in, and we therefore struggle from one support that offers itself on the wayside to the next. There is very little independence, hardly any venturing out. No real structure that could carry its own weight, let alone suggest new outlines (and lead up to and hold in place heavier conclusions), seems to take shape. The peculiar ambiguity of the idea of freedom has contributed to this debilitation, for it on the one hand postulated a goal and framework, while it on the other hand is such an altogether problematic notion that it gives neither guidance nor coherence. We do not advance beyond a casuistic game of blindman's bluff. The idea of freedom has been like a hood that kept the falcon of thought on the leather glove. For it gives the illusion that we have a goal, that it is known, that there is a framework and that all is fairly understood -- and so the major questions are not even asked.

II

A Theory of Freedom

We now have to shift gears. So far we have simply planted question marks next to some commonly made root-assumptions and marked out ground that is debatable and problematic. From here on in, however, we shall proceed in more methodical and systematically progressive fashion, for now a Theory of Freedom is to be developed.

It should be clearly understood that the subject matter of our theory will in one sense not be freedom itself. The aim will rather be to explain the views that have been held concerning it. So far these lie about us in bewildering variety. The intention now is to move up one level in abstraction and to bring to light a logic and a lawfulness that governs the diversity of these contentions, that orders their perplexing multiplicity. What we mean to propose is therefore in that sense a kind of metatheory of freedom.

I shall start from an experience, partly to give the coming high abstractions a concrete reference point, but also for other reasons that will soon become apparent:
There are moments in which we feel that our real life has not yet begun. The whole of our past seems like a long rehearsal. In different degrees it seems as if everything so far was only "hypothetical," was only one of many possibilities that we considered, was not actual and final, and did not already use up a part of our total time. Sometimes this feels as if we ourselves had not been the agents, had not been properly "inside" our life, but had observed it only, as spectators that saw it happen -- impersonally, the evolution of an interplay of forces. It is as if a wooden counterfeit of ourselves went through the motions that are our past, and what we really are has all this time lain patiently ducked in a blind, waiting to make its move. Only the making of this move would be the sudden entrance. It at last would bring the self that so far stayed behind the scenes on stage. It would be our first real action, a kind of birth, the long-delayed beginning of our genuine life.

What would be required for the accomplishment of this is subject to quite opposite perceptions. Sometimes it seems as if it would be marvellously easy. We feel that everything could change between this breath and the next, that a new internal will would be sufficient, that one would only have to nod, say yes, and one would step like through the opening of a curtain. But much more often it seems discouragingly difficult. All ordinary measures seem inadequate. It is as if we had to make an absolutely new beginning that cannot happen here but only on some other side to which we must cross over, as if this new start had to be purified from every connection with the present since any continuity with our past would compromise it. Then we dream of utterly fantastic extrications; we want the life of a beach-comber, or of a hermit, join the Foreign Legion. Paradoxical and mad, it seems that only such a drastic cut, only something so wild and unheard of, would finally be "real," as if only such a far-flung act would bring at last one's hidden self to the outside.

The anguish and the frenzied search for an impossible determination that come with this experience gain plausibility if we concentrate on the manner in which the self is unavoidably conceptualized when it occurs. When the experience is intense we feel literally disconnected from everything we are. Not only our past, but even our thoughts and feelings and sometimes even the thought that we have Now, seem somehow Other than us, strange, like things that we observe. It is the other side of this that makes this anguish prototypical and that conveys the sense that this is its definition, its essence become real. For when so much has been "split off" and made an "object" then hardly anything remains for the self that does the observing. If the self disassociates itself from its own constituents then it has reduced itself to something insubstantial, to nothing but a point, the point from which the rest is seen. The base from which I then experience, the domain that I genuinely feel to be my "self" has shrunk to next to nothing, and it is this that renders the sense of isolation and bereftness commensurately absolute.

As a first example we shall set a most unqualified and drastic view of freedom against the feel of this experience. It represents a position analogous to a limiting case in mathematics, and precisely its extremity is apt to make it theoretically instructive. The substance of this general conception occurs of course in many places but a particularly evocative expression of it can again be found in Dostoevsky, this time in the Notes from Underground.
Still in the first half of that work, in which the taunted and exasperated, always pacing, feverish and ragged, frail little Government Official records his philosophy of spite, there is a passage in which Dostoevsky brings that part of the novel to a concentrated, pitched summation. His clerk explains that only an act of sheer caprice, done in total independence, in rebellion against every consideration of advantage or of reason has a genuinely metaphysical dimension. He proclaims it as the sumnum bonum. Nothing else gives man true freedom. Only such an act breaks through the neutral shell of anonymity that holds man captive. It alone gives uniqueness and establishes distinction. Without it the self has no more identity or definition than one egg has among dozens.

This clerk has a friend and he says of him: "When he prepares for any undertaking this gentleman immediately explains to you, elegantly and clearly, exactly how he must act in accordance with the laws of reason and truth. What is more, he will talk to you with excitement and passion of the true normal interests of man; with irony he will upbraid the shortsighted fools who do not understand their own interests, nor the true significance of virtue; and within a quarter of an hour, without any outside provocation, but simply through something inside him which is stronger than all his interests, he will go on quite a different tack -- that is, in direct opposition to the laws of reason, in opposition to his own advantage, in fact in opposition to everything."

In a frenzy of exasperation he turns on all the "sages, statisticians, and lovers of humanity," on all the wise and calculating system-builders, and flings against their efforts his one, but to his mind, shattering objection. All their rationally founded, carefully constructed edifices fall to the ground, so he insists, for in their enumeration of the ends and goods that man pursues one aim and one desideratum has been invariably omitted. But it, ironically, is the most important. It is "the most advantageous advantage." This advantage which is "more important and more advantageous than all other advantages" consists precisely in acting "in opposition to all laws; that is, in opposition to reason, honour, peace, prosperity -- in fact in opposition to all those excellent and useful things," it consists in "one's own free unfettered choice, one's own caprice, however wild it may be, one's own fancy worked up at times to frenzy." "What man wants is not 'a virtuous,' 'normal,' or 'rationally advantageous' choice. What man wants is simply independent choice, whatever that independence may cost, and wherever it may lead."

That the representative expression of this idea of freedom did not occur in a classic philosophic text, but instead had to be taken from a novelist like Dostoevsky should on second thought not be surprising. Even those philosophers who limit the capacities of reason are not apt to identify freedom with only those acts that offend against it. In works of literature, however, close variants of this idea are encountered fairly often (for example, in Blake, or in Gide -- the gratuitous act -- or in D. H. Lawrence). What is more, if there is such a thing as a brute and basic experiential meaning associated with the idea of freedom then it is not far from the Underground man's view -- and literature is of course more likely to preserve this raw sense than more cautious philosophical definitions. The idea of being totally unbounded, of yielding to no authority whatever (not even to that of reason), of acting without all
encumbrances -- that image seems close to the root-experience of freedom, and captures some of its original appeal. And since distant memory of this expectation still glows behind all talk of liberation we began from it.

The import of this idea of freedom can be grasped more firmly if the several ways in which it represents an outer limit, a maximum, are specified in detail:

It is not only the value that is placed on freedom -- that in all his other actions man is like a puppet, pulled by the string of the laws -- "the damnable laws" -- of nature and of reason, so that he is a "piano key," indifferent, anonymous, dependent; while only the act of whim, the capricious act is different: it alone creating the possibility of uniqueness and self-definition -- there is also the extreme insistence that freedom requires that rationality be violated. On this score this notion bears resemblance to the stance that a son might take when he struggles for independence from his father. To a son mere "independence," the fact that he made his own decision, also might not seem sufficient. He experiences "real" freedom only when he moves in direct opposition to his father's wishes. It is as if nothing short of demonstrated freedom met his standards. This is an essential facet of the Underground man's position for without it the "system and the theories" would not be "shattered to atoms." This only happens because freedom for him consists precisely in acting "directly opposite" to reason, and because this freedom is also the most "advantageous advantage."

This idea of freedom touches still another outer, not-to-be-transcended limit when he advocates this contrariness to reason not in the name of a spontaneity which too much rationality might damage, and also not for the sake of an emotion, or a sensibility, but puts it forward as an absolute and final end.

To this one could still add that the transgression of rationality represents an unexceedable condition in yet another sense: one could see sheer reason as the last, and least burdensome of all "constraints"; to rear up even against it then represents a kind of measure. If the mere presence of a reason for it renders an act less than free, then what will count? Only an act that materializes out of nothing. It is as if there could be no context whatsoever, as if an action could be "free" in that sense only in the species presence of creation -- when God said: Let there be light.

This version of freedom obviously provokes numerous questions, but for the moment we shall not consider how this concept could possibly be justified against other rival claims concerning freedom, or whether anyone in seriousness could place such an extravagant value on the exercise of the blindest and most obstinate caprice. We shall instead concentrate on one single issue: What is the experience that this idea of freedom presupposes? What general relationship must a man have to "reason" if this concept is to be true for him? How, in other words, must he experience the thoughts that in a given case suggest to him the "sensible" or the "judicious" course, if the adoption of this course is then "unfree," is mere obedience and servility?
To pose this question is to know how it has to be answered. The affirmations of the Underground man that one must act contrary to reason to be free presuppose that he experiences his rationality as something other than himself. He of course must not literally believe that his own thoughts are someone else's (that would be insane), but there has to be a distance, a sense that they are at one remove from him, that they are not as intimately part of his own person, of his "real" self, as other things. There has to be a degree of disassociation. He has to experience his rational thoughts as somehow "on another side," as "objects" for a "subject," as "things" that he encounters and confronts.

And this is true of Dostoevsky's humiliated, spiteful, ineffectual clerk. In all sorts of situations his reason gives him sensible advice: not to force his way into the dinner party of his friends, where he is not wanted, where he will be grotesquely out of place, where he is bound to cause embarrassment and be the butt of every joke; not to persist in his protracted search for vengeance against the officer who "moved him aside" in the pool hall. But it is always the same. He experiences this "reasonableness" as only yet another bridle out to tame him (in fact it is the most insidious hindrance for it is the enemy inside his camp); and so he hears it out with fascination, but then runs on against it with all his gathered force, bursts through it, and does precisely the very thing against which he was warned. In his perception these rational counsels speak ultimately not for him. They pronounce the interest of society, or something even vaguer, the judgments of order and of lawfulness. Forces out to overwhelm him, to crush his individuality, speak in them in a voice disguised to be his own. Thus they are dictates and constraining orders, issued not by him but inflicted and imposed. To follow them is still to be led by a leash. His reason conveys to him at most how impersonal considerations effect and balance and outweigh each other. Acting in accord with it would therefore not be for him. They pronounce the interest of society, or something even vaguer, the judgments of order and of lawfulness. Forces out to overwhelm him, to crush his individuality, speak in them in a voice disguised to be his own. Thus they are dictates and constraining orders, issued not by him but inflicted and imposed. To follow them is still to be led by a leash. His reason conveys to him at most how impersonal considerations effect and balance and outweigh each other. Acting in accord with it would therefore but transmit their neutral and indifferent resolution. He would still remain but an anonymous passivity, an inertness submitting to a pressure.

It would be wrong to think of the Underground man's experience as bizarre and distant, and to imagine that anything so strange could only have small bearing on the normal and the close to us. On the contrary, the point is very much that he exemplifies in a strong fashion a syndrome that in its milder forms is known to all of us, and that is everyday and even humdrum. A really common situation in which we too experience our thinking as an objective process that happens at a distance from us is when we lie awake after a party and our mind makes up the witty comebacks for which it is now too late. We too grow then impatient with our thoughts, as they drone on like an abandoned tape recorder under our bed, and eventually we may turn on them with irritation and shout for them to stop.

A close parallel to the Underground man's extreme idea of freedom appears in a scene in the film made after the life of T. E. Lawrence. It occurs in the last third of the film when Lawrence is already in command of a small but formidable Arab army with a long string of brilliant exploits to its credit. After a temporary set-back Lawrence is in the process of preparing a major and well-planned campaign that promises hurt to the Turks and glory and loot to his men. He needs troops, however, and the scene narrates his interview with a proud tribal chieftan. "Your fame will spread far if you join me. There will be much money. This is your long sought chance to get even with the Turks. Together we will lead your people out of their servility. We will lift them up out of
their obeisance. You can be the father of a new, proud nation." The Arab sits unmoved and distant. Disdainfully he shakes his massive head to each of these reasons. But he knows full well what force they have, and he feels it. His gesture is a refusal, a fending off, really the sign of his determination not to surrender to their power. Eventually Lawrence's arsenal is exhausted. He has given every reason, and all have been repulsed with the same refusal, all have been parried by the same shaking of the head. So both men sit through a silence, till Lawrence is just at the point of rising and taking his curtain leave. Then at last the chief speaks: "I will join you," he says, "but not for fame, nor for money, not even for my people. Not for any of the reasons you have offered. I will do it, but only because it is my whim." This man acts in fact not against but with reason. Yet he tries to shroud this, to present it as a coincidence. If the action were the result of reason, it would be forfeited. Then he would only be the servant who does what he must do. So he insists that it was gratuitous, a mere whim. In this way he attempts to isolate his action from all outside forces, to give it autonomy and the guise of having come from nothing. He sets it free and thereby makes it more his own.

The generic view of freedom just examined is obviously "late." Housed in deep subjectivity, its gloomy flamboyance and desperate extravagance have a likeness to the final variation on a theme that recapitulates in brilliant willfulness once more the otherwise abated impulse. We turn now to the opposite point on this horizon and look to the beginning, to a very early and only sketched, still unsmooth and therefore all the more revealing philosophic presentation of a view of freedom.

It was the most tantalizing, the most Socratic of Socrates' paradoxes that set the stage for Plato's engagement with the problem of "free" action. With superb irony Socrates had cast his perhaps most upsetting doctrine into the formula of an apparent platitude: "No one errs voluntarily." What could be more innocent or less controversial? Who could possibly object to that? And yet, seen differently this seeming tautology articulates the essence of a view concerning man's relationship to evil that is anything but bland. Its implications make this very clear. If no one "errs voluntarily" then all evil (all wrong action) is the result of error or of a force major. So it in truth lays down the radical assumption that the "natural" impulse of all men is always in the direction of the good -- for nothing less would guarantee that man acts badly only when he is deceived or forced.

Socrates' deceptively uncontroversial formula dispenses in reality a universal exculpation: none are truly guilty. All are victims of ignorance or of coercion. How very untautologous this dictum really is becomes still more apparent if we compare it to Christian ideas, such as Calvin's "Elect," or Luther's "not through works, but through faith alone," which embody the very opposite assumption that man's "natural" impulse and even action is to no avail.

The essential benevolence and "charity" of his position were possibly to Socrates not much more important than the once more slightly covered implication that knowledge, and particularly the knowledge he communicated, knowledge of the Good, is then of cardinal importance, since once man has this knowledge the good will be invariably done, unless there is coercion. This, too, must have delighted Socrates' sense of the ironic.
That this idyllic vision, in which freedom and knowledge together suffice to make man good, accompanied the birth of freedom and of knowledge had portentous consequences for the later histories of both. But our concern is with the importance that Socrates' paradox had for Plato.

We know that Plato executed his philosophic enterprise amid a great shifting of values. The ethic that for us is still exemplified in Homer's poems, a structure of virtues appropriate for a warlike, not yet comfortably settled, feudal people, no longer fitted the Athenian city-state. Its plausibility had faded and new requirements were making themselves felt. Prowess, incontrovertible, actual success (often gained, no matter how) had been indispensable for the survival of the more precarious and externally more threatened agrarian society, and these therefore had been elevated to the rank of "virtues." In the old ethic the estimation of one's peers, and "reputation" generally, had counted for much: it represented the gratitude bestowed by this society on those who visibly excelled on its behalf, and it spurred on to feats of daring and magnificence. But now, in the polis, other virtues were more needed. Order, dependability, the qualities that bring about internal cohesion had to be enhanced, and therefore now the days of the "quiet virtues" started, pre-eminent among them those of Justice.

Two circumstances attendant on this change require our more particular attention. There is, first, the fact that the more ancient values of warlike excellence and visible success carry "their own reward" quite obviously with them. They still do this for us, and more than likely they did this even more conspicuously for the Greeks. The desire for the goals that they extol is indeed so "natural" that no further elaborate justification seems required, more particularly not if they have the support of long and colorful traditions. With respect to these values one thus could truly say that "no one errs voluntarily." That no one would on purpose fall short of the standards that these values raised, that no one would deliberately aim at weakness, or incompetence, or degradation, and prefer voluntarily failure to success -- that indeed could pass for an innocuous or tautologous assertion. But with the newer values about to take their place this is different. It is at least not obvious that orderly behavior, honesty, and justice are always "naturally" satisfying, especially not when they require sacrifices, and that no one falls short of these new values voluntarily is anything but evident. These values require therefore a justification in a sense in which the earlier values did not.

The second difference concerns the matter of "visibility." The older values of excellence and of success required actions that were in essence public, that displayed themselves to spectators and glittered in the sun. Not so the newer ethics of the polis. Justice and honesty demand adherence precisely also when they are not seen, when no one else is present. Their enjoinments therefore must dispense with the enticements of a "reputation," and this makes their justification at once more necessary and more difficult. (Hence Gyges' ring in The Republic.)

The complexity of Plato's involvement with the Socratic paradox and with the notion of freedom implied by it should now take shape. In essence Plato made this paradox the one main premise of his superb attempt to construct the sorely needed philosophic justification of the newer, quiet virtues. His strategy was natural, perhaps the only one available to him. His principal design was simply
to bridge the gap between the old and the new, to show that the same rationale that had patently applied to the old values was still true for the new -- though in a subtler way. It became his aim to demonstrate that justice and the quiet virtues were in the end as "naturally" desired as were success and excellence, that considered deeply they too "were their own reward," that rightly understood one would no more "voluntarily" fall short of them than one would "freely" seek disgrace and failure. The Socratic dictum was thus the Archimedian fixed point around which the whole undertaking of justifying the new values was to turn.

Thus Plato in essence substituted the new for the old value in the Socratic paradox. He shifted its meaning from the idea that men freely pursue honor and magnificence to the quite different notion that they freely follow justice. In this way he created the appearance that the new morality was not a requirement exacted by society but represented only what men "really" want. In the process he in effect imposed a false psychology. He sacrificed an accurate perception of man's actual desires to give to the new values an air of being natural and justified -- and the results of this are still around us.

This stratagem laid the base for the single idea of freedom that had more influence than all the rest, for now freedom was linked to the good, and only one small further step was needed to reach the notion that man is free when he acts in harmony with reason and unfree when he violates it. For Plato this was perhaps no step at all since virtue and rationality were for him most closely linked. ("Virtue is a species of knowledge.") In any case, the idea that one is free in following reason often underlies even the details of Plato's exposition. To give one example, in The Republic Socrates poses the question "To begin with the state, is it free under a despot or enslaved?" and receives the answer that under a despot a state is of course enslaved. Then he continues "If the individual then is analogous to the state, we shall find the same order of things in him: a soul laboring under the meanest servitude, the best elements in it being enslaved, while a small part, which is the most frenzied and corrupt plays the master. And just as a state enslaved by a tyrant cannot do what it really wishes, so neither can a soul under a similar tyranny do what it wishes as a whole. Goaded on against its will by a strong desire, it will be filled with confusion and remorse. Like the corresponding state, it must always be poverty stricken, unsatisfied and haunted by fear. Nowhere else will there be so much lamentation and groaning and anguish as in a country under despotism, and in the soul maddened by the tyranny of passion and lust." The point here is that a soul dominated by a passion or lust is as tyrannized and enslaved (as unfree) as a state is under despotism. That a soul governed by reason is in contrast free is clearly the intended other side of the same coin. (And it is easy to cross again from this side of the analogy back to the state and to conclude that the state too is free when reason (the philosopher king) governs it.)

Customarily the idea that freedom is obedience to reason is attributed to Hegel and that makes it easy to treat it as the sophistry of a "metaphysician" who was supposedly "conservative." But this thought is not so easily exorcised -- nor for that matter is Hegel. And I mean not only that the same idea occurs already back in Plato. Or, if it comes to that, also in Rousseau (dearer to liberal hearts than either Plato or Hegel), who in the Social Contract says
quite flatly: "For to be subject to appetite is to be a slave, while to obey the laws laid down by society is to be free." And of course also with slight variations in a host of other thinkers. No, I mean that this connection between freedom and rationality with its built-in guarantee that the exercise of the irrational and unacceptable will from the start not count as free is basic to the force and history of the idea of freedom. That presumption, together with its counterpart that freedom only means the freedom to be reasonable, gave much of its power and persuasiveness to that idea. Without that tacit understanding it would have been much harder for a subject to make his claim legitimate, and if it had not been for that guarantee rulers would have been even more reluctant to grant or furnish it.

How central this conception that has its root in Socrates' paradox is still to our view of freedom can be gauged from the ease with which we say that freedom is of course not license and that its counterpart is patently responsibility. These and other similar cliches would be without foundation on anything like the first paradigm of freedom we examined. If freedom is "caprice" then it most definitely does not end where "license" starts, and responsibility on that earlier view is not the condition but the death of freedom. These assurances hold only if something like the present view of freedom (the second paradigm) is presupposed. And that is some indication of just how pervasive and extended this view is.

Yet the roots of this view go even further down. It is implicit in many everyday experiences and also in much common language. If a man struggles against a temptation and loses (say, he does not want to drink but ends up drinking) we quite naturally think of him as under a...coercion. We might say: he did not want to drink, but his thirst was stronger, and it made him do it. This is so much the normal way of talking that it slips by us and arouses no attention. But it should, for it is really very curious. When we say "He did not want to drink, his thirst overcame him" we nonchalantly split one thing in two. We speak of the man and of his thirst as if the thirst were a separate thing. In a sense we do even more: there is one person who has made a resolution and who is also thirsty. These two attributes have equal status. But we arbitrarily end this equilibrium. We transfigure the resolution into him. He is nothing but this good intention and for it he receives full credit. The thirst, on the other hand, is sent to limbo. It is a bad, independent thing that he encounters and fights, like St. George and the dragon. There could be no question of his "defeat" or of his suffering "coercion" if something like this were not envisioned.

Plato's view has its base in this sort of experience -- and it is a matter of experience and not just of language, for we experience the thirst as something against which we struggle. One could conceive of Plato's principle as a generalization, as an inductive inference that moves from these experiences to the whole sphere of passion and of reason. In all probability there also occurred some interaction: this way of experiencing temptations very likely exercised some influence on Plato, but his authority in turn reinforced and spread the custom of this kind of thinking. Plato helped to make it "normal."
And the same holds for morality. We as a matter of course hold a man more responsible for premeditated crimes than for "crimes of passion," and we accordingly punish the former more severely than the latter. Again we say: "He was not responsible, his passion got the better of him" and this too sounds entirely natural and normal. Yet it again is actually very curious for on either of the two most current theories of punishment, those of deterrence and reform, one could argue that our practice should be precisely the reverse. Surveys might show that punishments for crimes committed after long and careful thinking are not nearly as effective as penalties for acts done in a fit of passion. Punishments might change people's passions more than their thinking -- especially if the punishments come quickly. If this were so we should be held more responsible and should be punished more severely for crimes of passion than for felonies that were premeditated. In terms of reform or deterrence this would only be consistent. But we refuse to do this, and to reverse the relative severity of punishments in this way would be morally repulsive to us. Yet why am I more responsible for premeditated acts and less responsible for acts of passion? Why is an act more mine when I have thought about it and less mine when I do it in anger? The anger is me too -- it may be more me than my thinking. The answer is that we here too assume something similar to Plato's notion; and in this case again some interaction probably took place: this manner of holding men responsible in all likelihood exercised some influence on Plato, but he in turn lent his authority to it and thereby reinforced this "habit."

This element in everyday experience and morality represents the bedrock -- maybe the sandstone -- on which this second view of freedom ultimately rests. All of its variously shaded formulations are supported by this common ground. Without it Plato never could have shifted the Socratic paradox to its new meaning, and if that base had not been there freedom and rationality could not have been linked together.

Now that we have a crude sketch of a second, very different "theory" of freedom we can address to it the same single question that we earlier put to our first example. Then we faced the extreme insistence that an act is only free if it is "completely independent," and we selected one element from this sweeping notion, the part which requires that a free act must be contrary to reason, and asked how a person would have to experience his own reason for this to be true. Now we have before us the exact denial of this proposition. An act, according to the present, philosophically far more prestigious notion, is free only when it is rational (even when it "obeys" reason), and we are unfree precisely when rationality is violated, we are "enslaved" when a passion or an appetite leads us to irrational behavior.

The simple-sounding yet, all the same, crucial question now is again: what experience is presupposed by this position? Under what conditions would this double claim (if rational then free, if contrary to reason then coerced) be not only plausible but true? How, in short, would a person have to experience his own reasoning for him to be always free when he acts according to it and always unfree when he goes against it? And further, what experience of all else that can prompt actions (of, for example, motives, passions, and desires) must someone have if he is always unfree when these other forces sway him against reason?
Let me quickly interject before we answer this that the claims involved are of course far from obviously true. Why should an act be "free" just because it is in congruence with reason? Or "coerced" because it is irrational? It is not at all apparent why there should be any such connection, why one should in any way affect the other. More particularly, why should it be impossible for the dictates of reason ever to oppress us? For it is an essential part of this view of freedom that this cannot happen, that reason can govern the passions, the will, and the conduct of the whole person, without any risk that it will ever tyrannize us.

How extraordinary this contention actually is becomes more evident if we recall that Hegel (in his early writings on Christianity, and in the Phenomenology) but also the German playwright and essayist Schiller conducted a polemic against Kant's ethic for the very reason that Kant had insisted on resolute conformity to the imperatives of "practical reason" -- very much with the understanding that in obeying reason one was of course free. Both Hegel and Schiller argued that Kant had invested reason with tyrannical powers, that he had split man in two and sold the larger part of man into slavery under the lordship of reason. They went on to say that this form of slavery was uniquely vicious since it divided man against himself and degraded him completely, making one half tyrant and the other slave.

But back to our question: what experience of reason would render all my rational acts free? The answer again is hard to miss. Clearly there is only one condition which would make this the case: I would have to experience my own rationality (or, if this is clearer, the dictates of rationality when I apply them to myself) in a fashion that is the exact reversal of the Underground man's -- therefore not as an impersonal voice that imposes alien commands from a neutral externality on me, but precisely as that which speaks most truly and authentically for me. I will be free in following the requirements of reason, no matter what they are, only if it and I are one and the same. Then it is obviously impossible for it to oppress me.

On the other side, all my deviations from the rational course will be coercions suffered by me only on the condition that whatever prompts them is experienced as somehow other than me. Everything that is dissonant from reason, that inveighs against it must be disassociated from me, must be something that I encounter and confront. Then I of course will be the victim in every case where it prevails. But not otherwise.

The mutual dependency between this concept of freedom and this structural division of experience is a simple logical connection. It would hold even if no one had actually ever advocated this idea of freedom. And it alone is crucial to our enterprise. The fact that all kinds of variations on this view have played their roles in the history of philosophy (and one could mention others besides Plato, Rousseau, Kant, or Hegel) and that it moreover corresponds to one sense of freedom that frequently crops up in everyday experience and language adds of course enormously to the interest of this example. But the main evolving argument does not hinge on this. It is concerned only with this view as a general type. In the various historical philosophies this view naturally does not appear in its simple, clear-cut essence. But the details of just how Plato or Rousseau (the General Will) or Hegel shaped and qualified the straight lines of this "model," or of how on its chessboard the controversies of "positive" vs. "negative" freedom, or of freedom vs. license were played out will be discussed when we are ready for them. For now I will only mention one example to give some idea of the explanatory power of this postulated pattern.
Consider Plato's well-known hierarchy of the human faculties in which reason is assigned the highest place, since reason raises man above the rest of nature and only its full exercise renders a man truly human. Here is the quintessence of the human; the emotions and the body belong distinctly to a lower order. This attitude toward reason clearly matches the presupposition which we discovered independently: the general view of freedom implicit in Socrates' paradox.

On the one hand this could be regarded as a kind of confirmation. We argued that a certain view of freedom presupposed a certain experience of reason, and it now turns out that Plato who held this view of freedom also maintained the corresponding view concerning reason. It is a little as if we had made a prediction that now has come true. But we could also regard it as an explanation, as affording us a deeper insight into Plato. We can now see how two seemingly separate parts of his thinking fit together.

But a third conception of freedom waits for us. This one has a plain and homespun quality. Without subtle iridescence, it is made of undeceptive cloth, meant for hard use. Like the other two it is a generic type that appears in a multitude of species variations which qualify the outlines of this prototype. Most fundamentally it draws the line between the free and the coerced in what appears to be the crudely obvious place: you are coerced if external, outside forces compel your action; you are free if this is not the case, if what you do is controlled or prompted by yourself. This rough-hewn idea of freedom of course again crops up in countless places. Its cleaver cuts the joints of practical, everyday decisions, its guidelines are invoked in court to govern legal determinations of innocence and guilt, and one could naturally cite no end of literary and of philosophic places in which it has been discussed. But one of the first and also most revealing treatments of it occurs in Aristotle.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, in the second paragraph of Book III, Aristotle defines "the compulsory" as "that of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion." And he reiterates this a page later: "What sort of acts could be called compulsory? We answer, that without qualification, actions are so, when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing." We, in other words, are coerced only when "the moving principle" of an action is physically or literally outside us and if that moving principle has been contributed by us then we are free.

Compare this to the other two ideas of freedom. In the first version the freedom of an act was already spoiled if it was conditioned by anything at all. Its claim was most demanding and therefore also most easily transgressed. To be truly gratuitous an act had to materialize as if from nothing; even mere rationality disqualified it and therefore even reason needed to be crossed. The "Platonic" conception was one step less extreme. If a desire or a passion or any other force controlled one's action then it was "tyranny." Only reason was exempted and we found that this was possible only because reason was thought to be the most authentic self. Our third example, the "Aristotelian" view (I only use this designation for easy reference) is once more less restrictive, but now by several degrees. In its interpretation the "moving principle" of an action can be not only reason but anything belonging to the agent, and as long as this is true the act will still be free. It does not become "compulsory" until the moving principle lies outside the total agent.
If we now ask for the third and last time our peculiar question about the experience on which this latest meaning of freedom seems to be predicated then the answer is once again as patent as before. If the Underground man could secure freedom only by transgressing reason, and if this was so because he experienced reason as something that society imposed upon him, so that even his own rational thinking was not "his own" but measured only the depth to which he had been invaded, and if in the "Platonic" view rationality becomes the very opposite, the guarantee of freedom because rational thought is now experienced as the only faculty that is truly self, then the "Aristotelian" view clearly presupposes that no parts of the acting subject are experienced as "alien," as belonging to the self in some lesser sense, part of it but still at one remove, somehow at a distance from what one "truly" is. Only if all parts of oneself are equally accepted as one's own can all the actions that flow from one's whole person be free, and only those whose moving principle is outside be coerced.

After all that has gone before it should not be too surprising that Aristotle himself says (in the first section of Bock III of the Nicomachean Ethics): "The irrational passions are thought not less human than reason is, and the actions which proceed from anger or appetite are therefore the man's actions."

This statement flatly denies Plato's disparagement of the irrational passions, emotions and appetites. It attacks Plato's hierarchy of the human faculties which gave primacy to reason and relegated the passions to an inferior state. In fact it almost sounds like a direct response to Plato. It is as if Aristotle had marked out a major difference that distinguished his own position from that of his teacher. To say that "the irrational passions are not less human than reason" creates an equality that to ears that had heard Plato must have been like blasphemy. For Plato had dubbed reason "divine" and to pronounce even the irrational passions as on a par with reason meant that sows now fraternized with the gods.

This again constitutes a kind of confirmation. As in the case of Plato, we decided independently that a certain theory of freedom presupposes a determinate experience, and now we find that Aristotle did indeed hold the corresponding view. We argued that his view of freedom required the equal acceptance of all elements in a person, and it now turns out that this was the attitude he advocated. But the more important point is once more that this illustrates a logical connection which would exist even if Aristotle had failed to observe it. The idea that we can be coerced only by external forces but are free if the moving principle is inside us inherently requires that the passions and the appetites are not banished to some outer sphere from which they invade us. Why should they always play the part of the opposing forces, and why should we (we being suddenly nothing but a pure intention and a high resolve) be only the innocent victims of their alien power? This view in the same way necessitates that reason be demoted, that the claim to its hegemony be discounted as a snobbish prejudice. Only one attitude is consistent with this theory of freedom: namely, that everything about us is equally human. We are not only our reason but all the rest is part of us as well, and it has equal status. We are all of our elements and none of these is less we than others. There are no gradations. It is reminiscent of Sartre's "You are the totality of your actions," except that this attitude goes further. Why single out actions? You are just as much your deceptions, fears, hopes, hesitations, feelings, and your body. None can be written off.
This way of relating to oneself seems so natural and so attractive and somehow so right ("we are obviously our total self; it is simply self-deception, or neurotic to think otherwise.") that one is tempted to conclude with premature relief that this is the "correct" relationship to one's experience and that the corresponding view of freedom is therefore "true," that it tells us what freedom "really" means.

Only to indicate how very far we are from this (we still have to climb up a whole level of abstraction) we should look at the other side. For this view actually runs into a sharp conflict precisely with common sense. It in effect denies the phenomenon of compulsion, and not just in a technical, say Freudian, sense but even in the very ordinary and old-fashioned meaning. On this position the excuse "I could not help it" can never be invoked when an act "originated from within the person." The other side of what at first seems to be no more than the welcome democratization of the parts of man is that we now have only one and the same relationship to all of our actions, that we are equally responsible for all of them. And this increase in guilt is at least a disadvantage or a difficulty that all those attracted to this view must face, and it in turn illuminates the motives that underlie the alternative contentions.

In the particular case of Aristotle one could conjecture that this implication was most unwelcome to him. So conceivably he thought of the equality among the parts of man as a most basic and important doctrine and regarded this consequence simply as a kind of price that needed to be paid for it. But that would have been an easy and uncharacteristic stance. Instead one might (but this is emphatically only a suggestion) read the Nicomachean Ethics with a view to this dilemma. This could throw light on the complex qualifications and restrictions which Aristotle introduced, for some were perhaps designed to on the one side keep the totality of man together and preserve the equality among all parts, yet to on the other side diminish the weight of this unwelcome implication.

The three specimens we have examined all point directly to the same conclusion. In each case we encountered one underlying principal distinction. To the one side of it lay that which we experience as separate and different from us, that which is "disassociated" and confronted, and once removed from the most intimate and genuine self. The other side of this division complemented and negated this: it contained the element that we experience as constitutive of our self.

I now want to suggest that we in general experience our component elements in two distinguishable modes or manners. I experience my desires, for example, either as wants or inclinations that are genuinely mine, or I experience them in a way that is analogous to my typical experience of external objects. In the latter case they "occur" as something that inflicts itself upon us. They break into our world and force themselves upon us as a given. They are like facts, opaque and solid in their presence. They insist on being dealt with, and we reckon with them. When I satisfy them I do it with a sense of surrender. It becomes a chore. In the other case a desire is experienced as something that emanates and flows from me, it is my wish, a form in which my being directs itself upon the world. We have a whole range of language to describe these different relationships to desires stretching on the one end from "obsession" -- a strong, uncontrollable, incomprehensible desire -- to the other end where we might say "for the first time in my life I did what I really wanted." Between these extremes lies a whole spectrum of graduated language.
That desires are experienced in these two modes is evident. Yet the same is true of most of the other elements that are constitutive of human beings. The Underground man illustrates the case of rational considerations, Plato that of passions; but hopes, too, and expectations, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and habits, as well as mannerisms, tastes, and preferences can be experienced in these two general manners. A thought can be a moment in my present project, the act which in this second sustains my existence for the future and thrusts it against the world, or it can be an indifferent, mechanical occurrence, the next event that happens on the stage, done not by me, but by an "it" that I observe. But the same is also true of our bodies, of the roles we play, and, of course, especially of our actions. I perform a gesture, or I witness my hands going through the motions; I am my body, or I inhabit it like a transient and unsettled tenant.

A strong example might do more than a tedious enumeration. In the single situation of having to parachute from an airplane you might experience your body as a thing that will not jump despite all your imperious commands, or you might experience the reverse: your thoughts and feelings might be fearful, but you might brush them aside, neutralize them as "expected symptoms," and permit your body to "take over," putting your faith into its reflexes and instructed mechanisms.

For the moment we shall concentrate entirely on the fact that there are these two modes of experience, that there is this cardinal division which runs through our consciousness, and that many elements can be experienced as either on the one or the other side of it. Whether all the components of a human being can be experienced in these two different manners is irrelevant to our topic. And all the other questions which are raised by this phenomenon -- questions like to what extent we can be mistaken about the location of an element, or how much control we have over the mode in which a given element is experienced, or about the general lawfulness with which this division shifts, will have to be postponed. Some of this will be important later but for now we are concerned only with the sheer existence of this duality.

The two modes we have distinguished are really two extensions of a continuum. But we shall for simplicity's sake treat it as an either/or distinction and refer to the gradations only when we need them. This will permit us to refer with one word to the relationship which a subject experiences as his own in the strong sense. We shall say: he identifies with them. In the other case we shall say that he does not, or that he disassociates himself from them. There are of course connections to everyday and to other technical meanings of the much-used word "identity." This is inevitable and in some ways perhaps even good for the very constrained and aseptic meaning I intend might give a more definite shape to the amorphous mass that now goes by this name. In any case the connections could eventually be illuminating. But strictly speaking I mean here by "identify" no more than was already said. The usual associations (empathy, value, etc.) perhaps cannot be entirely repressed but behind them stands now an unassuming yet firm fact: that something either is experienced in a certain manner or that it is not -- and this is all that "identifying with it" will here mean.

We still need a quick, economic term to refer generically to all those elements with which a given person identifies, be it for a period or his lifetime. I shall call it the area or locus of his genuine or true self. It is vital that this term
is not misconstrued. It emphatically does not refer to anything like a metaphysical or transcendental Subject, nor is it meant to indicate what this or that person "really" is and distinguish that from his masks or self-deceptions. No entity is involved in any way. This term merely summarizes into one class all the different components -- some desires, some actions, some thoughts -- with which a given person identifies, that is, those which he experiences in a certain manner. If we think of a person as a very large set of elements then the locus of the self is no more than a subset of this larger set, and as the locus of the self shifts, some elements are removed from this subclass and others enter it.

We can now observe that each of the three different views of freedom presupposes a different identification. The last, plain-spoken notion seemingly so close to common sense assumes that the subject identifies with his entire person. Only if the passions and desires, but also the rational resolutions and the body or anything else that can prompt an action are experienced as belonging to the self are all the actions whose "moving principle" is inside the person free. And only if he does not identify with anything that lies outside his person will all the actions whose moving principle is external to him be coerced. The line of identification in his case would have to coincide exactly with his actual existence. His self is firmly circumscribed against the outside world, but everything inside it is equally accepted.

The conception of freedom which is especially important to morality and which has played so large a role in philosophy assumes an identification with reason, and the opposite, a non-identification, with all other parts of the subject. Only if the subject identifies with reason and with nothing else, if rationality is experienced as constitutive of one's real self, while all the other elements of one's person are experienced in the other mode, as disassociated from it, will all the actions that represent an exercise of rationality be free and all other actions be coerced. The area of identification, in other words, has to be smaller. Only reason is the locus of the true self; the other parts of the subject are experienced as not belonging to this core. They confront it.

In the example illustrated by the Underground man the subject does not identify with reason. He experiences it as disassociated from him, as a force that he has to oppose and hence his actions were only free when he succeeded in this and transgressed the dictates of his rationality.

The next step is now easy. We have three different ideas of freedom and each assumes a different identification, but there is a simple correlation. Each of the concepts of freedom draws the line between the free and the coerced in a different place, but each also assumes a different identification and the two always coincide. A shift in the area of identification is always matched by the same shift of the distinction between the free and the coerced. In all three ideas of freedom the free acts always originate from the locus of the true self, and the unfree acts from elements that are disassociated.

On this basis we can now advance a kind of definition: an act is free if the agent identifies with the element from which it flows; it is coerced if the agent disassociates himself from the element which generates or prompts the action.
This means that identification is logically prior to freedom. Freedom is a function of identification, it stands in a relationship of dependency to that with which a man identifies. If there is no identification, there is no freedom regardless of all other circumstances. Tell me what a man identifies with, and I will tell you what freedom he possesses. Tell me what he experiences as dis-associated from himself, and I will tell you when he is coerced.

We now have reached one of the cardinal propositions of this investigation. The idea that the different meanings or theories of freedom result from different identifications represents the higher level "theory" of freedom that this chapter promised. Much of what is still to follow will be a development of the implications entailed by this proposition. But we are nevertheless still far from home. This definition is nothing like a neatly packaged final product. It is more analogous to a tool that will be used as we advance with this discussion.

So let us go back to our first example, that of Dostoevsky's Underground man. We have said that in his case an act is not free unless it contravenes reason and that this presupposes a nonidentification with his rationality. But this is only one part of his idea of freedom. To be free an act also had to be contrary to considerations of advantage or of value, contrary to his habits and emotions and desires; in fact it had to be "in opposition to everything" and completely "independent." We are again primarily interested in this as a type. It is for us one possible expression of the paradigm which insists that freedom is not freedom unless it is complete. Such absolute freedom may of course never actually exist; no action may ever satisfy these requirements and be in this sense totally gratuitous. Yet it is a fact that this idea haunts much of our thinking about freedom and therefore its presuppositions and the psychology behind it need to be explored. The question "But is this "really" freedom; does whatever has been said or granted mean that we are "really" free?" has a way of lurking in the background. One of the aims of the next few pages will be the disarming of this lingering sense of suspension. We have to see what being "really" free would actually involve.

Clearly it would not be sufficient if the Underground man disassociated himself from the cerebral and the foresightful but identified with his dark and mad passions. This would be more nearly the self-image of a romantic. The Underground man is not free when he acts out of an emotion, but he experiences his feelings too, just like his reason, as a noxious, irritating pressure which he sometimes inculcates correctly but which more often breaks in upon him when he least expects it and which then whirls him into a "vile" and "shameful" action.

He is free only when he flouts not only reason but also everything else that could have prompted or motivated or excused the action. The act must have no basis whatsoever. It must arise suddenly as if from nothing and from nowhere, a spark with neither purpose nor direction. It is as if a deed becomes truly his only through complete elimination. Anything at all that surrounds or attaches to one of his actions takes it from him and is enough to relegate him to the role of an ineffectual observer. The act must be sheathed in pristine isolation. Only then does it return him the assurance that it was his act, that for once he had not been the victim of manipulation.
There can be only one self-image behind this rarified and overwrought sense of freedom. He must not identify with any of his natural components. He experiences everything that he actually is as once removed from his "true" self. All his thoughts and acts and feelings happen like events that he observes as from a distance; they move like placards on the far shore of a river. His mode of experience gives a precise sense to the vague idea of being in self-alienation. Everything is for him an object. He himself is nothing but the point on the horizon from which everything is seen, he is only a pure incessant glance. It is as if the everyday experience of being too self-conscious, the incapacity to simply be or do and to end the division into spectator and actor in him had frozen into solid shape.

This conceptualization of the self, which places the "true" self beyond and behind all experience, which thinks of it as immune and out of reach, is of course very reminiscent of the philosophers' traditional Subject or Ego. And it bears perhaps even more of a resemblance to Sartre's ontology, where consciousness is defined as pre-eminently a Transcendence, as a pure "Nothingness at the heart of Being," as a hole, an emptiness, a Negativity in the center of existence. And these connections are suggestive: what is for Sartre the immutable and universal structure of consciousness itself is for us one possible self-image, a limiting case that results from the refusal to identify with any part of one's actual existence and escapes to a pure beyond, to a postulation. And Sartre's concept of "absolute freedom" is of course related to the view of freedom we are now discussing and again we find that Sartre in fact holds a view of the self which we reached by another route, which is for us no more than the assumption that his view of freedom presupposes.
What Makes an American an American

Leon Sinder

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Let me tell you something. I wasn't born in the United States, so I'll give you a non-American view. I think a lot of problems are insoluble. I think Americans don't think so, but I think that a lot of problems are insoluble. There are directions toward solutions, but these directions get longer and longer and longer as the problems become more and more known to us. It's the attitude that you bring with you to the problems. If you feel that you must have a solution, then you'll be torn apart constantly. If you feel, on the other hand, that total solutions are impossible but there are aspects of solutions that make life a little more palatable and meaningful, then I think we can have some discussion with each other.

What I'd like to discuss this morning is what I think makes an American an American. I know there are 210 million people in the United States. It's the height of ego—I really mean stupidity—to try to cover that big a canvas. There are always people who do not fit into this canvas. There are always groups who do not fit into this canvas. But the blindest person would have to acknowledge the fact that, if you live in China, there is a difference in the way you see the world than if you live in Scandinavia. Now, there are Scandinavians who see the world like Chinese, and there are Chinese who see the world like Scandinavians, but there's a definitive difference between the way the world view is seen in China and Scandinavia.

What I'd like to do this morning is discuss values, the way an American sees the world. Those of you who come from California, for example, will perhaps see it slightly differently from those who come from Maine. I've heard people say that California is a state of mind and Maine is a state of being, and both of them don't really exist. Perhaps that's true. People in northern California say that southern California is a cuckoo-clock country, and people in southern California say that northern California is somewhere "up there."

What is a value? To be pedantic, it's a way that people see the world, the way they see reality. Reality is a very difficult word, because it involves selection out of the totality of things which you see, things which you feel, out of history. Most human beings have their reality selected for them. For example, you were born into a noun-oriented world. The first words one learns in English are noun words. They're words of possession, like mother, father, things of that nature. If you had been born into another world, the first words you would have learned would have been active words, such as running, sitting, standing, and so on. We are very, very materialistically oriented from the time we can learn to talk and are aware of learning speech. That does not make it bad or good. That is, what I'm saying does not have implicit value in itself, but it's the way we begin to perceive reality. We say "my house," "my wife," "my car," "my" this, "my" that.
If you break it down, possession is an abstract. I may have a dollar bill in my pocket; I say "my dollar." I didn't print it (I wish I could). I didn't make the paper. I don't even know the process that's involved. If somebody asks what makes it mine, the answer seems to be, well, I possess it. What I possess is the transient thing: I usually give it to somebody else. Now it's yours. What makes it yours? Well, I gave it to you. I have the right to give something of mine to you. All these are part and parcel of our language makeup. We're not alone in this. The very nature of the way we see the world is in terms of the very nature of the first words we learn.

In this selected reality out of the totality of reality, our culture selects for us certain aspects to emphasize. For example, we are an upper-right-hand-oriented culture. If you want to sell something in the United States, you put the title in the upper right hand, because Americans look at the upper right-hand side first. Why not the middle lower? I don't know why. They don't. We are a pastel-oriented culture. There are other cultures which are green-oriented cultures. A lot of this is based upon deep, deep cultural history. All of this is selected reality, that is, the way the world is given to you to see. There's also physical reality. For example, I may be the world's greatest authority on art. I am accompanied by somebody who has excellent eyesight, 20/20 eyesight. I'm myopic; one of my eyes goes this way, one of my eyes goes that way, and I've lost my glasses. And we both walk into a museum and look at paintings. It's obvious I don't see the same painting he sees. If we have with us a man who happens to be an electrician, he's watching the same painting, but what he's interested in is the way the light hits it.

Have you ever gone to anything with a professional, like going to the movies with a professional movie maker? It's hard because he says, "There's a jump right there." But you say, "What about the book?" or "What about the film?" He says, "What film?" He's seeing aspects of reality.

My brother has a book-printing plant. I'm sure he's never read Plato, but he's set Plato for books. I said to him, "Maurice, have you ever looked at..." and he says, "Look at that beautiful type, look how clean it is." But what the hell does it say? What it says to him is what he brings to it. This is a form of sociobiological reality.

All of us have both of these, that is, the reality of our biological nature and the reality of our cultural makeup. To be very, very serious, you see the world at twenty very differently from the way you see the world at sixty or seventy. The very physical senses are different--your tastebuds, your hearing ability, the way you see reality. That's selective reality and physical reality.

There's another way of seeing the world, too, which we sometimes call insight, that is, not using the physical reality and not using the selective
reality, but using some kind of intuitive wisdom. Here we get into all kinds of arguments about whether this is a God-given idea, whether there are some people born with biological propensity for genius, or something of that nature. But it's obvious that there are people in the world in every culture--it doesn't matter where one is--it doesn't matter whether you're in the most primitive culture or the most complex culture--there are individuals who despite the selective reality of their culture, that is, the language they've been given, the way they see the world, despite their biological propensities for seeing the world, nonetheless see the world in a slightly different way from their fellows. Whether you can call this intuition or genius or....

I'm sure you've run across the fact that genius seems to occur at the same rate in all cultures; it's only the ability to pick out the geniuses which varies. In one age you may have fifty geniuses and in another age there doesn't seem to be one. And the question this raises is whether the fifty are not born or whether the other people are not selecting them out. All cultures in the world--all societies--have a few ways of seeing the world, a few underpinnings, a few keys, and these keys are the basic values of their society.

A value--again, forgive me for being pedantic--is a hierarchically structured way of seeing the world. It never has the same worth in the world. For example, we talk about murder and killing. They're both the same act, but one has a different value from the other. If you ask somebody, "Do you think it's wrong to kill?" for example, he may say, "Yes, it is wrong to kill." If you say, "Do you think it's more wrong to kill your mother than a stranger?" and if he says, "Yes, it's more wrong to kill my mother," then obviously he has a different way of seeing the world. It's not killing that's important alone, but in terms of whom, and so on.

For example, there's an apocryphal story that a young man went to ask Schweitzer if he believed in the reverence for life, and Schweitzer said he did. And he asked him why he built his hospital out of wood. All the hospital was built out of wood. Wood's a living thing. If he had reverence for life, why did he make a building? Now, here would be a hierarchical structure, a way of seeing the world, a value system.

In my opinion, there are very few values that men share. I know one that they share in common: it is better to be healthy than to be sick. That's the only one I know that all mankind shares. There are some cultures that feel that sickness is a form of health, like the Navajos, who are hypochondriacal. When they meet each other, the first question is, "How do you feel?" The Koreans, when they meet each other, ask first, "Have you eaten?" The Koreans are gluttons as a culture, an underlying value. You never have discussion in Korea of sex or anything else. The first thing you discuss (and in China too) is food. Ninety-nine percent of the discussion is food, 4% is politics, and you have to divide the rest into mundane items. It's their way of seeing the world. It's a little bit like a Jewish mother on Friday night: eat, eat, eat. And that, too, is part of a value system, an underpinning, a way of seeing the world.
Values are very old in society. They do not change rapidly. The technical aspects change, but the underlying realities do not change. It doesn't matter whether you're in a democracy or an autocracy, or whether you're having a revolution or you aren't having a revolution. The underlying values are irrationally held, they're deep in history, and they do not change rapidly. Now, there are only a few of them. They're based upon the interpretation that a culture or society gives to its history.

In very old cultures, like India, say, or China, the values tend to be more conservative, much more difficult to change, than they are in, say, new societies like ours. Let me give you an example. China had a revolution in 1912, based upon a Western idea, which is a rather fascinating thing. Sun Yat Sen's "San Minh Chu I," the Three People's Principle, was borrowed from a lot of ideas that he got from the West. Then they had another revolution in 1948, another major revolution which began in '26 with Mao Tse Tung. Now, Mao Tse Tung is supposed to be remaking China. So what does he do for New Year's? He writes a poem and draws a painting. Han Wu Ti, 210 B.C., wrote a poem and made a painting for New Year's. And every other Chinese emperor did. Mao Tse Tung lives where? In the Celestial City. New clothes, but same old China. Because it's a very old, old system and its underlying values are very difficult to change. Change is always traumatizing in an old system, not so traumatizing in a new one.

The beauty of America—and, my colleagues, seriously, I'm very turned off on a lot about this country—but the beauty of America was that this country represented a reconstituted (a little like milk) culture, a brand new culture, where all kinds of elements had been thrown into the pot and a brand new culture was supposed to emerge. In theory, with a new personality, a new set of values. Now, it's obvious that America doesn't come full blown, doesn't start in mid-air. It has to have some basis. So we borrowed from many places. But America's values are, in my opinion, unique because of their newness. We are a very new society.

We have a relatively old government; we are a couple of hundred years old now as a government. Most of the governments of the world are much newer than we are. But we are a very new society, and we mustn't mix up the two. When we talk about having had 200 years of democracy or something like that and most of Asia being only fifteen or sixteen years old as governments, that doesn't matter. Governments come and go like underwear. The people do not. Governments can kill you, yes, and they do kill you. And they can make your life miserable, but in reality, in terms of the world, they don't mean much.

I get a kick out of people discussing Greece; they always go back to the Periclean age. Greece hasn't had a democracy since 500 B.C. Why do people get all uptight about the colonels? What's new? Why is everybody uptight now about the lack of democracy in Greece? Greece hasn't had a democracy in 2500 years. We forget this, because we talk about
governments instead of talking about people. People have value. Governments are made out of people, but also there's a process of work that leads to a government becoming a thing on its own.

There are ideal values and real values. There are things that people say and there are things that people do. The gap between the two cannot honestly be too big. If the gap between reality and ideality is very, very big, then the society becomes schizophrenic. It goes crazy. There are primitive societies that have done this, actually willed themselves to immobility and death. Perhaps the modern world is in the process of doing just that sort of thing. How does any society in the world put its reals and its ideals together? We call it rationalization, we call it some kind of building blocks, and so on. The reality is always hedged with the ideality, and the ideality is always hedged with the reality.

People say, "I believe in freedom." Okay. What do you mean by that? I'm a captive of my physical makeup. Damn it, it can't get rid of this stuff, no matter what I do. I would like to be ten people. I'd like to have one of them right now in China, very fascinating. But I'm enjoying being here, too. How do you get rid of this corporeality? We're captives of that. We're captives of a time sequence. We're captives of many things.

So freedom is an ideal which is absolutely impossible to attain, perhaps like education, which is an ideal absolutely impossible to attain. You people may be knocking yourselves out about something that itself doesn't have to be knocked out about. There's a distinct possibility that maybe we've got as far as we can go, given the way things are constituted, and perhaps we ought to reconstitute our ideas about where we want to go. You know, to be successful is like saying, "Let's make an announcement that we've won the war and go home." It's an abstraction anyway; we don't know what the word "winning" means. A friend of mine says that's how we could solve all the problems of the world. Just tell the poor they're rich and the rich they're poor. Now, we have to change the value of what we mean by rich.

I'll give you one more example. The Indian government decided to have a crash program on birth control. They were really going to get across that it's bad to have a lot of kids. In Delhi, when you land at the international airport, there are two huge posters--I mean really big, as big as this room. One shows a couple who look like hell, torn clothes, haggard, and they've got eleven kids, dirty, stinking kids, everything hanging out. There's another couple that look very much as if they're from Boston; they're very clean, nice clean clothes on, two beautiful kids, the ideal American family, a boy and a girl. They're not blond and blue-eyed, because the government didn't have that much courage, but they're almost blond and blue-eyed. The message: You got eleven kids, you see how you're going to live; you got two kids, you see how you're going to live. That's how we see reality. If you ask an Indian, he'll
say, "Look at that poor family, they only have two children!" There are different ways then of seeing reality in terms of a particular culture.

The ideal and the real coexist, and they are contradictory. I think contradiction is known in the human condition. I think we are constantly in contradiction, constantly we are driven by ideals, we don't know why. For example, what the hell am I doing here this summer? I mean, I haven't cut my damn grass in two years! And I want to cut it. And I'm sure there are a lot of you who've said, "Why am I wasting a month up here, what the hell for? Supposing I missed this twenty-four days, would it make so much of a difference in my life?" and so on. Well, we are driven by these contradictory elements in us. I wish I knew what the logical answer was. I don't. I don't think anybody knows. We create systems to give ourselves logical answers. Things are as illogical, as irrational as the saying "I don't know." But we try to make these things coexist.

What are the basic values that I see espoused in America today? Before I answer, I must say that I think--I'm talking about America--that in the last few years there has been a speeding up, a beginning of change in the underlying basic values that I'm giving you. I think there is the beginning of the potentiality of a revolutionary change in the American value system, but it's just in its nascent beginning, and, like a very young plant, easily trampled.

What are the underpinnings of American society? Here we go. Despite what everyone says, I think there is a general emphasis in America on the puritanical tradition. We in this country have a concept of efficiency, we talk about efficiency, and it's very important. We're very proud of getting something done. I remember during Air Force days, there was a sign above the pilots' room: "The Difficult We Do Immediately, The Impossible We Do Tomorrow." We have a feeling that if we want to in this culture, we can do anything--go to the moon, tow the moon to Mars, bring Mars in, cure cancer, anything--and all we've got to do is make the thing work a little better. All we've got to do is get a better curriculum, get a few better teachers, have a little better relationship with the kids, have a nicer room, and it will work. This is our concept of efficiency.

We also believe in social service in this culture, that somehow or other--this is one of our values--you must give something back to society. What? Now, we believe that somehow or other we must give back--and this belief is shared by the biggest robber barons in this country, even the tax dodgers. We are the only country in the world to have Ford Foundations. There is no other culture that has this. In India, for a guy to give back to society, are you crazy? My uncle, okay, my cousin--but who are you? I don't know you from Adam. This social service, the idea that you must somehow serve society, is also an underlying value in America.

We also have an idea--and I know that a lot of you will take umbrage with each of these, and I wish you would--of responsibility, that somehow or other we have to be responsible for our actions in society. Whether
we're responsible by going to jail or by paying a fine or by something else, we are responsible.

In these concepts of puritanism, of efficiency, of social service, of responsibility—it's all one value. It's focused, in my opinion, on the in-group. It is not efficiency for the total culture, but efficiency for a small group. It's social service for a small group, and so on, but nonetheless, this is an American idea.

The small group sometimes extended. We have things like the "Commonwealth" of Massachusetts, the "Commonwealth," the idea that we are all part of a single entity in a particular area. Not the United States—I don't think the United States exists. I'm trying to make it exist today, I think.

I'll give you an example. You go to the movies. We have ratings for the movies—I don't care what you are or what your persuasion is. I was driving one day and heard them advertising a film about 800 or 900 people getting killed: this is a general public film, anybody can go see it. You get an X rating if a man's kissing a woman's breast. The act of physical affection, that's bad. But people killing each other, that's okay. Now, that is part of our puritan tradition.

We're a species of puritan puritans. We were democratic until it came to Jews and Roger Williams. The settlers had a commonwealth as long as it was their wealth that was common. Do you remember during the 1968 convention, when the Chicago police were interviewed, by and large they were horrified at the college students, they were horrified because they used profane language. They used four-letter words, and that for a Chicago middle-class or lower-middle-class guy who thinks that education is supposed to enoble you, not teach you four-letter words, was the worst thing, and he said that to you while he hit you on the head with a club. A clean word is "war"; that's a clean word. (The only graffiti I've seen done in Japan, by the way, four-letter words, was by Americans. I don't know what that means.)

We also worry about dress, long hair and short hair. When I was in Washington, I made what I thought was an empassioned talk for three or four hours, and I said something about not caring if my students come to school with their penises painted green. Here were three hours of what I thought was positive input. You know what I got back from Washington? They were worried about my saying I didn't care if my students came to school with their penises painted green. Three hours didn't mean anything. I could have given three Sermons on the Mount, four Platonic discourses. But that one statement made them all nervous. You see, I picked the wrong color.

Second value, besides this puritanism: We have a great emphasis in America on time in country or time in place; it is one of our cogent values. For example, we have the Daughters of the American Revolution, the First Families of Virginia, the ones who came here on the day before
the ones who came on the Mayflower the day after. We are extraordinarily
conscious of when we got here and when you got where you are. In
California, they'll always say to you, "There are only a few of us
natives." I wonder what native means, not Indian, certainly. You have
to decide whether native means pre-1912 or pre-1948 or pre-the-day you
arrive or post-the-day you arrive. If you ask a Korean peasant, "When
did you get here?" he looks at you as if to say "What the hell are you
talking about; what do you mean when did I get here? I've always been
here." If you want to show how people have made it in this country,
you say, "The Kennedys got here only a few hundred years ago as Irish
refugees from the potato famine area," and we say, "See, they've got it
made, they've only been here a hundred years or so." The worst place
in the world in the United States about the time-in-country hang-up is
where we are right now, New England. People paint paintings about mythical
ancestors to stick up on the wall.

Time in country and time in place are a most serious thing. A great
many Americans have only been here since 1939. This is a fact: most
Americans have been born here; 1939 is the cut-off point. We are a brand
new people—a very, very, very new people in place. Americans move a lot.
One out of every five families moves every year; 20% of Americans move
every year. There's an apocryphal story that a Frenchman who goes from
the left side of Paris to the right side of Paris gets a farewell party.
Same thing with a Chinese; for a Chinese to leave home is a traumatic
thing. Americans are highly physically mobile people. And time in place
is a very important characteristic in our value system.

We are also a vocalized democracy, but without pluralistic attitudes.
Here's what I mean. Our value system talks about the "melting pot"
principle, and I think that despite Oscar Handlin and a lot of other
people this is an operative principle in America. For example, there
are very few Americans who speak a second language. The reason is that
all Americans up until very recently had to learn English. And we try to
teach Americans standard English. For example, go to become an actor,
and show up with a Georgia accent. You know the first thing they have
to do? Break you of that accent. Then if you're in a movie about Georgia,
you relearn your accent. We have the king's English, or the queen's English,
or the Boston English, or whatever it is, but there is a single form of
speech pattern which we accept as valid. We vocalize pluralism, but we
really do not mean pluralism here.

This is a very important element, the forging, the creation of a
single entity on a pluralistic basis. When I came here, I was twelve years
old. I couldn't speak English, and we went on speaking French at home.
My mother was very worried about my crossing streets when I left school,
and I remember she used to come to school to pick me up. She'd call out
my name in French, and I would walk beside her as far away as I could.
I was the only kid whose mother couldn't speak English. What a disgrace!
The thing I wanted first to learn was English. People say, "You speak
like you're from Brooklyn," and I get a charge out of that. The people
who say that are from Kansas.
I'm not knocking this, but it's an American element: we vocalize democracy and espouse pluralism, but in reality we deprecate it. It's the ideal and the real in culture. We do not accept pluralism. The problem of the high school in South Dakota was a problem of Indian kids in effect saying to their non-Indian teachers, "Go to hell." And instead of glorying in their saying "Go to hell," we have to bend them to our American way. There has been a change in this, but this nondemocratic nonpluralism is part of our cultural makeup. Are we alone in this? No, but I'm talking about America right now. We deny the validity of the external contributing culture. I'm going to repeat that. We deny the validity of the external contributing culture.

For a long time Americans felt that the only place that there was "culture" was in Europe. If you want to see paintings, you have to go to France; if you want to hear singing, you have to go to Italy; and so on. We've had this kind of inferiority complex in terms of the external world, but an inferiority complex with a kind of smug sense of superiority, that you go over there to see the item they have. You go to see the aboriginal painting or singing, but the reality of the world is here.

Another element is to me of tremendous importance. That's the influence of the concept of abundance. I think that as a culture, we are a blessed culture. This country is so rich it's unbelievable. It is rich beyond belief, physically, in its abundance. The land in America was endless, the forests were endless, the resources were endless, and so one of our values was and is--despite all the ecology talk, a basic indifference to the predatory practices upon the land--this endlessness. We feel we will not run out of anything, despite all the talk about ecology. There are thousands of posters printed "Don't Litter." There are thousands of posters, and the biggest litter is the posters that say "Don't Litter." Now, it's been said that for every little red book that Mao Tse Tung publishes, a forest in China dies. For every campaign for ecology, a tree goes down the drain. Any of you ever pick up the Sunday New York Times and see the articles about not wasting natural resources? Kids bury automobiles; it's marvelous--they dig up the ground and bury a car in San Diego as a symbol of their antipollution idea and then they drive home from this meeting. Remember the movie "Easy Rider"? They were giving up the world in Volkswagen busses.

There's a book that I'd like to recommend in this context, a small book by Dorothy Lee called Freedom in Culture. Dorothy Lee talks about Dakota Indians being given seeds and told, "Look, you guys are starving; we'll teach you how to make a farm, plant, clear the land and so on." Two years later, the people come back and the trees are still up and they say, "What the hell's the matter?" The Indians had planted a seed here and a seed there to save a tree, very bad farming. They said, "What's wrong with you people? How dare we cut a tree? We didn't grow it, we didn't plant it; it doesn't belong to us; it's not our tree." I just drove up here--highway 84, highway 86, highway 90, highway 95. Is there any highway bill in this country that's ever failed to pass? Any?
This is the influence of the frontier and abundance. We are an extraordinarily rich country, and we will get richer and richer and richer. We’re like the profligate son whose father left him 100 million dollars in stocks, and no matter how he gambled it away, he got richer all the time, no matter how badly he lived. I’ll give you another example. Where I live, they were clearing along route 9A to make it wider because there was a dangerous spot in it. And I play games. I went over to the workmen; they had all this lumber cut, and I said “Can I take some of it?” and they said, “Oh, no, it doesn’t belong to you.” And I asked who it belonged to and they said it belonged to the State, because the State was widening the road. Two days later I came by and they had huge bonfires going; they didn’t know what to do with the wood, and the best way to get rid of it was to burn it. I couldn’t take it to burn it because it was State property, but the State could burn it. This kind of indifference is a prevalent attitude in this culture. It is an extraordinarily prevalent attitude—one of our basic values.

Another basic value in America: We have a cultural emphasis on the man of action; the doer is important, not the contemplator. Long hair, egghead—we don’t use those terms any more—but nonetheless in our culture a person who does something is the one who counts. “Publish or perish” is doing something. Write a book and it makes you a thinker; write two books, it makes you twice a thinker; you write four books, you’re four times a thinker; spend all your life writing books, you’re a great thinker. Doing is important; we have a basic contempt for activities which minimize activity. Now, I talk personally here. I’m a very garrulous guy, but I’m also a moody guy. If I go to a cocktail party and I’m just sitting down having a drink and I’m not saying anything, the hostess always comes over to me and says, “What’s the matter? Are you sick? What’s wrong with you?” Nothing! “Why aren’t you doing something? I’ll introduce you to…; he likes to talk about….” Well, I just want to sit and have a drink. You’ve got to do something.

Going, getting ahead, growing are important in our culture. This is true of business, for example. If you stand still in American business, you die. The motto is constant growth. I was in a university that had a kind of idiotic president, an absolute jackass, who used to give us speeches about how we are now the fastest growing private university in the United States. Well, cancer grows very fast too; we aren’t proud of that. The question is what kind of growth, what purpose. We are interested in doing. We’re very much doers. The Peace Corps are doers. The American military are doers. We’ve got to rearrange the world and rearrange the culture. On the political scene, we are doers.

Kids used to say, “No one listens unless you show them you mean it. You got to demonstrate or break windows or raise hell or do something.” The kids came to me one time because I’m very much against the war in Vietnam, and they wanted to know what they could do. Some of them wanted to close up the tunnels, you know, lie down across Lincoln Tunnel, close the bridges. I suggested, being a man in the puritanical tradition, that
they all walk down the street naked, just a quiet walk down Flatbush Avenue. Lie down in the road and have cars run over you—that's maybe all right. Nakedness? Well, I could understand, because Flatbush Avenue is one of the dirtiest streets in the world and you'd get dirty, except that a lot of the kids I suggested it to hadn't bathed for a while, so I was a cookoo clock.

I also made a peculiar suggestion to the Chinese government in February. I wrote this letter (I don't know if it ever got there) explaining that the Chinese could end the war in Vietnam very easily by marshalling ten million people. First day, a half million surrender—just walk into the town. Second day, a million. Third day, a million and a half. We would be shooting them not to come. That wasn't accepted. All right.

I had another idea—a politically active theme. This is not going to sit well with most of you. But if you study statistics, it takes a certain amount of time to kill somebody in a war; we know exactly the length of time it takes to kill somebody. That means that if you diminish that time, you save a life. For example, if it takes an hour to kill somebody, then if you can waste an hour, you save a human life. I suggested to North Vietnam, also facetiously but seriously, that they should take 100,000 girls, the most beautiful girls they had, fit them with intrauterine coils, and parachute them naked into the front lines. Well, on the face of it, it sounds absolutely absurd and dirty. But, first of all, intrauterine coils prevent birth, so I'd create no problems there. Secondly, imagine Americans, 500,000 Americans, shooting these girls! If they wasted an hour each, I would have saved maybe five or six thousand lives. I think that's a pretty good idea. People thought I was insane.

So a value in America is action. No one listens unless you grow, unless you're big, have power, youth—and it's true in academic life, too, very true. The one thing you don't want in academic life is a thinker. You don't know what that little cookoo clock's going to do next, and if he publishes, he's on record, and you know what to do with it. All groups participate in this value in this country. There's admiration for the man who made it, and that's true whether it's the Godfather or John D. Rockefeller. It's true in war, it's true in our ideals, our value system.

Out of these true values—there are others—comes the basic set of paradoxes. I think we are basically an anti-intellectual culture. We have inordinate pride in intellectual productions. Let me repeat this. We are basically anti-intellectual; we don't like people to think. In my opinion, we're afraid of them; but we're very proud of the productions of thinkers. We're proud of the size of our libraries. Whether people read the books or not is beside the point. We're proud of the size of our faculties, the number of Ph.D.'s on the campus. If you want to judge a school, the first thing you do, if any of you ever sat in on a rating committee, is take the back of the catalog of the school and flip through and see how many Ph.D.'s there are. There could be 65 SOB's, but they've
got the degree, and the school is rated plus. If you want a graduate
department--I've created graduate departments--you go to the State, and
your faculty has to have Ph.D.'s. Are they good, are they competent?
Are they decent, are they human, do they care about the human elements
that are input into the classroom? Utterly immaterial. We are inordinately
proud of towns, for example, and talk about special individuals that
they have, a famous writer or a poet. Ipswich, for example, John Updike.
But we do not want intellect to interfere with the business of running
society. We're proud to have an Einstein, but stay in your laboratory,
Al; leave politics to the people who know. Who are the people who know?
The people who do not want interference by intellect. We're proud of it,
like animals in a cage.

In 1939 I took a course at City College with Bertrand Russell. He
was fired in 1939, because a little girl from Brooklyn got pregnant and
her mother filed a law suit saying that she was influenced by one of
his books. He didn't make her pregnant, which might have been something;
his book gave her a state of mind that made her pregnant! Therefore,
we took away the platform from him. I don't have to tell you that this
is still a cogent argument, whether you're dealing with a Marcuse or
anybody else.

We also have another value in this culture: a tremendous emphasis
on organization. We believe very strongly in organized activity. We
organize things; we are geniuses at organization. But at the same time
we vocalize individualism. Let me give you an example. IBM, which is
one of our giant corporations and deals in imagination and brilliance
and genius and so on--Mr. Watson of IBM came out with a directive one
day that the one thing he would not countenance in his offices in the
summertime was shorts on men. Evidently there's a correlation between
the length of the pants and the length of the thought. The shorter the
pants, the shorter the thought. And the longer the pants, obviously--
genius. We vocalize individualism, but try to go to school in shorts
at a university. We vocalize our ideals as individuals; the reality
is corporate, organized behavior.

Comment: We've heard about all these values relative to other cultures,
but you compared it with China and India. What about European cultures?
Aren't some of these values extant there also?

Sinder: Well, it matters which value you take. For example, the ideal of
time and place, in terms of European culture, doesn't exist at all.
And if you take the ideal of intellectual achievement, in terms of
European cultures, it doesn't exist. In that respect, we're very much
like the Russians; we use our intellect and our ideas and our strength
for a particular purpose.

Comment: Then all of these, in your estimation, are uniquely American?

Sinder: Not uniquely American. The compendium of all of them makes what I
would call a unique American, but some things are shared with a lot of
cultures.
I haven't mentioned youth. In America, if it's new, it's better than if it's old. In China, if it's old, it's better than if it's new. The item is not what's important. A new system here is better than an old system. We won't let an old building stand in the way of, let's say, a housing development. In China, they'd build around it.

Something else that's American: In my opinion, we don't really have any knowledge of hard times, physically hard times. I think Americans by and large are a culture which consciously accepts the idea that technology will lead to ever increasing betterment in their society, whether it's an argument about whether you should have $6,500 given to a poor family, or whether there should be retirement at a certain age, or whatever. We have a feeling somehow or other that life will always be better, and we don't have any real remembrance of hard times in this society, in terms of war, in terms of depression, or anything else. There are individuals who do have some memory of hard times, and there are groups who do have memories of hard times, but I think as a general culture we really don't have any memories of hard times. There's been no famine in this country as a historical phenomenon. There are hungry areas in this country, but there's been no famine to speak of. There are places that are devastated by floods or hurricanes and so on, but we see these as a kind of abnormal visitation by abnormal nature, a freakish behavior. We don't really have a conscious memory of life as a difficult process. This is part of our values. I call it a permanent revolution of increasing expectation for material betterment.

In our educational system, we have a subcultural grouping—we argue about education for whom. I would like to have you think about education for what. One of our basic values that we argue is whether we extend the franchise in education, whether we educate more people. We have terms like "educable" and "nineducable." We have terms about education which imply that we still focus on the noun aspect of our culture and the individual. And I'm raising the question: education, not for whom, but for what?

The nature of American character is changing, in my opinion. The change is more rapid than in old cultures, say, French or German and Russian or Chinese culture. But the underlying basic value system in America is dualism of democracy versus pluralism, the ideal of permanent expectation of things becoming better, the sense of technological ability to deal with the world, the idea of endless abundance in nature, and so on. These, I think, we all share in common.
The Authority of Biosocial Factors
Leon Sinder

This presentation was made at the Durham, New Hampshire, Question of Authority Workshop, July 1972.

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What I will talk about this morning is the concept of authority from the biosocial viewpoint. Before I begin I would like to say that it seems to me a great many of the discussions on authority that start out with philosophical or psychological elements really miss 90% or perhaps 95% of the reality that's involved with man. Man is an animal, much more like other animals, particularly other mammals, than he is unique. That is, unless you go along with people like Teilhard de Chardin who have begun to maintain that modern man or new man starts as a brand new phenomenon and that we have to think of him in that way. What I have addressed myself to this morning is this physiological or biological nature of man and the kinds of demands that are made on him—if you want, the authority of nature that's demanded of man and the really minimal amount of freedom that man has to choose and pick the kinds of life styles and the kinds of lives that he will lead.

You all know from the little blurb about our respective backgrounds that my training was in anthropology. My orientation tends to be philosophical, but my training was in anthropology. A great deal of anthropology, particularly in America, began, in my opinion, in two ways. It began first as a gathering of culture, as a gathering science, when people, as early as Thomas Jefferson, began to realize that there were elements in this country that were disappearing very, very rapidly and that they would like to save some of the residue of these elements. The Lewis and Clark expeditions, for example, were attempts to gather a fast-disappearing culture's life style and put it down for the benefit of the culture which would dominate. That is, the American Indians were being decimated as early as the nineteenth century, and the Lewis and Clark expeditions were the beginning, in some ways, of anthropology. Another approach was the collecting approach of Otis Mason, in which people went out and picked up the arrow points and so forth for other people to look at later on.

A more modern approach—and I don't want to sound too pedantic—appeared in the early 1920's with the Germanists headed by people like Franz Boaz. They came out of such rigid disciplines as geology but began to address themselves to problems that were more cogent, problems like race. There was an attempt to use anthropology to prove or to refute certain biological theories. This kind of refutation seems to be necessary periodically. We are now going through this catharsis again: people who are potential Nobel Prize laureates have to defend themselves against statements they make because they involve political issues like race. But I would like to bypass all of that and start discussing man as just the biological animal.

Now, before we do this, one of the ways to look at authority is to ask how it is determined. How do we determine authority? If we deal with just man, we can start out with man as a culture-bearing animal, and we say that authority could be determined by the culture which he comes from, the culture into which he's born. This is the view of the superorganic: that is, that man makes very few choices for himself. For example, he's born
into an English-speaking community, he may be born as a Caucasoid, he may be born as a Catholic, he's given a name, and, very often, it's predetermined whether he's to be allowed to live or not. Many cultures used to practice female infanticide. There were cultures that started out by telling you whether you were wanted or not. For example, in ancient China a great many names for girls were "one too many" and "girl too many." You were given a name, oftentimes, after you were born, which already indicated the role that you would play in life. Now, that was a tremendous authoritarian statement, to be called One Too Many. In our culture, we have a little bit of this. The names that people get oftentimes--Tuesday's Child and Wednesday's Child and so on--predetermine the kind of lifestyle you will have by determining the way you're accepted into the culture.

How authority is determined for one culture-bearing man can be argued from many, many viewpoints. You've already heard some viewpoints here. It's undoubtedly true, however, that one of the determinants--in my opinion, the major determinant--is the very nature of the biological animal which is called man.

Now, aside from how authority is determined, another factor that comes in is how it is carried out. It's one thing to say, "How is authority determined?" It's quite another to determine how these determinants are carried out. For example, if you live in a dictatorial society, the ways of carrying out the dictates of society are very different than if you live in a nondictatorial society. You may carry out authoritarian behavior by tacit consent or by nontacit consent, by fear, by ostracism, by lack of approval--there are hundreds and hundreds of techniques. The most important technique to me, however, is the biosocial technique. Therefore, I am saying that not only is authority determined by the biosocial nature of man, but authority is carried out because of the biosocial nature of man. I'm not trying to be simplistic here. Man does create myths, he creates his gods, he creates his culture in many ways--but there are predeterminants for his cultural creation. And these predeterminants are things that are in the very nature of the kind of animal he is.

Let's start then. Basically, this animal that you call man is perhaps four million years old, perhaps a little younger, perhaps a little older. He shares... Note I'm saying "he." Here we could get into a very big argument. "Why he? Why not she?" I understand there's a new book out--I haven't read it--by an English pseudo-something, not pseudo-female, but pseudo-something. It's a takeoff on Darwin's The Descent of Man, and it's called something--The Descent of Woman? That's too obvious. I didn't want to accept that. Man is supposed to originate in the water, and it goes into the whole bit of some kind of evolutionary process involved with proving that women are superior. It's not necessary. I think women are biologically superior to men. The idea is superior for what? I often think of Darwin's survival of the fittest, of two male deer challenging each other for survival, the strongest deer being challenged by the second strongest deer, and while they lock horns the unfit-for-survivals breed. These factors must be taken into account.
Man has been around as an animal for perhaps four million years. We can argue whether he's changed in those four million years, whether his thought processes have changed. We know from endocranial casts that his brain capacity has changed. We know--when I say we know I mean it's generally accepted in science, and you've heard (NHF Working Paper E-1003) an extremely valid view that a fact is a fact until a new fact makes the old fact a nonfact. That's what we're really saying--keep our minds open to this all the time.

But there are certain bases for accepting certain kinds of truths. There is a correlation between brain size and brain capacity. It's not a one-to-one correlation when you get to animals whose brain sizes are fairly similar. But nonetheless there is a correlation. For example, the brain size of man and perhaps an elephant compared in terms of mass--fairly close. But in terms of the kind of structure that houses them, the elephant can go up to fifteen tons, a whale can go up to ninety tons, a man perhaps 150, 200 pounds. (There's really not an infinite plasticity in the human form. You don't find, basketball players and Sumo wrestlers notwithstanding, you don't find nineteen-foot people who weigh twelve or thirteen hundred pounds. So far we haven't found them. Man really varies very little compared to other animal forms.)

Nonetheless, the earliest man--from the time we can determine what we call man--his endocranial capacity was probably 600 cc. Modern man is anywhere around 1440 or 1450. Now, that leads us to some argument. Classic Neanderthal, about 175,000 years ago, had over 1700 cc cranial capacity, and people have raised the point whether the parts of the brain that were more convoluted, if you want, in the Neanderthal, are the same parts of the brain that are in modern man. And some scientists have said no. Nonetheless, man for four million years has been pretty much the same. Biology in terms of human beings, although by some scientific segments speeding up, is nonetheless a relatively conservative thing. The human form has remained fairly constant for a very long period of time.

Anthropologists deal with a series of minutiae. They want to prove to each other that they're all geniuses, so they create names like Pithecanthropus or Sinanthropus and put something at the end; you call it Pithecanthropus erectus or Sinanthropus pekinensus, and since nobody knows what that means that makes you a genius. Like a doctor who writes down a prescription to give you an aspirin, and the guy's a cookoo clock, and you pay $8 for a prescription. If you want to say this is a human constant, I think that you might say so.

Man, then, as an animal is about four million years old. Now, when I say "about"--he may be much older, he may be much younger. The argument waxes and wanes. Some Swiss anthropologists say that man differentiated as early as ten million years ago. Some other people say that all this business of millions of years is sheer nonsense, and that we shouldn't really accept this kind of thing. And it matters where you draw your criteria. Whatever it is, man is a relatively new creature and yet not so new.
But man is overwhelmingly an animal. He shares a lot more with the animals that surround him, with which he is deeply associated, than he differs from them. What does he share in common with all living things? All animals have to take in energy of some form or another—food or whatever. The other day we were eating lunch. A very pretty girl with long legs, a blond girl, nice-looking teeth, who looked like she was about to fall down, was serving us. I asked her what she ate, and she said she was on macrobiotics. She has chosen a particular form of diet, but whatever diet we choose we must take in some form of energy. Our energy is not like photosynthesis. We can't stand out in the sun and turn our faces up and let the water run on us and the sun beam down on us and live—we're just not going to do it. That's all there is to it.

If we have to make some choices, social choices, about killing or not killing, for example, these choices are precluded to us because man must kill something to eat, whether it's a grain, a living thing, or another animal. He does. It's obvious that he does. It's obvious that in so doing we can make judgments. We can say there are higher forms and lower forms and so on. Those are self-deluding judgments. They are important self-deluding judgments, but nonetheless they are self-deluding judgments. It's a little bit like the Schweitzer story I told you the other day, where the reverence for life does not extend to wood. Again, without being too pedantic, there are studies going on right now with flowers—I don't know if any of you have read them—where flowers recognize their execution. There have been tests done by electricity, special instruments, to show that if a man is in a greenhouse cutting flowers and then approaches other flowers, there is a change in the pulsation that the flowers give off. Grass has been tested now, and it gives off sound as it's being cut. Of course, this is a projection of us onto the grass, and maybe the sound is "Hey, speed it up; I'm enjoying this." But the fact is that there is reaction, and there are reaction patterns. So man must, like every other living form, take in some energy. Simultaneously with taking in energy...

All of you who want to get picky with me could say that all things, nonliving things, are forms of taking in energy, and here we could get into a fascinating discussion as to whether there's such a thing as a nonliving thing. Does prelife presuppose life, and does life presuppose prelife? And where do you draw the line? This is not a small subject, and we could spend, I guess, months and months on this point—where do you draw the line between life and prelife?

If you take in energy in some form, you must give out some waste material. This energy has to be transmuted into use and some waste material must be given out. If you deal with living things like trees or plants, the waste materials can be utilized by other living things in the oxygenation process. But some waste material must be given out. And here we have two bases for life: one is the taking in of energy, the other the giving out of waste material. A third one is that the living form, in order to perpetuate itself, must have some way of reproducing. Now, this is a very simplistic statement. When we get to man, the reproduction cycle is very complicated, not only biologically complicated but socially complicated. All else being
equal, everyone in this room, if they have the biological capacity—that is, if they're premenapausal—could reproduce. It's obvious that, unless we have some things going on that I'm not aware of, none of you is going to reproduce with each other in these three weeks. Certainly it'll take you a little longer than that. You might begin the process, but there is a time factor.

These three things—the taking in of energy, the giving out of the resultant energy or waste, and the reproductive process—are part and parcel of all living things. Man shares with all living things these three. I'm not exhausting other items that are equally important, but I've chosen these three on purpose.

What separates man? What do I mean when I say the authority of the biosocial forces from just these three? In my opinion, by the time we get to mammals and to prehominids, if you want to include the anthropoid apes, 75 million years ago, there was already present another factor which was biosocial, which was tantamount to these biological factors. Without these three which I've chosen to delineate, this living form cannot go on. The individual living form may go on, but the form itself, special form, cannot go on. That is, if we have fifty forms and all fifty stop breathing, obviously you're going to have the death of the form after a given period of time in terms of the length of its lifetime, its individual lifetime. We may have only one or two of the forms breathing; that may be sufficient to keep the species going.

In my opinion, probably at the beginning of the mammalian differentiation, another factor was added. I call this factor the need to belong, tantamount to a biological factor. Man, being one of those major mammals in the world (the dominant mammal if you think in terms of power), has added to these three biological elements a quasi-biological element (because it's not measurable, it's not part of a physical body, it involves something beyond the physical body itself)—a need to belong, to be part of a group. Whether this is instinctual in the early mammalian forms or whether it becomes social in the later forms like man is really immaterial here. Many studies, as early as Wolfgang Kohler's Mentality of Apes, have shown that if you separate a form from its group, it will do almost anything to get back to the group. If you take good care of it, if you feed it, if you love it, it nonetheless will make the try if it has an opportunity to rejoin its group. Group behavior, group association becomes more important even than the individual's biological persistence. Studies have been done lately by people such as Jane Goodall, people who've done in-depth studies, living with the group for nine months, ten months, a year, to the point where they've been accepted as being part and parcel of the environment, of the group. You've read about this in relation to these pseudoscientific phony books like The Territorial Imperative, which in my opinion is out and out garbage, but sells—I'm jealous as I can possibly be.

These studies have shown that anthropoid apes, for example, recognize not only internal motives for other groups' behavior but recognize small groups as being more important to them than the larger groups. For example, you
have a small group of anthropoids (they usually run a maximum of fifty or less in the group) and, for one reason or another, there's a point at which the group splits and another group comes into being. There's a maximum point of a sense of group association, and after a while the group splits. There's also recognition of group motives. For example, if an anthropoid ape lives in an area--here's where we mistake that territorial imperative--and has another ape invade, he will drive him out. But if a Neanderthal comes into this area to do exactly what the anthropoid has done, eat up the tree or whatever, they will not react. It's as though they recognize the internal motives externally. Now, this sense of group belonging is to me a biosocial characteristic, tantamount to the same thing as the intake of energy, the giving out of waste, and, if you want, reproduction.

Who determines the group? Do they recognize this group as a distinctive idea? Are you told who this group is? And so on. Well, it's obvious that here we could play what I'll call a germanic game because it's interested always in speculation about origins. We have to start somewhere by saying that man now lives, whether we like it or not, in a series of already predisposed groups, wherever you go. Some of these groups are based on national origin, some of them are based upon race, some of them have religious bases. But everywhere in the world man groups himself. Nowhere are there hermits. A hermit is a hermit in English, or he's a hermit in Japanese. His dreams come to him in the language of a group. Man cannot--and this is not John Donne paraphrased--live alone. It is an utter impossibility. The need to belong, in my opinion, is the prime characteristic of being a man. This need to belong is not for man perhaps instinctive anymore; perhaps there are no instincts. The socialization or cultural processes have perhaps driven out all instincts. But this is tantamount, in my opinion, to biological instinct.

The authority of the need to belong. I want to emphasize this again, because the need to belong is a form of biosocial authority. To remove oneself from one group and to join another group takes the strongest form of will; to pick oneself up and remove oneself, to readjust, to live elsewhere, is a conscious powerful act done under only the most stringent compulsion. I don't want to go back into the formation of the American cultural character, but you all know that when people leave a country in which they were born, for example, there are two ways they can leave: they can leave by pull, that is, to go somewhere where it seems life will be extraordinarily better; or they can go by push, that is, because life where they're living is extraordinarily difficult. Overwhelmingly, groups leave by push; individuals leave by pull. One or two people are adventurous; they are pulled. But groups never are pulled. They don't leave the graves of their ancestors readily, they don't leave the tree they planted as a child, things of that nature. It's a traumatic experience for all human groups to move.

Perhaps we could understand the American cultural character a little better in this context and realize that Americans are one of the few people in the world that have voluntarily moved and have done so from the time they became Americans. That is, there were people in groups who
picked themselves up from Massachusetts and went to Ohio. They ran out of land in Massachusetts evidently. It was so "damn crowded in the seventeenth century" around Boston that they had to move to the woods. It's a very interesting phenomenon of Americans, and a characteristic very little commented about.

This need to belong is to me an authoritarian principle impinging upon the nature of man. Groups reinforce this; they use this, but they don't create it. It is already in man. There are no individuals; there are no human individuals. There are people that have specific characteristics; we single them out from the group by those specific and unique characteristics. But there are no individuals. Einstein had to go to the bathroom like the rest of us, and he died as the rest of us will die. An ape, whatever he felt or thought about the kinds of things he was eating, had to eat. Man varies because he eats only meat on Tuesdays and fish on Fridays and he makes a big deal out of it. But no man ever says, "I will not eat," because he can say that only up to a certain point, and then it says, "No longer will you not eat; you will die."

These characteristics are authoritarian characteristics. Man creates symbolic systems to break this. For example, in certain religions, man says there's no death; there are only stages of life, and he kids himself—in my opinion. Certain religions talk about the circularity of life. They even talk about the possibility of logical thought or irrational thought. All these are abstractions from reality. They may not exist at all. There are some philosophies that say all the world is an illusion, and a discussion of an illusion is an illusion, and here you've got a tautological statement. If the discussion were an illusion, it must be a real discussion, but how can it be real if it's an illusion? And somewhere along the line there are some realities, one of them the reality of this biosocial factor, in my opinion, of the need to belong. Every type of anthropoid and man have shown this to be the case.

Within this need to belong, however, there are variations. How big a group do you need? There are certain institutions that are older than men that still persist—the family, for example, is older than man. Anthropoids recognized families, and so do forms even older than anthropoids. This recognition pattern may be instinctive; it may be postinstinctive, that is, social. But the family as a unit—note, as a unit, not necessarily the husband/wife/child relation, but the family—is a form of belonging. People may say that animals need to form a sense of union in order to perpetuate the offspring, and it's a "biological imperative." We can say it's an authoritarian principle within the confines of nature. Animals must create familial units for shorter or longer periods of time in order for this unit to perpetuate itself. And that is authoritarian. To do away with the family is out of the question, and people argue whether the family is falling apart or isn't—it's sheer garbage to argue that. The makeup of the family may vary—that is, one man/five women, five men/one woman, or an old lady and a young man. That's okay. We can play that game. But we kid ourselves when we think that we have free will—rational behavior—to play this game ad nauseum. We are playing within the confines of A to
B, not A to Z, and a very fixed A to B at that. Now, marriage—that's something else. Marriage is a legal state and so on. I don't know if animals marry, but one can say that they go through certain courting dances and so forth, and who's to say they don't consider that marriage? Well, that's again a game we play.

This need to belong, the creation of family patterns, and so on, is authoritarian, the authority imposed on us. A second biosocial authoritarian principle, which particularly afflicts man but I'm not certain that it doesn't affect other living forms, is the consciousness, whether it's instinctual or social or cultural, of the passage of time. No living form does not have imposed upon it some consciousness, whether it's instinctive or not, of the passage of time.

There's a behavioral pattern which begins to vary as the animal form matures. Whether the behavioral pattern is in terms of getting food, whether it's a sexual drive, or something else of that nature, all animal forms, and man most of all, become conscious of the authority and the passage of time. No culture in the history of the world ever mixes up generations. Older people are always older than younger people. Now, that's not a nonsequential stupid statement. They're always older, maybe not more important, but always older. There is no way to reverse generations, no way. If you kill the parents, then the young eventually become the parents, who are killed by the young, who are then the parents. There is no way you can give birth to your father. It's an impossibility. Now, this is an authoritarian principle, the passage of time.

There's no way to arrest, biologically speaking, completely the cessation of the particular unique form. We are born to die: it is an authoritarian statement. Some people say we are born to live, we are born to do other things. That's a game we play. These are very deadly serious games, but they're games. We can create supersystems out of them; we can create religious systems out of them, philosophical systems, dialectical systems. But the authority is again a biosocial element. All living forms age. Aging may be slow, imperceptible in some forms; it may be rapid in other forms. All living forms age, and the aging process demands of these living forms specific sets of behavior patterns.

A seven year old girl in our culture may be exposed to all the sensual literature in the world, and she may be a genius, but unless there's something dramatically different about her body, no matter what she does, she cannot reproduce. No matter how many books by Masters she reads, it's just not possible. There have been cases of five year olds and all the rest, I know; I'm a little bit suspicious.

Simultaneously, although we don't know too much about the again process, animals age, all of them do, and age is an authoritarian demand upon them to change their behavior patterns. I may think I'm twenty-five but I'm fifty, damn it. I don't like that, frankly, but there's very little I can do about it. Oh, I can say I'm a beautiful fifty, but, damn it, it's fifty. This is a very important fact, an authoritarian imposition on the human condition.
You may want to project this onto thought processes being set: a lot of people are doing this. In social science, for example, you really don't know very much until maybe you're fifty or sixty years old. It takes a tremendous amount of basic knowledge to begin to synthesize. But in the physical sciences, if you haven't made any contribution perhaps by the time you're twenty-five or thirty, you're going to be a synthesizer but not a seminal thinker or an innovator. The flashes of genius in certain sets of behavior patterns are based upon an aging factor. People have said by the time children are five, if you haven't reached them, you better forget about it. Maybe by the time they're three. I think most value systems are already inculcated in children surely by the time they're three, maybe by the time they're two, maybe by the time they're one. What you're building afterwards are minutiae on really unimportant things, things like data, facts, and so on. But the decency, or the feeling about the world, perhaps are really finished by the time they're one.

Ashley Montague--I don't think you like Ashley Montague--has come out with a theory that modern man takes nine months inside to give birth and one year outside, that the gestation cycle is twenty-one months and not nine months. If you want to put it another way, the last twelve months are the inculcation of to whom you belong--the need to belong.

There are arguments and discussions that the very nature of the way a child feels, the security that it feels, after birth is as important, perhaps more important, to the way that human being will grow as the very nature of the chromosomal genetic makeup once it's inside the body. That is, biology has to be hyphenated in the sense it's used for man. We call it biosocial, this need to belong.

Perhaps man has become a creature who now takes longer to be born. That may be very important in terms of theories of education. I'm sure all of you are aware of some of the works of the people who have been writing on kibbutz life and the kinds of human beings that emerge out of kibbutzim. There are also books on the rearing of children in the Soviets in the 1930's and 1940's--nonbiological mothers, biosocial mothers. Anthropologists have done studies in southeast Asia, where an island like Alor has been studied and they've shown that in Alor when children are born they're immediately socialized to have not a biological mother but a social mother. Any woman who has milk in her breast picks up a crying child and suckles him. When that child grows up, he doesn't have a mother--he or she has mothers. The child is told, "If you want to live at home you're a bad child. You must want to live in many homes." He's induced to run away as a positive action instead of staying home. These children turn out to be pretty miserable bastards, rather unhappy. On the other hand, Balinese children right next door are played with, masturbated when they cry, at a very early age, and people have said that Balinese children are the happiest children. Happy or miserable--a human value judgment, something to be argued about.

The need to belong then is one of my biosocial forces. The concept of the passing of time is another. A third element--and this has been dealt with in a philosophical way by people as diverse as Nietzsche and
Schopenhauer--is the "will to power," as they called it, the "power drive." Darwin may have called it "survival of the fittest." But there is no animal, particularly among the mammalian, that I'm aware of that doesn't tend to line up in terms of differentiation of power within the particular group. That is, not all animals are equal to all other animals. They may all be pigs, but some pigs are equaler. There is a power drive.

Some people call this instinctive behavior. Zimmerman's early study of gibbons called this a sexuality drive. The animals compete with other animals because for some reason or other there is a dominant male that has a higher propensity for sexuality and therefore he is acting out the imperative of the biological or the biosocial factors to reproduce. And the higher sexual drive therefore enables him to gather the females. This is not a personal satisfaction but, if you want, a biological satisfaction. Now, I don't know if anthropoid apes have ever been interviewed to find out whether they're getting a kick out of gathering the females or whether they feel imposed upon by being an anthropoid and would say, "I don't really want to do this, but it's driving me. What can I do? I can't help it." A Dostoevskian theme. Whether they're being driven by or whether they're really enjoying their activities is really utterly immaterial.

There seems to exist, again, the authority of the form, a differentiation in terms of power relationship within that group. If you don't like the word power, sorting out—call it what you will. Now, this sorting out changes sometimes. For example, in anthropoid apes there are certain behaviors where the male is dominant; in other behaviors the female is dominant. Many studies of anthropoid apes have shown that if a male announces to a female a drive for sexuality, he's better mean it, because if he backs out she'll beat the hell out of him. He may initiate the action, but she is often the dominant and aggressive one in the action. "Don't be a big shot. If you shoot your mouth off, put up."

It may vary from male to male, it may vary from group to group—but the drive to dominance, to power, is an authoritarian impulse in the living form. Is it a constant impulse? It would seem to vary from group to group. There are groups that seem to emphasize more group behavior than leadership, and some groups that seem to emphasize total leadership, the dominant male or female, rather than group behavior. If you study lemmings or white foxes, animals that seem to have suicidal tendencies every four or five years, this problem comes up. Studies of lemmings have shown that they commit suicide in fjords in Norway; groups of lemmings swimming in this direction pass groups of lemmings swimming in that direction, and both commit suicide. Are they led by individuals or aren't they? We really don't know, but it would seem that there are times when there's a group biosocial compulsion that's stronger than the individual. Whether this is created by leaders, or created, if you want, by instinctive behavior, is really immaterial here.

There is in all these higher animal forms an attempt to differentiate. The differentiation oftentimes is in terms of physical size, biological factors, and oftentimes in terms of age, again a biological factor, the
passage of time. There are very few old animals, beyond the most powerful of the mammals like the elephant—most animals in the pristine wilds die or are killed off by the group when they become old. Only man really saves old people. That gets us into a lot of other discussion. But among the mammals you seldom find, except for elephants, old ones. And perhaps the mammals of the sea, like whales.

A fourth biosocial factor which I would like to discuss which, it seems to me, occurs only in higher anthropoids and man but nonetheless is an authoritarian imposition by nature upon the form, is what I call the inertial factor. Now, what do I mean by the inertial factor? All social forms are conservative. All social organizations, social formations, are conservative. The conservatism is in terms of the need of the form to perpetuate itself. For example, you may have a familial pattern that gets together and stays together until the young are able to leave the nest, if you will, and then the form goes asunder. For the period of time of the fledgling life, of the inculcation of the young into their ability to fend for themselves, we have a form of inertia, a form of staying together. When you get to human and social institutions, revolutions, revolutionary changes are non-biological, but revolutionary changes are aberrational to the biological process. I think perhaps if we were to look at mutations over a short period of time that would seem to be true. But over four, five, seven billion years, we might see that mutational forms are after all not mutational forms altogether, because if a living form repeats itself once every million years, in regularity, then it's as regular as a living form that repeats itself once very year in regularity. The only difference is in terms of time and space. And since we don't know time, we don't know its dimension, we make assumptions about its dimensions; a billion years may be as short as a day. You know, there's been a revival of the whole human and philosophical approach to studying science. The question is whether just because something seems to work in the short range, that short range is not aberrational. The sun rises, the sun sets for a billion years—does that mean that's normal or abnormal? Since we only live a few hundred years, all of us, for us it's very normal. Supposing you're a star system, which is a living form, is it normal or abnormal? We really don't know; we make some conjectures on this.

Now, this inertial element—or, if you want, conservatism—is imposed upon the form (it's a great authority) by the need to perpetuate, if you want, biological transfer, genetic transfer, and so on. The human child, for example, is one of the most defenseless things that there is. After all, the human child is a suckling, defecating animal. That's all it is. When can it be turned out on its own? You'll see a movie about the wolf child. Will it be suckled by wolves, like Romulus and Remus, or Tarzan of the apes? Our human child, if you turn it loose in the wilds, dies. That's all it'll do; it'll die. Period. Now, how old does it have to be before it dies? Past socialization, past three or four. By that time, it can't be wolf, it can't be anything. It may forget, it may be dirty, it may need its nails to be cut, but, damn it, it's socialized already. Very socialized.
It would seem maybe that some of our social institutions are the extension of this sort of thing. When do you let go in a particular society? How young is young? Or, if you want, how old is old? Obviously, there are biological authoritarian demands on the processes of society which cause society to be inertial.

Certainly in some cultures, these demands are so strong that they create certain social institutions. For example, in New Guinea if a woman is pregnant, the husband (even though they have multiple marriages) has sexual relations with her every day until the child is born. It's called seminal feeding. And if the child is born and dies, he's blamed. He's been remiss in his feeding of the child. The connotation is that the child belongs to him, not to the woman; she's just the vessel into which he pours himself. He built his kid; it's his kid biologically. The Athenians felt the same way. An Athenian husband regarded his wife as a pot into which he poured himself, and it was his child—democratic Athens was very dictatorial with women. Dictatorial Sparta was very democratic with women. For those of you who are women's libbers, you might start reading about Sparta, because Spartan women used to choose men and tell their husbands about it, but the child didn't belong to her or to the husband; it belonged to the state.

This inertial element, if you want, nonrevolutionary element, is tantamount to a biological drive. Can man change this? I don't know of any society in the world in which permanent revolution is accepted as a form of human behavior. I don't know of any ever in history. I don't know of any that exist anywhere. Revolution is always the upsetting of the inertial process which enables the forces of nature to perpetuate themselves. Whether it's giving birth or anything else. I've often thought that true liberation for women, one form of true liberation, would be if nine women would all get together and produce one kid, each being pregnant a month. If they decided it's a pain to be pregnant for nine months, and if they could somehow space it, create a cooperative institution, a commune to give birth. I'd like to see it. And even for Gloria Steinem and Bella Abzug and some of our other friends, it might be a difficult task.

Next I want to talk about how these what I call biosocial factors of authority are carried out in society. Are they just carried out by the very forms of being living, that is, by natural forms? Or are they reinterpreted as a social and cultural form?

There are many studies that have shown that this business of this sense of belonging is so powerful in living forms that if man feels that he's going to be pushed out of a particular group, the group can make him do almost anything. Note I'm saying almost anything, because I don't believe like Watson and the behavioral school that you can take someone and, if you have him in a room or in a particular social condition, you can remold him completely. Maybe that's an "irrational" feeling on my part; call it the essence of divinity, the spark of humanity, whatever you like. But studies in concentration camps have shown in terms of
behavior that some people, some rare individuals, even under optimum stress, can sometimes activate the principles and the ideals of a group other than the group that they find themselves in. But that means that they have a reference group that's another group. There's no man that has no reference group.

Now, the point is: What power can a new reference group have on making people carry out certain precepts? I'm not either a pessimist or an optimist about man, but I'm very saddened by man. I think man can do almost anything to man. He can destroy all men and rationalize that it's for the good of them—kill, murder, anything—all in the name of goodness, decency, rationality, irrationality, and so on. The thing that frightens me most is that social science is running society. As a person interested in philosophy, the thing that would frighten me the most would be for a philosopher to run society. Plato, in all his rationality, was given the chance to run a city. He did a miserable job. He was a bastard first-class. He was so damn involved in his intellect that he forgot it was people he was working with. He had a floating brain, but they never ate or slept or made love or cried or were afraid or sat on a toilet. They only thought. Well, I've done all of those while sitting on a toilet.

And I'm frightened by philosophers—not frightened, I'm not frightened of anything anymore—but I'm saddened, I'm saddened by social scientists. Under no circumstances would I let social scientists run the lives of children. They confuse intellect with humanity. They talk about—sociologists and anthropologists, particularly sociologists, a particular breed of human—the facts and the statistics and all that business. If you take a man and stick one foot in the oven and the other in a cake of ice, on the average he's very comfortable. As a matter of fact, there are no averages. And though it sounds amusing, here I am saddened by what I see in my own field.

As I've told some of you, I think I'm going to get out of teaching, and that's really the reason; I'm extraordinarily saddened by what I think are scholars who have forgotten that the reason that they're scholars is to improve the human condition in all its foibles, instead of trying to build the world in terms of what they consider correct. They may be dead wrong, but they refuse to admit this kind of thing. Now, I wouldn't trust the politicians either. Well, who? Maybe cocker spaniels. Not a bad idea.

Many studies have shown that the group you belong to—this group I was discussing, this need to belong—can be altered at a very early period in the lifetime of a form. For example, studies with animals have shown that if you remove the living form from its biological parents very, very early, if you give it something which is warm, something which is soft, something which has sound, it reacts to that. Then you reintroduce it after a while to the real biological mother. It will reject the biological mother for the form that gave it a sense of belonging, of sustenance in that early period in the cognition of its life. Now, admittedly, these experiments have been done with things like ducks and not with children, but we have removed children (and there are many studies) from their biological mothers and fathers and put them into this kind of social environment, and their
personality formation is very different. A lot of other studies have
tended to show that children forget how to cry, for example. They
become very, very unemotional. This is very good if you want a purely
rational or intellectual child.

I would like to discuss something else for two minutes, how this is
carried out. How are these social biological imperatives carried out by
man? Because man, man everywhere, the moment he became man had language,
in my opinion, and language is a biological element—you can't have
language without having certain things occur in the physical form, like
vocal cords, mental capacity, and so on. The language you use may vary from
group to group, but you have to have ready a propensity for language,
you have to have the physical speech center, whether it's your upper
palate or your lips or whatever. You need teeth, you need a tongue, you
need lips, and so on. There are other kinds of language—body language,
but that's cultural language. For example, if somebody says, "How do
you feel?" you shrug your shoulders; in another culture it means something
else. In Korean, when you go you come and when you come you go. In Korean,
when somebody says, "How do you feel today?" you say yes. Yes in Korean
means I acknowledge the fact that you asked me the question, and then I
answer the question. So Koreans always say yes to everything. Very
interesting. Those of you who are laughing share a common value system—
those dirty minds.

How are these things carried out? How are these social biological
imperatives carried out? They vary from society to society. Their usage
is lost in antiquity. We know very little really about man beyond ten
or fifteen thousand years ago. For example, if you dig a tomb or you dig
Neanderthal man, you'll find this man with red ochre; we make a rationali-
zation that he must have had an afterlife because red in our culture is
a symbol of life or blood. We don't know. If we dug up a live Neanderthal,
he might say that it was the only damn thing available and that he really
preferred yellow.

History doesn't exist at all; it's man's version that exists, and it
may be true or it may not be true. Overwhelmingly, it's not true. So
now we have the historians; I've gone through sociologists, philosophers,
historians, and so on. We will surely end up with cocker spaniels. But
all societies use as part of carrying out the authoritarian elements in
behavior patterns the weight of history. And this is the way we've always
done it; this is the proper way. Alexander Pope's proper study of man
was man. Who says so? Man. Interesting tautological use. But all
societies use history, and history, if you look back to the biosocial
factors, is the inertial force.

You say this is the way we have done this for 2,000 or 3,000 years.
For example, this conference started—I'm not saying this to be critical--
with medieval and then we went back to, say, 500 B.C. Greece. Well, as
an anthropologist, I could say what the hell are we doing? Why don't we
go back 10,000 years or 20,000 years? Maybe the Platonic/Aristotelian
viewpoint is aberrational. It's only 2,500 years old. That's all.
Why don't we go back two million years? We might find that man has had another way of thinking, except for one thing—we cannot dig up a live Neanderthal man. We can only do some kinds of projections. So we find him buried, we say he had a religion. Maybe. We fine some skull fragments in the caves in the Near East—in Israel or Jordan or Lebanon—and we can see association between Cromagnon and Neanderthal man. But what was it? A dominance and subservience? Did they like each other? Did one eat up the other one? Did they have sexual relations? Were they married? We don't know. We make all kinds of guesses. But these guesses are important factors for authority.

People say this is the way life is, this is the way it should be, man is a rational animal. Who says so? Man is an irrational animal. Who says so? The rational or irrational animal says that man is a rational or irrational animal. Who says that man says? Man says that man says. We must have freedom. Who says so? Man says he wants to have freedom. What's wrong with slavery? (If you're not a slave.) Man says it's wrong. So what? Man says God exists. Well, how do we know. The first thing was the Word. Well, how do we know there was the Word? We tell you.

It occurred to me in a dream—I'm not making light of this—that we use the weight of history, the inertial forces of social being, as a form of authority. This is a tremendous and powerful argument. This is why old societies change slower than new societies. It's one of the basic problems we have in America. We're a new society, and the weight of our history is very meager. We are trying to make it heavier. We're now rehabilitating the American Indian. We're not unproud of him, so we say, "I've got 1/43% Indian in me and my left tooth comes from the Cherokee." We do this now, we're proud of it. And then we'll discover some other things. We have not yet discovered that we're related to the anthropoid apes; we're not proud of that. But we might even end up being proud of that too.

Also, authority rationalizes the human condition. We say man strives for certain things. As far as I know, man strives for intake of energy, output of waste material, and reproduction. I don't know of anything else. There's no universal, in my opinion, except that it's better to be healthy than to be sick. If you don't like that word, it's better to be comfortable than uncomfortable. If you're sitting on a tack, you move your ass. Now, if that tack is your religion, then you're more comfortable with your religion than with your can. That's a rationalization. You become a martyr because it's more comfortable to die for something. When we discussed freedom, I would like to have thrown in "freedom for" and "freedom from." You can't talk about freedom if you're starving or if you've got a disease. You can only talk about it when you're comfortable. And the people who did all the discussing (Plato and so on) had a lot of slaves who were uncomfortable so they could be comfortable. They were dictatorial bastards, and let's face that. The human condition is not free. It's always based upon somebody else's degradation. Americans are among the chief culprits in this in the world today. (It's a feeling I have. That's an aside, but I wanted to throw it in.)
I'm not making light of any of these; these are vital. A myth believed long enough becomes real, and you act on it as though it were real. If you say man has a drive for freedom, you act on it. Man must live in democracy, you act on it. As a matter of fact, man has lived in autocracy and dictatorship and slavery for a hell of a lot longer than he's lived in, if you want, free choices.

Now, a third way of carrying out these biosocial factors is to isolate you from the group, remove you. You can remove people in many ways--put them in prison. Does society have the right to remove somebody from the group? You can argue about that. You do things we don't like, go away. Hit the road. Other animals do this. The animals that turn out oftentimes to be killers become killers because they are rogues, they are isolated, they're pushed out of the group; they don't leave it, they hang around the outside, they snipe at it, they complain, they become the hippies of the elephant colony, but they want in. And they die outside.

This social distancing we also do with individuals. I told you the first time I talked to you that a few years ago I wouldn't have been allowed up here. There were no Jews allowed in the White Mountains a few years ago. Social distance. You weren't supposed to contaminate the purity of the air up here, so people here could think ethereal thoughts about freedom. New England is the place where freedom begins. So Jews were polluters. But they have been rehabilitated, and now they're allowed up in the White Mountains, and I guess freedom will go by the board.

Social distancing is a form of isolation. So is physical incarceration. So is personal ostracism.

Most groups carry out their authority by removal from the group. Whatever methods they devise, whether it's a legal system or some other way, they remove you, they put you out of the group. This can be done on a small scale; it can be done on a large scale. That is the greatest punch, to be removed from the group, because man has this biosocial imperative to belong. And in trying to belong to the group he will do anything. I was very saddened when I was in Laos to see American pilots wearing a peace symbol, putting up a V signal, and getting into a plane and bombing the hell out of the Phatat Lao, because they need to belong more to our group than to theirs. Though they may be psychologically and emotionally torn in pieces by doing what they're doing, they do it. We all do it. It's a very sad thing.

The last statement is that the biosocial factors of man tend to be relatively static in terms of their demands, but the interpretation of the biosocial factors of man tends to be dynamic. Man interprets. Whether you deal with modern psychology or with the old philosophic systems of rationality or irrationality--the forces are the same. The 2,500 year old Greek was just like us, exactly. And so was primitive man, just like us, exactly. He had the same needs exactly, but the concepts of carrying out these needs are dynamic. Therefore there's always a lag, there's always a break, between cultures in terms of how they carry out the various biosocial factors. This is another form of authority--that is, the group's imposition of biological factors.
Let me give you one last example. Don't think I'm being vulgar now; I want you to look at your own minds when I speak. You've had to urinate badly in a place where you couldn't. Well, a bird won't foul up its nest, won't urinate or defecate on itself. Now, you're in the middle of Fifth Avenue, New York, you can go to a hotel, but you're from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, you don't know what hotel has what, and you haven't got a dime in your pocket, because you have to pay a dime. Now you start philosophizing and rationalizing and telling yourself it's improper; you can bring your body, your mind up to a point, but beyond that point the biological factors overwhelm your social and cultural conditioning. If you do it often enough, you destroy your kidneys. And so society creates mechanisms to allow you not to ruin yourself biologically and not to ruin yourself socially. But if there is a choice, then the dominant authority is the body. You may die in the faith, but, damn it, you die.