The movement toward school decentralization in Chicago's best described as a strategy of incrementalism. It has proceeded along separate fronts--administrative decentralization, district and school advisory councils, and a special experimental district. This paper describes the extent to which these developments have progressed. It also seeks to explain why only modest steps have been taken and describes the obstacles that decentralization faces in the Chicago political system. In seeking to explain these obstacles, primary consideration is given to the role of ideology in explaining the behavior of school administrators. The author focuses on that aspect of ideology which describes the proper processes by which an individual believes that government is supposed to operate, the way social change ought to occur, and the strategies and tactics appropriate to a government official. (Author/JF)
Obstacles to School Decentralization: The Chicago Case

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Introduction

The movement toward school decentralization in Chicago is best described as a strategy of incrementalism. It has proceeded along separate fronts--administrative decentralization, district and school advisory councils, and a special experimental district. This paper will describe the extent to which these developments have progressed. It also will seek to explain why only modest steps have been taken and the obstacles that decentralization faces in the Chicago political system. In seeking to explain these obstacles, primary consideration will be given to the role of ideology in explaining the behavior of school administrators. Here we focus on that aspect of ideology which describes the proper processes by which an individual believes that government is supposed to operate, the way social change ought to occur, and the strategies and tactics appropriate to a governmental official--what we shall call an instrumental ideology.

This paper does not seek to explain the total range of motivations and causes prompting administrative behavior, eg., the role of personal self-interest, nor all the systemic barriers to school decentralization in Chicago. Instead we will focus on one important dimension, ideology, as the explanatory variable responsible for the negligible decentralization which has taken place in Chicago.


This we contrast to that part of an ideology focusing on a world view (a general perspective on how the American political and economic systems work today, for whom, and why) and values and goals (how American society ought to operate). See Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies (Chicago: Rand McNally Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 6-11.
Before turning to a discussion of these ideological factors, we will begin with an explanation of different kinds of decentralization. It is useful to characterize these brands of decentralization within the perspective of representation, a concept with a long tradition in political science.

**Four Models of Administrators as Representatives**

It has been observed frequently that school decentralization really is a catchall phrase for two essentially different reform positions, administrative decentralization and community involvement or control (hereinafter community participation).¹

The managerial view of decentralization has received varying support among educational professionals since as early as 1938.² This perspective speaks of transferring authority from a higher level of the bureaucracy to a lower one in order to give local officials more flexibility in responding to particular needs. According to one definition, administrative decentralization is:

...a managerial technique whereby a central authority delegates functional responsibility and some decision-making to officials of subunits of the local school system, each of whom administers schools in a particular geographic area.³

This managerial perspective on decentralization sees local administrators as trustees of the constituents they serve. The administrator presumably knows what is best for his constituents. Even though he is not always

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capable of answering their wants and demands, the reasoning runs that he
knows better than they what their objective interests are.\textsuperscript{1} Also, according
to this view, the administrator may have to balance the demands of one group
against the needs of another group. Hence the administrator requires autonomy
to respond as he sees fit.

This tradition of political thought is known as trustee or inde-
pendence representation, a view first expounded by the eighteenth century
British parliamentarian Edmund Burke.\textsuperscript{2} While Burke confined himself to
parliamentary government, the notion of the representative as an expert is
equally applicable to career bureaucrats such as educational administrators.
In Burke's eyes the representative was a member of an elite group serving the
nation's needs as well as the interests of localities.\textsuperscript{3} These needs were

\textsuperscript{1}David Easton defines wants as the expectations, opinions, motiva-
tions, ideologies, interests, and preferences of members of a political system. Demands refer to those wants which members would wish to see implemented in the political system and, therefore, which they explicitly express. See David Easton, \textit{A System Analysis of Political Life} (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), pp. 38-39, 71. He defines an objective interest as an instrumental need which others attribute to a person or group according to criteria independent of the subjective perceptions of that person or group. There may be disagree-
ment between an individual and others as to what is in his self-interest. A
second party may claim that what an individual wants is not in his interest or
that what is in his interest he does not
want. Hence emerges the argument that
authorities must protect a constituent's needs even against his will, that, para-
doxically, as Rousseau said, we must force men to be free.

\textsuperscript{2}For an excellent discussion see Hanna F. Pitkin, \textit{The Concept of

\textsuperscript{3}As Pitkin has pointed out, Burke both emphasized representation of
local interests and the national interest. See Pitkin, p. 174. Commentators
frequently have missed this emphasis. Nevertheless, the point is well taken that
Burke failed to distinguish adequately the style of representation, i.e., the
degree of independence separating representative and constituents, from the focus
of representation, which refers to the constituency a representative is oriented
toward. One can thus retain Burke's view of trusteeship (style) but examine
trusteeship with a local rather than national focus. See Heinz Eulau, John Wahlke,
William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," \textit{American Political Science
Review}, LIII, No. 3 (September, 1959), 742-56.
discernible by reason and deliberation among the elite. Although the representative was obligated to keep in touch with the feelings and needs of constituents, he was not expected, in Burke’s view, to be bound by their opinions or will. He was merely a trustee on their behalf. Similarly, administrative decentralization, by virtue of its vision of policy-making as a matter of efficiency, expertise, wisdom, and balance rests within the trustee tradition.

It is useful to bear in mind that representation has both formal and substantive features, and this distinction applies to trusteeship. Formal representation concerns itself with the institutional machinery designed to guarantee that a representative acts in accordance with his constituents’ interests or wishes. Examples of institutional safeguards are the distribution of authority between constituents and the representative and the provisions for holding a representative accountable. By contrast, what the representative actually does is substantive representation. Given this dichotomy, it is possible to examine administrative decentralization from two perspectives. First, it is possible to speak of formal local trustee representation wherein the bureaucracy has been formally reorganized to permit field administrators greater authority and power to act. Here we examine the decision-making structure, the procedures and rules, and the official role relationships within the organization.

It is possible to achieve formal local trustee representation without changing the school system’s outputs to constituents, whether we define outputs as new policies, improved student achievement, or whatever, since formal representation deals only with authoritative relationships rather than actions per se. Thus it is essential to examine substantive local trustee representation. In order for this kind of representation to occur, there would be evidence of a change in the behavior of local field administrators and this
changed behavior would have to result in new system outputs.

It should be stressed that the achievement of formal local trustee representation does not depend on the existence of substantive representation. The authority patterns in a bureaucracy may permit local administrators far more latitude than they exercise. Thus a bureaucracy could be formally decentralized but its actions would not result in greater substantive representation of local communities. Also, we do not wish to argue that administrative decentralization is the only medium for formal trusteeship. While we shall treat the two synonymously in this paper, it is conceivable that other institutional machinery besides decentralization could create formal local trusteeship.

On the other hand, can substantive local trustee representation exist without formal local trustee representation? Hypothetically, the answer is yes. Just as local administrators may fail to act in accordance with their full authority, so too can they choose to exercise greater initiative than their actual authority would imply, with or without the approval of superiors. Alternatively, central office administrators may represent local communities, making it unnecessary for local administrators to have substantial authority. Thus, it is quite possible to assert that school systems which are not formally decentralized do nevertheless exercise substantive local trustee representation. Given this fact, it is worth noting that even if decentralization failed in its efforts to institute formal local trusteeship, the latter could still exist, decentralization notwithstanding.

It is true that while it is hypothetically possible to achieve substantive formal trustee representation without formal trustee representation, whether such a possibility actually occurs is an empirical question. There are compelling organizational norms discouraging any administrator from trying to exercise authority which is not his. The sanctions of peers and
superiors can discourage a principal, district superintendent, or area superintendent from deviating too widely from tradition. It will become clear that in the Chicago school system there were certainly barriers to the achievement of substantive trusteeship in the absence of formal trusteeship.

One cannot look to the school system's constituents to determine whether either formal or substantive local trustee representation exists. Recall that the opinions of constituents are quite irrelevant to local trusteeship. Instead, a determination of whether formal or substantive representation exists depends upon an objective determination of the facts. According to Burke, the needs and interests of constituents were discernible by reason once the representative had adequate information. The corollary of this assertion is that the representative's behavior must be studied in the same fashion. However, social scientists cannot be so sanguine about Burke's claims to an objective reality. Also, if one attempts to test the existence of formal or substantive features of local trusteeship, one cannot look to the opinions of those served by the school system. One must fall back upon some extrinsically valid and reliable criteria for assessment.

The second view of decentralization, loosely grouped as community participation, proceeds from quite different assumptions. Two established views of representation intersect in this reform tradition. This first says that a representative should be responsible to a particular constituency. He is answerable to constituents according to how well they feel he serves their interests. This view, which we shall term local mandate representation grew out of Madison's Federalist Papers and the writings of nineteenth century Englishmen such as John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Although liberal
theorists have differed, essentially they say that a representative should respond to the individual's best interest so that the individual is pleased.

This line of reasoning finds its expression today among reformers who accuse administrators of being unsympathetic to community demands and remote from their concerns. They see the antidote as more opportunity for citizens to win concessions from administrators on particular expressed concerns. While these reformers have not always viewed administrative decentralization with hostility, the two reform traditions are not necessarily bedfellows. It is true that administrative decentralization is a sine qua non for extensive community involvement or community control; without local managerial authority to implement citizen wishes, community involvement would be an empty gesture. Nevertheless, administrative decentralization can proceed quite comfortably without citizens playing any role.1 As we have said, managerial decentralization may even require collision with citizen demands. So when citizen groups speak of the need for closer working relationships with administrators and less obstructiveness, they are calling upon a different concept of representation than trusteeship. They wish to tie administrators to a particular mandate rather than to allow them to act as independent trustees.

Readers will recognize local mandate representation as an example of substantive rather than formal representation. It concerns itself with the merits of an administrator's behavior, not the formal relationship he has with constituents. It is the analogue of substantive local trustee representation.

The reform movement for community participation also speaks to a fourth view of representation, one which complements the mandate version. The perspective in question is local accountability representation, the notion

that a public official should be accountable to constituents by means of formal institutional machinery such as elections, shared decision-making authority, and the like. From this view springs the argument that such devices force a governmental representative to act in a certain way, i.e., do what his constituents want, a concern shared with proponents of formal local trustee representation. Accountability representation is formal; mandate representation is substantive. The former specifies the institutional means appropriate to a representative, the other the appropriate ends of his actions.

Much of the struggle over community participation has been fought over institutional arrangements. Whether administrators or community representatives will have the authority to make policy and determine its implementation has rightly been seen by reformers as an important issue, since it could well determine how responsive an administrator's actions will be to citizen mandates. As Hannah Arendt put it aptly, the end of human action, quite unlike the end products of technology, cannot be reliably predicted. Consequently, the means used to achieve political goals are usually of greater relevance to the future world than are the intended goals. Thus, the institutional channels for citizens to express their demands take on great significance.

Can local mandate representation and local accountability representation exist without one another? First, it is evident that local accountability representation will not guarantee a mandate relationship between an administrative representative and his constituents. The local citizenry may fail to exercise its influence even though it has sufficient authority. It may be insufficiently organized, apathetic, co-opted, or whatever. So formal accountability does not predict the substance of interactions between constituents and the representative. Second, it is equally true that even without an

accountability relationship it is possible (although not necessarily probable) that local mandate representation may exist. Administrators may be responsive to the local citizenry’s wishes through informal communication channels and outside of formal governance structures on which citizens sit. In other words, local communities may be influential in school decision-making even though they have no formal decision authority. Clearly, then, neither local accountability representation nor local mandate representation depend on one another for their existence. Though the presence of one may heighten the effectiveness of another, they are independent phenomena.

As the reader will see in Table I, we have described four models of representation germane to decentralization.¹

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<th>Dimension of Representation</th>
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<td>Administrative (Managerial)</td>
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<td>Formal</td>
<td>Formal Local Trustee</td>
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<td>Trustee Representation</td>
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We turn now to discuss the trends toward each kind of representation in Chicago, after which we will seek to explain why these developments have not been significant alterations of the status quo.

¹This is not to suggest that other views of representation are irrelevant to decentralization. The authorization and symbolic views do have implications but are not dealt with here. Descriptive representation will be discussed subsequently. For a discussion of these other views, see Pitkin, pp. 14-111. Also, James G. Gilbulka, Administrators as Representatives: The Role of Local Communities in an Urban School System (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1973). Readers familiar with the author’s previous work on decentralization will recognize Table I as a revision of earlier treatments of trustee representation.
Formal and Substantive
Local Trustee Representation

The Chicago public school system has been under an administrative decentralization plan since 1967. Shortly after assuming the superintendency in September, 1966, James Redmond asked the board of education to commission the management consultant firm of Booz-Allen & Hamilton to develop a reorganization plan. Although the system had been formally decentralized under Redmond's predecessor Benjamin Willis, the substance of the reorganization was widely reputed to exist on paper only.

Under Redmond's leadership the system was divided into three administrative areas in 1968, each directed by an area associate superintendent and responsible for approximately one-third of the city's schools.

There are at least four premises built into the argument for administrative decentralization, assumptions which we will have occasion to question:

1. It is assumed that school systems are overcentralized in their decision-making, and that decentralizing decisions will solve the school system's problems.

2. It is assumed that field administrators (principals and district superintendents) better understand the needs and wants of their local communities and districts than do central administrators because of their closer proximity to the situation.

3. It is assumed that the commitment and expertise for solving local needs rest within the bureaucratic structure rather than with constituents.

4. It is assumed that adaptability to local needs should not be obtained at the expense of efficiency, merit, universalistic standards, and the needs of broader constituencies at the city-wide, metropolitan, state, and national levels.
In previous research the author studied the development of administrative decentralization in order to assess whether the plan resulted in formal or substantive local trustee representation. Four criteria were examined to determine whether formal local trustee representation was achieved by decentralization:

1. Whether authority and power were redistributed to field administrators (area superintendents, district superintendents, or principals) in various decision-making functions—budget, curriculum, staffing, and school-community relations.

2. Whether field administrators used new authority and power to introduce new policies and procedures for allocating resources to districts and schools.

3. Whether different policies and procedures for allocating resources were developed among each of the three administrative areas of the city.

4. Whether field administrators expressed support for decentralization.

Although only limited data were available to examine whether decentralization facilitated the existence of substantive local trustee representation, one criterion was employed focusing on system outputs under decentralization:

Whether the attitudes of field administrators favored new staffing patterns, new curricula concepts, new patterns of school-community relationships, and other innovations, indicating that they would change their role behavior if they had adequate authority.

The author found that none of the four criteria for assessing formal local trusteeship indicated any appreciable changes in the school system's authority and decision structure. Area administrative officials continued, as field officials had under the old administrative structure, to have to clear most decisions with central office personnel. Similarly, the examination of field administrators' attitudes, while a far from perfect measure of substantive

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1 For a detailed explanation of the research design and methodology as well as the data upon which the author's conclusions are based, the reader is referred to Cibulka, "Administrators as Representatives: The Role of Local Communities in an Urban School System." The research was conducted as part of the Danforth Large City School Board Study.
local trusteeship, indicated that most respondents favored the status quo or traditional policies.

Several explanations may be offered to account for the negligible effects of decentralization as an agent of local trustee representation.

The Incompatibility of Strategies for Reform

Redmond apparently understood that the obstacles to implementing administrative decentralization were ideological as well as personal. Central administrators who controlled the decision-making apparatus defended standardized formulas as a way of distributing resources and centralized policy-making as more efficient. Moreover, central officials were reputed to be more conservative in their values (namely, what should be done apart from how decisions should be made). These ideological differences underlaid a power struggle between Redmond and the bureaucratic elite then in power. Consequently, Redmond wished to consolidate power in a new chain of command, staffed with personnel loyal to his ideological preferences rather than to those of the previous superintendent. Yet in making his appointments, Redmond did not have sufficient power to bring in personnel from outside the system. Because he had to rely on career bureaucrats socialized within the system, it was only prudent for him to retain some controls over how they proceeded with decentralization. Redmond also wished to move himself into a planning role so that he could deal with long-range problems and act more effectively as a spokesman for the school system. So he has left the day-to-day details of system operation to a deputy superintendent and left a great deal of authority in the hands of this office. From a purely practical standpoint, someone had to remain accountable for system maintenance. Diffusion of responsibility to three different area associate

1 Respondents were categorized as favoring major reform in a policy area, favoring moderate reform, favoring the status quo, or favoring a traditional policy. Altogether 78 interviews were conducted with administrators.
superintendents was organizationally unwise, since the superintendent remained accountable to the board of education.

Redmond thus faced the dilemma that change agents frequently face. In order for reform to occur, many changes must be effected. Yet the requirements for reform in one situation frequently violate those requirements appropriate to another reform. Here one is confronted with the paradox that decentralization would not be likely to bring about substantive local trustee representation without some degree of central control since Redmond was unable to appoint officials who clearly had different substantive ideological values, quite apart from their reformism on procedural matters relating to decentralization. Yet the institutionalization of central control in the hands of the deputy superintendent blocked formal local trustee representation, which would have been helpful (although not essential) to substantive local trustee representation. Administrators argued that they could not be held accountable for reforms unless they were given the requisite formal authority.

Thus the creation of substantive local trustee representation appeared to require centralized control, yet the creation of formal local trustee representation was diminished by centralization. This dilemma is merely one example of the perplexing problem that the ends men seek are frequently confounded by the institutional means necessitated in order to achieve these ends.

The Illegitimacy of Conflict in School Administration

A second explanation for the failure of decentralization is that the strategy for implementing it was gradual and non-directive. Redmond attempted to decentralize the bureaucracy by changing the attitudes of the
staff rather than by using his authority and power to seek compliance. A power strategy would have involved considerable risk. First, it might have polarized and organized Redmond's adversaries, who might, in turn, have openly challenged whether he had sufficient power to force his staff to comply with his policies. As we shall discuss, not all the board of education members were enthusiastic about decentralization and thus were potential supporters of Redmond's adversaries inside the bureaucracy. A second difficulty of the power strategy is that it would have led inevitably to some form of conflict within the organization that may have become public. And it is an unquestioned assumption among educational administrators that conflict is counterproductive. This ideological bias is a holdover from the Progressive movement, which heavily influenced the philosophical formulations of public school educators. Progressives such as John Dewey believed that there are no fundamental conflicts of interest in society that would not be solved by improved communication and understanding between educators and the citizenry. It is the role of the expert to help citizens subordinate their private interests, which serve the family, clique or class to which they belong, and to identify instead with a public interest. From this assertion among Progressives that communication will generate a productive consensus has followed the corollary that conflict is the result of selfish, parochial pursuits. Therefore, conflict must be avoided wherever possible.

Thus if Redmond had used a power strategy and if this had led to active resistance among some members of the bureaucracy, the resulting conflict would have been interpreted in the ideology of school administration

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as a signal of incompetence. This was especially so in Redmond's case because he had been brought to Chicago to restore confidence in the schools after the demise of Benjamin Willis, the controversial target of civil rights groups. However, the cost of avoiding conflict was that the pressure on subordinates to change their behavior was necessarily defused. The deputy superintendent used this leadership vacuum to consolidate power. This in turn furthered centralization. To summarize, the illegitimacy of conflict minimized the inclination to use a risk-oriented strategy in bringing about reform, even though some conflict would have been necessary in order for administrative decentralization to have succeeded.

The Political Machine

Another reason why it was not in the self-interest of Redmond to pursue a power strategy, as distinct from a persuasive approach to reorganization, is that conflict would have violated the expectations of Chicago's political machine. Mayor Richard Daley shuns controversy. His organization relates to constituents through personal ties and by making available material perquisites such as jobs and favors in exchange for votes. The political machine relies on a citizenry that is indifferent to issues. Interest in issues may create pressures on machine politicians or lead to a questioning of authority. Moreover, interest in issues generates conflict, which threatens to undermine the personal trust between constituents and authorities which is fostered by the machine.

It is not prudent for a school superintendent in Chicago to ignore city hall. Although the school system was reformed in 1946, political influences still can be found in the bureaucracy. Since the late 1960's the school

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system has come to rely on the mayor's power for various requirements, particularly to relieve its financial problems at the state capitol, to resolve the union contracts, and to help build new schools without seeking a voter referendum. The intervention of the mayor's office to solve the school system's crises has meant that the superintendent must keep an especially watchful eye on the mayor's expectations. Benefits are rarely conferred by the mayor without accompanying costs to the recipient. The mayor can gather enough votes on the board to fire a superintendent. So where the superintendent is accountable to the mayor, it is in his self-interest to be cautious about creating controversy. His conflict avoidance should not be interpreted as a mere bureaucratic maneuver. Thus, we find the irony that where conflict avoidance was once intended to remove education from politics, this instrumental norm now serves the political world, albeit unintentionally.

School Universalism and Machine Particularism

In fact, the Redmond decentralization plan is remarkably similar to the decision structure of the political machine. Both organizations are formally decentralized but operationally centralized. The machine is decentralized in two respects. First, it relies heavily on precinct captains, ward committeemen, and aldermen to make day-to-day decisions in their turf. Second, there is very little actual authority residing in the mayor's office. Power is dispersed among many functional units of government. Yet there is an extreme centralization of influence because the mayor as boss of the political machine has gained control over the use of authority.¹ The present operation of the school decentralization plan, formally decentralized but operationally centralized, is thus comparable to the structure of the political machine.

¹ Banfield and Wilson, pp. 104-05.
It is not outlandish to conjecture that Daley would resist a radical educational decentralization plan. While his authority in the educational bureaucracy is greatly weakened, as we have said, he still controls certain jobs and has considerable influence. A sweeping decentralization plan would lessen whatever brokerage power he has accumulated. Consequently, in helping to design the decentralization plan, it is probable that Redmond took this political problem into account. He could not diminish the mayor's power. Nor could he relinquish his power because the mayor holds him accountable. What emerged was a decentralization plan which has the formal trappings of decentralization but in fact retains maximum control at the top of the bureaucracy.

The differences between politically controlled institutions and reformed ones has received considerable emphasis among scholars. For example, Ted Lowi has argued that reformers dispersed authority so badly that today it is difficult for municipal government to address urban problems effectively. He asserts that reformed institutions like the public schools are just as irresponsible as the old political machines; their leadership is self-perpetuating and not readily subject to controls by higher authority. Lowi applauds Chicago as an exception to the predicaments faced by reform cities such as New York. However, he does not address the apparent fact that the political machine in Chicago continues to exercise power within reformed institutions such as the board of education. If, as he argues and I shall support, both the machine and reformed institutions are basically the same in their insularity, it does not follow that making the schools more a part of the political system, as some scholars have argued, will solve anything.


which perhaps accounts for the tendency to analyze the different styles of each without examining the similar effects of the styles. We might describe the political machine as operating according to particularistic ethnocentrism while the reformed public schools exhibit universalistic ethnocentrism. Each shares an ethnocentrism biased against particular constituencies such as the poor and minorities. This underlying similarity of each institution is obscured by the obvious contrasts between universalistic and particularistic standards of resource allocation which differentiate the two.

At the same time it is important to observe that even the apparent differences between universalism and particularism are not as wide as they first appear. The usual assumption is that educational bureaucrats apply universalistic standards in the interests of honesty and efficiency. On their side, politicians are said to apply particularistic criteria based on personal loyalties they possess, on raw calculations of self-interest, on ethnic, class, and racial preferences, and on the desire to maintain a balance of power. However, the applications of universalism by educators have not been without their biases, as so much of the criticism leveled at our schools suggests. First, educators obviously have personal interests and role interests just as do politicians; their actions can be quite as self-serving. Second, the treatment of students with different needs on the basis of standardized, impersonal formulas has been increasingly unacceptable to large segments of the population served by the schools. The sheer unreality of attempting to impose simplistic, uniform solutions on complex problems has forced educators to make concessions to various interest groups, and on grounds that are quite as particularistic and arbitrary as those used by politicians in

1 This aspect of universalism, related to the melting pot myth, is a compelling aspect of ideology. However, because it does not deal with instrumental values, we limit its treatment here. See Leonard J. Fein, "Community Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of Universalism," Community Control of Schools, ed. by Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 76-99.
allocating resources. Also, numerous decisions are made by bureaucrats based on their obligations to another official, to a particular constituency, or based on their political ties to city hall. These can only be regarded as particularistic responses. Moreover, two additional factors have mitigated the erstwhile credibility of universalism. The fact that schools have become a central arena for contesting the allocation of values in our society means that educators will inevitably be forced to deviate from standardized formulas in order to please one or more of the contestants. The professional assumption that administrative decentralization can achieve trustee representation and that the improvement of neutral competence will prevent conflict is naive. The other factor which has diluted universalism's credibility is the scarcity of resources available to urban school systems which has intensified the power plays of various constituents served by the system as each vies for his fair share.

On their side, politicians have ideological biases which extend beyond self-interest or the exigencies of each situation. As Peterson and Greenstone argue, the rational self-interest calculation model is not a sufficient explanation for what motivates machine politicians. They too have normative preferences regarding community, the polity, and how one aggregates the public interest. To recapitulate, just as the political machine does not make decisions on parochial, idiosyncratic grounds alone, neither are the schools at the opposite end of the spectrum. Their important similarities have been overshadowed by obvious differences.

Like the public schools, the political machine has no incentive to decentralize its administrative decision-making. The political machine resists decentralization in its domain because without centralized power the

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mayor would have no ability to act. Through the centralized distribution of perquisites he maintains his power. The schools are not so different from this particularism as one might suspect. Their diffuse goals lack clear priorities or canons of performance. Yet decentralization is possible only where subordinates can rely on clear criteria for making decisions. Such criteria allow top officials to grant autonomy because they can establish clear policies to guide administration and will not sacrifice control by decentralizing. On the other hand, where universalistic standards play a diminished place in decision-making, which is true in both the political machine and the schools, power must be centralized in order to ensure accountability and proper performance by subordinates.

The goal diffuseness of the public schools may be described another way. It would be proper to describe school systems as possessing an ur-centralized control structure even though they have a centralized decision structure. Decisions must be concentrated at the top of the organization because the profession lacks clear performance standards such as one finds in the legal and medical professions. Instead control centers on recruitment, socialization, and advancement procedures in order to ensure that universalism will prevail.

The management-by-objectives movement in administration is one attempt to develop performance standards. Redmond has encountered strong resistance from his administrative staff in implementing such a plan. Moreover, his performance appraisal plan is clearly more compatible with centrali-

1 See Sam D. Sieber, "Organizational Influences on Innovative Roles," Knowledge Production and Utilization in Educational Administration ed. by Terry L. Eidell and Joanne M. Kitchel (Columbus, Ohio: University Council for Educational Administration, 1968), pp. 120-42.

zation than with decentralization. Goals are set first at the top of the organization. As one moves downward, each successively lower layer of the bureaucracy adapts these goals. Performance appraisal is thus a modest way of involving field officials but of nevertheless holding them accountable to central administrators.

We are thus drawn to the conclusion that one compelling reason why school bureaucracies retain centralization is because they have no other way of ensuring accountability to universalistic standards, of checking the tendency toward particularistic responses which might embarrass the system. This interpretation help explain why the administrative decentralization plan in Chicago has resulted in relatively few departures from traditional standardized procedures and policies.

Is there a more fundamental contradiction here? In that decentralization requires adaptation to unique situations and perceptions, does it thus contradict universalism? Universalism and decentralization are not mutually incompatible. In order for universalistic norms to be compatible with decentralization, the criteria used for distributing resources must be contextually rich—that is, they must permit locally defined needs and allow for locally impacted resources to meet the needs. This definition of universalism has not prevailed in Chicago, however. Instead, standardization has been its operational equivalent and has, therefore, effectively checked administrative decentralization. To summarize the argument, the particularism of the political machine is not so different from the operational realities of universalism in the school arena. Both lead to centralization and limited local trustee representation.
Technical Nature of Administrative Decentralization

A final explanation for the limited effects of administrative decentralization on local trustee representation is that school administrators have defined administrative decentralization as a technical issue. As Cobb and Elder have argued, this technical orientation among experts checks the public's ability to define an issue in terms which have broad appeal. For example, no special efforts were made, other than through an initial press release, to inform city-wide groups or local ones about the objectives of the decentralization plan, how it would improve services and school-community relations, and how decentralization would be organized. From the perspective of the professional staff, decentralization was a professional matter capable of implementation without the public's involvement.

However, this very insularity at the outset inhibited Redmond once he ran into difficulties implementing the reform. He had no reference publics outside the bureaucracy, other than reformers on the board of education, to generate pressure on recalcitrant bureaucrats. In fact, community groups have come to see administrator decentralization as an obstacle rather than a positive objective; they complain that they must check with many officials, each of whom disclaims authority to make a decision and "passes the buck" to someone else. Indeed, the concept of trusteeship, namely the notion that administrators can monitor public needs better than the public, comes under serious question when administrators bicker among themselves on who of them can best serve that public. In summary, the tendency on the part of school administrators to define an issue in technical terms isolates them from potential allies as well as adversaries.

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In turning to accountability representation and mandate representation, we will have occasion to examine whether the ideological factors we have mentioned—conflict resistance, universalism, and technical expertise—act as obstacles there. And we will also address again the reciprocal relationships between certain ideological norms of the political machine and those of the school system which suggest that autonomy from politics is not the fundamental malady of urban schools.

**Local Accountability Representation**

**and**

**Local Mandate Representation**

The movement in the Chicago school system toward giving local communities a formal participatory role falls into two categories:

1. Federally funded programs such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (E.S.E.A.) Title I programs, the Model Cities Program, and an E.S.E.A. Title III program known as the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project.

2. District superintendents advisory councils in each of the system's 27 districts and local school councils throughout the system.

The author's research between 1967-70 and his follow-up investigations addressed the question of whether a high or a low degree of citizen participation, and accordingly local accountability representation, has been achieved. In defining degrees of citizen participation in both phases, the analysis employs Sherry Arnstein's distinction between citizen power, tokenism, and nonparticipation, as may be seen in her typology of citizen participation arranged in a ladder fashion in Table 2.1

The criterion of a high degree of citizen participation is whether the participation achieved in the advisory councils and experimental programs reached the level of citizen power, which the reader may see would be steps six, seven, or eight—partnership, delegated power, or citizen control. Steps one through five are defined as constituting a low degree of citizen participation. While the definitive characteristics distinguishing one participatory step from another are complex, the essential distinctions may be provided here.

In the four lowest steps, authorities define participation as either cooptation of the citizen to gain his support (manipulation), educating the citizen to improve his attitudes and behavior (therapy), informing the citizen, or consulting him. In each case the involvement is also accompanied by a predominance
of power in the hands of authorities along three dimensions—the method of selecting citizen spokesmen on decision-making bodies; the degree to which local laymen dominate decision-making rather than professional spokesmen; and the extent to which the goals, functions, and authority of the body are wide-ranging rather than limited.

The only distinction between the fifth step placation and the previous steps is that citizens are given a predominance of power on one of these three dimensions rather than on none. Partnership (step six) and delegated power (step seven) also may provide power on only one dimension but the power is more significant; citizens have either a formally negotiated sharing of power or legally delegated power. The eighth step, citizen control, provides citizens with the balance of power on all three dimensions and gives citizens final authority.¹

Only one of the federal programs, the Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project, achieved a high degree of citizen participation on Arnstein's scale (step six, partnership). This project lapsed when federal funds expired; it was well-known within the bureaucracy that the school system's funding crisis was a convenient excuse for terminating the experiment. E.S.E.A. Title I Programs were a mixture of step two, therapy, and step five, placation. The Model Cities Program achieved step five, placation.

The district superintendent's advisory councils achieved step four on Arnstein's ladder, consultation. The guidelines for local school councils constituted step five, placation—both of these being low degrees of citizen participation.

participation. The formal differences between the district and the school councils were amplified in their operation, the realm we choose to call local mandate representation. Citizens have come to realize that district superintendents have no autonomy to decide a matter without checking higher. On the other hand, principals always have had considerable authority over new programs in their schools, instructional standards, the placement of teachers once in the building, relationships with parents, etc. Consequently, the local school councils have emerged as the more important participatory instrument.

Administrators have tried to hedge on the power of these local school councils. Their strategies have been severalfold. First, the councils can no longer select a slate of principal candidates for their schools when a vacancy occurs; they can only nominate. District superintendents are sent to all such deliberations to keep the group in check. Second, the agendas of the councils are heavily weighed toward consideration of new resources rather than better use of existing resources. The groups spend inordinate time on proposal writing and on ranking priority needs for building repairs, etc. By and large, schools in white ethnic areas have accepted this limited role while councils in many black communities and more affluent white communities have informally usurped greater authority than they formally have. Third, the administrative staff has tried to stack the councils with PTA representatives, a group which has been largely supportive of administrators in the past.

1The author confined his research to a study of the policy statements on the councils as they have been negotiated between the board and the superintendent. There was no systematic research on the degree to which these participatory policies were actually implemented; the treatment of this subject in the paper is confined to anecdotal information collected by the author since 1970. This information permits us to speak in tentative terms about the degree of local mandate representation achieved by the councils.
These developments since the original research on the councils was conducted tend to confirm the findings that the councils, both by guidelines and operation, constitute a low degree of accountability representation. In due course we will cite several explanations for the low degree of participation achieved.

Since the research on citizen participatory vehicles did not examine their substantive outputs, what we have termed local mandate representation, it was necessary to turn to different phenomena in order to examine how much substantive influence local communities have, quite apart from their formal authority to exercise influences. Local mandate representation was examined by selecting a number of communities served by the school system and studying whether citizen demands made on school authorities were answered successfully.

Seven communities in the City of Chicago were identified. The sample simulated the range of needs and expectations facing school authorities in Chicago and differed on essentially five characteristics—ethnicity, socio-economic status, percent of foreign born, home ownership, and nearness to the ghetto. All identifiable issues in these communities (54 in number) were studied between 1967 and 1970. It was said that if a majority of the issues in a majority of the communities were answered successfully in the eyes of those articulating the demands, then a high degree of local mandate representation would exist. Otherwise, a low degree would exist.¹

The major finding was that in only one community was a majority of the issues answered successfully by authorities. The distinguishing character-

¹Several kinds of issues were excluded from consideration since it is not always within the ultimate authority and/or power of an institution to answer every demand successfully. There were a.) cases where the administrative staff stated that it lacked the resources to implement a demand, or where the author has evidence that this was the case; b.) cases where administrators stated to the community petitioners that the demand was already implemented or accomplished, and where there was no evidence to contradict this; c.) issues where the administration was confronted with conflicting intra-community or inter-community demands on the same issue.
istic between this community and others was the way in which it expressed its demands. First, community leaders were persistent in pursuing their grievances up the chain of command; they were not easily rebuffed. Second, they frequently used conflict strategies such as boycotts, press releases, sit-ins, pamphleteering, and the like to dramatize their demands. The combination of these strategies in other communities appeared to be associated with successful resolution of the issue and was more persuasive than other possible explanations of differential success rates. For example, success did not vary with the functional categories of demands—budget vs. attendance boundaries or whatever. Nor was the scope of the community organization's constituency important. Nor did success correlate with a particular community type. 1

We turn now to explain how administrative behavior has generated a low degree of local accountability representation and local mandate representation in the Chicago public school system.

Conflict and Acquiescence

We have spoken of resistance to conflict as an important element of the professional administrator's instrumental ideology which checked the achieve-

1For reasons which have to do with internal developments in local communities of Chicago, the author speculates that local mandate representation has decreased over the last several years. Leaders in some black communities are no longer as interested in the schools as they once were. Where conflict and persistence lessen, so do favorable concessions from the system. In white communities which once employed conflict, the strategy has turned toward harassment of principals in more subtle ways in order to force their resignation if there is a grievance which could be resolved by him. These communities see boycotting and related techniques as too exhaustive of their resources and too divisive among their ranks. On the other hand, conflict and persistence have increased in the Latin community over the last several years. They have won numerous concessions through this strategy, which has been favored by the fact that they have a Latin spokeswoman on the board of education.
ment of administrative decentralization in Chicago. This ideological commitment also operates to limit the role which local community groups can play in establishing local accountability and local mandate representation.

Several illustrations may be offered. First, administrators have tried to confine their interaction with community groups to a style which might be termed deliberative politics. In their efforts to protect the general welfare, administrators take great pains to avoid recognizing ethnic, racial, group, or class differences and the conflict that such representation in policy-making engenders. As we have said, their view of the city is one governed by education, persuasion, and consensus rather than by adjudication of conflicting interests and ideologies. The latter is associated with vices of the political world--its alleged parochialism, its supposed self-serving motives and corruption, and its accommodation of special interests. Educators resist the styles of political expression found elsewhere in our society--particularistic politics, pluralistic politics, and status group politics. Particularistic politics is the style of the political machine. The relationship between authorities and constituents is personal and is based on specific perquisites conferred as favors upon the constituent. The citizen's support is coopted by the institution. Educators reject this style as an example of privatism and partisanship at its worst, although we have raised the issue in discussing administrative decentralization whether the two institutions are, in fact, all that different.

Pluralistic politics, while it has won defacto recognition to some degree, is rejected as an acceptable pattern for school-community relations. Here interest groups, particularly institutional interests, negotiate multi-lateral policy agreements in a covert bargaining atmosphere where each party

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1 Salisbury, "Schools and Politics in the Big City."
frankly acknowledges the others’ interests. While Chicago school officials have on occasion been pressured to enter such arenas, for the most part they have resisted the inclusion of community organizations in negotiations with institutional actors such as the park district, the planning commission, housing officials, etc.¹

School officials have been even less receptive to status-group politics, which has recently come to dominate school-community relations in the face of increasing hostility expressed by community groups toward school authorities. Status-group politics is characterized by open bi-polar conflict between protagonists. The conflict is perceived by participants as a struggle for the rights of a broad group of individuals such as social classes, a racial-ethnic group, a consumer interest, or an otherwise dissatisfied citizen group. Not only is the conflict open, but it is ordinarily intense; what one party wins is assumed by both parties to be at the other’s expense. In school politics, as elsewhere, status-group conflict has taken two forms, confrontations between status groups in which government authorities become involved as adjudicators and direct confrontations between disgruntled status groups and the school authorities.

The decline of the politics of deliberation which administrators

¹Even in the case of relationships with large institutions, school administrators have been reluctant to relinquish their autonomy. Thus, it would be an overstatement to characterize the bargaining process as one where institutional self-interests are frankly acknowledged. Although Redmond has been considerably less contemptuous of politics than his predecessor Willis, school officials still tend to look at other institutions from an ideological perspective which stresses the superior motives of the school system, namely its mission to help children, s contrasted with the supposed political motives of the opposition. Despite this perspective, the fact that school officials now recognize that they must bargain with other institutions indicates that we have here a variation of the pluralist bargaining model. The character of Chicago politics has also forced school administrators to accept, however begrudgingly, pluralistic representation on the board of education; every member the mayor appoints is associated with some organized interest e.g., labor, real estate, blacks, etc. While administrators rarely bargain directly with board members, they cannot always afford to ignore the interests they speak for.
prefer is illustrated by the school system's annual budget hearing and its annual issues hearing as well. Here local community groups and city-wide interests are invited to speak on matters which concern them. The hearings epitomize a deliberative style. They attempt to confine citizens to a specified channel for proper exercises of influence. The hearings may be seen from one view as a social control device; as Gamson puts it, such channels "restrict the use of resources by potential partisans by subjecting their influence attempts to public surveillance and accountability." The hearings rarely allow interchange with board members; the time allotted to speak is limited. The school system makes no attempt to act on recommendations of particular groups. The public recognizes the deliberation as cosmetic and therefore increasingly refuses to participate in such forums; only about a third of the groups now make presentations, and the number is considerably lower in black communities.

The attempt to provide balanced representation on district advisory councils and to limit their functions is merely one example of how administrators have sought to maintain deliberative politics and to hedge against status-group conflicts. At the local school, the PTA continues to be the favored vehicle for interacting with citizens because of its longstanding tradition limiting itself to mere discussion of school problems (rather than action itself) and its commitment to playing a supportive role. As we have said, administrators continue to give PTA's a favored place on school advisory councils wherever this is possible. Under pressure they have sometimes had to afford other groups a greater role on the councils when they have demanded one.

The rejection by administrators of status-group conflict as a preferred method for articulating local community needs has had contradictory

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effects. In the first place, this normative stance has sometimes served to precipitate conflict toward the school system. School administrators will try to ignore community demands which they consider irresponsible, unrepresentative, or irrelevant—in other words, demands whose style tends toward conflict. By doing so they either silence the group or force it to escalate its demands. So, ironically, the perception that conflict ought to be snuffed out at every turn frequently serves to exacerbate it.

On the other hand, the fear of conflict by administrators has encouraged them to acquiesce to belligerent demands which are pursued persistently through several layers of the bureaucracy or which are expressed directly to central officials rather than pursued at lower levels of the decision-making apparatus. Thus, while administrators attempt to prevent conflict in order to maintain certain standards that they consider appropriate, once they are confronted with conflict, however illegitimate it is in their eyes, they are inclined to acquiesce quickly.

Field administrators such as principals and district superintendents have been less likely to acquiesce than central office officials such as the deputy superintendent or the superintendent. A plausible explanation for this fact is that conflict is repugnant to all bureaucrats at all levels but is more embarrassing to central office officials. At the top of the pyramid the school system is most visible to important constituencies such as the media, the civic elite, city politicians and bureaucrats, state and federal officials, and others. Even though these parties cannot literally vote a superintendent in or out of office, they are an important audience upon which he depends to maintain confidence in his leadership.¹

¹A similar argument is made by James Q. Wilson, who distinguishes between a mayor's audience and his constituents. See James Q. Wilson, "The Mayors and the Cities," The Public Interest No. 16 (Summer, 1969), pp. 25-37.
This interpretation is suggested by the way school officials reacted
to participatory demands by various local constituencies who desired account-
ability representation. It was not the demands of local groups themselves
which caused school administrators to alter participatory outputs. Instead,
it was the intervention of some more "cosmopolitan" audiences such as the
University of Chicago, the mayor's office, or the federal government, that
appeared influential. The federal government played a crucial role in in-
creasing the system's acceptance of citizen participation in E.S.E.A. Title I
Programs and in the E.S.E.A. Title III, Woodlawn Experimental Schools Project.
On the other hand, the mayor's office resisted conflict-prone local groups
who wished to see more citizen participation in the Model Cities Program and
thus gave the school system reinforcement in situations where it might other-
wise have acquiesced to avoid embarrassment.

In the debate over the development of district superintendents
education councils and over local school councils, Redmond's staff ignored
local complaints and demands until the board itself intervened on behalf of
local constituencies.

Thus it is possible to conjecture that the growth of status-group
politics, with its tendency to make the local school-community relations
highly visible to broader audiences, has increased the bargaining power of
rancorous local groups in the political arena.

These developments, however, should not cloud the fact that most
local groups do not have the resources or the ideological persuasion to use
conflict and persistence. Consequently, neither local accountability repre-
sentation nor local mandate representation are the rule. The primary effect
of the professional ideological bias against conflict is a conservative one.
It lessens the potential for local groups to achieve a legitimate decision-
making role (local accountability representation) as well as their ability to achieve specific concessions on an issue by issue basis (local mandate representation).

**Universalism**

In discussing administrative decentralization we cited the role of universalism in school decision-making. While it was pointed out that universalism is accompanied by particularistic considerations, it nevertheless plays an important role. Here it is worth examining the effects of standardization, as it has been applied as an operational equivalent of universalism, on the inclination of community groups to participate in school affairs.

The economists' concept of "public goods" is useful in explaining the way in which the school system's resource allocations stand in the way of greater community participation. As a general principle, administrators believe that the conferring of special benefits to particular schools is unfair. Education is not, according to them, a private good divisible by preference or by demand. Instead, it is a collective good conferred fairly and equitably to all and in which all benefit. As nearly as possible, therefore, the distribution of resources (textbooks, teachers, building repairs, etc.) should be on the basis of objective criteria and formulas.

As Weeres has argued, this tendency to see education as a collective good distributed without consideration to special claims is quite different from the political arena, where municipal services are conferred according to the particularistic demands made by different neighborhood groups. He argues that this collective orientation by school administrators has limited the groups which organize in the public arena. This is because no group can justify

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to its members that they will receive greater benefits by participating than by not participating. This dilemma is a variation of the free rider problem addressed by Mancur Olson.¹ Why participate in an organization if your contribution in efforts or money will yield no results or if any concessions by school authorities will be distributed to all schools indiscriminately of your particular efforts?

Riker and Ordeshook argue that there are two considerations a citizen makes in deciding whether or not to participate.² He evaluates the social consequences of his actions and he evaluates the private consequences.

By social consequences Riker and Ordeshook mean the relative efficacy of an alternative for realizing certain outcomes. The individual's taste and judgment influence his efficacy, as do the objective conditions in which he is operating. While some individuals would be personally capable of great efficacy if they were to participate in the political arena, it is not rational for them to do so. This is because the scope of political actions is greater today; the centralization of decision-making and the complexity of issues tends to reduce a person's efficacy. Efficacy and scope tend to proceed inversely. If by organizing fifty people to protest a policy, an individual represents only one-one hundredth of 1% of those affected by the policy, he is unlikely to be as effective as when those fifty people constituted 5% of those affected by the policy. To follow Riker and Ordeshook's argument further, as efficacy decreases, and with it the incentive to participate, then so do the consequences of failing to participate. If one's actions are of small con-


sequence, his welfare is not particularly harmed by withdrawal from political participation. Thus, it is quite possible for a citizen to value public education but to refrain from participating because his potential impact is so negligible.

Standardized resource allocation in school systems has made it hard for the community person to argue on behalf of his group's specific needs since this violates fairness. And standardization implies centralization, which of its nature makes it hard to organize for a collective change in policy; the individual rightly calculates that the scope of organization required to make a claim on the system is too large to make his efforts worthwhile. Moreover, Olson has concluded, the larger the group, the smaller, ceteris paribus, are the incentives for participation. In other words, the broad scope of school policy-making requires large-scale citizen organization to change policy. Yet it is precisely large groups that offer individuals the least incentives. Thus we see that there is an intimate relationship between standardization, centralization, and citizen apathy. The first two require one another and bring in their wake a disinclination by local community persons to participate in school affairs.

Moving to other dilemmas of universalism vis-a-vis school-community relations, it is worth noting that the universalist ideology of administrators is not without its contradictions. To cite an example, it is difficult to embrace simultaneously an antipathy for conflict and a universalistic frame of reference without compromising one or the other. If one gives in to a particular group in order to quell conflict, this may violate universalism. Yet if he insists on universalism, this may generate conflict. This dilemma accounts for why some administrators, particularly certain principals, insist on universalistic standards even though their stance creates sustained
resistance.

A parenthetical note is also in order on that aspect of universalism which insists that representation of local communities not be at the expense of meritorious achievement standards for hiring and evaluating personnel. Reference to such standards has enabled Redmond to renege on the primary power of local school councils, namely, their selection of principals from among a pool of candidates who had already passed the written and oral examination. We have mentioned previously that where he had once conceded that local councils could play such a role, he and the board have since hedged in this power. The defense for such actions is that the superintendent must protect professional standards against the parochial considerations of a local school constituency. While administrators are clearly concerned with maintaining their power and job security, it is also apparent that universalistic norms have served to check the role of local communities both in achieving accountability representation and in achieving local mandate representation.

Technical Expertise

A clear tension exists between the view that public affairs should be run by experts and the view that lay people ought to assume this role. Public school administrators are firmly committed to the former argument.

To understand their ideological position it is helpful to refer briefly to the historical tradition within which school administration emerged. The professionalization of school administration took place as part of the larger Progressive reform movement after the turn of the century. This movement actually had two quite different emphases, efficiency and expertise on the one side and populism on the other, and each had separate supporters within the movement. Administrators, who emulated the business community, advocated
norms of efficiency and the role of expertise. We have already seen the importance of expertise in the formulations of John Dewey. In fact, the Progressive movement as a whole, not just its conservative wing, resolved the contradictions between expertise and populism in favor of elitism, notwithstanding devices such as direct election and the recall. This conservatism can be seen most clearly by contrasting Progressives to their critics on the left, the socialists. In Milwaukee, which achieved the strongest socialist tradition in American municipal government, and where socialism made some inroads into school government, there was a protracted debate between socialists and Progressives. Socialists, while they favored expertise, also expounded a greater role for public participation than the Progressives. In the Progressive heritage, expertise has clearly overshadowed participatory forms of representation.

The ideology of school administration has sought to limit public participation to the board of education and, even here, to confine the board's role to the setting of policy, leaving administration to professionals.

Recently Redmond has been willing to compromise this ideology in order to check the incursions made into administrative turf by local community leaders. Formerly Redmond openly balked at any attempts by board members to involve themselves in day-to-day details of administration. Recently, however, three board committees have become important, each relating to one of the three administrative areas of the city. These committees have come to involve themselves in the resolution of community complaints and disputes. While this involvement of board members has resulted in a loss of autonomy for administrators, administrators had little choice. District councils and
local school councils have not substantially reduced demands expressed to the board and to central office administrators. The demands could be allowed to fester; this is dangerous because it would do nothing to disguise embarrassing conflicts. The administrative staff could negotiate these issues; however, it is reluctant to do so because central staff fears setting a trend toward centralized conflict resolution. So the least repugnant alternative has been to allow board members the right to involve themselves in settling disputes, a trend once considered anathema.

This development toward area board committees may prove in time to be costly to administrators. In the past when board members have involved
themselves in the day-to-day problems of the schools, they have acquired valuable information which they were then able to use as a bargaining tool with administrators. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that this is a revolutionary trend. First, board members themselves find it in their self-interest to limit extensive demands by community groups since community participation could diminish their own role. Also, the membership of these committees is balanced so that political machine members can always be counted on to support the administration where necessary.

Like the norms of universalism, the technical orientation of administrators has proven to serve socially conservative interests. Administrators see themselves as neutral civil servants serving the public and being partisan to no faction's welfare. In Chicago Redmond generally has operationalized the principle of neutrality to mean that his policies are as noncontroversial as possible and that they lean subtly in the direction of the biases of the board majority, which ordinarily rests with the political machine. He was brought to Chicago with a reputation as a moderate reformer, while his predecessor Willis had come to be defined as a conservative and had the support of the political machine. The dilemma for Redmond has, therefore, been to present a platform of reform but not to lose the support of the machine majority. For a time in 1970 the board majority consisted of reformers and Redmond subtly shifted his neutrality to appease them. However, with two new appointments to the board at that time, Daley was able to restore the political machine's dominance on the board. Again, Redmond, while appearing neutral, shifted subtly to more cautious, conservative positions. On a board which is as carefully balanced as Chicago's, Redmond must be middle-of-the-road to survive. His positions must strike a balance in order not to alienate the reformers
who see him as a reformer nor to reduce his support among the machine members. He can pursue a survival strategy under the norm of professional neutrality. Ideology and self-interest are mutually enforcing.\(^1\)

One other observation may be made about the instrumental ideology of technical expertise as a device which checks accountability and mandate representation. Administrators have sought to use descriptive representation as a way of responding to community demands for a greater role in decisions. More black principals and administrators have been recruited in recent years. Paraprofessionals from the community have been brought into the system and given training. It is argued that black employees share a common background with constituents and can therefore represent their needs better but still maintain some standards of technical expertise. The problem with this view of representation, however, is that it assumes that likeness on some ascriptive trait--race, sex, residence, etc.--will necessarily make the individual represent those like him. In fact, the representation may be only symbolic. The black principal may have little sympathy for poor black constituents. Also, the institution, by controlling the rewards and sanctions to an employee, can strongly influence his role behavior. For years in Chicago, administrators have successfully coopted critical community leaders by hiring them as paraprofessionals. These leaders have then defended the school system by using the rhetoric of the system's technical expertise against constituents who were criticizing the system. In other words, descriptive representation frequently is a social control device used by school authorities to legitimate their expertise in the eyes of constituents.\(^2\) It is understandable that descriptive

\(^1\)In a city where reformers or conservatives predominated more clearly, there would be a more problematic relationship between ideology and self-interest.

\(^2\)Recently there has been evidence of some reversal of this trend. Paraprofessionals are using their knowledge of the system to help constituents. This is a reminder that cooptation can work in both directions. In a cooptive relationship each party expects to gain more from the arrangement than he concedes. Usually the advantage accrues to the institution who hires, but the cooptation may work to the institution's disadvantage.
representation would be preferred by experts to mandate or accountability representation. It gives the appearance of representation but requires minimal accommodation by the system and may even forestall new citizen demands. It is precisely this style of representation which has been favored by the Chicago political machine, to which we again turn.

The Political Machine

Having examined the reform values of conflict resistance, universalism, and technical expertise we find that the operationalization of at least two of these values—conflict resistance and technical expertise—is not as hostile to the values of the political machine as some writers have suggested. Both systems check local accountability representation and local mandate representation in similar ways.

Both school administrators and machine officials wish to appease conflict. For example, the response of school officials to demands for accountability representation is itself an example of Chicago politics. At each stage in the controversy administrators made specific, partial concessions hoping to blunt the edge of conflict and to placate constituents. Like their counterparts in the political arena, school officials articulated no overall policy on citizen participation. They hoped to defuse the issue by coopting citizen support for specific benefits rather than for a comprehensive program.

Of course, conflict appeasement does operate somewhat differently in both arenas. Administrators operate from an ideological perspective that seeks local community support for the school system based on a consensus over common goals. The political machine seeks support from its community constituents through the distribution of special favors and perquisites. However, the attempt to avoid antagonistic relationships with constituents is a more compelling similarity between schools and the political system in Chicago.
than are the different styles of conflict avoidance. The important point is that conflict appeasement in the broader political culture of Chicago reinforces this ideology in school administration. Commentators such as Salisbury who argue for a closer relationship between the educational and political systems suppose that bringing the educational decision structure into the political arena would make educators more receptive to constituent demands, and therefore, to local mandate representation. To be sure, resource allocation would become more particularistic i.e., responsive to particular demands, but it would also most likely mimic the style of the political machine. Political integration would stress material inducements to the citizenry such as jobs and other specific, visible benefits. Reintegration also would lead to attempts to establish more personal, cooptive ties between school authorities and constituents. It would discourage issue-oriented politics quite as much as the political machine now does. Moreover, reintegration probably would be biased in favor of demands posed by white, ethnic constituencies and upper-income constituencies in the city.

To cite another example, the political machine and school professionals share a dim view of citizen participation. Political integration would therefore do little to increase local accountability representation. The regime structure of the school system would remain hostile to widening of formal channels for expression of citizen demands.

We have stated previously that universalistic i.e., standardized, resource allocation blocks citizen motivation to participate in school affairs. Reintegration of Chicago schools into the political system would remove the excesses of universalism which disinclines citizens from participating in school affairs. However, the elitism of the political system, namely, its
resistance to participatory channels, would tend to neutralize any advantages incurred by particularistic resource distribution. It is true that a higher degree of local mandate representation might flourish under particularistic resource allocation. However, the political machine would place a premium on preventing the emergence of demands at all by means of the cooptive devices we have mentioned previously and by restricting participatory demand inputs. The advantages accruing from political affiliations would tend to be washed out by other disadvantages. We may see, then, that the Chicago political system, primarily through the qualities it shares with the schools, serves to reinforce the existing obstacles to greater community participation, either formal accountability representation or accountability representation. This is not to deny the differences between the two arenas, only to say that their similarities until now have received inadequate attention.

Summary

This paper has examined the ideological foundations of the educational reform movement which stand in the way of school decentralization, both decentralization's manifestations as administrative trusteeship and as community participation. Both of these reform planks is appropriately identified with different concepts of how administrators represent community constituents. The specific elements of administrators' instrumental ideology which have been discussed as obstacles are resistance to conflict, universalism, and technical expertise. In addition, this analysis has focused on the similarities between the Chicago political system and the reform values of the public schools, arguing that the political system today is a residual factor influencing the behavior of school officials. A corollary argument has been that
reintegration of the Chicago public school system with the Chicago political structure would be unlikely to result in significant shifts toward decentralization, given the similarities of both systems. It is apparent that administrative decentralization, community participation, and political integration all face major obstacles as avenues for educational reform in Chicago.