This is a report of a year-long survey conducted at a sample of Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations to ascertain enlistment motivation of individuals entering military service. During the survey period of April 1971 to April 1972, there was a decline in draft motivated enlistments with learning a skill or trade and the opportunity for advanced education as the most desirable motivators. The survey also showed the importance of family, friends, and recruiter as a motivational factor in choosing which service branch to enter. Also included are some implications for recruiters based on the statistical survey. The questionnaire and research data are presented in the appendixes together with tables showing the characteristics of applicants and enlistees in the year of study. (Author/JC)
Manpower Research Report

Trends In Enlistment Motivation:
Results of AFEES Surveys of Enlisted Men from April 1971 to April 1972

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REPORT NO. MA 73-1

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This report was submitted by Manpower Development Branch, Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).
TRENDS IN ENLISTMENT MOTIVATION
Results of AFEES Surveys of Enlisted Men from April 1971 to April 1972.

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Harford, Margi A.

Supported under Contract No. DAHC 15-73-C-0131, (Project DATA) task Order No. 72-12-5 and monitored under Contract F41609-73-C-0030, Project 4499-07-50. This study used data collected by the Gilbert Youth Research, Inc.

A year long survey was conducted at a sample of Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations to ascertain enlistment motivation of individuals entering military service. During the survey period of April 1971 to April 1972 there was a decline in draft motivated enlistments with learning skill or trade and the opportunity for advanced education as the most desirable motivators. The survey also showed the importance of family, friends, recruiter on determining in which service a man enlists.

Enlistment
Motivation
Recruitment
Incentives

Enlistment
AFEES
Military Personnel
This Report describes results from a series of analyses performed on data obtained through the DoD Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Station (AFEES) Survey of enlisted personnel. This report is a post facto documentation of data previously analyzed for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The principle objectives of this study were (a) to identify possible trends in enlistment motivation, (b) to study recruiting effectiveness, and (c) to explore possible reasons or factors underlying the decision of some men to enlist in a Service other than the Service to which they initially applied for enlistment.

Data were generated by enlistees entering the Armed Services from April 1971 through April 1972 at a nationwide sample of 25 AFEES locations. The time period coincided with important events such as a reduction in selective service actions, a decrease in troop levels in South Vietnam, and an increase in military compensation.

Data analyses and report preparation activities were performed by Dr. Allan H. Fisher, Jr. of HumRRO Division No. 7. Statistical analyses were done by Ms. Janet Buckley. Research assistance was provided by Ms. Margi A. Harford of Division No. 7. Ms. Leslie S. Rigg of Division No. 7 coordinated report preparation activities. Dr. Robert G. Smith, Jr. is the Director of Division No. 7.

The original draft of this report was prepared under Project ROTC SURVEY. The current report was prepared for the Director of Manpower Research of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) at the request of Mr. Frederick W. Suffa, Assistant Director, Procurement. This effort was supported under Contract No. DAHC 1-73-C-0131 (Project DATA), Task Order No. 72-12-5.
SUMMARY

Climate of the Period

This research occurred during FY72, a dynamic period in history. During this period, a reduction in manpower requirements and a concomitant reduction in the level of the draft occurred. In addition, the level of manpower in South Vietnam was reduced. Further, a major increase in military pay was authorized and announced, and recruitment activities were expanded as part of a policy designed to increase the quantity of voluntary accessions, and hence, to compensate for the reduction in inductees and draft-motivated accessions anticipated as a result of lowering the draft calls. Finally, Service selection policies were modified in some instances to ensure the maintenance of sufficient quality among voluntary accessions. In general, the objective was to attract a sufficient quantity and quality of accessions to accommodate initial accession requirements. Central to this approach was the hypothesis that the draft served to provide both quantity and quality manpower, and hence, was a major reason or motive in enlistment.

Major Results

Instead of draft-motivation or pay influence, the most powerful reported influences in enlistment included career development concepts, e.g., to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life, and the opportunity for advanced training and education. Further, these factors exerted a stable, continuing influence on the enlistment decision for the majority of enlistees over the period of the study. This finding suggests that both draft-motivation and financial incentives should be evaluated in
proper perspective, considering the complex of additional, more powerful reasons for enlistment.

However, there was evidence of anticipated changes in enlistment motivation over time for certain factors. For example, there was a decline from April 1971 to April 1972 in the extent to which the draft motivated enlistment. The decline in reported draft-motivation corresponded to a decline in the rate of reported receipt of notice of induction by enlistees, and to a slight decline in higher aptitude (AFQT) enlistees over this period. The influence of pay as an incentive in enlistment increased over the period April 1971 to April 1972. While the initial impact of the military pay increase appeared to have been realized by the Army (the first Service to announce the pay increase), the data suggest that the other Services were subsequently able to communicate an awareness of the fact that each Service obtained the same pay increase.

Certain consistent differences were noted over time in the extent to which various reasons for enlistment were attributed influence by men in the various Services. These inter-Service differences may have value in future recruitment and advertising activities.

During the period April 1971 to April 1972, the Army, Navy and Air Force were differentially effective in their efforts at recruitment. While the Army and Air Force attained their quotas, the Navy did not. This research indicates that the branch of the Armed Service in which a man eventually enlists appears to be influenced by a number of factors including the selection policies of the Services, the influence of individuals such as family, friends and the recruiter, and draft-motivation. The Army accommodated their recruitment quotas apparently as a result of both attracting more applicants and enlisting these applicants. While the Army pay increase
announcement coincided with an observed increase in Army applicants and enlistments, the Army recruiters showed a consistent ability to enlist a high percentage of their initial applicants over the entire study period. The Air Force also accommodated their quotas, apparently by attracting sufficient applicants and employing a flexible, responsive policy of selection in enlisting needed percentages of these applicants. In contrast, the Navy appeared to have failed to attain their recruiting quotas during this period due in part to consistent adherence to a stringent policy of selection, even when the quality of their applicants was superior, and the quantity of applicants was potentially sufficient to meet their quotas. These results indicate the necessity of evaluating selection and recruitment policies rigorously, including the requirement to monitor the disposition of applicants for enlistment as a continuing effort in manpower management.
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INTRODUCTION

Continuing assessment of the enlistment motivations of voluntary accessions is essential in maintaining a successful program of military manpower management. Central to this effort is a provision to monitor over time the motives or reasons for enlistment endorsed as important by accessions, and to monitor the disposition of serious, qualified applicants for enlistment.

The present research was designed to determine which reasons for enlistment are attributed influence, and to identify possible trends in enlistment motivation. The particular data chosen for analysis included reasons for enlistment, such as the opportunity for advanced education, joining the Service to learn a trade or skill, qualifying for the G.I. Bill, and others. Because of interest in the topics of draft-motivation and monetary compensation, additional analyses were made of:

1. Draft-motivation Indices, e.g., the percent reporting true-volunteerism or draft-motivation, the percent reporting receipt of a notice of induction, and selected indices of recruit quality; and

2. Indices of Pay Influence, e.g., the percent attributing influence to personnel benefits in their decision to enlist.

The latter were studied to investigate the effects on reported enlistment motivation of events such as a reduction in draft levels and combat commitments, or an increase in military compensation—events which occurred during this survey period.

The present research was also conducted to investigate the disposition of serious, qualified applicants for enlistment. For the study period, the analysis indicated the percentage of serious initial applicants to each
Service who are enlisted by that particular Service, as opposed to the percentage who are enlisted by another branch of the Armed Services. Thus, recruitment activities were monitored over time.

Further, this research explored possible reasons or factors underlying the decision of some men to enlist in a Service other than the Service to which they initially applied for enlistment. The following aspects of this phenomenon were studied:

(1) The Selection Process, including application of the indices of quality of enlistee, e.g., education and mental ability.

(2) Draft-motivation, including both the self-report of true-volunteerism or draft motivation, and the receipt of a draft notice prior to enlistment; and

(3) The Influence of Selected Individuals, including the reported influence of choice of Service, of friends in a particular Service, parents or relatives, and the Service recruiter.

Data to accommodate these various research objectives were obtained through the DoD Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Station (AFEES) Survey of FY72.
METHOD

Questionnaire

The questionnaire used in this research includes 37 multiple-choice items.

The questionnaire was designed to obtain data on reasons for enlistment and demographic information, as well as to assess the "image" of the military services. Additional information (including AFQT mental ability category) was coded for inclusion by questionnaire administrators at the individual AFEES sites. (See Appendix A for a copy of the current questionnaire.)

Sample

Data from the AFEES Survey were based on responses obtained from questionnaire administrations conducted at a common nationwide sample of 25 AFEES\(^1\) sites during the months of April 1971 through April 1972.\(^2\) (See Appendix B for a list of the sample sites, the precise weeks of survey administration, and sample size for each bi-weekly period.)

The questionnaire was administered to a 100\% sample of male enlistees at each of these AFEES sites on a bi-weekly basis during the study period. The total sample for the present study consisted of 26,853 voluntary accessions to the enlisted force.

---

\(^1\)These 25 sampling sites were selected from 74 possible AFEES locations to represent small, medium, and large recruiting sources within the five major recruiting districts.

\(^2\)The initial administration of the questionnaire covered the period from October 1970 through December 1970. The data base for this research consisted of data collected from March 1971 through June 1972. Data from a subset of this time frame were analyzed in the present effort.
RESULTS

As the Armed Forces moved from the traditional conscription system toward an all-volunteer force, it was anticipated that trends in reported enlistment motivation would be evident in the responses of each successive population of new recruits. The present sample survey research was primarily concerned with an analysis of trends in twelve reasons for enlistment which occurred between April 1971 and April 1972. It was hypothesized that trends in enlistment motivation would be occasioned by an over-all reduction in required draft levels and by an increase in military compensation. Therefore, particular attention was focused on trends in (1) endorsement of draft-avoidance as a reason for enlistment, and (2) the influence attributed to personnel benefits (including pay) as an enlistment motivation. (These reasons for enlistment will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter.)

Overall Endorsement of Reasons for Enlistment

As a perspective on this research, it is instructive to review the percent of strong influence accorded each reason for enlistment by the study sample over the entire period of this research. Table 1 presents this data. Results indicate that there was considerable variation in the attribution of strong influence to each reason.

The majority of respondents attributed strong influence to each of three reasons for enlistment: (1) to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life; (2) the opportunity for advanced education or training; and (3) to enlist in my choice of Service. Less than 30% attributed strong influence to enlistment for overall personnel benefits (29.6%); or
PERCENT ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO EACH REASON FOR ENLISTMENT

Base: Total Sample, April 1971 to April 1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percent Strong Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity for advanced education and training</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To enlist in my choice of service</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For travel, excitement, and new experience</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve at the time of my choice</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For increased maturity and self-reliance</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To serve my country (patriotism)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military career opportunities</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The overall benefits - pay, room and board, medical care and training*</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To qualify for the G. I. Bill</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To avoid the draft*</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To leave personal problems behind me</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Presented for comparison purposes

TABLE I
to avoid the draft (21.3%). Hence, the factors of draft-avoidance and personnel benefits (pay) must be viewed as possessing secondary relevance as motives which influence enlistment—at least in the report of the accessions.

I. TRENDS IN ENLISTMENT MOTIVATION

The most frequently endorsed reason for enlistment was to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life. There was no appreciable trend in endorsement of this reason over time. Between 59% and 65% of the total sample attributed strong influence to this reason in each month. This reason appears to exert a strong, continuing influence on the enlistment decision. See Figure 1 for trend data on this reason for the total AFEES sample.

Additional analyses showed that the rate of endorsement of this reason was highest for Navy and Air Force enlistees and lowest for Army enlistees. This finding was consistent for the entire study period. (See Appendix D, Figure D-3 for trend data by Service.)

A second reason for enlistment which received majority endorsement was the opportunity for advanced education and training. During the initial period of the study, there was no noticeable trend in the attribution of influence to this reason. However, there was an increase in endorsement of this reason in the latter months of the study (approximately January 1972 and thereafter). An appreciably higher level of endorsement was found in April 1972 (64%) compared to April 1971 (55%). Figure 2 presents trend data for this reason.

Additional analyses indicated a higher percentage of Air Force enlistees endorsed this reason compared to enlistees in the other three Services.
BASE: Total AFEES Sample
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE
TO ENLISTING FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION AND TRAINING

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 2
This finding held over the entire period of the study. (See Appendix D, Figure D-4 for these trend data by Service.)

Another reason attributed strong influence by the majority of the sample was the decision to enlist to obtain one's choice of Service. While the previous reasons showed minimal evidence of trend variations, there was a noticeable decline in the percent who attributed strong influence to this reason during the study period. Fewer enlistees cited this reason as a strong influence after November 1971. From December 1971 to April 1972, only approximately 50% of enlistees attributed strong influence to this reason. Prior to December 1971, the rate varied from 54% to 57%. Figure 3 presents trend data for this reason.

Analyses of this reason by Service showed that the decline in endorsement of this reason over time was not unique to one particular branch of the Armed Services. The reason was attributed less influence over time to enlistees to each Service. However, for each month there was a substantial difference in endorsement of this reason between Army enlistees and enlistees to other Services. In each month, lower percentages of Army enlistees attributed influence to choice of Service as an enlistment motivation compared to enlistees in the other Services. (See Appendix D, Figure D-5 for the trend data by Service.)

Approximately 44% of the sample attributed influence to enlisting for travel, excitement and new experiences. This rate of endorsement was consistent over the study period with 40% to 48% of the AFEES sample attributing strong influence to this reason for enlistment during any particular month. See Figure 4 for trend data.

Enlistment for foreign travel opportunity is often associated with
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR ONE'S CHOICE OF SERVICE

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 3
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR TRAVEL, EXCITEMENT, AND NEW EXPERIENCES

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 4
the Navy by civilian youth (Fisher, 1972, Friedman, 1972). In the present study, the rate of endorsement of enlistment for travel, excitement and new experiences was higher for the Navy enlistees compared to enlistees in the other Services, with only occasional exceptions noted. Conversely, enlisting for travel, excitement and new experiences was generally less frequently endorsed as an enlistment influence by Air Force enlistees. No consistent trend over time in endorsing this reason was noted by Service. (Results for the by Service analyses of this reason appear in Appendix D, Figure D-6.)

In total, 42% attributed strong influence to enlistment to fulfill the military obligation at the time of one's choice. A very slight decline in endorsement of this reason was noted over time. However, there was only a minimal variation in the rate of endorsement for this reason (between 39% and 46%). Figure 5 contains trend data for the total sample.

Additional analyses of this reason revealed that Marine Corps enlistees were somewhat more likely to attribute strong influence to enlisting at the time of one's choice than were enlistees in the other branches of the Armed Services. (See Appendix D, Figure D-7 for trend data by Service.)

Approximately 42% of the total sample claimed that a strong influence in their decision to enlist was the desire to become more mature and self-reliant. Only minimal variation was noted in the percentage endorsing this reason over time. Trend data for the total sample appear in Figure 6.

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TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO SERVE AT THE TIME OF ONE'S CHOICE

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 5
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE
TO ENLISTING FOR INCREASED MATURITY AND SELF-RELIANCE

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 6
Additional analyses indicated that by far the highest rate of endorsement of enlistment to increase maturity was given by Marine Corps enlistees. This finding was consistent over time. (See Appendix D, Figure D-8, for the detailed, by Service analysis of responses to this reason.)

Enlisting to serve one's country (patriotism) was endorsed by over 40% of enlistees as a strong influence in their enlistment decision. Endorsement of this reason was relatively consistent over time. Results appear in Figure 7.

Marine Corps enlistees were much more likely to endorse patriotism as a strong influence in enlistment than were enlistees in the Army, Navy and Air Force. This finding was consistent over the entire period of the study. (See Appendix D, Figure D-9.)

Another important reason for enlistment derives from the conclusion that career opportunities in the military looked better than in civilian life. In total, 40% of the sample endorsed this reason as exerting a strong influence on their decision to enlist. In contrast to most of the reasons discussed above, this reason demonstrated a substantial trend in endorsement over time. This reason achieved higher endorsement in August 1971 and in March/April 1972. The pattern of response appeared to be bimodal, suggesting a possible six month cycle. However, more detailed analyses do not sustain this hypothesis. Further, where the response rate for April/May 1971 was only 38%, the rate for April 1972 (one year later) had increased to 47%. The trend in attributing strong influence to military career opportunities is shown in Figure 8.

Analyses of the data by Service showed that a higher percentage of
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO SERVE ONE'S COUNTRY (PATRIOTISM)

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 7
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR MILITARY CAREER OPPORTUNITIES

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 8
enlisted in the Air Force and the Navy endorsed this reason as a strong influence in enlistment than did Army and Marine Corps enlistees. The hypothesized bi-modal response was not evident in the analysis by Service, where endorsement trends were found to be highly complex. Hence, the aggregate bi-modal hypothesis is not supported by these data. (See Appendix D, Figure D-10 for results by Service.)

Among other reasons for enlistment, the rate of endorsement of qualifying for G.I. Bill benefits is of relevance. At the time of this study, modifications in the law to increase benefits under the G.I. Bill had been proposed which have since been enacted. In total, 26.7% of the sample reported that the opportunity to qualify for the G.I. Bill exerted a strong influence in their decision to enlist. This motivation exerted a consistent influence over time, i.e., there was no appreciable trend in the rate of endorsement of this reason. Results appear in Figure 9.

Analyses of the data by Service suggested the existence of a possible trend toward increased endorsement of this reason over time by Army enlistees. (See Appendix D, Figure D-11 for the trend data by Service.)

Enlistment to leave some personal problems behind was attributed strong influence in enlistment by only 10.8% of the total sample. Variation in endorsement from month to month was very slight (from 9% to 14% over the study period). Results appear in Figure 10.

Analyses of endorsement of this reason by Service indicated that Army and Marine Corps enlistees were more likely to attribute influence to enlisting to avoid personal problems than were Air Force and Navy enlisted. (See Appendix D, Figure D-12 for trend data by Service.)
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO QUALIFY FOR THE G.I. BILL

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 9
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO AVOID PERSONAL PROBLEMS

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 10
In summary, for the total sample of enlistees, trends in endorsement of the ten previous reasons for enlistment were minimal over the period of the study. There was a slight decline in the enlistment influence attributed to the choice of branch of Service. There was also some indication of a recent increase in the importance of training, advanced education, and military career opportunities. However, with these exceptions, endorsement of the other reasons for enlistment evidenced minimal variability over the study period.

These analyses also indicate that many of the reasons had strong differential attraction to enlistees in the various Armed Services. Learning a trade or skill useful in civilian life was a reason for enlistment most frequently attributed influence by men in Navy and Air Force. The opportunity for advanced education or training appeared to hold particular appeal for Air Force enlistees. Military career opportunities were another more influential factor in Navy and Air Force enlistments. Navy enlistees cited travel as a reason for enlisting. Enlisting to increase one's level of maturity or for patriotism were reasons important to Marine Corps enlistees. Army enlistees were attracted by the opportunity to qualify for the G.I. Bill, but not for choice of Service. Small percentages of both the Army and Marine Corps enlistees appeared motivated to enlist to leave personal problems behind them. These inter-Service differences may have value in future recruitment and advertising activities.

**Trends in Draft Motivation and Pay Influence**

Only minimal variation over time was noted in endorsement of most of the reasons for enlistment. However, substantial shifts in the extent of influence over time were evident for draft-motivation and personnel benefits. There was evidence of a decline from April 1971 to April 1972.
In the context to which the draft motivated enlistments. Conversely, the influence of the reduction in enlistment increased over the period of April 1971 to April 1972. This section will deal extensively with these two trends.

During the study period, military manpower needs were undergoing a steady reduction in force, with an accompanying reduction in the number of men inducted into the Service. The direct result was a reduced quantity of enlisted accessions. However, a major positive side-effect of the draft is also noteworthy. There is a substantial relationship between draft-motivation and selected indices of manpower quality; e.g., educational attainment and tested aptitude. In general, the higher the percentage of draft-motivated men, the higher the level of education and of mental ability (measured by the AFQT). Hence, it was hypothesized that the Services would suffer both qualitatively and quantitatively from elimination of the draft and associated draft-motivated enlistments.

One of the major strategies, designed to offset direct and indirect effects of the draft, was the provision of various personnel benefits (including economic incentives) for joining the military services. Two military pay increases were authorized during the study period, which doubled the entry pay level for enlisted men. Initial advertising for the pay increases was begun by the Army approximately mid-way through the study period (18 November 1971 and 24 November 1971).

This research was performed to study the effects on reported enlistment motivation of: (1) the reduction in draft calls, and (2) the increases in military compensation. Specifically, it was predicted that:
(1) With the wide publicity accorded the draft-reductions, young men who voluntarily enlist in the Armed Services would increasingly be those men who would have enlisted in a no-draft environment with no associated military obligation. In addition, fewer of these volunteers would report that receipt of a draft notice influenced their enlistment. Finally, a progressive decline in aptitude would occur as time passed and the effects of draft-motivation declined.

(2) As the amount of publicity accorded military compensation increased, endorsement of military pay benefits as an enlistment motivation would correspondingly increase.

Because the Army had been the primary recipient of manpower through the Selective Service System, and because the Army was permitted to be the initial Service to begin the nationwide announcement of the increase in military compensation, the effects occasioned by draft-reduction and increased military pay would probably be more pronounced for the Army than the other Services. Therefore, separate analyses were performed using only the Army sample.

Figure 11 indicates the percentage of respondents attributing strong influence to draft avoidance and to overall personnel benefits as reasons for enlistment over the period of April 1971 to April 1972. As predicted, there was a general decline in the influence of the draft as an enlistment motivation. This decline coincided with draft levels during this period (See Appendix D, Figure D-1, for trends in draft-avoidance, by Service.) In contrast to the decline in draft-motivation, endorsement of personnel benefits showed an increase over the study period. The increase was most pronounced in late December 1971 and early January 1972. This increase occurred approximately one month after the announcement of the military pay increase. (See Appendix D, Figure D-2, for trends in the endorsement of personnel benefits, by Service.)
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO AVOID THE DRAFT AND FOR PERSONNEL BENEFITS

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 11
1. Correlates of Draft-Motivation

Three additional trends were found which appear related to the decline in reported draft-avoidance. These trends are: (1) an increase in the reported rate of true-volunteerism; (2) a decrease in the rate of reported receipt of draft notices; and (3) a decrease in the percentage of higher aptitude accessions. Each result is discussed for (a) the total sample, and (b) Army enlistees only.

With respect to the first finding, the proportion of the total sample classified as "true-volunteers" increased from 65% to approximately 77% over the period of this research. The top line in Figure 12 presents this trend in true-volunteerism over time for the total sample. The extent of true-volunteerism was also determined for only those men who enlisted in the Army, the prime beneficiary of the draft (see Figure 13). For Army enlistees, an increase in the percentage of true-volunteers (from 64% to 73%) was also evident during the study period.

With respect to the reported receipt of draft notices, the percentage of enlistees in the total sample who reported the receipt of a draft notice prior to enlistment declined over the period of the study. The lower trend line in Figure 14 presents the data. A decline over time in the percentage of Army enlistees (only) who reported receipt of a draft notice prior to their enlistment also was found. Army results appear as the lower trend line in Figure 15.

With respect to aptitude, the percentage of men in the two higher mental ability groups decreased in the total sample during the period of the study. Results for the total sample appear as the middle line in Figure 14. Similar findings were noted for Army enlistees (see the middle line in Figure 15).
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO AVOID THE DRAFT

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 12
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO EnLISTING TO AVOID THE DRAFT

BASE: Army Enlistees

Figure 13
SELECTED CORRELATES OF DRAFT-MOTIVATION

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

SYMBOL TABLE
- DRAFT NOTICE
- HS GRADUATES
- AFQT MG I OR II

Figure 14
SELECTED CORRELATES OF DRAFT-MOTIVATION

BASE: Army Enlistees

Figure 15
It was predicted that a decline in the quality of enlistees (as inferred from aptitude or education) would accompany a decrease in draft-motivated enlistment. In support of the hypothesis, there was evidence of a decline over time in mental ability (AFQT Mental Groups I and II) for both the total sample (Figure 14), and the sample of only Army enlistees (Figure 15). Contrary to the prediction, data from the total sample indicated no downward trend in education over time (Figure 14). However, further research indicated that the lack of decline in level of education for the total sample was attributable to an increase in the educational level of Army enlistees (Figure 15). (This increase offset an observed decline in the educational level for men in the other services.)

In general, the decline in reported draft-motivation corresponded to a decline in the rate of reported receipt of a notice of induction by enlistees, and to a slight decline in higher aptitude enlistees over this period.

2. Trends in Pay Influence

It was hypothesized that announcements of military pay increases would be reflected in increased rates of attributing enlistment influence to personnel benefits (including pay, room and board, medical care, and training) for enlistees during the study period. Further, it was anticipated that a higher percentage of Army enlistees would report the influence in enlistment of personnel benefits, including pay, since the Army was the first service to publicize the pay increases (18 November 1971 and 24 November 1971). (The other Services announced the increases about one month later.)

The increase in educational attainment for Army enlistees in November 1971 and thereafter appears to have resulted from a change in Army recruitment policy designed to increase the percentage of high school graduate accessions. This policy permitted the substitution of G.E.D. equivalency for the high school diploma. Hence, the apparent increase in educational attainment may have been an artifact of a change in recruitment policy.
Both hypotheses were sustained. Results appear in Figure 16.

For both the total sample and the Army enlistee sample, there was a substantial increase in the percent who attributed enlistment influence to personnel benefits during January 1972 (and thereafter), with the major impact reported among men who enlisted in February 1972 and March 1972. Also, a higher percentage of Army enlistees attributed influence to personnel benefits in February/mid-March than was reported for the total sample.

A more precise evaluation of the impact of the Army pay increase announcement was given by analysis of responses provided by Army enlistees only to an "image" item. The response "best for pay-Army" showed a marked increase in January 1972 compared with the period October through December 1971. The increase ranged from approximately 24% to 30%. See Figure 17.

Two other findings merit mention. First, enlistees in each Service other than the Army cited personnel benefits at a higher rate than did Army enlistees in the final month of the study period (March 27/April 10). The same finding was noted in the Army "pay image" analysis. These findings suggest that while the initial impact of the military pay increase was realized by the Army (the first Service to announce the pay increase), the other Services were subsequently able to communicate the fact that each Service obtained the same pay increase.

Second, there was a time-lag before the effect of the Army pay announcement was noted. Although the increases in military compensation received initial publicity in mid-November 1971, there were only slight increases in the mention of benefits as an enlistment incentive until mid-January 1972. The general finding seems to be that the effects of an advertising campaign require some time to be reflected among the responses of enlistees. However, an assessment of Army "pay image" among male.
COMPARISON OF TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR PERSONNEL BENEFITS (INCLUDING PAY) BETWEEN TOTAL AFES SAMPLE AND ARMY ENLISTEES

SYMBOL TABLE
• TOTAL
X ARMY ONLY

PERCENT

44.0
38.0
32.0
26.0
20.0

APR 26 MAY 24 JUN 21 JUL 19 AUG 16 SEP 13 OCT 11 NOV 9 DEC 6 JAN 3 JAN 31 FEB 28 MAR 27 MAY 10 JUN 7 JUL 5 AUG 2 AUG 30 SEP 27 OCT 25 NOV 22 DEC 20 JAN 17 FEB 14 MAR 13 APR 10 1971 - 1972

WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFES SURVEY

Figure 16
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING "BEST FOR PAY" IMAGE TO THE ARMY

BASE: Army Sample

Figure 17
civilian youth in November/December 1971 did indicate a slight change in image. See Figure 18. But note that the Air Force was consistently attributed the most favorable "pay image" of any Service by male, civilian youth.

Branch of Service Offering Best Pay

BASE: Male, Civilian Youth (Gilbert Youth Surveys)
II. TRENDS IN RECRUITING EFFECTIVENESS

During the period of April 1972 to April 1973, the major Armed Services were differentially effective in their efforts in recruitment. While the Army and Air Force attained their recruiting quotas, the Navy did not. Another objective of this research was to determine possible reasons for this differential recruitment effectiveness.

The Dynamics of Recruitment

The recruiting problem can be viewed in terms of the relative success with which each branch of the Armed Services: (1) initially attracts men who wish to serve in that particular branch of Service and enlists these applicants; and (2) enlists men initially attracted to the other Services who are not enlisted by these Services.

Much of the effort expended by the individual Services in advertising and recruitment have been directed toward the achievement of the initial recruiting objective. This goal involves the marketing concept of "selling" a high percentage of the potential enlistees attracted through advertising or motivated by other influences. Less emphasis has been accorded the enlistment of applicants to other Services; e.g., referrals. This emphasis is generally appropriate, since the majority of enlistees are composed of the men a Service initially attracts and enlists. However, the success with which a Service enlists men initially attracted to some other Service may be an important factor in the accommodation of recruiting quotas. For example, it has been estimated that 1 of the total Army enlistee pool in FY72 consisted of initial applicants to other Services.6

This input was presumably needed to accommodate Army recruiting quotas for the period.

The survey data permitted the development of two indices employed to analyze recruitment effectiveness. One index was a measure of the extent to which each Service initially attracted applicants through advertising, public relations, recruiting, etc. The data were expressed as the percentage of initial applicants for each Service; i.e., as "share-of-applicants." The second index was a measure of the extent to which each Service enlisted its respective applicants. This index is called the "capture rate."

Share of Initial Applicants

One relative criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of the recruitment effort is the percentage of enlistees who initially apply to each Service for enlistment. (While a "pure" measure would be the share of all applicants, the present data base includes only those applicants who were sufficiently qualified and motivated to enlist in one of the Armed Services.) Figure 19 provides trend data on the percentage of initial applicants to each branch of the Armed Services.

The Army attracted the highest percentage of initial applicants. The Marine Corps attracted the lowest percentage of initial applicants. The share of applicants for the Navy and Air Force fell between the extremes of the Army and Marine Corps.

Some trends were noted. The Army attracted a particularly high share of applicants in January 1972 and thereafter. The Navy share of applicants was highest in the summer months. The Marine Corps share of applicants tended to decline during the fall and early winter, while the
SHARE OF INITIAL APPLICANTS FOR EACH BRANCH OF THE ARMED SERVICES

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFEES SURVEY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APR 26 MAY 24 JUN 21 JUL 19 AUG 16 SEP 13 OCT 11 NOV 8 DEC 6 JAN 3 JAN 31 FEB 28 MAR 21 MAY 10 JUN 7 JUL 5 AUG 2 AUG 30 SEP 27 OCT 25 NOV 22 DEC 20 JAN 17 FEB 14 MAR 13 APR 10 1971 -1- 1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SYMBOLE TABLE**
- ● ARMY APPLICANTS
- X NAVY APPLICANTS
- Y USMC APPLICANTS
- ♦ USAF APPLICANTS

**TABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Air Force share of applicants was lower during the late summer and late winter periods.

Inspection of the previous data do not suggest unequivocal reasons for differential recruitment effectiveness. Thus, the Navy had a higher share of applicants than the Air Force in several months, yet the Air Force met their recruitment quotas while the Navy did not. The "capture rate" measure helps to clarify the dynamics of recruitment effectiveness.

Capture Rate

A second measure of the effectiveness of the recruiting effort is the extent to which each Service succeeds in enlisting men who initially apply to that particular Service. This index is an estimate of recruiter effectiveness in "selling" (enlisting) the applicant attracted by advertising, public relations and other influences. An estimate of this effectiveness is provided by computing the percentage of initial "serious applicants" to each Service who are enlisted in each month by that Service. Figure 20 contains this data for the study period.

In interpreting the data, a figure of 100% for a Service would mean that recruiters for this Service enlisted every serious applicant who first applied to that particular Service. Conversely, a figure of 50% would imply that half of the applicants to a Service were enlisted by that Service, while the remainder were rejected and referred elsewhere, or simply chose another Service of their own volition.

With minor exceptions, the Army successfully enlisted a higher percentage of initial applicants than any other Service. Conversely, with one exception (February 28/March 13), the Navy consistently enlisted the lowest percentage of initial applicants. The Air Force and Marine Corps generally
PERCENT OF SERIOUS APPLICANTS ENLISTED BY EACH BRANCH OF THE ARMED SERVICES

BASE: Total AFEES Sample

Figure 20
enlisted applicants at capture rates between those of the Army and the Navy. These data suggest that the Navy failed to attain their recruiting quotas by reliance on an overly stringent policy of failing to enlist a sufficiently high percentage of their initial applicants.

Trends in the capture rates were noted for Services other than the Army. In general, the Army consistently recruited over 90% of its initial applicants. In one prime Army month, January 1972, the Army recruiters enlisted over 96% of the serious applicants who initially applied to the Army. The Navy capture rate increased appreciably over the period of the study. However, the increase was still insufficient to permit the Navy to accommodate its quotas. Conversely, the Air Force capture rate declined from about 90% in the initial part of the study, to only approximately 80% in the latter part of the study. This finding appears to be a result of the Air Force application of a temporarily stringent quota control policy, permissible since the Air Force had smaller recruitment quotas during the latter part of the study. 7 Hence, the Air Force was able to meet their recruitment quotas in spite of a lower capture rate.

1. The Relative Quality of Initial Applicants

Additional analyses were performed to determine if the quality of Navy applicants was such that a stringent policy of selection was essential. "Quality" is defined by the percentage achieving AFQT scores in the top two categories of mental ability, Mental Groups I and II. Data from September 1971 to January 1972 were analyzed. The hypothesis was not supported. As Table 2 indicates, the Navy attracted the highest quality applicant

7 Personal Communication, Mr. Frederick W. Suffa (OASD, M&RA) to Allan H. Fisher, Jr. (HumRRO). 21 June 1972
of any Service in this period. Thus, it was not necessary for the Navy to apply a policy of high selectivity because of the quality of their initial applicants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Initial Applicants to Each Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based on September 1971 through January 1972 enlistees in the AFEES sample survey.

2. The Historic Basis for Applicant Selection Policy

Another hypothesis was evaluated, namely that in FY72 the Navy continued to apply a policy of stringent selection of applicants which originated in 1970 when the quantity of Navy applicants was so large (relative to recruitment quotas) that the policy was appropriate.

Research was performed at two points in time to test this hypothesis. The analyses were performed for men who entered the Armed Service in (a) October and November 1970, and (b) September 1971 through January 1972—approximately one year later. Table 3 indicates the percent of men each Service enlisted from its respective pool of serious applicants, at each point in time. The data support the hypothesis.
PERCENT OF INITIAL SERIOUS APPLICANTS
ENLISTED BY EACH SERVICE
(Base: AFEES Survey of Enlisted Men)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3

In October-November 1970, the Navy had the lowest capture rate (71%) of the four Services. Even though the Navy capture rate increased to 80% in September 1971/January 1972, it remained the lowest rate for the four Services. Thus, the Navy appears to have continued the application of a stringent selection policy from October-November 1970 to September 1971/ January 1972.

The implications of these findings achieve importance when considered in the context of attempts by the Navy to achieve their respective recruitment quotas. In October-November 1970, the Navy achieved its quota in spite of a policy of high selectivity—when only 71% of initial Navy applicants enlisted in the Navy, while 29% of initial Navy applicants enlisted in another Service. (As noted above, the Navy had a substantial "delay pool" of enlistees awaiting entry during this period.) Thus, based upon selection ratio, the Navy could afford to employ a policy of extreme selectivity. However, during September 1971/January 1972, the Navy failed to achieve its recruitment objectives, while continuing to adhere to a stringent policy of selection. In this period, the Navy enlisted only 80% of its initial applicants, while 20% of initial Navy applicants were subsequently enlisted in another Service.
Summary

The AFEES sample survey data provided some indication of possible reasons for differential recruitment effectiveness (quota accommodation) noted by Service. The data indicate that the Army accommodated its recruiting quotas by both attracting initial applicants and by enlisting a high percentage of these applicants. (Further, the Army enlisted a substantial percentage of initial applicants to the other Armed Services.) In contrast, in the latter months of the study, both the Navy and Air Force appear to have employed more stringent policies of applicant selection than did the Army. But the Navy and Air Force were differentially successful in accommodating their respective quotas for recruitment. The Air Force also accommodated their quotas by attracting sufficient applicants and employing a flexible, responsive policy of selection in enlisting these needed percentages of applicants. In contrast, the Navy appeared to have failed to attain their recruiting quotas during this period due to consistent adherence to an overly stringent policy of selection, even when the quality of their applicants was superior and the quantity of applicants was potentially sufficient to meet their quotas.
III. FACTORS IN THE DISPOSITION OF APPLICANTS

Given the results of the previous section, additional research was performed in an attempt to postulate reasons underlying the decision of some men to enlist in a Service other than the Service to which they initially applied for enlistment. In this research, data from a subset of the total sample was aggregated to increase the size of the sample. Data on enlistees were combined for five separate time periods: (1) the weeks of September 13 and September 27, 1971; (2) the weeks of October 11 and October 25, 1971; (3) the weeks of November 8 and November 22, 1971; (4) the weeks of December 6 and December 20, 1971, and (5) the weeks of January 3 and January 17, 1972.

The Disposition of Initial Applicants

As background for this research, it is useful to review the extent to which applicants enlist in a branch of Service other than the first Service to which they apply. Table 4 illustrates the extent to which initial applicants for each Service were enlisted in their own Service or in another Service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service Applied To:</th>
<th>Service in Which Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


TABLE 4
The disposition of initial applicants for each Service can be determined by reference to the appropriate row vector, connoting applicants to each Service (i.e., the data should be read horizontally, not vertically).

The extent to which the Army was successful in enlisting initial Navy applicants (11%) and Marine Corps applicants (10%) is particularly noteworthy. These are the largest off-diagonal percentages in this matrix. (See Appendix E for the numeric values for this matrix.) Also important is the relatively high percentage of initial Air Force applicants (6%) enlisted by the Army in this period. In addition, the Army realized the highest applicant conversion rate (92%) of any of the Services over the entire period.

The basic question raised by these findings concerned why each Service lost some of its applicants to the other Services. An understanding of the reasons associated with this loss of applicants might result in a reduction in the number of losses by each Service. An overall gain in manpower would thus be realized making a net increase in the total available civilian pool of applicants unnecessary. In an attempt to answer this question, analyses were performed on the extent to which the disposition of applicants was a function of the following factors: (1) the selection process; (2) draft-motivation; and (3) the influence of friends, family and the recruiter.

The Formal Selection Process

The general policy of each Service is to select high school graduates whenever possible. The study data indicate that in the case of the Navy and Air Force, few non-high school graduates were accepted for enlistment. In fact, each Service enlisted a subset of men from its respective pool of initial applicants which possessed a slightly higher percentage of
high school graduates than was found in the pool of initial applicants per se. See Table 5 for results.

THE EFFECT OF SELECTING ON EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Applicants To Each Service</th>
<th>Initial Applicants Enlisted By Each Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY 67.2%</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY 77.7%</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC 61.7%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF 82.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5

The Navy data in particular exemplify the selection process. Among all initial applicants to the Navy, almost 78% possessed at least a high school education. But from among this applicant pool, the Navy enlisted a group of men of whom 82% possessed at least a high school education. Similarly, each of the other Services appeared to have selected the more highly educated applicant for enlistment. See Appendix F, p. F-2 for detailed results on education.

The process of selection is not entirely positive in its effects. Accommodation of recruiting quotas typically occurs in a series of finite time periods, e.g. monthly. Therefore, a Service may need to enlist men of lesser quality late in the month in order to attain their quotas. However, the force of a standing policy of selection may cause the Service to reject more qualified men earlier in the time period. If these forces
operate as posited, then a Service could both select the "cream of the crop" of its respective initial applicants, but also enlist "rejects" (or referrals) of lesser quality from the pool of initial applicants to other Services. The present data on AFQT support this tentative hypothesis. See Table 6 for the results.

The Relationship of Mental Ability (AFQT) To the Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent AFQT Mental Group I or II</th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS To Each Service</th>
<th>ENLISTEES, BY SOURCE</th>
<th>ENLISTEES, BY SOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6

Two important aspects of selection are illustrated by the data in Table 6. First, each Service selects higher aptitude personnel from their respective pools of applicants (compare the first and second columns). This is the same positive effect of selection previously noted for education. Second, a negative (counter-productive) aspect is noted in the enlistment of men who initially applied to the other Services. In this process, each Service enlists less qualified men. For each Service, the quality of these enlistees is inferior to the quality of initial applicants to the respective Services (compare the first and third columns).

The net result of selecting from one's pool of applicants and also
enlisting men not accepted (enlisted) by another Service tends to vary by Service. In these data, the Navy and Air Force had the highest quality enlistees (see the column labelled Total Enlistees), primarily as a result of extensive selection from a highly qualified initial applicant pool. In contrast, there was a slight diminution in aptitude in the Army and Marine Corps enlistee populations compared to their respective pools of initial applicants. However, as noted in the previous section, the Army and Air Force attained their respective recruiting quotas for this period, while the Navy did not. See Appendix F, p. F-3 for detailed results on aptitude.

1. Selection and Race

This research indicates that major selection parameters used by the Services include educational attainment and tested aptitude. It was deemed important to determine if race was also an important factor in the enlistment of serious, qualified applicants, since selection based on race is not permitted. Table 7 presents information on the disposition of applicants as a function of race.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS To Each Service</th>
<th>ENLISTEES, BY SOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Relationship of Race To The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

TABLE 7
Two findings are noted. First, from their respective pool of initial applicants, each Service enlisted a slightly higher percentage of Caucasians (compare the first and second columns). Second, in enlisting men from the pool of initial applicants to the other Services, each Service enlisted a lower percentage of Caucasians than was found in their respective initial applicant pool (compare the first and third columns). However, the net effect was negligible in comparing the percentage of Caucasians among total enlistees to total applicants (compare the first and fourth columns). See Appendix F, Figure F-4, for detailed results on race.

Draft Motivation

The draft was another factor operating to influence the final choice of Service of applicants. Previous research indicated that a substantial positive relationship exists between draft motivation and reported receipt of a draft notice prior to enlistment. Therefore, it was hypothesized that receipt of a draft notice might induce young men to select that branch of the Armed Services which would best satisfy their military service objectives, and that evidence of "shopping behavior" would be noted in which higher rates of receipt of a draft notice prior to enlistment would be reported by men who eventually enlist in a Service other than the Service to which they initially apply. A corollary hypothesis was also stated; i.e., that men who describe themselves as true-volunteers would be more likely to enlist in the Service to which they initially applied. The data in Table 8 support the initial hypothesis.
The Relationship of Receipt of Draft Notice To The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

Percent Reporting Receipt of Draft Notice Prior to Enlistment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS To Each Service</th>
<th>ENLISTEES, BY SOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8

Each Service enlisted a lower percentage of men reporting the receipt of draft notices from their pool of initial applicants (compare the first and second columns). However, in support of the initial hypothesis, each Service accepted men for enlistment who initially applied to other branches of the Armed Service, and these men tended to report a much higher rate of receipt of draft notices prior to enlistment than did the initial applicants to the Service (compare the first and third columns).

See Appendix F, page F-5, for detailed results on receipt of draft notice.

Results varied by Service in testing the corollary hypothesis of a relationship between true-volunteerism and the final branch-of-Service decision. Table 9 presents the data.
The Relationship of True-Volunteerism to The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

Percent True-Volunteers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS</th>
<th>ENLISTEES BY SOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To Each Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>65.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9

The hypothesis of higher true volunteer rates among "initial applicants who are enlisted" than among men "gained from the other Services" appeared to hold for the Marine Corps, but not for the other Services. The Marine Corps attracted a pool of initial applicants who were predominantly true-volunteers (77.5%) and was able to enlist a subset of enlistees of whom over 78% reported true-volunteerism, while the applicants gained from other Services reported a relatively lower rate of true-volunteerism (71.9%). In contrast, for the Army and Navy, men gained from other Services reported slightly higher rates of true-volunteerism than did initial applicants to these two Services. For the Air Force, there was no difference between the true-volunteer rates reported for "initial applicants enlisted" versus applicants gained from the other Services.

See Appendix F, p. F-6 for detailed results on true-volunteerism.

The Role of Selected Individuals in the Choice of Service

The AFEES survey presented an opportunity for each enlistee to indicate which of several categories of persons was most influential in his
selection of the particular branch of Service in which he enlisted. The main types of persons endorsed were: (1) the Service recruiter, (2) a parent or relative, and (3) a friend in the Service. The relationship between endorsing each person and the final branch-of-Service decision is discussed further.

1. The Role of the Parent or Relative

The parent or relative was reportedly most influential in the final choice of the Navy, and to a lesser extent, the Air Force. Table 10 summarizes the findings.

### INFLUENCE IN choice OF SERVICE: FAMILY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT INFLUENCED BY A PARENT OR RELATIVE</th>
<th>Prototype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10**

Thirty percent of Navy enlistees reported that a parent or relative influenced their choice of Service.

Additional analyses revealed that the parent or relative was cited as influential by men whom the Navy and Air Force selected from their respective applicant pools at a higher rate than was reported by men whom these Services enlisted from among initial applicants to other Services. Results appear in Table 11 (compare the second and third columns).
The Relationship of Parental Influence To The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

Percent Influenced by a Parent or Relative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS To Each Service</th>
<th>ENLISTEES BY SOURCE</th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11

It was also found that initial applicants to other Services who subsequently enlisted in the Army or Marine Corps tended to endorse parents or relatives as a major influence more frequently than did initial applicants to the Army or Marine Corps who enlisted in these Services.

See Appendix F, p. F-8 for detailed results on the influence of parent or relative in final Service selection.

2. The Role of a Friend in the Service

Having a friend in the particular service can also be a powerful influence in the final branch-of-Service decision. A friend in the Service was reportedly most influential to Marines and Air Force enlistees. Almost 30% of Air Force enlistees reported that a friend in the Air Force influenced their choice of Service. The rate for the Marine Corps was 28%. Results are given in Table 12.
INFLUENCE IN CHOICE OF SERVICE: FRIEND-IN-THE-SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percent Influenced by a Friend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 12

Additional analyses revealed that friend-in-service influence was slightly more effective in Air Force "gains" of enlistees who first applied to another Service (31.6%), than it was among initial Air Force applicants who were enlisted by the Air Force (29.6%). The reverse relationship held for the other three Services. Results appear in Table 13.

**The Relationship of Friend-in-Service Influence To The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Initially Applied To This Service</th>
<th>Initially Applied To Another Service</th>
<th>Total Enlistees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 13

65
Finally, analyses of these data indicate that the Air Force "attracts" men from each of the other Services who report a high rate of mention of friend-in-Service influence. Having a friend in the Air Force appears to have been an important secondary effect in enlistment, particularly to men who first applied to the Army or Marine Corps. However, the rate of mention is also high for Air Force enlistees who initially applied to the Navy for enlistment.

See Appendix F, page F-9, for details on the role of a friend-in-Service on enlistment decision.

3. The Role of the Recruiter

Recruiters in the various Services were accorded differential influence in the decision of enlistees regarding choice of Service. The Army recruiter was most frequently mentioned as the major influence in enlistment in that Service. Table 14 summarizes the results by Service.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percent Influenced by Recruiter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 14

The Army recruiter was reported to be an influence in Army enlistment of men who initially applied to the Army (28.8%), as well as by men who first applied to another Service and eventually enlisted in the Army (30.0%). Table 15 presents these details.
The Relationship of Recruiter Influence
To The Disposition of Applicants for Enlistment

Percent Influenced by Recruiter in Choice of Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>TOTAL INITIAL APPLICANTS To Each Service</th>
<th>ENLISTEES, BY SOURCE</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL ENLISTEES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initially Applied To This Service</td>
<td>Initially Applied To Another Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 15

The Navy recruiter was accorded far more influence in the enlistment of men who first applied to another Service (27.1%), than he was in the enlistment of men who initially applied to the Navy (17.8%).

In contrast, the role of the Army recruiter was evident in both his screening of initial Army applicants and in his enlistment into the Army of men who first applied to each of the other Services. See Appendix F, p. F-7 for details.

In particular, the Army recruiter appeared to have been an influential factor in the recruitment into the Army of men who initially applied to the Navy or Marine Corps, but who were not enlisted by these Services. This impact is impressive in light of the image of the Army per se. For example, each enlistee was asked to indicate the extent to which the branch of Service strongly influenced his enlistment decision. (See Appendix D, Figure D-5 for these results by Service.) Among Army enlistees, only 44% claimed that they were strongly influenced by the branch of Service. The rate was considerably higher for the other Services: Navy 59.4%, Marine
Corps 60.5%, and Air Force 62.8%.

Although the image of the Army *per se* was not as favorable as the image accorded the other Services by enlistees, the Army recruiter was apparently able to effectively compensate for the Army image. The Army recruiter was able to both attract initial Army applicants, as well as to enlist men who initially applied to other Services. Compared to Navy, Air Force, and Marine recruiters, the Army recruiter received a higher level of endorsement for his influence from both initial applicants to his Service, and from men "gained" from the pool of initial applicants to other Services.

**Summary**

The preceding findings suggest that the final branch-of-Service decision may result from a complex of reasons, including but not limited to (1) selection, (2) draft-motivation, and (3) the influence of key individuals, including the recruiter.

The influence in enlistment of key persons varies by Service. In the disposition of applicants, the Army recruiter appears to have had more impact than recruiters for the other Services. A friend-in-the-Service appears more influential in Air Force and Marine Corps enlistments. The influence of family or relatives is more pronounced in Navy enlistments.

For each Service, draft-motivation (as inferred from the reported

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receipt of a draft notice) was related to "shopping behavior" and final choice of Service. No consistent finding was noted for reported "true-volunteerism."

The major factor in the final branch-of-Service "decision" appears to be the formal selection procedures (and quota control systems) employed by the Armed Services.
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this section is to review the major findings and implications of this study. For perspective, the findings of these analyses are contrasted with the results of subsequent multivariate analyses performed on the same data. Further, the results of the present study are compared with the findings of other investigators with respect to near-term trends in the quality of voluntary accessions.

Trends in Enlistment Motivation

The present results indicate that two of the most frequently discussed motives in enlistment are of minor importance, at least insofar as the enlistee per se is willing to attribute influence to various reasons. Thus, draft-avoidance and personnel benefits were endorsed as influences by only a minority of enlistees, with draft motivation assuming less importance over time. These findings strongly suggest that increased emphasis in enlistment motivation research should be expended in analysis of the "other reasons" for enlistment. They also highlight the need for more sophisticated, secondary analysis of survey data.

Subsequent to this research, additional analyses were performed on AFEES Survey data to generate a classification of reasons for enlistment. Data for Army enlistees only were subjected to
multivariate analyses. Results from these analyses suggest a four-way classification of reasons for enlistment.

1) Enlistment for career development with the emphasis on education and training and the opportunity for a military career.

2) Enlistment in the service of one's choice (Army) at the time of one's choice.

3) Enlistment to obtain military personnel benefits including pay, and to qualify for the G.I. Bill.

4) Enlistment for individual development and possibly change, with the emphasis on increased maturity and self-reliance obtained by exposure to travel, and new experiences.

These results may have important implications for the development of future advertising and recruitment programs. One or more of these four major factors could be used as the basis of essentially independent packaged advertising appeals designed to motivate young men to enlist in the Army. For example, these data suggest that appeals based on career development with the emphasis on training would be effective in attracting men into the Army who were not draft-motivated. It may also be desirable to perform similar analyses for enlistees in the other Services to determine if a similar classification of enlistment motivation underlies the responses of Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps enlistees.

Trends in the Quality of Voluntary Accessions

The present results indicate that as draft calls declined, there was a decrease in higher aptitude enlistees and (except for the Army) a decline in the educational attainment of voluntary accessions.

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A comprehensive evaluation of near-term trends in draft-motivation, education and aptitude was reported by Binkin and Johnston (1973). These researchers indicate that the number and percentage of true-volunteers increased substantially from FY71 to FY73. They also report that the proportion of high school graduates in the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps declined from FY70 to FY72, but that the proportion of high school graduates in the Army did not decrease. These findings confirm the results of the present study for trends in FY72 only.

Moreover, in terms of tested aptitude, Binkin and Johnston noted that a decline in the proportion of enlistees with above-average aptitude scores (Mental Groups I & II) occurred for each Service from FY70 to FY72. This finding is consistent with present study results for FY72 only. But Binkin and Johnston also report a moderate increase in the rate of enlistment of men with average ability (Mental Group III) and a decrease in enlistment of men with below average aptitude (Mental Group IV).

Trends in Recruitment Effectiveness

The present study indicated that the Army, Navy and Air Force were differentially effective in their ability to accommodate recruiting quotas for FY72.

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11 ibid., p. 8-9

12 ibid., p. 15.

13 ibid., p. 12.

14 ibid., p. 12.
The Army accomplished their recruiting quotas apparently as a result of both attracting more applicants and enlisting these applicants. While the Army pay increase announcement coincided with an observed increase in Army applicants and enlistments, the Army recruiters showed a consistent ability to enlist a high percentage of their initial applicants over the entire study period. The Air Force attracted sufficient applicants (and high quality "referrals") and employed a flexible, responsive system of enlisting sufficient applicants to meet their quotas. The Navy failed to meet their quota by apparent adherence to an overly stringent policy of selection. While the policy had an appropriate historic basis, the policy became dysfunctional as conditions changed.

Factors Associated with the Disposition of Applicants

The present research indicates that the branch of the Armed Service in which a man eventually enlists appears to be influenced by a number of factors including the selection policies of the Services, the influence of individuals such as family, friends and the recruiter, and draft-motivation.

Data from the present study indicates the influence of selection policies with regard to education, aptitude and race. In FY72, the Armed Services generally tended to select a larger proportion of white, high school graduate and high aptitude accessions from their respective initial pool of applicants. (However, each Service also enlisted men
from the pool of initial applicants to other Services. In general, such enlistees were of lower quality than the respective initial applicant pool to each Service.

For each Service, draft-motivation was related to final Service choice in that men who reported receipt of a draft notice more often enlisted in a Service other than the Service to which they initially applied. No consistent findings across Services were noted for the influence of a key person in final Service choice, although the Army recruiter appeared to have more influence than recruiters for the other Services.

Subsequent to the present study, multivariate analyses were performed on AFEES Survey data to identify factors associated with the enlistment disposition of initial applicants to each Service.15 The automatic interaction detection (AID) technique was used. (See Appendix C for an example of the technique). Results are discussed further, by Service.

For initial applicants to the Army, the major factors influencing enlistment were educational level and race. The Army was more likely to enlist applicants who were high school graduates (or above) and to enlist white applicants. An interaction effect was found in which white high school graduates were more likely to be enlisted into the Army (94%) than were non-white, non-high school graduates (82%).

Analyses of the disposition of initial applicants to the other Services found that the major factor operative for Navy enlistment was educational level. Race was not a major factor in the disposition of Navy applicants.

15 op. cit., Fisher & Harford.
An interaction of age and aptitude (AFQT) was noted in the disposition of initial applicants to both the Air Force and the Marine Corps, with each Service selecting high aptitude applicants, and preferring applicants in the 18–25 year range.

In these multivariate analyses, neither draft-avoidance nor the influence of various persons was found to possess as much importance in the disposition of initial applicants as the customary selection criterion of aptitude and other demographic characteristics, e.g., age and education.
Findings from these data amply justify the decision of the Department of Defense to study enlistment activation as a dynamic, time-phased phenomenon. The mechanism of a continuing survey of enlisted personnel at entry is necessary, if one is to evaluate with precision the effects of enlistment incentives such as increased military compensation, in relation to events such as defense obligations, changes in recruitment policy and/or variations in military manpower requirements. A continuing AFEES Survey will be of particular importance as the zero-draft environment is achieved.

This research also indicates the need for a more comprehensive analysis to integrate findings derived from samples of enlisted personnel such as the AFEES Survey with data from civilian youth, and with enlisted population data. AFEES sample data on the demographic characteristics of enlistees should be contrasted with enlistee population data -- for a more definite understanding of trends in the quantity and quality of enlisted accessions. It is also essential to track the accommodation of recruiting quotas over time, as this information is necessary in interpretation of the advisability of employing policies of varying stringency in the selection of recruits. Finally, comparisons of the endorsement of reasons for enlistment from the AFEES Survey with potential reasons/incentives for enlistment from civilian youth surveys may provide important information on the impact of enlistment incentives.

While these data suggest that the majority of applicants enlist in the first Service to which they apply, a substantial number contact more than one Service before enlisting. It may be desirable to perform more
refined analyses of this "referral"/"shopping" behavior to determine the extent of multiple recruiter contacts.

There is an urgent requirement to increase the level of knowledge regarding factors which operate to enhance recruiter effectiveness. The present study presents a paradox for the Army recruiter. On the one hand, Army enlistees attribute minor influence to the branch of Service (Army) in their enlistment decision. On the other hand, the Army enlistee endorses the Army recruiter as influential in choice of Service of the recruit. The 1973 version of the AFEES questionnaire (DD-M (AR) 1252) will explore recruiter effectiveness in detail, and analysis of these FY73/74 data is most desirable in investigation of factors related to recruiter effectiveness.

Finally, the need is apparent for improved models and manpower information systems which will permit the DoD/Armed Services to project manpower supply and monitor the disposition of applicants for enlistment. The extent to which the Armed Services are successful in accommodating their quotas for recruitment depends on their ability to (1) attract sufficient applicants and (2) enlist appropriate percentages of these applicants. But inferring the success of these activities from recruiting quota accommodation suffers from two potential shortcomings: (1) the delay in feedback provided to the recruiting commands should quotas not be met, and (2) the lack of diagnostic information needed to correct shortfalls should they occur. In addition to quota accommodation, data from the present study demonstrates that each Service must monitor two detailed types of information. First, the Services must monitor the rate with which initial applicants (not just enlistees) are attracted to each Service. Ideally, this continuing assessment of
supply would also include near-term estimates or projections of both applicant quantity and quality.\textsuperscript{16} Such a model(s) would provide information on projected fluctuations in quantity or quality which might have implications for the modification of existing recruitment and selection policies.

Second, the Services must monitor their respective "capture rates"; i.e., the extent to which they accept (or reject) their initial applicants for enlistment. (This second index can be employed to insure that a Service will not risk being overly selective, relative to the quantity and quality of its applicants.)

Finally, since the supply of applicants may change at any time, each Service should have a flexible but responsive procedure by which it can modify its policies of selection and recruitment in accordance with anticipated changes in the quantity and quality of applicants.

\textsuperscript{16} Since the total applicant pool for a Service will include referrals from other Services, this factor should be taken into account in a comprehensive projection of potential supply.
APPENDIX A

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
The Department of Defense is studying the attitudes and opinions of enlisted men in all the services on several subjects. In order to provide the Defense Department with meaningful data from the enlisted men themselves, you are requested to complete this survey. Your cooperation in completing this questionnaire as fully and accurately as possible will be greatly appreciated.

We are not interested in identifying any particular individual who answers this questionnaire. Your answers will be treated in confidence, and will not become part of your military record or commit you in any way.

**GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO RESPONDENTS**

General instructions concerning this questionnaire:

A. Answer all the survey questions. Read each question and all of its responses carefully before selecting your answer.

B. Select only one response to each question. Mark your answer on the answer sheet only. Do not write on the questionnaire booklet.

C. If any question is not clear, or you have any difficulty, ask for help from the supervisor.

How to complete the Answer Sheet:

A. Use only a #2 pencil when filling out the answer sheet. Do not use ink.

B. Be sure that the item number on the answer sheet is the same as the number of the question you are answering.

C. Mark on the answer sheet the box that has the same letter or number as the response you selected from the questionnaire.

D. Fill in the box with a heavy mark, but do not go outside the lines of the box. Look at the examples below:

   ![Examples](right-wrong-wrong)

E. If you make a mistake, erase the mark completely before entering a new one.

F. Do not tear, fold, or bend the answer sheet.

G. Erase your name from the upper right-hand corner of the answer sheet.

H. Do not fill in your Social Security Account Number (SSAN) or make any mark on the answer sheet that would identify you in any way.

I. The number at the top of the answer sheet does not identify you. It is a means of controlling answer sheets only.
Questions 1 through 12 are reasons that may have influenced you to enlist. Using the scale below, indicate to what extent each of the reasons influenced your decision. For example, if "Career opportunities in the military looked better than in civilian life" was a strong influence for you to enlist, you would mark answer "A" for question 1 on your answer sheet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strong Influence</th>
<th>Some Influence</th>
<th>No Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Career opportunities in the military looked better than in civilian life.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>To become more mature and self-reliant.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>To learn a trade or skill that would be valuable in civilian life.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>For travel, excitement and new experiences.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>To serve my country.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>I wanted to leave some personal problems behind me.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>I wanted an opportunity for advanced education and training.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I wanted to qualify for the G.I. Bill.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The over-all benefits—pay, room and board, medical care, and training.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>To avoid the draft.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I wanted my choice of service.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>To fulfill my military obligation at a time of my choice.</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Do you plan to stay in the service at the end of your current enlistment?

A No, I plan to leave the service
B I am undecided
C Yes, I plan to stay for a while longer
D Yes, I plan to make the service my career

14. What type of education have you had?

A Academic (College preparatory)
B General
C Business (Commercial)
D Technical (Vocational or Trade)
E Other than the above

15. Have you had formal training in a trade school?

A Yes
B No

16. Did you receive your draft notice before you enlisted?

A Yes
B No

17. In which Armed Service have you enlisted?

I have enlisted in the:

A Army
B Navy
C Marine Corps
D Air Force

18. If you tried to enlist in another Service, in which Service did you first try to enlist?

A I did not try to enlist in another Service.
B I tried to enlist in the Army
C I tried to enlist in the Navy
D I tried to enlist in the Marine Corps
E I tried to enlist in the Air Force

19. Under which enlistment program did you enlist?

A General Enlistment (no specific program/commitment)
B Delayed Active Duty Enlistment
C In-Service Technical/Special Training Enlistment (for example, nuclear, electronics, etc.)
D Choice of Geographical Area of Assignment.
E Choice of Occupational Area of Assignment.
F Commissioned or Warrant Officer Programs.
20. What is the length of your enlistment?
   A 2 years
   B 3 years
   C 4 years
   D 6 years

21. If there had been no draft and you had no military obligation, do you think you would have enlisted?
   A Definitely yes
   B Probably yes
   C Probably no
   D Definitely no
   E I do not know

22. Did the possibility of being drafted influence you to enlist?
   A No, it had no effect on my decision to enlist.
   Yes:
   B STRONG influence for me to enlist
   C MODERATE influence for me to enlist
   D SLIGHT influence for me to enlist

23. Which ONE of the following MOST influenced your decision to enlist in your selected Service?
   A Recruiting publicity
   B Armed Services recruiters
   C Parent or relatives
   D Friend in the Service
   E School counselor

24. The Services tell you about themselves in many ways. Which one of those listed below had the most influence in your decision to enlist?
   A Radio
   B TV
   C Newspapers
   D Magazines
   E Military publications
   F Posters
   G Movies

25. Were you working when you decided to enlist in the Armed Services?
   Yes, I was:
   A Working full-time
   B Working part-time
   C Working part-time, student part-time
   D Student full-time
   E Student part-time
   F Unemployed
26. If you were working full-time before you decided to enlist, how much was your weekly pay?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Does not apply; I was not working full-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Less than $25 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Between $25 and $50 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Between $50 and $75 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Between $75 and $100 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Between $100 and $125 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Between $125 and $150 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Between $150 and $175 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Between $175 and $200 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Between $200 and $225 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Between $225 and $250 per week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Over $250 per week</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. In what year were you born?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1943 or earlier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>1955 or later</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Skip spaces 28-37 on your answer sheet and answer questions 38-47 in corresponding spaces.

38. In what month were you born?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>August</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>December</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39. On what day of the month were you born?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Day</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
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<td>B</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
40. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Select ONE answer only.)

A. Did not complete Elementary (Grades 1 through 8) School
B. Elementary School Graduate
C. Completed 1 year of High School
D. Completed 2 years of High School
E. Completed 3 years of High School
F. Completed 4 years of High School
G. High School Graduate
H. Completed GED credits for High School Graduate equivalency
I. Completed 1 year of College
J. Completed 2 years of College
K. Completed 3 years of College
L. Completed 4 years of College
M. Completed GED credits for 2 years' College equivalency
N. College degree (B.S., B.A., or equivalent, except LL. B.)
O. Law Degree (LL. B.)
P. Master's degree (M.S., M.A., or equivalent)
Q. Doctor's degree (Ph. D., M.D., J.D., or equivalent)

41. What was your Selective Service classification just before you enlisted?

A. I-A
B. I-A0
C. I-C
D. I-D
E. I-O
F. I-S
G. I-W
H. I-Y
I. II-A
J. II-C
K. II-S
L. III-A
M. IV-A
N. IV-B
O. IV-C
P. IV-D
Q. IV-F
R. V-A
S. None

42. Are you married?

A. Yes
B. No

43. What is your race?

A. Caucasian
B. Negro
C. Other

44. Which branch of the service is highest in tradition?

A. Army
B. Navy
C. Marine Corps
D. Air Force
E. No difference
45. Which branch of the service is best for providing a paid college education?
A. Army
B. Navy
C. Marine Corps
D. Air Force
E. No difference

46. Which branch of the service is best for pay?
A. Army
B. Navy
C. Marine Corps
D. Air Force
E. No difference

47. Which branch of the service offers the best chance to prove you are a man?
A. Army
B. Navy
C. Marine Corps
D. Air Force
E. No difference
APPENDIX B

AFEES SAMPLE SITES

AND

SAMPLE SIZE INFORMATION
SAMPLE SITES FOR THE ARMED FORCES ENTRANCE AND EXAMINATION STATIONS (AFEES) SURVEY

Albany, New York
Baltimore, Maryland
Cleveland, Ohio
Fairmont, West Virginia
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Richmond, Virginia
Springfield, Massachusetts
Ashland, Kentucky
Charlotte, North Carolina
Jacksonville, Florida
Nashville, Tennessee
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Dallas, Texas
Chicago, Illinois
Denver, Colorado
Fargo, North Dakota
Kansas City, Missouri
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Omaha, Nebraska
Butte, Montana
Los Angeles, California
Phoenix, Arizona
Portland, Oregon
Spokane, Washington
Shreveport, Louisiana
## SAMPLE SIZE PER ADMINISTRATION

**AFEES SURVEY DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration Dates*</th>
<th>Total Sample Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 APR/10 MAY 71</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 MAY/7 JUNE 71</td>
<td>1,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 JUNE/5 JULY 71</td>
<td>2,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 JULY/2 AUG 71</td>
<td>2,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 AUG/30 AUG 71</td>
<td>2,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 SEP/27 SEP 71</td>
<td>2,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 OCT/25 OCT 71</td>
<td>2,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 NOV/22 NOV 71</td>
<td>2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 DEC/20 DEC 71</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 JAN/17 JAN 72</td>
<td>1,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 JAN/14 FEB 72</td>
<td>1,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 FEB/13 MAR 72</td>
<td>1,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 MAR/10 APR 72</td>
<td>1,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26,853</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*First day of each week of administration.
APPENDIX C

CORRELATES OF TRUE-VOLUNTEERISM:

A DEMONSTRATION OF THE AID TECHNIQUE
DEMONSTRATION OF THE
AUTOMATIC INTERACTION DETECTOR (AID)

Total Sample
n = 1679
p = .65

Received Draft Notice Prior to Enlistment
n = 272*
p = .31

Did Not Receive Draft Notice
n = 1407
p = .72

Younger Age (18-)
(Assumed Not Yet Draft Eligible)

Older Age (19+)
(Assumed Draft Eligible)

n = 434*
p = .80

n = 973*
p = .68

n = sample size (AFEES, 26 Apr/10 May administrations)
p = proportion of true volunteers in the sample
* = designates final cells
APPENDIX D

TRENDS IN REASONS FOR ENLISTMENT

BY SERVICE
APPENDIX D

TRENDS IN REASONS FOR ENLISTMENT
BY SERVICE

Charts

Avoid the Draft
Personnel Benefits
Learn a Trade or Skill Useful in Civilian Life
Opportunity for Advanced Education and Training
Choice of Service
Travel, Excitement and New Experiences
To Serve at the Time of One's Choice
Increased Maturity and Self-Reliance
To serve One's Country (Patriotism)
Military Career Opportunities
To Qualify for the G. I. Bill
To Leave Personal Problems Behind
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO AVOID THE DRAFT,
By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-1

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-1
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR PERSONNEL BENEFITS, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-2
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLATION TO LEARNING A TRADE OR SKILL, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Weeks of administration for the AFEES survey

Figure D-3
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR ADVANCED EDUCATION AND TRAINING,
By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-4
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR ONE'S CHOICE OF SERVICE, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-5
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING FOR TRAVEL, EXCITEMENT AND NEW EXPERIENCES, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFEES SURVEY

Figure D-6
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO SERVE AT THE TIME OF ONE'S CHOICE, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Weeks of Administration for the AFES Survey

Figure D-7
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE
TO ENLISTING FOR INCREASED MATURITY AND SELF-RELIANCE,
By Service

PERCENT

60.0

52.0

44.0

36.0

28.0

APR 26 MAY 24 JUN 21 JUL 19 AUG 16 SEP 13 OCT 11 NOV 8 DEC 6 JAN 3 JAN 31 FEB 28 MAR 27
MAY 10 JUN 7 JUL 5 AUG 2 AUG 30 SEP 27 OCT 25 NOV 22 DEC 20 JAN 17 FEB 14 MAR 13 APR 10
1971 - 1972

WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFEES SURVEY

Figure D-8
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO SERVE ONE'S COUNTRY (PATRIOTISM), By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ US Air Force

PERCENT

Figure D-9
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE 
TO ENLISTING FOR MILITARY CAREER OPPORTUNITIES, 
By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

PERCENT

56.0

49.0

42.0

35.0

28.0

WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFEES SURVEY

Figure D-10
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO QUALIFY FOR THE G.I. BILL, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

Figure D-11
TRENDS IN ATTRIBUTING STRONG INFLUENCE TO ENLISTING TO AVOID PERSONAL PROBLEMS, By Service

Symbol Table
* Army
X Navy
Y USMC
+ USAF

WEEKS OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE AFEES SURVEY

Figure D-12
APPENDIX E

BASIC DATA COUNTS ON THE

DISPOSITION OF INITIAL APPLICANTS
APPENDIX E

BASIC DATA COUNTS ON THE DISPOSITION OF INITIAL APPLICANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE TO WHICH INITIALLY APPLIED:</th>
<th>SERVICE TO WHICH ENLISTED</th>
<th>TOTAL APPLICANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SERVICE APPLIED TO:</td>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>3738</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>2552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ENLISTEES</td>
<td>4379</td>
<td>2792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: September 1971 through January 1972
A FEES sample survey data.
APPENDIX F

DETAILED DATA ON SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS AND ENLISTEES
APPENDIX F

DETAILED DATA ON SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF APPLICANTS AND ENLISTEES

Data
Education
Aptitude (AFQT)
Race
Prior Receipt of Draft Notice
Self-Reported True Volunteerism
Recruiter Influence
Family Influence
Friend-in-the-Service Influence
### PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES (OR HIGHER EDUCATED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Enlisted Percent</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total Applicant Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Enlisted Percent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTE:** Percentages are not additive.
### APTITUDE: PERCENT MENTAL GROUP I AND II

**Initial Applicants to:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Enlistee Percent**

- Army: 30.2
- Navy: 39.2
- USMC: 26.1
- USAF: 36.4

**Source:** September 1971 through January 1972 data from the AFEES sample survey of enlisted men (N = 11,174).

**Note:** Percentages are not additive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Applicants To:</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total Applicant Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>83.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlistee Percent</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Percentages are not additive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INITIAL APPLICANTS TO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCCMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL ENLISTEE PERCENT</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Percentages are not additive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total Enlisted Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ENLISTED PERCENT</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Percentages are not additive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Applicant To:</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total Applicant Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMC</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Enlisted Percent</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Percentages are not additive.
Percent Influenced by a Parent or Relative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Applicants to:</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total Applicant Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Enlistee Percent: 20.4 29.9 18.8 24.2


Note: Percentages are not additive.
### PERCENT INFLUENCED BY A FRIEND IN THE SERVICE

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Initial Applicants To:</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Total Enlisted Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>25.4</td>
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<td>Total Enlisted Percent</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Note:** Percentages are not additive.