Curriculum as a field of study emerged in an intellectual climate in which the idea of social control was dominant. The intent of this paper is to look historically at the integration of the idea of social control into curriculum discourse, to indicate its dominant position as the underlying assumption of most early curriculum work, and to suggest the importance of this fact for contemporary curriculum thought. Section I marks the historical formulation of the idea of social control in American thought. Sections II and III outline the theories of Ross and Elwood, contenders of the two basic viewpoints of overt and covert social control. Section IV looks at the social context in which the idea of social control was developed, while Section V deals with influences in operation on curriculum such as developments in the field of psychology. Section VI presents the views of other formative theorists in the emerging field of educational sociology. Section VII considers whether that initial orientation toward social control still remains. It is observed that the idea of social control continues to dominate and that the function of this orientation historically and perhaps today has been to restrict certain segments of the nation's population in the name of social homogeneity. (Author/KSM)
AMERICAN CURRICULUM THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF
SOCIAL CONTROL, 1918-1938

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1918, as Herbert Kliebard has so compellingly pointed out, was a critical year for the curriculum. That year saw the publication of Franklin Bobbitt's *The Curriculum*, William Heard Kilpatrick's "The Project Method." and "The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education" of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education. The focus of these publications on the issue of curriculum, particularly Bobbitt's text, suggested that a significant transition had occurred in curriculum work. The year marked the transition, Kliebard argued, of curriculum from almost an avocation to a specialized professional activity and a formal field of study.¹

What had historically, at one time or another, caught the interest of most serious thinkers had become by the end of the nineteenth century, as evidenced in the work of William T. Harris and Charles W. Eliot, a distinct activity. What had originally taken the form of informal speculation in popular articles and reports of a variety of commissions and agencies had begun to take the form of theoretical formulations. Unfortunately we lack an adequate intellectual history of this transition. But what occurred around 1918 and during the next twenty years seems to be analogous to developments in the field of social work where over a similar period of time there took place the transition from the informal and non-specialized activities of the volunteer charity worker to the activities of the specially trained and paid social worker.²

In another, less known respect 1918 was also a critical year for the curriculum. In that year the American Sociological Society devoted
its twelfth annual meeting to the topic of social control. The papers that were presented dealt with such diverse topics as control in primitive societies, the management of the economic system, child welfare, and the control of immigrants. As such the meeting seemed to be concerned with the issue of social control as it was related to all areas of institutional life. The recognition of the importance of the idea of social control at the most important meeting of the nation's sociologists suggests that the concept had achieved a distinctive place in American social thought. It had become one of those dominant themes or conceptual frameworks that from time to time seem to capture a discipline and direct the energies of its members. The broad scope of the papers presented at the meeting suggests that not only had the concept captured the discipline of sociology, it had become a dominant theme in the social thought of the period itself. Just as the concept of equilibrium has dominated contemporary social science, the idea of social control was preeminent in the years between 1900 and at least 1930.

The simultaneous occurrence of these seemingly disparate events, one in education and the other in sociology, were, as it turns out, connected. The emergence of curriculum as a field of study in an intellectual climate in which the idea of social control was dominant did not leave the field unaffected. For no group of American thinkers were more enamored of the idea of social control than were the formative theorists of the curriculum field. And no group adopted the idea of social control into their formulations with such a passion as did these early curriculum workers.

By the idea of social control we are referring to those sociological and psychological processes through which individuals are forcibly or voluntarily convinced to conform or adjust to the attitudes, values,
and behavior of their social group. It is quite difficult to establish the roots of the idea of social control because it is an issue which has seemed to engage social thinkers since antiquity. This can be explained by the fact that social control, in the language of the sociology of knowledge, is a constitutive property of social life. That is, the idea of social control is inherent in the institutionalization process and as such is synonymous with the notion of society itself. But for the purposes of this paper we will limit our attention to the development of the idea in American thought. Here it is somewhat easier to locate its origins.

In recent years educational scholars have shown an increasing interest in the idea of social control, particularly as it relates to the development of American education. But there has been no treatment of the idea as an intellectual construct and its integration in that form into the educational disciplines, specifically the curriculum field. As a result we currently fail to realize both the dominant position that the idea of social control has played in curriculum discourse during the formative days of the field and contemporaneously. It is the intent of this paper to look historically at the integration of the idea of social control into curriculum discourse, to indicate its dominant position as the underlying assumption of most early curriculum work, and to suggest the importance of this fact for contemporary curriculum thought.

There have been historically two formulations of the idea of social control in American thought. The most common formulation, which I call an overt theory of social control, was developed in the years between 1894 and 1900 by the American sociologist, Edward A. Ross. It was further developed and applied, particularly to education by Ross' fellow sociologist and former student, Charles A. Ellwood. Its
integration into the curriculum field took place at the hands of three individuals, Ross L. Finney, David Snedden, and Charles C. Peters. As both sociologists and early curriculum theorists, these individuals brought into the field certain sociological concepts, such as the idea of social control, that provided grounding assumptions for the principal kind of theorizing that was occurring—specifically speculation and investigation centering on questions of curricular selection and organization.

There was also a second formulation of the idea of social control, which I call a covert theory, which was rooted in the interactionist social psychology of John Dewey, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead. It too, primarily through the work of Dewey, made an impact on the curriculum field during its formative days. Because this covert formulation does not appear as a distinct theory but has to be constructed from various strands and themes in the work of these three individuals, this view of social control has been ignored by most educational scholars.

These two formulations can be distinguished on three grounds. The overt theory of social control was concerned with direct, artificial modes of control that operated at the external, institutional level. The covert theory of social control, on the other hand, was concerned with indirect, natural modes of control that operated at the internal, psychological level of the personality. Second, the overt theory of social control focused on conscious and planned modes of direction, while the covert theory looked to unconscious and spontaneous modes of control. Third, the mechanism of the overt theory of social control was coercion, and its intent was centered on securing behavioral conformity. The covert theory emphasized voluntary or self control in order to secure an adjustment in beliefs and attitudes as well as behavior.

Obvious demands of space and time would not allow us to do justice
in this paper to both of these formulations. Because the overt formulation has had a more visible impact on the field in its formative days and because we are still in the process of constructing an adequate history of our field, we will in this paper concentrate on the overt theory of control and its integration into curriculum discourse. We will make brief mention of the importance of a covert theory to the field given the dominant position that the overt theory has played.

II

As we indicated Ross came to the idea of social control in about 1894, while he was teaching at Stanford University. What is critical if we are to understand his notion of social control, by which he meant the "linch-pins" that hold society together, is to recognize that he considered it a conscious device of social organization. That is, its mode of operation was through artificially constructed institutional forms. "Like the hypothesis that storks bring babies, the theory that the moral instincts beget control has a distressing lack of finality. But how the mystery lights up when we reach the idea of society,—a something distinct from a bunch of persons!" Ellwood was more precise on this point when he pointed out that social order is "...in a sense artificial. It is a product of the culture of the group. It is not simply the natural or spontaneous order springing from instinct, unreflexive habit, imitation, and sympathy; but there are added to these original factors consciously accepted customs and institutions." Ross argued that there might once have been, perhaps in primitive societies, natural and spontaneous tendencies for order, such as sociability, sympathy, a sense of justice, and individual responsibility. But these tendencies were out of place in modern society, which was built not by those who were kind and understanding of their neighbors but by the aggressive and warlike.
Ross identified four modes of social control, those that operated by sanctions, suggestions, feelings, and judgment. He broke down each mode into more specific types of control. Those controls governed by sanctions, for example, included law, public opinion, and belief, while those governed by feelings included religion, ideals, ceremony, art, and personality. By looking at the types of controls that these two modes typified, it would seem that what Ross was doing was providing a continuum of methods of social control, ranging from those controls that operated externally in the form of institutions to internal controls that operated at the psychological level of the personality. While this may have been Ross' intent, in fact he was not able to develop an explanation for how control operated psychologically. His problem was that the psychology he employed, based on Gabriel Tarde's notion of suggestion-imitation, could not explain how control took place at this level. This school of psychological thought lacked any mechanism to account for how the interactive processes of imitation and suggestion influenced behavior. As such it could only talk about external results of imitation and not the internal processes that stood behind them. Ross did not, for instance, have a notion of personality in a psychological sense, even though he used the term. He used the term, personality, to refer to a personal characteristic analogous to charisma. As a result Ross described the process of social control, even when he was talking about types of control that appeared to operate internally, in external, institutional terms. For our purposes his view of education, a type of control that operated by suggestion, provides the best illustration. The notion of suggestion conveys the impression that some psychological process is at work bringing about control. But Ross described education in institutional metaphors: "The avowal that free education is 'an
economical system of police' sounds rather brutal.... But now and then the cat is let out of the bag."13

As the above quotation suggests, Ross seemed to adopt controls that operated through sanctions, such as the police, as his model. These controls operated quite visibly and were thus understandable to him. Since sanctions operated coercively to obtain conformity, Ross talked of other modes of control in similar terms. Again, his view of education is illustrative. Speaking of the school, he stated:

In this microcosm the too obstreperous ego gets a wholesome dressing down. There is formed a habit of moderating one's claims, or respecting others' rights and of hitting upon those moral solutions known as 'justice.' Closely related to this is the training to self control and the habit of obedience14 to an external law which are given by a good school discipline.

Although Ross used psychological terminology and talked about self control, his emphasis was on the coercive power that a "dressing down" possessed and on the conformity inherent in the notion of obedience.

III.

Ross' treatment of education as a type of social control was limited. He did however suggest both how and why the school should function as an agency of social control:

Thoroughly to nationalize a multitudinous people calls for institutions to disseminate certain ideas and ideals. The Tsars relied on the blue-domed Orthodox church in every peasant village to Russify their heterogeneous subjects, while we Americans rely for unity on the "little red school house."15

But it was Ellwood, first at the University of Missouri and later at Duke, who spelled out in great detail both how the school was to serve as an agency of social control and, even more importantly why it was necessary for it to carry out that function. The problem facing modern American society, which demanded techniques of social control, was ignorance. It was, Ellwood believed, ignorance, specifically out the laws of social relations,"...which breeds crime, revolution,
bolshevism, anarchy, distrust, antagonism between classes, and even lack of faith in democracy itself."\textsuperscript{16}

The solution to the problem was for the school to take on the function of teaching the laws of social relations and thus to become an agency of social control. Ellwood was never clear about what these laws were. At times he referred to them as rationally founded habits and at other times as simply rationality. But what he seemed to be getting at in reality was not the usual notions that rationality conveys but instead conformity or likemindedness.\textsuperscript{17} He pointed out that this homogeneity of opinion was the task of sociology as a science:

When science in general fully recognizes that its social task is this work of correcting erroneous opinions and standards and of synthesizing ideas and values so that the true view of human life shall emerge, we shall not lack sufficient likemindedness in civilized society nor ultimately, a high and stable social order.\textsuperscript{18}

And likewise it was to be task of the school. The school, Ellwood argued, had to be founded on a "socialized curriculum," that is a curriculum in which at least one third of its content was devoted to the social sciences or social studies.\textsuperscript{19} The function of this curriculum was to instill in the student social knowledge and social intelligence and thereby to socialize his "will."\textsuperscript{20} As such it would serve to create likeminded citizens.

In this respect Ellwood was addressing himself to the question of how education served as an agency of social control. His answer was through the curriculum. But more important for our purposes was that it was the content of the curriculum that provided control. It is viewing the content as the source of control that is indicative of an overt theory of social control within an educational context. It is analogous to defining control in external and institutional terms something artificial that is consciously created. Without developing
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this point in depth, we need to note that this notion of the control power of the curriculum is fundamentally different from that of the covert theorists of social control. The curriculum provided for social control for Dewey not in this sense but in the sense of serving as a forum where certain natural and spontaneous psychological processes concerned with the development of a "self" could take place. 21

Ellwood viewed the school as a coercive institution just as Ross had done. As he pointed out, schools were not "...created for the training and development of individuals as such, but rather to fit the individuals for membership in society, that is, to control the processes by which they acquire habits, so that they shall advantageously co-ordinate their activities with those of the group." 22 This coercive orientation comes through most clearly in Ellwood's model of school organization to deal with the problem of an increasing drop out rate. What is particularly interesting is that his model was based on penal reform, which again followed Ross' lead of talking about education using a penal metaphor. Ellwood suggested that the existing compulsory education law based on age should be abolished and replaced with an attendance law modeled after the current penal reform of the indeterminate sentence. 23 Under his plan the child would be "sentenced" to school for the indeterminate period necessary for him to master a predetermined curriculum. By basing attendance on achievement in this way instead of on age, Ellwood believed that the school could "catch" every child and socialize him before he had a chance to drop out. 24 This same orientation is suggested in Ellwood's comment on those educators who would solve the problem of student elimination by altering the curriculum so that it appealed to the students' interests:

The result is that we have made education such a "soft" affair
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that it is very far from furnishing the discipline which life requires. Now, I am not opposed to the making of the curriculum attractive to the child's interests, provided it is wisely done; but it is absurd to think that in this way alone children can be held long enough in public school to give them the training they need. On the other hand, there is a real danger that by this method habits of perseverance, self control and hard work will fail of proper emphasis.25

IV.

We saw earlier that Ross looked to the school as a means of obtaining social unity in the midst of a heterogeneous population. If we are to understand the control orientation of Ross as well as that of the curriculum theorists whose work we will be examining, we need to look at the social context in which the idea of social control was developed in American thought. The emergence of the idea of social control during the first part of the twentieth century represented a response by certain intellectuals to a problem they saw as being associated with the nation's transition from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrialized one. The problem was one of social heterogeneity caused by the influx during this transitional period of a large number of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. The sociologist, Leon Bramson, has suggested the social function which the idea of social control has fulfilled in light of this problem:

It is a field of endeavor at least part of which might be summarized by saying that it represents an effort to make intransigent individuals and groups of different races, nationalities, ethnic origins, creeds, religions, and economic statuses behave like White, Protestant, northern members of the American middle class.26

The period during which Ross and the other theorists we are considering in this paper came to maturity, 1865 to 1900, was a time of doubt and fear to many Americans, particularly members of the old middle class of small farmers and merchants. It was for this class that Ross and his fellow theorists of social control spoke. This middle
class felt that their social order, which they viewed as being embodied in the small, rural town with its deep, face-to-face, personal relationships, was endangered. They believed that the influx of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe threatened the homogeneity in religion, politics, and values they thought to exist in the town. They also believed that the growth of the large industrial corporations of the post-Civil War period threatened the economy of the small town, which was based on agriculture and small scale manufacturing. In short, the very community these Americans believed that their forebearers had carved from a wilderness seemed to be crumbling before an expanding, urban and industrial society.

The despair of this middle class expressed itself, specifically through such spokesmen as Ross, in a feeling of a loss of community. Because the everyday problems of birth, death, sickness, and initiation were taken care of within its boundaries by its members, the small town took on an almost mystical character as the guarantor of order and stability. An entire ideology developed which celebrated the small town as the essence of the American community. Now this ideology took two distinct forms. For Ross it was a belief in the small town as a physical entity. Ellwood and the other theorists that we will consider took instead what they thought constituted the basis of the small town's ability to provide for stability, its homogeneity or likemindedness in beliefs and behavior, and idealized it. If life in the small town appeared to teach these individuals anything, it taught them that stability, order, and progress were dependent on the degree to which beliefs and behavior were common. If stability and progress were to be obtained within urban America, the spirit of likemindedness, that is in other words, a sense of community, had to be
restored and maintained. The notion of social control represented an attempt to achieve this.

Both Ross and Ellwood were strong hereditarians, and they viewed the problem of heterogeneity from that perspective. They were both afraid that the influx of Eastern and Southern Europeans into American society would threaten the native population, which was of Anglo-Saxon descent, with "race suicide." Ross believed that there was something genetically defective about these immigrants. As he stated, "our people, moreover, are singularly free from blood taints. One cannot live in Central Europe without observing that the signs of rachitis, scrofula and syphilis are much more numerous there than they are here." For Ross then there was clearly something inferior about these immigrants:

You are struck by the fact that from ten to twenty percent are hirsute, low browed, big faced persons of low mentality. Not that they suggest evil. They simply look out of place in black clothes and stiff collars, since clearly they belong in skins, in wattled huts at the close of the Great Ice Age.

Ellwood developed this idea further to argue that the social problems usually associated with industrialization and urbanization, criminality, pauperism, and vice were in fact characteristics of the immigrants caused by their defective genetic makeup. The increases in these problems then were directly attributable to the growing number of immigrants among the American population. The ultimate result of this unchecked immigration would be the displacement of a superior Anglo-Saxon race by an inferior race from Eastern and Southern Europe. More immediately however the immigrants posed a threat to the American social order. It was Ross and Ellwood's belief that likemindedness could not be achieved with a population of diverse peoples. Ellwood made the point that these immigrants represented an incompatible element in
The people that are coming to us at present belong to a different race from ours. They belong to the Slavic and Mediterranean subraces of the White race. Now, the Slavic and Mediterranean races have not shown the capacity for self government and free institutions which the peoples of Northern and Western Europe have shown. It is doubtful that they have the capacity for self government.33

Given the supposed threat of the immigrants, Ross and Ellwood hoped to restrict their entrance into American society. Ross played a major role in this effort as a member of the National Committee of the Immigration Restriction League, specifically in its attempt to prevent President Wilson from vetoing immigration restriction legislation in 1915.34 Social control, as we have talked about it, represented a second line of defense. If the immigrants could not be excluded from American society, Ross hoped that the techniques of social control he had developed could be used to minimize their destructive influence on the social order and on the "national blood."35 In part it would seem that these theorists favored restriction because they were not certain of the efficacy of various agencies of social control in dealing with the immigrants. Ellwood indicated this in the case of the school as an agency of control:

The public school is not as yet, however, a perfect agency of socialization, and even when attended by the children of the immigrants they fail to receive from it, in many cases, the high element of our culture and still continue to remain essentially foreign in their thought and custom.36

The idea of social control as it was developed in American sociology included a role for the school and its curriculum. To see the full working out of this idea, we now need to turn to certain formative theorists of the curriculum field who were to link education with the social science disciplines, especially sociology but also psychology.

V.

During its formative days the curriculum field was ripe for a
doctrine such as social control. A tradition of using the schools and other educational bodies as agencies of control had existed since before the American Revolution. In the eighteenth century crusades against vice, profanity, and liquor led to the establishment of a number of religious or bible societies to educate the masses against these evils. The same tradition manifested itself in the nineteenth century with the creation of a number of total institutions to control such problems as insanity, crime, delinquency. As for the school itself, we only have to read Jefferson's "A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge" to recognize that from the very beginning the American school was viewed as having a significant control function.

But prior to the work of Ross, the notion of control was fundamentally different. The difference lies in the fact that this early notion of control was not conceptualized as scientific, in the positivistic sense, action to regulate people and events. Nineteenth century reformers, particularly, knew, just as Ross and Ellwood did, that they wanted to control certain elements of society in order to regain a sense of stability that they felt to have been lost. But they also believed that they lacked certain scientific principles, which they could not identify, that would provide them with a certain mechanism of control. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century, when the social sciences began to establish themselves as scientific disciplines modeled after the natural sciences, that a theory of social control as a theoretical construct could emerge. The problems of urbanization and immigration which led Ross to the idea of social control were in fact old problems. They were the problems that brought about the great reform movement of the mid-nineteenth century. What was new was the approach that Ross took. What
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had been a vague attempt to control people became, beginning with Ross, a matter of science governed by what were thought to be sound theoretical principles, such as the idea of social control.41

Not only was the field ripe for the doctrine of social control, but other influences besides sociology that operated on curriculum discourse were conducive to the integration of the idea of social control. Unlike many other fields of study, curriculum did not create its own body of assumptions or its methodology. Rather it borrowed them from other fields.42 It has been argued in recent years that the curriculum field has relied on psychology, specifically the language of learning, for most of its assumptions.43 There is evidence to suggest that this influence by psychology on curriculum existed since the formative days of the field. Early in this century psychology influenced the content and nature of courses in the teacher education curriculum, courses that in current terminology would be known as curriculum courses.44

Before we deal with the impact of sociology and the idea of social control on the curriculum field, we need to look at this impact of psychology that we just mentioned. From the very beginning of the field, one figure and one psychology were dominant, Edward L. Thorndike and his connectionist school of psychology. As Clarence Karier has argued, he was undoubtedly the most influential curriculum theorist that the field has produced.45 He authored methods texts that attempted to apply his psychology to both problems of teaching and curriculum building. And he developed his own elementary school textbook series in arithmetic and ability tests in reading, spelling, handwriting, and drawing.46 But his impact on the field rests with his position as one of the nation's first educational psychologists at the most important school of education of the day, Teachers College, Columbia University. From that
vantage point he helped to determine the psychological orientation of many of the first curriculum theorists, such as Snedden, as well as those who were to dominate the field in its later days, such as Hollis Caswell. 47

Three features of Thorndike's work are significant for our purposes in this paper. First, his connectionist psychology was in essence a variant of behaviorism. Behaviorism, more so than most psychological theories, is preoccupied with the need to control human activity. 48 Thorndike's contribution to this emphasis on control was to suggest how the behavioristic principle of conditioning, which he expressed in his Law of Effect, was in fact a prime mechanism of social control. 49 Second, unlike John D. Watson, the founder of American behaviorism, Thorndike was a hereditarian. He argued, in a similar fashion to Ross and Ellwood, that certain segments of the population, those who were different than the Anglo-Saxon, Protestant majority, were genetically defective. It was their defective heredity, he argued, that was responsible for the increases in crime and pauperism that were occurring with the emergence of industrialization and urbanization. 50 But Thorndike added something new and important to this point of view. Heredity was important for Thorndike because it was the prime determinant of the intelligence of the individual. And intelligence in turn was the key factor in individual character and virtue as well as in the progress of the social group. Intelligence was in fact such a critical factor that Thorndike argued that the quality of social life was directly related to the number of intelligent individuals in the population. 51 What was new was that Thorndike was redefining the problem of heterogeneity, the issue that Ross and Ellwood had talked about in cultural and racial terms, as a technical problem using the scientific
language of testing and measurement. As such the idea of social control for Thorndike represented a scientific approach to deal with a technical problem. This began a tendency in the curriculum field, which becomes critical in contemporary curriculum discourse, to remove the issue of social control from its political and social context.

Third, Thorndike shared the same social views as Ross and Ellwood. Where Ross and Ellwood were afraid of the immigrant, Thorndike was afraid of the unintelligent. It was those of low intelligence who Thorndike believed had to be controlled if the American community was to be restored. Just as Ellwood was uncertain of the ability of the school to serve as an agency of social control, so was Thorndike. Consequently he too sought more certain modes of control than education. For him the most certain mode of controlling the unintelligent was to remove them from future generations through eugenic sterilization. He maintained given "...the fact that genes which make able and good people also tend to make competent and helpful homes, and the argument for sterilizing anybody near the low end of the scale in intellect and morals whenever it can be done legally is very strong."

It would appear then that Thorndike's influence on curriculum discourse was conducive to the idea of social control as developed by Ross and Ellwood. In the formative days of the curriculum field, evidence suggests that sociology enjoyed an influence at least equal to that of psychology. And the sociological ideas that made the greatest impact on the field were those of Ross and Ellwood. To understand how both the influence of psychology and sociology affected the early curriculum field, we need to turn to the work of Finney, Peters, and Snedden.

As we stated at the beginning of this paper three individuals served
to integrate the notion of an overt theory of social control into the curriculum field, namely Ross L. Finney of the University of Minnesota, Charles C. Peters of the Pennsylvania State University, and David Snedden of Teachers College. These three individuals were sociologists who were identified with the emerging field of educational sociology. But the extent of their writings on questions of curriculum suggests that they were along with the more familiar figures of Bobbitt, Charters, and Rugg formative theorists of the curriculum field.

In 1926 Rugg argues that historically the curriculum field had established three distinct traditions, based on different modes of organization, which by and large accounted for most curriculum discourse. These three traditions included organizational patterns based on fixed subjects, scientific curriculum making, and dynamic growth or child's needs-interests. During the period after 1918 as these three traditions began to work themselves out as schools of thought within a formal field of study, they became integrated with certain theories and constructs borrowed from sociology and psychology. It was these theories, particularly the notion of social control, that furnished these organizational patterns with their assumptions about the social function of education and the way in which children learned. These sociological and psychological theories then served to guide educational practices that were derived from these traditions of curricular organization. More specifically, Finney's work helped to link the idea of social control with the fixed subject organizational pattern, while Peters and Snedden articulated a theory of social control appropriate for scientific curriculum making. As we stated at the beginning of the paper there was a second formulation of the idea of social control that is rooted in the work of Dewey. Dewey was also the leading
spokesman for the idea of organizing the curriculum around the needs-interests of the child. As such he served to link that tradition of curricular organization within the field to a notion of social control.

Of the three individuals who brought the overt theory of social control into the curriculum field, Finney was the most articulate and thorough. Because of this and the fact that Snedden has been treated at length by several other writers, we will focus our attention on Finney with some consideration being paid to Peters. Except as regards the issue of curricular organization the formulation of Finney is so similar to those of Peters and Snedden that this restricted focus will not damage our analysis.

Although Finney developed his ideas almost twenty years after Ross first put forth his notion of social control, he was, just as Ross had been, concerned with the problem of community and the threat posed to it by the immigrants. If anything, the World War and the Red Scare intensified the problem that Ross had confronted earlier in the century.

Finney saw the old middle class, the same group that Ross had spoken for, as being trapped in the post-war period between two potentially dangerous forces. From below they were being challenged by the laboring classes, the majority of whom were first generation immigrants. Finney believed that this group, infused with a Bolshevik ideology carried over from Europe, would attempt to overthrow American society in a socialist revolution parallel to the Russian Revolution of 1917. From above the middle class was being economically squeezed out of existence through the expansion of the corporation at the hands of a small class of monied industrialists. Finney was in effect restating Ross' argument about the loss of community in an industrial society with a greater emphasis on class than on race. Where Ross spoke the Anglo-Saxon race, Finney identified them, perhaps more precisely,
as the middle class. For Finney it was the middle class that was in danger of committing "race suicide." 57

Finney did not however see this problem as only a cultural one. He also identified it as a technical problem of intelligence. It was his contention that the average American, particularly the working man, was of low intelligence. "And now come forward the psychologists with scientific data for headlining what we all knew before, namely, that half the people have brains of just average quality or less, of whom a very considerable percentage have very poor brains indeed." 58 And Finney believed that the individual of low intelligence could not contribute to the growth and progress of society. He pointed out that "I.Q.'s below 99+ are not likely to secrete cogitations of any great social fruitfulness." 59

Finney's problem was thus one of heterogeneity, which he defined either in cultural terms as a question of class or in technical terms as a problem of intelligence. The critical factor is that throughout his work, Finney equated low intelligence with the laboring class. His solution to this problem was to obtain social homogeneity by making everyone middle class and thereby alike in behavior and attitudes. He wanted as a first step in this endeavor to raise the living standard of the laboring class. This would, he hoped, make them less susceptible to revolutionary propaganda. At the same time he wanted to reduce the wealth of the monied class through taxation so that they would approach the status of the middle class. 60 This latter proposal sounds somewhat radical. But it is interesting to note that this is the only statement throughout all of Finney's works on regulating the industrialists. The focus of his work was clearly on controlling the laboring class. Finney's intent however was not to seriously change the condition of the laboring
class beyond improving their standard of living. Rather what he wanted was for the laboring class to behave as the middle class, particularly with respect to their commitment toward their work. He wanted them to be happy performing the "humbler economic functions" that would occupy the life of the mass of the population. It would seem that Finney had mis-read the history of the European middle class and identified them as being committed to social order and stability and as willing to defer personal gratification. Evidently he forgot or ignored the historical tendency of the middle class to foment social revolution, particularly to enhance their own social privileges.

The function of the school for Finney was to teach the laboring class to behave as he thought the middle class did:

A far wiser propaganda for the workers is one that will ally and amalgamate them with the middle class. And such an alliance and amalgamation should be forced upon the lower classes, whether their agitators like it or not, by compulsory attendance laws that make high school graduation practically universal.

What Finney was talking about here was education for social homogeneity:

From the standpoint of social control the necessity for mental homogeneity is equally impressive. Uniform and conventional behavior cannot be secured by compulsion in a democracy, as it could under monarchical and autocratic types of government. If a democratic people's conduct is to be dependable and harmonious they must think and feel alike. They must have a similar understanding of the reasons for their behavior. Popular education is to a democracy what a standing army is to an autocracy.

Peters also held this view about the importance of homogeneity, linking it to the survival of society. A key purpose of education for him was the "...production of conformity, like-mindedness, solidarity, loyalty, consensus--all of which have been, and still are, essential to the preservation of the group and its civilization."

What Finney and his fellow curriculum workers were saying was that the school had to become an agency of social control. The term,
social control. Peters pointed out could refer to both unplanned and
natural processes or planned and artificial ones. Of the two, Peters
emphasized the latter, which he called sanctions. As such it would
appear that these theorists were adopting the notion in the overt sense
that Ross had developed it. In defining how the school would function
as an agency of control, Finney and Peters appeared in their explicit
statements to emphasize voluntary control as opposed to coercive
control. Thus they talked about social control as being self control.
But when examined more closely their statements represented a veneer
to mask a coercive orientation. Finney pointed out:

On the surface of things the school should present the
appearance of voluntary self government by the students
themselves, under the supervision of the finest social
idealism. But the student body should understand per-
factly that absolutely irresistible compulsion is closeted
with the faculty and the board, to be used to the uttermost
if necessary.

Finney's point was that American society was in danger from a
radicalized working class which threatened revolution. Their revolution,
if it came to pass, would destroy the middle class, which to Finney's way
of thinking was the embodiment of American democracy. Give this situ-
ation, coercive means of social control were justified if necessary to
prevent revolution.

The source of the order necessary to block revolutionary change
resided for Finney in society's habitual modes of action as expressed
in the nation's historic institutions. Because the school was to
function as an agency of control to secure order, its chief activity
had to be to teach these habitual responses. In a sense the objectives
of education would be derived from the nature of the nation's existing
social institutions. Given this view of education, Finney argues that
habit and drill were more important than critical thinking. Individuals,
he believed, must first and most importantly in the present social crisis be "trained to revere and to obey" the dictates of society's existing institutions.\textsuperscript{67} The task of the curriculum was to teach these habitual responses:

The aim of social conservation not only confers the place of prime importance in pedagogy upon the problem of curriculum content, but it also compels the doctrine of method to shift front completely, at least so far as conservation in concerned. Conservative education fears the shallow democracy of current theory, because its overemphasis upon individual choice and initiative leads the educand to regard the hard things of life as elective. Social conservation depends absolutely upon habituation. Children must be first habituated to what the race has demonstrated desirable; later the habits should be rationalized and emotionalized, and thus elevated into ideals.\textsuperscript{68}

In defining this role for the curriculum we should note that Finney located the control mechanism in the curriculum content, an approach we suggested was typical of an overt theory of social control.

The form of Finney's proposed curriculum was one organized around fixed subject matter. Finney, we have argued, wanted to obtain likemindedness in society by making everybody middle class, or at least appear to behave as if they were middle class. He believed that diversity in class, language, race, and religion in society was the source of social difficulty. This diversity meant that the members of society would not behave in the same way, and as a result they could not participate in a common institutional life.\textsuperscript{69} This in turn would lead to the immediate breakdown of the existing institutions of society and eventually in the breakdown in social life itself. What made people alike, according to Finney, was their social heritage, the stock of knowledge in the humanities, sciences and technology which the society had accumulated over the ages. It was this stock of knowledge that determined the form of existing social institutions. Social problems arose then under conditions of diversity, the most important cause of which was ignorance of the social heritage. Finney believed that if
people were knowledgeable about the social heritage, they would accept its teachings and behave in accordance with them. As such, everyone in society would appear to be the same, in this case middle class.

It was through the curriculum that the social heritage would be equally distributed to all segments of society. One aspect of the social heritage was of critical importance to Finney, that which he called the "new humanities" (biology, geography, psychology, anthropology, economics, sociology, political science, philosophy, history, and social psychology). Essentially this was his term for the social sciences. No other branch of knowledge had been so consistently ignored by the then existing school curriculum with its emphasis on foreign languages, mathematics, and rhetoric. By making the "new humanities" the focus of the curriculum, Finney hoped to correct this lack of emphasis in the traditional curriculum. Because of the concern of the subjects of the "new humanities" with the nature of social life, they would in effect make the institutions of society the objectives of education. That is, they would instill students with the conclusions of the social heritage as to the desirable form that society's institutions should take. This, Finney believed, would equip all students with the knowledge they needed to behave as members of the middle class.

We must not forget that Finney assumed that middle class attitudes and behavior were the visible embodiment of the American social heritage.

Finney did not ignore the other aspects of the curriculum. The curriculum that he envisioned was made up of six categories: language, vocational subjects, sports and amusements, the sciences, the fine arts, and the "new humanities." Although Finney was an advocate of the fixed subject matter curriculum, his approach to this organizational pattern was different from its more typical form as represented by the mental or formal disciplines movement of the nineteenth century. His
notion of what constituted a subject or for that matter knowledge was
strongly influenced by the idea of social efficiency that dominated
all modes of curriculum organization during the 1920's. Typically,
social efficiency is associated with the scientific curriculum makers,
such as Peters, Bobbitt, and Charters. Now Finney was critical of
the process of scientific curriculum making, particularly the procedures
used to determine educational objectives. But he accepted the util-
itarian orientation inherent in the idea of efficiency. Consequently,
his curriculum proposal was different from that of the Committee of
Ten who also advocated a fixed subject mode of organization. Higher
mathematics, under Finney's proposal, would no longer be required in
the high school curriculum as it was in the four courses of study
recommended by the Committee of Ten. It would be reserved for indi-
viduals who actually needed this advanced knowledge in their working,
adult lives. In like manner, formal English grammar would not be
required of every student under Finney's plan. It would only be nec-
essary for the majority of students to possess a functional degree of
literacy. In broad terms Finney's program focused on the "new humanities"
and the fine arts with decidedly less emphasis on mathematics, formal
English, and foreign languages. The fine arts, however, were to be used,
according to Finney, as a force for social control. He envisioned them
as being used to instill the students with similar aesthetic tastes so
that they would appreciate and enjoy the same kind of art. It was his
belief that cultural homogeneity was a prerequisite to social homo-
geneity. Thus the fine arts, just as the "new humanities," were to be
used to build a homogeneous social order based on middle class attitudes
and behavior.

We have already stated that Finney believed that the majority of
the population possessed what he called "duller intellects." This suggests
two problems for Finney. First, how did he expect these individuals of low intelligence to master the social heritage? And second, how could the dull and bright, that is the middle class and the laboring class, study a common curriculum derived from the social heritage? Finney's social psychology, just as Ross', was taken from the suggestion-imitation school. Following this school of thought, Finney argues that the mind was guided through a process he called "passive mentation." By this he meant that the contents of the mind were derived passively through a form of social suggestion. In terms of this notion of mind, learning for Finney was simply the development of associative bonds or habits that were passively taken on and continued to operate automatically. As such, Finney's psychology was compatible with the dominant behavioristic tradition that Thorndike established within the curriculum field. There were of course, according to Finney, a few individuals within society who were capable of active and original thought. It was these people who infused the new ideas, which took on the form of habits, into the social heritage to provide for normal social change. Finney was not clear who these individuals were, but it would appear, given the brunt of his argument, that he was talking about some segment of the middle class.

Although society, according to Finney, was composed of a very few independent thinkers and a mass of passive followers, it turned out that the overt behavior of the vast majority of society was the same. Except in extreme cases of retardation, it was not possible to differentiate the bright and dull from their overt behavior. That is, the imitative nature of mind meant at the least that the vast majority of the society, no matter what their abilities, could be conditioned to perform the same routinized habits. Thus if the social heritage as
humanities" was defined as a discrete number of habitual responses, anyone could learn them in the same way at the same time. The most appropriate way to express these habitual responses in order to guarantee their speedy adoption by individuals, Finney suggested, was as slogans and catchwords:

What the duller half of the population needs, therefore, is to have their reflexes conditioned into behavior that is socially suitable. And the wholesale memorizing of catchwords—provided they are sound ones—is the only practical means of establishing bonds in the duller intellects between the findings of social scientists and the corresponding social behavior of the masses. Instead of trying to teach dullards to think for themselves, the intellectual leaders must think for them, and drill the results, memoriter, into their synapses.

Interestingly enough, given the significant role that differentiation and tracking has played in curriculum discourse, Finney's curriculum was to be taught to both the bright and dull together in the same classroom. Both groups would be taught to memorize the slogans that represented the social heritage, but the bright would also be taught to understand what they were doing. In this respect his proposal would lead to a kind of curriculum differentiation, but Finney neither recognized this fact nor dealt with it. Because learning was for him a passive process of imitation, the presence of the bright, that is middle class students, would provide the dull, that is laboring class students, with models of appropriate behavior. This would allow all members of society to learn the same overt behavior and possibly to learn to think and feel the same. Because the bright represented the middle class in Finney's formulation, the effect of this curriculum proposal would be to make everyone, at least in behavior, middle class. This aspect of the curriculum was what Finney called education for "followership." For the bright he talked about a second phase of education for "leadership" at the college level. It was here that the right would be taught to understand their social heritage.
Peter's curriculum proposal paralleled the theory of Bobbitt, and as such it should be quite familiar to us. But we should note that he too viewed the curriculum as a means of social control:

As long as education was conceived as general discipline, it could guarantee nothing except undirected momentum; one could only hope that the momentum would carry the individual through to good conduct instead of bad. But when education is conceived as many particular readjustments for the particular problems of life, it can guarantee whatever conduct is demanded, since it can mature techniques...for getting the individual under training formed into ways our plans require.77

VII.

With the establishment in 1938 of a Department of Curriculum and Teaching at Teachers College, the formative days of the curriculum field came to end. The next thirty years were to see the maturing of the three schools of thought that constituted the field in its early days. The obvious question at this point is whether that initial orientation toward social control that dominated at least two traditions within the field still remains. Both the fixed subject curriculum and scientific curriculum making, although they are known by different names, represent viable traditions within the contemporary curriculum field. Michael Apple has argued that the contemporary variant of scientific curriculum making, competency based curriculum design, is essentially a system of social control.78 Although the social orientation of the structures of the discipline movement, the current form that the fixed subject curriculum has taken, is more illusive than the competency based movement, it too appears to be a mode of organizing the curriculum for social control. Most suggestive of this fact is Thomas Grissom's paper on the thought of James B. Conant which links the curriculum reforms of the 1960's, which were by and large organized around a structures of the disciplines approach, to a conception of education that sees both the school and its curriculum as forces for social unity and stability, a view similar to
the one that Finney held. Apple, in examining the content of these curriculum reforms, particularly in the sciences and social studies, has found a systematic absence of examples of the value of conflict. As a consequence, he argues, students are tacitly taught to believe that consensus both about disciplinary knowledge and about social issues generally is desirable, while conflict is not. He makes the compelling point that such beliefs serve a social control function by implicitly legitimating existing social arrangements.

Given the fact that social control is a constitutive property of institutions, the existence of a control orientation within the curriculum field does not tell us much except that our past traditions still remain with us. The critical issue however is whether or not the same political perspective that led to the development of the idea of social control and its adoption by early curriculum theorists still continues. Does curriculum discourse continue to serve as a force for building social homogeneity at the expense of minority groups such as the immigrants? Unfortunately there are indications that this still may be the case. One is the increasing popularity among curriculum workers of theories and techniques of behavior modification. As a tool of control, behavior modification contains the same coercive element that we found in the work of Ellwood and Finney. This is best illustrated by the suggestions for handling so-called hyperactive children given in a recently published text on behavior modification for classroom teachers:

Postural control can be achieved by equipping the hyperkinetic student's seat with a seat belt.... When the student is observed jumping up, calmly fasten the belt. The student then remains seated long enough to complete work, for which he should be reinforced. The removal of the belt can be contingent upon the correct completion of a specified number of responses....Hyperactive students frequently talk at a high rate.... Upon each instance of talking out, the student is fitted with a surgical mask that covers his nose and mouth. This is worn for about five minutes, or until a specified number of academic responses are completed.
It is worth noting that behavior modification has found its most welcome reception among penal reformers as the most effective way of dealing with intransigent prisoners. As such the curriculum field's adoption of these techniques is reminiscent of Ross and Ellwood's use of penal metaphors to talk about the social control function of education.

A second indication of the political orientation of curriculum discourse as well as of educational theory in general is the re-emergence of hereditarian thought as represented in the work of Arthur Jensen and in William Shockly's "sterilization bonus plan." Although it's not clear at this point whether this kind of orientation will enjoy the popularity it did in Thorndike's day, the increasing use of eugenic sterilization on Blacks and the poor should give us pause to wonder.

There would be less to worry about if an alternative tradition, similar to the radical interpretations found in sociology and history, existed within the curriculum field to offset the dominance of the kind of social control orientation we have described. There was a third tradition of organization that existed in the formative days of the field, that of dynamic growth or child's needs-interests. We have stated that this position unlike those of fixed subject matter and scientific curriculum making was rooted in what we have called a covert theory of social control. Until recently, interpretations of the principal formulator of this tradition, John Dewey, have failed to uncover this orientation toward social control. As such this tradition has typically been interpreted as constituting a liberal alternative to the conservative positions of Finney and Thorndike. More recent work however has identified this social control orientation. Most interesting is the fact that this recent work argues that although
Dewey's notion of control was different than that of say Thorndike's, its commitment to building a homogeneous community was as strong. We have maintained that this covert notion of social control operated indirectly and spontaneously on the personality to secure control and that the desired control was defined as a voluntary adjustment on the part of the individual. But as it turns out, the intent was just as restrictive toward diversity as any notion of control we found in the work of the overt theorists of social control. This tradition of child's needs-interests has expressed itself in contemporary curriculum thought in the form of humanistic or psychological education. Although this new school of thought expresses itself in therapeutic language that likens the role of the teacher to that of a clinician, its roots are in Dewey's thought. Contemporary curriculum theorists for the most part have ignored the control implications of this school of thought. But several psychiatrists and social critics have pointed to the potential for social control inherent in conceptualizing curriculum as a mode of therapy. Thus it would appear that at present the field lacks a viable alternative to a social control orientation.

The problem is whether or not curriculum theories rooted in a context in which social control is the highest ideal, can be removed from that context and used for different and more benign ends. This becomes a critical question when those ameliorative ends involve minority groups who have taken over the role once played by the immigrants. The resurgence of both coercive modes of control and hereditarian ideas within the curriculum field, as well as within the educational disciplines, generally suggests that our past traditions and practices still linger on. In this respect Alvin Gouldner's examination of the roots of structural-functionalism in the thought of
Talcott Parsons may prove illuminating. Gouldner argues that Parson's position at Harvard during the depression tended to isolate him from the social and economic disruptions of the period. This experience had a profound influence on his later social theory. It led him, when articulating his notion of structural-functionalism, to assume, perhaps tacitly, a fundamental stability about society and its institutions. Over the past thirty-five years this assumption has lost whatever visibility it might have had within Parson's own statements of structural-functionalism. But according to Gouldner, the assumption is so inextricably linked to structural-functionalism that it limits the ability of the theory to deal with questions about unstability within the social system. Gouldner's implication is that theories developed within one social context cannot simply be removed from that context. They carry with them the social orientation in which they were developed. As such, it may be impossible without a total break with our past traditions of organization for the curriculum field to sever its linkages to a commitment to social control as defined by Finney and Peters.

Professor Kliebard has argued that as a field, curriculum lacks a sense of its history. Quoting C. Wright Mills, Kliebard has made the perceptive point that we must study our history if for no other reason than ridding ourselves of it. In this paper we have looked at the dominant position that the idea of social control has played on our field, and we have suggested that it continues to enjoy that dominance. Moreover we have suggested that the function of this orientation historically, and perhaps even today, has been to restrict certain segments of the nation's population in the name of social homogeneity. Such a historical commitment seems on the face of it to belie the public statements contemporary curriculum workers and their professional organi-
nations make about the purposes of our field. At the least we may hope that examinations of our history may instill in us an awareness of where we stand today as a field. Or perhaps we can hope that by uncovering our past, we may in some way gain the kind of critical perspective necessary to reorient our efforts and in fact rid ourselves of our historical heritage.
References


10. Ibid., chapters 10, 11, pp. 126-137, 151, 153.


20. Ibid., p. 79.

21. This difference is suggested in the following quotations, the first by John Dewey and the second by George Herbert Mead, two of the formulators of the covert theory of social control. "The basic control resides in the nature of the situations in which the young take part. In social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action to a common result and gives an understanding common to the participants. For all mean the same thing, even when performing different acts. This common understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social control. It is indirect, or emotional and intellectual, not direct and personal. Moreover it is intrinsic to the disposition of the person, not external and coercive." See John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 39. "The getting of this response into the individual constitutes the process of education which takes over the cultural media of the community in a more or less abstract way. Education is definitely the process of taking over a certain organized set of responses to one's own stimulation; and until one can respond to himself as the community responds to him, he does not genuinely belong to the community." See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 264-265.


25. Ibid., pp 572-573.


35. Wilson, op. cit., p. 112.


39. A good illustration of this is Horace Mann's statement that education unlike such professions as law lacked a theoretical grounding in scientific principles. See Horace Mann, "A Historical View of Education; Showing Its Dignity and Its Degradation," in Lectures and Annual Reports on Education (Cambridge, 1867), p. 263.

37.


42. Kliebard has demonstrated this quite convincingly by showing how the formative assumptions of the scientific curriculum makers, Bobbitt and Charters, were borrowed from the idea of scientific management developed by Frederick Taylor. See Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in Freedom, Bureaucracy, and Schooling, ed. by Vernon Haubrich (Washington D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971), pp. 74-93.


46. Geraldine Joncich, The Sane Positivist: A Biography of Edward L. Thorndike (Middletown: Weselyn University Press, 1968), chapter 17; A good idea of Thorndike's influence on curriculum can be obtained from examining the bibliography of his writings that appeared in the Teachers College Record in February, 1926, May, 1940, and October, 1949.

48. John D. Watson himself stated: "The interest of the behaviorist in man's doing is more than the interest of the spectator—he wants to control man's reaction as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other natural phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and to control human behavior." See John D. Watson, Behaviorism, revised edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 11. The clearest statement of this control orientation can be seen in the first of the mechanistic or behavioristic psychologies, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 21, 49; For a discussion of this linkage of Hobbes to behaviorism see Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1966), chapters 1 and 2.


52. One of the features of modern, technological society is the tendency to redefine what are essentially political problems as technical problems through the use of scientific language. Thus crime now becomes an illness, radicalism a form of pathology, and cultural eccentricity a sign of low intelligence. For this idea I am indebted to Michael Apple's paper, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," The Journal of Educational Research LXVI (September, 1972), 10-18.


59. Ibid., p. 388.


65. Ibid., p. 249.


68. Ross L. Finney, "Prerequisite to Progress," Teachers College Record XX (May, 1919), 234.


72. Ibid., pp. 23-26.

73. Ibid., p. 330.

74. Ibid., p. 60.

75. Ibid., pp. 70-71, 442-452.

76. Ibid., p. 395.


81. Recently there have been published several texts on behavior modification prepared specifically for teachers. See, for example, Walter Vernon, *Motivating Children: Behavior Modification in the Classroom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); J. Mark Ackerman, *Operant Conditioning Techniques for the Classroom Teacher* (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972).


"The Curriculum Field in Retrospect," *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 83.