The growth of collective bargaining in higher education has been rapid, but the accelerating interest and commitment has not been uniform. The purpose of this study is to provide an initial understanding of the dynamics and consequences of collective bargaining at one institution, The State University College at Cortland, New York. The personal interview was selected as the data collection method. The interview schedule was designed to elicit as much information as possible about each respondent's perceptions of the consequences collective bargaining had at Cortland. A discussion of the findings reveals that consequences of collective bargaining were primarily negative: development of adversary relationships, truncated communication, formalized procedures, and changes in the roles of participants. The picture that emerges is one of a segmented university--internally and externally--in which the opportunity costs of collective bargaining seem very high in terms of personal relations, effective administration, program development, and the role of the participants themselves. (Author/PG)
Collective bargaining in America has its origins in the spasmodic labor union movements of the nineteenth century. Collective bargaining procedures for preventing the unilateral imposition of demands are now systematic, institutionalized parts of the public and private sectors of the American economy. Collective bargaining in American higher education is a relatively recent phenomenon, however. Most observers date its beginnings as a recognizable entity with the 1969 agreement between the City University of New York and its instructional staff.

The subsequent growth of collective bargaining in higher education has been rapid. In November 1973 there were 212 institutions covering 313 campuses whose faculties were covered by collectively bargained contracts. The 212 institutions included 150 two-year institutions and sixty-two four-year institutions (Chronicle of Higher Education, 1973). Though this number represents less than ten percent of the potential number of institutions, a large national survey (Ecker and Huldrige 1973)...

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1 The research which is the basis for this report was supported, in part, by the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, in conjunction with the Department of Manuscript and University Archives and the Small Grants Office, Cornell University.
shows that over one third of the faculty members surveyed believed collective bargaining was the most effective way for faculty members to influence decisions on their campuses.

The Problem

The accelerating interest in, and commitment to, collective bargaining in higher education has not been uniform. Implicit in the Ecker and Baldridge findings is the statement that nearly two-thirds of the faculty members surveyed ranged from neutral to negative in viewing collective bargaining as an effective way to exert influence on their campuses. The range of opinions about collective bargaining in higher education range from strongly pro to strongly con and touch most points in between.

Collective bargaining has the potential to have a direct impact on the distribution of power, the role of the participants, and the structure of internal governance in higher education. The problem is that there is little substantive information available on the consequences collective bargaining has when it is introduced into higher education. Nor is it clear whether or not higher education is similar enough to draw effective analogies from the experience business and industry have had; there are arguments on both sides.

The purpose of this study is to provide an initial understanding of the dynamics and consequences of collective bargaining at one institution (the State University College at Cortland, Cortland, New York). The task is made difficult by the limits which change imposes. This is a period of rapid growth and, in some cases, transition in collective bargaining, so the information gained will be at best a snapshot of how things are at
some point in time. It will, however, be a point in time with a history to help interpret the print. The print itself may provide a basis for comparison at some future point in time and may provide some insight about where to focus the "camera" in future study.

Methodology and Design

The decision to examine the consequences and how they have come about at one institution, that is to use a case study approach, grew out of the lack of coherence in the existing literature and research. Kerlinger (1967) points out that the rationale for case study research is founded on the need for preliminary investigation that will provide the groundwork for later, more rigorous, systematic testing of hypotheses. The case study offers the potential for obtaining a wealth of material but has the recognized disadvantage of being ex post facto research which weakens any potential statements of causal relations.

The decision to use an institution from the State University of New York (SUNY) was based on the institution's accessibility for research and on SUNY's particular position in time. The SUNY institutions have been organized sufficiently long for participants to be aware of the consequences of collective bargaining; SUNY completed its second year under a negotiated contract in June, 1973. At the same time, the implementation of collective bargaining is recent enough to insure that a large number of the faculty and staff have been at the institution for a period of time prior to the introduction of bargaining as well as their time spent under the collectively negotiated contract.

The State University College at Cortland (SUC-C) was selected as the site for a series of in-depth personal interviews because of its accessibi-
lity for research and because of its integral role in the history of collective bargaining in SUNY. The personal interview was selected as the data collection method because of its value in research that is, as Kerklinger points out, exploratory in nature, that seeks to identify variables and relationships, and that seeks to guide other phases of research. There are difficulties in using the interview technique due to possible ambiguity in the wording of questions and in the definition of terms. Additional difficulties may arise when respondents screen their answers or refuse to answer questions which are sensitive to them. At the same time the personal interview can obtain a great deal of information, is flexible and adaptable to individual situations, and, most important, permits probing into the context of, and reasons for, answers to question.

The Interview Schedule

The interview schedule was designed to elicit as much information as possible about each respondent's perceptions of the consequences collective bargaining had had at Cortland. With this goal in mind, the schedule provided for an exploration of the nature of the consequences and how they developed. The historical perspective of each respondent was crucial to this understanding of common perceptions of differences linked to bargaining and how these came about. Items included in the schedule were developed from the research findings of Blackburn and Bylsma, from projected consequences that have received extensive discussion in the literature about collective bargaining, and from the concepts of communication, trust, and degree of control in the organization that have been proposed in the behavioral theory of labor negotiations developed by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie (1965).
The interview schedule was designed to be open-ended and flexible to permit probing of issues, perceptions, and reasons. The purpose of the study and the development of the items on the schedule governed the questions, but the context, sequence, and wording were left up to the interviewer. The interview itself was a combination of the standardized and unstandardized types proposed by Kerlinger.

The interview schedule was field tested in a series of interviews at the State University College at Oswego, Oswego, New York. The field test established the approximate length of time necessary for each interview, tested the clarity of the questions and terms, and provided a baseline to guard against over-interpretation of idiosyncratic responses. After minor revisions, the interview schedule was used in a series of interviews at the State University College at Cortland in May and June 1973.

The Sample

Participants were selected initially on the basis of their position in the institution; the president, the three vice-presidents, the current co-presidents of the local bargaining agent, the past president of State AFT affiliate, and the divisional deans were selected in this manner. Each of these participants was asked to suggest other potential persons to be interviewed and the interviews were "snowballed" from that point. Finally, key issues or decisions were discerned the individuals concerned were interviewed if they had not been. The single external criterion imposed was that participants had to have been at SUC-C at least one year prior to the advent of the negotiated contract.

One of the weaknesses of such a selection scheme is that it is a non-random procedure and the results therefore cannot be assumed to be
representative, even though they may well be. This factor stems from the possibility that some members of the population may be over-represented while others are under-represented. The strength of the procedure lies in the fact that it permits, as Simons (1969) phrases it, "putting the telescope on what you really want to see." It permits those who are closest to the consequences, the dynamics, and the differences to be heard. In an exploratory study, this is a crucial concern.

A total of twenty-nine interviews were conducted; they ranged from nineteen minutes to one hour and nineteen minutes in length. Two additional individuals were asked to participate but they refused; they based their refusal on an unwillingness to be tape recorded or transcribed verbatim. The interviews were conducted under guidelines established by the Department of Manuscripts and University Archives at Cornell University for use in Oral History research. Each interview was tape recorded, transcribed, and preserved in keeping with those guidelines.

Additional Data Sources

Each participant was also asked what other sources of information would provide an understanding of the consequences collective bargaining has had at SUC-C. Material suggested, and subsequently obtained included a copy of the contract, memoranda of understanding, a transcript of the representation hearings, and newsletters published by the Senate Professional Association (SPA) and the State University Federation of Teachers (SUFT). In addition, a substantial body of personal information was gathered. This included personal correspondence, telegrams, personal memoranda, and unpublished manuscripts. This secondary information was gathered to supplement and
cross-reference the interview material as well as to provide additional perspectives.

The Setting

An understanding of consequences that are part of present perceptions depends in part on an understanding of the history and setting they grew from. There are five factors that are important to an understanding of the consequences of collective bargaining as they were discussed by the faculty at Cortland.

First, several authors, for example Carr and Van Eyck (1973) and Garborino (1973) suggest that the legal environment has been conducive to a movement toward collective bargaining by professionals. The passage of the Taylor Law in New York State in 1967 gave public employees, including university faculty members, the right to select a bargaining agent and engage in collective bargaining. Several respondents suggested that they felt one reason bargaining came to SUNY was because the Taylor Law practically mandated it.

The second and third factors grow directly out of the Taylor Law in the form of decisions made by the Public Employees Relation Board (PERB). First, PERB had to deal with the multi-campus structure of the State University system and second with the question of who would be included in the bargaining unit. The State University of New York (SUNY) is made up of twenty-six units: twelve university colleges with programs through the Master's Degree, four university centers with graduate and professional schools, two health science centers, six agricultural and technical centers, and the specialized maritime and forestry colleges. PERB (1969) ruled
that all twenty-six institutions would be included in the unit based on the criteria of community of interests, power to reach an agreement, and joint responsibility to the community. The history and development of bargaining at each institution became a part, at times inseparable, of the history and development of the larger system. The Board (1969) also ruled that all academic and non-academic professional employees, including department chairmen, would be included in the unit. The ruling was based on the current (at the time) interaction of the groups and the possible fragmentation of the unit if they were not included.

The fourth factor that is important is peculiar to Cortland. The first union, the State University Federation of Teachers, was chartered at Cortland in 1966. In 1967 the president and founder of the union was notified of his non-renewal and a reprisal suit followed that contended that the president was not renewed because of his union activity and a two year reassessment period was ordered. The reprisal was perceived to be a part of the state's unwillingness to accept the potential bargaining organization. The hearing itself directly involved a number of members of the Cortland faculty and administration and had impacts that are still being felt.

And fifth, the representative agent was chosen from four competing organizations: SUFT, the Civil Service Employees Association, the Senate Professional Association, and the American Association. S.P.A. was perceived to be essentially an anti or non-union organization, was backed by the New York State Teacher's Association, and won the runoff election with SUFT. SUFT remained the loyal opposition and on May 15, 1973 the two organizations merged to form a new, labor oriented bargaining agent.
with an expanded membership.

The Analysis

The interview schedule began with an open-ended question about the results of collective bargaining as the respondent had seen them. The interviewer then asked what effect that item had had in response to each item or issue that was mentioned by the respondent. During and after the discussion of these spontaneous items, the interview schedule developed three series of probes to question for additional consequences; these three series were grouped into subheadings of economic, academic, and institutional consequences.

Nine of the thirty-five items which were discussed will be presented here. Seven of these items were selected for two reasons. First they were selected because a significantly large number of the respondents discussed them. But more important, they were selected because they appear to have both the most extensive consequences and the greatest viability for answering the questions of development and difference. Those seven items are formalized structure and procedures, grievance, salary, merit pay, communication, adversary relations, and governance.

An additional four items are sufficiently related to each other to be combined under the rubric of teaching. These four items were stated to have been unimpacted by bargaining. They are teaching responsibilities, degree requirements, departmental objectives, and teaching methods. Finally, the consequences of collective bargaining for students will be discussed because students are the third major interest group directly involved with higher education; the other two being faculty/staff and administration.
Table 1 presents a simple count of the number of respondents discussing each of these items and is subdivided into a count of management confidential, non-teaching professionals and faculty.

Table 1. Number of Respondents Discussing Each Item As a Consequence of Collective Bargaining

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total N=29</th>
<th>Mgt. N=6</th>
<th>Non-Tch. N=6</th>
<th>Confid. Prof'l. N=6</th>
<th>Faculty N=17</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formalized Structure and Procedure</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievance</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salary</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit Pay</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary Relations</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Responsibilities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Requirements</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Departmental Objectives</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Methods</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After counting and selecting items for discussion, the comments made by all respondents concerning each item were extracted from the interviews. The synopsis of the synthesis of those comments for each item is presented in this section in narrative form. There is always the difficulty of maintaining objectivity in this process, but the careful attempt has been made to extract the context as well as the content for each synthesis. Every effort has been made to minimize any ideological tendencies the researcher may have had.

**Formalized Structure and Procedures**

At a basic level, collective bargaining had defined the relationships
between the persons designated as management confidential, the non-teaching professionals and the faculty. Within this formal framework, the NTPs seem to have gained the most, perhaps, as some of them commented, because they had the most to gain. Bargaining has provided formal procedures to insure that NTPs will have due process, term appointments, promotion steps, and peer evaluation.

There was a widespread concern that formalization had resulted in more impersonal, more structured relationships. Eight of the respondents stated specifically that this structuring forced them into confining situations that stifled creativity and/or restricted effective role performance. As a result, several felt that they had to justify proposals in terms of structure rather than potential. In addition, there was a distinct concern that structuring encouraged minimum standards of performance, that is performance up to but not beyond the established expectancy.

It was apparent at all levels that the new procedures and structures were time consuming. The necessary concern with dates, procedures, schedules, and so on now takes time that had formerly been used for programming and planning. At the administrative level there was a sense of isolation by definition. At times communication with subordinates was inhibited and, in some cases, the locus of decision-making was identified categorically and even the consultative role was preempted.

The increase in formal structure and procedure is evident in the printed rules structure. Changes, for example, were made after the 1971 printing of the Policies of the Board of Trustees which involved definitions of administrative offices, appointment of professional staff, procedure for academic promotion, leaves of absence, and termination. In addition to the
Policies and the Agreement there are an additional twenty-one typed, single spaced pages of memoranda of understanding at the local level which have the force of the agreement.

**Grievance**

The grievance procedure formalized in the agreement drew heavy comment from the participants. The general feeling was that it was too early to judge the effectiveness of the procedure but that it was worthwhile simply because it had been established. There was some concern that the procedure was long and weighted in favor of the state. The State had taken a narrow view of the procedure and was able to sustain its interpretation that grievances could be made only on procedural matters. The contract appears to support a broader interpretation but the bargaining agent has not been able to secure that interpretation.

**Salary**

It is difficult to determine what salary increments would have been received without bargaining, especially in light of the changing economic situation. The Salary Report prepared by the Office of Institutional Planning seems to support the argument that traditional increments had been lost without sufficient wage increases since collective bargaining began. There were three dominant concerns expressed in relation to the negative consequences bargaining had had on salary. First, there were substantial inequities in the salary structure that had not been addressed. Second, the loss of salary gains and an accompanying loss of morale had made the college less competitive for new faculty and in one department led directly to a loss of faculty. And third, the negative salary arrangement impacted aca-
domic performance. Faculty efforts were becoming dependent on potential economic returns or on a sort of status quo mediocrity to guage their efforts rather than on differentials of demonstrated ability, hard work, or scholarly performance.

**Merit Pay**

Merit pay was one of the two issues that drew the bitterest criticism from all those interviewed. Part of the criticism was directed toward the lack of timing and the procedure for awarding merit. There was a concern that the lack of established procedure and the pettiness displayed in peer evaluation would lead to the abolition of merit altogether. This in turn would perpetuate mediocrity and discourage talent and innovation.

The final frustration over merit was one of not knowing whether or not it would be continued. This lack of knowledge made planning nearly impossible and pointed toward a return of the same cycle of inadequate time, rising pettiness and the politics of peer evaluation all over again.

**Communication**

In spite of the fact that personnel files are now open and there is an established procedure of deadlines and notifications, there was general agreement that collective bargaining had had a negative effect on communications. First, communication had been restricted by the designation of individuals into specific categories. Second, there was a widespread concern that it was now necessary to screen any public statement or written communication less it be misinterpreted and used by one or the other of the bargaining parties. Regardless of whether the respondents perceived more or less communication to be taking place, with only two exceptions, it was perceived to be
less meaningful and less useful.

**Adversary Relations**

The great majority of the respondents felt that, though there might be basis for adversarial relations in pre-existing conditions, collective bargaining had extended and intensified those conditions. Collective bargaining has led to the development of adversarial relations within the faculty and staff. There is a conflict between those who support collective bargaining and those who oppose it and between individual faculty members who must now evaluate each other for tangible rewards. The result has been an erosion of mutual trust and an increase in the difficulty of leadership at the departmental level.

Collective bargaining has also led to the development of adversarial relations between the faculty/staff and the administration. There seems to be a cyclical effect at this level. The administrators perceive themselves as adversaries and use the formal rules and the contract to make more independent decisions, to the detriment of personal relations and program development. As this occurs the faculty feel more cut off and/or alienated which enhances their feelings of employer-employee divisiveness which posits the administration as an adversary. The cycle then seems to renew itself and, as some stated it, makes the campus certainly a less pleasant place and reduced everyone's effectiveness somewhat.

Finally, adversarial relations have developed between State level management and the faculties as they are represented through the bargaining agent. There is a distinct perception that the State has taken a very hard line toward collective bargaining as though to get rid of it. For some this has led to a resolve to fight for bargaining, for others it has accentuated
their feelings of frustration, lack of trust, and loss. The severe cleavage with the State level administration has been perceived as hostile to a genuine academic climate. It seems that the divisional deans and department chairmen have become crucial because they, rather than the local administrators, have been cast in the role of mediators.

 Governance

Collective bargaining has had two distinct consequences for internal governance at Cortland. First, it has brought non-teaching professionals into the governance structure as voting members. There was no consistent perception of what difference this had made except on the part of the NTP's who now felt more a part of the institution. Second, the bargaining agent has taken over some of the prerogatives that formerly were the domain of the faculty. Specifically, the bargaining agent has taken over the grievance procedure and concerns for professional rights; the Faculty Rights Committee had ceased to exist.

As a matter of record, the Faculty Executive Council has only the power to make recommendations while the bargaining agent has the authority of law and can force action in some areas. Anything that is negotiated into the contract will obviously become the domain of the bargaining agent. The real question for many of the respondents was whether or not the bargaining agent will assume control of internal governance de facto even if it does not control de jure through the contract.

 Teaching

Each respondent was asked whether bargaining had influenced teaching responsibilities, degree requirements, departmental objectives, or teaching
methods. All responded "no" to the direct question so it would seem that the teaching process itself will be the last domain to remain independent on bargaining. In fact, there were several sharp retorts that this area was the domain of the faculty and not subject to bargaining. This position was taken even in light of perceived effects bargaining has had on programming and institutional governance.

Students

The effect of program and development loss has been mentioned several times. This directly affects students but so far students have been perceived as being relatively unaware of this impact. Students have, however, been perceived as developing an openness to the concept of collective bargaining and adapting its processes to their own use. If this happens, the loss of programming and forecasting time, especially by the student personnel staff, has been perceived as a crucial loss. Forecasting and programming are essential if the college's student personnel programs are to be effective and beneficial to the maximum number of students. The student personnel staff has already identified time lost to bargaining and energy lost in adversarial relations as causing loss in these two areas. A student bargaining agent would very probably extend the time and energy loss already apparent.

Some faculty also see a rising adversary attitude on the part of students with regard to teaching and research that could have extensive long range implications. The other effect concerning students that was mentioned in a small minority of the interviews was that the formality and impersonality that bargaining brought with it has begun to spill over to relations with students. If this continues and students perceive that
they have no part in the process increases, the movement toward a student union for bargaining could well increase.

Discussion

Those of the faculty and staff at Cortland who were interviewed discussed consequences of collective bargaining that were primarily negative regardless of whether they were for, against, or neutral toward the process. These consequences involved the development of adversary relationships, truncated communication, formalized procedures, and changes in the roles of participants; in these respects there seems to be a great deal of congruence with the findings of Bylsma and Blackburn (1972). Continuance of the present form of collective bargaining can only serve to extend and intensify those consequences. The picture that has emerged is one of a segmented university - internally and externally - in which the opportunity costs of collective bargaining seem very high in terms of personal relations, effective administration, program development, and the role of the participants themselves.

There seem to be two very real hypotheses if the present exchange approach to collective bargaining continues.

1. As (when) collective bargaining makes significant economic gains, faculty and administration will lose a corresponding degree of their role in decisions, including academics, to external authorities.

2. If significant economic gains are not forthcoming, bargaining will encompass increasingly large segments of non-economic issues with an accompanying increase in formalization and rules structure.

If the State makes economic concessions it will expect a return; the only
return under the current approach would be a less participatory role. If the State does not make economic concessions, the bargaining agent must show some manifestation of progress. Neither of these prospects is very desirable.

With this in mind, there are several comparative points that seem pertinent to a consideration of the future of collective bargaining and research on collective bargaining in higher education. Those comparative points come from studies of the unionization of other professional groups and from industrial and labor relations theories of bargaining.

**Airline Pilots and American Public School Teachers**

The status of collective bargaining by the airline pilots and American public school teachers proposes the questions of the nature of the services offered and the sources of power available to participants. Both of these groups have established themselves as essential services. The public schools are still considered a necessity for maintaining the American system of life and student attendance is mandated by law. The public must, as Doherty and Oberer (1967) put it, "buy the product whether or not they think it's a good one." The airline pilots' essential service nature is rooted in their role in the economy. The teacher's source of power is in the legal mandate for their services and the airline pilot's in the cost of the industry disagreeing as opposed to agreeing with their proposals. Pilot's wages represent only a small part of the operating cost of the airlines, but a withdrawal of their services shuts down the industry.

It does not appear that higher education enjoys an essential service function, or that it can count on public support or cost of disagreement as
a source of power at present. There were no expressions, among the respondents at Cortland, of any source of power other than increased membership. Even in the considerable concern about the State's position on salary and grievance, there was no mention on what costs the bargaining agent could impose for disagreement and no mention of the collegiate function as an essential service.

Baitsell (1966) also points out that the airline pilots have been able to maintain a basic, though highly complex, wage formula and a position of "pattern plus" bargaining. The basic pilot's wage formula involves nineteen categories, each with its own formula for computation. At Cortland there are already differentials based on longevity, rank, field, and merit, with increasing emphasis on establishing additional definitions. If this increasing wage formulization continues, a great deal of care and questioning must be given to how it effects the demands and objectives of the profession.

Scientists and Engineers

There has been an active movement for collective bargaining among scientists and engineers for over forty years. During this time two factors are clear: when bargaining has occurred it has been under the auspices of the professional associations and there has been a vital concern with the preservation of professional identity. The perceived consequences of adversarial relations, impairment of superior-subordinate relations, and specification of performance at Cortland seem to support concerns that the chemists and engineers voiced fifteen years earlier (Reigel, 1959). These points of concern raise the question of whether or not higher education will adapt the process of collective bargaining to its own needs and demands. As bargaining grows, research and evaluation in this dimension appear to be man-
Canadian Higher Education

Collective bargaining among college faculty members in Canada is even more recent than that in the United States. The Canadian concept, however, projects bargaining on two levels or "tiers" (Adell and Carter, 1972). The first tier involves actual contract negotiation between the province and all the institutions in the province. The second tier is concerned with the negotiation of local issues at each individual institution. In its nascent stage, there appears to be a far greater amount of local negotiation and individual institution bargaining integrity in the Canadian situation than is true in SUNY. It seems important for the multi-institutional bargaining units like SUNY to watch the development and effectiveness of the dual approach in the Canadian Universities.

Industrial and Labor Relations Theory

When industrial and labor relations theories are applied to collective bargaining in higher education, two concepts are quite clear. First, collective bargaining is a dynamic rather than a static, concept which can be shaped to the needs of the participants. Second, collective bargaining is a developmental process that represents the awareness of the participants of what the process is and where they place their emphasis (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965).

Procedurally and conceptually, collective bargaining in SUNY corresponds to the very basic or distributive level proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965). The agreement is viewed as a contract that is binding and inflexible rather than a tool for facilitating the relationship of the parties. At the
time, the SUNY institutions, as all institutions of higher education, represent different sets of needs and needs that are different over time. In addition, higher education is an existential part of a larger context that includes other competing interests as well as economic and social consequences. At the institutional and system level the bargaining process is part of a variable-sum rather than fixed-sum pattern. Each of these factors points toward a more extensive analysis of collective bargaining in higher education in terms of industrial and labor relations concepts.

In Closing

It is at the personal and institutional levels that the final effectiveness of collective bargaining, or the lack of effectiveness must be measured. The answer will be determined primarily be the effects bargaining has on the role of participants at the individual institutions like SUC-C. So far, the faculty and staff have held the teaching and research functions aloof from the bargaining process, while internal governance, institutional administration, and student personal programming have experienced the greatest change. In all cases, the context of the activity had changed, and that in itself may portend changes for the role of the participants.

A. W. R. Carruthers (1966), Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Western Ontario has pointed out the potential and the costs of collective bargaining:

... may I suggest that the real question over the issue of collective bargaining for professional employees is one of attitudes, of personal values and inclination. First, you cannot have collective action unless you are prepared to surrender a measure of personal independence. The interest of the individual must be subordinated to the interest of the group, or group action will not be meaningful.
The extension of this train of reasoning is that there is more individual potential as group action becomes more meaningful; the increase in individual potential in turn contributes to a more cohesive group, which gives more benefit to the group and the environing society, and in turn increases individual potential. It is like a life cycle chain, each step enhancing the next for the benefit of the organism.

References


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