Intercultural communication is defined in this paper as communication among persons of different cultures and is discussed in terms of cultural variance with regard to perceptions, intuitions, feelings, and emotions. Psychological studies, as well as the author's experiences, are cited in support of the theories. Two pantomimes are suggested to demonstrate the division of the brain: in the first, one figure represents the right half of the brain (Goldmund), and the other figure represents the left half (Narziss); the second mime is designed to represent three different kinds of self-concepts, each one representing a different adaptation of the two kinds originally portrayed in the first pantomime of Goldmund and Narziss. (LL)
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIELD
OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION

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This paper was delivered October 1, 1973, at a conference in Washington at American University. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Training Institute of the Business Council for International Understanding (which is headquartered at American University) and the Washington Chapter of the American Society for Training and Development. Much of the same material was again presented in November at the annual conference of the Speech Communication Association. In the paper a deliberate effort has been made to use metaphors and language which communicate to a general audience. The presentation is normally accompanied by slides and other visuals and is designed for gradual transformation into an integrated cognitive/aesthetic experience with the addition of pantomime to illustrate major aspects of the subject. A successful experimentation with the pantomime took place in Washington early in December, 1973.

The field of intercultural communication is young and possesses qualities of vigor and of awkwardness; of conviction and also of uncertainty; and the field is also not clear about the boundaries of its body image. All of these qualities are found in a growth period. As I attempt to give an overview of the field, in some way suggest its history, its concepts, ideas and methods, while at the same time not neglect its applications and promise, I find that I begin to ease myself into the posture that the task cannot be done, not even in the one and a half hour that I have with you. That I have to say today will be more in the nature of an introduction to the proceedings of this conference.

I wish to make these remarks because I plan to display my comments around a few basic ideas which not everyone in the field would totally accept so it is necessary for me to make the disclaimer early.

1 See Fisher, 1970, 32, for the indefiniteness of boundaries of body image in children.
The question is often asked, "What is intercultural communication?" Perhaps an answer to this question is a good start for the path that we will follow through the field. We can answer the question by saying that it involves communication among persons of different subjective cultures (Triandis, 1972) with key word being "Subjective." Let us explore that for a moment.

Psychologists and physiologists in recent years have engaged in the study of the brain and have begun to provide an objective view of the rich, sometimes lush and sometimes grim, images which inhabit the far country of the mind. The images and the landscape are part of the person, and not immediately available to observation; hence the nature and qualities of the mind are subjective. The images, emotions, or if another term is needed, the programs of the mind, are unique results of each individual's life experience. Nevertheless, each individual and each brain, although unique, are not capricious, since each is forged in experience shared among persons whose images and emotions are shaped in similar social environments. In many cases, as we look at the behavior and the mind behind it, we discover that there are qualities of minds shared with some other minds and these qualities we can call subjective culture. They come in patterns, or, if we wish, we can say that there are certain topographical features to the mental landscape which some persons share with others but not with all other persons. Subjective culture is derived from experience which a person has had in common with others and which has left similar mental markings imprinted on the mind; these persons have the same subjective culture. In intercultural communication, its theoretical parts and its contents are designed to provide the maps of these cultural qualities, patterns of thinking, values, assumptions, which make up subjective culture.

There is one universal feature of the brain, shaped by subjective culture, which is so fascinating and so important for our purposes, that I wish to bring it forward now.

Man appears universally to perceive the world as a duality or in binary terms. Thus there is the Yang and Yin in China, the Gemini signs of the Zodiac in the western societies, (Cf. Tot, 1962) and innumerable other manifestations of the binary view which has teased and informed the human mind. Coming closer to our field, Freud too divided the mind
Into the unconscious and the conscious, the Id and the Ego (presided over by the Super Ego). And now, out of work in psychobiology in the 1960’s, there comes the startling discovery that two personalities inhabit the mental landscape, one dwelling in the left half of the brain and the other in the right half. This finding came from studies of the results of brain surgery performed on persons suffering from severe epileptic seizures. When the surgeon severs the connection between the two hemispheres of the brain, the corpus callosum, the surgery calms the patient but also reveals the two separate personalities.

The right half of the body is controlled by the left hemisphere of the brain, but for the person who is left-handed, the skill and precision of the hands are controlled by the development of the right half of the brain. Literally speaking, for persons who have lost the connection between the left and right halves, either through injury or surgery, the right hand knoweth not what the left hand doeth. A person with a "split brain" who handles a cube with the left hand, behind a screen so that the cube is known only through touch, will probably find it difficult to select the word "cube" from a list of words as the object is handled.

The example draws attention to the important aspect of the two halves of the brain; they contain different functions. For our purposes, it is important to note that spatial perception, artistic qualities, feelings and emotions are associated with the right hemisphere, while in the left hemisphere are found language and analytical abilities.

All of us have the capacities, to some degree, of both hemispheres—and in some way, in the domain of emotions, feelings and intuitions we know it. How does it feel to confront the two potentials in ourselves, to bring out clearly these contrasting qualities? I cannot describe it with words. Let us convey the feeling through vision.

**PANTOMIME**

**POSSIBLE SCENARIOS**

Two figures appear on the stage back to back with locked hands; they may be tied together with rope or perhaps wrapped together with cloth. There is some slight movement in unison of the two, then a paroxysm of activity and the two burst apart each to one half of the space of the stage, and from here on their movements and actions will be conducted to map out an imaginary central line separating the stage space into two halves.
A second possibility is that the two figures emerge as from sleep and separate into their two halves of space and mark out the central line demarcating the two halves of space.

One figure represents the right half of the brain, and will be called Goldmund, while the other figure represents the left half of the brain and will be called Narziss.

The movements of Goldmund will be languid flowing and convey an emotional sweep, and, if possible, also a feeling of esthetics and a sense for space and for things. Movements should flow from the inside, from the central body rather than from the extremities.

The movements of Narziss should be individuated and differentiated into every body part: each part of the arm should move independently, each part of the hand, and each joint of the fingers should move independently. The head should be held at an angle to the body, and the two arms held and moved asymmetrically, the lips moving as in speech.

From the point of view of the audience, Goldmund dwells in the left hand space while Narziss dwells in the right. Whenever Goldmund moves into the space of Narziss, his movements deteriorate because of conflict between the two styles, and the reverse happens when Narziss moves into the space of Goldmund.

The conflict induced by the competing styles should be resolved in solving some problem in performing some task, which will unite the language, analysis and factorial approach of Narziss with the intuitive and esthetic approach of Goldmund with its dependence on emotion.

After seeing the brain come to life in organic forms, it is easier to appreciate the two personalities inhabiting the mental landscape, and with a power beyond the ability of analysis to convey. I had barely suggested the history and the ideas which exist independent of the psychobiology you have just seen. I am sure that the movements and expressions you have experienced have reached a deeper emotional level than my words are able to evoke.
Although the significance of the division of the brain may be a recent discovery in psychobiology, the natural division between human qualities is as old as right and left. In some cases one or the other may predominate, and then in some instances, there is a strong competition between the two, and it is this point which is relevant to intercultural communication. Since the field arose from practical requirements, and personal human needs in cross-cultural communication, the emphasis is on the right side of the brain; but then there is the need to analyze, to communicate over distance and time, to reach conclusions, and that is referred to the left side. Intercultural communication incorporates, or shall we say minds, both. Conferences, conventions and instruction in this field are consistently attractive to both kinds of mental orientations, those seeking an emotional message and those that require analysis—logical and verbal. This issue is not unique, of course, to intercultural communication, but because of the youth of the field, because of its links to practice and to "relevance," and because it has some emotional and humanistic content, the emotion-cognition contrast exists close to the surface.

Turning to very practical matters of this conference, we have tried to cope with these striving motives of persons interested in intercultural communication by devoting the first day, today, primarily to the left, and then tomorrow and the next day, we shall move in the direction of the right. Even today, however, as I have already done and will do again, I wish to acknowledge the right hemisphere, assure it that it is not forgotten, and remind it that in natural events, in real life, that we function with both hemispheres, though seldom simultaneously. In describing a tumble, we may begin by placing both hands on the floor, push off with the feet—but usually desist and say, "head over heels," and accompany it with the gesture of the hand.

The cognitive-emotional distinction is one of the universals of human experience which consistently energizes the field of intercultural communication. But let us leave it behind for a moment, and turn to some of the problems we encounter in Intercultural communication. In describing subjective culture as the important aspect of the field, I did not identify what goes into it, and I wish to turn to that subject now, and proceed with indicating the various areas of the map which constitute the theory, fact and content of Intercultural communication. One of the most important of these aspects of subjective culture is perception.
Strange to say, at least in American culture, reality is in the eye of the perceiver, or more accurately stated it is part of his subjective culture. It has been shown that perception of the world is different from culture to culture.

The concept that a significant part of reality is housed in the brain itself is elusive and difficult to grasp. Most people retain a tenacious belief that the brain can in some way sweep aside errors, desires, misperceptions and apprehend a vivid, immutable reality. It is believed that there is an objective and irreducible perceptual order which somehow works its way past the sensory organs, the nerves, eventually to register on the brain its indelible print like light falling on film to produce a photograph. The idea of the eidola goes back at least to the ancient Greek (Boring, 1950), but this conventional concept that the mind mirrors the world out there is not a valid view. Whatever ultimate reality may exist in the objective world it does not impinge upon the sensory organs and is not transmitted in its representativeness to register in the circuitry of the cells in the brain. Even the basic percept of form and the simple perception of color, received by the sensory organs, undergo abstraction before transmission to the brain where the original perception is encoded, and another modification takes place. Once the perception is stored, it does not remain immune to other events which may further modify it. At some future time the original perception may be retrieved and brought to conscious awareness, but this process itself leaves a mark on what is recognized as a past experience. It is clear that in this complex process, there is plenty of room for the past experience of the individual to provide "input" into a raw perception so that when it is served up, the retrieved outcome perceived as the original event may reveal features which are novel to the original perception, and we have an instance of a reality which is partly traced back to the features and qualities of the brain itself as the repository, assimilator—or perhaps we can say the computer—of prior experience.

The influence of the stored experience on perception, thinking and behavior of the individual is critical for us, because the major task of intercultural communication is to discover those regularities in perception, thinking, valuing and behaving which are shared among members of the same cultural group. Since we have repeatedly insisted that
Subjective culture is a quality of the mind, both personal and shared with other members of the cultural group. I would like to turn to a personal example to illustrate the way in which experience modifies perception and memory. The specific content of the example will be idiosyncratic, but the process which it illustrates is general and perhaps it will remind you of similar experiences of your own. I hope that I have been successful by this point in establishing the validity of personal examples, since the core of subjective culture is the qualities internalized which are shared with some others.

As a child of seven or eight, I lived in Brazil. One of the most vivid experiences of this period of my life was the revolution, which deeply affected the pattern of life. The college with which my father was associated turned over its resources and plant to alleviate the human hurt caused by the revolution. I specifically remember my mother taking me to the red brick gymnasium. I walked with her through the main floor, which had been turned into a hospital, with row after row of beds filled with wounded soldiers. Afterwards I went downstairs and bought some candy at the small store and then walked home.

More than thirty years later I visited the same college campus for the first time since leaving when I was eight. I was escorted throughout the campus by an old gentleman who was finishing more than forty years of service to the college and who had been there during the period of revolution. One of the places that I asked to be shown was the red brick gymnasium that still stood out so vividly in my memory. As we walked through the campus, down an incline, I say the squarish building which we approached and which he identified as the gymnasium. It stood in a familiar shape but I was disappointed to observe that the red brick walls had been covered over with what appeared to be cement, since the surfaces of the structure now were grey and smooth. I asked my escort when the gymnasium had been redone and why the bricks had been covered. He answered that the building stood the way it had been built, that it had not been changed. I asked if he were sure; I distinctly remembered the red bricks, and I told him about the visit to the gymnasium when it was used as a hospital. He assured me that he was an engineer and as such had been the Vice President responsible for the plant and grounds, that he had supervised construction and changes in the plant, and in fact was inspecting construction taking place during our tour of the grounds. The building stood, he repeated, the way it had been built.
In my mind I went back and remembered all the gymnasiums I had known in junior high school, high school, college. I remembered those of the schools which I had attended and those with which I had become familiar for one reason or another. This trip through memory yielded a strong image of red brick gymnasiums. My experience with them had produced a mental image in my mind that they are made of red brick. This experience, coming later, encroached upon the earlier experience of the gymnasium in Brazil, modified it, and changed the concrete grey walls into a red brick structure. And even today when I turn to the long reaches of memory and remember going into that improvised hospital, I walk into a door framed by a red brick wall.

I do not want to impose upon anyone here a similar image of red bricks, but I would like to extract from the example the important principle of how the human mind constructs its reality and even modifies old images stored in memory into new forms to correspond with later experiences. If the pantomime was successful in raising the emotional reality and vitality of the inhabitants of the mental landscape, perhaps my example will begin to suggest some of their customs and behavior. The display of how experience reaches back in time to possess and modify memories of earlier experiences effectively demolishes the objectivity of a perceptual order outside the brain, at least one that can be known, and assigns to the mind itself a large share of the government of reality. Studies in the past frequently have shown that subjective culture reveals its influence markedly in memory.

The images of the mind can also be thought of as guiding the immediate perception of the world and the emotional responses to it. First let us turn to basic perceptual processes in the area of illusions and show that the environment in which one lives and past experiences modify memory and, to a lesser degree, perception. The example that we are now looking for is one which shows that perception, even at the level of the retina, involves the selection, abstraction and suppression of stimulation. The processing of incoming stimuli is partly governed by the nature of the perceiver's sensory and neural systems. At the same time the perceptual environment induces certain sets on the perceiver over time which influence how he perceives his world.
Beginning in 1956, an extensive study was conducted among persons drawn from seventeen different geographic areas (Segall, Campbell, Herskovits, 1963). Most of the persons in the study came from different parts of Africa, and one group from the Philippines and two from the United States. The purpose of the study was to determine the perception of space and susceptibility to geometric illusions of the persons in different parts of the world. The subjects were presented with stimulus materials such as the one illustrated:

![Muller-Lyer Illusion](image)

It is the so-called Muller-Lyer illusion. Although the two horizontal lines are the same length, most people perceive them to be of different lengths. The experimenters constructed different variations of the illusion, and of the three others which they used, so that they were able to allow their subjects to select the particular illusion in which both "lines" appeared to be equal, the so-called PSE, point of subjective equality. It was found that the difference in length of lines varied from group to group when they selected what appeared to be equal lines. A group of residents in Evanston, Illinois, perceived the lines to be of equal length when they differed by 21.3%, while for some groups in Africa, the perception of equality was made for lines differing in length less than 2%.

The results of this work, and others as well, clearly show first, that everyone is susceptible to the same illusions, but the degree of susceptibility varies. The writers attribute the differences in perception to the environments in which people live. In terms of the Muller-Lyer illusion, which we have illustrated, the strong susceptibility of the American sample stems from life in a well-camouflaged environment with many right angles and regular rectangular forms in structures. These perceptual qualities are relatively absent in some of the African environments, where people did not perceive the illusion to the same marked degree.

These studies of illusions are extremely important, for they show the profound and fundamental influence of the perceptual experience of the perceiver in determining how space and geometrical forms are perceived. These are areas of perceptions which are relatively objective in the sense that they do not suggest meaning or values in the same way that simple designs such as the star of David, the cross or other images,
which are embedded in symbolic association, evoke emotions. But with
the Müller-Lyer illusion and with the other similar designs used,
simple lines and geometrical figures, the cultural differences dis-
covered indicate the influence of the environment and of the perceptual
history of the perceiver at the fundamental level of the process of
perception. Thus we have to side with the Buddhist sages who see the
substance of the world as *maya*: perceptual reality is an illusion.

Above, we have attempted to suggest the influence of the mind it-
self, first on the remembering of past events, on memory, and then
secondly on the raw process of perception. Although the experimental
data in the field of illusions is impressive, we can raise the question
of relevance. How often in intercultural communication are we really
concerned with the problems of perception of space and the susceptibili-
ty of geometric illusions? There are a few instances such as efforts to
train mechanics, engineers and other professions in methods which re-
quire the use of diagrams and layouts. Although it has been shown that
cultural differences of the kind we have talked about intrude in these
instances, admittedly their relevance and importance are not great. If
we turn to the area of thinking and of social stereotypes, involving
valuations as well as thinking, then we enter into areas which are much
closer to everyday experience in intercultural communication. This area
is a vast one which can best be suggested here through the same combina-
tion of personal example and general principle which we employed to
symbolize the impact of the mind on memory. Let me turn to a personal
example which illustrates the surprising degree to which the ability to
perceive depends on the act of categorizing or the process of coding
stimuli. The perceiver responds to the category to which a given stim-
ulus has been assigned. The implication is two-fold: perception is of
the general and not of the specific stimuli. The response is to a stimu-
lus only as member of a class, and the difference between perceiving,
thinking and valuation is diminished.

The example is somewhat complex, since it involves a perception, a
classification of it, and then an evaluation of the classification of the
perception. The example refers to an experience of the late nineteen
sixties when professors like myself had become accustomed to male students
wearing their hair long. In the beginning, it looked odd indeed, but
eventually, just as it happens with growing familiarization with persons


from another society or group one accents the basic phenomenon, and makes 
Judgment about it in much the same manner that one might make judgments 
about any other aspect of appearance or of dress. I felt that if the 
male student had a small face, delicate features, he should avoid framing 
it at the top and sides with flowing and often flying masses of hair. 
(Illustrative slide) On the other hand, a rugged face, with salient 
features could be well set off by the frames of hair which some of the 
students affected. As I sat in my office, I frequently had occasion to 
obsere the interaction between hair and face during the periods between 
classes when students walked past my window. I had often noticed that 
when I looked outside at the walking students, they came from my rear, 
passed the window and walked on down the path. When they approached 
from this direction, I could not see their faces, since they approached 
from the rear and walked away from me. At best I could see the tip of 
a nose perceived from the three quarters rear. When students came from 
the opposite direction, towards me, I could of course see their faces 
from three quarters from the front.

One day I was seated at my desk when I became aware of the usual 
hubbub indicating the split between classes and the movement of people 
outside the office. I glanced up and noticed two male students passing 
each other just outside the window, going in opposite directions. 
(Illustrative slide) The one going away from me had long hair down to 
his shoulders; while the other walking in the opposite direction, 
that is, approaching me, had delicate features and wore his hair short. 
I glanced at them and glanced back down and continued my work. The 
thought passed through my mind, in accordance with my perceptual belief, 
that the student should not have long hair with his kind of features; he 
should wear his hair much shorter. I suddenly realized that I could not 
make that judgment since I had not been able to see the face of the 
student with the long hair at all. I quickly glanced our the window 
again to observe the two students, who were two or three paces apart, 
now and verified that the student approaching me, whose face with its 
delicate features I had seen, wore short hair and that the other whose 
face I had not seen had the long hair.
I had made a judgment about two combined heads: to one face I had attached another’s half, and vice versa. The perception had been clearly guided by the value about faces and hair, and even though the perception was of two separate particulars, I experienced no difficulty at all in combining them into more general categories and deriving a valuation from the perception. It was a startling experience for me to catch this observation on the wing. It is seldom that we can halt the flight of perception or of thinking and examine it as a process. It is this fixing of the experience which is unusual; otherwise, I propose that what I have described happens all the time; it is at the root of all concepts, stereotypes and generalizations. It is just another example of the fact that we perceive categories, or more accurately examples of categories, rather than particulars. The important conclusion for intercultural communication is that many categories used for classification are part of subjective culture. These are encountered as patterns of thinking, values and assumptions. Before turning to these, I would like to briefly summarize the three points I have made about the mind.

The issues of categorization, perception (and its illusions) and the impact of experience and of the brain processes on memory, convey the open-ended aspects of reality which are filled by the subjective culture and the personal constructs and images of the individual. With the aid of pantomime, I have attempted to show some of the richness of the mental landscape and to appeal to emotion and to intuition to understand how the mind functions. At this point I would like to turn to the topic of cognitive maps of the mind and of subjective culture. It will not be possible to present a detailed map; I will indicate only some of the main features. And in the same way that our physical landscapes are marked by signs and directions, and our maps with captions, language is one of the most important and useful guides for understanding the cognitive maps of subjective culture. Language presents a particularly useful source of rules which the language speaker observes, and which he may not be aware of at all. For Americans in particular, who believe in self-determination, it is an important attainment to clearly show that our behavior is guided by rules which we neither select no wish to recognize, and sometimes resent, since they appear to impede our creativity of expression.
Thus far, I have been suggesting that in the mind there lives a thriving community of images, emotions, and other inhabitants of the mental landscape. It is a world of mental space, often seen in color, emerging bluish, with shades of red. Some people see it as luminous purple. As both my discussion and the mines have shown, it is a world of two communities, one more emotional and the other more analytical. The former is more concerned with relations and whole parts, while we find that the other stresses the isolation of factors, in short, of analysis regardless of how the parts actually occur in the world of objects and observation.

The moment that we disregard the qualities of the inhabitants, the images and emotions, and attempt to construct maps of their relations, how they move through the landscape, their affinities, affiliations and conflicts, we have entered the realm of patterns of thinking. The description of patterns of thinking in terms of affiliation and of human communities is an accurate model of work of a number of anthropologists, sociologists, and social scientists who perceive a striking parallel between patterns of thinking and the kinds of social structures which man invents for himself. The French sociologist Crozier in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Wittfogel in Oriental Despotism, Levi-Strauss in his work with structuralism, each see this parallel. But let us avoid a review of the literature and proceed as we have been doing by presenting a few outstanding examples.

In the views of some people, the relation between perception and thinking is continuous (Arnheim, R., Visual Thinking, 1972); one merges into the other one. Pursuing our metaphor that patterns of thinking are analogous to the relations found among images and emotions, we can also say that the qualities of the images and emotions contribute to the kinds of relations organized in mental space. One determines the other at least in part. In the same way that the patterning of human communities, the family, the neighborhood, the tribe, the city, vary from culture to culture, we find that maps of subjective culture describe different patterns of thinking.
This difference used to be a difficult one to talk about or to accept in the mid-sixties. Students, and people in general, believed in only one natural and normal way of thinking - the rational way. Some people were more adept than others and were believed to be better thinkers. Some people made more mistakes, particularly when they allowed emotion to intrude. All of these views revolve around the central belief that there is one way of thinking. During the nineteen-sixties, however, accumulating evidence and a changing social and cultural climate, produced an increasing ability for people to break out of their culture envelopes and regard their behavior and that of others more objectively; and, perhaps above all, a greater tolerance for differences developed during this period, which led people to be more receptive to differences in thinking.

At a general level, nearly everyone who has conducted research into the thinking process arrives at two basic patterns. Even where exceptions are made and more than two basic patterns are identified (Pribram, 1949) the two basic ones can still be found dominant.

The most interesting recent work in this field has been done by Rosalie Cohen at the University of Pittsburgh (Cohen, 1959). Dr. Cohen has collected empirical evidence on the two basic patterns, although she is careful not to rule out a greater number. Her data is drawn from the performance of grade school students in accomplishing certain mental tasks. Importantly, she arrives at distinctions between the two patterns that, at a general level, we can assign to the two halves of the brain. She calls her two types analytical and relational. I would like to show you one design drawn from her protocols, to illustrate a salient difference between the two patterns of thinking.

Complex

Simple

![Diagram showing a complex design transforming into a simple design](image-url)
The analytical mind is adept at isolating the embedded figure, extracting the simple part from the more complex figure. The relational thinker, on the other hand, has great difficulty in performing this perceptual feat. For him, the world is perceived in totalities; he does not arbitrarily break it up into simpler factors for the purpose of analysis.

Let me stop with this one example and draw some important generalizations from it. The first is that if we adopt the concept of isolation of factors and apply it to the social area, then we discover that the children in the Cohen study who were analytical, who separated out the simpler figures, came from homes in which they were assigned special tasks to perform, and lived in peer groups in which the children also developed special roles. The relational children, however, more often came from homes in which they were not given special tasks; the last child to finish at the dinner table cleaned up, so to speak, and in their peer groups there existed little development of special roles. Thus we see in the work of Cohen a parallel between thinking and social structure.

I would like to stress that the differences in thinking do not reflect differences in intelligence; they are differences in styles of thinking. In the work of Cohen, therefore, we perceive the reflection, the shimmering shadow of one of the overwhelming concerns in the field of intercultural communication. She found that children with both types of patterns of thinking varied in intelligence. There were very bright, relational children and yet there were the not so bright as well. The same distribution held up for the analytical children, some more and others less intelligent. We can now ask the question about communication, who communicates the best with whom? Her work suggests that similarity of style of thinking is helpful. If communication occurs across differences, then there is an important result. Children of one style who are very intelligent communicate better with children of the other style who are only moderately intelligent. If the communicators have different styles, high intelligence for both hinders communication. This result clearly implies the importance of style, or patterns of thinking, in the process of communication.

I should add that the distinctions in style which Cohen has found in the two patterns are similar to those found by others comparing patterns of thinking across cultures, between Americans and Chinese for instance. Thus, we are talking about a human quality which has been
cultivated to different degrees in various groups, and in various parts of the world. In many ways, it is easier to recognize the difference when it is associated with a foreign language, different physical appearances, and a strange land. Intercultural communication has exploited this psychological fact as a means of identifying human differences as qualities of the person, and then of showing the necessity for training and educating in these differences to span the gulf which separates people whose styles of thought are different. The difference is more readily acknowledged in the stranger from another land, but it also exists next door. The Chinese we see as exotic, but the child next door is not very bright.

Before moving on to language, I would like to describe one aspect of thinking which distinguishes most Americans from persons who have another subjective culture. Many Americans seem to have a versatile and energetic inhabitant in their mental space, an imaged Observer-Agent (the IOA), whose function it is to assume perspectives and to take action. The concept of the imaged Observer-Agent can be illuminated by means of an example from art, from monuments which you will find in most cities.

If you travel to Quito, Ecuador, and walk through the Independence Square, you will notice in the center of the square a tall column with a classical figure standing on the pinnacle. At the base of the column there are four bronze lions forming a square. To an American eye this monument may appear unusual; it may convey a slightly uncomfortable feeling of looking at something without an invitation. What is it about the monument that evokes this feeling as it did for me? (Illustrative slide)

One day as I looked at it, there flashed into my mind the Image of the Nelson monument in Trafalgar Square in London and the Grant Monument at the foot of Capitol Hill in Washington. I realized that the Quito monument showed the four lions with their necks turned to glance up at the figure which crowned the column. Their glance closed off and completed the monument's composition, and also excluded the observer. It is difficult to appreciate the monument from a photograph, since the column is tall and the lions are far below, but the same effect can be found
with another group in Quito just outside the American Embassy. (Illustrative slide) If you will notice, the maiden is seated in the middle of a pool of water and surrounded by four seals at the edges of the water, all craning their porcine necks backward for a glance at the figure. (Illustrative slide)

In contrast to these two art works, the lions of both the Grant and the Nelson monuments do not look at the central figure commemorated. Instead, they glance out to engage the perception of the observer. They invite the observer to enter the composition.

These two styles of art suggest a basic strategy in thinking. In the first case, the world is perceived to have its own integrity and to exist whether there is someone around to think about it or not. For example, let us suppose that the person who has such a feature as part of his subjective culture is repairing a road. A bridge has washed away and it is being replaced. A sign is put up just before the bridge to warn the motorist, "Road under repair." A motorist arriving there might wonder why it is that the sign was not placed at the last point at which he could have detoured rather than just before the washout. In fact, I find in many parts of the world that the answer to the motorist's complaint, who probably would be an American, is simply that the sign is placed where the road is under repair. The world is accurately described.

Most Americans would be inclined to place the sign at the motorist's last choice point, since their minds are populated by implied Observer-Agents who are eager to do things, to participate, to make decisions. Many Americans seem reluctant to confront the material world on its own terms; they prefer to see it as an arena for making decisions and taking action which is directed towards goals and taken from a perspective. When I have shown symbolic photographs to students and asked for what they see in them, they often ask who the photographer was and then put their eyes behind the camera with the photographer and imagine what was in his mind as he took the photograph, and impute to the photograph what they conjecture was in the mind of the photographer. American students seem to be reluctant to look at a photograph as a pattern of objects or surfaces and permit perception to speak directly to them. This is what it means. The students require the agency of an implied Observer-Agent to carry out the analysis or to be the determiner of meaning in a manner similar to English syntax, which requires it to rain and does not permit the happening of rain to be its own cause.
The implied Observer-Agent is not a permanent inhabitant in all subjective cultures. This can be seen if the IA is socialized and taught to conduct interviews, as is common in America. For example, if a survey were conducted among Americans about recent events in Washington, an interviewer might say, "If you were Judge Sirica, what would you say to President Nixon about the tapes?" Most Americans would readily accept that form for eliciting information, whereas members of other societies would probably correct the interviewer emphasizing their own identity as separate that of the Judge. They would not accept that form of the question; they would expect to be asked for the information directly, without the intervention of an "as if" or, in other words, the intercession condition, of the implied Observer-Agent.

There is an old tradition in the analysis of the mental process that thought and language are the same: language controls thought, and thought is derived from the structure of language. It is only a model of language and thinking, but it is an attractive idea which can be used to draw attention to two aspects of words and language which have significance for subjective culture, assumption and values.

By the use of language, I would like to try to show that there are systematic qualities of subjective culture which govern the behavior of the individual, and yet the individual does not know what these are. This fact is a difficult one for education and training, since we are often in the position of drawing attention to qualities in people which they consider perfectly obvious, but which at the same time are highly differentiated aspects of themselves, shared only with other members of the same subjective culture. My purpose in this example is to show, though the use of language that there are rules governing language use which native speakers observe but which they are not normally conscious of.

black  soft  sweater
wool
brick  large  house
old  red

Notice that with the first example there are six possibilities, while with the second, the four adjectives introduce twenty-four different ways in which they can be ordered. The agreement which native speakers show is indeed remarkable and attests to the power of
the rule that in English anytime an adjective refers to substance, it must precede the noun. Thus a red, brick house is not made from the same substance as a brick red house. It is true that one can compensate for brick's position. A stress on brick followed by a pause and then a quick "red-house", conveys the meaning that the house is made of bricks. But these paralinguistic devices merely emphasize ways of circumventing the rule which we are trying to illustrate.

The potency of language structure is a constant source of amazement to me. For instance, if we use a compound noun, "schoolhouse", instead of the simple noun, "house", and then use the two adjectives to modify it, "red, brick", so that the phrase now becomes "red, brick schoolhouse," the introduction of "School," which is really used as an adjective undergoing the rites of passage for nounhood, the "red bricks", to my mind's eye, now turn to salmon!

The order of adjectives in other languages does not follow the pattern of English. Thus in Portuguese, adjectives tend to follow nouns, but the rules are complex, since native speakers give great attention to style and to the sound of words, and avoid enumeration of adjectives. When several are needed, some follow and some precede the noun, and some of the adjectives are woven into prepositional phrases. The four adjectives used to modify house when rendered in Portuguese and then literally translated into English would read: "The old house, large and made of brick, red."

Several interesting generalizations can be made from the simple rule of the order of adjectives. If they are considered as specifications or as modifications of a general concept, then, in English, reservations precede the main point. In Portuguese, the opposite set of conditions tends to prevail. The speaker first presents the main idea and then modifies it with adjectives. This quality of languages can be interpreted in terms of patterns of thinking. The English pattern is inductive, moving from the specific to the general, while the pattern in Portuguese is deductive, movement flowing from the general to the more specific. This connection between the language and patterns of thinking is the sort of idea that we noted earlier: the mutual dependence of one upon the other.
In English, although it is inductive and concrete, the primacy of the adjectives placed first without substantives, introduces a suspense of abstraction. The native English speaker compensates for the abstract arch of adjectives by identifying agents, using more concrete subjects than predicates and by a consistent use of examples where others, in Portuguese, for instance, might be content with definitions and abstractions, without connecting them to substantives.

We began this discussion by noting the twin tendencies in intercultural communication—one the cognitive and the other the emotional. I would like to return to that dilemma at this point by turning to language for an exposition of emotion now that we have extracted from it the cognitive implications for patterns of thinking. Language does provide a vehicle for emotion through lexical markings, we can raise this topic by means of examples related, again, to the use of adjectives. We have examined their order when modifying nouns. Now let us look at the internal pattern of adjectives and then examine how they convey emotion.

Adjectives in English are found in polarities so that one can refer to tall-short, light-dark, good-bad, heavy-light, etc. The polarities of adjectives are uneven; one pole called nominal refers to the whole dimension. Answers to questions, in which the respondent uses the polarities makes this clear. One invariably asks about tallness, goodness, heaviness and so on, in walking into a cafeteria, one inquires, "How good is the food here?" The opposite member of the polarity is more specific in meaning and generally refers to a precise range of judgments between the two opposite polarities of the adjectives. It has a lexical marking (Clark 1969). This is indicated by the question on entering a cafeteria, "How bad is the food here?" Immediately the questioner is confining expected answers to a range in the region of bad. The meaning is more precise than when the adjective good appears in the question.
This discussion is intended only to convey the general idea of the concept of 'marking' which is given a much more precise meaning and definition by psycholinguists. For our purposes, it is only necessary to draw attention to the fact that markings in words or in a grammatical structure are a complexity from the grammatical point of view. The term bad is more complex than the term good. Similarly passive voice in a sentence is more complex than active. The word bad, by way of meaning, carries a negative emotional connotation, but this conclusion can be extended to include a negative emotional meaning for bad because it carries a lexical marking. Similarly the passive voice or other words and structures which have markings also convey negative emotional meaning.

The concept of markings is a powerful one which bridges the gap between theory and application. Most people apparently intuitively grasp the implications of the idea and apply it to their behavior. Let me finish the discussion of language with an example which involved the concept of lexical marking. I use it to suggest how theory contributes to meeting the needs of the practitioner.

An explanation of behavior, anchored in language and then proceeding to general cultural analysis, was used in a conference of a large group of Catholic missionaries. The group, consisting of nuns of a single order, met in Rome on the theme of international communication. There were various concerns in the group, but one of the major ones involved the perceived national and cultural distinctions among American, Flemish, and Brazilian members of the order. The Americans were seen as romanticists by the Flemish, who in turn were judged cynical by the Americans, both of whom agreed that the Brazilians tended to exaggerate. During the meeting these perceptions were associated by the conference leaders with language and analyzed in terms of the linguistic stress placed upon negative emotions, which was conveyed by means of the language structure or the use of favored expressions. Whereas the Brazilians were much more prone to speak in positive terms, the Flemish were more negative with the Americans falling in between. This analysis, based on language and 'markings' and on an increased understanding of the motivational factors affecting the group was successful in resolving issues which had come up during the meeting.
Americans were romantic according to the Flemish in the group, but analytical from the point of view of the Brazilians. I do not know if Flemish or Portuguese languages have been subjected to the kind of psycholinguistic analysis with which I have been concerned during the past few minutes. It is clear, however, that in the conference, the differences in qualities attributed by one group to the other, and the differences in the use of language suggest that many of the differences in attitude among the groups could be associated with the use of languages. I will not insist that language determined them, but language was certainly implicated.

Language provides an excellent vehicle for displaying the qualities of subjective culture. We can turn to either the rule of adjectives or to the principle of markings and point out that these ideas govern behavior; they act as rules to which behavior conforms. The individual, the culture-bearer, may not know the rule or the principle, and when he introspects, he cannot encounter an idea, a feeling, or an emotion which corresponds to the rule or concept, but the next time he is confronted with the necessity of modifying a noun, he will observe the rule for adjectives perfectly, regardless of his knowledge of it.

In addition to providing a good analogy for subjective culture, this observation also points to one of the major issues in education and training in intercultural communication; the objective of attaining cultural understanding. Most people do not acknowledge what it means to be a member of a culture. Yet persons typically do not reserve or suspend their judgment with respect to issues which in some way implicate their own subjective culture or which challenge it. This phenomenon brings us to one of the main areas of intercultural communication, the consideration of cultural assumptions. Assumptions are attitudes and beliefs, normally unconscious, which affect thought and behavior and which seem so natural and so much a part of oneself that they are assumed to be natural for everyone, regardless of cultural background. Thus those who deviate from patterns of behaviors governed by "assumptions" may be characterized as immoral, wrong, stupid, or in some way unnatural or abnormal in behavior. When the person has some insight into his assumptions and is willing to admit that others might not share them, then the assumption can be referred to as a value. For our purposes we will consider assumptions and values together, both comprising one of the most important content areas of intercultural communication.
Assumptions and values cut across psychology, sociology, philosophy and anthropology and can be conveniently grouped into about five components. The categories are somewhat arbitrary, but do provide a convenient guide. Each one of the five major components may be said to be characterized by a major value or assumption which has variants in all cultures. Similar to adjectives they may be analyzed in dimensions, with the variant of one's own subjective culture treated as a nominal variation and others as lexically marked. Each major component of values and assumptions may be typified by a major value.

The first component is form of activity. Nearly every visitor to America has noted the preoccupation Americans have with speed, work and keeping busy. Other peoples seem to be able to adopt a more detached and relaxed view of worthwhile activity. The pace of life is slower and perhaps more reflexive toward its own intrinsic values without betraying the same urgency to perform and to leave a mark on the external world. This contrast in values can be expanded extensively to elucidate the culture differences associated with forms of activity. (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961).

The second component is social relations. All men live in groups but the forms these groupings take vary. For Americans a basic social value is that of equality. Although American society has witnessed, and still does, major exceptions or contradictions to this value as it works out in practice, within its psychological and social limits, equality has in certain ways characterized the American life style more than that of any other society.

The third component is motivation. This is a difficult value orientation to discuss. It is so much a part of the thinking of Americans that it is hard to convey the thought that in other societies there may be images of man in which the concept of motivation is not particularly intrinsic. The stress on motivation is a cultural characteristic in itself. When we pursue the question of motivation into the scholarly literature three types of motivation emerge. The first, achievement, is deeply held by Americans. The other two motives, power and affiliation, do not to the American ear really sound as if they should be classified as motivational forces. To the American, behavior is understood in terms of motivation and motivation is achievement—that is what is meant by the concept. It is thoroughly American in conception and in practice.
The fourth component is relation to the world. Buried in the mind of all men is some kind of image of the world. In its broadest sense, this includes political, social and other factors in addition to those of the physical environment. Within this area, one of the important issues is the relationship between the individual and his environment. It is clear that for Americans, it is man who should control and extract from it whatever is beneficial for him; it exists at his service. For others, however, there is the idea of unity with nature and with the world. In other parts of the world, man feels desperate, overwhelmed by an inhospitable and hostile environment surrounding him. He spares no love for a world of limited good and sparse opportunity. There are of course some social groups, particularly minorities in American society, which share the feeling of powerlessness and environmental hostility characteristic of some other cultures.

The fifth and last component is view of self. It refers to the self perception of people who have different subjective cultures. This is an intrinsically interesting topic and for Americans a very important one. Traditionally in American society, the drama of both history and of the individual has been the struggle with and conquest of the environment. Americans have always been concerned with what is out there and with the methods the individual may use in harnessing and controlling it, whether it is the Remington rifle to subdue their foes, barbed wire to control cattle, the railroad to span the continent, or persuasion to capture the customer. In the Orient, in contrast, in India, China and Japan, the human drama has been more within. The struggle has been to control internal rather than external forces. In recent years in American society a new interest has developed in the nature of man. A new inclination toward introspection and self-searching has grown up which, in the field of intercultural communication, has frequently been manifest as an examination of the self concept.

In approaching this important and sensitive topic, I would like to turn again to pantomime, to non-verbal communication to dramatize three different concepts of the self. Pantomime offers a more direct and impactful communication of the different ways in which people develop hypotheses about themselves. It may also be able more adequately than words to convey some of the feelings about the self and some of the aspects of the self derived from subjective culture—despite the fact that the individual may believe that all aspects of the self are intimate parts of himself, created, sustained and nourished by his own unique "self- hood."
We will very briefly sample three different varieties: the first is the individualistic self, characteristic of Americans, though not exclusively American. It depicts certain salient qualities which nearly everyone recognizes in Americans and which are commonly associated with business and travel. The second concept is that of the social self in which identity is attained principally through relations with others. This is found among Americans but is not considered a native product. It thrives better in other countries. The final self concept is an abstract one, difficult to grasp and more at home in parts of Europe and Asia than in America. Expressively it is depicted in a cosmic dance.

PANTOMIME

The pantomime is designed to represent three different kinds of self concepts, each one representing a different adaptation of the two kinds originally portrayed in the first pantomime of Narcissus and Goldmund.

I. Individualistic-analytic

Characteristics: separate movement of body parts, analytical, derives emotional reactions from action rather than from movement, and from travel. Should portray a traveling salesman or a hitch-hiker.

The motif of travel should be used to convey the feeling of loneliness and of self containment. Space should be conceived as essentially objective and neutral, as something to be traversed.

II. Social-emotion

Movement should be fluid and the mime should be in the constant company of imaginary companions. They could be constructing something in which the companions contribute to the work. Emotion should be subdued manifestations of congeniality and affiliation.

III. Abstract-emotional

The idea of the cosmic dance comes to mind which includes intensity of activity but is conveyed abstractly. I can image one "dancer" with only arms moving thus contributing four arms to the apparition.
The movements and expressions of the gifted mimes convey a significance to the emotions and to the understanding which my comments and words cannot touch. I wanted the mimes here today so that we would never lose sight of the origin of intercultural communication in meeting the practical, emotion-based needs of human interaction.

The principal objectives of developing skill in intercultural communication are to accept the nature of cultural self-identity, to develop conceptual bridges to persons with different subjective cultures, to accept the concept of cultural relativity, and to assess the facilitating and impeding aspects of one's own subjective culture. The achievement of these objectives should result in the suspension of the idea that cultural diversities impede communication and the substitution, instead, of the belief that cultural diversities constitute a resource for human understanding.

"END"