This report describes a one-day conference intended to advance knowledge concerning social change in Japan and the United States. Characterizing the change as one from industrial production dominance to knowledge production dominance, the conference addressed related questions such as defining post-industrial society, informational society, and "quality of life" and interpreting the consequences of those definitions. Reported here are the comments of nine speakers from America and Japan on four topics -- Environment and the Urban Situation, Information, the Economy, and Social and Governmental Organizations -- each discussed within the foregoing context but from the two differing nationalistic points of view. (JH)
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

REPORT OF A WINGSPIREAD CONFERENCE
THE JOHNSON FOUNDATION
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

A Wingspread Conference convened by Japan Society, Inc, and The Johnson Foundation November 1972

Report prepared by Emerson Chapin
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(Nichi)=Japan
(Bei)=United States
Johnson Foundation Programs in United States-Japan Relations

The strengthening of United States-Japan relations is a long-standing program goal of The Johnson Foundation. Japanese post-war industrial strength was moving forward steadily in the late fifties at the time this new Foundation began to mold its international programs. Early projects included exchange of persons from Japan and the United States, including scientists concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In 1961, a group of Japanese industrialists met at Wingspread with United States businessmen to discuss productivity motivation. Thus, we have a sense of kinship in recalling early handclasps and discussions with colleagues from Japan. Those early relationships can now be viewed as a forecast when one considers the intricate, interdependent economic relationship of Japan and America and its overriding importance. Thus, for more than a decade The Johnson Foundation has cooperated in programs which brought to Wingspread, its conference center in Racine, Wisconsin, Japanese prominent in industry, science, libraries, and university circles.

As the profile of Japan became more prominent on the world screen, Johnson Foundation program activity in this area moved on steadily. The Johnson Foundation proposed to the Japan Society, Inc., (New York) in 1969, a conference on “Japan and the United States in the 1970's.” When this conference was convened at Wingspread, the program included presentations by: James Abegglen, specialist in international organization and marketing problems and author of the study of Japanese management methods, “The Japanese Factory”; James W. Morley, Professor of Government, Columbia University, formerly special assistant to the Ambassador at the United States Embassy in Tokyo; and Herman Kahn, Director of the Hudson Institute of New York, author of books on defense and foreign policy issues. A report on this Wingspread conference was written by Emerson Chapin, well known for his New York Times articles on Japanese affairs. Published by the Japan Society and The Johnson Foundation, this report has been distributed widely, and is still available.

In 1972, the Second Japanese-United States Conference on Libraries and Information Science in Higher Education was held at Wingspread, organized under the auspices of the American Library Association — (Advisory Committee for Liaison with Japanese Libraries). Mr. Warren Tsuneishi of the Library of Congress — Orientalia Division, served as chairman. Participants included leaders in library science from Japan and the United States.

The publication which you now hold reports on a 1972 Wingspread conference convened by the Japan Society and The Johnson Foundation on the subject, “Social Change in the United States and Japan.” The Wingspread meeting was a sequel to the seminar held at Japan House (New York) on the subject, “The Informational Revolution — The United States and Japan in the Post-Industrial Age.” Three days of thought and discussion served as preparation for the Wingspread meeting and its invited audience of 175 Midwestern opinion leaders. Distinguished scholars, four Japanese and an equal number of Americans, brought to the New York and Wisconsin discussions a high level of thoughtful analysis. This publication identifies those Japanese and American colleagues...
in the best way — by presenting their respective contributions to the subject.

The large attendance at the Wingspread meeting was a barometer of recognition of Japan as a world economic power, and the high significance of United States-Japan relations. It is our hope that the ideas generated by speakers and audience at the Wingspread meeting will have wide influence.

It was with pride that The Johnson Foundation cooperated with the Japan Society in this conference, working with Mr. Rodney Armstrong, Executive Director, and Mr. F. Roy Lockheimer, Associate Executive Director, respectively. We were pleased that Tateo Suzuki, Japan's Consul General in Chicago, greeted the conference on behalf of his government and participated in the Wingspread meeting.

In this project the ultimate goal is human — the use of resources of both nations for an improved way of life, materially and spiritually.

Leslie Paffrath
President
The Johnson Foundation
INTRODUCTION

Has society in the United States, Japan and other advanced countries entered a new era, known as the post-industrial society or as the informational society?

Do continued economic growth and technological development necessarily produce a higher living standard and a better quality of life? And how can such matters as "quality of life" be measured and judged?

Why is it that the great advances in knowledge of recent decades, far from resolving mankind's chronic problems, seem to have been accompanied by increased social unrest, greater cleavages in society and a widespread sense of dissatisfaction and frustration?

These questions were among those taken up by nine experts from the United States and Japan in a one-day conference on "Social Change in the United States and Japan." The session, sponsored by The Johnson Foundation and the Japan Society, Inc., was held Nov. 18, 1972, at Wingspread, The Johnson Foundation's conference center at Racine, Wisconsin. More than 100 invited scholars, civil servants, journalists, foundation representatives and businessmen participated.

Few hard-and-fast conclusions were reached — indeed, one of the points of basic agreement among the experts was the peril of trying to forecast the future in any detail. But there were many shared opinions and judgments on the characteristics of recent social change, the impact of changing values, and the major social, economic and political problems that lie ahead in Japan and the United States.

There was agreement that continuing economic growth had not proved a panacea for all social ills but in fact had heightened them in some instances. There was a shared concern over urban and environmental problems. There was discussion of ways in which democratic political participation may be retained and increased as government becomes more specialized and the mass media more powerful. Illustrations were given of the effects of an "informational overload" and the near-instantaneous communication that characterizes the present age. Repeatedly, the discussion seemed to return to the basic question of how the quality of life, the level of societal welfare, could be sustained and improved.

The public meeting at Wingspread had been preceded by three days of private working sessions at the Japan Society's headquarters in New York. There the experts presented papers and engaged in detailed consideration of four general areas of examination: The Environment and the Urban Situation; Information; Economy; and Social and Governmental Organization.
### SPEAKERS & THEIR SUBJECTS

#### The Environment and The Urban Situation

**United States**

NATHAN GLAZER, Professor of Education and Social Structure, Graduate School of Education, Harvard University.

**Japan**

KENICHI TOMINAGA, Department of Sociology, University of Tokyo.

#### Information

**United States**

CHARLES FRANKEL, Old Dominion Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

**Japan**

YOSHIMI UCHIKAWA, Director, Institute of Newspaper Research, University of Tokyo.

#### The Economy

**United States**

ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, Norman Thomas Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research.

**Japan**

HIROFUMI UZAWA, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
Social and Governmental Organization

United States

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, Frank G. Thomas, Professor of Government, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Japan

JOJI WATANUKI, Professor of Sociology, Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on Peace and Development in Asia, Sophia University.

JAMES W. MORLEY, Director of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, served as the conference chairman and has edited the proceedings of the full conference, to be published by the Japan Society, Inc.

F. ROY LOCKHEIMER, Associate Executive Director of the Japan Society, Inc., was the conference co-chairman.
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Dr. James W. Morley, the Conference Chairman, dealt in his opening remarks with the paradox of a new stage in history in which, it had been believed, "problems would be susceptible to solution by advanced knowledge," and yet in which "frustration and discontent were sweeping over this land."

"We are gathered today to try to face that paradox," he explained. "Why, when the promise seemed so great, is the performance so unsatisfying?"

The Environment and the Urban Situation

Dr. Nathan Glazer, the first speaker, noted as a paradox that "when we think of post-industrial society, we tend to be optimistic: post-industrial society seems to indicate affluence, elimination of hard and dirty work, expansion of knowledge, greater capacity to use information. Yet, the kinds of information one sees coming into being and the kinds of information-handling capacity don't seem directly relevant to our most seriously felt urban problems."

He listed what he said were "the felt discontents of the larger American city" in rough order of how they affect people: crime, racial problems and integration, high taxes, housing, and the quality of urban services, including transportation and congestion. It is the problems at the lower end of the list that are most susceptible to change under the informational impact, he said, and there remains the considerable problem "of having useful knowledge which, for political or social reasons, is not easy to apply." As an example, Dr. Glazer recounted how the New York City government had introduced a systems analysis method to determine the most efficient deployment of sanitation workers to places where, and at times when, most garbage accumulated, only to find that labor unions and even state laws made it difficult to alter the existing patterns.

But the basic urban problems, he declared, "very often come down to problems of race in the American cities." Though the black middle class faces prejudice and political conflict, its problems of racial integration and educational integration are not insuperable, he asserted. "The greatest problems do not arise when we deal with blacks and whites of similar social status," he pointed out; the major problem is that the urban poor are largely black poor. "It is the combination of class problems and race problems in one fairly explosive mixture that makes it hardest to apply new knowledge in the cities."

Dr. Glazer recalled the hope that was placed 20 years ago in programs of urban renewal—the replacement of old housing with new housing. "Visions of new and rebuilt American central cities arose," he said. But the program quickly ran into the question of differential distribution of whites and blacks among the poor and the better off. "To rebuild the city slums meant to move out the blacks—and urban renewal became known as 'Negro removal.'" The problem was to find other living space for poor blacks: the whites did not want to accept them and in some cases the middle-class blacks didn't want them either. Thus in many cities urban renewal came to a halt: "social problems made it difficult to apply sophisticated approaches."
Dr. Glazer also examined the concept of building "new towns," in which it would be possible to create a new community afresh, "without the old unions, old housing, old distribution of people." But, he noted, the population of the new town will inevitably be the more economically active part of the population, "a whiter part of the population, while left behind in the central city will be a higher concentration of the blacks." Thus the new town programs "will further concentrate social problems in one area of the central city, and create protected enclaves outside."

Dr. Glazer declared that he did not want to sound too pessimistic, and observed that improvement of the economic status of blacks would moderate the social problem. "Once the impact of social change hits both races in the United States more equally, then we can apply new knowledge more successfully in many areas." But he warned that this would necessarily be a gradual process.

Dr. Tominaga began by observing that the average income for a worker's household in Japan had risen by almost 10 per cent annually over the last 20 years, "but it can't be said that the degree of satisfaction with life has shown comparable improvement." In fact, recent surveys showed that more people felt life had become more "difficult" than had found improvement in their living conditions. Recently, he said, "most Japanese people did not realize that rapid economic growth could cause the quality of life to deteriorate." He cited air and water pollution, the growing problem of waste disposal, traffic congestion and rapid increases in land values. Thus, high economic growth had begun to change the value standards of the Japanese people. Emphasis is shifting, he explained, from "economic growth primacy to societal welfare primacy."

The Tokyo University professor explained what he meant by the term societal welfare: it is something "not to be interpreted in the narrow sense of public welfare — government aid to the poor, or old-age pensions — but a wider concept, a basis of human happiness or well-being in the social life of the people."

"Economic welfare," Dr. Tominaga declared, "depends upon satisfaction coming from economic goods purchased in the market, whereas social welfare, or societal welfare, depends on the satisfaction that comes from social welfare resources available in daily life, including all sorts of need-gratifying goods, economic or non-economic, natural or non-natural, tangible or non-tangible." In this category, he listed such items as income, savings, pension, caloric intake, amount of living space, rent, public park space, degree of pollution, crime and suicide rates, and traffic congestion.

Dr. Tominaga described a project in which he sought to measure societal welfare levels in Japanese urban areas, cataloguing a list of 180 items affecting human life, having them evaluated by professional experts according to a scale running from "tolerance" to "fulfillment," and classifying the results. The conclusion, he said, was that there had been measurable decline in housing, transportation and the natural environment, while other areas of life showed improvement. The aim of the project, he said, is to establish a "quality-of-life index" as a means of setting policy goals for urban administration.

"Goal-setting so far in economic planning has been in terms of economic measures alone, such as gross national product and growth rate," he declared. "Measuring welfare levels and establishing a methodology of social indicators are the bases of social policy and social planning, as distinguished from economic policy and economic planning in the narrow sense." This can serve as a means "to find appropriate ways of allocating government expenditures to welfare fields on the basis of rational findings."

Discussion: In the discussion period that followed, the first question was a request for a more specific definition of "post-industrial society". Dr. Nathan Glazer explained that the term, first used by Daniel Bell of Harvard University, related to the concept of change in advanced societies. Primarily, he said, it refers to change in the work force — "a drop, or at least stability, in the number of workers in industrial processes, and a rise in the number involved in services and
in information-handling processes." According to this concept, "when a society moves from a situation in which it handles material quantities, such as steel and coal — which it is still doing, of course — to a point where it is handling information, as in computers and the educational system, then many other changes follow and society has become rather different." But, Dr. Glazer added, "whether this has really happened, and whether society does become different when this happens, are subjects of discussion."

The speakers were asked their views of the merits of a system of negative income tax and guaranteed income. Professor Glazer explained that the concept had not yet become widely known or popular in the United States, partly because of its complexities and partly because of concern over maintaining work incentive if a basic guaranteed income is provided. Dr. Tominaga said that the concept was just beginning to become known in Japan, but added that unequal distribution of income was not so great a problem in his country. Professor Uzawa argued that the setting of a minimum monetary income entailing cash payments could itself have the injurious effect of raising prices of necessary goods and services, contributing to an inflationary spiral. The key, he suggested, lies in providing more social services rather than assuring a minimum cash income.

The speakers were asked what could be done to provide "political clout" for the proportionately small sector of the population afflicted with poverty problems. Professor Glazer said in reply that while the poor were a minority, "many of their interests coincide with other interests" that may have greater political impact. Professor Tominaga commented that the Japanese cities had no major racial problems and that their difficulties were "urban problems rather than poverty problems." He also explained that inequalities in income distribution in Japan were largely urban-rural disparities created in the processes of industrialization, with the main distress found in rural regions.

**Information**

Professor Charles Frankel voiced skepticism about the concept of post-industrial society. The concept provides a useful label for calling attention to certain new features in our life, he commented. It theoretically implies "a shift in the kinds of work people engage in — more service activities, an increase in leisure, a decline in ideological types of thinking and a lessening of the sense of class struggle." It is a useful concept "to the extent that you don't swallow it wholeheartedly."

"It is not true that we have gone through a knowledge explosion with respect to human and social sciences. At most, we've been hearing the popping of paper bags, and a great deal of wind has come out." He noted useful progress in the natural and biological sciences, but "in fact, he added, "we know precious little about how to increase people's ability to read."

"Where we have had increases in knowledge, there are limits in our capacity to use this knowledge," Professor Frankel asserted. "Vested interests get in the way." One of the great blocks to the introduction of new educational knowledge, he observed, is the resistance of teachers, who "have been accustomed to doing things in certain ways, so that introduction of new knowledge is a form of expropriation — it expropriates their skills." Where there are opposing interests, Dr. Frankel said, "increased knowledge can sometimes simply sharpen people's sense of their opposition to others."

"The post-industrial society," Dr. Frankel asserted, "includes an implicit assumption of automatic progress — that, at least in certain respects, we are going to get better; that there's going to be more rationality in society, more knowledge. This is in part an act of faith." It is assumed that science will automatically continue to progress, but this actually is dependent on a number of factors, including maintenance of government allocations for social infrastructure. Furthermore, he declared, major advances usually have been a consequence of penetrating insights by scientific geniuses — he mentioned Einstein as an example — and there is no absolute guarantee that genius will recur: "it's a bet on the fall of the genetic dice."
In a critical appraisal of social scientists, Professor Frankel asserted that “the increase of knowledge in the physical sciences has increased the prestige of accredited social inquirers. It has increased the market demand for what they produce and has led to a natural eagerness on their part to sell what they produce. To a considerable extent, what they sell has not produced the results they have suggested might be achieved.” This has contributed to “the waves of irrationalism that engulf us,” and has “led society at large to condemn rational methods.” He called for “much greater discipline or modesty among social scientists.”

Next, in what appeared to be a rebuttal to Professor Tominaga’s presentation, Dr. Frankel asked: “Can you quantify the welfare function?” He inquired whether “what is good for society can in some sense be set forth with the same precision and impersonality with which you set forth conditions for building a bridge.” Again and again, he said, “those who can produce hard information, but information which is narrow and neglects key values, take priority over those who have only soft historical information or common sense to offer.”

In concluding, Professor Frankel observed: “We’ve been taught by a market society to deal with questions as technical rather than moral. We often tend to deal with the technical and forget the moral. We face broad new problems in education and morals, and this will require substantial reworking of present educational practices and present moral ideas.”

Also as a result of high-speed communication, Dr. Frankel argued, “We live in an international world, a communicative world in which I know much more about what is going on in the Paris peace negotiations than about what is going on on my own road and among my own neighbors. The scene in which it is possible for us to take action is one about which we receive very few communications, while the scene in which we do not have a chance to act — where we are merely spectators — is one we receive constant communications about. This causes difficulties, particularly when a democratic culture tells us: ‘You’re responsible for what’s happening.’”

He said that “it is more apt to speak of a communications revolution in our society than a knowledge revolution” and declared that “the information overload reaches a point of no return.” Through modern communication, all of the world’s suffering and disaster is made immediate to the individual: “I think this is an emotional overload of considerable proportions, and this may help to explain outbreaks of mass irrationalism.”

Also as a result of high-speed communication, Dr. Frankel argued, “We live in an international world, a communicative world in which I know much more about what is going on in the Paris peace negotiations than about what is going on on my own road and among my own neighbors. The scene in which it is possible for us to take action is one about which we receive very few communications, while the scene in which we do not have a chance to act — where we are merely spectators — is one we receive constant communications about. This causes difficulties, particularly when a democratic culture tells us: ‘You’re responsible for what’s happening.’”

Professor Uchikawa referred to a survey conducted in Tokyo and Yokohama by N.H.K., the Japan Broadcasting Corporation, indicating that respondents were most interested in hearing about things “close to themselves.” The new emphasis on family and personal life “has created a new demand for diverse and extensive information dealing with livelihood and use of leisure time,” as well as meeting specific needs of individuals and small segments of society. He reported that there was “a demand for the type of information that involves people emotionally rather than rationally.”

The rise of television has changed the function of the printed press from that of basic reporting to that of elaborating, explaining and backgrounding the news that people first hear through radio and television, Professor Uchikawa pointed out. But he expressed confidence that Japan’s major newspapers, which are among the world’s largest and most technically advanced, faced no fundamental threat from the broad-
cast media and will continue as the basic means of conveying detailed information.

He discussed a new medium of expression known as "mini-komi," or mini-communications publications. These are mainly mimeographed periodicals, including underground organs, circulated largely among young people. "It is characteristic of the information revolution that young people are trying to make their own voices heard," he declared. "This is an expression of discontent and distrust of the mass media; it is one of the new problems that the Japanese press is facing."

Explaining that the Japanese press had engaged in extensive technological innovation in recent years, Professor Uchikawa examined the prospects for home facsimile newspapers. More than 90 percent of Japanese newspapers now are distributed by home delivery, he said, but rising labor costs, traffic congestion and other problems threaten this system. Consequently there has been much interest in a system whereby a newspaper could be printed by an electronic receiver in the home. At present, he said, the costs of the receiver and the special paper required are prohibitive, but if this can be resolved, "we foresee the start of the home facsimile newspaper in Japan, and the structure of social communication will be greatly changed."

Discussion: A questioner asked how much social change actually had been brought about by the introduction of high-level technology. Professor Frankel responded that in large organizations inertia or the status quo increasingly tended to prevail because, in the vast flow of communication, "messages from the outside don't get to be heard so easily." During the nineteen-sixties, when the war in Vietnam was at its height, he said, there was such an extraordinary amount of highly sophisticated information available from morning to night that a government official at the receiving end not only "couldn't think" but "heard only what the people engaged in the effort, with a vested interest in continuing it, told him."

He told of the "greater vulnerability of our system to idiocies of various sorts," explaining that "very minor events can, by dint of mass communications, become major social events." Thus a student demonstration at Columbia University in the spring of 1968 "became a riot at Columbia because people saw themselves on television that night and were encouraged to go on." The demonstration at Columbia helped to provoke one at the Sorbonne and those involved in the Columbia outbreaks "saw themselves achieving results in Paris. Soon they were exchanging messages at the expense of the system," Dr. Frankel declared, with the commercial television networks serving as a communications link.

As a consequence, Frankel observed, "a boy like Mark Rudd," one of the Columbia radical leaders, "was for a time a major figure on the world stage who helped encourage something happening in France that 16 or 18 months later undoubtedly had a great deal to do with de Gaulle's leaving the world stage."

"Think what Jesus Christ could have done, in his time, if he had only had the mass media!" he commented.

Dr. Frankel noted "assassinations and waves of assassinations" and "hijackings and waves of hijackings" as a result of media coverage. Prediction of the future is made more difficult, he asserted, because "the range of both idiocy and charisma is greatly increased."

Asked whether intellectuals had lost touch with the mainstream of America, Dr. Frankel declared: "I don't think it is the function of intellectuals to articulate for Middle America. They are critics of society, they are not supposed to speak for it." At the same time, he acknowledged that intellectuals should not confine themselves to the ivory tower but "must move among the mass of Americans more freely," else their criticisms are likely to be ignorant and parochial.

The Economy

Professor Robert Heilbroner explained that he would briefly examine a few questions about the nature of the post-industrial society, which he characterized as "complicated and a bit elusive."

By post-industrial society, Professor
Heilbroner asked, "do we mean the end of a society in which the characteristics of industrial society have disappeared?" What, he asked, was industrial society? It was a system, he said, in which "the most important political dynamite of the society rested in an industrial working class." Since early in this century, he explained, the blue-collar sector, or industrial working class, has become relatively stable, and "what has changed is that a new group has taken over the dynamite and the dynamism—the so-called white-collar group, occupied in that enormous diversity of occupations called the service sector, which includes government, theater, domestic servants, a heterogeneous variety." Equally important, he said, has been the major decline of rural society over the last century and a shift to "the scene in which industrial and post-industrial societies take place—the city."

Post-industrial society, he went on, "is sometimes talked of as a society in which knowledge inputs have grown enormously and contributed to this curve of growth on which we are all ascending toward nirvana." But, he commented, such intangibles as "inputs of knowledge" are hard to count. "The one thing that is surely true about this new era—if it is a new era—is that whether or not we know more, we are certainly schooled more." With many persons now spending 20 to 25 years in school and study, "we become accustomed to an atmosphere of schooling, and I suspect one's outlook, what one expects from society, changes accordingly."

"Does this mean the end of the series of problems that we have called 'capitalist problems'?" Dr. Heilbroner asked. He noted that "two classic scenarios" about capitalism had been largely destroyed: one, the Marxist thesis of the downfall of the capitalist system, and the other, the view that "capitalism would produce endless quantities of growth, and economic growth would bring social harmony." Capitalism, he continued, is diverse, but it generally is characterized by uneven income distribution and marked concentration of industrial wealth. These elements have not changed, "and the movement into the post-industrial, schooled, service sector is not going to change them."

Capitalism has been marked by certain disfunctions, including depression; and inflation, a new problem, has proved very recalcitrant. Thus, he summarized, there will be a persistence of endemic problems that are recognizable, in terms of the old era, but there will be "some changes that do mark the 'post-industrial age' as perhaps a new period within capitalism."

One of the most significant changes, Professor Heilbroner said, is a "growing recognition of the necessity to manage society in the face of certain problems that emerge from its very post-industrial nature"—such as environmental decay and the aspirations of a schooled, white-collar working class. "This seems to give rise to a business-government coordination that goes under the name of planning."

A second major change, he said, has been "the rise to a new position of influence within society of a professional elite." This group, including economists, sociologists and political scientists, is regularly consulted by government and by large corporations, in hopes of finding answers to persisting problems. Thus, "there is a drift of influence into the hands of professional groups trying to cope with the kinds of problems arising in the new society."

Professor Hirofumi Uzawa voiced pessimism over the ability of orthodox economics to deal with current challenges. He described the economics profession as in a state of confusion and said there seemed to be "growing sentiment in the profession that the existing political framework is not able to cope with the number of more serious political and social problems that have arisen in countries of which the main institutions are those of capitalist society." And, he added, "the economics profession has not come up with any answers."

He told of his shock at finding, after a dozen years spent away from Japan, that the actual conditions of life there in the mid-nineteen-sixties were "so different" from the impression given by the published statistics. "How is it that the economics profession can produce these figures, which don't come close to what is happening in the society?" One explanation, he said, was that the
existing market society, "in which everything is appropriated to private individuals and the market resolves the conflicts," makes no provision for social resources, quality of life and the environment. These things do not show up as income or in data on gross national product.

In Japan, he said, "a great deal of freedom has been accorded to unconstrained enterpreneurial activity." The government policy has been one in which "industrialization comes first, then employment will be increased and income will be raised." After that, people would take care of their own welfare needs by constructing necessary facilities, such as hospitals. But this system has not proved satisfactory, he asserted: "What we have done has been to build a wonderful, efficient factory system or industrial complex, while neglecting the construction of overhead capital needed for living and the natural environment."

Dr. Uzawa commented hopefully that he thought he now saw growing public awareness "of the enormous social burden borne by the Japanese in general, and the poor in particular, associated with the process of rapid industrialization and rapid economic growth." He said that the Japanese "have seen the need to shift priority from an economics-first, industry-first principle to one that cares more for equality of real income distribution, preservation of nature and construction of a living environment," but predicted that it would take years to achieve a fundamental change.

**Discussion:** In the question period, the two economists were asked whether continual labor pressure for higher wages, and the inflation this produced, left "any alternative to an absolute planned economy." Professor Heilbroner replied that this was a "hard" question and he would give an equally hard answer. He noted that periodic wage increases obtained in industry were generally matched, or even exceeded, by corresponding increases in productivity, but that the real problem lay in sectors in which there was no productivity increase — "the municipal sector, the state government sector, service industries in general, in which productivity is not susceptible to the kinds of cranking up one can get in industry."

Dr. Heilbroner noted "a kind of free-for-all" in this area of bargaining and suggested that this would be a critical factor in the effort to control what had become endemic inflation in most capitalist societies. He expressed the view that — short of having a high unemployment level or a society with unusually strong internal discipline — the only way to deal with this is "to have a series of not very effective but quite necessary ad hoc interventions, called wage and price controls, income policies and all the rest, which seems to be the road down which all the advanced countries are going" — in other words, a managed economy.

Professor Uzawa drew laughter when he suggested that he might have "a cure for inflation." He went on to explain that a modest rate of monetary inflation, in the area of 3 per cent, might be made acceptable if it were accompanied by the provision of essential social services to the poor and the elderly — those who suffer most from the effects of inflation. The key, he said, is "to devise some mixture of providing money and services-in-kind in such a way that it is possible to contain direct price increases at a reasonable level."

**Social and Governmental Organization**

Dr. Samuel Huntington, introducing his topic, said he had gained a feeling during the group's discussions in New York earlier in the week "that while we may increase our knowledge and understanding of problems, this does not necessarily lead to any compensating increase in our capability for solving them." Instead, he said, "there is a gap developing here, and one which is quite clearly a recipe for frustration."

Remarking that political prediction is the most difficult form of prediction, he nevertheless ventured to outline five trends he discerned in relation to the evolution of post-industrial society. The first is the "rise of a new middle class — increased power for white-collar, technical, professional, bureaucratic, well-educated groups." Then he told his audience: "If you want to see what the emerging ruling class in post-industrial society looks like, look at the person sitting next to you in this room. Here we have a very good cross-section of the people who will constitute the
dominant social force in a post-industrial society.

There are also declining social forces, he stated, citing the residents of the central cities and the industrial, blue-collar workers. However, declining sectors frequently show relatively large political power—"evidence that the less important a group becomes in American society, the more powerful it may become in the government." He described farmers as a notable example, and said it was conceivable that the industrial working class and the central cities, and individuals like Mayor Daley of Chicago and George Meany, the labor leader, "may continue to play an important political role for some time to come."

Second, Dr. Huntington, like other speakers, noted higher educational levels under which perhaps 50 per cent of the younger population had been exposed to college. This could create a new type of gap in society—a difference in political outlook and values between those who have been to college and those who have not," as well as between "those who receive a more liberal, humanistic education and those who receive a more specialized, technical education." By and large, "persons who are more highly educated tend to be more interested in politics and more politically participant."

Third, Dr. Huntington said, at a time when familiar political organizations tend to be on the decline, the executive bureaucracy and the mass media are emerging as two key institutional groups, with a potential for cleavage and conflict between them. "Each needs the other and each tries to use the other, and there is going to be continuous competition between them." He spoke of the Pentagon Papers case as "only the biggest battle in a war that seems likely to go on for some time."

He then took up a matter raised earlier by Professor Heilbroner, which he described as the political problem associated with inflation: the increase in labor costs for essential government services in which there is no corresponding productivity rise. He cited as an example the problem of a mayor caught between the pay demands of policemen, firemen, sanitation workers and other civil servants on the one hand and taxpayer resistance on the other. "How do you reconcile the problems of a political system in which you have competitive elections and in which you also have fairly wide-open collective bargaining for public sector employees?" he asked. "By and large," he went on, "we don't have a tax system in this country which can meet the demands placed upon government, and there is no indication we are going to get one in the immediate future."

The Japanese, he added, "are much better off, in the sense that Japan can float up to higher levels of government expenditure on their 11 per cent growth of gross national product each year. The tax crunch doesn't play the same role in their society."

Finally Professor Huntington surveyed questions raised by post-industrial values and examined the problem of whether people accustomed to relative affluence would face up to such questions as military security. There is "a post-industrial culture, with emphasis on intellectual self-fulfillment—that people born into, if not affluence, at least a comfortable existence, do not worry about economic problems: they have other concerns." He noted that the mood among college undergraduates was "how clearly antagonistic to the idea of paying taxes to support military forces, and to supporting large-scale military forces," and asked: "Does this mean that a post-industrial society may be at the mercy of societies that have not reached that fortunate state and are capable of maintaining large-scale military forces?" Does it mean "that a post-industrial society must necessarily be politically and militarily isolationist, even if for other reasons it may need to be deeply involved in the international society?"

"If you have a society that is more highly educated and more participant, whose dominant institutions are the bureaucracy and the media—both of which operate on people and don't furnish opportunities for participation—our political system seems to be weakening in the traditional sense and it seems to me there is need for new types of political institutions which will furnish channels for participation," he said.

A further problem, he asserted, concerns the capacity for decision-making. "Every society, even a family, requires a certain measure
of deference, authority, hierarchy—all concepts that are fundamentally at odds with post-industrial values. The question is whether there isn’t some sort of conflict between post-industrialism in this sense and the requisites of society.”

He ended on a whimsical note, observing that he might have sounded rather pessimistic, “but all these conflicts will emerge in their full glory only if post-industrial society emerges in its full glory—and maybe it won’t.”

Professor Joji Watanuki argued that while change and modernization had occurred in Japanese society, traditional values were still deeply rooted. The group loyalty basis, the high degree of solidarity, the sense of unity among business enterprises, are all traceable to persisting traditional values and social structure. Japanese politics is still geared to old-style village values, even though some new-style politicians whose appeal is based primarily on personality and personal attractiveness, have been emerging in the cities.

The Japanese bureaucracy is highly efficient, Dr. Watanuki said, and although it was decentralized in the reforms that followed World War II, it was subsequently recentralized. Such a strong, centralized bureaucracy “is well suited to the arrival of an informational society—to improvement of the technology of information—and it may well become more efficient.” But such a prospect is not necessarily welcome, he said, “for this kind of centralization might restrict individual liberty and the other values that we must preserve if we believe in democracy.”

Professor Watanuki noted also the emergence of new value standards emphasizing more local autonomy, welfare and concepts of individual happiness, and expressed hope that these would serve as a counterbalance to traditional centralization as the need of expanded governmental functions grows. He voiced assurance that “since the postwar reforms, there is no possibility that our nation will turn to a totalitarian or authoritarian society.” Thus he foresaw that the nineteen-seventies would be a “waiting period” in which the traditional values and social structure would persist but would be modified by new values and new-style politics. “Perhaps in the nineteen-eighties the shape will become more clear.”

Discussion: The first question asked from the floor was: “What can we learn from what seems to be the successful union of business, government and finance in Japan?” Professor Uzawa replied that while much attention has been focused on the economic accomplishments of such cooperation, less attention has been paid to the welfare aspects and the environmental consequences. Under official Japanese policies, most investment has been directed toward the needs of industrial development, but this “has had a rather negative effect on the over-all harmonious development of the Japanese economy.” The government’s economic policies also contributed to the continued accumulation of surpluses in the nation’s balance of payments, which has had injurious international effects, Dr. Uzawa asserted. “The government should act as an umpire. Too much bias in favor of a particular sector of the economy may end up in a very distorted use of public resources.”

Dr. Frankel observed that if Americans knew how, it would be good to emulate that feature of Japanese schooling that contributed to such a well-educated and well-motivated labor force. In general, he declared, “our school system is just not as good as the Japanese in bringing people to learn things, definite and delicate skills, and in teaching them to respect exacting performance—the sense of workmanship, doing a job well.” Japan, he said, “has the best educated and motivated labor force in the world and the lowest paid proportionate to education.”

Professor Uzawa was asked whether he saw any prospect of sizable future unemployment in Japan. He replied that the unemployment rate continues steady at about 1.2 per cent “no matter what we do” and added that the Japanese view of unemployment was somewhat more relaxed than that in the United States. He then challenged Dr. Frankel’s view that many Japanese were underpaid, drawing attention to “all sorts of fringe benefits that are not necessarily expressly stated in the employment contract. If we take these things into account,” he declared, “the pay of the average Japanese worker may be comparable to that of the American worker.”
The discussion turned toward the difficulty and danger of predictions, with Professor Heilbroner declaring that economists had a particularly bad record in this respect. After World War II, he said, economists feared and predicted recession and none foresaw the rise of inflation as an endemic problem. None foresaw the emergence of poverty as a central, enduring characteristic of the affluent society, and no one anticipated the problem of chronic deficit in the national budget even as the gross national product continued to grow. Professor Frankel, stressing lessons to be learned from history, observed that "there is not too much in modern sociology that goes beyond what was said by Plato and in the Bible—if they are read with intelligence." He went on: "We do have considerable aids to talking about the future that come from the human past, particularly intelligent reflection on the past. Conditions are not going to change all that much. Responses will be more or less within a predictable range."

A question was asked as to what would develop if a post-industrial society as such did not emerge, as Professor Huntington had suggested might occur. Dr. Huntington, in reply, said that there was considerable difference of view about this whole question. Daniel Bell, he recalled, said that the post-industrial society had arrived between 1945 and 1950; thus, Dr. Huntington said, "we have already survived 20 years of post-industrial society and it doesn't look too different from industrial society." Social scientists, he said, have a tendency "to overemphasize the difference between the present and what is going to happen in the future." There is a tendency to assume that dramatic changes will occur when actually there may simply be a mixture of industrial and post-industrial society. In some cases in developing countries, the very process of modernization may reinforce some elements of tradition; thus religion and communal loyalties may become stronger rather than weaker.
A question prompted Professor Morley to offer a general summary of the discussions, in which he pointed to similarities and to differences in the two societies. "While the industrial labor force in the United States is leveling off, the labor force in Japan continues to grow—we are not the same in allocation of labor resources. We also differ in the balance of political forces. The Japanese bureaucracy is one of the most developed and efficient in the world; it occupies a position quite unlike that of the American bureaucracy, which is rarely given kudos in public. This suggests to many that the possibility of change may be higher in Japan, if the bureaucracy is more motivated to change, than in the United States, where social forces are very scattered."

"Traditional values, to the extent that they persist in each society, are very different," Dr. Morley continued. The individualism of the pioneer farmer who settled Wisconsin "is a very different thing from the communal values of the Japanese villager, who may still wish to submerge his individuality."

Another difference in the situation that had been brought out in the discussions, he explained, is that American society may be "more isolatable—that is, less dependent on the international community for survival of its internal mechanisms than is Japan, whose natural resources are so minimal that the international environment is literally crucial to it."

Dr. Morley said the scholars' discussions over the last week had seemed to point to greater Japanese confidence in the possibility of resolving pressing problems. "It seems possible," he said, "that in Japan the achievements over the last 10 years have been so impressive that there's a confidence that maybe they can develop social measures to cope with the problems—that maybe they can reallocate necessary resources to the public sector."

As regards the United States, "there seemed to be a little bit of feeling among those who discussed these matters that maybe we can't do this. We've had such a discouraging experience for the last 10 years that perhaps there's greater skepticism here about social progress," he declared.

Recalling Dr. Huntington's earlier comment that the group present at Wingspread constituted a good cross-section of the sector of society that would be most influential in the future, Professor Morley brought the meeting to a close by observing that "those of us up here on the platform have had a very rich opportunity to face the new ruling class."
This report has been prepared and distributed by The Johnson Foundation. The Foundation encourages the examination of a variety of problems facing the midwest, the nation, and mankind in the belief that responsible analyses and proposals should reach a substantial audience. The Johnson Foundation reprints various papers and reports. Publication, of course, does not imply approval.

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WINGSpread
THE CONFERENCE PLACE

The building Frank Lloyd Wright called Wingspread, situated on a rolling prairie site just north of Racine, Wisconsin, was designed in 1938 as a residence for the Johnson family. In 1960, through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. H.F. Johnson, it became the headquarters of The Johnson Foundation and began its career as an educational conference center.

In the years since, it has been the setting for many conferences and meetings dealing with subjects of regional, national, and international interest. It is the hope of the Foundation's trustees that Wingspread will take its place increasingly as a national institution devoted to the free exchange of ideas among peoples.

The rolling expanse of the Midwestern prairies was considered a natural setting for Wingspread. In the limitless earth the architect envisioned a freedom and movement. The name Wingspread was an expression of the nature of the house, reflecting aspiration through spread wings—a symbol of soaring inspiration.