This report examines California's geographic, socioeconomic, political, and educational makeup, and focuses in particular on organizations, governmental agencies, and persons affecting educational policymaking. The author first examines the structure of the policymaking body in the State. This structure includes the Chief State School Officer (CSSO), the State Board of Education (SBE), the State Department of Education, the Governor, and the Legislature. He next discusses the issues facing the policymakers, with such issues as school finance and tax reform, early childhood education, and teacher certification being discussed. The author looks at the policymaking roles assumed by such participants as Wilson Riles, the CSSO, the SBE, the Governor, the Legislature, and educational interest groups. Finally, the author examines what the policymakers and educational interest groups might do in the future. (JF)
STATE POLICY MAKING FOR THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CALIFORNIA

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JAlan Aufderheide

Prepared For
The Educational Governance Project
The Ohio State University
29 West Woodruff Avenue
Columbus, Ohio 43210
This report is one of twelve case studies growing out of the Educational Governance Project. In addition, two major reports, a comparative analysis across states and an explication of alternative models of state governance of education, are in preparation. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and is to be completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers: Martin W. Essex of Ohio, Jack P. Nix of Georgia, and Ewald B. Nyquist of New York, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University and Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, Jr. were the directors.

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February, 1974
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SECTION 1 -- THE CONTEXT

California: The Great Exception

How does one go about capturing the context of a state that defies description at every turn? Or categorizing neatly a land and its people so big and so complex that its diversity staggers the imagination?

In that pursuit, Carey McWilliams, a prominent interpreter of modern California, titled one of his books California: The Great Exception.¹ For there has never been a state like California, or as others would compare, there has never been a nation like California either. And Californians themselves are especially fond of international comparisons over mere national ones.

How can one "freeze-frame" the spirit and context of a California constantly changing and on the move, so that what one writes is out of date before it is printed? Or as Gladwin Hill put it in Dancing Bear; "The endless tide of immigration, peculiarities of geography, and the forced draft of California's economy, have made it a kaleidoscopic succession of states, changing from year to year, almost from day to day."²

What, of any permanence, can be said about a state whose families are constantly on the move? (One of every three California families move each year, as compared to one of four in the U.S.)³ As most American families change cars, California families change houses. Capturing the macrocosm that is California is about as easy as capturing an up-to-date Los Angeles Telephone Directory. A sense of impermanence pervades social, economic, political, and governmental spectrums above all other considerations.

California is indeed the Great Exception in everything from student revolt and campus violence (Berkeley, 1971 and on) to ghetto riots (Watts,
from the cybernetic politics of Spencer-Roberts to the "save everything" of the Sierra Club; and from the nearly one million alcoholics (a rate second only to Nevada) to more Nobel Prize winners than any other state. California may be leading the nation in "think tanks" and aeronautical engineers, but it also is given to dramatic excesses in crime and drug addiction. (Almost 5 per cent of California's residents were arrested in 1969.) The law and orderism of right-wing political groups is matched by a left-wing element dating at least as far back as Upton Sinclair's EPIC (End Poverty in California) anti-establishmentarianism of 1934. California may indeed have more than its share of mathematicians and psychologists, but it also has excessive suicide and divorce rates.

The homeland of the organized awakening of America's downtrodden farm worker also can claim half the backyard swimming pools in the United States, along with a mere twenty per cent of the mobile homes. The top national market for water beds, frozen foods, and automobiles also has more than its share of hippies, homosexuals, and bizarre religious groups.

Los Angeles is alleged by critics to be the blandest city ever built while San Francisco is at least a Manhattan, if not an Athens, to its admirers. These and other metropolitan centers in the Golden State have largely absorbed an unprecedented immigration of Americans to the extent that by 1971 over 20 million citizens inhabited California. Every tenth American is now a Californian. California passed New York in 1964 as the nation's most populous state, having experienced a growth of more than 1,000 people a day before slowing down in the late 1960s.

On a percentage basis, from 1960-1970 California ranked fifth in growth (after Nevada, Florida, Arizona, and Alaska) well above the United States
average, especially in black population.

**PER CENT OF CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION, 1960 to 1970**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>+27.0</td>
<td>+22.9</td>
<td>+58.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Average</td>
<td>+13.3</td>
<td>+11.8</td>
<td>+20.1</td>
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To the non-Californian, at least, it is these excesses that capture the excitement and/or despair of a Promised Land bursting with creative energy and crises. Hence, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that California, in spite of or because of these excesses, is a state of moderation. Between great extremes representing minority segments of society there are the larger moderate masses. Between the extremes of Death Valley and Mount Whitney fall (figuratively) the incredibly fertile Imperial and San Joaquin Valleys.

So it would be unrepresentative and unfair to California to dwell on excesses. Rather it is appropriate to include them as merely part of a dynamic, imaginative, and creatively energetic kaleidoscope which, at the outset we must admit, defies real description. What can be captured, perhaps, is enough of a flavor of her diversity that we are not surprised at anything we find.

**Socio-Geographic Characteristics**

One of the primary reasons why it is so difficult to develop more than a series of fragmentary conceptions of California is the fact that her geographic characteristics are so diverse, and spill over so easily into her social, political, and governmental collage.

On the basis of size alone, California is difficult to grasp. Larger than Germany or Italy, California stretches the 800 miles or so from Oregon to Mexico and is over 250 miles wide. Moving her from the west coast to the
Atlantic seaboard, California would reach from Massachusetts to South Carolina, and her western-most city would be Pittsburgh.

Near the extreme southern end, San Diego is uniquely suited to be a large naval base and aerospace manufacturing complex, while inland lies the Salton Sea and agriculturally rich Imperial Valley. Here, diversion of life-giving water from the Colorado River watershed, along with year-round sunshine, make the Imperial Valley a virtual vegetable garden for the nation. Where else can agri-business harvest half a dozen hay crops in a year?14

Moving north through the Coachella Valley, sandy desert areas have given way to groves of date palms, thanks again to imported water. Northward along the coast is the nation's second largest metropolitan area (home of the world's first four-level freeway interchange) with more than seven million Greater Los Angeles spilling over the rim of a 4,000 square mile basin--once described as "a collection of suburbs in search of a city."15

North and east of Los Angeles on the Nevada border, the San Bernardino and Inyo counties are typified by the Mojave Desert and Death Valley reaching 282 feet below sea level and 134 degrees F. above zero. Such arid and cruel topography nevertheless yields to borax mines, air force bases, and ordinance testing areas.

In the lee of the Coast Range from Bakersfield and points northwest stretches the great San Joaquin Valley. Facing the snowy Sierra Nevadas to the east, the San Joaquin is yet another example of a semi-arid quasi-desert transformed into rich farm land by diversion of mountain stream water. From Bakersfield to Stockton, oil derricks and sheepherders compete for space with raisin producers, truck gardeners, and cotton growers cutting across a social-ethnic spectrum ranging from Chinese to Basques.

To the east of the San Joaquin Valley, the land rises into Sequoia National Park, finally leading to the highest point in the Continental United
States (Mt. Whitney at 14,495 feet) before dropping abruptly back into Death Valley National Monument. To the west of the San Joaquin the Coast Range and Big Sur stretch north toward the Bay area (non-Californians should quickly learn to refer to San Francisco by its full name or as "The City," but never by the unsophisticated use of "Frisco").

The bright lights of The City by the Bay might be a fitting conclusion to our south-to-north flight over California. From smart shops, smooth culture, Broadway strip joints, and Market Street panhandlers, The City is anything and everything cosmopolitan. From cable cars, where you can play "king of the mountain" with other would-be passengers, to Fisherman's Wharf and a view of Alcatraz, San Francisco is as puzzling as the state to which it belongs (or vice versa in native perspective). Is The City a Golden Gate, China Town, Nob Hill, or an Embarcadero? In truth, like Sandburg's Chicago, it is all of these and more.

But San Francisco is not the end of a northbound tour. Perhaps anti-climactically to some, California is also gold-domed Sacramento to the north and east, a capitol city almost sleepy by comparison to the dizzy pace of the Bay area. Still further north, as one wonders if it will ever end, lie 250 miles of rolling farmland, redwood forests, and mountain wildernesses.

Despite Los Angeles and San Francisco, and despite the agri-business of the San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys, California is, spatially at least, an unsettled and only partially developed treasure. In light of her wealth, it is difficult to think of California in such terms. But of California's 100 million acres, nearly half is still national parks, forests, and other preserves. Only 17.5 per cent of the land is classified as suitable for cultivation—13 per cent actually being cultivated in 1965. And only 10 per cent of the people live in the open spaces outside the metropolitan areas.

So we must conclude that California is megalopolitan, rural, mountainous,
valleyed, desert-like, and richly agricultural. It is the heat of Death Valley and the bitter cold of the Sierras. Its geography has produced the tragedy of earthquake and the wealth of black gold, green gold, and real gold. Its common denominator is diversity to extremes.

Socioeconomic Makeup

If California were a separate country its gross national product ($112 billion in 1970) would be greater than that of all the nations in the world except the Big Six - United States, Russia, West Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan. Its per capita income would exceed that of all countries in the world including the United States. More than one-fourth of all California families have an income of $15,000 or more. The median family income of $10,732, as of the 1970 census, was more than a thousand dollars above the U. S. average. Such relative high personal income levels are reflected in the fact that in 1970 the per cent of employed persons falling in the white-collar category stood at 54.4 per cent, just a few percentage points behind the District of Columbia (57.9 per cent) and three other states (Alaska - 55.3 per cent, Maryland - 55.8 per cent, and New York - 55.2 per cent). On the other hand, California's per cent of employed persons falling in the blue-collar category stood at 30.8 per cent in 1970, or a ranking of 38th in this category among the fifty states and District of Columbia.

But perhaps the most striking socioeconomic factor revealed by the 1970 census is the fact that 90.9 per cent of California's 20 million residents maintain urban residences. That percentage is higher than for any other state with the necessary exception of the District of Columbia at 100 per cent. Still despite California's substantial agricultural output, only 1.2 per cent of her people live in rural farm residences. Only Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, D.C., and Hawaii have smaller percentages in this category.

At least two other social characteristics stand out in the 1970 census data. California has a high percentage of foreign-born residents among its total population: her 8.8 per cent is exceeded only by Hawaii at 9.8 per cent. In addition, Californians 25 years old and over appear to be well educated: the median school years completed by persons in this category is 12.4, exceeded only by Utah at 12.5.

Compared with the residents of the next most populous state, Californians by the late 1960s were earning 15 per cent more and spending 21 per cent more than New Yorkers. Nearly 8 million Californians were holding jobs and the unemployment rate was less than 5 per cent. Californians typically rank far ahead of average Americans in the valuation of their automobiles, reliance on credit cards and travelers checks, and use of air travel (The San Francisco-Los Angeles air corridor is the most heavily traveled in the world.) Conversely, Californians typically lag behind other Americans in purchase of U. S. Savings Bonds and low-priced cars.

In 1968 the California economy exceeded the national growth rate substantially in a variety of measurable ways. It doubled the national population growth rate, tripled in employment growth, had 5 to 6 per cent higher growth in personal incomes, doubled in housing construction, and the California job increase of 300,000 in 1968 represented about 20 per cent of all new jobs in the United States.

So the California economy is easily as difficult to grasp as her geographical characteristics. It boggles the mind to think in terms of spending a couple of million dollars a day building and maintaining highways, and a like amount per day operating a state university system. (California spends more on education than 43 other states spend on all government services.)

California likes the idea of getting a billion dollars or so a year from
the federal government, but on the other hand the income of Californians runs more than a billion dollars a week.

Lost in the shuffle are small concentrations of blacks and other minorities unable to share the wealth, although California apparently recognized other states had such problems. (California sent more civil rights workers into the South than any other state and left unresolved to explode--Watts, Hunter's Point, the Fillmore district, Oakland.)

So the over-riding impression of California, despite pockets of poverty, is that of prosperity and abundance. Generally the economic philosophy of the people seems to be "easy come - easy go." Unparalleled wealth seems to be matched only by unparalleled expenditures in a fast-paced economy not wholly unlike the high-turnover fast-food chains which abound in the metropolitan areas.

**Political Climate**

In a sense, it can be said that the geography of California is largely responsible for the political climate that has developed in the golden nation-state. For the isolation of California in the mid-1800s developed directly into the priority of linking California with the rest of the nation by railroad, hence giving rise to the era of railroad barons in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This was followed by the Johnson reform era that instituted progressive changes still in evidence today.

**Era of the Railroad Barons**

The turbulent, explosive frontier history of California, including the discovery of gold and perhaps premature admission to statehood, culminated on May 10, 1869 when the last spike was driven in the Central Pacific (antecedent to the Southern Pacific) line. The era of the railroad barons had
Through a series of shrewd and questionable - if not illegal maneuvers - the barons of the Southern Pacific railroad amassed incredible corporate and personal fortunes, not the least of which derived from the gift of alternate sections of land along the railroad right-of-way.

As the state's largest land owner, the Southern Pacific totally monopolized the principal means of transportation and established discriminatory freight rates to punish enemies and reward friends. One of the original barons, Governor Leland Stanford, had diverted state funds to the aid of the barons and fourteen successive Governors allegedly served under the control of the Southern Pacific. The control of California politics by the Southern Pacific stretched from 1870 to 1910, a forty-year dynasty which has been likened to "absolute dictatorship" accompanied by bribery, corruption, and get-rich-quick land grabs.

Hiram Johnson's Progressive Reform

But the greed of the barons led to their demise. By 1910 Hiram Warren Johnson was campaigning for Governor under the slogan "Get the Southern Pacific out of politics." Johnson, a fiery attorney, carried a banner of reform that earned him a description as a "bifurcated, peripatetic volcano in perpetual eruption, belching fire and smoke." The volcanic Johnson won the Governorship in 1910 and went on to be re-elected as Governor, and five times as U. S. Senator.

Not only did Johnson "kick the Southern Pacific out of politics," he went on to initiate a remarkable series of reforms that would affect the nature of California politics for generations to come. His immediate goal to "get the Southern Pacific" paralleled the longer range goal of forever removing California from "boss rule."

To cripple the political machines and old-style patronage politics,
Johnson swept through a series of reforms which included use of the initiative, by which citizens could enact their own laws; referendum, by which the people could reject legislation; and recall, by which corrupt or malfeasant public officials could be dumped. In addition, Johnson succeeded in achieving non-partisan election of judges and a cross-filing system for primaries (replac[ ] party machine conventions). Finally, reform legislation virtually wiped out patronage by placing state and local offices under civil service.

All of this led Teddy Roosevelt to call the work of the 1911 legislature "the most comprehensive program of constructive legislation ever passed at a single session of an American legislature." Johnson's efforts have been criticized, however, as tending to "throw the baby out with the bath water." One lasting effect of his reforms was a weak political party structure that, along, with the initiative and referendum processes, made the California political system one of the most unmanageable and unpredictable in America.

**Crackpot Politics**

By the 1920s, Johnson's progressive reform era had largely run its course. After a relative tranquil period, the Great Depression's high unemployment and strikes again threw California politics into an uproar. It is this period - the 1930s - that did the most to give California its partly undeserved reputation as a hotbed of crackpots and 'kooky' politics.

In 1934, Socialist Upton Sinclair won the Democratic nomination for governor and campaigned on the reckless EPIC program to "End Poverty in California." The Establishment and incumbent Republican Governor Frank Merriam virtually panicked as Sinclair appeared to be making a serious run for the governorship. In the face of the voting power of the poor and aged, Merriam had frantically endorsed the Townsend plan to give $200 a month to everyone over sixty - a plan which would have bankrupt the state.
As it was, Sinclair lost the election due to large sums - allegedly ten million dollars - poured into Merriam's campaign and the Townsend and EPIC plans faded away.

But Californians were bombarded with other "strange" social-political cure-alls. The "Technocracy" advocates proposed that engineers and technicians should run the government. The "Utopian Society" claimed half a million members and somehow reasoned that a controlled society with three-hour work days would end poverty and joblessness. Taken more seriously was the Thirty Dollars Every Thursday proposal - otherwise known as Ham and Eggs - which offered $30 a week to unemployed over fifty and would have cost a mere $30 million a week. The Ham and Eggs proposal was actually endorsed by, and helped to elect, Culbert Olson in 1938, the first Democratic Governor in forty years. The Ham and Eggs proposal itself did not fare as well. Although it had gained rather wide support, including organized labor, and reached the 1938 ballot by initiative petitions signed by a full 25 per cent (789,000) of the electorate, the plan was narrowly defeated at the polls.36

Thus the 1930s came to a close as a decade of "wild and wooly" politics, marked by social welfare proposals of the strangest type, and one which forever labeled California politics as - to say the least - unpredictable.

The Warren Era

The election of Earl Warren as governor in 1942, however, did serve to restore some sense of order and reason and propelled California toward a progressive future. No California politician has ever been so popular. Warren was elected governor three times, served longer than any governor before or since, and actually won in 1946 uncontested as he captured both the Democratic and Republican primary nominations.37

Warren promoted a flurry of far-sighted legislation much as Johnson had done thirty years before.38 Major improvements in welfare, old age pensions,
workmen's compensation, mental hospitals, and penal institutions are but a few of the credits of the Warren Administration. But more importantly, Earl Warren - at times acting like a Democrat, at others a Republican - steered state government through the War years with colors flying. During the peak of the booming war economy it was Warren's policy to siphon off every dollar over actual operating needs to be earmarked for post-war development. When the war ended, California had a multi-million dollar "piggy bank" bursting with the resources necessary to update the state's sorely neglected capital improvements. 

In addition, Warren contributed another dimension to the non-partisanship begun by Johnson - a nonpartisanship so well established in California that more than a dozen years later, when Democrats had a registration edge of more than a million voters, Republican Ronald Reagan would landslide over incumbent Democrat Pat Brown.

When Earl Warren left California for the Supreme Court in 1953, he turned the California Governorship over to Goodwin Knight whose latent Potomac fever led him to cultivate his conservative ties while at the same time romancing organized labor. But by 1958, when both he and William ("Big Bill") Knowland threatened to split the Republican Party with a fight for the governorship, the then-Vice President of the United States, Richard Nixon, stepped in. The Republican party by now had more than a million fewer registered voters than the Democrats, yet the Republicans appeared to be in solid control of state government. Nixon's gambit was to avoid party infighting by maneuvering Knight into running for the Senate, clearing the way for Knowland's bid for Governor.

But the gambit fell apart. Knowland was vulnerable to "carpet-bagging" labels thrown at him by native San Franciscan Edmund G. ("Pat") Brown. Knowland weakly responded to such charges with "Well, nobody has a crystal ball..." and subsequently lost the 1958 election by more than a million
votes. Knight, forced to run for a Senate seat he had not really wanted, lost by more than 700,000 votes.

The California Governorship fell to Pat Brown who tried to invoke non-partisanship much along the lines of Johnson and Warren before him. Re-elected in 1962 (by defeating Nixon himself) Pat Brown proved to be an honest, capable Governor whose tenure was marked by a questionable 1.7 billion dollar California Water Plan, and a much-needed thousand miles of freeways. The Brown years also included an overhaul of the executive branch, elimination of the cross-filing system, and creation of California's fair employment practices commission.

On Brown's third bid for the Governorship, he was undone by the unpredictable California electorate. What other state would catapult a veteran movie actor without a day's experience in public office into the Governor's mansion? And where else but California would that actor turn out to be such an adept politician that he would win election, re-election, and become a dark horse Presidential nominee beginning in 1968 to perhaps as far ahead as 1976? When Ronald Reagan defeated Pat Brown in 1966 he did so in a campaign claiming that something needed to be done about runaway taxes, violence on campus, welfare costs, and crime in the streets. After four years of the Reagan administration, California was in as much trouble as ever in those categories. Jesse Unruh, the 1970 Democratic gubernatorial nominee should have been able to give Reagan a great deal of trouble on those counts. But the adept Reagan defeated Unruh by more than a half-million votes. (As a sidelight to the unpredictability of the California electorate, large numbers voted for both the conservative Reagan and the black liberal State Superintendent candidate Wilson Riles on the same day.)

Unruh's contribution to California politics, in retrospect, is evidenced in the legislative branch of government, where he served as a powerful politician.
and Speaker of the Assembly. Under Unruh's leadership, the California Legislature assembled the most professional, best-staffed, best-paid legislative houses in the United States. A national authority and lecturer on state governments and legislative processes, Unruh's dwindling political capital led him to an ill-fated 1972 Los Angeles mayoralty campaign.

Uneducated and unaware observers might expect that Richard M. Nixon captures and represents the essence of the California political system. After all, he was the first California since Herbert Hoover to become President of the United States. But Richard Nixon never served a day of his political life in (California) local or state political office.

Nixon's successful 1946 and 1948 campaigns for U.S. Representative and for Senator in 1950 established his reputation as a conservative Republican, skilled at suggesting Communist or ultra-liberal leanings in his opponents. His selection as Eisenhower's running mate perhaps demonstrated his ability to out-manuever the more modest Warren who preferred a lower profile, though the latter was then California's favorite son. After serving two terms as Vice President, and influencing the nature of California's 1958 gubernatorial race, Nixon was defeated in his 1960 Presidential bid, and returned to California. His decision to enter the 1962 gubernatorial contest was an attempt to translate national political experience into California political capital. But the unpredictability of the California electorate has traditionally swung against "outsiders" or "carpetbaggers" who give any appearance of using California political office as a stepping stone. (Unfortunately, Nixon's Freudian slip on television explaining why he was running for "Governor of the United States" didn't help him at all.) Nixon's defeat at the hands of Pat Brown--in Nixon's own words--appeared to spell the end of his political career. The morning after losing to Brown, November 7, 1962, Nixon said "...this is my last press conference...You won't have Nixon to kick
The Nixon comeback notwithstanding, his impact on the politics of California itself has been minimal. If California has one of the best legislatures in all of the fifty states, it might appear also that Californians trust their elected legislators the least. Since the demise of the railroad barons when the constitutional provisions for initiative and referendum rights of the people were written, Californians have faced a steady and bewildering barrage of issues. Since 1911, 500 constitutional changes, 65 new statutes, and 35 laws already passed by the legislature have been put on the ballot for passage or repeal. In 1966 there were 16 such issues on the state ballot, 20 issues in the 1970 general election, and 22 more in 1972.

In short, signature gathering for initiative has become big business in California and today does more to serve the interests of pressure groups and the wealthy than the grass-roots concerns of the people. To quote one professional petition circulator, "If you give me $500,000, I'll guarantee to get on the ballot a measure to execute the Governor by Christmas!" In addition, experience shows that the ballot decisions are sometimes anything but the final voice of government. In 1964 two issues were approved—one repealing an open housing statute, the other outlawing pay TV—and later reversed by the courts on constitutional grounds.

Hence, issues presented via the initiative process are not always taken too seriously. One battle that did spark serious controversy was over Right to Work in the 50s with proponents and opponents, combined, spending something over 3 million dollars. And in the school finance controversy of late 1972, both the Governor and Assembly Speaker threatened to mount their own initiatives if the legislature did not act responsibly.

California political parties have been historically weak for several reasons. In the first place, the state constitution requires that elections
for all county and municipal offices be non-partisan. It is not surprising, then, to find that California lacks the characteristics of party machine politics at the local level which are commonly found in other states.

Secondly, the extreme non-partisan attitude of reformer Johnson in his attack on the railroad barons, had led to the curious political device of cross-filing in party primaries. As a device originally intended to destroy any chance for "boss rule," cross-filing allowed candidates of one party to run in another party's primary as well. Indeed, primary ballots did not even carry party affiliation labels by candidates' names until 1952.

The result of the cross-filing curiosity was to cripple any hopes of strong well-organized political parties, hence also crippling any sense of party responsibility. Another of California's famous non-partisan politicians, Earl Warren, had actually won the governorship in 1946 by cross-filing and defeating all opposition in both primaries. Perhaps another side effect of cross-filing is that it contributed to a historical tendency of voting for the man and not the party, much to the advantage of the Republicans.

Peculiarly and especially true in California, registration figures sometimes can be misleading when it comes to predicting election winners. Since the turn of the century, California has elected only two Democratic governors--Olson in 1938 and Brown in 1958 and 1962. Yet for decades the Democrats have had a significant majority in party registrations, typically approximating a 60-40 margin. The legislature also had been traditionally Republican until the late 50s. By 1958, however, Democrats had managed a sweep of both houses of the legislature as well as the governorship. Combined with the faded appeal of non-partisanship, the Democratic state government quickly and easily abolished cross-filing in 1958.

Republicans had typically been able to turn out a larger per cent of their registered voters than had Democrats. Moreover, the big business
backing of Republican politics had enabled them to typically outspend their opponents. But times change. Following the 1970 Census, it looked as if a Democratic legislature was going to reapportion the state. However, that issue escalated to the State Supreme Court by default, probably ensuring a less partisan reapportionment process, if not product. In any event, it appears that a more competitive two party system along the lines typical of state government will continue to emerge. Further, it becomes even more doubtful that a non-partisan campaign of the Johnson or Warren cloth could succeed in capturing the state, the tradition of ticket-splitting in California notwithstanding.

California's State Superintendent: Politician or Educator?

Perhaps almost as an appendage to the political history and context of California, we need to consider yet another curious aspect of the state climate--the rise and fall of Max Rafferty.

Flamboyant, bombastic Max Rafferty burst upon the California and national scene by virtue of a 1961 speech, later reprinted by Reader's Digest, and a subsequent campaign for state superintendent condemning permissive education and the decline of patriotism in the schools. His election as State Superintendent of Public Instruction in 1962 marked the beginning of eight years of controversy and divisiveness involving his office, the State Department of Education, State Board of Education, the legislature, and the Governor.

Rafferty's trademark fire-and-brimstone style and notably strong conservative stands on sex education, drugs, and busing made him sound far more like a politician than an educator. Rafferty did, in fact, bid for higher office in the 1968 Republican primary against liberal incumbent Senator Thomas Kuchel. That campaign, sometimes referred to as a "right-wing classic," centered around Rafferty's attack on the four deadly sins of violence, drugs,
pornography, and lawlessness, and the alleged failure of Kuchel to deal with those issues. Rafferty narrowly won the primary—perhaps more because of party disenchantment with Kuchel than his own merits—but went on to lose the general election. In retrospect, it may be that Rafferty's Senatorial aspirations led to his demise, another victim of Californians' distaste for "stepping stone" politics.

The Rafferty-Riles Election

When the 1970 campaign for election of California's State Superintendent of Public Instruction began, not many Californians were predicting that anyone would or could unseat Max Rafferty, or even give him "a run for his money." Such an assessment probably was warranted at the time, especially since there were nine candidates in the June primary. The campaign could have ended there had Rafferty received a majority vote in that primary.

As it was, Rafferty nearly succeeded in doing so, missing a majority by approximately a percentage point. His competition for the November election would come from Wilson Riles, who finished a rather distant second in the primary, capturing about 25 percent of the primary vote. (Riles may have been, in fact, a compromise candidate of anti-Rafferty forces unable to agree on their top choices.)

Despite Riles' impressive educational career (see Section IV), he hardly seemed likely to be the man to defeat Rafferty. Indeed, an early campaign poll showed that Riles had little chance to overcome Rafferty's well-established and strong identification with much of the California electorate.

Rafferty had also garnered individual endorsements from a strong majority of the ten members of the State Board of Education, in spite of a plea by then Board President Howard Day of Long Beach that the Board members remain neutral. Even so, the 1970 campaign was to be another kettle of fish.
Apparently avoiding publicity and sensationalism—trademarks of his opponent—Riles launched an issue-related campaign, tirelessly stumping the state at the local level emphasizing California's school finance problems, the need for community involvement, and promoting his pet program of early childhood education. Slowly, Riles' steady campaign of personal sincerity began to take effect. Newspaper endorsements began to mount, including two strong editorials on October 19 and 29 from the Los Angeles Times. Bipartisan endorsements from local boards of education and many prominent Californians (like San Francisco State College President, Dr. S.I. Hayakawa) also were forthcoming.

As the long campaign began to peak, it warmed up considerably. On the one hand, Riles charged that Rafferty had proven himself incompetent, had compiled a record of divisive rhetoric, administrative bungling, and fiscal mismanagement, and had "climbed for a partisan office on the backs of our children." This last charge was in reference to Rafferty's unsuccessful bid for U.S. Senator in 1968 while in the middle of his second term as State Superintendent.

Rafferty, on the other hand, with the polls beginning to show a closing gap between him and Riles, unleashed scathing attacks on his opponent who, among other things, was supposed to be a 'puppet' of Riles' campaign chairman, Los Angeles oil executive Dorman L. Commons. In addition, Rafferty blasted the Riles campaign as one founded on deceit, fraud, and hypocrisy. The campaign thus became increasingly rancorous with attacks on Riles' integrity and patriotism, including a thinly-veiled personal attack allegedly linking Riles and Communism.

By election day the campaign looked far more like a horse race than anyone had expected. If anything, the polls showed Rafferty to be trailing slightly. By midnight of election day it was all over. Riles had rather
easily carried Los Angeles and San Francisco counties and went on to capture all but a few counties in the state. San Diego and Orange counties, California's notably conservative heartland, went to Rafferty, but Riles' nearly 500,000 vote margin approached that of Reagan's.

As an epilogue, on election night, amid cheers of his supporters, Riles characteristically stated, "This victory tonight isn't for you and it isn't for me. It will be for the children." By way of contrast, Rafferty absented himself from subsequent meetings of the State Board of Education and refused to see newsmen. Then, beginning February 1, 1971, he began his tenure at Troy State University in the Deep South with an accompanying welcome from Alabama Governor George C. Wallace.
FOOTNOTES


4. Spencer-Roberts & Associates of Los Angeles, founded by Stuart Spencer and William Roberts has been characterized by Hill, op. cit., p. 197, as the "most strikingly successful" political campaign management organization. Among other feats, Spencer-Roberts accepted a client from their 1964 right-wing "extremist" list and, in 1966, sold him to the California electorate as "moderate" Ronald Reagan for Governor.


10. Ibid., p. 564.


14. The agricultural wealth of California would be hard to overstate. In 1965, the cultivated acreage of the state was only 2.6 per cent of the national total, but yielded 12.3 per cent of the dollar value of the nation's harvested crops.


17. Bean, op. cit., p. 495.
Beck and Williams, op. cit., p. 501.


Ibid.

California's foreign-born population is larger than its black population (8.8 per cent to 7.0 per cent), according to NEA's Rankings of the States.

See Morgan, op. cit., pp. 254-55, for such comparisons.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 565.

Morgan, op. cit., p. 255.

Hill, op. cit., p. 17.


Morgan, op. cit., p. 296.

Hill, op. cit., p. 35.

Ibid., p. 48.

Ibid., p. 53.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 571.

See Morgan, op. cit., p. 300; Hill, op. cit., pp. 87-88; and Beck and Williams, op. cit., pp. 401-410, for more on Depression Politics.

Of course, Governor 'Sunny Jim' Rolph did his part too--by advocating, during the depression that everybody just take a couple weeks vacation, by sending a case of whiskey to a condemned man, and by openly supporting a lynching. See Bean, op. cit., pp. 410-411.


Beck and Williams, op. cit., p. 409.

Hill, op. cit., p. 92.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 573.

Ibid., p. 574.
See Hill, op. cit., pp. 219-221, for an interesting treatment of the "Capricious Million" wherein this edge in registered voters is justifiably called "illusory."

Hill, op. cit., p. 145.

Controversies over diversion of water is "spattered" throughout California political history and is dealt with by all of the political scholars. In this instance, see Bean, op. cit., pp. 483-484.

Hill, op. cit., p. 2. (Hill emphasizes the idiosyncratic California electorate in titling his first chapter "Never Be Surprised.")

Peirce, op. cit., p. 58.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 578.

Ibid., p. 575.


Hill, op. cit., p. 173.

See Hill, op. cit., pp. 274-79, for the complete text of a most fascinating press conference soliloquy.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 582.

Hill, op. cit., p. 5.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 583.

Ibid.

Bean, op. cit., p. 335.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 584.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 585. In 1970, for example, the margin was 13 percentage points. Democrats accounted for 54.2 per cent and Republicans 41.0 per cent of registered voters, yet Republican Reagan captured 52.8 per cent of the votes cast.

Ibid., p. 519.

Ibid., p. 580.

This is yet another example of the vagaries of the California electorate. Reagan was elected in 1966 by promising (among other things) to end "flagrant permissiveness" of state supported institutions. But in the 1968 election, Californians chose liberal Democrat Alan Cranston over Republican student-baiting Rafferty. See Lavender, op. cit., p. 427.

Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1970.


Newsweek, November 16, 1970.

Ibid.


Ibid.
SECTION II--THE STRUCTURE

By Educational Governance Project definition, the California educational policy-making system includes the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the State Board of Education, the State Department of Education, legislative and executive branches of government, and educational interest groups. In order to better understand how the policy system operates and deals with educational issues, it is important to establish some sense of the powers, duties, and scope of each of the structural components.

The Chief State School Officer

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction in California is a Constitutional officer: his office is provided for by the Constitution of the State of California and subsequently the statutory provisions deriving therefrom. While the legislature and State Board of Education can (and do) provide a good deal of direction for the State Superintendent, it is his status as a Constitutional officer that gives him a sense of independence apart from the legislative bodies.

Constitutional References to the CSSO

It is not surprising to find more Constitutional references to the CSSO than to the SBE. As summarized below, these references range from important to mundane.

Article IX, Section 2 provides that a Superintendent of Public Instruction "shall be elected by the qualified electors of the State at each gubernatorial election" and shall take office "on the first Monday after the first day of January next succeeding his election."

Article IX, Section 2.1 provides that, on nomination of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the SBE shall appoint one Deputy Superintendent.
and three Associate Superintendents who shall be exempt from State civil service and whose terms of office shall also be four years. (The State Superintendent himself is exempt from civil service under Article XXIV, Section 4 (c).)

The State Superintendent of Public Instruction is an \textit{ex officio} member of three important bodies. A Reapportionment Commission, which is created if the Legislature fails to reapportion Senate and Assembly seats following a decennial Federal census, includes an \textit{ex officio} seat for the State Superintendent (Article IV, Section 6). Further, Article IX, Section 9 provides that the Superintendent shall be an \textit{ex officio} member of the Board of Regents of the University of California, and of the State College Board of Trustees.

The only other significant Constitutional reference to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction provides that his salary be determined by the Legislature through statute, except that the salary may not be increased or decreased during a term (Article V, Section 12).

**Statutory References to the CSSO**

The basic \textit{statutory} provisions pertaining to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction are found in Division 2, Chapter 2 of the Code. The more important of these are summarized and paraphrased below.

1. **Appointment, Salaries, Bonding** (Article 1, Sections 201-203)

   Election of the Superintendent is provided constitutionally, but should a vacancy in the office occur, that vacancy is filled by gubernatorial appointment (Section 201). The salary of the Superintendent is delegated to provisions of the California Government Code (Education Code Section 202, Government Code Title 2, Division 3, Part 1, Chapter 6) and the Superintendent is bonded in the amount of $10,000 (Section 202). In addition to salary, the Superintendent and his deputy and assistants are reimbursed for
necessary and actual travel expenses, paid out of the appropriation made for the SDE (Section 203).

2. **Powers, Duties, and Responsibilities** (Article 2, Sections 251-267)

Specific powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Superintendent of Public Instruction are legislated in Article 2, Sections 251 through 267. For our purpose of understanding the relationship between the Superintendent and the state educational policy system, only five of these sections bear elaboration.

The Superintendent executes, under the direction of the Board, the policies which have been enacted by the Board, and directs, under general rules and regulations adopted by the SBE, the work of all appointees and employees of the board (Section 252). Following this broad section, the statutes provide that he shall (Section 253):

a) Superintend the schools of the state

b) Prepare, have printed, and distribute to teachers and officers such blank forms and books as may be necessary to discharge their duties, including blank teacher certificates to be used by county and city boards of education

c) Visit the several orphan asylums receiving state appropriations and examine the course of instruction

d) Visit the schools of the different counties and inquire into their condition with travel expenses for same, not exceeding $1,800 per year

e) Authenticate all drafts and orders drawn by him, and all papers and writings issued from his office with his official seal

f) Have all valuable school reports, journals, and documents in his office bound at the state bindery

g) Deliver over to his successor all property, books, documents, records, maps, reports, and other papers belonging to his office

Perhaps an example of more significant authority granted the Superintendent is the statutory provision that he shall prescribe the regulations under which contracts, agreements, or arrangements may be made with agencies
of the federal government for funds, services, commodities, or equipment to be made available to the public schools (Section 254).

Two types of reporting procedures are also the statutory responsibility of the Superintendent. He is required to furnish city and county superintendents of schools with a certified estimate of the amount of state school money that will be apportioned to each during the school year (Section 259). Such estimates are to be prepared not later than July 25 each year.

A major reporting procedure requires that the Superintendent shall report to the Governor, on or before each September 15, a statement of the condition of the public elementary and secondary schools and other educational institutions supported in whole or in part by the State and under the jurisdiction of the SDE (Section 261). This report is to include tabular statements showing:

- The number attending public schools, and the average attendance
- The amount of school funds apportioned, and the sources from which derived
- The amount raised by county, city and county, and district taxes, or from other sources of revenue, for school purposes
- The amount expended for salaries of teachers, for building schoolhouses, for district libraries, and for incidental expenses.

Numerous other California Education Code statutes refer to the State Superintendent in his role of chief executive officer of the SBE and SDE. However, the provisions generally described above constitute the basic powers, duties, and responsibilities as prescribed in Division 2, Chapter 2.

In many respects, the CSSO is responsible to the SBE and legislature for much of the policy-setting that his office is designed to implement. But one exception should be noted, especially as it pertains to differences between the current CSSO and his predecessor. In California, the CSSO does have the opportunity to present to the legislature his own package of legislative recommendations, apart from the policy positions of the State Board of Education.
This structural peculiarity has previously resulted in the State Board of Education and CSSO taking opposed positions on legislation as well as interpretations of policies incumbent upon both the State Board and CSSO. This unique arrangement led to the necessity for previous California Attorney General opinions on the validity of conflicting policy interpretations between the State Board and Chief State School Officer. (See Section IV)

**The State Board of Education**

The California State Board of Education, in many respects, has a structure and functions much like a typical state board of education. It serves as a regulatory and policy-making body responsible to the legislators insofar as specific statutory direction is given, and perhaps could be seen as responsible to the Governor who must appoint Board members with the advice and consent of the Senate.

As pointed out previously, however, the CSSO is in one sense independent from the State Board of Education--much more so than if the Board were to appoint and employ the CSSO--and consequently the State Department itself is, to that degree, more removed from direct SBE control. In addition (as appeared in comments from respondents), there is little actual or implied accountability to the Governor beyond initial appointment or reappointment. Thus, the State Board of Education is independent to act on the merits of the matters before it, excepting instances of specific direction given by the legislature.

**Constitutional References to the State Board of Education**

The California Constitution is largely silent on the matter of SBE powers and duties. Few references to the SBE--even in passing--are found anywhere in the Constitution including Article IX which deals specifically with education.
Since direct references are so few and brief it is possible here to identify them in full. Article IX, Section 2.1 (new section adopted November 5, 1946) contains a sentence which reads: "The State Board of Education, on nomination of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, shall appoint one Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction and three Associate Superintendents of Public Instruction who shall be exempt from state civil service and whose terms of office shall be four years." In a sense, even this deals not with the SBE but rather with the SDE staffing pattern of higher echelon administrators.

Article IX, Section 7.5 (new section adopted June 2, 1970) is a single sentence section which speaks for itself and reads: "The State Board of Education shall adopt textbooks for use in grades one through eight throughout the State, to be furnished without cost as provided by statute."

Finally, Article IX, Section 7 (as amended June 2, 1970)—also a single sentence section—concludes treatment of the SBE by handing the ball to the legislature. "The Legislature shall provide for the appointment or election of the State Board of Education and a board of education in each county."

Obviously, such limited, meager coverage of the SBE in the Constitution means that the powers and duties of the SBE are derived mainly from statutes.

Statutory References to the State Board of Education

The basic statutory provisions governing composition, terms, organization, and powers and duties of the SBE are found in Division 2, Chapter 1, of the California Education Code. The more important of these provisions are paraphrased and summarized below.

1. **Organization** (Chapter 1, Article 1, Sections 101-112)

   The California State Board of Education consists of ten members who are appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
California Senate (Section 101). The terms of office for these members are four years, with three members appointed in even-numbered years and two members in odd-numbered years (Section 102). Vacancies are filled by gubernatorial appointment and two-thirds Senate confirmation, with appointees holding office for the balance of the unexpired term (Section 103). The Board reorganizes at the first meeting following changes in membership by electing one of the members president (Section 104).

The members of the SBE serve without pay, but receive necessary and actual travel expenses while on official business (Section 107). Such official business would include meeting at least six times per year at times of its own choice, provided that it meets at least once every three months (Section 108). In addition to regular meetings, special meetings may be called by the president, or upon the request of any four members (Section 109).

Adequate notice of each meeting must be given by the secretary via registered mail to each board member at least ten days prior to the meeting (Section 110). The apparent concern of the Legislature for adequate notice of meetings is probably justified, since the concurrence of six members of the board is necessary to legally take any official action (Section 112). In other words, a majority of the board, not a majority of those present, must vote in favor of any proposal for it to be enacted.

The Board is served by the Superintendent of Public Instruction who is the secretary and executive officer having charge of all the Board's correspondence and keeping a record of all its proceedings (Section 105). In addition, the Board appoints a secretary who also must act as executive officer of the board in the absence or incapacity of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (Section 106).
2. **Powers and Duties** (Chapter 1, Article 2, Sections 151-161)

   The powers and duties of the SBE include determination of all questions of policy within its powers (Section 151) as well as adoption of rules and regulations not inconsistent with state laws for the government of: 1) itself; 2) its appointees and employees; 3) day and evening elementary and secondary schools; 4) technical and vocational schools; and 5) other such schools--excepting the University of California and California State Colleges--as may receive in whole or in part financial support from the state (Section 152).

   The SBE is broadly charged with responsibility for studying educational conditions and needs in the state and making plans for the improvement of the administration and efficiency of the public schools (Section 153).

   The significance of the SBE as an official governmental agency is illustrated and strengthened by the fact that the SBE is granted subpoena powers (Section 155). Such subpoenas would be issued to compel the attendance of witnesses before the board in the same manner as any court in the state, including allocation of a reasonable allowance for expenses.

   A final major duty and responsibility of the SBE involves submitting a report of its transactions for the preceding two years, together with recommendations of its needs for the coming biennium, and recommendations as to changes in the laws or new educational legislation as may seem necessary (Section 158). Such report and recommendations are to be submitted to the Governor biennially on or before September 15 preceding the regular session of the Legislature.

   Article 2 also includes a group of miscellaneous powers and duties which may be mentioned only in passing here. These include: 1) permissive legislation allowing the SBE to become involved in courses of instruction for inmates in state institutions (Section 154); 2) adopting and using an official
seal (Section 156); 3) using the Department of General Services for printing (Section 157); 4) adoption of general guidelines regarding special instruction of mentally retarded minors enrolled in the public schools (Section 160); and 5) development of guidelines which school districts may use in the development of teacher evaluation procedures (Section 161).

Other references and directions to the SBE are scattered throughout the Education Code. For the most part, these are related to specific pieces of state law, rather than speaking to the broader organization, powers and duties as outlined in Division 2, Chapter 1 as summarized below.

In terms of the Constitution, the State Board of Education would appear to be less important structurally than the CSSO. Virtually all the credibility of the Board is dependent on the quality of individuals appointed by the Governor and virtually all of its authority derives from statute. In contrast, the CSSO's credibility—in terms of the office—is established by the Constitution with some powers and duties deriving from that source along with many others deriving from statute.

The State Department of Education

The California State Department of Education is the agency of State Government created in 1921 by constitutional and statutory provisions to provide for state-level administration of the public school system. Department responsibilities are largely related to public elementary-secondary schools, including post-secondary adult programs; special schools; statewide public library services; and limited responsibilities for certain kinds of private schools. The University of California, California State Universities (formerly colleges), junior colleges, and community colleges are apart from the State Department and are administered by Boards of Regents and Trustees.
Currently, the California State Department of Education employs some 2,600 persons and operates on a yearly budget of approximately $52 million. The Department annually disburses approximately $2.5 billion in monies, materials, and supplies to local educational agencies.

Basically the State Department is organized into four major activity areas: (1) the office of the Superintendent; (2) the educational program matrix; (3) fiscal and administrative services; and (4) library services. These major activity areas represent the substance of structural revisions effected, and presently undergoing further refinement, within the Department as a result of reorganization instigated by the current Superintendent.

In many functional and structural respects the California State Department does not differ a great deal from those of other states. There are, however, a few notable exceptions.

As one example, the Governmental Affairs Office (or Office of Legislative Liaison) is designed to provide direct communication between the California Legislature and the Department. The office organizes the departmental legislative program, provides bill analyses (by the ream), and factual information on the implications of pending education legislation.

All of this does not necessarily make this component unique as State Departments go. What is significant is the fact that the office is a creation of the Riles administration, and is predominantly staffed by non-educators—in other words, by professionals skilled in legislative-political processes as opposed to purely educational ones.

Another unique feature of the structure of the Department has to do with recent change-overs to an educational program matrix. The matrix has three vertical program management columns covering early childhood education, intermediate education, and secondary/adult education. Horizontal
matrix rows encompass general, special, vocational, and compensatory education as well as child development components.

**CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**
**EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM MATRIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Components</th>
<th>Early Childhood Education</th>
<th>Intermediate Education</th>
<th>Secondary/Adult Education</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
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<td>Special</td>
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<td>Vocational</td>
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<td>Compensatory</td>
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The significance of such a matrix approach to educational program administration and development within the Department rests again on the fact that it is allegedly a brain-child of the Riles administration. (Actually, this approach to program administration probably is traceable back to the Arthur D. Little Studies conducted in the early to mid-sixties.) From a theoretical standpoint, it provides for substantial pressure to integrate program components across matrix lines. But the practical effect is perhaps just as important. In the larger context, it provides for an intelligent, orderly framework to "shake-up" second-echelon SDE staff including those with considerable tenure. (The matrix also provides a logical follow-up to the top-level shakeup effected in the early months of the Riles administration.)

A final consideration, though not specifically a structural characteristic of the State Department, has to do with the manner in which the legislature has dealt with educational policy. It is worth special treatment here, because the State Department in California, perhaps more so than any other state, is governed by educational-legislative policy in very specific detail.
The California Education Code is replete with directives to the State Department as well as other components of the policy system. Any attempt to analyze even the basic parameters of State Department obligations under the Code would be as hopeless as it would be lengthy and confusing. (More than one respondent pointed in frustration to the five-volume Education Code with the comment that "nobody could possibly understand everything that's in there.")

Hence it is important, in examining the structure and role of the Department, to understand that a rather high degree of direction as provided by the Code is accompanied by some loss of flexibility and/or creativity. (Some have contended that lack of SDE flexibility and/or creativity is as much due to dominance of career civil service types, however.)

In the final analysis, however, especially through features like the Governmental Affairs Office and educational program matrix, the State Department has begun to show the effects of the hand of the Superintendent. Given the inertia and complexity of any Department the size of California's, one might argue that substantial change has already taken place. Or, alternatively, it may be that such organizational changes simply permit the Department to do a better job of essentially the same assignments.

The Governor

In many respects, the California Governor's Office is similar in powers and constraints to that office throughout the nation. The Governor naturally stands at the head of the executive branch of government with the primary responsibility of carrying out the policies enacted into law by the legislature. Much policy originates with the Governor since the executive branch is traditionally a focal point for the expression of societal needs.

But it is also a common characteristic of American government that citizens are fearful of too much centralization of power. Hence, other
California executive branch officials are also elected and have significant powers: the State Controller actually approves all state expenditures; the Attorney General is the chief law officer of the state and second only to the Governor in importance (The Attorney General as a "stepping stone" has produced two famous Governors in the last thirty years—Earl Warren and Pat Brown—who served 19 years between them)\(^5\); the Treasurer manages the money; and the Secretary of State is the custodian of records as well as administrator of elections; and the Chief State School Officer superintends the schools.

The California Governor would wield considerably more power were it not for the fact that state government is liberally dotted with special boards and commissions. The "big business" that is the University of California is governed by a Board of Regents. And while the Governor sits on that Board, he has no direct control; rather, considerable indirect control must be exercised through the budget. Another notable board is the independent State Personnel Board responsible for the hiring and management of all employees other than college and university. The State Personnel Board members serve ten year terms.

Another factor restricting the power of the Governor is the high percentage of state employees who enter government service via civil service. The California Governor therefore has little opportunity to utilize patronage appointments.

As can be expected in "separation of powers" and "checks and balances" systems of government, there is a normal amount of tension between legislative and executive branches. Such tension is augmented by the fact that there are always a few legislators who aspire to be Governor (especially true in 1972-73 with Senator Moscone and Speaker Moretti jockeying for
position during the months of debate on Senate Bill 90 - school finance and tax reform). The budget is always an issue in its own right as well as being a vehicle to force the Governor to accept changes in other proposed legislation.

And it is in the budgetary arena that the California Governor exercises most of his power and authority. For the last half-century California has had an "executive budget" which allows the Governor and, in turn, the Department of Finance to carefully control the operation of state government. If one were to isolate the single most significant power granted the California governor, it would have to be the "line item veto" which exposes component parts of larger appropriations to the blue pencil of gubernatorial disapproval.

Such line item veto power is augmented by the fact that a two-thirds legislative over-ride of a veto is almost unheard of in California. This is probably true because of the relatively weak (compared to other states) political party cohesion in California. Purely partisan issues seem far less frequent than in many other states.

Perhaps a less significant strength of the California Governor - yet still worth mentioning - is the fact that he spends less time as a "lame duck" than governors in many other states. The tenure potential of the California Governor is virtually unlimited. He serves four year terms with no restraint on re-election. (Earl Warren's two terms plus three years of a third mark the longest tenure.)

On balance, the Governor of California appears to be powerful in comparison with that office in other states. If we rely on Joseph Schlesinger's Index of Governor's Formal Powers, the California Governor ranks behind only New York, Illinois, and Hawaii, sharing fourth place with Governors of five other states - Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Maryland. (Schlesinger's combined index is comprised of point rankings in the areas of tenure potential, appointive powers, budget powers, and veto powers.)

The Legislature

The California legislature may well be the best of any legislature in the 50 states. Extensive investigation by the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, for example, ranked California first, well ahead of New York and Illinois, on the overall measure of "effectiveness." And on each of the Citizens Conference dimensions - functional, accountable, informed, independent, and representative - the California legislature ranked no lower than third.7

There are many reasons to substantiate such claims of excellence, not the least of which is the fact that California's 80 Assemblemen and 40 Senators constitute a legislature that is superbly staffed. Under Jesse Unruh's leadership the Assembly developed high-grade professional staffs thereby "tooling up" the respective committees to deal with research and program development responsibilities. This is especially important since the California legislature has relied heavily on committees with regard not only to policy making but also to legislative "watchdogging" of administrative activities.

In addition to committee staffs, individual legislators are also blessed. In California, even a freshman Assemblyman has office space and professional and clerical assistance comparable to minority leaders in some states. Such a sense of professionalism is probably also reflected in the fact that California legislators are the best paid of any in the nation.8 By 1971 the legislature's professional and support staff numbered 1,500 at an annual cost approximating $15 million. Besides being the highest paid, California
legislators enjoy an adequate living allowance while in Sacramento, as well as an automobile and oil company credit card.

In terms of staffing patterns, the California legislature also is uniquely served by the Legislative Analyst's Office, first established approximately thirty years ago, and functioning as an independent research and analytical reference for all legislative proposals that involve the expenditure of monies.9

Another noteworthy feature of the legislature is the degree to which members tend to think of themselves as policy makers first and party members second. Traceable back to the cross-filing system which existed until the late 1950s, a number of legislators still serving today at one point sought election as both Democrats and Republicans. Some of them did, in fact, reach the legislature after winning both party primaries. In addition, the lack of "party machines" at county and municipal levels has contributed to the electorate's relatively low level of awareness or concern for strict party lines. This is not to say that party politics are unimportant. With the abolition of cross-filing, and with the emergence of strong leadership from the Speaker of the Assembly who had the authority to "stack" committees with fellow party members, partisan thinking in the legislature has been on the increase. The tradition of ticket-splitting voters and bipartisan legislative issues still exists, though to a far lesser extent than in the forties and fifties.

Overall, it is important to understand that the California legislature has developed as probably the strongest in the nation, largely self-sufficient and independent of executive branch domination, and views itself with some justification as the programmatic, innovative branch of government. It is well-paid and well-staffed to the extent that it need not rely heavily on lobbyists, including the State Department of Education, or other "outsiders" for research information and analysis.
FOOTNOTES

1 The Constitution of the State of California.

2 Education Code of the State of California.

3 As of March, 1973 the final version of the SDE's Educational Program Matrix had not been produced nor implemented. As a conceptual model, the matrix provided for developmental stages in staff reorganization.


5 Peirce, op. cit., p. 577.


SECTION III--THE ISSUES

The issue areas of primary concern to the Educational Governance Project--school finance, program improvement, teacher certification, school desegregation--are of markedly varied importance within the California state educational policy-making system.

School finance, and the accompanying issue of tax reform, stood out above all other issues in 1972 in California. The issue area of program improvement--in the case of California, Early Childhood Education--ranked a distant second. Teacher certification and desegregation were of virtually no importance at all to the state educational policy system in 1972.

In making such an assessment, it is important to stress the criteria for judging the relevance of the issue areas to the overall project focus. That is to say, given the time frame of 1971-72, and the need for selecting issue areas that involved the broadest range of participants, school finance-tax reform ranked far ahead of other issues in occupying center stage of the policy system.

Teacher certification was a lively issue in 1970. Desegregation has cropped up in on-again-off-again fashion. Early Childhood Education was of some importance, but almost solely because it was championed by the State Superintendent and gave some indication of the impact of his office on the state policy-making system. But in 1972, to reiterate, no other issue preoccupied state government and the total public elementary-secondary community--including major educational and non-educational interest groups--like the issue of school finance and tax reform. For this reason, and because the dynamics of the system came into full play in this regard, the school finance-tax reform issue provides an ideal backdrop for analyzing the policy roles of actors and groups of actors.
The following sections provide an in-depth sequence of events and timetable for resolution of the school finance issue (Senate Bill 90), a brief resume of the parameters of the Early Childhood Education issue, and a rather light treatment of teacher certification.

**School Finance and Tax Reform: Senate Bill 90**

The California method of financing public schools has historically been much like that of other states—heavy reliance on local government (i.e., property taxation) to pay the bulk of school costs. In this respect, in fact, California has relied on such revenues more heavily than a number of other "megastates" or the United States as a whole.

**ESTIMATED PER CENT OF REVENUE FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1971-72**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Selected States</th>
<th>Per Cent From Local Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, of course, such dependence on local governments has relieved the state itself from providing a larger portion of school revenues.

If one looks at California's personal income per child of school age, there is little question that the state is wealthy (see also Section I) in comparison to the "megastates" or the United States as a whole.
ESTIMATED PER CENT OF REVENUE FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS FROM STATE GOVERNMENT, 1971-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Selected States</th>
<th>Per Cent From State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>88.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERSONAL INCOME PER CHILD OF SCHOOL AGE, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Selected States</th>
<th>Income Per Child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>$19,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>18,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>18,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>17,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>15,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>15,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>14,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>14,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>8,354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, a far more interesting tabular comparison is that of both tax collections and school receipts as per cent of personal income. Such a calculation represents a rough—though perhaps not completely fair and accurate—measure of "effort."

STATE AND LOCAL TAX COLLECTIONS, 1969-70 AS A PER CENT OF PERSONAL INCOME, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Selected States</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New York and Wisconsin</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>California</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LOCAL AND STATE REVENUE RECEIPTS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN 1970-71 AS A PER CENT OF PERSONAL INCOME, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Selected States</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>New Jersey and Pennsylvania</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>California and Florida</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Such data seem to indicate that, relative to other states, California ranks fifth in "effort" with regard to state and local tax collections, but thirty-fifth in "effort" to support the public schools. In other words, compared to other states, California appeared to be taking a fairly large chunk of personal income (12.6 per cent) for state and local taxes. But—again comparatively—only a small portion of the larger "chunk" went for public schools.

California's school finance problems were further compounded by a distribution formula which apparently did little to attempt meaningful equalization among school districts of widely disparate local wealth. To be sure, such comparisons as presented here are rough and make no attempt to assess the "quality" of such equalization efforts.

GRANTS DISTRIBUTED BY STATE EDUCATION AGENCIES FOR KINDERGARTEN THROUGH ADULT EDUCATION IN SELECTED STATES, BY METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION, 1971-72

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Flat</th>
<th>Equalizing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California(^\text{a})</td>
<td>871.4</td>
<td>547.3</td>
<td>1418.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>627.6</td>
<td>712.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>202.8</td>
<td>766.9</td>
<td>969.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>268.0</td>
<td>312.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>119.8</td>
<td>722.6</td>
<td>842.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey(^\text{b})</td>
<td>242.9</td>
<td>308.2</td>
<td>551.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York(^\text{a})</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>2450.1</td>
<td>2532.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>691.8</td>
<td>786.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>147.1</td>
<td>1094.1</td>
<td>1241.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{a}\)1970-71 School Year Reported; \(^\text{b}\)1972-73 School Year Reported
The result of all these factors in California, and to one degree or another in most other states, was a public school finance revenue and distribution system marked by gross inequities among local school districts. In California, the disparity of local wealth approximated a ratio of nearly 10,000:1 between the richest and the poorest districts' tax bases. With the state aid formula unable because of amount and design to offset such disparities, California was ripe for the now famous Serrano vs. Priest⁹ (see following pages). By then, there could be little doubt that school finance and property tax problems were inextricably bound to a common reform.

Such conditions setting the stage for the 1972 legislative crisis were not born overnight, of course.¹⁰ As early as September 29, 1970, incumbent Governor Ronald Reagan promised in a campaign speech, "If you see fit to return us to Sacramento next year, we'll propose, as the first order of legislative business, tax reform."¹¹ Reagan was returned to office that November. But at his first press conference in 1971 the Governor announced quietly that he would not introduce a major tax reform package as he had done in the past two legislative sessions.¹² Instead, the Governor observed that since both political parties had expressed a desire for tax reform, he would work with Democrats, who controlled both houses, to develop a mutually satisfactory program.

Throughout late spring and early summer of 1971, the Governor and Democratic legislative spokesmen, such as the Assembly Ways and Means Chairman Willie Brown, traded political punches over the Governor's proposed $6.7 billion budget.¹³ Differences among Assembly, Senate, and gubernatorial versions of the state's budgetary needs were eventually compromised and Reagan signed a $6.8 billion budget early in July. However, the larger question of tax reform remained unresolved. Furthermore, the Governor had slashed more than $500 million from the budget sent to him by the legislature,
with those cuts coming primarily from the areas of public elementary-secondary education, higher education, welfare, and medical aid for the poor. And the Governor still contended that the 1971 budget was more than $400 out of balance.

By the middle of July, 1971, Legislative Analyst A. Alan Post reported that the Governor's veto of additional school aid would result in a heavier burden for local taxpayers via the property tax. That prediction started coming true almost immediately as the Los Angeles Board of Education tentatively approved an increase in the school property tax rate of 28¢ per hundred dollars valuation. (An action giving rise to no small measure of "We told you so.")

Then in August, 1971, the California State Supreme Court addressed itself to Serrano vs. Priest—a case which provided strong impetus for SB 90 in 1972 and which prompted Rodriguez out of Texas to reach the U.S. Supreme Court.

Serrano was brought in class action by a group of Los Angeles parents challenging the disparities of a school finance system which relied so heavily on local property taxation. Ruling 6-1 in favor of the parents (thereby returning the case to lower court for disposition), the California Supreme Court found the method of financing in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment because it "invidiously discriminates against the poor and makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." The court did not say that property taxation was unconstitutional, but rather attacked the particular combination of property taxation and state aid constituting California's school finance system.

Much later—after passage of SB 90—the U.S. Supreme Court would reverse this thinking as it appeared in Rodriguez, but not before the pressure of
Serrano contributed significantly to the passage of SB 90 in 1972. Indeed, much of the debate over SB 90 revolved about the question of how much the bill would really move California toward meaningful equalization. Proponents argued that it would be a significant step, while opponents (California Taxpayers Association, for example) charged that it would "distort the state's future ability to meet Serrano demands." In any event, there seemed to be little question that compliance with Serrano would require California legislators to "think big." In September, 1971, Legislative Analyst Post estimated that the state might have to raise as much as $1.5 billion to comply fully. And by January, 1972, Senator Randolph Collier from Eureka, an upper house member since 1939, had proposed a $2 billion gross receipts tax program to resolve the state's finance problems. The drive for passage of a massive school finance-tax reform package was just beginning to take shape.

By March, the State Board of Education adopted a resolution calling for a statewide property tax of $2.50 per hundred assessed valuation. That statewide property tax suggestion was not new in California as both the 1969 Advisory Commission on Tax Reform and the Governor's 1971 Commission on Educational Reform had made such recommendations. Another study, contracted by the Senate in December, 1971, with Charles Benson of the University of California at Berkeley, recommended compliance with Serrano under a District Power Equalizing formula or, alternatively, Full State Assumption. But in the end all three of these approaches were largely ignored.

By May, 1972, Governor Reagan sent the legislature a $1.2 billion property tax relief-school aid package which he claimed would provide substantial, lasting and guaranteed tax relief for homeowners while also insuring educational opportunity for all children. Included in the Reagan proposal...
were sales, cigarette, and liquor tax increases to allow the state to achieve 50-50 funding of education with local districts. (California, as of May, 1972, provided less than 40 per cent state support.)

Perhaps the single most important breakthrough came in June when Republican Governor Reagan and Assembly Speaker Moretti announced, after weeks of quiet negotiations at staff levels, that they had reached a compromise on school finance-tax reform. Later, most respondents expressed belief that a bill could not have been passed without such a compromise.

Reagan's apparent priority of tax reform and Moretti's apparent priority of school finance were inseparable thereafter. The Reagan-Moretti compromise package would provide an immediate $450 million in property tax relief for homeowners and $500 million new money for schools. By the middle of July, 1972, State Superintendent Riles had added his support for the Reagan-Moretti compromise and urged prompt legislative approval of such a package.

Still, legislative approval was far from easy to come by, with the Senate proving to be a major stumbling block for the Reagan-Moretti package. Several respondents, looking back on the Senate's resistance, suggested that the "pride of the Senate" became as much the issue as anything. "After all," it was said, "the Assembly is the lower house!" Other respondents also suggested that the gubernatorial aspirations of both Speaker Moretti and Senator Moscone may have given SB 90 some "political football" characteristics.

In any event, the Reagan-Moretti package was pushed to a vote in the Senate Finance Committee with supporters believing that the bill could pass on the Senate floor if pried loose from committee. But the package was derailed on a close 6-7 vote and Senate Finance immediately moved to substitute a $900 million bill carried by Senator Dills (a measure hastily amended to raise sales taxes to provide enough revenue to cover the additional costs). At this point, it appeared that an atmosphere of "legislation by exhaustion" was beginning to set in.
A weary legislature postponed its scheduled recess in order to make one last attempt at passing a bill acceptable to both houses and the Governor. By late July and early August, the Assembly Ways and Means Committee—exercising some imaginative parliamentary footwork—took the Senate version, stripped out everything but the title, inserted the original Reagan-Moretti package, and voted 14-3 to send it to the Assembly floor.

When the bill reached the Senate floor the first week in August, the measure received a favorable vote of "only" 23-14. (Two-thirds approval was needed for such an appropriation.) By August 8, an exhausted legislature recessed with Speaker Moretti predicting that the legislature would return from recess on November 8 for a "bitter, difficult, and unhappy" windup.23

The three month recess was not without political maneuvering and developments, however. Early in September Governor Reagan proposed an across-the-board one-time income tax cut of up to $450 million if the legislature would not grant property tax relief when it reconvened in November. Also, the finance issue was generally debated in the election campaigns and may have led to the defeat of one or two of the legislators voting "No" on SB 90. In this regard, many observers commented on the efforts of the California Teachers Association through its political action arm to pour money into key campaigns for Assembly and Senate.

Further, the property tax relief question could have been decided by the people on November 7, since Proposition 14—the so-called Watson Initiative—would have limited the use of the property tax and raised state taxes to make up for lost revenues. However, the Watson Initiative was widely opposed, defeated on November 7, and the problem was dropped back into the laps of legislators.
The legislature reconvened the day after the election for one last hectic month to resolve the tax reform deadlock. Between November 8 and December 1—a period of intense political pressure and infighting—numerous charges and counter-charges were exchanged by leaders in the Senate, Assembly, and Governor's office. Reagan, for example, threatened to take his own initiative package to the voters if the legislature did not pass SB 90. Speaker Moretti, with his hat in the ring for the 1974 Democratic gubernatorial nomination, countered that if the Governor were to take an initiative to the people, he would take his version to the people also and let them choose between the two plans. And educational interest groups, all the while, were applying whatever political pressure could be mustered to "break" some "No" votes.

On this particular issue, and at least for this short time, the interest groups apparently worked closely together, exchanging strategies and cooperative "you-work-on-this-one" efforts. All of the educational interest groups with the exception of the California Federation of Teachers were backing SB 90. CTA was particularly aggressive in this application of political pressure and organized several "marches on the capitol." (An interesting and curious example of "politics makes strange bedfellows" was the appearance of conservative Ronald Reagan before a group of demonstrating teacher-pickets on the Capitol steps telling them they were "doing the right thing.")

Between the application of political pressure and further compromises, such as providing property tax relief for renters as well as homeowners, the deadlock in the Senate was broken. On December 1, the last day possible in 1972, the California legislature approved Senate Bill 90 which provided $561 million in state support for local schools—an amount divided between new money for program improvement ($332 million), including early childhood education, and monies for local property tax rollbacks ($229 million).
After two years of debate and political activity, the legislature had approved a massive school finance-tax reform package intended not only to promote 50-50 state-local funding, but also to be a significant step toward compliance with Serrano and the principle of fiscal neutrality. But in the aftermath of that chaotic legislative session, especially as more and more "trailer bill cleanup" problems were uncovered, even avid supporters of SB 90 began to have second thoughts about how far toward Serrano California had gone.

**Early Childhood Education**

Early Childhood Education became an issue before the state policy-making system almost solely because of the efforts of one man--State Superintendent Wilson Riles. During the election campaign of 1970, and in the months following, Riles had repeatedly emphasized his belief that the education of children should be begun much earlier than the normal kindergarten or first grade--perhaps as early as the age of four.

In a March, 1971, report to the legislature Riles asserted that "Research findings consistently document that as much as 50 per cent of a child's intellectual potential is developed before he reaches school age and that 80 per cent is developed by the age of eight. I am not satisfied that we have focused a sufficient portion of our energy and resources in this critical area." 24

Based upon this belief, Riles announced that he would name a blue-ribbon task force to develop a comprehensive, integrated Master Plan for Early Childhood Education. While the Task Force was to have considerable latitude to come up with its own recommendations, Riles suggested that the Master Plan might consider such innovations and improvements as:

1. Expanding the number of preschool day care centers and placing them where they can best serve mothers.
2. Converting the first three grades into a non-graded primary system with individualized instruction and comprehensive diagnostic evaluation.

3. Encouraging the best teachers—including more male teachers to go into the primary grades.


Under the chairmanship of the late Dr. Milton Babitz, the Task Force developed a series of ambitious and costly recommendations and reported the following to the State Superintendent and State Board of Education on November 26, 1971:

1. All children in California between the ages of 4 and 8 should have the opportunity to be served by a publicly supported primary school.

2. Goals must be clearly defined so that outcomes of the program can be evaluated.

3. Adequate funds must be allocated for the successful operation of the proposed expanded primary school.

4. The primary school must become a community educational center, focusing all the resources of the family and the community in order to serve children and their parents.

5. Parent education and involvement must be an integral part of the program.

6. An environment appropriate for primary education must reflect the nature and needs of the young child.

7. Medical, dental and nutritional needs should be met and social services, day care, and counseling must be accessible.

The substance of these recommendations of the Task Force was transformed into legislative policy positions of the State Board and State Department which proposed that the appropriation for the Early Childhood Education Program reach an annual level of $350 million or more over a five-year phase-in period.

The Early Childhood Education proposal finally took shape in the form of SB 1302 (Dymally) which was enacted in 1972 and funded as part of the larger school finance bill, SB 90.
However, "twixt the cup of the Task Force and the lip of legislative enactment," a number of substantial changes were made. First, the Task Force proposal had been geared to a beginning year of 1972-73 whereas SB 1302 pushed the starting year back to 1973-74. Second, educational opportunities for four-year olds (3 years, 9 months), which would have provided for optional participation upon parental request, was postponed for reconsideration by the legislature in 1975.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the funding levels for early childhood were cut substantially from those proposed by the Task Force and State Department of Education. First year appropriations by $25 million and second year $40 million represented far less than the $52 million and $123 million originally sought.

As mentioned previously, the importance of Early Childhood Education as a policy issue before the state policy system rested primarily in the fact that it was conceived and championed by the State Superintendent. To some degree, especially in light of the fact that other actors and groups in the educational community largely absented themselves from the issue, the Early Childhood Education proposal's success or failure was that of Wilson Riles.

On the one hand, if one were to be critical of the State Superintendent, it could be said that the legislative response of $25 million and delayed consideration of four year olds constituted a "put-off" or mere tokenism. On the other hand, the same facts could be used to praise a State Superintendent whose track record compares extremely well with that of his predecessor (Rafferty had found it virtually impossible and perhaps undesirable to communicate with the legislature, let alone secure program dollars from it).
Teacher Certification

Although a dead issue insofar as 1972 activities were concerned, the issue of teacher certification was a matter of intense controversy in California's state policy system at least as far back as the Fisher bill of 1961. The California legislature had voted, in 1958, to create a Joint Interim Committee on the Public Education System and also created a Citizens Advisory Commission to assist the Joint Interim Committee. After nearly two years and five thousand pages of documentation a majority report called for fundamental reforms in (1) the training and licensing of teachers; (2) the elementary and secondary school curriculum; (3) the evaluation and selection of textbooks; (4) statewide testing programs; and (5) administrative procedures. With regard to the preparation and licensing of teachers, the Commission's recommendations led to the introduction of the Fisher Bill in 1961.

The battle-scarred voyage of this bill through the Senate and Assembly is an instructive study in itself of the politics of American education, with the California establishment fighting the major provisions of the bill in all the ways it knew how but ultimately being beaten by a strong press and gubernatorial support, by equally strong support from the State Board of Education, by a legislature weary of establishment tactics, and by sheer weight of public opinion. When the Fisher Bill finally passed in a weakened but not crippled condition, it marked the first time in modern California history that the professional education lobby has not been able to block a major bill of which it disapproved.26

During 1970 the legislature considered and passed a bill (AB 122) amending Chapter 557 of the Education Code and dealing with the question of teacher certification. Otherwise known as the Teacher Preparation and Licensing Law of 1970—or more simply the Ryan Act—the act as approved by the Governor on July 30, 1970, created an independent commission to administer teacher certification standards.
The members of such a Commission are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate: six of the members are certified personnel in public elementary-secondary schools (at least four must be classroom teachers); four higher education faculty members; two school board members, and three private citizens. Other representatives of the State Superintendent, Regents of the University of California, Board of Trustees of the California State Colleges and the like serve without vote.

In effect, this piece of legislation, and the Commission thereby created, effectively removed from the State Superintendent, Board and Department, any substantial control over the administration of teacher certification. It is important to note here that the act was approved during the months immediately preceding the election of a State Superintendent in November of 1970. More bluntly, the action was taken during the Rafferty era and prior to Wilson Riles' upset victory.

That, perhaps, is the significance of the legislation. Several respondents referred to the Ryan Act as "the last example of a series of legislative moves to take power away from Max." This is not to say that the new Commission approach was not considered on its own merits. Yet it does suggest, however speculatively, that had a more popular State Superintendent (like Riles) opposed the idea (as Riles does) the legislation might not have been adopted in the first place.

The Ryan Act was strongly supported by the CTA as a measure to give teachers more voice in licensing, and the CTA represents formidable opposition to changing the current status quo in this regard. Wilson Riles is one opponent. In fact, the Superintendent includes the Commission in his list of fifteen such groups which should be abolished. But there is little evidence to suggest that the State Superintendent and State Department will be able to soon overcome such an established procedure to return control of teacher certification to the Department.
FOOTNOTES

1. Throughout the hectic 1972 legislative year there were numerous bills on school finance-tax reform. Since SB 90 passed, other defunct bills will not be referred to.


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. The author is fully aware of the dangers of playing the "statistics" game. Indeed, NEA's Rankings, as quoted by CTA, produced a sharp rebuttal from the Governor during debate over SB 90. NEA subsequently "revised" its data.


10. In January, 1969, former CSSO Max Rafferty, an arch-conservative, had called for a tax increase, if necessary, to resolve the "desperate financial situation."


12. Ibid.


15. Serrano vs. Priest, op. cit.

16. Ibid.

17. Rodriguez vs. San Antonio Independent School District, U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, Civil Action No. 68-175-SA.


21 Ibid., March 10, 1972.
22 Ibid., June 30, 1972.
23 Ibid., August 8, 1972.
25 The 25 member Task Force broadly represented the State Department, Higher Education, local schools, education-related businesses and interest groups.
SECTION IV -- THE POLICY ROLES

Wilson Riles: The Great Peacemaker

Wilson Camanza Riles, orphaned at the age of 11, worked his way through Northern Arizona University and served in Arizona as a teacher and administrator before coming to the California State Department of Education. Serving in the Department for 12 years, Riles established his reputation in directing compensatory education, was promoted to Deputy Superintendent of Programs, and in 1970 became a candidate for California's elected State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Riles, a World War II veteran, father of four children, and holder of two honorary law degrees and three honorary humane letters degrees, also served on both President Johnson's and President Nixon's task forces on urban education. Yet, as a black liberal Democrat and a relatively unknown political figure, he hardly seemed likely to unseat highly publicized incumbent Max Rafferty. After a heated campaign (see Section I), Riles began his tenure as State Superintendent in January, 1971, and immediately announced a shake-up of the State Department of Education's six top officials, not the least of which was Deputy Superintendent Everett Calvert. Calvert, whom some California respondents viewed as "worse than Max himself," had not only managed to alienate the State Board (to the extent that they allegedly would not pay his expenses to Board meetings); but, as much as anyone, had been an extremely divisive and abrasive factor in legislative relationships (to the extent that he was "invited" not to return to committee hearings). Although Calvert had a four year contract before Rafferty's defeat, under the Riles administration's first few months, his rank and salary were reduced and he was removed from significant decision-making channels.
The new Superintendent explained his top-level "housecleaning" by saying, "I think what I'm talking about is a team approach to solving California's educational problems rather than a divisive approach. I don't think it's any secret that some of the people we are terminating or reassigning thought too much about their philosophy and forgot about education."²

Necessary though such a shake-up may have been, it served the Riles administration only as a means to larger ends: the campaign and continuing concerns of Wilson Riles for early childhood education, school finance-tax reform, and the like. In order to make any meaningful progress toward these educational goals, the State Superintendent would have to mend fences and establish channels of communications with the State Board, legislature, Governor, and educational interest groups - channels of communication all but destroyed in the eight-year Rafferty era.

The State Superintendent and State Board

Max Rafferty had had a running series of controversies with the State Board of Education beginning first with Governor Brown's appointees. The division was such that Rafferty, during his first term, had asked the Attorney General questions like:

Does the State Board have the right to order the State Superintendent to do something he does not want to do? What happens if the Superintendent does not do so? Whose legal right is it to give orders to the employees of the State Department of Education? What would happen in the case of conflicting orders on the part of the Superintendent and Board?³

Although the resulting legal opinion favored the authority of the State Board, execution of Board policy became highly uncertain business during the Rafferty era.

In addition to the absence of a meaningful working relationship between the Board and Superintendent, a substantial majority of the 1970 Reagan-appointed Board had endorsed Rafferty's third term re-election bid over
black liberal Democrat Riles. The new Superintendent therefore had to work with a Board known to prefer Rafferty, for whatever reasons. Later, after two years as Superintendent, Riles said,

If I had approached my work with the Board with arrogance - after all 54 per cent of the people voted for me - I could have carried on as my predecessor had. I could have had a running fight with the Board. But my approach was that I had a commitment to a job and that I needed their help. I told them we would not always agree, but that it was incumbent on both of us to find the best way to help children.

Judging by the responses of the Board members, Wilson Riles has been highly successful in establishing an effective working relationship with a group of people that could have been difficult. (Several knowledgeable respondents perceive a cross section of the Board as comprised of mildly liberal, moderate, and conservative members.)

As one Board member put it, "Wilson Riles has really worked at developing harmony with and among the Board. I'm pleasantly surprised with him." Another Board member asserted, "Riles is much closer to the Board than Rafferty was." Still other Board members noted that the Superintendent's "soft sell" approach appeared to be effective rather than abrasive or divisive.

When asked whether there were Board members who opposed the Superintendent on policy issues, a majority of the Board felt that two or three members frequently did so. However, a number of Board members hastened to add that such opposition was on an issue-by-issue basis and had little if anything to do with conflict on a personal level. In this regard, one Board member said: "There are two or three who frequently oppose Dr. Riles, but I think even they have more faith in him now than when he was elected."

Yet there existed some small measure of friction. At least one Board member felt that

The committees (sub-committees of the full Board) are supposed to rubber stamp what he (Riles) wants. Then it goes to the full Board and they're supposed to rubber stamp it also.
We're always rushed. I'm sure it's done intentionally. There's always a big rush...we're always under pressure to get things through...if we don't act on something right away all sorts of bad things are supposed to happen...we almost have to go along with what he (Riles) wants because we only get one side of the story.

On balance, Wilson Riles appeared to have done an effective job of approaching the Board openly and honestly, winning their respect, if not always their agreement. As a case in point, Board members have appreciated his thinking regarding proposed legislation. Since the California Superintendent is a Constitutional officer, he has the right to propose legislation apart from the Board's. However, Riles made a point to refrain from pressing for any legislation not meeting the approval of the Board: "I try to get the concurrence of the Board before going to the legislature...I don't have to...but choose to."7

On issues which have been highly controversial, like Creation and evolution theory in science books, the Superintendent "kept his head down." In defense of staying out of such matters, Riles explained: "I have to identify what I consider to be priorities - things that are going to make a difference with children. I'm willing to take a stand on major issues...But I learned a long time ago that you don't waste your ammunition on target practice."8

The State Superintendent and the Legislature

Whatever problems may have existed with the State Board, they were overshadowed by a negative relationship between the CSSO and the legislature. As suggested previously, the Rafferty administration had done much to destroy any semblance of credibility and/or mutual respect between the legislature and the state educational agency. Rafferty was viewed as "arrogant" by many legislators, most of whom got the impression that "Max was too important to come over and testify before committees...He didn't want to give us the time..."
of day. When he wanted something from the legislature he would send (Chief Deputy Everett) Calvert over and that was worse than coming over himself. On the few occasions Max did talk to us it was clear we were being lectured.

Riles, by contrast, was predominantly viewed by legislators as being successful "most of the time" in getting SBE-SDE proposals enacted into law. Apparently legislators believed there were many and varied reasons for this turn-about. Most often mentioned was the fact that Riles differed so much from his predecessor. In the words of one legislator, Riles was simply a "welcome change" from what they came to expect from the State Superintendent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost always successful</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful most of the time</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful about half of the time</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful less than half of the time</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost always unsuccessful</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When pressed to give more specific reasons for the respect Riles has gained, legislators remarked "he's sincere, "he's a forceful personality," "a sincere man," and "honestly concerned about what's good for children." Legislators got little of the "ego trip" impression from Riles that they got from Rafferty. Several legislators also mentioned the "positive fallout of race" as a factor in the strong personal and physical impression Riles makes as an articulate black.

Other legislators mentioned more specific reasons, such as the new Office of Legislative Liaison created by Riles. Headed in 1972 by Harvey Hunt, former legislative staff member, the Office was staffed by professionals astute in legislative-political matters.
Other reasons for Riles' credibility with the legislature had to do with impressions that he believed education to be a bipartisan concern, and carefully avoided any partisanship. One legislator was impressed with the fact that Riles "took the time to come over to my office and sit down with me to talk about his concern for the early childhood education issue." Another legislator noted that "it's no secret that he is a Democrat" but went on to say that party affiliation had little to do with Riles' approach.

One legislator who applauded the good job being done by the Superintendent nevertheless suggested a rather cynical analysis: "Riles manages to keep the legislature in a euphoric state with good propaganda - the 'everything is beautiful idea' - which works with legislators because they like to turn their backs on problems." This viewpoint clearly represented the exception, however.

Other legislators pointed to a wide variety of reasons why Riles had been effective ranging from "he's got a good relationship with the Governor," to "he's been able to get the education groups to work together" and "the SDE is an active, well informed - but not powerful - lobbying influence."

On this last point it appeared that the State Department maintained frequent and somewhat successful communications with legislators. Superintendent Riles, Chief Deputy Coultas, and the legislative liaison office staff were "in and out" as needed and when circumstances required. However, legislators typically did not highly regard or heavily rely on the State Department for information and statistics. Rather, they seemed to look upon the Department as "just another source" in addition to the well-staffed legislative committees. This mood seemed to be consistent with the overall aura of independence that dominated the elected representatives in the legislative process.
### LEGISLATOR PERCEPTION OF SDE INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost always meets my needs</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually meets my needs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes meets my needs</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost never meets my needs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On balance, then, Wilson Riles has been effective in establishing his credibility with a legislature which tended to be independent in the first place, and which experienced a divisive, acrimonious relationship with the previous Superintendent. The contrast between the Riles and Rafferty "styles" was probably the most frequently-mentioned consideration in legislative respondents' discussion of the State Superintendent.

Riles has established himself as an articulate, sincere, non-partisan child advocate in the eyes of the legislature. But it is equally important that the legislators themselves emphasized comparisons with Riles' predecessor. At the very least, Wilson Riles represented - to them - a "welcome change."

### The State Superintendent and the Governor

In terms of the relationships between the Superintendent and Governor, many of the same comparisons appear to hold. When Ronald Reagan first took office in 1966, Max Rafferty was beginning his second term. Knowledgeable respondents indicated that Rafferty and Reagan did not get along with each other right from the start. Rafferty's free-wheeling style of taking political "potshots" at anyone and everyone, including California's Governor, did little to endear him to Reagan.

Riles' election to the Superintendency - concurrent with the beginning of Reagan's second term - marked a turning point in the Superintendent-Governor relationship. As one respondent put it:
The Governor and Wilson met the morning after the election and 'hit it off' right away - they began to develop a mutual respect immediately. Riles took the position that education was to be a non-partisan issue between the CSSO and Governor and legislature and that he (Riles) wasn't going to 'go public' with his criticisms. The Governor appreciated that, and they've both lived up to it.12

The relationship between the Governor and Riles amounted to more than a mutual non-aggression pact, however. The Superintendent's expressed concern for accountability struck a responsive chord with the Governor. In addition, one respondent noted that "under the Rafferty administration we (the Governor's office) either couldn't get the information we needed or else it was three weeks late. There's still a problem every so often, but it certainly is much better now."

Apparently, confidence levels between the Governor and Superintendent were such that specific problems, complaints, and letters brought to the Governor's office were referred to the State Department for appropriate action or response. In this regard, Riles' shake-up of State Department personnel may have given the Governor's office the impression that, as one respondent put it, "he likes to have very competent people around him. He has them pretty well 'whipped into shape'." Other respondents expressed doubt as to how much "real improvement" had taken place.

The Governor's office also shared respect for the degree to which Wilson Riles had established an effective working relationship with the legislature - "a good perspective of the 'big picture'."

In short, Superintendent Riles has been as much a "welcome change" to the Governor's office as he has been to the legislature. One respondent capsulized it by remarking on the significance of "the Governor making it a point to have Wilson present at the Los Angeles press conference to sign S.B. 90. He sure never would have done that with Max."13
The relationship between the educational interest groups and the State Superintendent appeared, if anything, to be better than that between the CSSO and SBE, or CSSO and legislature. With the sole exception of the California Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO), all of the educational interest group leaders interviewed indicated that their organizations were in basic agreement with the perceived priorities of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

This is not to say that there was total agreement. The California School Boards Association, for example, indicated that they "had some internal debates" over the early childhood education issue. Other respondents indicated that from time to time "normal problems of communications or differences of opinion arise" in a policy system as large and as complex as California's. The CTA, as another example, differed with the Superintendent on the question of whether control of teacher certification should be "inside" or "outside" the State Department. But the general attitude was one of respect, including the perception that the CSSO was legislative effective and influential with the Governor.

**Educational Interest Group (EIG) Leader Perception of CSSO Legislative Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost always successful</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful most of the time</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful about half of the time</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful less than half of the time</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost always successful</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EIG Leader Perception of the Importance of the CSSO to the Governor as a Source of Ideas and Advice**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Single most important source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Among his most important sources</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A minor source</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all important as a source</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A number of respondents seemed to identify significantly with the Superintendent as an individual, along the lines of "we have a good personal relationship with Riles." The Superintendent was perceived as "spending a lot of time and hard work" at building consensus, to the extent that one respondent flatly stated, "In my opinion he's done a fantastic job." So, in part, the good relationship between the educational interest groups and the Superintendent was based upon a strong personal rapport developed between the respective group leaders and the Superintendent.

In addition, the oft-cited comparison between Riles and Rafferty tended to dominate group-leader reaction to the CSSO. Especially with regard to the much-improved legislative relationship, interest group leaders remarked that "it's really a one man achievement" and that "Riles has taken a wholly different approach."

Significantly, interest group leaders were rather satisfied with the input they had when the Superintendent and/or State Department were in the process of formulating policy or program proposals. On balance, the group leaders did not perceive any one organization as dominating the SDE or CSSO. Rather, they seemed to feel that the Superintendent had done an effective job of listening to their respective viewpoints and attempting to achieve consensus without "playing favorites."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Always</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Several respondents inserted the qualifying "almost..."

In this regard, it is interesting to note the interest group perception of Riles' formation of the Educational Congress (a broad coalition of
education and education-related groups). At least three of the educational interest groups believed that they played a significant role in getting the Superintendent to call the Congress together. Whether the Congress was, in actuality, a brain-child of the Superintendent himself, or of any one of the several groups, the fact remained that there appeared to be a rather strong sense of identification with the action of the Superintendent to form the Congress.

In matters such as these, it is entirely possible that the "real" Wilson Riles may be perceived. That is to say, the most effective "politician" is perhaps the one who seems least to be "playing politics" and who most creates the perception that he is both accessible and responsive to the concerns of others. On the surface, at least, it appeared that Wilson Riles satisfied the groups that they had meaningful input, and at the same time retained his own initiative and prevented any one group from dominating the Department or his office—a delicate balance to strike, indeed.

On the other hand, at least one group—CFT—held a minority opinion. While crediting Superintendent Riles with doing an "effective job of convincing people he's making substantive changes" the Federation criticized SB 90 as "just patchwork" and accountability as "just passed on to teachers and not applied to administrators as well." Put another way, the CFT remarked: "Things are smoother than with Rafferty, but are they better?" The minority viewpoint also criticized Riles as the "great compromiser" who "gives in long before he has to."

The CFT also appeared to be the exception in terms of input into CSSO-SDE policy formation. The Federation believed it had made "very little" difference in the advice it gave because the SDE was "administrator-dominated....they don't bother to find out what teachers really care about."
The State Superintendent in Summary

In summary, the effectiveness of State Superintendent Riles was widely recognized and applauded by a majority of the State Board, educational interest groups, as well as executive and legislative branches of government. In analyzing the responses to wide-ranging questions regarding his effectiveness and reasons thereof, several recurrent factors emerged.

First, Wilson Riles is simply a warm, likable individual. His personal appearance, friendliness, and mannerisms are such that - as an individual - he would be difficult to dislike. There appeared none of the aloofness and bombast which trademarked his predecessor. As an articulate black, he conveyed a personal sincerity of interest for the education and well-being of California's children to the extent that few can question his true motives.

Second, as an administrator Wilson Riles at least gave the appearance of "shaking up" the top-level SDE positions. This was undoubtedly the case in removing Calvert but other major changes may have been foregone because of high risks of alienating educator sub-groups.

Third, Riles' emphasis on education as a non-partisan issue and his steadfast refusal to use the Superintendency as a power base for political attacks earned him the respect of other actors in the political arena.

In addition, Riles moved smoothly to achieve some measure of cooperation and harmony among the State Board, among the educational interest groups, and between the SDE and legislative and executive branches of government. Such "peacemaking" on his part revealed a deeper, more shrewd understanding of the art of politics than might otherwise have appeared on the surface.

While the overall picture was thus very positive and complimentary, at least two uneasy questions were just below the surface. As a difficult-to-discern undercurrent - perhaps largely unspoken - at least some of the
policy system participants were wondering when Wilson Riles was going to make his move...live up to the high expectations of his campaign...and really change things."

A second question - or perhaps a restatement of the first - asked, "Is Wilson Riles that good?...or was Max Rafferty just that bad?"

The State Board of Education

Is the California State Board of Education the policy-making body which charts much of the direction of the State Superintendent and State Department, and thereby also the direction of California's public schools? Or is it a "three ring circus?" Or both? Cliche or not, "it all depends on whom you talk to."

If one were to judge the effectiveness and importance of the State Board solely on the criteria of time expended for a part-time position, the Board would rank high on anyone's list. State Board members indicated that their responsibilities generally consumed about a week a month, with some members indicating that they spent more than that (others noting that they could easily spend more time if they would allow it). In addition to the formal Board meetings themselves, members attended sub-committee meetings and hearings, spent a great deal of time reading background material for their policy decisions, and received no small amount of mail from citizens across the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Day or so per month</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two or three days per month</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week or more per month</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About a week before each Board meeting, members received a bulky agenda and background material prepared by the State Superintendent and SDE staff. A good portion of the agendas were made up of matters pertaining to the legal approval of rather routine items. Board members indicated that about half the agendas were made up of such routine matters.

### PORTION OF STATE BOARD MEETING DEVOTED TO LEGAL APPROVAL OF ROUTINE ITEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost all</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About three-quarters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About half</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About one-quarter</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost none</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apparentely, State Board of Education members had limited access to formal channels of information other than those of the CSSO and SDE, or task forces or study committees under their direction. Most Board members indicated that they relied heavily on the CSSO and SDE and had few contacts of their own beyond personal friends and acquaintances in the schools. There was little evidence to suggest that the State Board received much input from educational interest groups, or political organizations. However, this does not mean that the Board was not bombarded from time to time by citizens groups, especially on matters like sex education and evolution.

Most Board members appeared reasonably satisfied with the quality of the information they received from the SDE regarding agenda items. A majority ranked the information as "usually" or "almost always" meeting their needs. But at least three Board members were not nearly so satisfied. Two of them believed that such background information "sometimes" met their needs, while another Board member contended that it "almost never" met the need.
Such a minority viewpoint was based upon a belief that the information "doesn't go into sufficient detail" and was "shallow and sterile." Whereas that kind of criticism was directed at the quality of information itself, at least two other Board members appeared to direct their criticism at the Superintendent. One Board member contended that "there's always a big rush" to get something through and felt that such time pressure was exerted intentionally to achieve the results desired by the CSSO and SDE. Another Board member charged that the CSSO was not altogether objective and trustworthy in making recommendations "to get their way."

On balance, then, it appeared that the Board relied heavily on the CSSO and SDE to provide the necessary background information on agenda items, that the Board had limited channels of information beyond the CSSO and SDE, and that the majority of the Board was satisfied with this arrangement, with only two or three members expressing overt criticism of the information and motives of the CSSO.

These differences of opinion on the part of the SBE members illustrate the working composition of the Board itself. The responses of Board members themselves as well as those of other respondents clearly indicated that the Board was frequently divided on various issues, but that a working majority - compatible with the CSSO and SDE - existed.

No Board member described the Board as "harmonious, little serious disagreement" or "divided into rival factions of nearly equal strength."
Rather, the consensus indicated that there existed rival factions, but that there was a clear working majority. This seemed to indicate that the majority-minority factions on the Board were relatively constant over time and issues. However, nearly a third of the Board contended that, while the Board was often divided, the lines of division depended on the issue confronting the Board. In essence, then, while there may be some question as to why lines of division appeared, there was little question that the State Board was divided into a working majority and a minority faction. As one respondent put it, "On, yes, we're a split Board."

### Description of State Board When Deciding a Major Policy Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency of Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Board is harmonious, little serious disagreement</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board is usually in agreement but there are Board members who sometimes dissent</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board tends to divide into rival factions of nearly equal strength</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board tends to divide into rival factions, but there is a clear working majority on the Board</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board often is divided but the lines of division depend on the issue that is confronting the Board</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On balance it appeared that the Board was neither extremely liberal nor conservative. An apparent working majority tended to cluster around the 'moderate' middle ground, while the minority tended to be substantially more conservative. This conservative minority encompassed two Board members on a regular basis, with one or two other members joining the minority from time to time on an issue-by-issue basis.

With regard to legislative concerns, the State Board of Education received recommendations from the State Department staff and/or study committees through its legislative subcommittee. After deliberation in subcommittee,
the proposed legislative position was reported to the full Board and acted upon in formal session. It thereby became the official policy of the State Board. However, as mentioned previously, since the CSSO is a constitutional officer in California, there is some question as to how binding such positions were on the SDE staff. While the CSSO (technically) could have had his own legislative program, it was the style of Wilson Riles to refrain from promoting any legislation not approved by the State Board.

There apparently was some question as to the degree of leadership exerted by the State Board in the process of seeking educational legislation. One Board member, for example, proudly pointed out that the State Board had appointed a study group to address the school finance problem several years prior to Serrano, had revitalized the group after Serrano, and had taken a strong position on the school finance question before the 1972 legislature. After taking a position on such legislation, at least some Board members believed that they continued to be involved.

At least three Board members indicated that, from time to time, they contacted legislators regarding Board policy and proposed legislation. One Board member, in fact, stated that "arriving early in Sacramento for Board meetings" facilitated such contacts with legislators. Several Board members also noted that Board members occasionally testified before legislative committees or subcommittees regarding pending legislation.

But there was serious question as to how much activity of this type took place, or, if it did, the extent to which it made any significant impression. The majority of the Board tended to view the legislative process as handled by SDE staff after the Board had taken a position. As one Board member put it, "The staff wants to handle it all. I'm sure they'd rather have us just stay out of it."

From the viewpoint of legislators themselves, on the other hand, there
appeared to be little contact—if any—between the State Board and the legislature. The great majority of legislators indicated that the State Board per se did not communicate its positions and recommendations to the legislators. One legislator, for example, indicated that he learned of SBE activity and positions "through the newspaper." Several other legislators mentioned that they could not "think of any examples" of issues where they had been contacted by Board members. As one legislator said, "In my 14 years in the legislature, I can't think of once (that he was contacted by a Board member)." Several other legislators commented that they couldn't recall the names of Board members.

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>One of the most important participants</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A participant of minor importance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important at all as a participant</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, one legislator remarked, "I don't know why they should (contact us). They're not a legislative body. They have the SDE staff to do the work for them." That, more than anything else, seemed to typify the legislators' appraisal. The legislators had frequent contact with SDE staff and recognized the CSSO as a credible spokesman for education. But little direct identification with or dependence on the State Board itself was apparent in the legislative process.

Given the fact that California State Board of Education members are appointed by the Governor, one might reasonably expect the Governor to seek to influence his appointees from time to time in their deliberations. Conversely, one might also expect that Board members might have some measure of influence with the Governor when the Executive branch developed legisla-

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It is therefore somewhat surprising to note that State Board of Education members themselves apparently sensed little communication or influence flowing in either direction. In response to several questions regarding whether the State Board ever works directly with the Governor's office, or whether individual Board members are among the Governor's close advisors on education matters, the State Board respondents almost unanimously indicated that there was virtually no contact. One Board member commented that "everything used to be out in the open, but not any more. I think Riles and the Governor go behind closed doors to make their decisions and that's it."

Several other Board members commented on perceived contact at staff levels—for example, between SDE staff and Alex Sherriffs, the Governor's education advisor. Yet another Board member replied that "we have complete access to the Governor," but implied again that such channels of communication were through staff level contacts. In this regard, it was pointed out that a staff representative of the Governor's Office attends virtually all State Board of Education meetings. But it was also mentioned that he "never says anything."

In essence, then, there appeared to be little direct contact between the Governor or his staff and State Board of Education members. There did appear to be frequent contact between the CSSO and Governor, and between their respective staffs. Whatever input or influence the State Board had with the Executive branch of government was indirect and dependent upon the degree to which staff personnel felt such activity was necessary or desirable. (In 1973, however, there may have been considerable direct pressure from Reagan on his initiative to place limits on state taxation. The State Board was alone among education groups in supporting the Governor's ballot initiative.)
With regard to communication between the State Board of Education and educational interest groups, a rather strange "mixed bag" appeared. On the one hand, the majority of the State Board believed that there was fairly frequent contact between Board members and the major educational interest groups: Association of California School Administrators, California Teachers Association, California School Boards Association, and California Federation of Teachers. Some Board members cited such contact as "often," while others said "sometimes." On the other hand, two Board members disagreed and cited such contact as occurring "rarely."

STATE BOARD MEMBER PERCEPTIONS OF CONTACT WITH VARIOUS GROUPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Person/Group</th>
<th>Frequency of Contact</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual parents or parent groups</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local (or county) school district superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City government officials</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Teachers Assn. (NEA affiliate)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>State Teachers Union (AFT affiliate)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Administrator Assns.</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>State School Board Association</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spokesman for &quot;Special Education&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor groups</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business groups</td>
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<td>Farm groups</td>
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<td>Religious groups</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Racial-Ethnic groups</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Apparently the State Board initiated such communication on occasions. When asked whether the State Board sought to enlist the support of the major educational organizations, some Board members answered affirmatively indicating that such communication was put in letter form or referred through SDE staff and the Educational Congress--a coalition of organizations. Still, other Board members said "No" to the question of seeking support from educational interest groups.

The interest groups themselves indicated a rather widespread and uniform lack of interest in the State Board of Education as an official agency in
the state policy-making system. Interest group respondents were unanimous in their assessment that none of the organizations could be called "particularly influential" with the State Board. As one respondent put it, "We (educational interest groups) don't really try to be (influential with the State Board)."

Such relative lack of emphasis on lobbying the State Board per se was directly related to the effectiveness of the CSSO. In the words of one interest group respondent, "Wilson's recommendations are usually bought (by the State Board) so again we get back to working through his office before the fact...before the recommendations are formalized." Since the interest groups generally perceived their relationship with the CSSO and SDE as good, and since they also generally perceived the Board as merely formalizing CSSO-SDE recommendations, it is easily understood that the State Board was of little direct concern to them in the policy-making arena. The interest groups tended to perceive the legislature as "where the action is" and "they (SBE) don't make that much difference anyway."

In concluding an assessment of the role of the State Board of Education, it is fair to say that some discrepancy existed between the perceptions of the Board members themselves and the perceptions of others regarding the importance of the State Board's role. The Board members tended to see themselves as more involved and in touch with the legislative process than the legislators or interest groups perceived them to be. While State Board members themselves admitted to utilizing SDE-CSSO staff capabilities for implementation purposes, the legislators and interest groups believed that educational concerns flowing from the SBE-CSSO-SDE were largely initiated by the State Superintendent and his staff.26

The dominant role of Wilson Riles unquestionably had a marked effect on the kind of role that the SBE played. For example, several respondents
mentioned the fact that the SBF had to be far more concerned about legislation during the Rafferty era when the Board and the State Superintendent were frequently at odds on legislative priorities. The ability of the present Superintendent to "sell" the Board on his ideas and achieve consensus among the diverse viewpoints of the Board enabled the legislature, Governor, and educational interest groups alike to channel their concerns and communications almost exclusively through the office of the CSSO, knowing that affecting policy proposals stemming from him would be tantamount to affecting the ultimate policy decision formalized by the State Board.

The Governor

Where else but California could a veteran movie actor and one-time liberal Democrat without a day's experience in public office gain the Republican gubernatorial nomination and win the election by a plurality of nearly a million votes? And where else but California would that Governor prove to be one of the country's most adept politicians to the extent that he would be a potential Presidential candidate?

Ronald Reagan's first campaign centered around the theme that something had to be done about taxes, welfare costs, crime in the streets, and violence on the campuses. By 1970--his second campaign--California was, if anything, worse off in those areas than before. But the personal appeal of Reagan, especially via television, and his natural political charm enabled the Governor to "package" relatively conservative ideology in language sounding at least moderate and of substantial appeal to the man in the street.

Throughout his first term as Governor, Reagan established himself as a cut-trim-and-squeeze politician equally adept at attracting right-wing moneyed interests and tired-of-taxes property owners. Halfway through his second term, the Governor disavowed any interest in running for a third
term or for a Senate seat, and expressed interest in preaching his tax-limitation approach to government on the national "mashed-potatoes" circuit. He is therefore considered by many observers to be a force to be reckoned with in 1976 national politics.

In California, the Governor not only has the constitutional responsibility for submitting his budget to the legislature, but also has substantial veto powers to reduce or eliminate one or more items of appropriation while approving other portions, in other words, line-item veto power. This, combined with the fact that a two-thirds concurrent vote of both houses is needed to override a veto (unheard of for decades in California) gives the Governor substantial authority and influence in the budgetary processes of state government.

Reagan was not reluctant to use such veto powers, with many cuts coming in educational matters which represent a large portion of the state's budget. In the 1971-72 budget bill, for example, Reagan vetoed $504 million from the spending document sent him by the legislature, with cuts primarily in public and higher education, welfare, and medical care for the poor. Other Reagan vetoes have chopped dollars from programs for teaching disadvantaged children, helping gifted children, raising minimum teacher salaries, and the like.

It is interesting to note, from the standpoint of practical politics, that the legislative branch of government has fewer potential responses to a governor like Reagan than to "spenders." That is to say, legislators can respond to vetoes by "holding hostage" particular money bills desired by the executive. But since Reagan's priorities have been to reduce or hold in check such spending programs anyway, the legislative "hostage" approach is generally ineffective.
It became increasingly difficult for the educational community to impress upon the executive branch of government that a growing crisis in educational finance equalled or exceeded Reagan's perceived crisis in runaway taxation. Such priorities led the Governor to veto cost-of-living increases for state employees two years running, with the hope that "they will understand that a salary increase would have required new and additional taxes on our citizens who are already hard-hit by unemployment and reduced earnings."

In addition to holding such perceptions as might lead the Governor to take positions generally unfavorable to the educational community, Reagan has been relatively inaccessible to many of the forces operating within the state policy-making system. Several knowledgeable California respondents commented specifically on Reagan's inaccessibility. One of these, apparently venting his frustration, charged that "Reagan spends less time in Sacramento than any Governor in the history of the state. He's either out of the state making Presidential points, or he's down on his ranch with his family." Another respondent commented that the Governor is generally inaccessible even to his own staff. "I understand that he requires everything to be in memo form and limited to one page. I don't think even Alex Sherriffs (the Governor's education secretary) sees him more than a few times a year." Moir accurately, perhaps, the Governor has been accessible, but on educational matters of interest to him.

Whether these perceptions were accurate or not, they did reflect a general frustration on the part of many in the educational community that the Governor's cut-trim-and-squeeze philosophy has put him on relatively safe ground, to the extent that he has been largely unreachable by the normal political pressures for increased school aid. In this respect, Senate Bill 90 proved to be quite the exception. SB 90 received gubernatorial support
because Reagan wanted property tax limitations. Moretti and the Democrats wanted more money for schools and the compromise was therefore necessitated.

The irony of it all was perhaps captured in early November, 1972, when the Governor appeared before a mass of rallying teachers who had marched on the state capitol and told them they were "doing the right thing."

Legislators' Perceptions of the Governor

Whether the Governor himself has been "doing the right thing" for education depends on which legislators you talk to. When asked whether the Governor has given public schools, including school finance, a high priority in his legislative program, the general answer was negative.

A few legislators--primarily Republicans--tried to indicate that the Governor at least had not been anti-education, or that he really would have liked to have been supportive of education if it were not for the larger question of runaway taxation. But even the most positive responses include comments like, "I would be inclined to say 'Yes' (that the Governor has given education top priority) but I'm sure the public school people would say 'No.' But the amount of money for public schools has gone up every year."

Others said things like, "Contrary to general opinion, the Governor has given education a high priority. School support levels have gone up consistently. The Governor supported SB 90, for example."

The majority of legislator-respondents expressed outright criticism of the Governor's treatment of education even though placed in the larger tax context. One Republican, for example, believed "the Governor doesn't have priorities in education. In the last six years he's become involved in school finance because it's a popular issue." Education itself apparently was not a priority for the Governor, though the question of school finance and tax reform were interlocked to the extent that Reagan had to support the former to get the latter.
Republican legislators tended to emphasize that Reagan's "top priority is a balanced budget" with emphasis "to balance the budget in accordance with our income." In so many words, many Republicans seemed to believe the best they could do was "deflect" charges that the Governor was anti-education, rather than refute such charges outright. Democrats, understandably, were far more outspoken in their criticism of the administration. One respected Democratic spokesman said "Hell, no. (The Governor doesn't give education priority.) He emphasizes law and order, termination of welfare programs...." Another Democrat, responding not quite so forcefully, believed the Governor gave education only "begrudging acknowledgment."

Whatever the reason for Reagan's position on SB 90--whether out of necessity for compromise on more school money to get tax reform features--the Governor was almost unanimously perceived as having played a major role in passage of the major tax reform-school finance bill of 1972. Many legislators, in so many words, simply said, "We wouldn't have gotten a bill without the Governor."

Descriptions of the Governor's role ranged from "worked like Hell" to "really went after (legislative) opponents head-to-head" and "often bordering on intense purely political power." One Republican who voted "No" in the early going indicated that pressure from the Governor's Office initially emphasized the "desperate need for party loyalty," gradually changing to the subtle point that "some of my 'ills would have tough going (if he didn't vote 'Yes') unto, and including, a potential veto (of his bills) although that wasn't mentioned in so many words."

Another key legislator voting "No" at the outset also indicated that "there was swift and unbelievable pressure from every direction including the Governor's office. I was subjected to virtually every kind of political pressure known to man."
Several respondents noted that the Governor used Department of Finance personnel to do much of the heavy work. One knowledgeable respondent indicated that the Department of Finance—and Deputy Director Ken Hall, specifically—"wrote half the bill and did much of the negotiating to come up with a workable compromise."

The consensus of legislator viewpoints was that the Governor was not particularly a friend of education, viewed school finance as just another demand on scarce resources, recognized the need for compromise if he were to achieve tax reform, and played a central role in securing passage of SB 90.

Educational Interest Group Perceptions of the Governor

Educational interest group leaders tended to be rather uniform in their assessment of the role of the Governor in regard to educational issues and school finance. When asked whether the Governor had really emphasized his views on education in the last two sessions of the legislatures, interest group leaders almost unanimously indicated that Reagan had not. Only two respondents, representing different organizations, indicated that the Governor had emphasized education. One of those stated that accountability—"Is the money being spent wisely and efficiently?"—drew the attention of the Governor with "nice general statements about education, but beyond that no action." The other stated that "up until last year, he (Reagan) had been very critical of education, but now he's coming around. I'm sure part of that is to Wilson's (Riles) credit." Aside from these two qualified "Yes" answers, the balance of the interest group leaders viewed the Governor as something considerably less than a friend of education.

This is not to say that interest group leaders did not recognize the role of the Governor in securing passage of SB 90. Rather, they viewed the Governor's basic commitment as being "to the tax reform question with
school finance as a necessary evil." Others commented that Reagan "certainly hasn't been an education Governor. He's largely ignored some of the more pressing problems--like school finance until he saw a way to get property tax relief." And at least one interest group leader questioned whether Reagan "really believes in public education. I think he believes more in education of the elite."

Aside from SB 90, all of the educational interest group leaders perceived basic disagreements on education questions between their respective organizations and the Governor's Office. But even on that issue, as one group leader indicated, "We were fortunate on SB 90 to be able to work with (Deputy Director of Finance) Ken Hall. He's fair and open-minded, but he's also sharp and tough."

The educational interest group leaders were also largely in agreement in their response to questions about whether some educational organizations have more influence than others with the Governor. A sample of the comments indicated that "It's safe to say there isn't a single educational organization that has much influence"; "Everybody is pretty much in the same boat--to a large degree the Governor is simply inaccessible"; and "Nobody has any kind of inside track."

There appeared to be some marginal edge in favor of the California Teacher's Association, if one group had to be picked. CTA allegedly was the only interest group to have an 'in-house' finance expert working closely with the Department of Finance. In addition, another respondent gave credence to the claim to the extent that "CTA is trying to capitalize on SB 90 and make it sound like they influenced the Governor but they didn't." Another non-CTA respondent, while reluctant to cite one group over another, suggested that "CTA might get through (to the Governor) a little purely from a power standpoint."
When asked how their respective organizations worked with the Governor and his staff, there again appeared to be a great deal of agreement. None of the group leaders claimed any direct access or input into the Governor's Office. The majority indicated contact with, and some "give and take" through, the Department of Finance. But even in this regard, several respondents indicated their influence was limited. "In the last 4 to 6 weeks--after November 7 especially--none of us had much influence." Still another commented that "After the Reagan-Moretti compromise there wasn't anyplace to go--it (SB 90) was the only ball game in town. We did the best we could with that. But I'd say it was all just so much tinkering after the Governor and the Speaker got together."

To sum up, the educational interest groups perceived themselves as generally in disagreement with the Governor on a philosophical basis from the outset. Whereas the interest groups actively pressed for additional state support both in terms of dollars and favorable legislative policy, these groups also perceived the Governor as trying to hold down spending and increase efficient use and management of existing resources. Generally this translated into a policy role of the Governor maintaining the status quo, exercising broad veto powers when necessary to countermand legislative enactments, and giving ground grudgingly when necessary as "trade-offs" for priorities of his own, such as property tax reform.

In addition to being philosophically diverse from the educational interest groups, the Governor was largely inaccessible to them. While such inaccessibility appeared to be part of Reagan's administrative style rather than an aloofness directed particularly at such interest groups, the fact remained that education interest groups' negativism toward Reagan was reinforced. Only in isolated cases, such as SB 90 where an alter ego like Ken Hall was accessible, did the interest groups play any influential role with the
executive branch of government. In such a vacuum, the interest groups appeared to have directed more of their attention to the legislative branch.

Finally, if any of the interest groups had an edge in the "influence" game, it appeared to be the CTA. But that margin appeared to be limited in a relatively small sphere of influence.

The Governor as Perceived by the CSSO-SBE-SDE

The perceptions of, and influence with, the Governor's Office that emanated from the State Board and State Department largely revolved about the Chief State School Officer. As noted previously, the relationship between Wilson Riles and the Governor was dramatically better than in the Rafferty era. The knowledgeable respondents were much in agreement on the "good relationship" that had been established.

There was also much information from respondents to indicate that staff-level contacts were better than before. The exchange of information and advice appeared to be appreciated at both ends of the line. But there was also a nagging subsurface question as to whether such mutual back-patting amounted to anything more substantive than "eye-wash."

The Governor appeared to be far more accessible to Wilson Riles than to anyone else in the educational community. Each refrained from "taking shots" at the other. Both appeared to have carefully cultivated their good relationship and were not reluctant to just as carefully let it be known. But what was different?

Wilson Riles listed early childhood education as one of his high priorities and, despite glowing descriptions about his relationship with Reagan, or for that matter the legislature, managed to get only $25 million for a program that was proposed at upwards of $300 million.
Both Riles and Reagan supported SB 90, with the latter understandably swinging far greater weight. In short, there was little opportunity or desire for either the CSSO or the Governor to "take each other on" as had been the practice with Rafferty. Respondents indicated that Riles and Reagan were very much alike in their thinking, especially with emphasis on accountability. Even so, the good relationship had little opportunity to be put to the test. (Later, in 1973, Riles would openly oppose Reagan's tax-limitation initiative.)

The Legislature

In terms of overall impressions, if one were forced to describe the California legislature in a word, that description would have to be "self-sufficient." Given the chance to offer a second one-word description, one might choose the term "professional." But these general terms do little to relate several dominant assessments generally and widely held by the actors within the state educational policy-making system in California.

The first of these nearly universal assessments was the fact that the California legislature was "where the action was" perhaps to a greater degree than might have been true in many states. Such an assessment was reflected in the priorities of the interest groups as they applied leverage within the policy system. The legislature was the focal point of considerable lobbying activity, as opposed to the State Board of Education which, by comparison, was largely ignored.

Adding to the importance of the legislative body was the fact that the Reagan administration typically gave little attention to educational concerns. More accurately, perhaps, the educational community (until SB 90) was unable to work with the executive branch on policy proposals of any significance.
A second major assessment of the policy role of the legislature had to do with the fact that it probably was more self-sufficient than any other state legislature. Several studies and scholars, previously referred to, have ranked the California legislature as among—if not flatly—the best in the country.

(Several factors can be cited to illustrate such a contention. California legislators are among the best paid, with ample office space and personal staff. But perhaps more importantly, the legislative committees are well-staffed, thanks to the Unruh era of "professionalizing" the legislative process.)

Other evidence existed to illustrate the self-sufficiency of the legislature. An outstanding example cited was the Legislative Analyst's office—consisting of 44 technical and 19 clerical staff—of legislative creation and charged with responsibility to "ascertain facts and make recommendations to the Legislature and to the Houses thereof concerning the State budget, the revenues and expenditures of the state, the organizations and functions of the state, its departments, subdivisions, and agencies, and other such matters as may be provided for in the Joint Rules of the Senate and Assembly."

In short, the Legislative Analyst's office was a legislative creation to serve as a non-partisan watchdog over any and all bills before either House which involve financial implications.

The importance of such staff at these levels—legislator's personal staff, committee staff, and Analyst's staff—was that the legislature was far less dependent on "outside" sources of information than it would be otherwise. Hence, in interviewing legislators, the "self-sufficiency" attitude came through as, in so many words, "Who needs the State Department for information? We have our own sources." Similarly, such staff resources reduced the degree to which the legislature relied on the Governor and Department of Finance.
A third major assessment of the policy role of the legislature in California was evidenced in the lengths to which these policy-makers have gone to be specific about educational matters. The sheer bulk of the Education Code—five volumes and a couple thousand pages—and the number of education bills per session (five to eight hundred) are beyond the comprehension and understanding of any one person.

Why has the legislature been so prescriptive? None of the respondents seemed to have a ready answer. Some referred again to the independence and self-sufficiency of the legislative branch. Others suggested that part of the reason may have to do with over-reaction to the Rafferty era. (As previously mentioned, the 1970 Ryan Act took teacher certification away from the SDE and placed it in the hands of an independent commission.)

There was evidence, however, that such specificity on the part of the legislature had reached the breaking point. Given the unmanageability of the Education Code, the California electorate, in November, 1972, approved Proposition 5 to "turn the Code around." That is to say, the issue, as passed, permitted the legislature to authorize schools to carry on activities not in conflict with state law, eventually resulting in a "permissive" code rather than a "compliance" code. (A legislative committee has begun work in this direction, but it may be five years or more before the changeover is effected.)

A fourth assessment, though perhaps more difficult to illustrate tangibly, had to do with the California tendency toward relatively weak party structures. Since the abolition of cross-filing in the late fifties, party strength has been on the increase. Still, even a major issue like SB 90 was not decided on a straight party-line vote. In a sense, this made influencing legislative decisions a more difficult process, since "capturing the party caucus" may or may not have produced the desired votes on the floor.
A fifth consideration, related to the last, was the fact that educational interest groups were much alike in their lobbying efforts, except for the CTA which added "political action" to their means of influence. The Association for Better Citizenship (ABC) was a creation of the CTA funded at the rate of $5 per CTA member (120,000 of them, remember) for purposes of electing "friends of education" (i.e., friends of CTA) to the legislature.

While there were many respondents--legislators and other group leaders alike--who spoke harshly of such a "power-play" on CTA's part, their tone at the same time reflected an odd mixture of fear and respect for the potential concentration of power by virtue of campaign dollars. Call it "whistling by the graveyard" or "wishful thinking" but most of CTA's non-friends contended "they're killing themselves."

In large measure, the various lobbyists representing interest groups (and it may be appropriate to include the SDE here) still tended to rely on the "soft-sell" and high-sounding approach of "providing information" which was concentrated on basically four committees: Senate Education and Senate Finance; Assembly Education and Assembly Ways and Means. For it was these committees that passed or killed much of the legislation of interest to the educational community. There was no evidence to suggest that other committees--Senate Rules Committee, for example--influencing the flow of bills and appointment of select committees garnered much attention from educational interest group lobbyists.

Considering the information provided by all of the respondents, one must conclude that the educational interest groups--CTA in particular--were at least moderately influential even in the face of legislative "self-sufficiency." The State Superintendent and the SDE, perhaps, ran a close second and most certainly accumulated a good deal of political capital in
the past two years—synonymous with the Riles administration. The Governor's Office, as noted previously, exercised little influence in formulating educational policy (excepting SB 90) because, simply, it chose not to do so. The Governor's priorities were to block policies and cut legislated educational expenditures, not increase them (again noting the unique exception of SB 90).

But in the final analysis, nobody controlled the legislature except perhaps the local electorate who exercised final approval or disapproval. The California legislature was simply too self-sufficient and too well staffed to be vulnerable to much "outside" pressure except in isolated critical instances.

**Educational Interest Groups**

Four major educational interest groups participating in the California state educational policy-making system were of interest to the analyses of this study. While other educational or education-related organizations existed (e.g., the Big Five), and from time to time had some impact on the policy system, the four identified represented long-standing interests via sizeable memberships and professional staffs—including lobbyists—to influence policy decisions.

The California Teachers Association (CTA), the largest of these interest groups, represented something in excess of 60 per cent of the professional educators in the state. The membership consisted primarily of elementary-secondary classroom teachers although more recent organizational efforts made some inroads on higher education campuses. School administrators once constituted nearly 10 per cent of CTA membership but administrators, for all practical purposes, have since joined their own organization. The CTA headquarters in Burlingame was augmented by a five man legislative office in Sacramento.
The Association of California School Administrators (ACSA) represented a relatively new amalgamation of previously existing administrator organizations under the CTA umbrella. Superintendents, elementary-secondary school principals, county office administrators, adult education administrators, personnel administrators, and the like belonged to ASCA. Approximately 11,000 members of ACSA represented roughly 70 per cent of total potential membership. ASCA headquarters were also located in Burlingame, with the legislative office located in Sacramento. Chief lobbyist for the organization was Gordon Winton, a former long-term Democratic Assemblyman and author of the Winton Act, a "meet and confer" negotiations law for public school employees and employers.

The California School Boards Association (CSBA) represented virtually all the local boards of education in the state with headquarters in the capitol city. CSBA also employed a full-time lobbyist and drew its credibility primarily from the fact that its members were locally-elected officials. CSBA believed that such a constituency placed the organization in the position of being "closer to the people" than the other educational interest groups and also gave them immunity from criticism as a "vested interest" organization.

The California Federation of Teachers (CFT) represented a relatively small number of teachers (25,000 or 15 per cent of potential) compared to CTA and stressed the importance of the classroom teachers' voice free of administrative domination. Affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers and the AFL-CIO, the CFT tended to be a relatively liberal organization loosely tied into urban and Democratic segments of the teaching profession and the larger society as well. Since the resources of the organization were much more limited than the larger CTA, the influence of the CFT--at least in the eyes of some California respondents--tended to
approximate "gadfly" status to keep the CTA "honest." That is to say, some of the influence of CFT was indirect to the extent that it affected CTA strategies, which in turn affected the policy system. This was perhaps especially true because a number of respondents perceived the CFT to be of limited influence legislatively except for "labor" Senators or Assemblymen. In addition, some respondents perceived the CFT to be "criticism" oriented.

Educational Interest Groups and the State Board of Education

The relationship between the educational interest groups and the State Board of Education appeared to be almost a casual one, relatively low key especially in comparison to legislative efforts. The groups expressed an apparent preference for working with and through the State Superintendent to "get what they want" or at least achieve the desired input. As mentioned previously, such an arrangement seemed to be to the liking of the interest groups (and probably to the Superintendent as well) and worked rather satisfactorily.

The interest groups indicated that they did, from time to time, establish direct contact with Board members either by letter or appearance of their spokesmen before Board committees and hearings. However, such contact was nowhere near the intensity or frequency of legislative contacts. State Board member responses also seemed to verify this perception in that some members believed there was "frequent" contact, while others believed it was on a "sometimes" basis.

The responses of the educational interest group leaders gave the impression that the State Board wasn't really "where the action was." Rather, they appeared to prefer directing their attention to the legislature for significant policy decisions. Where administrative or implementation concerns required attention, the interest groups preferred to work through the Superintendent. Only on those few matters where the Superintendent might
have been ineffective, needed interest group assistance, or proposed policy
the groups were unable to refine in formation. Ages, were the interest
groups prepared to work directly with State Board members.

Educational Interest Groups and the Legislature

There was no doubt at all that the educational interest groups perceived legislative activity as paramount in their attempts to influence the state policy decisions affecting them directly and education in general. Each of the organizations expended a considerable portion of its resources for support of lobbying activity. The CTA understandably fielded the most manpower, with five lobbyists and a "PR" man assigned to the Sacramento office. Each of the other organizations had one staff person assigned to lobbying with other staff and officers assisting on an "as needed" basis.

The focal points for such lobbying activity were perceived, by all the interest groups, to be four committees—Assembly Education and Assembly Ways and Means; and Senate Education and Senate Finance. Matters of purely educational policies without revenue or expenditure implications bypassed the "money" committees. But the more significant pieces of legislation passed through these committees. Interest group leaders were in basic agreement that there had been little change in the relative power or relationship of the four committees over the years.

One interesting aspect of the perceptions of the various respondents came in comparing the interest group and legislator assessment of the general effectiveness of the "education lobby" as a whole. The interest groups, understandably, were unanimous in their belief that the education lobby was among the top groups in the state. In asking legislators to assess the influence of the education lobby compared to others, one might have expected a rather different perspective.
To a degree, that difference exists. But, depending on one's expectations, the difference was minor. The great majority of legislator-respondents concurred in the perception that the education lobby was among the top groups. Only three legislators interviewed believed that the education lobby fell among the less important groups. In general, then, one could say that the educational interest groups had a rather accurate, if immodest, picture of their sphere of influence.

| EIG LEADER AND LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF THE LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCE OF THE MAJOR EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS35 |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| **Description**                  | **Frequency of Response** |
| The top groups                   | 4                  |
| Among the top groups             | 9                  |
| Among the less important groups  | 4                  |
| Not at all influential           | 1                  |

More interesting than an overall evaluation was the degree to which unanimity appeared among the interest groups and legislature as to which group was most influential and why.

The consensus of the interest groups was that the CTA was the most influential, with CSBA and ACSA next (a toss-up between them), and CFT a rather distant fourth. The interest groups perceived CTA as "leading the pack" in influence for several reasons, all of which really boiled down to one thing—money. CTA had the financial resources to field a large lobbying staff with substantial backup services in public relations and research. Just as frequently mentioned was the CTA political action "war chest" which was viewed with mixed awe and resentment. (CTA's dues checkoff of $5 accompanying membership enrollment yielded better than $500,000 per year.)

Getting legislators to discriminate among the groups as to their influence tended to be rather difficult, perhaps because there was an inbred reluctance to identify with one group over another, or perhaps because
legislators resisted admission that such groups did in fact exert considerable influence over the kinds of decisions made. A few legislators, for example, carefully made the point that "none of the groups really dominate." A few others simply resisted attempts to "pry loose" a value judgment. But the consensus of the legislator-respondents again closely approximated the view of the interest groups themselves, i.e., CTA was the most influential because they had money to spend. In addition, as with the interest groups, legislators expressed (subtly) a mixture of respect and resentment in such an assessment.

**EIG LEADER AND LEGISLATOR PERCEPTIONS OF MOST INFLUENTIAL EDUCATION GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Frequency of Assigned Rank</th>
<th>Total Times Mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By EIG Leaders</td>
<td>By Legislatorsb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>5 2 0 1 0</td>
<td>11 0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>1 4 2 0 0</td>
<td>0 3 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBA</td>
<td>2 2 2 1 0</td>
<td>1 4 1 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFT</td>
<td>0 0 2 0 2</td>
<td>0 0 1 2 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEA</td>
<td>1 1 1 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.A. School District</td>
<td>0 1 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Women Voters</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aAll groups ranked are included here even though they may not have been included in the scope of the question, e.g., League of Women Voters.

*bLegislators in many cases strongly resisted such ranking. In some cases the ranking was given grudgingly, in other cases respondents were steadfast in refusing.

One legislator, for example, commented on CTA's "raw political power" exercised by a group that "spends money all over the place." Another legislator categorized CTA as an "amoral group with a lot of political muscle." Still another legislator prefaced his remarks with "I hate to say it but... (CTA is most influential)."
Clearly, in comments from both legislators and other interest group leaders, the California Teachers Association paid a price in return for their well-heeled lobbying and political action. That price came in the form of a "backlash" of resentment which was only thinly veiled, if at all. The more outspoken critics of CTA freely used labels like "self-serving" for such a vested interest group. While one might picture CTA as "crying all the way to the bank" over such criticism, their vested interest status opened the door for the other two major groups to cloak themselves in less selfish garb in approaching the legislature. In reality, since neither the CSBA or ACSA would begin to compete with dollars, the natural recourse for them was to emphasize that "we're not in this for ourselves" and to make as much political hay as possible out of the real or imagined CTA weakness that "they're destroying their own credibility" with such a crass approach as (allegedly) trying to "buy" votes.

From a more objective point of view, the CTA simply "traded" one kind of effectiveness for another. Whether the exchange was to their advantage depended on one's own point of view. An organization like ACSA with a much-respected lobbyist established one kind of credibility and influence with certain kinds of legislators. A group like CFT, leaning heavily on AFL-CIO affiliation, was effective with other legislators, primarily those elected by organized labor. And the CSBA made some headway by emphasizing their locally-elected members who "really represent the people with (allegedly) no vested interest."

In the final analysis, grudgingly or not, legislators and interest group leaders agreed on who was most effective and why.

**Educational Interest Groups and the Governor**

The relationship between the educational interest groups and the
Governor of California (or more accurately with Ronald Reagan) was such that one had to rely on a great deal of "hearsay" testimony as opposed to concrete evidence. This was largely due to the fact that many respondents - not just interest groups - perceived Ronald Reagan as being relatively inaccessible, preferring to rely heavily on staff level relationships and advice.

There was at least some agreement among the interest groups that none of them had any strong "inside track" over others. When discussing relations with the Governor, the interest group leaders were far more disposed to talk of contacts and working relationships with Department of Finance staff than they were of the Governor or his immediate personal staff.

Such aloofness or inaccessibility on the part of the Governor was either the result of, or compounded by, the fact that - at least in the eyes of the interest groups - Ronald Reagan was far from being an "education Governor." Rather they perceived him in the "cut, trim, and squeeze" mold, with education draining precious resources and compounding runaway taxation.

Several of the interest group leaders, when asked whether they were in basic agreement or disagreement with the Governor, indicated they assumed they were in disagreement. A typical response, for example, was the comment that "philosophically I'm sure that we're in disagreement, but since the Governor hasn't done that much in education it's hard to cite specific examples." Another said, "We haven't really been in disagreement on issues because Reagan hasn't spent enough time on education for us to disagree with his positions."

However appreciative the interest groups may have been over the Governor's support of SB 90, none of them reflected any notion that the school finance issue was drawing the support. The group leaders clearly believed that the only reason school finance received gubernatorial attention was the fact
that, as one leader put it, education constituted a "necessary evil" to get tax reform features enacted. Further, whatever working relationship or negotiating went on with the interest groups over the school finance aspects were carried out by the Department of Finance (Deputy Director Hall specifically) and not the Governor or the Governor's education advisor.

The relationship between the interest groups and the Governor must therefore be characterized as virtually non-existent except out of necessity in given situations. There, the impression was that the relationship was at least temporarily tolerated.

Relationships Among the Interest Groups Themselves

Describing the relationships between and among the California educational interest groups (CTA, ACSA, CSBA, CFT) was highly dependent on the time period used as a frame of reference. During 1972, and especially as related to the school finance issue, the educational interest groups appeared to work rather well together. All except CFT were active supporters of SB 90, and evidence was given that respective lobbyists "traded notes" to help each other secure passage of this school finance measure.

The CTA, on one hand, emphasized and capitalized on its moneyed lobbying corps and political power. ACSA and CSBA, on the other hand, - unable to compete with dollars - emphasized the status of their local members as well-springs of credibility. CSBA in particular tended to emphasize (and cultivate) a non-vested interest label for itself (which simultaneously constituted a thinly veiled criticism of CTA). CFT, partly of its own doing, found itself "on the outside looking in."

But there was sufficient evidence in the data provided by many respondents to indicate that 1972 and SB 90 were atypical rather than typical of educational interest group relationships. To the extent that other years would
bring other issues (1973 and collective bargaining legislation, for example) the group leader responses implied that a far less harmonious relationship would exist. Dominating the perspective of the groups throughout was, by the very nature of their make-up, the labor-management components of controversy.

In other words, during 1972 ACSA may have worked better with CTA than CSBA, and CFT may have been ignored. But collective bargaining would, as a legislative issue in the eyes of the respondents, force ACSA closer to CSBA and similarly move the two teacher groups closer together.

In this perspective, the educational interest groups demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in their attempts to influence state educational policy system outputs. Perhaps it also just as well demonstrates that system components were and are dynamic, changing from issue to issue, and thereby resisting easy description.
FOOTNOTES

1 Los Angeles Times, November 11, 1970, p. 3.
2 Los Angeles Times, January 12, 1971, p. 3.
3 San Francisco Examiner, February 21, 1963.
4 Los Angeles Times, October 27, 1970.

6 This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to members of the California State Board of Education are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.

7 Interview with Wilson Riles, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, February 26, 1973.


9 This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to California legislators are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.

10 Summary of California legislator responses to the question: "How successful have the State Superintendent and his staff been in getting their proposals enacted by the legislature?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

11 Summary of California legislator responses to the question: "In terms of meeting your needs in deciding education and school finance bills, how would you rate the information coming to your committee from the State Department of Education?" in interviews held February-March 1973.

12 This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to Executive branch respondents are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.

13 Interview with California educational interest group leader, March, 1973.

14 Summary of Educational Interest Group leader responses to the question: "How successful have the Superintendent and his staff been in getting their proposals enacted by the legislature?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

15 Summary of EIG leader responses to the question: "Compared to other sources of ideas and advice available to the Governor, how important is the State Superintendent?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

16 This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to California Educational Interest Group leaders are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.
Summary of EIG leader responses to the question: "To what extent was your organization consulted by the Superintendent and his staff when they were formulating these policies?" in interviews conducted February-March, 1973.


This opinion and the following quotations taken from an interview with a CFT leader, February, 1973.

Summary of California State Board of Education member and ex-member responses to the question: "In general, how much time are you able to devote to the work of being a board member?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

Summary of California State Board of Education member and ex-member responses to the question: "What portion of its meeting time does your Board devote to what might be called the legal approval of routine items?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

Summary of California State Board of Education member and ex-member responses to the question: "In terms of meeting your needs in deciding on education policies, how would you rate the information provided for the Board by the State Department?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

Summary of California State Board of Education member and ex-member responses to the question: "Which one of these statements comes closest to describing the agreement on your Board when it must decide a major policy issue?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

Summary of California legislator responses to the question: "How would you assess the importance of the State Board in actually formulating and working for education legislation?" in interviews held February-March, 1973.

Summary of State Board member and ex-member responses to the question: "Could you estimate the frequency with which each (person/group) has sought to communicate their views directly to the State Board, or its members, during the past several years?" in interviews held February-March, 1973. (Note: One new member of the Board declined to respond due to little experience.)

The EIG leaders uniformly believed the SBE "formalized" CSSO proposals rather than providing real leadership.

Peirce, op. cit., p. 575.


Educational Interest Group Leader, Interview February, 1971.

This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to members of the California legislature are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.

This and subsequent direct quotations attributed to California Educational Interest Group leaders are taken from interviews conducted February-March, 1973.


The Big Five refers to a loose coalition of the five largest school districts in the state. (Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Long Beach, and Oakland maintained legislative advocate offices (space shared) in Sacramento.)

Summarized from interview data of February-March, 1973 in response to the question: "How do the major education interest groups stack up here (in influencing legislation) would you say that, taken together, they are..."

Summarized from interview data of February-March, 1973 in response to the question: "Among just educational organizations, which ones are usually the most influential when public school policy is being decided by the legislature?"
SECTION V--AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

About the time one reaches the point that the California educational policy making system of 1972 has been adequately (if not altogether accurately) described, the horrifying "where do we go from here?" question raises its ugly head.

We said in the introduction to California: The Great Exception, that "what is writes is out of date before it is printed." To a degree, that must hold true. System participants have changed and will continue to change, as will the issues. To engage in the "futurism" of what those changes will be constitutes highly risky business. However, one can at least raise a number of pertinent and pointed questions, the answers to which will largely determine "where California's educational policy making system will go from here."

Questions Regarding the CSSO

Respondents interviewed in February and March, 1973 gave the overwhelming impression that Wilson Riles relieved nearly everybody by being such a "welcome change" after eight years of Max Rafferty. Put another way, it appeared that Superintendent Riles was enjoying a protracted "honeymoon period" thanks to the divisive era of his predecessor.

This, of course, asks the major question: "When will the honeymoon end?" Several respondents, early in 1973, had already begun to hint that they were waiting for "Wilson to make his move." Another had already begun critically labeling him as the "great compromiser." Throughout, one became subtly aware that some of these comments were phrased with at least indirect reference to the fact that Wilson Riles stands for re-election in 1974.

There is always something nonsensical about "...if the election were
held today," because of course it can't be. However, the political capital
consciously or incidentally acquired by Wilson Riles would have assured his
re-election "today" if respondents in this study were to be believed and
were to be making the decision. On the other hand, the political vagaries
of the California electorate have time and again commanded us to "never be
surprised." If a Max Rafferty could be elected and re-elected in the first
place, will Riles be able to "cash in" his political capital at the voting
booths? The answer to that question will have much to do with the opera-
tion of the state educational policy system, 1974-78.

Questions Regarding the SBE

One feels unfairly cruel, and therefore guilty, about not having many
questions for the California State Board of Education because so many
respondents felt the Board "wasn't going anywhere" anyway. As one newspaper-
man put it "They make great copy, but they don't do anything to improve
education."

The Board has engaged, and probably will continue to engage, in rousing
windmill-tilting controversies over sex education, evolution versus Creation,
and other such issues seen by many as unproductive in the educational enter-
prise. Most of the serious attention paid the Board comes from the CSSO,
and Wilson Riles has been careful to show them a full measure of respect.
But the educational interest groups to a degree, and the legislature almost
entirely, have ignored the Board as a policy system participant.

Will the Board change in this respect? The answer of course depends on
whether a new CSSO is elected in 1974 and whether a new Governor begins to
appoint new members of dramatically different political cloth. Or does it?

Has the point been overlooked that the California SBE has, all along,
been doing its job? By absorbing the brunt of public controversy, has not
and does not the Board serve as a "buffer" for the rest of the state's public educational system? And finally, just as California's excesses have been over-played have not the State Board's excursions into controversy overshadowed other, more positive functions?

Even so, there is little to suggest that the State Board will be able to improve significantly its image with other policy system participants. Maybe that's what they meant when they said it was a thankless job, but one that had to be done nevertheless.

Questions Regarding the Legislature

One question regarding the legislature jumps to the fore to the exclusion of all others - at least insofar as educational policy making is concerned. What is the legislature going to do with the November, 1972, ballot Proposition 5? In brief, Proposition 5 permits the legislature to "turn the school code around" to a permissive, rather than prescriptive, legislative approach. In other words, school districts would be permitted to do anything not in conflict with statute.

Reversing the approach may mean that the California legislature will have to reassess the highly prescriptive role it has "enjoyed" heretofore. Is the legislature willing to give up that measure of power? To an extent, it would necessarily reduce at least the numbers of educational issues the legislature gets into every session. In that sense, more time could be spent on fewer, more important issues.

In any event, one thing is clear - there are no indications that the self-sufficiency of the legislative branch will diminish.

Questions for the Executive Branch

Who will be the next Governor of California? Will Republicans once again
overcome a disadvantage in numbers of registered voters? Or will a Democrat - the third since the 19th Century - capture the Governorship?

Those questions - so obvious they're embarrassing - and answers forthcoming in 1974 may dramatically alter the whole of the educational policy system. System participants, not the least of which would be the interest groups, may be faced with substantial readjustment of their power bases and influence points. Conversely, if another cut-trim-squeeze Governor takes up where Reagan will leave off (he said he wasn't going to run for re-election), the focus for educational policy improvement would continue to fall to the legislature.

**Questions for the Educational Interest Groups**

These perhaps are the most interesting and least answerable questions.

Is there any prospect of CTA-CFT merge (as in Los Angeles, or New York State)? Given present circumstances, such a merger hardly seems likely. But persistent rumors of national level NEA-AFT merger may have some (longer range) impact. More immediate perhaps is the question of whether CTA will continue to move toward a coalition of public employees (a'la CAPE nationally). Or what about the real "sleeper" - what role will CTA play in the selection of the next Governor?

Perhaps it is unfair to direct the key questions solely toward CTA activity. But given present conditions, it hardly seems likely that either ACSA or CSBA have the capability or inclination to dramatically alter "where the chips fall" in current policy system power relationships. One gets the impression, rather, that CSBA and - to a lesser extent - ACSA are sitting back hoping CTA has made or will make an "Artie Samish mistake." Otherwise, CSBA and ACSA will be hard-put to keep CTA in sight.

CTA's direction and fortunes will also affect the well-being of the
Educational Congress and thereby the precarious unity of the educational community as well.

*So Where Do We Go?*

Given these significant questions regarding policy system participants, one can only conclude - sheepishly and lamely - that we're going to the future. The plot has as many variables as a Hollywood script and one can only hope that it will be better written - not because it will have a better ending, but because it won't end. That is, unless San Andreas....