This case study describes and interprets the process through which State-level policy decisions are made for the public schools of Florida, and focuses on the people, agencies, and processes involved in the policymaking. After brief treatments of the socioeconomic environment and the political culture within which education takes place, the document considers the specific policymaking institutions (the commissioner of education, the governor, the legislature, the State department of education, and special interest groups) and their relationships, with emphasis on the structure and the process of the educational governance system. Major decisions previously made in the policy areas of school finance, desegregation, educational planning, and certification are described as actual examples of how educational policy decisions are made. A summary and an interpretation offer some concluding observations on Florida's educational governance system. Two appendixes contain summarizations of the Florida Education Finance Act of 1973 and the Teacher Education Center Act of 1973. (Pages 33, 36, and 48 may reproduce poorly.) (Author/DM)
STATE POLICY MAKING FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF FLORIDA

Frank DePalma

Prepared for
The Educational Governance Project
The Ohio State University
29 W. Woodruff
Columbus, Ohio 43210
This report is one of twelve case studies growing out of the Educational Governance Project. In addition, two major reports, a comparative analysis across states and an explication of alternative models of state governance of education, are in preparation. The Governance Project began in January, 1972 and is to be completed in August, 1974. The work was funded by the U. S. Office of Education under Title V (Section 505) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (OEG-0-73-0499). The Policy Board for the Project was composed of three chief state school officers: Martin W. Essex of Ohio, Jack P. Nix of Georgia, and Ewald B. Nyquist of New York, with the State of Ohio serving as fiscal agent. An Advisory Committee composed of eleven persons concerned with general and educational governance also served the Project. Contract for the work was let to the College of Education, The Ohio State University and Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzorì, Jr. were the directors.

January, 1974
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INTRODUCTION

"Go West" was the advice given to Americans seeking fame, fortune, relaxation, or retirement in the first part of the 20th Century. Since 1940, that advice has slightly altered, "Go west, or south to Florida." Florida is the Horatio Alger success story of the States in the mid-20th Century. The change that has taken place in Florida has significantly affected the institutions in the state, including education. This study focuses on the people, agencies, and processes involved in state level educational policy making in Florida and is organized into four general sections. The first section describes the background context - socioeconomic factors and political culture trends - in which the educational policy making system operates. The second section describes the policy making institutions - the commissioner of education, the governor, the legislature, the state department of education, etc. - and their relationships. This section emphasizes the structure and the process of the educational governance system. Major decisions in four policy areas - school finance, desegregation, educational planning, and certification - are described in the third section as actual examples of how educational policy decisions are made. A summary and interpretation section offers some concluding observations on Florida's educational governance system.

BACKGROUND CONTEXT

Socioeconomic Factors

Since the early 1900s, Florida's population has increased dramatically by absolute numbers and by per cent. Table 1 depicts Florida's population increase by absolute numbers and by per cent. In 1920, Florida ranked 32nd in the nation in population, but by 1970 Florida's population had increased
by 5.8 million people and Florida ranked 9th in the country in population.

TABLE I

FLORIDA'S POPULATION INCREASE: 1920-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Increase in Absolute Numbers Over Previous Decade</th>
<th>Per Cent Increase Over Previous Decade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,789,443</td>
<td>1,837,883</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,951,560</td>
<td>2,180,255</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,771,305</td>
<td>873,891</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,897,414</td>
<td>429,203</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,468,211</td>
<td>499,741</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>968,470</td>
<td>215,851</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Florida's population growth during this time period was much greater than the population increases of the United States average and other Southeastern states. Table 2 compares the rate of population increase for Florida, the Southeast, and the United States for the last three decades with the 1920-1970 period combined.

While the rate of increase may lessen, the absolute number of people moving to Florida will continue to increase. The University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research projects that by 1980, 8.7 million people will live in Florida, a percentage increase of 27.6 per cent over 1970, but an increase of nearly 2 million people in absolute numbers.

Undoubtedly, there are many reasons which accounted for Florida's population increase. Neal Peirce cited five reasons including the increasing number of retirees moving to Florida, increased tourism, permanent military installations, the space program, increased manufacturing and the citrus industry.

Why this phenomenal boom? A big part of the answer can be traced to Americans' increased longevity and the affluence that lets them buy a retirement bungalow or apartment under the warm Florida sun...The retirees, of course, are only one part of the Florida boom. Tourism has
TABLE 2

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

SOURCE:
Annie Mary Hartsfield and Elston E. Roady. Florida Votes. The Institute for Social Research. The Florida State University, 1972, Figure 1.
been growing by leaps and bounds, and in a recent year, 22.5 million visitors were counted, spending a tidy $6.2 billion. There are big, permanent military installations at Pensacola, Key West, Jacksonville, and many spots in the interior, the Space Center at Cape Kennedy has brought billions of dollars into Florida, manufacturing has made great strides, and a third of the world's entire citrus production still comes from Florida orchards. ²

The population increase affected age, race, and distribution characteristics of Florida's total population. Census figures showed that the median age of the 1970 Floridian was 32.3 years, and that Florida had a larger percent of senior citizens than any state in the union. Of Florida's total population, 14.5 per cent (990,000 people) were in the 65 years and older bracket while the U. S. average was only 9.9 per cent. Some large urban counties, Pinellas (29.5%), Sarasota (28.6%), and Volusia (22.3%) - were known for their high percentage of retirees, but smaller rural counties - Pasca (3.6%), Manatee (30.2%), Charlotte (35.1%), and Citrus (26%) - also had a large percentage of elderly citizens. ³ In 1970, 44% of Florida's 67 counties had at least 10% of the county's population in the 65 and over age bracket. So, while many retirees gravitated to popular but maturing retirement centers like St. Petersburg and Sarasota, other retirees located in less populated areas thereby spreading the population boom to rural counties.

While some rural counties have recently experienced a high percentage of in-migration, the large urban counties house the vast majority of Floridians. In 1972, Florida's population was unevenly distributed over its 67 counties as 80.5 per cent of the people lived in urban areas. According to a 1972 study ordered by the legislature, Florida's 11 largest counties contained 73 per cent (over 5.1 million people) of the state's population and 70 per cent (948,000) of the state's school-aged children. ⁴

Regardless of their age or where they lived, people who moved to Florida
were usually white. By per cent, Florida's minority population has decreased as the total population has increased since 1920 as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3

ABSOLUTE AND PER CENT DISTRIBUTION BY RACE: 1920-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>N=100%</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,789,443</td>
<td>5,719,343</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>1,070,100</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>28,449</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,951,560</td>
<td>4,063,881</td>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>887,679</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>7,493</td>
<td>.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2,771,305</td>
<td>2,166,051</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>880,186</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>2,153</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,897,414</td>
<td>1,381,986</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>514,198</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,468,211</td>
<td>1,035,390</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>431,828</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>968,470</td>
<td>638,153</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>329,487</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Florida is a much more affluent state now than it ever has been. From 1968 through 1971, Florida's total personal income increased by 37 per cent from $19,802 to $27,091 as the U.S. and Southeast increased 25 per cent and 29 per cent, respectively. Both Florida and the Southeast outpaced the U.S. average by per cent increase in per capita personal income for the same time period as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4

TOTAL PERSONAL AND PER-CAPITA INCOME FOR THE UNITED STATES, SOUTHEAST AND FLORIDA: 1968-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total Personal Income (Millions of Dollars)</th>
<th>Percent Increase Since 1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>684,746</td>
<td>745,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>117,609</td>
<td>129,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>19,802</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Per Capita Personal Income (Dollars)</th>
<th>Percent Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,436</td>
<td>3,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>2,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>3,078</td>
<td>3,388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1970 Florida ranked 9th nationally in total personal income with $24,938,000,000, 26th nationally in per-capita personal income with $3,642, and 13th nationally in per-cent increase from 1960-70 in per-capita personal income with 87%. 1970 census figures show that ten of the twelve states that had higher percentage increases than Florida in per-capita personal income were in the Southeast, as the Southeast made significant increases in per-capita personal income since 1960.

While Florida as a state has become wealthier, there are still many poor people in Florida. Using family incomes to illustrate this, the median family income in 1970 was $8,267 which was well below the U. S. average of $9,250. 12.7 per cent of Florida's families lived on incomes below county poverty levels while 16.8 per cent of Florida's families had incomes of $15,000 or more. These statistics do not tell the human differences between Florida's rich and poor. Some of that difference was captured by Peirce in the following narration:

Few states can match Florida's stark contrasts between wealth and poverty, opulence and squalor. It came home to me most clearly when I spent one morning touring the facilities at Cape Kennedy, where billions were being poured into the moon shots, and that same afternoon saw a sick farm laborer's child, flies swarming around its little body, lying on a bed in the Old Top Labor Camp near Winter Haven. From the glitter and ostentatious consumption of Miami Beach, one need not travel far to find thousands of retirees waiting in their drab, sun-drenched little towns for the next Social Security check. From select and sumptuous Palm Beach, it is but a few miles to some of the most wretched migrant labor camps in all America. Within the same state are places like Coral Gables, Boca Raton, and Naples, where the average home value is more than $30,000 and scrubby north Florida or Panhandle counties like Liberty or Holmes, where the average value is around $5,500.6

Peirce attributed much of Florida's increase in net income to the 16.8% of Florida's families who had incomes over $15,000. The average Florida worker's income was under the national average partly because over half of Florida's work force was in the low paying industries of agriculture,
retailing, and services. Dauer points out that the per-capita income distribution in Florida parallels other southeastern states except for families with incomes over $15,000. The concentration of wealth in the $15,000 and over bracket, Dauer said, accounts for Florida's high per-capita income compared to other southeastern states.  

The 67 Florida counties vary widely in wealth. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows that the per-capita personal income of the counties by four general classifications is: 4 counties are in the 3,950+ class; 17 counties are in the $3,200-$3,950 class; 24 counties are in the $2,450-$3,200 class; and 22 counties are in the $1,700-$2,450 class.

Floridians engage in diverse occupations and industries. Of employed people in 1970, 49.8 per cent were in white collar jobs, 16.0 per cent were government workers, and 14.1 per cent were in the manufacturing industries. Also Census Bureau figures show that in 1970, the leading industries for employing workers were: wholesale and retail trade (571,051), public services (343,684), manufacturing (341,836) and mining and construction (215,420). When one thinks of Florida's economy, tourism and citrus automatically come to mind. However, tourism and citrus are only part of Florida's expanding economy. Large military installations, a growing manufacturing business, agricultural exports including winter vegetables as well as citrus, and mineral mining are also essential parts of Florida's economy.

**Political Culture**

The tremendous growth of population and wealth in Florida has affected the political culture of the state. Three major developments in Florida politics have been (1) the strengthening of the Republican Party which moved Florida from a strict one party system to a modified one-party system, (2) the increased effectiveness of black voters, and (3) the urbanization of
FIGURE 1

Per Capita Personal Income 1970
A Bird's-Eye View

KEY:
- $3,950+
- $3,200 - $3,950
- $2,450 - $3,200
- $1,700 - $2,450
the legislature through re-apportionment.

Since reconstruction, Florida had been a one-party state voting Democratic in federal, state, and local elections. However, partly as a reaction to the civil rights stance of some national Democratic leaders in the late 1940s, this pattern changed to voting Republican in president elections while voting Democratic in state and local elections. The Committee on Civil Rights appointed by President Truman was one of many factors which turned Floridians against Democratic presidential candidates and the national Democratic party. Thirteen northerners and two southerners made up this committee which sought to end segregation practices. Floridians were upset at actions taken by the national Democratic administrations concerning segregation and states rights. Although Truman carried Florida in the 1948 presidential election, he did not have a 50% majority as many Floridians supported Thomas Dewey - the Republican presidential candidate - and Strom Thurmond - the Dixiecrat presidential candidate. In 1952, 1956, 1960, 1968 and 1972, Floridians supported the Republican presidential candidate while supporting Democrats for state and local offices. However, in 1964, Lyndon Johnson beat Republican Barry Goldwater, thereby becoming the only Democratic presidential candidate to win in Florida since Truman in 1948. Furthermore, Mr. Johnson won with a 51.2% majority vote - the first time a Democratic presidential candidate received a majority vote since 1944. This Democratic victory proved to be the exception to the rule as Floridians supported Richard Nixon in the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections.

The number of registered Republicans has grown from 60,665 in 1950, to 338,340 in 1960, and to 711,090 in 1970. While the number of Democrats also increased in that time from 1,006,580 in 1950 to 2,024,387 in 1970, the rate of increase was not as dramatic as the Republican percentage increase in
Pierce pointed out that from 1950-1970, Republican registration grew by a 12 time factor while Democratic registration doubled. Although Democrats still represented 73% of Florida's registered voters, he stated that "polls show that 40 per cent of the voters in Florida actually consider themselves independents." These independent voters register as party voters in order to vote in city and county elections, especially in heavily Democratic counties.

Hartsfield and Roady offered three reasons to explain the growth of the Republican party. First, many Republicans moving to Florida registered as Democrats in order to participate in Democratic Party Primary Elections. Florida has traditionally been a one party state, and the winners in the Democratic primaries usually win the general election. Registering as a Republican meant you could not participate in Democratic Primary Elections where state and local officials were actually chosen. Second, as the Republican Party began to gain strength, many Republicans registered as Democrats began to switch their party registration. Third, more intensive recruiting by the Republican Party had been successful in increasing the Republican Party membership as Floridians became disenchanted with Democratic national policy.

The rise of the Republican Party in Florida has had the net effect of moving Florida party politics from a one-party system dominated by the Democratic Party to a modified one-party system. While Democratic candidates still retained a decided advantage over their Republican opponents for state and local offices, Republican candidates began to fare much better in these elections. In statewide elections, Republican gains climaxed in 1966 when Claude Kirk was elected Governor (the first Republican Governor in Florida since Reconstruction), and in 1968 when Edward Gurney was elected to the
The movement toward a modified one-party system can be seen more clearly in the state legislature. In the 1961 state legislature (before reapportionment), Senate Democrats outnumbered Republicans 37 to 1 and House Democrats outnumbered their Republican colleagues 88-7. By 1973 these ratios had changed substantially. In the 1973 state legislature (after reapportionment), the Senate was made up of 25 Democrats, 14 Republicans, and 1 Independent while the House was comprised of 77 Democrats, and 43 Republicans. (Reapportionment accounts for the difference in legislative seats: 2 in the Senate and 25 in the House.) Democrats still retained decided edges in both chambers, but Republicans had gained a significant number of seats since 1961 - 13 Senate and 36 House seats.

The weakness of the state Democratic organization was as much a factor in Republican victories as the gains made by Republicans in voter registrations. Being the dominant party in a one party system, the Florida Democratic party included a wide continuum of factions ranging from staunch conservatism to strong liberalism. These factions never had to organize at the state level because the one party system assured Democratic victories in races for state office. Recently, however, the Republican victories of Kirk and Gurney acted as a catalyst in unifying these factions and building an effective Democratic state-wide organization for the 1970 general election.

Republicans approached the 1970 elections anticipating new gains in the state legislature, winning the other U. S. Senate seat, and retaining the governorship. However, Democrats scored substantial victories in 1970 by retaining the U. S. Senate seat when Lawton Chiles defeated William Cramer, gaining the governorship with Reubin Askew soundly defeating Claude Kirk (56% - 44%), and maintaining the ratio of Democrats to Republicans in the Senate.

...Part of the reversal had to do with the Democrats' newborn unity and nomination of politically moderate nominees, fresh faces on the statewide scene who could not be tarred and feathered as "ultra-liberals" like the losing statewide Democratic candidates in 1966 and 1968. But more than anything else, the Republican defeat was attributable to fierce internecine battles - a culmination of the pettiness and factionalism that had afflicted the Republican organization for several years - and the mercurial, buffoonish personality of Claude R. Kirk, Jr.

...No one can say yet whether the 1970 elections represent just a momentary delay in Florida's evolution to Republicanism, or a lasting return to a middle-of-the-road kind of Democracy. But it does seem likely that the Republicans will have to produce some leaders of higher quality, and more positively oriented party platforms, if they hope to capitalize on the strong demographic trends running in their favor.16

A second development in Florida politics has been the increased effectiveness of black voters. Although the percentage of blacks as part of Florida's total population decreased from 34% in 1920 to 15.3% in 1970, black voter registration increased. As of 1970, blacks made up over 15% of Florida's eligible voters and 11.4% of Florida's registered voters. Dauer pointed out that the intense pressures and restrictions which prohibited blacks from registering to vote in the past had greatly diminished.17 Black voter registration increased from 39% in 1960 to 56.2% in 1970, but the 56.2% was lower than the white voter registration percentage of 60% and "other" registration percentage of 64.2% in 1970. Dauer felt that the lower black voter registration was "no longer due either to legal restrictions or to white pressures against Negro voting or registration; it is now a product of such cultural factors as limited relevance to the Negro campaign issues, insufficient registration drives, and deficient organization in some areas."18

Although their percentage as voters was small, blacks have moved from being a non-existent political voting force due to the repression of potential
black voters, to a point where the black vote could swing a close election. Hartsfield and Roady stated the black "cohesive vote serves as a critical factor in closely contested elections. In 1964, the black vote was credited with throwing Florida's electoral votes to the Democratic presidential nominee." As for the percentage differences in voter registration, Hartsfield and Roady noted that "with continued increasing participation and increasing voter education, such differences may be greatly diminished by 1980."  

The third major development in Florida politics was the urbanization of the legislature through reapportionment. As the population increased and the urban areas grew, the basis and method for legislative apportionment set forth in the 1885 Florida Constitution became quite inadequate. By the 1960s, the Florida state legislature was one of the most malapportioned legislatures in the nation. The two major factors which led to malapportionment were the basis of apportionment (formulas used to determine the area and number of people a legislator represented), and the method of apportionment (the way in which apportionment formulas were implemented.)

Apportionment in the House of Representatives was according to the following basis or formula:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County Category</th>
<th>Seats per County</th>
<th>Total Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 MOST POPULOUS COUNTIES:</td>
<td>3 seats</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEXT 18 MOST POPULOUS COUNTIES:</td>
<td>2 seats</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 REMAINING COUNTIES:</td>
<td>1 seat</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 COUNTIES</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main tenant of the House formula was to allow every county to elect at least one representative, regardless of the number of people in that county.

The basis for apportionment in the Senate was different. The Senate apportionment formula divided the state into 38 senatorial districts which
were to be as equal in population as practicable. Senatorial districts had to contain whole counties (i.e., no county could be in more than one senatorial district), and the counties in senatorial districts had to be contiguous. Because of the restrictions of these formulas, as Florida's population grew, the difference in the number of people represented by each House and Senate member became more disparate. Based on 1958 population estimates, Figures 2 and Figure 3 present the disparities between the numbers of people each House and Senate member represented. Figure 2 shows that in 1958, on the average, a House member represented 46,700 people. While Dade County had one House member representing over 280,000 people, the majority of Florida's counties had one House member representing less than 40,000 people. Figure 3 shows the vast difference in the persons each Senator represented in 1958. According to the situation which existed in 1960, it was possible for a small percentage of voters to elect majorities in both legislative chambers. Only the vote of 14.7 per cent of the people was needed to elect a majority to the House while 12.3 per cent could elect a majority to the Senate.

The second factor which fostered malapportionment in the legislature was the method by which apportionment was carried out. The 1885 Florida Constitution gave the legislature the power to apportion itself. Serious consideration of reapportionment in Florida began in 1955 under Governor Collins. Although only the legislature could act on reapportionment, the Governor had the power to call a special legislative session solely for the purpose of considering reapportionment. Governor Collins called the first of such special sessions in 1955 and several others were called by successive governors. However, reapportionment efforts were blocked repeatedly by a group of 22 senators known as the "Pork Chop Gang". These
22 senators represented rural areas and feared any reapportionment plan would result in the loss of some or most of their seats due to large population gains in urban areas. They had enough votes to block any comprehensive reapportionment efforts until it became a matter for the courts in 1967.

Piecemeal reapportionment efforts by the Florida legislature failed to meet the 'one man/one vote' requirement of the Baker vs. Carr case, and in 1967 a U.S. District Court in Miami adopted a reapportionment plan submitted by a political science professor from the University of Florida, Dr. Manning J. Dauer. "The plan provided for a House of 119 members and a Senate of 48 members with a variation of no more than 5 per cent from district to district." This plan had the practical effect of increasing the number of Republican legislators and legislators representing urban areas.

The 1885 Constitution was revised in 1968 and included provisions that the legislature be reapportioned after each decennial census with the state supreme court acting as an enforcement body by automatically reviewing the legislative reapportionment plan and filing a court plan if the legislative plan was unacceptable. The 1968 Constitution stipulated that there be no more than 40 Senate districts and no more than 120 House districts. By the November elections in 1972, the 48 Senate districts had been combined into 40, and the 119 House districts had been expanded to the Constitutional limit of 120. Therefore, the basis and method of apportionment were changed with the practical effect of transforming the legislature from being mal-apportioned and rurally oriented to being fairly apportioned and urban oriented and thus more truly representative of the new Florida population.

The rising strength of the Republican party and the movement toward a two-party system, the increased effectiveness of black voters, and the
urbanization of the legislature were some of the major developments in Florida politics. There also were some recent trends in state education politics, two of which are briefly mentioned here, but will be dealt with more fully later in the text. Reorganization of the state educational structure had been a political issue for some time, but it hit a peak in the Kirk and Askew administrations. Efforts toward educational reorganization have focused upon establishing a lay State Board of Education and an appointed Commissioner of Education. Currently the seven Cabinet members serve as ex-officio members of the State Board of Education, and the Commissioner of Education is a statewide elected official, also serving as a Cabinet member. Another major trend in state education politics has involved the changing relationship between the Department of Education and the legislature. The next section describes these developments in more detail.

POLICY MAKING INSTITUTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

The purpose of this section is to describe the institutions involved in educational policy making in Florida and the relationships which existed among them. The roles of the commissioner of education, the state board of education, the department of education, the governor, the legislature and educational interest groups in educational policy making will be discussed. These roles and relationships have changed substantially in recent years. To understand this transition requires consideration of the "old order" which existed among Florida's educational interest groups.

Educational Interest Groups

Lawrence Iannaccone identified four types of structure which linked educational interest groups with state legislatures: disparate, monolithic, syndical, and fragmented linking structures. In his terms, the relationship
between Florida's educational interest groups and the state legislature was
monolithic until 1968. In such a structure, educators acted as a monolith
to present state level concerns to the legislature. Although there were
differences of opinion and interests among educational associations in the
state, they achieved a high degree of consensus on educational legislation.
Iannaccone characterized a monolithic structure as "a pyramid of associations
interested in education and educational legislation--a pyramid whose apex
appears where the associational system of schoolmen and their friends are
customarily linked to the legislature." In Florida, the apex of educational
interest groups where schoolmen were linked to the legislature was the
Florida Education Association (FEA).

Statewide educational interest groups in Florida included the FEA,
the Florida Association of District School Superintendents (FADSS), and the
Florida School Boards Association (FSBA). The FEA was the central or focal
point of Florida educators as both administrators and teachers were members.
Large urban classroom teacher associations (CTAs) and small rural teacher
associations were affiliated with the FEA. Building principals, local central
office administrators, local superintendents, and state department of education
employees were also FEA members. The FEA actively promoted the idea that it
represented "the united profession". Of all the statewide educational
interest groups, the FEA had the greatest amount of political influence with
the legislature because it had a large membership (teachers), and it had
members who were influential in local communities (teachers and administrators).

Since there were only 67 local or county districts in Florida, membership
in the Florida Association of District School Superintendents was limited to
a small but prestigious group of educators. In Florida, most county super-
intendents were well acquainted with their local political leaders and had
influence as a group in the legislature. The Florida School Boards Association also had some political influence although not as much as the FEA or the superintendents' association.

The FEA was a forum where the respective educational interest group leaders resolved differences and formulated common positions on educational legislation. The relationship between the three educational interest groups was one of close ties and harmony. For example, the executive secretary of the superintendents' association had his office in the FEA building. The Department of Education (DOE) also had close ties with the FEA. Teacher salaries were one cost variable in the foundation program. The DOE and the FEA cooperatively provided the legislature with figures on teacher salaries. In short, the FEA was coordinating the efforts of educational interest groups in the "old order" in which educators approached the legislature as the united profession.

Before reapportionment and governmental reorganization, the Florida legislature depended on the DOE and the FEA for educational legislative proposals. The DOE had the expertise to write educational proposals in proper bill form and to supply necessary supporting data. The DOE and the FEA cooperatively set legislative priorities and formulated educational policies. The FEA was the focal point for accommodation among school interest groups as the superintendents' and school boards' organizations became involved in setting priorities and formulating policy through the FEA. Although these groups disagreed at times over specific policies, they all supported the final legislative program in the "old order" monolithic linkage structure.

Fragmentation of the "old order" began in the early 1960s as rising teacher militancy began to strain the relationships between educational
interest groups. The FEA demanded a higher level of state support for education, and called a statewide teachers strike to back its demand. While in favor of increased state aid to education, the superintendents and school boards organizations became alarmed at the threat of a statewide teachers strike.

The FEA pressured the 1967 legislature into providing additional funds for education, only to have Governor Kirk use his line veto power to reduce the legislative educational appropriations by $106 million (for kindergarten through junior college). Stressing the growing possibility of a statewide teachers strike, the FEA was successful in forcing Governor Kirk to call a special legislative session solely on education in early 1968. Dissatisfied with the increased appropriations for education made in the special session by the legislature, the FEA called a statewide teacher strike in February, 1968. 30,000 of Florida's 60,000 teachers took part.

The strike ruptured the relationships between the FEA, the superintendents and school board groups, and the DOE. Bitterness and distrust replaced harmony and cooperation. Administrators fled the FEA as they felt the organization had betrayed them. Close ties with the Department of Education, the Florida School Boards Association, and the Florida Association of District School Superintendents were severed. Disenchanted with the way FEA leaders handled the strike, many large county classroom teacher associations eventually disaffiliated with the FEA, including the Dade, Hillsborough, and Pinella County CTAs. The strike accomplished little, but seriously weakened the previously powerful FEA. Once at the apex of the educational interest group pyramid, the FEA lost membership, prestige, and much of its political influence. Its remaining constituency was in the more rural, sparsely populated Florida districts. The "old order" had been shattered and a new form of interest
group involvement was to emerge.

While not an interest group in the usual sense, the Department of Education became the most influential group of professional educators. Educational interest groups began to form closer ties with the DOE in order to be involved in decisions concerning possible legislative proposals on education. The Florida Association of District School Superintendents formed the closest ties with the DOE. By 1973, the executive secretary of the superintendents association was a DOE employee. The Florida School Boards Association also established closer ties with the DOE. The legislative programs of the superintendents and school boards organizations were practically the same as the DOE's legislative program. On the other hand, the DOE relationship with the FEA was severely strained by the strike.

The post 1968 strike period found the superintendents and school board groups aligned against teacher groups on management-labor issues. But the teacher groups were also split among themselves. The FEA and the large urban CTAs reflected a rural-urban difference of opinion which prompted these teacher groups to disagree at times. As time passed, differences between the teacher groups lessened and mutual concerns became more apparent. FEA and CTA leaders became increasingly disenchanted with Commissioner Christian. They felt that he was too cautious and that he merely reacted to legislative proposals rather than initiating legislation. Moreover, the various teacher groups did not have sufficient political influence in the legislature to gain legislation that they wanted, and the common quest for collective bargaining guidelines for teachers brought these groups closer together.

In early 1973, the teacher groups began to reunite in an effort to gain more influence in the legislature. The FEA and three large county CTAs--
Dade, Pinellas, and Hillsborough—entered into a formal coalition termed the Florida Legislative Alliance (FLA). The major goal of the alliance was to obtain collective bargaining guidelines for teachers, but leaders from these teacher groups viewed the FLA as a step toward getting the large county CTAs to reaffiliate with the FEA. Said one CTA officer, "They (FEA) need us because of our large membership, but we (large county CTAs) need the FEA, too" because of their statewide base. The urban CTAs have large memberships and more money than the FEA, but the CTAs depend on the FEA for research and data producing capabilities.

In order to gain more political leverage, the large county CTAs have become deeply involved in state and local political campaigns. One CTA leader stressed that it was more profitable for teachers to elect officials who were sympathetic to education than it was to lobby public officials unsympathetic to education. The CTAs have most commonly become involved in legislative campaigns, but have also been involved in the statewide campaigns of Cabinet members as well as the local campaigns of county officials. The Dade CTA was active in electing teachers to the Dade County Democratic Executive Committee. A Dade CTA official stated that in 1970, only four teachers were on Dade's Democratic Executive Committee, but, by 1973, 25 teachers served on the 100 member committee.

The urban CTAs became involved in campaigns in various ways. They endorsed candidates, made financial contributions to campaigns, provided publicity, researched educational issues for the candidates, and supplied campaign workers. The FEA supported the CTA's involvement in political campaigns, but it did not have the money or the manpower to become involved in campaigns as a state level teacher's organization. The FEA did endorse candidates and provide publicity for candidates, but that was the extent of their involvement. In contrast to the teacher associations, the Florida Association of District School Superintendents and the Florida School Boards
Association were not involved in campaigns at all. Both organizations feared that campaign involvement would cause internal disagreements among factions in their own associations.

While teacher groups were coming closer together, they remained aligned against the superintendents and school board groups on several issues. The relationship between teacher groups and Commissioner Christian was strained because of the 1968 strike. FEA and CTA leaders became more vocal in their criticism of the Commissioner. The "old order" monolithic structure which linked educational interest groups to the legislature had been fragmented.

The influence of educational interest groups in the legislature varied from issue to issue, but legislators stated that on "gut issues" like school finance legislation, the educational interest groups had little or no influence. Even without the 1968 teacher strike, the relationship between educational interest groups and the legislature may have altered, because the legislature underwent vast changes in the 1960s.

The Legislature

Changes in the late 1960s transformed the Florida legislature from one of the weakest in the nation to one of the strongest. Usdan, Minar, and Hurwitz described the weakness of the legislature and its dependence on outside help on educational legislation.

The legislature in Florida is responsible for the final approval of budgets for educational institutions, but its sessions are so short and infrequent (60 days every other year) that it must rely heavily on outside guidance. The committees responsible for appropriations and fiscal matters are severely understaffed, and cannot develop the expertise essential to the intelligent appraisal of these budgets. For help with the elementary and secondary schools and the junior colleges, the legislators depend on information from the Department of Public Instruction and the FEA.  

The legislature was weak for several reasons which included: (1) malapportionment of the House and Senate; (2) restrictions such as biennial sessions, ceilings on legislative pay and legislative expenses, etc; and (3) inadequate
secretarial and staffing help for individual legislators and standing committees.

Legislative malapportionment was discussed in a previous section. The effect of reapportionment on legislative conflict will be discussed in this section. The malapportioned legislature of the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s was controlled by rural legislators. The basic conflict was between rural and urban legislators. New conflict arose in the reapportioned legislature. Eight legislative leaders, who served during 1971 and 1972 legislative sessions, were interviewed. Due to time limitations, not every legislative leader interviewed was asked all the questions on the interview schedule. Six legislative leaders were given a card that listed certain conflicts that could typically be found in state legislatures. They were asked to rate the importance of each conflict when a major school finance bill was being considered by the legislator. The responses of the legislators are presented in Table 5.

Important conflicts over major school finance issues were between legislators representing urban-suburban-rural areas, and between legislators representing wealthy and poor school districts. Legislators indicated that during the Kirk administration, intense conflict existed between the supporters of the Republican Governor and his opponents in the Democratically controlled legislature. Conflict between the Governor's supporters and opponents has not been as important during the administration of Democrat Reubin Askew. Legislators also felt that the conflict between conservative and liberal legislators was related to the area that the legislator represented. Liberal legislators most often come from urban Democratic areas like Dade and Duval Counties while conservative legislators usually represented rural Democratic counties or Republican urban counties like Broward County. Conflict between
Table 5

Legislators' Perceptions of the Importance of Certain Conflicts Over Major School Finance Bills

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Conflict</th>
<th>Importance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Between the Political Parties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Between the Governor's Supporters and the Governor's Opponents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Between Spokesmen for the Cities and Those for Suburbs or Rural Areas</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Between Liberals and Conservatives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Between Business Spokesmen and Labor Spokesmen</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Between Spokesmen for Wealthy School Districts and Those Spokesmen for Poor School Districts</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Other Conflicts (Specify)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Fight Over Educational Reorganization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=6

Political parties or between business and labor spokesmen was perceived as unimportant when a major school finance issue was being considered.

Reapportionment made the legislature more urban and Republican in its orientation. Some of those new urban legislators came from counties like Duval (Jacksonville) County, where taxes were high but the schools were underfinanced because there were many students and property values were low. Other new legislators came from counties like Broward (Ft. Lauderdale) County, where taxes were low but the schools were well-financed because there were fewer students and property values were high. On school finance issues, there was conflict between legislators from "pupil rich, property poor"
counties and "pupil poor, property rich" counties. When the legislature was malapportioned, rural legislators restricted urban areas from obtaining additional state funds for education. The urban-rural conflict still existed in the reapportioned legislature, but urban legislators were now in control.

The legislature was also weak due to the many prohibitive restrictions placed upon it by the 1885 Constitution. However, the 1968 Constitution re-organized state government and lifted many of these prohibitive restrictions. The new Constitution included provisions which allowed the legislature to meet in annual sessions and which abolished the ceilings on legislative pay. Annual sessions provided more continuity to legislative programs and allowed the legislators to deal with issues more comprehensively. In 1969, legislative pay was increased to $12,000 annually over Governor Kirk's veto. Other changes which strengthened the legislature included abolishing the Legislative Council, revamping the standing committees, instituting a pre-filing system to introduce bills, and developing in-service training programs for legislators and legislative staffs.

Inadequate staffing for legislators and standing committees was a third reason that the legislature was weak. Not until governmental reorganization in 1969 were individual legislators and standing committees assigned secretarial help and permanent staffs. The new permanent staff to the House Education Committee was composed of a full time director, four full time staff aides, two part time staff aides, and two full time secretaries. The staff for the Senate Public Schools Committee was slightly smaller. The purposes of these staffs were to research potential bills for committee members, write bills for committee members, and provide information on bills that have already been introduced. These staffs were relatively new and, outside of the two staff directors, many staff members had little to no political or educational ex-
perience. However, legislators who were interviewed expected all permanent staffs to standing committees to become more experienced and helpful in future sessions.

According to the 1971 Citizens Conference on State Legislature, Florida's legislature ranked fourth in the nation in legislative "professionalism." The Citizens Council ranked each state legislature by five dimensions (parenthesis denote Florida's rank on each dimension): functional (5th); accountable (8th); informed (4th); independent (1st); and representative (30th). Only the legislatures of California (1st), New York (2nd), and Illinois (3rd) ranked higher in combined totals. The Florida legislature's overall rank of fourth was sharply contrasted by the low legislative rankings of its Southeastern neighbors: Tennessee (26th); Louisiana (33rd); Mississippi (42nd); South Carolina (44th); Georgia (45th); North Carolina (47th); and Alabama (50th). The Florida legislature's high overall rank further illustrated the changes and improvements which took place in the legislature.

Florida's legislature ranked first in independence due partly to the increased staff that individual legislators and standing committees were provided. With this added staff, the legislature was more capable of producing data, formulating bills, and developing alternative proposals. While the legislature had become more independent, it still relied upon outside sources for information on educational issues. To determine their most useful sources of information on educational issues, legislators were asked two questions. The first question asked them to identify the individuals or groups that supplied the most useful information about public schools. The second question asked which information source they personally found to be the most useful. Table 6 contains a list by frequency of mention of the individuals and groups that the legislative leaders identified as the information source each personally found most useful.
TABLE 6

FREQUENCY MENTION OF SOURCES OF USEFUL INFORMATION ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO LEGISLATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Frequency of Mention N=8</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other legislators</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local school district officials</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom Teacher Associations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Education Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida School Boards Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Association of District School Superintendents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations outside of Florida</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data indicated that there were multiple, competitive sources of useful information available to legislators on public school matters. Legislators also utilized the specialized expertness or expertise of their legislative colleagues. The importance of legislative staffs was an evident source of useful information which legislators relied upon. The state level teachers', superintendents', and school boards' interest groups were not identified as particularly useful sources of information by legislators. Of the legislators interviewed, not one identified a state level educational interest group as a source of information that he personally found the most useful. Legislators identified school officials and local teacher groups as sources of useful information. This acknowledgement of local educators as an information source was an indicator of the importance of "grass root" involvement to legislators. On educational issues, legislators wanted to know the effect of the bill "on the schools back home."

The legislature was the forum where many crucial educational decisions were made, especially in the school finance area. The way which the legislature processed educational legislation was interesting and complex. The important legislative committees dealing with education in the House were
the Appropriations Committee and the Education Committee. The Ways and Means Committee and Public Schools Committee were the important Senate committees dealing with education. Most educational legislation originated in either the House Education or Senate Public Schools Committees. Bills were classified into money bills (bills needing financing) and non-money bills (bills that changed regulations, etc., but did not require financing). When a non-money bill passed the House Education or Senate Public Schools Committee, it was eligible to be placed on the floor for consideration by the respective chamber. When a money education bill passed either the House Education or Senate Public Schools Committee the bill was referred to the appropriate financing committee - the House Appropriations or the Senate Ways and Means Committee.

Each finance committee had a sub-committee which specifically dealt with the funding of educational bills. When an education bill was referred to one of these financing committees, it was first considered by the sub-committee dealing with education finance. Theoretically, the bill must be voted on, and passed by the full finance committee before it was eligible to be sent to the particular chamber's floor. Because the finance committees heard so many bills, the full finance committee usually voted positively on a bill which a sub-committee had passed. Therefore, the House Appropriations Sub-Committee on Education and the Senate Ways and Means Sub-Committee which dealt with education were the arenas in which many important educational policy decisions were made in Florida. Once a bill passed through a committee, it was eligible to be placed on the calendar for consideration by the respective chamber. If passed, the bill then was ready for consideration by the other chamber and the bill was referred to the appropriate committee.
A small group of influential legislators had a great deal of control over the legislative process through a system which interlocked the education, finance, and tax committees in the legislature. Chairmen and vice chairmen of these committees frequently served on the other committees. For example, in the 1971 and 1972 sessions, Representative Terrell Sessums was Chairman of the House Education Committee and he also served on the House Appropriations Committee. Representative Marshall Harris chaired the House Appropriations Committee and served on the House Finance and Taxation Committee. Similar interlocking took place in the Senate. The legislative tax committees - concerned with raising needed money, the appropriations committees - concerned with allocating money, and the education committees - the largest single spenders of state operating funds were all closely interlocked to ensure some continuity in funding educational proposals.

Since 1969, the House was very active in promoting education legislation. In the fall of 1968, Fred Schultz became House Speaker. Schultz was from Duval County (Jacksonville) where property taxes were high but the public schools were in financial trouble. When Schultz became House Speaker, two of his goals were to get more money for schools and to examine the school funding structure in Florida. Schultz was particularly interested in achieving greater equity in school finance. During that time period there were also a number of other House members who were interested in education and school finance legislation. In the words of one legislator, "There evolved in the House a group of people who became extremely knowledgeable in educational matters, especially school finance." In the 1969 and 1970 legislative sessions, this group of House members included Representatives Terrell Sessums (D), Bob Graham (D), Ralph Turlington (D), Buddy MacKay (D), William Conway (D), Marshall Harris (D), Fred Schultz (D), Richard Pettigrew (D), Don Reed (R), and Joel Gustafson (R).
Representative Pettigrew became House Speaker for the 1971 and 1972 sessions, and the House continued to initiate many school finance proposals. "It was mere happenstance," observed a legislator, "that brought these particular men together at the same time." There were other House members keenly interested in education and this also contributed to the amount of educational legislation the House considered. The House initiated, developed, and passed a great deal of educational legislation which prompted a House member to say that the House "jammed educational reform down the Senate's throat," from 1968 through 1972.

After the 1972 elections, the group of House members providing impetus for educational reform was greatly diminished as some members retired, lost re-election bids, or ran for other elected offices. Fred Schultz was no longer in the legislature, but served as Chairman of Governor Askew's Citizens Committee on Education. Bob Graham and Richard Pettigrew were in the Senate and Joel Gustafson gave up his House seat to run for Congress. However, there was still a core of the original group left in important leadership positions for the 1973-1974 sessions with Terrell Sessums as Speaker for the 1973-74 sessions, Marshall Harris as Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Ralph Turlington as Chairman of the Finance and Tax Committee, William Conway as Chairman of the Education Committee and Buddy MacKay as Chairman of Appropriations Committee Sub-Committee Education, there were enough House leaders who were knowledgeable about and concerned with education that the House would probably continue to initiate many educational reforms.

There was also a group of Senators who provided much impetus for consideration of educational legislation from 1968-1972. Senators Louis De La Parte, Jr. (D), John Broxon (D), Henry Saylor (R), Jim Williams (D), Ken Plante (R), and Bob Saunders (D) were all interested in promoting educational
reform. This small group of House and Senate members contained key legislative leaders. They were able to muster the necessary support in order to pass many educational bills. In the new reapportioned, reorganized, and fully staffed legislature, these legislators were able to translate interest in education into educational legislation. In the old malapportioned, restricted, and understaffed legislature this probably would not have been possible. For years the Florida legislature had been the weak sister to the executive and judicial branches of government. But changes in the late 1960s transformed the legislature from one of the weakest into one of the most effective in the nation.

The Governor and the Cabinet

An understanding of the governor's role in Florida's state government is contingent on one's understanding of Florida's Cabinet. The Cabinet has dominated the Executive Branch of Florida's government since the 1885 constitution took deliberate steps to weaken the governorship. The Cabinet was made up of seven statewide elected officials: Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Commissioner of Agriculture, and Commissioner of Education. Cabinet members not only served as heads of their particular departments but also as ex-officio members of many boards and commissions. As Florida's population increased and state government expanded, agencies and departments were created and assigned to different Cabinet officials to regulate, and the state government structure became cumbersome. Figure 4 depicts the governmental structure before the 1968 Constitution forced governmental re-organization. The Cabinet sat over 22 ex-officio boards and 3 ex-officio and appointive boards. The Governor appointed a host of administrative officials, boards, and commissions, as Florida's state government was administered by some 123 agencies.
The governor was weak under the cabinet system for many reasons. First, the governor had only one vote out of seven on many matters. Since the Cabinet sat as ex-officio members over several boards and commissions, the governor's one vote was not worth any more than any other Cabinet member's vote. Whereas most governors in other states were the chief administrative officer, Florida's governor was one of seven chief administrative officers.

Secondly, the governor had little control over fiscal and budgetary matters because the Cabinet sat as ex-officio members of the Budget Commission, the central budgetary agency. Third, until 1965, the governor was elected to a four year term with no power of succession, while Cabinet members enjoyed unlimited succession. This allowed some Cabinet members to build independent sources of power. Since other cabinet members served on an average of 12 years, they were often more skilled in political maneuverings than was the Governor.

Joseph Schlesinger pointed out the importance of Florida's governors in 1971. Schlesinger used a point system to rate a governor's power by four dimensions: tenure potential, appointive powers, budget powers, and veto powers. The maximum for any category was 5 points with 1 point being the lowest. Florida's governorship rated three points apiece on the tenure potential and veto powers dimensions, two points on the appointive powers dimension, and one point on the budget powers dimension. The grand total of nine points gave Florida's governorship a ranking of 47th out of the 50 states on Schlesinger's combined powers. By any standard, the power of the Florida governorship was weak.

The 1968 Constitution paved the way for governmental re-organization in Florida which became reality with the 1969 Reorganization Act. This Act modernized the state government structure in Florida by reducing the number of boards and commissions that the Cabinet sat on as ex-officio
members. The Reorganization Act consolidated governmental boards, commissions, and agencies into 22 departments which have direct lines of authority either to the governor or to cabinet members. Figure 5 shows the state governmental structure after reorganization.

Governmental reorganization enhanced the power of the governor by giving him sole authority over more than half of the 22 departments; by allowing him to succeed himself to a second four year term; and by giving him power to present a single budget to the legislature. Previously, the Cabinet presented budget requests to the legislature, but now all departments presented their budget requests to the governor who consolidated them and presented one single budget to the legislature. Although the governor was still relatively weak, compared to his counterparts in other states, Florida's governorship certainly would rank higher on Schlesinger's index of formal gubernatorial powers than it did.

Governmental reorganization had two direct effects on state educational policy making. The Cabinet was retained as ex-officio members of the State Board of Education, but the budget procedure changed as all budget requests were processed through the governor. With reorganization, the governor was given direct authority over the Department of Administration which was made up of six divisions. One of these six divisions was the Budget Division. The Department of Administration issued budget instructions to all agencies concerning the format of their budget, but their dollar request was not regulated. The Budget Division had five full-time analysts whose sole job was to work on the educational budget request. The following steps describe in general terms the process involved in the development of the educational budget which becomes part of the school finance bill:
Figure 5

Executive Department Organization

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1. The Commissioner of Education formulates the educational legislative budget and recommends it to the State Board of Education. Formulating the educational legislative budget is a complicated process as the DOE must gather data necessary to make calculations and projections for the public schools', community colleges' and state universities' programs. Analysts from the Department of Administration's Budget Division constantly review the budget as the DOE develops it.

2. When the State Board of Education has approved the DOE legislative budget, the Commissioner formally presents the budget to the Governor.

3. The educational legislative budget is analyzed by the Department of Administration's Budget Division along with the budget requests from all other state agencies.

4. Department of Administration officials meet with the Governor to critique the overall budget situation and the Governor indicates his budget priorities.

5. The Department of Administration develops guidelines for the Governor's priorities, the budget requests from agencies, and the state's projected income.

6. The Department of Administration then meets with agencies who have submitted budgets (including the Department of Education), informs them of the Governor's recommendation concerning their budget, and allows the agency either to reorder their budget or argue against any changes the Governor has recommended.

7. Department of Administration officials then meet a second time with the Governor. Many final decisions are made concerning specific budgetary items. Because education is such a large part of the budget, decisions concerning the educational part of the budget are usually the last to be made.

8. After the second meeting with the Governor, the Department of Administration must put together the Governor's legislative budget recommendations, print them, and make them available to the public 30 days before the legislative session begins. The document sent to the legislature contains both the particular agencies' original budget requests in one column of the page, and the Governor's recommendation for that item in the other column. By state law, the Governor's budget recommendations to the legislature must be balanced. If the Governor's budget recommends more than what is available, he must recommend new taxes to raise the necessary revenue to cover his budgetary requests. Before 1968, the budget was submitted by the Governor and Cabinet as the Budget Commission which also had to submit a balanced budget. While the Budget Commission did not recommend expenditures in excess of anticipated revenues, it did recommend new programs to the legislature which were not provided for in the budget. If the legislature adopted the new programs, it had to raise current taxes or find new tax
sources to fund the program. Under this system, the legislature either had to increase taxes or turn down new programs. Since the Cabinet members did not have to fund their new program proposals, they were in a politically advantageous position. If the legislature refused to adopt the new program proposals, Cabinet members could publicly state that the legislature refused to fund their program proposals. If the legislature adopted the new programs, Cabinet members could take credit for the programs without the stigma of having raised taxes. In the 1969 governmental reorganization, the legislature shifted the budget recommendation authority from the Governor and Cabinet to the Governor only. The legislature required the Governor to submit a balanced budget or recommend the necessary tax increases because it was tired of the old system where the Governor and Cabinet made budget requests without recommending tax increases to pay for their recommended programs.

9. The Governor makes his budget recommendations to the legislature and the money committees in the House and Senate develop bills. Again, the sub-committee dealing with education in the House Appropriations Committee and Senate Ways and Means Committee are crucial places where decisions are made concerning school finance.

10. Normally, the appropriations bills developed in the House and Senate are different, and a joint conference committee is formed to develop an appropriations bill that is agreeable to the majority of the House and Senate members. The school finance issue is usually the major problem facing the joint conference committee.

11. Once an appropriations bill passes the legislature, it goes to the Governor. The Governor can approve or veto the entire bill, or he may veto individual items in the bill. In the case of a veto, the legislature can override it with a 2/3 majority vote. In some respects, the Governor has gained budgetary powers with this new procedure. However, the legislature still received a copy of the particular agencies' original requests, and departments headed by Cabinet members can lobby for their original requests in the legislature. Since the Commissioner of Education was a Cabinet member, the Department of Education and other educational interest groups could lobby for a school finance bill which may or may not be in agreement with the Governor's recommendations. Under the new budget procedures, the Governor had more budgetary influence, but he did not have complete control over the legislative budget requests of agencies in the executive branch headed by Cabinet members.
Although the governor was gaining power, the Cabinet still dominated the executive branch of government. The Governor and Cabinet sat as ex-officio members of ten different boards—including the State Board of Education. The Governor and Cabinet met on every first and third Tuesday of each month. At each meeting, ten different agendas were considered covering subjects such as education, highway safety, and natural resources. According to state law, the governor was the chairman of the State Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education was the Board's secretary and executive officer. The meetings were perfunctory as each Cabinet member had an aide or staff of aides who performed the preparatory work. The Secretaries for each board prepared the agenda for that board. For example, the Commissioner of Education was responsible for preparing the agenda for the State Board of Education.

Agendas were to be prepared a week before the Governor and Cabinet meeting. The Governor and Cabinet staff aides then met on the Thursday preceding the actual Governor and Cabinet meeting to review each of the ten agendas. At these aides' meeting, labeled by their critics as the "little cabinet," any additional background information needed on items in any of the ten agendas was given. Department of Education representatives were present to clarify any questions about items on the education agenda, just as representatives from other governmental agencies were present to explain items on their particular agenda. Since the Commissioner of Education is a voting member of all ten boards, his staff aide must secure any additional information the Commissioner needs on agenda items of the non-education boards. It was at this aides' meeting that differences and conflicts were resolved. If aides felt that further supporting documents or information was needed, they asked the proper agency for it at this meeting.
After the aides' meeting, each aide considered the items on each agenda, summarized the supporting evidence for that item, and formulated a voting recommendation (yes or no) for the Governor or his/her respective Cabinet member. Aides then met with the Governor or their respective Cabinet members, and presented each of the ten agendas. For each item on the agenda, the aide had a brief summary statement of what the item was as well as a recommendation to vote yes or no on that particular item. The aides generally agreed that the Governor and the Cabinet members followed an aide's recommendation "most of the time." One aide estimated that aides' recommendations were accepted by the Governor and the Cabinet members "99 out of 100 times."

The Cabinet meeting itself was routine. Most conflicts over agenda items had been resolved before the meeting. Usually, the Governor and Cabinet members did not question each other strenuously in their areas of competence. The Commissioner of Education was recognized as the expert in education, as the Governor and other Cabinet members were recognized as experts in their fields. Therefore, the Governor and each Cabinet member exercised a great deal of autonomy and power in his designated area. Conflict and dissension over certain issues did exist, and at times the conflict could not be resolved prior to the meeting. Cabinet members would cast dissenting votes on certain items. But in general, the Governor and Cabinet members tried to avoid controversy by formulating policies that the other members could support. An interest group official characterized the working relationship among the Governor and Cabinet members as, "I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch mine."

Sitting as the State Board of Education, the Governor and Cabinet usually approved items that the Commissioner of Education placed on the educational board agenda. In Florida, the State Board of Education was the ultimate appeal board for teachers who had been dismissed. The State Board could also revoke teaching certificates. These administrative actions, not
policy matters, were the most controversial educational items on the State Board of Education's agenda. Many observers felt that the Cabinet rarely, as the State Board of Education, took a public stand on an important or controversial educational issue. The Cabinet, as a State Board of Education, did not collectively lobby for educational proposals in the legislature. The Commissioner of Education spoke for the Board on education legislative proposals.

Many legislators felt that Cabinet members, excepting the Commissioner of Education, actively avoided becoming involved in educational legislation. Generally, the Commissioner of Education made specific recommendations for the State Board of Education on all legislative educational issues. His recommendations carried the support of all Cabinet members. However, in one past session, a legislative sub-committee was considering two educational proposals, one that would have allowed college students to graduate in three years and another which would have abolished the Board of Regents. One legislator had asked the Governor and Cabinet members, as members of the State Board of Education, to make recommendations to the sub-committee on these proposals. This legislator said that some became so upset at the request which would involve them in such controversial issues that "you would have thought I had raped their mothers."

In summary, the Cabinet met twice a month as ex-officio members of ten different boards, of which one is the State Board of Education. Each Cabinet member had an aide who devoted all or part of his time to educational matters. The Commissioner of Education enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and power because the Governor and other Cabinet members usually endorsed items that the Commissioner placed on the education agenda. Although the Governor or an individual Cabinet member might have taken a position on a specific educational proposal, the Governor and the Cabinet
rarely lobbied for educational proposals as the State Board of Education.

The Commissioner of Education

The Commissioner of Education served as one of the six Constitutional Cabinet members. He was elected to four year terms and he could succeed himself indefinitely. Because he was a Cabinet member, the Commissioner was a member of the policy-making board for education as well as being the Constitutional chief administrative officer for the Department of Education. The Commissioner's formal power stemmed from his status as a Constitutional Cabinet member and as a Constitutional statewide elected official.

There were some who disagreed with having an elected Commissioner who served on the Cabinet, and opponents of this structure cited the following disadvantages. First, his role as a Cabinet member was dysfunctional because it cast the Commissioner as a policy maker as well as the chief state administrator. Second, non-educational Cabinet responsibilities consumed so much of the Commissioner's time that he could not adequately serve as the chief state educational official. Third, because he was elected, the Commissioner had to temper his stands on controversial educational issues in order to be re-elected. Therefore, the Commissioner's status as a statewide elected official and as a Cabinet member was perceived as having both strengths and weaknesses.

Floyd T. Christian became Commissioner of Education in 1965. He was appointed by the Governor to fulfill the unexpired term of State Superintendent Thomas D. Bailey and was subsequently elected to full terms in 1967 and 1971. In the late 1960s, Commissioner Christian probably enjoyed more power and prestige than any Commissioner before him. First, he had the formal powers in the form of political resources and independence which came with being a Cabinet member and statewide elected official. Second,
Commissioner Christian had been Superintendent of Pinellas County (St. Petersburg) for 17 years before becoming State Commissioner. He had strong ties with other county superintendents, and through the Florida Association of District School Superintendents, he had contacts in all of Florida's 67 counties. These contacts, coupled with county Democratic chapters, gave Commissioner Christian a strong political organization. One legislator commented that Commissioner Christian could "push buttons in every county."

Third, the election of Claude Kirk in 1966 as the first Republican Governor in Florida since reconstruction, set the stage for public disputes between Governor Kirk and the Commissioner which kept Commissioner Christian's name in the media headlines for four years. Democrats were smarting from the loss of the governorship in 1966 and of a senatorial seat in 1968 to the Republicans. Governor Kirk and Commissioner Christian waged a series of public battles on educational issues as the Governor vetoed several educational bills.

One of the biggest of these battles occurred in 1968. Governor Kirk had vetoed a school finance bill in 1967, but was pressured by the FEA to call the legislature back into special session solely for education in 1968. At the end of the special session, the legislature passed a school finance bill which gave education (K-Junior College) an additional $227 million by raising state sales tax from 3¢ to 4¢. Neither Governor Kirk nor the FEA liked the bill. The FEA called a statewide teachers strike. Governor Kirk allowed the bill to become law without his signature. To veto the bill, he claimed, would be a victory for militant striking teachers.

Since both the FEA and Governor Kirk were against the appropriations bill, Commissioner Christian received a great deal of the credit for obtaining substantial additional funds for education. The DOE worked extremely hard during the special session to try to get the legislature to pass a bill that would avoid a FEA strike. Commissioner Christian and the DOE
legislative staffers were satisfied that the additional $227 million appropriated to education was as much as they could reasonably expect. However, the FEA spurned the bill as inadequate, and called the statewide teachers strike. Governor Kirk opposed the bill because it called for an increase in Florida’s sales tax. Commissioner Christian and the DOE took a moderate position - education still needed more money, but the additional funds appropriated in the special session was a step in the right direction.

By opposing the strike and keeping the schools open, Commissioner Christian lessened the effect of the teacher strike. Commissioner Christian sought special legislative measures to keep the schools open. Most Floridians opposed the teacher strike, and the public generally supported Commissioner Christian's efforts. The Commissioner received a great deal of media coverage during this time period, and it was at this point during the late 1960s that Commissioner Christian's political influence reached its zenith. Complementing his formal powers were a strong political organization, the respect of many Democrats (who controlled the legislature), and extensive media exposure which gave him public recognition in his bitter disagreements with Governor Kirk.

Christian ran for re-election in 1970 and easily won. However, his political power had been greatly diminished. First, Christian campaigned for re-election stating that if re-elected, it would be his final term as Commissioner, thereby establishing himself as a lame duck. Secondly, Democrat Reubin Askew defeated Claude Kirk in the gubernatorial race, and Commissioner Christian no longer enjoyed the public confrontations which kept him in the media limelight. These factors reduced the Commissioner's political influence, although he retained the formal powers inherent in the Commissionership and the political contacts he had developed.
Commissioner Christian had also been embroiled in the controversial issue of educational reorganization. Educational reorganization was closely tied to proposals to change the Cabinet structure. Many Floridians (as well as political scientists) attacked the Cabinet system on the basic premise that executive power was so diffused among seven officials that no one official could be held responsible for the operation of state government. Opponents of the Cabinet system felt that all executive authority should have been placed in the Governor. In that way responsibility for decisions could have been focused on one person, and the public could demand explanations for decisions. Supporters of the Cabinet system argued that the Cabinet system assured openness in governmental administration, and offered executive checks and balances because executive policies were agreed upon by a majority of the seven members. Furthermore, Cabinet system supporters claimed that Florida had been free from any scandal in matters over which the Cabinet had responsibility.

As Florida grew and the state government increased its services, the Cabinet system came under increasing attack. Governor Kirk pressed very hard for reorganization of the executive branch in the 1968 Constitution, but the new constitution did little in restructuring of the Cabinet system although the governorship was somewhat strengthened. Since wholesale restructuring of the Cabinet system did not seem possible, Governor Kirk tried to weaken the Cabinet by removing Cabinet members one at a time. The theory was that if one member could be removed from the Cabinet, then other members could soon be eliminated. Given the increasing lack of confidence the public had in education because of rising costs, new instructional methods, and desegregation, Governor Kirk seemed to feel that the Commissioner of Education was the most vulnerable Cabinet member to attack.

Governor Kirk and Commissioner Christian engaged in several public disagreements over educational issues and vetoed educational bills. While
these disagreements reflected differences in educational philosophies, they were also attempts by Governor Kirk to discredit the Cabinet and the role of the Commissioner of Education as a Cabinet member. Through the Committee on Quality Education which Kirk appointed, the state educational organization structure was criticized as ineffective. According to the Committee, the Cabinet did not do an adequate job as the State Board of Education. What was needed, said the committee, was a lay state board which could spend more time on educational issues and muster citizen support for educational proposals. Moreover, they said the Commissioner of Education spent too much time on non-educational matters and did not adequately administer the State Department of Education. Educational reorganization plans which they advocated had two basic tenets: one, a lay board of education would be created with members being appointed by the Governor upon senate confirmation; and two, the lay board would appoint the Commissioner of Education.

Governor Kirk's legislative proposals concerning educational reorganization were unsuccessful. His successor, Reubin Askew, promptly appointed a Citizen's Committee on Education which again took up the issues of educational reorganization and school finance. In February, 1972, educational reorganization hit its peak when the House narrowly defeated a constitutional amendment proposal (CSHJR 3063). The amendment provided for a fifteen member lay State Board of Education which would be appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate. The new State Board would have had the authority to appoint the Commissioner of Education. Had the amendment passed the legislature, it would have gone to the voters in the next election.

The six Cabinet members (other than the Governor) were given credit for defeating this bill. These Cabinet members viewed an attack on the Commissioner of Education as an attack on the entire Cabinet system. Fearing
further attacks on the Cabinet system if this one succeeded, they banded together. Using their independent political bases and independent lobbying power, the Cabinet members were successful in blocking the bill's passage. Legislators did not feel educational reorganization would be an issue in the 1973 legislative session, but politicians and educators agreed that it would be a major issue again in 1974 and 1975. It appeared that educational reorganization in Florida was only a surface conflict in Florida for a much deeper conflict involving governmental structure in the executive branch—a cabinet system vs. a single powerful executive.

Many legislators were genuinely concerned about the merits and demerits of the present educational structure. One legislator felt that the Cabinet was "totally ill equipped" to act as a State Board of Education. He observed that the Cabinet "acts as a rubber stamp" for the Commissioner while never functioning "as a governing body in education." A former legislator stated that all state boards of education "are a waste of time" whether they were made up of Cabinet members or lay members. He contended that "a lay board would not know any more than the present Cabinet board." His suggestion was a Governor appointed Commissioner of Education with no board of education "leaving educational policy making" to the Governor because such a large portion of the budget goes to education. Under this structure, voters would be able "to pinpoint responsibility" for state educational decisions.

The Department of Education

Florida's Department of Education was composed of four divisions: Division of Elementary--Secondary Education, Division of Universities, Division of Vocational Educational Education, and Division of Community Colleges. Figure 6 represented the organizational structure of the Department. The 1969 governmental reorganization act placed all public education,
including colleges and universities, in a single department. This study focused on state policy makers for K-12 programs which directly involved the Deputy Commissioner, the Associate Commissioners, and the Division of Elementary-Secondary Education. The DOE staff has grown, and according to a 1972 U.S. Office of Education study, there were 443 full-time professional staff employees in the DOE. All Department employees concerned with elementary and secondary education were covered by Florida's Career Service which offered job security and benefits similar to Civil Service.

Herman Meyers, Associate Commissioner for Budget and Planning and Development, and Cecil Golden, Associate Commissioner for Program Planning and Coordination, were responsible for organizing DOE educational legislative efforts. Technically, Meyers was responsible for working with the Senate and Golden was responsible for working with the House. In reality each worked in both chambers depending on content of a particular issue. Mr. Meyers' main area of concern was school finance legislation, and he was assisted by DOE staffers from the Bureau of Research and the Bureau of School Finance. Mr. Golden's main area was general educational legislation, but both men coordinated the DOE legislative efforts. Since Florida's Commissioner of Education was involved in other political areas and had many Cabinet responsibilities, a great deal of the responsibility for developing educational legislation was apparently delegated to the DOE. To supplement legislative proposals, the Department relied on information from all its bureaus, but especially the Bureau of School Finance and the Bureau of Research. While the Bureau of School Finance produced information focusing on the funding of public education, the Bureau of Research produced statistical information on a variety of school related subjects.

The Department's relationships with the Governor and the legislature have been affected by changes which have taken place in Florida. For many
years, the Department had a good relationship with Florida's governors. This was due to several factors. First, governors had little control over the budget and conflict between the Department and the Governor was minimal on this point. Secondly, the Commissioner of Education, as a fellow Cabinet member, had relatively easy access to the Governor. Another reason that the Governor generally supported the Commissioner of Education's educational proposals was that the Commissioner also voted on non-educational issues important to the Governor. Third, Governors only served for one four year term while the Department had permanency and continuity.

This relationship has changed due to the following factors: first, the 1968 Constitution gave the Governor more technical power over the budget. The Department of Education had to work with budget analysts from the Department of Administration while developing the educational budget. Although the Governor could not dictate the dollar amount of the educational budget, he had more formal control than he had before 1968. Secondly, the Governor acquired the right to succeed himself to a second four year term, which gave him more time to press for his personal educational proposals. However, the Department still had the power to lobby for the school finance budget once it was in the legislature, and the Commissioner of Education still retained political influence with the Governor since both voted on Cabinet boards.

The DOE did not have a good working relationship with Governor Kirk. The Governor and the Commissioner disagreed on several educational issues, and Governor Kirk vetoed educational bills which the DOE had written or endorsed. The DOE had a better relationship with Governor Askew and his staff. Although Governor Askew and Commissioner Christian disagreed on some issues, most notably educational reorganization, both men were Democrats and shared other common concerns. The DOE has worked closely with Governor...
Askew's staff. The Department provided much technical assistance to Governor Askew's Citizens' Committee on Education even though the DOE disagreed with the Committee's recommendations on educational reorganization. Except for Governor Kirk's administration, the DOE has generally had a good working relationship with Florida's governors.

The relationship between the Department of Education and the legislature altered significantly during the late 1960s. When the legislature met in biennial session with no staff assistance, it relied almost totally on the Department of Public Instruction (later renamed Department of Education) for preparing legislative proposals on education. For many years there was a single legislator who was the educational spokesman. The Department provided him with bills and background materials, and the legislature generally passed the bills that the Department had introduced. Since the Department was the only available staff to the legislature on educational matters, the legislature could not form alternatives to Department proposals. Therefore, Department proposals were rarely substituted for or amended.

Further strengthening the Department's influence in the legislature, was the strong tie between the Department and Florida Education Association. The Department consulted with the FEA leaders (which represented administrators as well as teachers before the 1968 strike) on potential educational legislation. When the legislature convened once every two years, the Department presented well prepared legislative proposals which had the backing of the FEA. With the dramatic changes in the legislature in the late 1960s, the relationship between the Department and the legislature also changed.

Legislative changes--annual sessions, standing committees with permanent staff, pre-session committee hearings, a pre-filing system, etc.--resulted in a stronger, more independent legislature which was much less dependent on the Department for educational legislation. No longer did the Department
enjoy the almost absolute information power which left legislators with little choice but to accept Department proposals. The legislature now had the time and the capability to generate alternatives to the Department's educational proposals. To be effective, the DOE had to change its image. Said one DOE spokesman, the ability of the legislature to formulate alternatives "forced the Department to become better at" providing accurate information, developing viable alternatives to original proposals, and explaining programs and proposals more clearly to the legislature and the public. Whereas Department proposals were once accepted and passed by the legislature with little question, the Department had to lobby for its proposals in a legislature which considered many educational proposals. The DOE still had expertise in writing educational bills in proper language and providing support information to back up the bills. But in addition, it had to lobby strongly for its proposals whereas these proposals were previously passed without much resistance.

Legislative leaders were asked to rate the information from the DOE in terms of meeting the legislators' needs. Table 7 represented the responses of the legislators. Legislators criticized DOE information as "slow in coming" or "hard to get data on proposals they are against." However, these legislative leaders admitted that the DOE controlled the data system and information flow on educational matters. The DOE provided information on the cost of proposed programs and calculations for the complicated Minimum Foundation Program. The permanent staffs to the education and finance committees could run check tests of DOE data, but the legislature depended on the DOE for the original data on many educational proposals.

Commissioner Christian had complete confidence in his DOE staff, and he gave the staff leeway in developing educational proposals. The DOE staff had a group of top level people who were quite adept in lobbying for
Department proposals. DOE staffers denied that they were lobbyists, contending that they merely "supplied information." However, legislators viewed the Department as a lobbying force. When the Department supported a bill, "they (DOE) flood this place (legislature) with educators," one legislator relayed, "but when they are against a proposal, it's hard to get any information out of them."

TABLE 7
LEGISLATOR'S PERCEPTION OF DOE INFORMATION

In terms of meeting your needs in deciding upon education and school finance bills, how would you rate the information coming to your office from the State Department of Education? Would you say that it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of times chosen</th>
<th>N=7</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Almost always meets your needs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usually meets your needs</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sometimes meets your needs</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Almost never meets your needs</td>
<td>0</td>
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The DOE staff also tried to build public support for their proposals through various county and state groups in order to "make it easier for legislators to vote for our bill." A Department spokesman said that the DOE staff worked hard at formulating solid education proposals that "will make a legislator look good" to the public by supporting the proposals. The DOE always had representatives present at committee and sub-committee meetings of the educational and appropriations committee. Some legislators felt that the DOE would block educational legislation it disagreed with by dragging its feet on supplying requested data, or by flooding a legislator with raw data which he could not interpret.

In sum, the Department was once virtually the only staff available to the legislature on educational matters and Department proposals were generally accepted. However, as the legislature became stronger and more able to formulate alternatives, it became less dependent on the Department. The Department
became more sophisticated in its lobbying techniques in order to retain its influence with the legislature. The DOE constructed a reputation of supplying accurate and useful information. It built public support for proposals and worked closely with legislators to explain proposals fully. The DOE tried to develop proposals which legislators could vote for and which made legislators look competent to their constituencies. Also, the DOE tried to block legislation which it did not agree with. Although the legislature could develop educational proposals and could formulate alternatives to DOE proposals, it still relied on the DOE for useful data and expertise in educational matters. Said one legislator grudgingly, the DOE "has saved our (legislature's) ass from time to time." However, the legislators did not like being as dependent as they were upon the DOE, and they hoped that eventually the permanent staffs to the education and appropriations committees would be able to provide them with more useful data and expertise on educational proposals.

PROCESS OF STATE EDUCATION POLICY MAKING

This section will deal with specific decisions in four major policy areas: school finance, desegregation, certification, and educational planning. Although the content of the decisions in each policy area is quite important, this section will focus on describing the actors involved and process used in arriving at these policy decisions. It should also be noted that the following descriptions are primarily based on information obtained from interviews with legislators, educators, educational interest group representatives, and governmental staff aides and corroborated by newspaper accounts and articles or documents prepared by state agencies and interest groups.

School Finance

The major school finance trend in Florida has been to increase the
percentage of state dollars going to education. A series of legislative enactments pointed out this trend. As in any state, the arena for school finance decisions was the legislature. Since 1959 in Florida, the House had been the chamber where school finance reform had been promulgated. Prime actors in these decisions have been legislators, the governor, the commissioner of education and the DOE, while secondary actors included the large classroom teacher associations from Dade, Pinellas, and Hillsborough Counties, the Association of District School Superintendents (closely aligned with the DOE, and representatives from various districts).

Since World War II, the legislature had dealt with school finance only after major crisis situations in Florida schools forced it to act. The legislature was so weak, that it simply did not have the capability to anticipate and avoid problems. As one legislator put it, "About every ten years (Since World War II) there would be a crisis in the schools and the legislature would react" by enacting some type of school finance legislation. Post WWII Florida faced several school crises which included inadequate building space for a rising school population and low teacher salaries. Governor Spessard L. Holland appointed a Citizens' Committee on Education (and practically every Florida governor since Holland has appointed one for various reasons) which made a two year study of Florida schools. The Committee spelled out its findings and recommendations in the Education and the Future of Florida. The 1947 state legislature enacted many of the report's recommendations, the most notable being Florida's Minimum Foundation Program which was derived from the Strayer-Haig formula. By 1957, school costs had risen so rapidly that Florida schools again faced a crisis situation. The legislature reacted by earmarking tax funds specifically for education. However, Florida schools were in desperate financial condition again by 1968. Governor Claude Kirk vetoed a 1967 school finance bill, but under increasing political pressure and the threat of a statewide teachers strike, the
legislature passed a school finance bill which gave education over $200 million additional by increasing Florida's sales tax from 3¢ to 4¢ in 1968.

As in other states, school finance in Florida was inextricably tied to tax issues. Prior to 1968 in Florida, the county school board had the power to levy 10 mills of tax on property without a vote of the electors (non-voted millage). Up to another 10 mills could be assessed by local district boards with the approval of the voters (voted millage). Therefore, county school boards had to have voter approval for any millage above 10 mills. Each of the 67 counties had a tax assessor, and the vast majority of these tax assessors were elected. The tax assessor set the assessed value of all ad valorem and personal property in the county. Since he was elected, he often assessed the value as low as possible. This created a problem for school districts who were near or at the 20 mill maximum (ten non-voted mills and ten voted mills) but still could not raise enough revenue because assessed valuations were so low.

In the early 1960s, the legislature passed a bill requiring that all property be assessed at 100 per cent of "just value." "Just value" was defined as the current market value of the property. However, county tax assessors ignored the law until 1963 when the Florida Supreme Court ruled that property had to be assessed at 100 per cent of "just value" in the Walter V. Shuler case from Duval County (Jacksonville). Many Florida counties reassessed property value either voluntarily or under court order, but other Florida counties were still well beneath the "just value" standard which the law set and the court upheld.

During the middle 1960s, increasing market values in concert with the reassessment of property in counties caused taxpayers to protest, but some counties still could not raise the needed revenue. In Duval County, the
schools deteriorated to the extent that the Southern Association disaccredited all of Jacksonville high schools. Fred Schultz, a House member from Duval County, became Speaker designate in the 1967-68 legislature, and Speaker in the 1969 and 1970 session. Schultz recognized the problems that schools were having in Duval County and sought to attain greater equity in school finance.

The legislature began to push for greater equity in school finance in 1965, and some minor changes were made in the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP). The required local county effort to participate in the MFP formula was modified to include a complex formula of tax paying ability based on five indicators of wealth in the county. In 1969 the legislature changed the required local effort from an index of taxpaying ability to a flat 3 mills on the non-exempted real and personal property with a ceiling of 10 mills for operating expenses. Essentially the legislature said to participate in the MFP, a county had to assess 3 mills which would be equalized by the state through the MFP. This 3 mill minimum increased the local required effort of many wealthy counties. In 1967, the legislature had attempted to reform school finance and increase state dollars for education, but Governor Kirk blocked these efforts. Wealthy counties such as Broward (Ft. Lauderdale), Pinellas (St. Petersburg), and Palm Beach (West Palm Beach) were also Republican counties. These counties were "property rich, pupil poor" meaning that the counties had few students in relation to the wealth of property in the county. Therefore little millage was needed to raise funds for education. "Property poor, pupil rich" counties had many students in relation to the property value in the county. Legislative efforts such as requiring a local effort of 3 mills to participate in the MFP would have the effect of wealthy counties giving more dollars to the state than they got back, with these dollars being redistributed to the "property poor, pupil rich" counties. Governor
Kirk articulated the Republican position by contending that school finance was a local matter, and money for schools should be raised at the county level.

After Governor Kirk took office in 1967, teachers became more vocal and organized in their efforts to obtain more state assistance for education. The governor had taken paradoxical positions. In his 1966 campaign, he publicly stated that he wanted Florida's educational system to be the best in the nation, yet he was against increased taxes needed to improve the educational system unless these taxes were voted for by the people. The FEA and the Governor were on opposite sides of the issue as the legislature considered a school finance bill in 1967.

The FEA gathered data to support the case for increased state aid to education. Teachers were upset about certain conditions in the state educational system: low teacher salaries, shortage of classroom space, inadequate and outdated textbooks, and sub-par programs in kindergarten and special education. The FEA cited statistics such as "...Florida was ninth in the nation in total population, ninth in public school enrollment, and tenth in personal income--but it was twenty-sixth in average teacher salaries, thirty-fourth in per pupil expenditures for local schools." While in favor of increased state aid to education, the superintendents' and school boards' associations were alarmed by increased teacher militance. They began to separate themselves from the FEA and its strong militant position for increased state aid to education.

Several forces were operating in 1967 concerning school finance. First, many county districts were unable to adequately fund their schools. Second, taxpayers were revolting because of increasingly high property taxes. Third, educators, especially teachers through the FEA, were more vocal than ever about their position that education was poorly funded. Fourth, legislators were aware that many local county districts were in financial trouble.
Due to reapportionment, the legislature was urban oriented and more sensitive to the problems of larger county districts. The 1967 legislature increased state aid to education for the 1967-69 biennium by $332.6 million (K-Junior College). This increase included $77 million specifically for teacher salaries. However, Governor Kirk used his line item veto power to reduce the educational appropriation by $106 million and defended the reductions as necessary to avoid new taxes. Of the vetoed money appropriations, $75 million came from K-12 programs such as kindergarten, first grade, exceptional child, and library programs.

Although the $77 million for increased teacher salaries remained in the budget, the threat of a statewide teacher strike gained momentum in late 1967. The strike threat pressured Governor Kirk into calling a special legislative session solely on the topic of educational finance in January, 1968.

Governor Kirk had earlier appointed a "blue ribbon" citizens committee, the Commission on Quality Education, which was to make recommendations to improve Florida's educational system, especially in the area of school finance. The Committee was asked to formalize its recommendations before the special legislative session started, much earlier than it was originally supposed to have its work completed. The Commission made its recommendations which included greater equalization in school finance and a higher state support for education. The legislature convened for a ten day special session on education in late January, 1968. Not until the end of the last day of the special session did the legislature agree on a $350 million package which satisfied neither the FEA nor the Governor.

Governor Kirk was against the one cent increase (3c - 4c) in the state sales tax that was needed to finance the package. This proposed tax increase violated Governor Kirk's no new taxes pledge. He threatened to veto
the bill since the public had not been given a chance to vote on the tax increase. However, the FEA let Governor Kirk save face by calling its long threatened strike on the last day of the special session—after the legislature had passed the package.

The FEA offered several public reasons for the statewide teachers strike. One reason the $350 million package was unacceptable was that it included money for non-educational purposes and tax relief. The bill contained an extra $233 million for education (Kindergarten through Junior College) but the FEA reasoned that the new tax increase would be attributed to education when in fact millions went for other purposes in a special session supposedly for education only. Also, the FEA labeled the amount of increase as inadequate. Third, the FEA was against the 10 mill cap or limit placed on local county districts on the basis that any cap on local millage would restrict a district from raising needed revenue.

While these were the surface reasons for the strike, political and educational observers felt that there were additional underlying reasons for the strike. First, the emotional involvement of the FEA leadership hindered them from viewing the situation objectively. Including the 1967 regular session and the 1968 special session, education had received an additional $592 million over the 1965-67 biennium with $135 million earmarked for teacher salary increases. Instead of striking, observers felt that the FEA could have taken credit for these increases as victories. Secondly, FEA leaders were unable and unwilling to stop the strike machinery once it was set into motion. Whatever the reasons for the 1968 strike, it caused a loss of public support for the FEA and let Governor Kirk out of a difficult situation.

Had the FEA accepted the package and not struck, Governor Kirk would have had to veto or sign the bill. Either course provided disadvantages to
Governor Kirk. Vetoing the bill meant another showdown with the Democratically controlled legislature. Signing the bill meant that he tacitly agreed to the sales tax increase which he did not want to do. However, the teacher strike offered him a viable way out; he allowed the bill to become law without his signature claiming that vetoing the bill would be a victory for militant striking teachers.

There were also apparent trade-offs between Governor Kirk and Commissioner Christian. In the 1968 bill, Commissioner Christian agreed to support a legislative proposal that would allow the people to vote on whether the Commissioner should be elected or appointed. In return, the Governor did not veto the appropriations bill. Christian then publicly supported an attempt to place the issue of an appointed Commissioner on the ballot as a Constitutional Amendment even though he was against the concept of an appointed Commissioner. Although the amendment passed through the legislature, it was never placed on the ballot. A constitutional revision committee also had a set of constitutional reforms to place before the voters which included more powers for the Governor, but retained an elected Commissioner. Only one of these two constitutional revisions could be placed on the ballot, and Kirk chose to back the latter revision because it guaranteed the governorship certain powers even though it retained an elected Commissioner. Therefore, the question of an elected vs. an appointed Commissioner was never voted upon by the public.

In a sense, education was both the winner and loser in the 1968 bill. Legislators were now deeply involved in school finance matters and more concerned about equalization. Commissioner Christian and the DOE were satisfied with the added state revenue, but not convinced that the 10 mill cap on local districts was good for education. The cap did not allow local districts to
assess more than 10 mills for local operating expenses. Education gained additional funds in the 1968 special legislative session, but the subsequent teacher strike disillusioned thousands of Florida's finer teachers. James Cass pointed out that many of the striking teachers "were among the better teachers in the schools--the ones who felt most keenly the inadequacies of time and facilities for teaching." The teacher strike had the most devastating effect on teachers who struck "...out of a strong personal commitment to the improvement of education in Florida." Cass described the effect the strike had on these teachers.

....They (the striking teachers) believed that an opportunity was offered to make a major breakthrough in support for the schools of the state--with the ultimate beneficiary the child in the classroom.

But when they returned to their classrooms, overwhelmingly they were not only defeated, but disillusioned. No one cares, they said, except us. The state responds only to power, the local school boards are more interested in retaliation than in education, and even the parents remain unconcerned. So why should we continue to care? Perhaps this is the most destructive legacy of all.

The FEA could have been the biggest winner in 1968, but it was the biggest loser. The FEA could have increased its already politically influential position. It had succeeded in pressuring Governor Kirk into calling the special legislation session. Instead of striking, the FEA could have justifiably taken the credit for the additional funds appropriated to education during the special session. Said one high ranking DOE official, "Had the FEA not struck, we (the DOE) would be going to the FEA today for their approval of our legislative proposals." By striking after the bill had passed the legislature, the FEA lost membership, prestige, close ties with the DOE and other educational interest groups, and political influence in the legislature.
The $233 million increase to education in 1968 had the practical effect of taking much of the pressure off the 1969 legislature to act on school finance matters. However, many legislators, especially House members, had become deeply involved with school finance matters and these legislators wanted to probe deeper into school finance problems. They found a ready partner in the DOE. Pressure was being applied from larger urban counties (Dade, Broward) who were experiencing deficits due to the required three mill local effort. It was also apparent that 1968 increases made in state aide to education were only stop-gap, and that the real answer to achieving equalization in school finance was in reforming the MFP. Five distinct disequalizing factors in the MFP were identified:

1. Property wealth differed from county to county.

2. The ratio of children to the general population differed from county to county.

3. Race track funds were distributed equally to each county which meant the county with the fewest number of children received the same amount as the county with the highest number of children.

4. There was no uniform assessment of tax rates.

5. There were unusual cost off-sets such as urban cost differentials, transportation, and teacher rank.

Included in the 1968 Appropriation Bill was a 10 mill cap or limit on local property tax for education. The legislature imposed the cap on the premise that equalization in school finance could be achieved by putting more state dollars into education. The cap, Speaker Schultz argued, would restrict the ability of large urban counties with good property tax bases from levying extra millage for their schools while refusing to vote for extra state money for education. Since district school boards had the power to assess 10 mills without the vote of the people (non-voted district millage), a district could reach the 10 mill cap without any voted millage. Theoretically, all districts over the 10 mill limit had to roll back to the limit.
However, legislators realized the crisis that would follow, so provisions were made for school districts to allow voters to vote for extra millage over the cap for the following reasons: capital outlay purposes; required debt service; deficit of state funding of retirement matching; commissions to tax assessor or tax collector; and the amount of money necessary to replace any decrease from the previous year in funds from PL 874 (federal impact funds).

The cap forced districts to turn to the state for more dollars. In the 1967-68 period, there were 24 school districts at the 10 mill maximum and state revenue made up 40 per cent of a local districts' budget. While state aid to education had increased in that two year period, twice as many districts were at the 10 mill maximum. Local districts were again pressuring the legislature for more state money since they could not raise it locally due to the legislated millage cap.

In the 1970 School Equalization Act, the legislature passed a bill to increase state support for education. Whereas other major school finance legislation since World War II had been in response to school crises, the 1970 School Equalization Act stemmed more from legislative desire to achieve equity in school finance than from pressure due to a current school crisis. While there was some pressure from local districts, it was not the intense crisis pressure which had triggered the pressure which had triggered the previous major school finance bills. The 1970 bill revolved around three tenets: equalization; unusual costs off-sets (urban differentials, teacher certification ranks, transportation, etc.); and a guarantee of 100 per cent fair assessment of property value in all counties. This bill was formulated by House members who relied upon DOE information and expertise concerning the MFP formula. The bill had the following features:
The value of instructional unit would be raised by $1100 a year for four consecutive years. In 1969-70, the average value of an instructional unit was $9700, but by 1973-74 it would increase by $4400 to $14,100.

Beginning in 1974-75, the DOE is required to include a cost of living adjustment in the educational budget to compensate for inflation.

The required local effort to participate in the MFP was raised from 3 mills in 1969-70 to 7 mills by 1973-74. Equalized millage would increase by one mill each year: 1970-71 4 mills required to participate in MFP; 1971-72 5 mills required; 1972-73 6 mills required; and 1973-74 7 mills required.

The MFP was adjusted to reflect 100 per cent uniform assessment in each county. The 1969 legislature passed HB990 which was a tax ratio study. This bill required the DOE to compute local effort for the MFP on an adjusted 100 per cent tax roll, irregardless of the tax rate counties were using.

An ad valorem tax equalization section was also included which provided added state funds for those counties whose yield per mill per ADA was below the state average. This especially affected some large urban counties such as Duval, Hillsborough, Escambia, and Brevard counties who did not have high property values.

All school finance in Florida since 1970 was basically related to the 1970 School Equalization Act. Some important school finance decisions made since 1968 have not been mentioned and much more could be said about the 1970 School Equalization Act and its effects. However, for the purposes of this study it was equally important to focus on the relationships between actors and the process involved in formulating these policy decisions.

The 1970 legislature considered two equalization proposals: the "Harris Plan" and the "Christian Plan." Both plans were aimed at equalization but they varied in ways to achieve it. The "Harris Plan" achieved equalization by increasing the local required effort by 1 mill yearly until 1973-74 when all districts would have a 7 mill local effort requirement. In effect, the "Harris Plan," developed by Representative Marshall Harris, achieved equalization by increasing the total amount of state aid but redistributing more of the money to poorer counties through weighted elements in the MFP.
The "Christian Plan" was proposed by the DOE. It dealt with poorer school districts that were below the state average level of property assessment in local taxpaying ability. School districts had to meet certain requirements to be eligible for funds under the "Christian Plan" which achieved equalization by bringing up the poorer districts to higher level. Aspects of both plans were adopted into the final version of the 1970 School Equalization Act. The 1970 Act achieved equalization by giving more state aid to both wealthy and poor districts, but it gave more to the poorer districts in order to close the gap in per pupil expenditures between the wealthy and poor districts.

The 1970 School Equalization Act also highlighted the changing relationship between the legislature and the DOE. The legislature began to assert its own independence and capability to develop school finance proposals with the "Harris Plan." No longer totally dependent on the DOE for information and expertise, legislators developed a plan which was combined with the "Christian Plan" to form a bill which pointed Florida in the direction of full state funding for education. The bill reflected an inter-dependence between the legislature and the DOE. The DOE promoted the idea of a partnership relation between the DOE and the legislature on educational legislation. The DOE did not have the hold of absolute information and expertise in educational matters that it once had over the legislature. To its credit, the DOE changed its image in working with the legislature developing a much more sophisticated technique to get legislative proposals accepted.

The focal points for school finance decisions were the sub-committees on education in the House Appropriations and Senate Ways and Means Committees, and the joint House-Senate Conference Committee on appropriations. The impetus for the 1970 School Equalization Act came from the House rather than the Senate.
The bill was hammered out in a joint conference committee on appropriations with House members holding out for a bill that would ensure greater equity in school finance. One legislator remarked that the House had "80 solid votes" for an equitable school finance bill and that House members on the joint conference committee took the attitude that "there is no way we are leaving without an equalization formula for school finance." Legislators from wealthy urban districts were generally opposed to the bill while legislators from poorer urban and rural districts supported the bill. Finally House members on the conference committee were able to develop a bill which the senators could agree to.

Members on the joint conference committee recognized the probability that Governor Kirk would veto the bill. Fearing that the Governor would use his line veto power to veto items in the 1970 School Equalization Act, members of the joint conference committee added a rider to the general appropriations bill which had the effect of off-setting the Governor's power to line veto the school finance portion. According to this rider bill, Governor Kirk could not veto the school finance bill without vetoing the whole appropriations bill. Governor Kirk vetoed the whole appropriations bill, but the legislature overrode his veto even though there were enough Republican votes to block the override. The Governor then took the bill to court on the grounds that the Florida constitution provided the Governor with line veto power. However, the court ruled that the general appropriations bill which included the 1970 School Equalization Act was valid.

The Cabinet, as a State Board of Education, did not play an important role in this process. Individual Cabinet members may have supported the bill, but the Cabinet did not take a stand as the chief educational policy making board in the state. Neither did educational interest groups play a major role in this process. The large Classroom Teacher Associations from Dade, Pinellas, and Hillsborough counties used what leverage they had with
legislators from their districts to gain support for the bill. The FEA was still trying to recover from the 1968 strike, and thereby did not play a significant role in this bill. The Florida School Boards Association had little leverage, and the Association of District School Superintendents worked closely with the DOE, as it has on all educational matters since 1968.

Legislators stressed that Commissioner Christian initially opposed the 1970 School Equalization Act and that the DOE was against any disruption of the status quo. The impetus for change, contended the legislators, came from the legislature not the Commissioner of Education. Legislators contended that Commissioner Christian proposed an alternative equalization plan only after he saw that the House was already developing an equalization proposal. According to legislators, the Commissioner did not feel that the House equalization plan was politically viable. Commissioner Christian depended on large Democratic votes in the populous counties like Dade. While the DOE provided services and staff assistance to small counties in areas such as capital outlay, the larger counties had staffs of their own in these areas and did not need DOE assistance. Since the DOE had no expertise to offer large districts in terms of services, it would have been politically unwise for the Commissioner to endorse a plan that took money from these larger rich districts. Commissioner Christian originally took the position that he had to be concerned with the rich districts as well as the poor districts. After Dade County legislators began supporting the House equalization proposal, legislators felt it was politically easier for the Commissioner to endorse the proposal and retain votes in these larger counties. Legislators labeled the Commissioner and the DOE as politically cautious and protectors of the status quo.

As politically cautious as they might have been, it does not seem that the Commissioner and the DOE were that enamored with the status quo in
school finance. The legislature was the arena in which school finance decisions were made. Since the middle 1960s, Florida legislators had made exceedingly difficult policy decisions in school finance to assure equalization through increased state funding. It seemed clear that the DOE played a significant role in the development of these policies. The 1970 School Equalization Act was a complex bill, and the legislature had to rely on DOE assistance to formulate it for several reasons. First, the MFP was a complicated equation which few people outside of the DOE understood. Over a period of time, DOE staff members spent long sessions with individual legislators, especially House members, to explain the format and intricacies of the MFP as it existed. Secondly, even with increased permanent staff to the education and finance committees, the legislative staffs could not provide legislators with the data that they needed to formulate an equalization plan. The DOE had the capability of generating data and of organizing it in an understandable and useful fashion. Third, the DOE had the ability to project what effects certain plans would have in local districts much quicker and more accurately than legislators could. Apparent as it is that the DOE was deeply involved in formulating the 1970 School Equalization Act, it was still very difficult to determine how much initiating action the DOE took.

Interested in building a new image, the DOE realized that providing accurate information was not sufficient. The DOE staff used their skills in writing bills and in providing information to draft legislation which legislators could take credit for. The DOE staff which worked in the legislature worked with individual legislators, down-played their role, and allowed legislators to take much of the credit for work they had done in order to obtain legislation which the DOE wanted. Said one Department spokesman, "The changes in the legislature forced us to change our image" and mode of operations. Pointing to the large turnover in the legislature (for example, 19 of the 28 members on the House Education Committee were
new) in 1973, he continued, "There now is a great deal of turnover in the legislature. It is our job (DOE) to provide continuity to educational legislation." Cognizant of the need to move toward equalization, the DOE staff worked with the group of legislators, especially House members, who were concerned about school finance.

Since this small group of House members provided the impetus and developed the actual bill, many legislators were not aware of the total ramifications of the bill. Some legislators voted for the bill on the mistaken premise that all districts gained large increases in state aid. In the 1970 primary and general elections, there were legislators from property rich districts who lost re-election because they had supported a bill which local voters felt hurt their school district. The 1970 School Equalization Act called for consecutive one mill increases in required local effort from 1970-71 (4 mills required) through 1973-74 (7 mills required). For political reasons the 1971 legislature voted only a \( \frac{1}{2} \) mill increase from 4 mills to 4.5 mills required rather than the full one mill increase that the 1970 Act stipulated. However, the 1972 legislature raised the required local effort by 1\( \frac{1}{2} \) mills to 6 mills which put Florida back on the schedule set in the 1970 Act.

The 1970 School Equalization Act set Florida squarely in the direction of full state funding, but it also had consequences in the area of assessment and accountability. In 1970, the legislature passed a one year act which required the DOE to develop a statewide assessment program. Previously, each county school district conducted internal evaluations, but there was no external evaluation of how well the district was educating its pupils. With increased state money going to education as a result of the 1968 and 1970 legislative enactments, the legislature began insisting on some external evaluation of school districts. In 1971 Terrell Sessums, Chairman of the
House Education Committee, wrote and sponsored an accountability bill which passed the House. The DOE had no prior knowledge that the bill was being written, and therefore, had no input into the bill. A DOE spokesman indicated that this bill did not incorporate an assessment plan which the 1970 legislature had directed the Department of Education to develop. The DOE was in a difficult dilemma because Mr. Sessums was Speaker Designate, and the DOE did not want to offend him by opposing the bill in the House. By working with the Senate the DOE was able to have the bill amended to include the DOE developed assessment plan which complied with the 1970 legislature's directive. The 1970 assessment bill and the 1971 Accountability Act basically were legislative inspired bills requiring uniform assessment of student learning in Florida. With the Senate sponsored amendments, the DOE felt that the final accountability act required more than just standardized achievement tests as the original bill did.

In summarizing the 1970 School Equalization Act in terms of the process and actors involved, there was no overriding crisis or extreme pressure forcing the legislature to commit such large amounts of state dollars to education. Rather a small group of legislators and the DOE legislative staff developed a school finance bill which further moved Florida toward equalized educational funding. Commissioner Christian initially opposed the House equalization plan, but he supported the concept of equalization.

While it was not certain whether the original impetus for the bill came from the DOE or the legislature, it was clear that the 1970 School Equalization Act was the product of preparatory work by House members and DOE legislative staff members. Governor Kirk was clearly opposed to the increased amount of state dollars that would go to education, but the legislature overrode his veto. A subsequent court effort by the Governor to have the general appropriations bill ruled unconstitutional was not upheld.
Various educational interest groups had little to do with the bill. The bill was passed because a group of Florida House members became deeply involved in school finance issues. They were willing to make some bold political moves in order to achieve a greater degree of equalization in school finance.

In the 1973 legislative session, the Legislature passed the Florida Education Finance Act of 1973. This act completely revised school finance in Florida, and raised the state level of funding to over 80 per cent. The act is very complicated, and Appendix A contains the State Department of Education summary of the act. The rest of the discussion will focus on the policy making process that produced the act rather than its contents.

There were three groups of important actors who were instrumental in passing this bill. Governor Kirk's Citizens' Committee was generally credited with initiating the basic thrust of the bill. School finance experts were brought in to study Florida's school finance structure and make recommendations concerning possible changes. However, it was the Department of Education that did the bulk of the technical and statistical computations for the Citizens' Committee. The DOE was quite involved in writing the final draft of the Citizens' Committee Report.

The Citizens' Committee final draft was used as the basis of a bill passed by the House early in the 1973 legislative session. Speaker Terrell Sessums and Representative Buddy MacKay were instrumental in moving the bill through the House. Once in Senate, however, the bill bogged down. The Senate fully agreed with the intent and directions of the finance bill, but differed on basic points with the House. First, the Senate did not want to appropriate as much as the House wanted to. The Senate wanted some validation that the new weighting formulas in the bill would funnel money into the appropriate district and program. The Senate passed finance bill appropriated much less than the House version.
The final version of the bill was settled in a Joint Conference Committee. Key members on this joint committee were Senators Bob Graham and Jim Williams, and Representatives Buddy MacKay and Marshall Harris. House members clearly pushed for the new finance legislation. Again, DOE representatives provided information that legislators needed.

The Governor's Citizens' Committee was the most visible group that initiated and supported the bill. Some observers felt that Governor Askew was sure to run for re-election. The Governor had taken a strong pro-busing stand in 1972 that might prove to be a political liability in a re-election campaign. Closely associated with his self-appointed Citizens' Committee, some observers felt that the Governor would promote his support of the new finance bill to modify his image on educational matters. While this might be seen as a political advantage, his interest in the 1973 school finance legislation was more than just what he could gain politically - it stemmed from a basic interest to improve Florida's school finance structure.

The House in general, and Speaker Sessums and Representative MacKay in particular, were quite active in promoting the bill. Sessums and MacKay both served on the Governor's Citizens' Committee, and therefore, were quite knowledgeable about the committee's recommendations. House members supported the bill from the beginning as evidenced by the quick passage of the bill in the House and the high level at which the House funded the bill.

While the Citizens' Committee and the House both received a great deal of public credit and recognition for initiating and supporting the bill, the DOE did a lot of behind-the-scenes work which made the bill workable. The bill was finally appropriated at $830 million - a figure that the DOE had proposed before the legislative session began. It was the DOE's expertise that coordinated and worked out the intricacies of the new formula.
Although the DOE did not receive the public credit that the Citizens' Committee and the House received, it is doubtful that the bill could have passed without the DOE's support. Viewing Governor Askew as a supporter of education, the DOE was happy to have the Governor take a great deal of credit for the bill. Certainly, if he had been against the bill, it could not have passed.

Educational interest groups played a minor role in the development and passage of the bill. All the groups eventually supported the bill, but for different reasons. The only reticent group was the superintendents' association. At first, the superintendents opposed the bill because they were uncertain of its effects on local districts. However, as the bill was debated in the Legislature, their opposition lessened and the superintendents finally supported the bill when it was in the joint conference committee. The Florida School Board's Association supported the bill because it gave local boards more control.

The FEA and other classroom teacher associations also supported the school finance bill. Teacher groups believed that their support of the bill was tied to support from the Governor and the House for collective bargaining legislation. While a collective bargaining bill did pass the House, it died in the Senate. The Senate Ways and Means Committee did eventually pass a collective bargaining bill out of committee, but there were so many amendments tied to the bill that it never reached the Senate's floor for a full vote. Although the Governor favored collective bargaining legislation for public employees, he did not actively support it in this session as heavily as teacher groups had hoped. However, 1974 may be the year that the Legislature passes collective bargaining legislation. The same collective bargaining bill which passed the House in 1973 has been refiled for consideration in the 1974 legislative session. Some observers felt that
Governor Askew would take a more active role in supporting the legislation than he has in the past. The DOE, neutral about collective bargaining in past sessions, seems to have decided to take a more active role in the 1974 session. The collective bargaining proposals to date have heavily favored labor. Perhaps fearing that a collective bargaining bill would pass without DOE input, department spokesmen indicated that the DOE might promote collective bargaining legislation that balanced management and labor viewpoints. While teacher groups were dismayed that their support of the school finance bill did not help them achieve a collective bargaining bill for public employees, their efforts in the 1973 session might pay off in the 1974 legislative session.

The Florida Education Finance Act of 1973 passed due to a number of factors. It was educationally sound and consistent with Florida's movement toward full state funding. It had the support of the Governor and the House to move it through the legislative process, and its contents reflected a sound school finance foundation provided by the expertise of the DOE.

Desegregation

The purpose of this section is to offer an overview of state level involvement, especially of Department of Education involvement in desegregation. Florida's 1885 constitution provided for segregation in all aspects of community life—from segregated housing to segregated schooling. The initial push for desegregation came from the 1954 Supreme Court Decision of Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education. The Cabinet, as the State Board of Education, basically took a wait and see attitude after the 1954 Brown Decision. Florida continued its dual system unchallenged until the early 1960s when federal court suits were filed against Dade and Escambia counties. Following these suits, suits against Florida school districts were
filed in federal courts including one by the U. S. Department of Justice against 14 Florida School Districts in 1970. Other Florida school districts fell under the jurisdiction of the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) which derived its power from the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Desegregation suits were never filed in state courts because the Florida constitution provided for segregation until the Constitution was revised in 1968. Even in its revised version, the Constitution did not include any civil rights provisions, nor did it give constitutional authority to the State Board, the Commissioner, or Department of Education to force local districts to desegregate. DOE spokesmen pointed out that while federal funds were withheld from a few local districts by HEW, this was strictly on a federal-local basis. The DOE did not have the authority to withhold state funds from local districts due to non-compliance with federal desegregation plans. By the 1970-71 school year, all 67 Florida counties were operating under federally-guided desegregation plans: 33 county districts operated under federally court ordered desegregation plans, and 34 county districts operated under HEW volunteer desegregation plans.\(^44\)

State level educators and politicians viewed desegregation as a federal-local matter in Florida. The state played a mediating role by trying to help local districts meet federal desegregation requirements. The 1964 Civil Rights Act provided funds for state agencies to assist local districts in meeting desegregation requirements. A joint application for assistance funds was filed by the DOE, Governor W. Haydon Burns, and the Attorney General's office. Florida became the first state in the union to establish a state level Technical Assistance Program (TAP). The TAP used federal funds to help county districts develop desegregation plans, and conduct workshops and seminars for local educators and board members. The TAP also used federal funds for dealing with desegregation crises as they arose.
throughout the state. While other sections of the DOE (Federal-State Relations, Bureau of School Facilities, Bureau of Planning and Coordination, etc.) have provided assistance on specific problems in desegregation, (transportation, building needs, staffing, etc.), the TAP remains as the main state level agency which assisted county districts in desegregation. At first, federal funds for TAP were dispensed through the Governor's office. However, Governor Burns feared that his successor might cut off the funds for TAP, so he transferred the funding for TAP to the DOE. TAP was under the Division of Elementary-Secondary Schools in the DOE, and the DOE directly received funds from HEW to finance TAP.

The TAP also acted as a liaison between the Department of Education and the Human Relations Commission which was in the Department of Community Affairs. The Human Relations Commission had a broader interest in integration--it was concerned with more than integration of the educational system. Through the TAP, the DOE and the Human Relations Commission exchanged information and cooperated on matters of common interest.

There was no specific legal basis for the Commissioner of Education to take initiative in local desegregation matters. However, some legislators felt that Florida's Constitutions provided the Commissioner of Education broad authority in this area, and Commissioners avoided using this authority. In cases of severe racial disturbances in the schools, the Commissioner has become involved at times on the premise that these disturbances disrupted the normal process of the public school system. Local educators or local residents could invite the Commissioner to become involved in their district when racial disturbances broke out. DOE staff members usually appeared on the scene after a local racial disturbance broke out. Observing and assessing the situation, the DOE observers were
able to provide Commissioner Christian with information so that he could make recommendations to the school district if the district so requested. By waiting until districts requested his help, the Commissioner was protected from charges of interfering with "local" matters.

The Urban League and the NAACP have actively supported school desegregation. The NAACP filed some of the original court suits against local districts in the early 1960s. More recently, both groups have been involved in specific local districts which have experienced racial conflict over school matters.

Desegregation remained a vital issue in parts of Florida although tremendous progress was made in physically desegregating schools. By 1973, 95 per cent of all K-12 students attended desegregated schools. But emotionalism still ran high, especially on the subject of busing. The 1972 legislature voted to put a busing referendum on the March primary ballot over the objections of Governor Askew. The referendum had no legal implications but it did allow Floridians to express their feelings on the busing of students. In the March 14 presidential primary, Floridians voted 3 - 1 (1,108,792 to 388,253) against mandatory busing to achieve integration. To lessen the impact of the referendum, Governor Askew's forces persuaded the legislature to also place another referendum on the same ballot on providing equal opportunity to quality education for all students regardless of race, creed, or place of residence. This referendum passed by a 3-1 margin (1,069,891 - 291,368).

While the referendums showed that Florida voters were in favor of providing quality education, but against mandatory busing to achieve integration, they had no impact upon what districts were required to do by federal desegregation plans. The busing referendum was disturbing to many
Florida politicians and educators. Once it had been introduced in the legislature, it became extremely difficult for legislators to vote against putting it on the ballot for political reasons. One state level educator said the busing referendum was a chance for legislators "to wave the bloody red flag of racism" which evoked strong emotional responses in people. Although most gubernatorial campaigns have been free of overt racial platforms, some political observers felt that Governor Askew's strong public stand on mandatory busing may be used against him by his opponents, thereby making desegregation a major campaign issue in the 1974 elections.

Commissioner Christian increasingly became more involved in local desegregation crises. In February, 1973, media newscasters gave national exposure to racial disturbances in the Pensacola schools. The Escambia County (Pensacola) Board of Education solicited Commissioner Christian's help in that crisis, and the Commissioner offered a set of recommendations which included the reassignment of a building principal. A legislator from the Pensacola area was upset at the Commissioner's "interference" in this matter. The Commissioner stressed that the local board had requested his opinion, and his recommendations were based on information provided by the local district and DOE staff members who had been observing the Pensacola situation. The independence that the Commissioner enjoyed was also apparent in this action. Being a statewide elected official, he did not have to worry about being removed from office by other elected officials. The Commissioner and the DOE through TAP were becoming more frequently involved in local desegregation crises in an advisory capacity. With physical desegregation largely achieved, Florida educators are accepting it as a fact (even though some Florida residents disagree with desegregation) and they were now becoming more concerned with the orderly progress of their schools.
District Comprehensive Educational Planning

The purpose of this section was to investigate a policy decision in which the Department of Education had provided leadership and initiative. The DOE has been very active in the general policy area of educational planning. This can be seen in the 1972 decision to require all districts to submit a district comprehensive educational plan. The formal policy actors in this decision were the legislature, the cabinet, and the DOE. Isolating this specific decision was difficult because it was only one section of a massive school code revision bill which the legislature passed and the Cabinet accepted into the State Board of Education Regulations in 1972. District Comprehensive Educational Planning was actually buried in the massive school code revision bill of 1972, and was not dealt with as a separate issue. The legislature and the Cabinet recognized the need for revising the school code, but they really did not become involved in specific sections of the code revision.

The DOE provided the impetus and initiative for the school code revision. Both the legislature and the Cabinet viewed school code revisions as "housekeeping" matters and the DOE was rarely challenged on code revision matters. In the 1972 school revision, the legislature and the Cabinet formally legitimized what the DOE had done. Therefore, these revisions were handled rather routinely by each of these governmental bodies. Legislators stated that educational legislation concerning certification, planning, supervision, etc., were not "gut issues," such as school finance. The legislature relied on DOE competency in these "housekeeping" matters. The 1972 school code revision covered many areas and was very technical. By including all the revisions in one bill, the DOE made it very difficult for the legislature or the Cabinet to extract single sections to disagree with.
Neither the legislature nor the Cabinet had the expertise to offer alternatives in these technical areas. Historically, Florida laws on education were codified in 1938. From 1938 through 1972 many laws were added to the code, but none was deleted. These laws were voluminous and many were antiquated. For example, they still provided for a dual segregated school system which was being desegregated by federal courts and HEW. A complete revision was needed. In 1971, Associate Commissioner Herman Meyers chaired a task force made up of DOE staff members and representatives from the Florida Association of District School Superintendents. This task force produced 175 pages of recommended school code revisions. The DOE then formally presented the revisions to Commissioner Christian who endorsed them. The Commissioner had these recommendations introduced into the 1972 legislature in bill form. The legislature passed the bill, and the Cabinet adopted the appropriate revisions into the State Board of Education Regulations.

Although there was no direct demand or pressure on the DOE to require district comprehensive plans, there seemed to be two general reasons for this action. One was the growing press for educational accountability in Florida. The DOE realized that districts had to develop an overall plan with objectives and strategies to meet these objectives in order to meet rudimentary accountability requirements. Student learning would be assessed at the district level, and ultimately districts had to show that they had an overall plan with goals to raise student achievement.

Second, the DOE wanted to eliminate some of the prohibitive restrictions which forced the DOE to be "fault finding inspectors" in their relationships with local districts. The DOE was (and still is) promoting the idea that DOE-local relationships should be characterized as a partnership, with county districts having more freedom in planning and programming to meet local
needs as the DOE provided leadership and services in helping them to formulate alternatives. District Comprehensive Educational Planning was a specific policy which the DOE hoped would help to build the new partnership-type relationship.

Although district comprehensive planning had been part of the school code for some time, it was not enforced. Previously, each school district submitted a number of plans from a variety of areas (voc-tech, special education, etc.), but now local districts were required to submit one comprehensive plan by November 1 which combined all these other plans. In 1967 the legislature provided local districts added money ($1,700 per instructional unit) to develop experimental programs through the Educational Improvement Expense (EIE) fund. The DOE tied the required comprehensive plan in with the EIE funds by including a provision in the school revision act which stated that in order for districts to be eligible for EIE funds, they must submit a district comprehensive plan by November 1 of every year. Although the DOE had the power to block funds going to districts which did not submit their plan on time, no district had been denied EIE funds through 1972.

The DOE reviewed all district plans and returned them with suggestions and recommendations. However, the DOE purposely left out any enforcement provision in the school revision code which would give the DOE the authority to force local districts to incorporate the DOE recommendations. All local districts had to do was submit another comprehensive plan by the following November 1 in order to qualify for their EIE funds. The intent of the DOE was not to prescribe to districts how to spend money or what to include in their plans, but rather to help districts assess how well they did what they set out to do. The DOE wanted districts to set goals and objectives, and then make plans to meet those goals and objectives with the DOE providing
assistance where it could. While the DOE had the power to force districts to submit comprehensive plans, the DOE was powerless to dictate the content of the plan. Said one DOE spokesman, "We want to develop this partner relationship with local districts, not dictate to districts on how to spend money."

Some local districts criticized the concept of district comprehensive planning. First, some felt that they should have been consulted more during the formulation of the policy. Many districts viewed the required comprehensive plan as another imposed regulation from the DOE. A second criticism was that the DOE did not allow enough lag time in order for the new policy to be adequately implemented. The legislature and the Cabinet acted on the school revisions in the spring of 1972, and local districts were required to have their first plan in by November 1, 1972. Although the DOE developed guidelines and held regional conferences to assist local educators in developing their plans, district leaders complained that the DOE tried to implement a new policy without adequately preparing local districts for it. One state level interest group official labeled the new comprehensive plan as an "instant program."

The school code revisions and District Comprehensive Educational Planning were efforts by the DOE to change its role from one of prescribing, regulating and enforcing guidelines to one of leadership. The DOE hoped that this measure would give more decision making power and flexibility to the local districts. The District Comprehensive Plan gave districts much more flexibility on how to spend money, but also made districts more responsible and accountable for the educational outcomes in terms of student achievement.
Certification

In 1972, the Cabinet, acting as the State Board of Education, officially adopted a set of performance-based teacher education standards for approving teacher education programs. These standards allowed colleges and universities to develop pre-service education programs designed to meet performance-based criteria in both pre- and in-service teacher education programs. While the Cabinet officially adopted new certification and teacher education standards, it really did not become involved in the actual development of these policies. The continued impetus for progressing toward performance-based criteria actually came from State Superintendent Thomas Bailey, Commissioner Christian, and the DOE, with the DOE developing most of the policies.

The push for changes in certification began in 1964 under State Superintendent Thomas Bailey. At that time, the two groups which influenced certification and teacher education programs were the Florida universities which had teacher training programs and the Teacher Education Advisory Council (TEAC). Before 1964, the DOE prescribed the courses needed for certification, and universities developed specific courses to meet these prescriptions. In order for a course to count toward certification, the DOE had to approve it. In 1965, the DOE reformed certification requirements, and these reforms were adopted by the Cabinet into the State Board of Education Regulations. These new regulations provided for a dual program in certification. The first program was the already established traditional approach of University developed courses for certification which were DOE approved. The second program allowed universities to formulate the courses in the major teaching area which the student was preparing for. The intent of this was to decentralize certification authority to the universities because the DOE was behind in processing certificates and was giving
different interpretations for courses taken at different universities. The second program allowed universities to submit teacher training programs to the State Board of Education for approval even though these programs might vary from the courses which the DOE prescribed for certification in that content area. However, universities were skeptical about what they could and could not do, and not until 1967 did a teacher training institution—Florida Presbyterian College—receive state approval for a teacher education program which varied significantly from the traditional programs.

The Teacher Education Advisory Council began as an informal group in the 1930s to advise the state superintendent on teacher education matters. The group became a more formal body in the 1950s. The TEAC was largely responsible for the rigid prescriptive courses which the state required for certification as the state superintendent (later renamed Commissioner) and the Cabinet usually followed the TEAC's recommendations. The TEAC was comprised of the Deans of all the universities which had teacher training programs, representatives from the FEA, and lay members. The DOE had little to do with the development of the TEAC's recommendations, but the DOE had to enforce the prescribed regulations for certifications. The DOE felt that it had to gain more control over policy formation and began to formulate its own policies in certification. The 1965 decision to reform certification requirements was done without the support of the TEAC, and this caused a rift between the DOE and the TEAC. The DOE was clearly gaining more control over certification regulations which were being recommended to the Cabinet. In order to bridge the rift with the TEAC, in the late 1960s the DOE began submitting department developed proposals on teacher education programs to the TEAC for approval before submitting the programs to the Cabinet. In 1972, the State Board of Education reformed the TEAC,
renamed it the Florida Council on Teacher Education, and further clarified its advisory role.

In 1968, the DOE expanded teacher training programs in universities to three approaches:

1) A "standard" approach which followed traditional certification practices.

2) An "experimental" approach which allowed institutions to try innovative programs.

3) A "performance-based" approach which provided for continuation of an experimental program demonstrated to be effective.

While these were pre-service teacher training programs in colleges and universities, the DOE was also concerned with in-service programs operated by local districts. The DOE prescribed the requirements a teacher had to meet in order to extend or renew a teaching certificate, and the most commonly used method was for a teacher to take extra course work at the university to meet state requirements. However, in 1968 the State Board of Education adopted regulations (developed by the DOE) which allowed teachers to earn credit toward extending their certificates by participating in district operated in-service teacher education programs. This regulation affirmed the local districts' responsibility to provide professional growth opportunities for teachers. Districts had to submit a master plan for in-service education to the DOE for approval. Master plans included weighted credit for activities such as college courses, educational travel, workshops, etc. A teacher with a bachelor's degree (Rank III certificate) was required to renew his certificate every five years. Previously, he needed six credit hours of course work from the university to meet state requirements for renewal. Now he could participate in his district's in-service program and through various activities he could earn the equivalent of six credit hours. This did two things: first, districts were given more
responsibility to provide meaningful in-service programs for teachers. Not all districts were happy with this added responsibility, but by 1973, 65 of Florida's 67 districts had DOE approved master plans for in-service programs.

A second result was that in-service programs were legitimated. Teachers did not have to rely solely upon university courses to meet renewal requirements for certification. The DOE had become increasingly disturbed at the reluctance of universities to update teacher training programs. By allowing teachers to earn needed credit for certification renewal through district in-service programs, the DOE signaled universities that it was time to start modernizing teacher education programs.

To continue to progress toward performance-based teacher education programs, the DOE recognized that adequate materials were needed rather than more regulations. Using federal funds under the provisions of the Education Professions Development Act, performance-based criteria for teacher education programs were developed. Training module packages were written which could be used by universities for pre-service programs or by local districts for in-service programs. Further funds for teacher education program development were provided for in an educational research and development act passed by the legislature in 1970. This act also provided for a board of governors to act as an advisory group to Commissioner Christian on research and development matters.

In 1970, the Research and Development Board of Governors adopted the following objective for teacher education: "By the end of 1974, competencies (performances) expected of teaching personnel in the elementary and secondary schools will be clearly identified. Evidence will be available showing relationships between teacher competencies and pupil learning. Teacher
training techniques will be available for use in pre-service and in-service
teacher education programs which are aimed at the specified competencies..."47
The DOE used this objective to develop new standards for approving teacher
education programs based on performance criteria which the SBE formally
adopted in 1972.

Although the more established universities balked at these programs,
two new universities opened in 1972 with full performance-based teacher edu-
cation programs. Florida International University in Miami and the University
of North Florida in Jacksonville produced a catalog of teacher competencies
which could be used by universities for pre-service programs and local dis-
tricts for in-service programs.

The legislature had an indirect effect on the movement toward performance-
based criteria. There were six classifications for teacher certification in
Florida; teacher certification with a Rank I certificate as the highest and
a Rank VI certificate as the lowest. There were incentives in the MFP
formula for districts to encourage teachers to get a "higher ranking certi-
ficate." Through weighted elements in the MFP, districts received more state
aid for teachers in the Rank I and Rank II classifications. However, some
legislators were not happy with that weighting procedure, because a teacher
could get the higher rank certificate merely by taking more courses or
obtaining a masters degree. One legislator said, "I am not convinced that
a teacher with a masters degree is necessarily a better teacher than one
with a bachelor's degree." As Florida continued to move toward full state
funding, legislators were less willing to give districts extra money just
because those districts had teachers with masters degrees. Most legislators
endorsed the idea of performance criteria for teacher education programs
although they did not know specific aspects of Florida's current movement
in this direction.
From 1965 to 1973, the DOE methodically moved Florida toward performance-based criteria for certification and teacher training programs through a series of changes in state statutes and state board of education regulations. Control of teacher education programs shifted from universities and the TEAC to the DOE. The DOE provided the impetus for change with the Cabinet rather routinely accepting the DOE proposals. While Commissioner Christian fully agreed with Florida's progress toward performance-based criteria, he had little involvement in actually developing the policies. The Commissioner had a great deal of faith in the DOE, and he gave them the leeway to develop programs aimed at change. The Commissioner supported DOE efforts, and he used his influence with the Cabinet to have the necessary regulations adopted.

The Teacher Education Center Act of 1973 was intended to create a new state policy for the education of teachers. The thrust of the act was to develop teacher centers in each school district for pre- and in-service teacher education. The intent of the legislation was to get universities and colleges, local school districts, and the teaching profession to cooperatively develop meaningful pre- and in-service teacher education programs. A complete DOE summary of the bill is in Appendix B.

The bill was initiated, written, and supported by the DOE. The main opposition to the bill came from the universities and colleges. These teacher training institutions opposed the bill because it set a precedent of earmarking university and college funds for a particular program. Previously, the legislature appropriated funds which were spent at the discretion of the universities and colleges. The bill might have far reaching implications for teacher education in Florida. However, to make the teacher education training centers work, there must be cooperation between local districts and universities and colleges. While the rationale of the legislation may be educationally sound, the bill's ultimate success will not be known until the teacher education centers are actually developed.
INTERPRETATION

In concluding the case study, this section will offer an explanation or interpretation of what has been reported about Florida's statewide educational governance structure. To facilitate the explanation, some themes which seemed apparent in the previous pages will be discussed. The overriding general theme seemed to be the transition from the "old order" policy-making structure to a "new order."

There were several characteristics of the "old order." Educational interest groups were unified under the title of the united profession. The Florida Association of District School Superintendents and the Florida School Boards Association were closely aligned with the powerful Florida Education Association. Secondly, these educational interest groups cooperated with the Commissioner of Education and the Department of Education on educational legislative proposals. The third characteristic of the "old order" was the dependence of the legislature on the DOE and educational interest groups (especially the FEA) for educational legislation. In the "old order," the Governor and the Cabinet, acting as the State Board of Education, played little to no role in the formulation of educational policy decisions. Professional educators were clearly the initiators of educational proposals in the "old order" educational policy-making system.

The fragmentation of the unified profession growing out of the 1968 teacher strike began the transition to the "new order." This strike ruptured the close ties between the educational interest groups, ruined the close working relationship that the FEA had with the DOE and Commissioner Christian, and stripped the FEA of its political influence. A second factor aiding the demise of the "old order" was the strengthening of the legislature. Reapportionment in 1967 gave the legislature a more urban orientation
and governmental reorganization in 1969 made the legislature more capable of initiating educational legislation.

The "new order" educational policy structure was characterized by continued transition and uncertainty. In early 1973, the educational policy-making system was still in a state of transition and flux and many uncertainties existed. There was uncertainty about educational leadership. The legislature, the DOE, and Commissioner Christian had initiated much of the important educational legislation since 1970. But in 1973, Governor Askew played an important role in the passage of a major school finance bill—the Florida Education Finance Act of 1973. Therefore, Florida had several actors—the legislature, the DOE, the Commissioner, and the Governor—competing to initiate educational policies. These actors were all leaders in the area of school legislation, but there was no one dominant leader.

Other uncertainties existed in the "new order." The struggle for executive control between the Governor and Cabinet continued. Resolution of this conflict was still unsettled in 1973. Another uncertainty was the success of the DOE in adapting to a legislature that was capable of initiating educational proposals and of formulating alternatives to DOE inspired proposals. These uncertainties marked the "new order" in Florida's educational governance system which was still in a state of transition at this writing.

A second apparent theme was the emergence of the legislature as an initiator of educational legislation. The malapportioned, rurally-dominated legislature met in biennial sessions. The legislature did not have the capability to initiate its own educational legislative proposals or formulate alternatives to DOE or FEA initiated proposals. Reapportionment in 1967 and governmental reorganization in 1969 strengthened and modernized the legislature. Other factors related to the emergence of the legislature
as an initiator of educational proposals were the fragmentation of the educational interest groups and the increased public concern over educational costs.

The 1968 teacher strike split the educational interest groups at a time when the legislature was becoming more capable of initiating its own educational proposals. While the DOE remained the main spokesman for professional educators, the unanimity among schoolmen was gone. Teacher groups were pitted against the superintendents' and school boards' organizations. These educational interest groups no longer had the political influence they enjoyed as the united profession. Aided by increased staff, annual sessions, higher pay, and modernized procedures, the legislature was able to originate educational proposals. It was easier for the legislature to assume a greater initiatory role in educational proposals due to the weakened political influence of the educational interest groups.

Increased public concern over rising educational costs was another factor in the emergence of the legislature as an initiator of educational proposals. As in other states, property tax payers in Florida were alarmed about added property taxes needed to fund rising educational costs. Legislators from "property poor, pupil rich" districts were particularly aware of the dilemma schools in their districts faced—ineffective funding for schools even though property taxes were high. Due to increased property taxes and spiralling educational costs, legislators began seriously to consider the concepts of equalization in school finance and equal educational opportunity.

The third apparent theme in this case study was the effort of Commissioner Christian and the Department of Education to adapt to the new legislative capabilities. The DOE seemed to have adapted much better to the
legislature than did Commissioner Christian. The DOE has become more sophisticated in its lobbying activities in the legislature. The DOE was concerned with building a new image by providing accurate and usable information to legislators. Legislators grudgingly admitted that they still depended upon the DOE for information on crucial matters such as school finance. However, legislators felt that the DOE was conservative and a protector of the "status quo."

While the DOE has gained some degree of success in adapting to the legislature, Commissioner Christian has not fared as well. Due to contacts in local counties through the superintendent's organization and local Democratic machinery, the Commissioner had a great deal of political influence in the legislature and in the Cabinet. The Commissioner adamantly fought Governor Kirk's vetoes of educational legislation in the late 1960s which increased his political influence with the Democratic Cabinet and legislature and gave him statewide media exposure. However, several factors diminished the Commissioner's political influence in the early 1970s. First, the Commissioner announced his retirement at the end of his term in 1975 thereby making him a lame duck. Secondly, Democrat Reubin Askew defeated Claude Kirk in 1971, and the Commissioner no longer had a Republican Governor to oppose publicly. While his political influence had diminished, the Commissioner remained a proud man who stood by his convictions.

Commissioner Christian opposed some of the legislative proposals which were aimed at giving added state aid to large urban districts. Legislator and interest group leaders were particularly critical of the Commissioner's opposition to such proposals. They felt that he was too conservative and that he primarily reacted to educational legislation rather than initiating educational proposals on "gut issues" like school finance. Legislators
stated that some proposals which the Commissioner did initiate were "outdated," or on "non-controversial" issues which required "corrective" legislation. One legislator said that Commissioner Christian supported a recent proposal to give all teachers a flat across the board raise. Most legislators realized that a flat across the board raise was inequitable because of economic differences among the counties. In essence, the Commissioner apparently had not adapted as well to the new legislature as had the DOE. While he retained some political influence in the legislature, legislators no longer viewed the Commissioner as an initiator of educational proposals on critical issues such as school finance.

The continued weakness of the Cabinet as the State Board of Education was the fourth theme apparent in the case study. The Cabinet had the statutory and constitutional authority to take a more active role than it did in making educational policy decisions. The Cabinet certainly had the capability to lobby for educational proposals in the legislature, but Cabinet members chose not to act collectively as a State Board of Education. The Cabinet rather routinely adopted items on the educational agenda at the request of the Commissioner and basically tried to avoid controversial educational issues. Commissioner Christian was the dominant educational policy maker when the Cabinet met as the State Board of Education.

Florida's educational governance structure with the Cabinet acting as the State Board of Education and a statewide elected Commissioner serving on a cabinet was increasingly attacked as inadequate. The press for educational reorganization was the fifth theme which ran through this study. Governor Kirk pressed hard for educational reorganization but was unsuccessful. Governor Askew has also been unsuccessful to date in his efforts to reorganize Florida's educational structure. While highlighting inadequacies in Florida's educational policy making system, educational reorganization
was only a surface issue. The deeper conflict was over the control of the executive branch of government. Governor Askew and his predecessors were concerned with educational reorganization, but also concerned with weakening the Cabinet's power.

Educational reorganization could weaken the Cabinet in two ways. By having a lay State Board of Education, the Cabinet would have one less function to sit over. By having an appointed Commissioner, there would be one less Cabinet member. If either happened, it might provide the chink in the Cabinet's armour that Florida Governors had searched for. Through educational reorganization, some of the Cabinet's power could be eroded. Governor Askew's Citizens' Committee on Education went to great lengths in discussing the merits of educational reorganization. But the issue of educational reorganization will not be decided on the basis of educational merit. Rather it will be decided on the basis of political power: does Governor Askew have enough power to achieve educational reorganization legislation or does the Cabinet have enough power to block it?

Florida is a state which has experienced significant economic, political, and social changes. These changes have affected the educational policy-making structure at the state level. Relationships between the governor, the legislature, the chief state school officer, the department of education, and educational interest groups are in a state of flux and transition. Education is a prime concern of all these actors, especially educational finance. Florida's school finance legislation of 1970 and 1973 is a pattern which may permit Florida to be the first large industrial state to have a fully equalized program for funding of education designed to achieve equal educational opportunity.


4 Finance Division of Dade County Public Schools, Urban Cost Differential Study and Legislative Recommendations (Miami: Dade County Public Schools, November 1, 1972), p. 1.


6 Peirce, Megastates, pp. 474-475.


10 Peirce, Megastates, p. 462.


12 Ibid.

13 Hartsfield and Roady, Votes, pp. 18-20.

14 Dauer, Florida, p. 123.


16 Peirce, Megastates, pp. 463-464 and 467.


19 Hartsfield and Roady, Votes, p. 42.
20 Ibid., p. 38.
22 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 121.
26 Ibid., p. 48.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 19.
35 Cass, "Politics and Education...", p. 76.
37 Cass, "Politics and Education...", p. 79.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.

42 Ibid., pp. 15-26.


44 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

45 Ibid., p. 3.

46 Also on the primary ballot was a resolution which would permit prayer in public schools. The voters overwhelmingly supported the resolution (1,138,620 - 296,102).

This act rewrites the state funding program for public schools by replacing the Minimum Foundation Program with a new act incorporating programs for Current Operation, Pupil Transportation, and Capital Outlay into a single comprehensive funding program.

The intent of the Legislature, as expressed in the act, is to guarantee to each public school student the availability of programs and services appropriate to his educational needs, which are substantially equal to those available to any other similar student, notwithstanding geographical differences and varying local economic factors. An additional purpose of the act is to increase the responsibility and authority of local school districts in matters of instructional organization and method, and in seeking more effective and efficient means of achieving the goals of the various programs.

Each of the three basic elements of the program are outlined and summarized individually below:

**CURRENT OPERATION OF SCHOOLS**

Current operation funds for each school district are generated from a formula which uses as its base unit a full-time equivalent student. Essentially, for the purpose of the act, one full-time equivalent student represents one student in membership in a school for a minimum of five net hours per day for a school year in grades 4 through 12, or four net hours in grades K-3. For a double session school the time requirement is reduced to 4½ net hours in grades 4 through 12 or 3½ net hours in grades K-3. The aggregate number of instruction hours in membership, represented by part-time students is equated with the required time for full-time membership in developing the total number of full-time equivalent students to be funded.

Each student's instruction time is classified into one or more of the programs listed below in order to determine the full-time equivalent student membership in each program category:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Programs</th>
<th>Cost Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Kindergarten and grades 1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Grades 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Grades 11 and 12</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Programs for Exceptional Students</td>
<td>Cost Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Educable mentally retarded</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Trainable mentally retarded</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Physically handicapped</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Physical and occupational therapy I</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Speech therapy I</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Deaf</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Visually handicapped I</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Visually handicapped</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Emotionally disturbed I</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Emotionally disturbed</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Socially maladjusted</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Specific learning disability I</td>
<td>7.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Specific learning disability</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Gifted I</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Hospital and homebound I</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Special Vocational-Technical Programs**

| 30 Vocational education I                                  | 4.26        |
| 31 Vocational education II                                 | 2.64        |
| 32 Vocational education III                                | 2.18        |
| 33 Vocational education IV                                 | 1.69        |
| 34 Vocational education V                                 | 1.40        |
| 35 Vocational education VI                                 | 1.17        |

**Special Adult General Education Programs**

| 40 Adult basic education and adult high school              | 1.60        |
| 41 Community service                                       | 1.30        |
After the total instruction time of all students has been converted to full-time equivalent membership and classified into the program categories above, the number of full-time equivalent students in each category is multiplied by the cost factor assigned to the particular program as noted above. The products thus obtained represent the weighted full-time equivalent student membership in each program category.

Once these weighted full-time equivalent students have been obtained for each category they are added together to obtain the total weighted full-time equivalent membership for the school district.

This total weighted full-time equivalent membership is then multiplied by a "base student cost figure" established annually by the Legislature. (For the 1973-74 school year this figure is approximately $579.00). The figure thus obtained represents the basic amount for current operation.

To this basic amount is then added a supplement for each full-time equivalent student in basic programs who qualifies, under criteria established by the State Board of Education, for supplementary compensatory education. (For the 1973-74 school year this supplement is determined by multiplying .05 times the base student cost).

The sum of the basic amount for current operation and the supplement for compensatory education is then adjusted by a cost of living factor for each district determined annually by the Legislature, based upon a study conducted by the Department of Administration. For 1973-74, these factors range from .91 to 1.09. Therefore, this sum is adjusted, either upward or downward, to reflect the computed cost of living index in each individual district.

After adjustment for the district cost of living factor, an amount is deducted from each district's total representing the required local effort of that district. For 1973-74 the collective local effort of all districts is fixed at $324,000,000, and the amount to be deducted for each district is determined on a percentage basis, based upon the percentage of the total net non-exempt assessed valuation of the state represented by that district. For instance, if District "X" contained three percent of the total net non-exempt assessed valuation of the state, then the local required effort for District "X" would be three percent of $324,000,000.

For those districts whose tax base is relatively low in relation to their number of pupils, an additional amount for purposes of ad valorem tax equalization is added. Eligibility for these funds is determined by computing the yield of one mill of taxation on ninety-five percent of the net non-exempt assessed valuation of the district and dividing that amount by the number of full-time equivalent students in the district. If the resultant figure is less than seven percent of the base student cost (7% of $587 for 1973-74), the district is entitled to the difference between the actual yield of each mill and that figure for each mill levied at, or in excess of, eight mills in 1972-73. For the 1974-75 and subsequent years this computation will be based upon eight percent of the base student cost measured against the yield per mill on the previous year's non-exempt assessed valuation.
For all years subsequent to 1973-74, the required local effort of each district will be seven mills of tax levied on ninety-five percent of the net non-exempt assessed valuation of the district for the preceding calendar year.

The net figure obtained, after deducting the required local effort, and adding any amount for ad valorem tax equalization, represents the total state allocation to the district for current operation of schools.

For the 1973-74 fiscal year, each district is guaranteed a minimum level of support computed by the following procedure:

The average unit value of combined local and state resources for the 1972-73 year is determined by dividing the number of instruction units into a figure representing the total 1972-73 state share of the district Minimum Foundation Program plus the value of ten mills on the 1972 tax roll.

The unit amount thus obtained is increased by five percent and the resultant figure is multiplied by the number of instruction units that would have accrued to the district under a 1973-74 Minimum Foundation Program. If the amount generated by the new funding formula for current operation plus ten mills of tax on the 1973 tax roll does not generate an amount in excess of the minimum guaranteed level, then the 1973-74 allocation will be adjusted to reflect this minimum level of support.

**PUPIL TRANSPORTATION**

The allocation for Pupil Transportation to each school district is based upon the membership of students transported who:

1. Live more than two miles from school, or
2. Are physically handicapped, or
3. Are vocational or exceptional education students transported from one school center to another.

A density index is determined for each school district by dividing the number of transported students by an adjusted bus route mileage. The allocation for transportation is then determined by multiplying the allowable per student cost, as determined by the formula below, by the total membership of transported students in the district:

\[
\text{Allowable per student cost} = \frac{434.77}{2 + \text{the density} - 13.65}
\]

Provision is made to adjust the transportation allocation proportionately for any school district which provides transportation for a period of time either less or in excess of the basic 180 days.
This part of the funding program was designed in an effort by the Legislature to assume a greater share of the responsibility for state funding of school construction by developing a systematic plan whereby each district will be able to meet the increasing needs for satisfactory school facilities for all students, and to maximize the availability of satisfactory student stations to meet the current and projected needs of the districts and to remove the necessity of involuntary multiple daily sessions.

The Commissioner is charged with the responsibility of annually determining the projected construction and debt service needs of the school districts for the ensuing five year period and reporting such findings to the Legislature.

The amount to be allocated annually to each school district is based upon the total amount appropriated by the Legislature and determined as follows:

The cost of the projected school plant needs in the district is computed, along with the five year projected debt service needs, and the expenditures of ad valorem taxes in excess of ten mills.

The resources available during the five year period from the School Capital Outlay Amendment (Article XII, Section 9(d) are also computed along with any other projected available construction funds during this period of time.

The total projected school plant and debt service needs for the five year period, less the projected resources available, plus the expenditure of ad valorem taxes in excess of ten mills represents the total estimated cost of unfunded school plant and debt service needs for the district.

The annual allocation to each district is determined by multiplying the total amount of the legislative appropriation for this purpose by a figure representing the percentage of the total statewide unfunded need located in the district.

**TOTAL ANNUAL STATE ALLOCATION TO EACH DISTRICT**

The total annual state allocation to each district from the Florida Education Finance Program is then the sum of:

1. The total allocation for current operation,
2. The total allocation for pupil transportation, and
3. The total allocation for school construction and debt service.

**Categorical Programs**

In addition to the basic programs of current operation, transportation, and capital outlay, a number of categorical programs are authorized.
These are grouped into two categories—General and Transitional. The funding for programs classified as transitional is limited to a maximum of four fiscal years, beginning with the 1973-74 school year. These programs include:

**General:**
1. Capital outlay as provided by law.
2. Community Schools.
5. State Textbook Program.
6. Vocational Improvement Fund.

**Transitional:**
1. Bilingual (sic) program as provided by law.
2. Driver Education.
3. Elementary School Counselors.
4. Occupational Specialists.
5. Safe Schools Program as provided by law.

### Comprehensive Information and Assessment System

The act also requires the development of a comprehensive management information and assessment system by July 1, 1974, and requires cost accounting of all state, local and federal funds on a school-by-school program basis. By the 1974-75 fiscal year ninety percent of the current operating funds must be expended in the schools and programs which generate the funds.

### Revision of Existing Statutes

A number of revisions, deletions, modifications and amendments to existing statutes are also made by the act in order to provide more flexibility to the local districts and to remove conflicts and inconsistencies with the new funding program. Among these are:

1. Subsections (4) and (5) and paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (6) of §236.02, Florida Statutes, are repealed. The net effect of this change is to remove the requirements for employment of supervisors and maintenance of specified classroom loads as a condition of participating in state funding. Numerous requirements relating to salary schedules are also deleted, including the requirement that 15 increments be incorporated in all instructional schedules, that rank and contract status be taken into consideration, and that certain minimum salary levels be maintained.
2. Section 236.03, Florida Statutes, relating to transportation units under the old Minimum Foundation Program is repealed.

3. Except for the subsections dealing with occupational specialists and elementary counselors, all of S236.04, relating to computation of instruction units, is repealed.

4. Chapter 72-283, which was to become effective July 1, 1973, is repealed.

5. Sections 236.05, 236.07, 236.08, and 236.09, Florida Statutes, all dealing with allocations and computations under the Minimum Foundation Program are repealed.

6. The definitions of exceptional students which was located in S236.04 (4), Florida Statutes, is transferred to S228.041.

7. Section 230.23, Florida Statutes, is amended to establish procedures and requirements for the provisions of services to exceptional children.

8. Section 232.01, Florida Statutes, is amended to authorize educational programs for deaf, blind and severely physically handicapped or trainable mentally retarded children below age five in homebound programs.

9. A formula is also included, based upon full-time equivalent students, for computing instruction units for purposes of distributing Capital Outlay and Debt Service funds authorized by Article XII, Section 9(d) of the Florida Constitution.

(HB 734, Chapter 73-345, Effective date: July 1, 1973)

HB 792 Safe Schools Act of 1973

The legislative intent, as set forth in this act, is to assist local school districts in utilizing their administrative capacity to develop preventative and educationally sound solutions to the problems of school disruptions, vandalism and the threat of personal harm to both students and faculty.

The act establishes a School Safety Fund at the state level ($1,850,000 was appropriated for this fund in the 1973 Appropriations Act) and prescribes a formula for determining the eligibility of each school district to receive assistance.

For the first 30,000 pupils in average daily attendance in the district, $30 per teacher unit is allotted; for the next 20,000 pupils in average daily attendance, $40 per teacher unit is allotted; for the next 15,000 pupils in average daily attendance, $50 per teacher unit is allotted; and for all pupils above an average daily attendance of 65,000, $100 per teacher unit is allotted.
However, regardless of size, each district which files an acceptable project is guaranteed a minimum of $5000. If appropriated funds exceed the total entitlement of all districts then each district shares the additional funds in proportion to the amount that its entitlement bears to the total appropriated amount.

Each school district which desires to receive funds for which it is eligible must develop and submit a school safety plan to the Commissioner of Education for approval, and must also make an annual report on its school safety program to the Commissioner and to the Education Committees of the House and the Senate.

The Commissioner is charged with the responsibility for reviewing and approving district plans, for review and evaluation of the annual school district reports, and for disseminating information concerning school safety programs to school districts. The Department is also required to conduct a seminar dealing with the education of disruptive students to be attended by at least three delegates from each school district, and to submit a report to the Legislature not later than March 1, 1974 on alternative educational programs for disruptive students and other matters including school security.

(HB 792, Chapter 73-346, Effective date: July 1, 1973)
APPENDIX B

Florida Department of Education Summary of the Teacher Education Center Act of 1973

Teacher Education Center Act of 1973

This act takes note of the fact that the responsibility for pre-service teacher education has historically been assigned to the colleges and universities, with inservice education being the primary responsibility of District School Boards, and expresses legislative intent that a new state policy for education of teachers be adopted whereby teachers will have a major role in designing, developing, implementing and evaluating solutions to meet their educational needs.

Effective July 1, 1973, the act assigns responsibility for operating programs for pre-service and inservice teacher education jointly to the colleges and universities, the District School Boards, and the teaching profession. The colleges and universities are assigned primary responsibility for operating pre-service programs, the School Boards are assigned primary responsibility for operating inservice programs, and the teaching profession is assigned the responsibility for providing information to make all programs meaningful and relevant.

The State Board of Education is directed to develop regulations providing for establishment of Teacher Education Centers in School Districts designed to augment university teacher education programs and district inservice programs, and to provide time and opportunity to pre-service and inservice teachers to interact with faculty and staff of the colleges and districts.

Each teacher education center shall be planned, financed and staffed jointly by one or more School Districts and one or more Colleges or Universities, and shall operate a program, including:

1. Inservice teacher education.
2. Pre-service teacher education.
3. Preparation and reproduction of teacher training materials.
4. Community participation in educational programs, and
5. Development of recommendations for programs of alternative routes to certification and completion of masters degrees.
6. Any other activities, consistent with standards established by the Department which are designed to satisfy a need demonstrated within the School District.

Any programs offered through teacher education centers must have the approval of the Department of Education and must be consistent with appropriate standards and procedures for approval of pre-service and inservice programs of teacher education.
The act also establishes a State Council for Teacher Education Centers, to be composed of twelve members appointed by the Governor, including:

1. Six classroom teachers,
2. Two university teacher educators,
3. One District School Superintendent,
4. One School Board Member, and
5. Two representatives of the Department of Education.

Council members shall be appointed for three year terms and shall have the responsibility:

1. To recommend to the Department of Education the most feasible location for teacher education centers,
2. To recommend guidelines for expenditure of funds for teacher education centers,
3. To evaluate the progress of teacher education centers, and
4. To perform any other duties necessary to achieve the purposes of the act.

Each Teacher Center shall be located in facilities furnished by the School Board, and shall be administered by a local Center Council of not less than nine members, appointed by the School Board. The membership of the Council must be representative of all applicable groups, provided that a majority must be composed of classroom teachers.

Each local Center Council is responsible for recommending policies and developing goals and objectives for the Center, making recommendations for employment of the staff of the Center, and for making recommendations for an appropriate budget.

In multi-district centers, a proportionate number of members shall be appointed from each district based upon the total number of teachers in each participating district.

Each local Teacher Center must submit an annual report to the State Council for Teacher Education Centers outlining the programs and activities conducted in the Center. The State Council shall review such reports and submit an evaluation to the State Board of Education and the Legislature.

The funding of local Teacher Centers shall be the joint responsibility of the participating school districts, colleges and universities, and the Department of Education.

The School Board is responsible for the provision of facilities, employment of staff, and provision of funds for inservice training expenditures.
The Board of Regents is responsible for allocating faculty positions to each Center, based upon the student credit hours earned by participants, and for providing an equivalent pro rata amount of non-faculty resources allocated for the state university system.

The Department of Education is responsible for insuring that adequate resources will be made available to a Teacher Center prior to approval of the Center. The Commissioner is further directed to include in the Department's legislative budget the amount of funds necessary to properly fund each Center.

The act authorizes funding to the university system for non-credit student contact hours in Teacher Centers at the same rate allowed for upper division credit courses, and prohibits college faculty members from charging consultant fees for services performed in approved Teacher Centers.