
This book is a critical review of the present state of theory and the various research methods being used in European youth sociology. The work is divided into two sections. Developed in the first section is a theoretical approach to youth based on a thorough analysis of the standard theoretical works in the sociology and psychology of youth (e.g. Eisenstadt, Parsons, Erickson, Keniston, Matza, J. S. Coleman, Gottlieb and Reeves, Bourdier, Schelsky, Musgrove, etc.) and the theoretical work in Europe of the last decade. The synthesis of the different works is based on the author's personal consideration of the problems and approaches. The second section is comprised of a methodological analysis of the empirical works which appeared in Central and Western Europe (those countries which are members of the Council of Europe) during the decade 1969-1970. (Author/RM)
Henrik Kreutz

YOUTH AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A Methodological Review
of European Youth Research 1960 - 1970

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The Council for Cultural Co-operation was set up by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 1 January 1962 to draw up proposals for the cultural policy of the Council of Europe, to co-ordinate and give effect to the overall cultural programme of the organisation and to allocate the resources of the Cultural Fund. It is assisted by three permanent committees of senior officials: for higher education and research, general and technical education and out-of-school education and cultural development respectively. All the member governments of the Council of Europe, together with Greece, Finland, Spain and the Holy See are represented on these bodies (1).

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These works are being supplemented by a series of "companion volumes" of a more specialised nature to which the present study belongs.

General Editor:
The Director of Education and of Cultural and Scientific Affairs, Council of Europe, Strasbourg (France).

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"Youth and Social Change - A methodological review of European Youth Research 1960 - 1970"

Introduction

In October 1969, the Council for Cultural Co-operation arranged a Symposium at Helvoirt (Netherlands) on "Youth and Participation". One of the purposes of this meeting was to discuss how research in the field of youth problems could be improved upon, as regards both substance and methods and also as regards co-ordination at European level (1). At the end of this Symposium, which brought together experts and research workers in different fields and specialists in youth problems, it was proposed that the research done by Professor J.A. Stalpers of the Institute of Social Science, University of Tilburg (2), on which the discussions had been based, should be pursued further so as to prepare a survey of the present state of theory, the various research methods being used (with concrete examples) and any research results already at hand which might be useful in policy-making (3).

This work was entrusted to Dr. Henrik Kreutz of the "Institut für Angewandte Sociologie", Vienna, who drafted a survey covering some hundred selected works on the basis of a research plan and suggestions put forward by a group of experts chaired by Dr. Rousselet, Director of the Centre for Study and Research on the Employment and Working Conditions of Young People (Paris). Dr. Kreutz's findings are the subject of this book, which might be described as a review of the present state of theory and the various research methods being used in youth sociology. It is a high-level critical study covering a selection of works which throws valuable light on the basic characteristics as well as the present conditions and limitations of sociological research on European youth.

As regards the progress made so far in this branch of social research and especially in research on youth questions, the author shows right from the start that the situation is, to say the least, unsatisfactory, for reasons which he sums up as follows.

Investments in research on youth questions are small and such research as is done is not always of a high standard. Often sociologists follow a false working hypothesis from the start and do not pay enough attention to methodology. This branch of research is interrelated with others. Circumstances have combined with the requirements of users to bring discussion down to a very low intellectual level, with attention focused on mundane matters.

However this may be, while it seemed necessary in the first instance to consider the sociological viewpoint, this survey suggests that sometimes it might be worthwhile to go

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(1) Doc. CCC/EES (69) 50, page 1.
(2) The results of this research have been published under the title "Youth and participation: a critical survey" (Doc. CCC/EES (69) 50) available from the Council of Europe Secretariat.
(3) Doc. CCC/EES (69) 86, page 2.
The diagnosis given is of considerable value but needs to be supplemented:

the existential aspects of youth questions ought to be investigated and a multi-
disciplinary approach found.

Accordingly, reference might be made to other fields of study such as psychology,
ethnology, history of civilisation and the educational sciences to complete this
preliminary assessment. This is one of the aims of the Colloquy to be held at
Baden (Austria) in 1973.

The opinions expressed in the survey are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views or policy of the Council of Europe.
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PREFACE

The work presented here is divided into three sections. In the first section, an attempt is made, based on previous works, to develop a theoretical approach to the Sociology of Youth. The second section is comprised of a methodological analysis of the empirical works which appeared in Central and Western Europe (those countries which are members of the Council of Europe) during the decade 1960 - 1970. The third section provides the detailed documentation.

Corresponding to their individual characters, the three sections differ in their approach, construction, and the methods they apply.

In the first section, an attempt is made to form a general sociological theory of adolescence through a synthesis of a few important theoretical approaches. This synthesis was not performed in an eclectic fashion, but rather is based on the author's personal consideration of the approaches as they appear in the literature. This section could, then, easily give the impression of being the author's own (original) theoretical approach (inasmuch as it is not overloaded with quotations and references, as is the case in handbook articles and other summaries). It represents nevertheless the results of a detailed investigation of the available theoretical literature. The references to the different authors, which would have been possible in practically every line, were left out; on the one hand not to disrupt the flow of the argument, and on the other because complex theoretical works cannot be adequately portrayed in a few lines or arbitrarily selected quotations.

This section was designed to fulfil two functions. First, it establishes from a theoretical standpoint the reasons that certain areas of empirical research concerning adolescents are considered particularly important, and are therefore dealt with at greater length in the following sections. The second and more important goal of this part lies in the attempt to develop a theoretical framework for the Sociology of Youth.

While a purely intellectual synthesis was an adequate approach in the first section, completely different procedures had to be chosen for the second.

Proceeding from the development and presentation of a theoretical thesis, an attempt was made to investigate the available empirical works with likewise empirical research techniques. Since the number of empirical works which appeared during the decade in question was far too large to be analysed within the scope of a works such as this, the necessity arose for discrimination with respect to content. The apparently available alternative of drawing a random sample from all the investigations proved to be, for practical and theoretical reasons, impossible.

The boundaries regarding subject matter to be included were drawn on the basis of the theoretical analysis presented in the first section. The methodological analysis of the empirical research was carried out on three levels, and leads to a statistical analysis, which in turn provides a basis for certain statements about research practices in general. Strictly speaking, the results of this analysis can of course only be applied to the areas
dealt with in the study. However, there is no reason to assume that the quality of the empirical data in other areas of research dealing with adolescents is essentially better or worse.

The third section offers in depth discussions of all the relevant empirical works from the standpoint of methodology. Procuring the individual works, however, proved to be extremely difficult, and this preliminary report lacks evaluations of a few of the research papers. These will, of course, be included in the final version. It is for all intents and purposes impossible that analysis of the additional works will indicate any major differences or variants.

This project had in general to contend with great problems of organisation, which were further intensified by a variety of disadvantageous personal conditions. The original plan was to perform the study within the framework of the Sociological Institute of the University of Vienna. Due to measures taken by one of the leaders of the organisation, this proved to be impossible.

The author is deeply indebted to the vast majority of the working group within the Council of Europe and most particularly to Dr. Bosio and Professor Hicter for their help.

Thanks are likewise rendered to the representatives of the Council of Europe, Mr. de Roulet and Mr. Raty, for their aid and understanding.

Last but by no means least, the author is indebted to his co-workers, especially to mag. rer. soc. Federico Nier-Fischer, without whose aid the completion of the report would have been impossible.
PART I

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR YOUTH RESEARCH
1. Theory of youth and social stratification

A question important in both its practical and theoretical aspects and which has been
dealt with by several authors from differing points of view, has been whether or not
"youth" forms a distinct social unity within society. From the practical point of view it
is of primary relevance to know whether the attitudes of juveniles are determined by
different factors from those of adults on the one hand, and children on the other. For the
politician it is important to know whether one has to expect a different hierarchy of needs
in adolescents and in adults, whether one has to apply different means to influence
juveniles, and whether one's influence declines amongst adolescents by the very process of
satisfying members of other age groups. In this respect the old slogan: "He who wins
youth wins the future" is not as evident as it seems at first sight. Those who have
juveniles as their adherents only during their youth and lose them as they grow older, can
hardly exercise great influence on society in the long run. It is therefore important for
the politician to attract young people; however, in very few cases can he manage to become
a politician specifically for youth, since it represents a minority, so he has to defend
the adults' interests as well (1).

This statement already implicitly presupposes that there do exist actual conflicts of
interest between adolescents and adults, and that as a consequence one is justified in
considering youth as a distinct social body. This hypothesis, however, is not generally
accepted today. Theorists of a Marxist orientation in particular refuse to accept youth as
a homogeneous category and point to specific class or social distinctions which also exist
in youth (2). From the theoretical point of view the primary problem which therefore must
be settled is whether "youth" represents a relevant social category, and if so, to what
extent.

The question of whether there is a juvenile age group within society at all has often
been put incorrectly, insofar as it has become entangled in minor questions of definition
which attempt to find answers on an abstract basis rather than upon observable realities (3).

In my opinion, efforts aiming at a limitation of the concept of youth have been
unsatisfactory to date, because there have been no attempts to find an answer within the
framework of an already existing theory, or to propound a new theory. All attempts were
grounded upon relatively arbitrary conceptual stipulations based directly on the usage of
everyday language.

Because of this, almost all such attempts at definition cease to be relevant to
general sociological approaches and can not therefore be treated within the scope of a more
comprehensive theory. But it is precisely this type of theory which is necessary in order
to answer the question posed above. For, in order to determine which attitudes and
behaviour we can attribute specifically to juveniles and which we cannot, we must obtain
two kinds of information.

1. We have to know what social conditions cause variations in the conduct of different
individuals who find themselves in the same situation. In other words: how is society
structured, i.e. which relatively homogeneous population groups exist within it, and what
conditions determine their evolution and existence? By what criteria are individuals associated with certain social formations, how much does this process of affiliation determine the individual and how sharp are the demarcation lines between those different population groups which are themselves internally homogeneous? Do different criteria overlap causing mixed groups, etc.?  

2. We must be able to anticipate changes within this internally structured system. We have to know whether and to what extent structural limitations shift, old criteria become ineffective, new ones turn up, etc. It is, for instance, always uncertain whether an observable difference between juveniles and adults is due to a difference in age, or in generation.

Various theoretical approaches

An analysis of specifically juvenile attitudes and behaviour can therefore only be performed through the knowledge and simultaneous investigation of the process of social change. If one does not want to act against this postulate, one must first consider the criteria by which the population is divided into socially relevant groups. The attempts of sociological theorists to answer this question may be divided into two groups roughly outlined as follows:

(a) Social structure is attributed to "objective" circumstances and conditions of which those concerned do not have to be aware.
(b) The individual consciousness of members of society is the origin of affiliation. Differences which are realised and acknowledged by the majority are equated with structure of society.

Both groups have their snags. The reference to objective facts can be supported by historical investigations showing the genesis of topical existing structures; but then it will also inevitably lead to a point where retracing of subjective to objective circumstances is either discontinued and concluded dogmatically or where a certain anthropology is introduced postulating a number of invariable human characteristics (4). Following up this second possibility, one easily runs into the danger of raising the average members of a society to the status of the scientific analyst and thereby to deny oneself a priori the possibility of understanding, due to the limitations of the analyst.

Apart from these two groups, there seems to be a third which is best represented in the reflections of Theodor Geiger. When treating problems of social stratification Geiger distinguishes between population parts and economic-social classes. According to Geiger, population parts are units of people classified according to objective characteristics. Socio-economic classes, on the other hand, are characterised by their members' mentality; they are, however, not as easily defined as population parts.

"The entirety of those who represent a mentality type like this, who defend such an interest, cannot be calculated, because they are at most only partly organised, i.e. socialised in integrated form. Nevertheless, they are active collectively as a 'social bloc', most of all as a foundation and sounding board of public opinions" (5).
There are assumed to be correspondences between certain segments of the population, and certain social strata. These correspondences do not, however, by any means imply a deterministic affiliation.

"... a segment of the population belonging to a certain socio-economic level is the typical recruiting field of a stratum of distinct mentality. Level and mentality relate to psychic motivation, segment of the population and stratum with respect to typical (not strict) conformity (6)."

The chances that a stratum will proliferate are therefore limited by that population segment from which it can characteristically draw members. The presence of a population part by no means implicitly proves the existence of a respective class. The formation of a common mentality through an equivalent situation does not come about automatically, but depends upon the extent to which the entire conditions of livelihood of those individuals belonging to a given population segment are determined by this particular membership.

The individual is simultaneously a member of various population parts (e.g. age categories, professional groups, etc.) and not each of them has vital importance for him. Geiger, however, assumes that in each society a certain form of differentiation has central significance and therefore largely dictates the mentality of individuals. In this respect mentality exhibits itself in "thousand particulars of everyday life."

"Standard of living, habits of consumption and other ways of life, use of leisure time, taste in literature, forms of family life and social life constitute the lifestyle and this is an expression of mentality." (7)

When a certain structural characteristic of society achieves central importance, this will cause the evolution of relatively stable strata which are relevant in every respect:

"If it is then maintained that a stratification which has its origin in one area of cultural activity, for instance in the economic field, radiates from that area, entering into the socialisation of other systems of cultural activity and thus penetrates in the form of a style of socialisation the total structure of society - then this stratification is changed into a universal sociological category and strata become carriers of fundamental societal convictions." (8)

If a certain form of structural differentiation acquires a dominant meaning for the individuals in this way then those strata that have educated themselves accordingly acquire central importance for the social dynamic.

The concept of social movement is inextricably intertwined with the definition of stratum. Hierarchical and well organised associations, parties, military leagues might succeed in bringing a movement to a position of power in the turmoil of public life; they co-operate with, or represent the basic tendency of the movement in various ways they invest it with different ideological expression, or may compete with each other. The foundation of a movement is the stratum which complies with the social structure of a latent mass as follows: an extensive but unknown social range, open for anyone who feels drawn to it, neither bound by rules nor organisation, not bound by strictly formulated doctrine and catechism - only held together by state of mind and psychic principles. A
stratum therefore resembles a liquid saturated with mineral salts, wherein the organisations, methodically entering battle ranks take form, the same way as crystals settle. They are embedded in the still amorphous, barely controllable mass of hangers on and sympathisers. (9)

In this analysis of social stratification in Germany during the time between wars, Geiger has been able to take it for granted that the society he investigated was economically determined. This assumption has been applied to today's Western European situation by the majority of sociologists. As regards the position of youth in this society, the question arises in view of the immense increase in youth groups, whether this assumption still holds, and if so, whether and to what extent youth can be considered a proper social formation at all.

**Socio-economic situation and different mentalities**

Should empirical analysis actually demonstrate that youth can be considered a proper social class with its own mentality, this would lead to the conclusion that today's youth is either characterised by its own, economically orientated position, or that the economic determination of social stratification has been largely reduced while other structural differentiations have gained in significance. Following Geiger's approach it will be necessary to investigate thoroughly the socio-economic position of youth as well as its mentality.

The socio-economic position of adolescents must be subjected to a close investigation, in which the following question will be of central interest: Is it possible to find common aspects in the situation of various groups of adolescents so that one can speak of a part of the population called "youth" at all? If yes, in what respects do these aspects exist and to what extent? Empirical research has proven that those persons called adolescents in colloquial speech find themselves in very different situations, and that "youth" therefore can by no means be considered a relatively homogeneous stratum. On the basis of this statement it seems, however, as unjustified to deny every similarity in socio-economic situation, as has been done by a number of sociologists, among them Leopold Rosenmayr and Manfred Markefka (10), as it would be to overemphasise the homogeneity of "youth" without criticism. From the scientific-sociological point of view, there are two basic assumptions responsible for the fact that a number of sociologists refuse, without thorough examination, to speak of youth as a stratum:

(a) stratification is considered (invariably) to be economically determined;
(b) equally invariably, the family is postulated as the smallest unit of social stratification so that no proper status can be attributed to the adolescent belonging to such a family, and "youth" therefore cannot form its own stratum. (11).

On the other hand the subjective aspects, summed up by Geiger under the expression "mentality", should also be thoroughly examined. Here we have to bear in mind that Geiger was very well aware that a distinct group-feeling and a feeling of unanimity do not necessarily exist in all members of a class, as has been imputed to him by Markefka. On the contrary, he proceeds from the fact (see above quotation) that on the basis of the same situation individuals start to develop similar dispositions, which consequently
cause organisations to evolve as cores of the stratum and that individuals on the margin are especially approachable from these centres. They form a public, receptive to these organised groups which Geiger compares to a sounding-board. It would be a mistake, however, to concentrate investigations exclusively on the habits and dispositions of adolescents themselves.

With respect to the socio-economic situation, it is relatively clear that it is not only determined by the adolescents, but also (to a larger extent) by the adults. Thus when investigating the position of adolescents, we must not consider them narrowly as a given fact; we must also take into consideration the possibility that this position is precisely the result of conflict between population segments (i.e. adolescents and adults). In the same way during the examination of subjective phenomena (as has already been realised by Siegfried Bernfeld (12)) the notion of youth as formed by adolescents has to be taken into consideration not as an independent entity, but together with the notion of youth as it is seen from the adults' point of view. The attitude of adults towards adolescents has therefore to be incorporated in the investigation on the objective as well as on the subjective level if, in conformity with Geiger, one sees the notion of class and that of "social movement" as being inseparably associated.

Turning towards the "objective facts", we must ask now the "youth" segment of the population differs to such a degree from the other parts that a proper social class "youth" can come into existence. Age in itself can only be taken as an indicator, for the question of "why can age become a socially determining feature?" must itself be clarified. In other words, we have to ask why can age become the basis for social stratification; i.e., a structural characteristic of society. Are the invariable, somatic maturing processes and their psychic correlates responsible for this fact, or is it the result of certain culturally formed processes of learning, or other circumstances?

The answer to this question is dependent on comparisons, since controlled experiments with complete societies are out of the question. Such comparisons can be made among different cultures and on the basis of historical research. The question at which such comparisons aim has already been indicated: with which social structural features does the relative meaning of age vary concomitantly as a relevant characteristic of stratification?

On the basis of such comparisons (however roughly compiled), S.N. Eisenstadt, for instance, has drawn up the thesis that age always gains in social relevancy when the status of the individual is not ascriptively determined by his relationship to a certain family status. This thesis would lead to the conclusion that the economic determination of the stratum could certainly continue to exist, but also that the possibility of transferring the family status to adolescents may have been considerably diminished in recent years. A number of authors are of this opinion (13). The existence of a relatively strong feeling of insecurity amongst adolescents in our society is generally conceded.

Taking this as a basis, one can today cautiously support the thesis that the adolescent, especially of the upper strata, is subject to a loss of status; in fact almost to a degradation, since the ascriptive status assigned to him as a child is no longer acknowledged, and he must, so to speak, start from the very bottom in order to
reach his own proper status, which will then to a significant degree determine his position as an adult. As an additional difficulty, it may be added that at least for some adolescents their family's material goods (such as an apartment or a car) are no longer directly and regularly available. Should these assumptions prove correct, this would provide a genuine basis for the age-relevant formation of strata within an economically determined society, since adolescents who are confronted in similar life situations with similar problems would then form a population segment which is sufficiently homogeneous within itself to allow the evolution of a common mentality. This kind of situation can, however, lead to the result that adolescents will not try to improve their status individually (each one for himself), but will at least attempt to improve the status of their age group as a whole. The need to attain an individual position after a certain age may bring about a circumstance in which individuals in the same situation unite in order to improve their generally accepted initial position. If this is the case the emerging solidarity based on age and the antagonism against adults should rise concurrently with the family status. The effort to raise the status of the age group rather than that of the individual is appropriately called "stationary emancipation" by Werner Loch (1971).

Even if one accepts an explanatory approach of this kind, one is not relieved of the duty of explaining why the predominance of ascriptive co-ordinations within a given society is replaced by the allocation of achievement. Economic or other factors may be responsible for this acculturational process. Finally, there is the possibility that the degradation of adolescents may simply represent a sort of ritual initiation. This means not so much that ascriptive status allocation is actually not abrogated, and the attainment of the final adult status is achieved with the massive participation of the family, but rather that the adolescent is pressured to success in order to prove his reliability and that he has to meet certain formal performance demands in order to be accepted later on as a full adult member of the socio-economic stratum of his family. Especially for the upper classes a ritual like this would have the function of legitimising the transference of material goods, prestige and privileges.

**Family of descent, status and education**

Should these assumptions prove valid one can with reference to today's situation assume that formal scholastic education mainly takes over this function. This assumption is supported both by the fact that in numerous sections of the population a successful termination (the diploma) is more important than the actual profit received from learning, and that juvenile protests aim principally against scholastic institutions.

The hypothesis that loss of status represents a relatively general characteristic of youth which differs in gravity according to family status has been formulated too inaccurately up to now and will have to be more precisely summed up. For this purpose it will first of all be useful to draw up a rough, schematic picture of the adolescents' situation which can be referred to during thorough research. A schema of the effects of the family status and, rudimentarily, of the adolescent's variable loss or gain of status would appear as follows:
If the adolescent's education corresponds to his family's status, he will be subject to a loss in status which may be considered normal insofar as he is at the beginning of a career, while his parents have already advanced. He can therefore eventually attain his family status on his own and without difficulty. He does not reach it automatically, but must demonstrate further appropriate achievements. If his education does not correspond suitably to his descent, the danger of true degradation is added to the normal loss of status, since it is doubtful whether he will ever be able to reach his family status. For adolescents receiving an education above the average standard for their descent, an ambivalent situation can be assumed, because a certain limited limited loss of status occurs against which there exists the prospect of true social ascent.

With these explanations, it becomes evident that to discuss this topic definitely requires that both the topical youth-specific status and the expectations of their future adult status must be taken into account.

This action, should the education correspond to the family status, will produce a situation in which the adolescent may expect to reach his parents' status but he will still have to make considerable efforts to do this. The position ascribed to him as a matter of course during childhood is questioned and has to be confirmed by his own actions.

Should the education not correspond to the family status, one can only hope to maintain it by faith in parental help and extreme optimism. In the opposite case one can, however, count upon a special degree of insecurity. It applies specially to those adolescents at the beginning of their career; social ascent may be likely but has yet to be achieved. Accordingly it is by no means certain, and the subjective probability of future success is not extraordinarily great, especially when the educational system is undergoing rapid extension so that a considerable and continually increasing number of adolescents find themselves in this situation.

If the educational system is made uniform then suspended the adolescent will lose another way of judging his own status. A consequence of this change might be that
ascriptive criteria will again come to the fore and that the status of adolescents will be determined by their family status. This status allocation could easily be transmitted through a juvenile sub-culture's symbols whereby the material and ideal parental support will be decisive in best complying with the criteria of this sub-culture (14).

Another possible consequence would be an increased feeling of insecurity among adolescents which could be associated with the perception of impending loss of status especially where a higher family status is concerned. In which direction those forces developing as a defence against this situation will lead is a largely open question. They could be used as a means of massive pressure against adults with the aim of raising the status of adolescents and making it less insecure; they could also lead towards a more or less secessionistic sub-culture developing its own status criteria.

Sexual differences and other distinctions

Those sociologists of the opinion that one cannot devise general youth theories, as there are very distinct groups of adolescents, might object to the above arguments that the distinction according to family status is not sufficient and that further differentiating features would have to be taken into consideration. This argument seems perfectly justified, and it will therefore be necessary to examine to what extent other distinctions alter the adolescent's situation; in particular, what effects do sexual distinctions have?

The young girl is undoubtedly in a completely different position from the boy in traditional middle class society, and one could, at first sight, assume that the status insecurity of the girl is still less significant today. Now it is undoubtedly true that not only the children, but also the wife traditionally participate in a man's status. This results in the fact that at least for a considerable number of girls, their own professional careers do not have the same central importance as they do for male adolescents. One can therefore conclude that for girls future marriage has in part a similar meaning in allocating status as the professional career does for boys. To be more specific, there are theoretically two different ways available for a girl to reach a certain adult status. This, of course, is only correct in principle, as even today possibilities for professional ascent by women are still limited and the traditional solution by marriage remains the most viable.

Reference to an ascriptive status allocation for married women should, however, not lead to the misunderstanding that girls do not have to undergo similar status insecurities to boys during their youth. Real doubts will arise for girls as to how good a marriage they will achieve, especially because of the traditional (at least apparently) passive role of the women in partner selection. A marriage either into her own stratum or into a higher class has yet to be secured. The girl is confronted by a status risk no smaller than the boy regarding his professional career. Undoubtedly certain requirements and faculties (such as looks, control of her own feelings) are more important for a girl than for a boy; this does not change the fact that insecurity about adult status exists in a similar way. Whether the girl is also subject to a phase-specific loss of status seems to be disputable at first. On the one hand, according to the traditional gradation, the
married woman is rated higher than a "Miss". Even for unmarried persons, the fiancée or ever the steady boyfriend will offer more security and superiority compared to girls who are still in a completely open situation as regards marriage. On the other hand, it is clear that youthfulness plays an extraordinary role, especially with women, and is gaining a high degree of social respect.

If therefore we have to concede that for girls a number of factors, such as looks and self-control, play an important part, it remains evident that the girl has to start at a similar level to the boy; namely at a zero-point. If she aims towards a professional career the sexual difference will be an aggravating factor and an additional insecurity. If marriage concludes the stage of juvenile development, considerable efforts are still required until one can reach the status of a well-married woman (relative to the respective stratum). One can even maintain that today a proper youth phase can be more clearly recognised in girls than in boys, with the following pattern of behaviour becoming more and more common: a period of professional practice between school training and marriage which, apart from economic necessity (if it exists), serves to fill in time as well as to find a suitable man through the work itself. Professional practice is not primarily regarded as a career.

Some women will give up these semi-careers immediately after marriage. Others would like to give them up at this time, but cannot afford it financially and continue working until the birth of the first child. The majority do not wish to continue once they are mothers and they also consider the selection of a partner from this viewpoint (15). In short, youth as a phase of work and in partner selection for girls can be relatively clearly isolated between childhood and adulthood. Even if this pattern cannot be adhered to, it does determine the intentions and wishes as a normatively secured guiding principle.

These analyses justify the maintenance of the thesis in its general form. This naturally does not mean that differences are denied; on the contrary, it takes into account that the universal basic tendency appears in varieties which will differ according to social descent and sex, but will not represent different processes in principle.

It is not possible here to discuss all the differentiating factors. Since, however, it has been possible to analyse the most important ones without having to give up the original thesis, it might be sufficient at this point only to note that further modifying circumstances, such as town-country distinctions or religious differences, can be summed up in a similar way. One might emphasise that today one can find a pronounced status insecurity and at least a phase-specific loss of status with children of farmers (contrary to many conflicting views) and that this population group is increasingly undergoing an extraordinarily problematic youth phase.

There could be another way in which generalising statements about the status of youth might be misleading. We cannot exclude the possibility that adolescents are treated differently in different institutions of adult society.

Thus, it could be the case that other kinds of status relations exist between adolescents and adults in the educational situation (training workshop, school, university) than in times of leisure, and in service organisations (starting with hospitals and
including shops and amusement establishments. For male adolescents the experience of army education must be considered and is in this respect certainly different from other institutions.

This possible inconsistency of status allocation might be still further increased by the mass media (which are in part directed to specific age groups) in which the position of adolescents is presented in a manner that does not necessarily correspond to reality.

A number of authors, such as for instance Helmut Schelsky, maintain furthermore that there are major differences between the treatment of adolescents within smaller group relations (family, circle of acquaintances, neighbourhood, groups of friends) and that within large secondary organisations. Some go as far as to suggest that the adolescent is granted a larger degree of equality in the modern nuclear family than within most of the secondary organisations.

It must also be noted that the position attributed to pupils in the various educational centres and schools cannot be equated, and that therefore a change of schools can bring about considerable changes for the adolescent.

One can therefore infer that the hypothesis of situational determination and institutional dependence in the status of adolescents is to a large extent correct. This fact cannot, however, be used to disprove the thesis of the existence of age-specific status distinctions. More precise investigations have shown that for adults social status is also dependent upon the specific social context (16). From the fact that social diversity varies according to the sphere of conduct, we cannot conclude that individuals are not assigned any precise social position which is reflected in the various situations in different, but still quite accountable forms.

The only factor which is decisive in answering the question whether the various age groups can be assigned a proper social status is to what extent status variations which are caused by specific situations can either annul or be responsible for differences between age groups. According to empirical data available to date one can maintain that age dependence and situational determination do exist side by side and are at least partially independent of each other. In all probability fluctuations in social status determined by institutions or situations are even more frequent in adolescents than in adults, a fact which would imply that the insecurity of young persons regarding their own position in society would be even more increased.

Up to now our considerations have been based on the assumption that social stratification is still economically determined and that adolescents constitute a class of their own (in spite of all internal differentiation).

To verify these assumptions empirically, well-defined criteria must be postulated allowing us to accept or reject the accuracy of these theses.

**Basic conditions for the establishment of a separate class**

On the assumption that the first hypothesis is correct (economic determination of stratification) we have already, regarding the second thesis (youth constitutes a special class) enumerated a number of such criteria:
1. If all adolescents (with rare exceptions amounting to not more than a few per cent) are dependent on their family for their position in the production process, their actual income, their possibilities for earning money, and their social (material) security, they undoubtedly cannot constitute a stratum (assuming that status is still determined by economic position in our society).

Now, dependence is certainly a matter of degree and empirical verification is therefore extremely difficult to come by. In order to clarify the problem we may, however, make use of the following line of reasoning:

If the dependence is complete, no adolescent will, by definition, have the possibility of living on his own and independently of his family (or of its substitution by welfare or other institutions). If, on the contrary, it is not feasible to be supported by one's parents, the anticipated situation is also evident. In those cases where a medium degree of dependence exists (i.e. it is possible, but difficult for an adolescent to live without economic assistance by parents, or institutions as substitutes for the parents), one can expect that a number of adolescents will break off from the parental family. This number will increase as the structural chances for independence for juveniles improve.

If it is then possible empirically to determine that a socially significant minority of adolescents (the limit will most probably be reached at 10% of the total population of the same age) are characterised by a distinct socio-economic condition, then this implies the existence of a proper stratum.

Nevertheless it may be the case that this possibility exists only for a certain segment of adolescents. Further empirical investigations would be necessary to prove whether we are then confronted with a trend leading to proliferation of the youth phase into further population segments.

2. If one can observe social movements made up of adolescents and/or a youth-specific mentality common to at least a part of juveniles without their holding a socio-economic position of their own, one is forced to doubt the (solely) economic determination of social stratification.

3. Socio-economic independence from parents is an indication of, but by no means an adequate criterion for, the achievement of a proper social stratum of "youth". A second criterion has to be fulfilled in the same way: a specific formation of socio-economically determined interests of adolescents which does not coincide with that of adults. Not only must the momentary socio-economic situation be considered in this respect, but also the future prospects (in the sense of Max Weber).

The less these are dependent upon the characteristic of the family, the more the position of the adolescent will become independent in the long run (even when his parents still provide for him). This is still valid even when the emphasis on individual effort and individual capacities is only obvious during youth and actually represents a kind of initial ritual.

If this second criterion is fulfilled one can expect a tendency to become apparent for the formation of a proper class of adolescents. This is also true when only a very insignificant degree of independence from the parental family exists.
If one wants to investigate whether this second criterion is satisfied, one must first ask to what extent adolescents occupy a specific position within the societal productive process. While not being able to give an accurate answer to these questions, we will point out below a few facts and considerations which are relevant to this problem.

The position of adolescents in our society

The following circumstances seem to be characteristic of the adolescent's position within our society:

1. The adolescent has mainly a receptive role while accumulating knowledge, skills and psychic dispositions. Nowadays this reception mainly takes place in a formalised learning process which, traditionally, is not classified as work. The result is that the adolescent has no claim for remuneration for his activities, and that financial subsidies, in so far as he receives any at all, acquire the character of maintenance expenses (scholarships, compensations for apprentices, etc.). He is therefore not offered any material equivalent (not even an exploitative, unjust one) for his achievement and the material incentives actually offered in order to increase achievement are insignificant. In so far as the successful termination of the educational phase is linked to a good professional career and chances for earning money in later life, material remunerations for success in learning are postponed to the future. These compensations can only be gained after a long time and are uncertain in so far as a high percentage of failure in all higher educational institutions is not unusual and unfinished education is of virtually no value. The insecure and lengthy prospect for remuneration is now even more in doubt because the extension of higher education causes a relative devaluation of the advantages formerly obtained by a final examination. This circumstance might have the result that for adolescents the long-term profit declines in importance and that the demand for direct, and not postponed, payment for actual learning achievement gains support.

The possibility of a fundamental re-orientation in this respect cannot be completely excluded: while learning has traditionally been considered a privilege and a means of accumulation for private purposes, it can now be emphasised that learning constitutes work upon which society is dependent and which therefore has to be considered as an integral part of the entire production process.

2. The receptive role of the juvenile differentiates him from the adult, and even if the distinction may sometimes only be one of degree, this does not provide us with the delimitation of childhood. We have already pointed out other distinctive features above: first of all economic independence from parents, or even better, a relaxation of economic dependence. Dependence decreases in proportion to the amount of money of his own which the adolescent receives from sources outside the family, such as scholarships, remuneration for apprentices, work during vacation, etc.

Importantly as this may be, there is a further circumstance which seems to have even greater weight: the more the adolescent's possibilities in life depend upon his own actions, and the less the influence that parents have on them, the more autonomous this phase will become and the more distinctly it will stand out in relation to childhood. How the older child doubtless has similar formal tasks to fulfil as the adolescent -
e.g. the primary role of accumulating knowledge. The fundamental difference is that the child has no choice whether to attend school or not; he may be a good or a bad pupil, he may, in most European countries, attend various types of school after a certain age, but he has no genuine alternative to school attendance. The youth phase is characterised, however, by the basically voluntary nature and independence of the learning achievement. The juvenile, theoretically at least, has the option of refusing formal receptive learning. Certainly in the long run such a decision entails reducing one's possibilities in life; the choice, though, definitely exists, and even in countries such as the USA where school attendance is compulsory up to the age of 16, many pupils actually leave school at the age of 14.

The social and psychic situation also changes for the apprentice, the pupil or student who decides to continue studying. His role as a receptive and accepting person is not invariably determined and in his actions he always behaves conscious of the prospect of ending his formal education. This can of course be done in different ways: some might consider a premature termination as dangerous and threatening, others might consider it pleasant and desirable. The conflict with the social environment will thus assume different forms. The existence of a group of "unlearned" adolescents who have broken off their education therefore contradicts the widespread opinion which finds in the very existence of this group a refutation of the thesis that a proper youth phase exists. This is taken as an indication of the fact that there actually exists an economically defined phase of youth (within which, however, different individuals live a variety of lives).

It is this very opportunity to reject the youth role (it is of minor importance whether this happens consciously or unconsciously) that makes it clear that the youth role is distinct from the role of the child on the one hand, and of the adult on the other hand.

3. Already the simple fact that juveniles, in the vocabulary of society, have not yet started to "work" implies that they do not really have the possibility of acquiring material resources and thus of achieving control over means of production (except over his learning potential). Furthermore legal regulations for the ascriptive assignment of material auxiliary resources (by inheritance, donation, etc.) are arranged in such a way that a considerable number of adolescents are excluded from the beginning. These legal regulations are now being supplemented to such an extent by uncodified normative ideas that adolescents or young adults can hardly ever attain control over means of production even after the age of majority. The result is that within a society in which at least secondary organisations are subject to the laws of barter, they find themselves in a relatively underprivileged position. The fact that they have quite a lot of money at their disposal for consumer purposes does not alter the fact they have no direct influence on production through material auxiliary resources.

4. The possibility of attaining control over means of production (and over other people) through knowledge and skill is also ruled out for adolescents. This is so mainly because the holding of positions of authority requires special knowledge, long experience and similar qualifications. Since, however, our educational system aims primarily at the transmission of general knowledge (every-day language characteristically terms somebody "unlearned" if he starts working right after compulsory school) the adolescent is not at all
specialised, or is only at the beginning of specialisation. The direct consequence of this fact is that he cannot objectively influence the formalised process of learning itself which he has to go through and which in its second part tends towards specialisation. This means that the individual adolescent is to a large extent powerless. Alienation from the existing system lies close while it is certain that the adolescent will not reach commanding position of his own relatively soon. This alienation may of course increase solidarity as well as reactively influence the formalised learning process itself. As the juvenile can only apply his own ability and willingness to learn (and as an individual refusal to use them in accordance with the prescribed goals does not help, but only causes damage), it is a logical step to question the functional ability of educational institutions by joining other persons in the same situation and thus gain influence.

Mobility to adult status

In speaking of youth as a social stratum in the manner implied above, then we have presupposed that concrete information can be given about mobility into and out of this stratum.

1. A number of theoreticians have understood this mobility as an ascriptive assignment of positions (17). This does not seem really possible in our society and the acceptance of this approach has been responsible for a number of grave misinterpretations of today's situation. It may seem paradoxical for many readers, but there is much evidence to support the view that assignment to an "age group" is based on achievement criteria. Here we must concede that only in an ideal case using the ideological vocabulary of society is it a question of assignment following individual achievement, and that in reality group achievements (principally the family) are almost always decisive. Achievements, however, have to be performed in such a way that from their appearance they may be plausibly declared to be individual achievements. This can be best demonstrated in the transition from adolescence to adulthood. In order to achieve a "normal" transition the adolescent must first finish his education successfully. (In addition something akin to respectability is needed; a vague kind of habit and attitude syndrome which can only be discussed briefly in this study.) If he does not succeed, professional success is expected, which is not the equivalent of the formal learning process, but does, in practice, replace it. The essential fact now is that if the adolescent does not achieve a specifically youthful performance, he can only become an adult at the cost of a long-term social descent. The sanction for not achieving the necessary performance is clearly defined, severe and virtually irreversible: this premature adult status results in a considerable decrease in options. The "youth" condition has, therefore, a built-in demand for performance which may be avoided only by suffering severe disadvantages. The movement of the adolescent towards adulthood is based on achievement, in so far as this movement does not suppose a definable degradation compared either to the family or to the initial career. The social stratifications of adult society are to a large extent the result of this process of allocation which takes place during youth. In other words: the adolescent is placed, at the beginning of a career, in an under-privileged phase of formal learning of variable duration. During this phase considerable achievements have to be performed which cannot
be interpreted as proper work and consequently are not paid for. This phase can be shortened at any time, but only at the cost of a long-term lessening of opportunities in later life.

2. Of course the movement of juveniles towards adult status is not concluded simply with the end of formal education. As mentioned above, the juvenile has to attain a certain "respectability". This implies, on the one hand, accumulation of experience, especially professional, and, on the other, a minimal income. One could describe this as another process of learning and incorporation not yet made formally recognisable, differing in various sections and gaining importance as the formal education phase shortens.

Because the final acknowledgment of adult status is based on co-opting depending partly on arbitrary factors, a generally valid definition of objective behaviour and criteria cannot be given. The assignment of adult status therefore is not the automatic result of objective performance only. It is not a question of "contest mobility", but of "sponsored mobility" (18). This means that performance is a necessary but not a total condition for attaining adult status, as adult judgment is also decisive and relative superiority or inferiority does not result directly from competition within the same age group. This circumstance again offers the possibility to develop solidarity with members of the same age group, since the individualistic tendencies involved in the mutual competition can be cancelled-out by assigning the disadvantageous results to the decision-making adults. That performance is necessary, but that success depends not only upon achievement but also upon a not quite definable (and probably, even objectively, not necessarily rational) adult consent, might increase their insecurity still further.

This may cause the suspicion that the entire regulation which demands achievement (partially justifiably) might be a pretended ideological facade and an approval of ascriptively given status assignment helped by pretended proof of achievement. Once this point is reached, it is only logical to reject the judgment of adults and to refer to the status acquired amongst members of the same age group. In these circumstances, the adolescent's demand for a voice in the decision-making process in matters concerning them, is a moderate one. However, the demands will become all the more insistent as the criteria of achievement become less well defined.

3. Since the transition in status from childhood to adolescence is also brought about by co-opting on the part of adolescents, the older adolescents for their part can exercise relatively strong pressure upon the younger ones to adopt an anti-adult attitude. To be accepted as an adolescent, the child must assume modes of behaviour and opinions which bring it into conflict with adults. A lack of integration in the adolescent age group will therefore constitute a positive condition for acceptance by adults. This results in the frequent and apparently paradoxical occurrence that persons who seem to be infantile in many respects achieve a success relatively quickly.

The restrictions regulating adult co-opting are obvious in the patriarchal system and even emphasised ideologically. In this system it is evident that only an insignificant part of the population is ever given complete adult status and that all other members of society remain children more or less. The lifelong denial of adult status can still be relatively well observed in the position of women in our society; for instance it is
evident in the expression "Fräulein" (Miss) for the unmarried woman, which she can only rid herself of by the acquisition of certain titles of professional denominations (such as i.e. Mrs. Doctor; "Frau Doktor"). Apart from this, fundamental elements of the patriarchal system can be discerned in our society. One is unable to make one's own decisions about a considerable part of one's time and actions if one occupies a subordinate position within an organisation. A lower adult status implies that at least in some important walks of life a full citizenship has not been obtained. Premature escape from compulsory achievement which characterises the youth phase therefore leads towards partial adulthood. This aspect, and the question of whether the movement from adolescence to adulthood is reversible or not, cannot be fully discussed here, but will have to be reserved for fuller treatment when dealing with the social stratification of society as a whole.

It should be noted, however, that a partial or complete loss of adult status may occur for instance by placing somebody under guardianship, or as a result of criminal activity or through welfare needs so that one has to keep in mind the possibility of a reversible status transition after all (19).
Footnotes:

(1) The fact that territorial units play such an important role for the election of representatives in our form of parliamentary democracy in all likelihood considerably reinforces this orientation with respect to the majority.


(3) f. the presentation of the older literature by Henrik Kreutz (1964). Youth: Group Formation and Object Selection, Vienna (mim.), part 1; Manfred Markefka (1967), Youth: Concepts and forms from the sociological point of view, Newted.

(4) The assumption of invariable human attributes can at this instance contain the postulate of certain evolutionary potentials of man as well as characteristics that cannot be accurately observed. But even in this case fundamental anthropological suppositions are made.

(5) Theodor Geiger (1932), The Social Stratification of the German People, Stuttgart, pp. 4 ff.

(6) Geiger, op.cit., p. 5.

(7) Ibid., p. 80.

(8) Ibid., p. 7.

(9) Ibid., p. 7 ff.

(10) Leopold Rosenmayr (1966) in the introduction (pp. XXXVI to LII) to the book: L. Rosenmayr, E. Körkeis, H. Kreutz, Cultural Interests of Adolescents, Vienna-Munich; Manfred Markefka, op.cit., p. 128.

(11) Manfred Markefka, op.cit., p. 129.


(17) f.i. Eisenstadt (1956) loc. cit.


(19) The fact that the loss of respectability may lead to the deprivation of adult status is, for instance, demonstrated in the laws of the Austrian Civil Law Code. By these laws, it is quite feasible to put someone under guardianship due to his prodigality.
2. Value-prevalence and the value-rebellion of the youth

Investigations into the value-orientations of youth have an important position in the literature of sociology (1). Such research concerning adolescents and young adults (2) has been growing in importance, particularly since the advent of student revolts. Even a quick analysis of the publications shows that there is a great difference between the tenor of assertions made before and after the revolts. Before them, the majority of the results and conclusions points to a great conformity between adults and youth, more specifically between parents and their children (3), while during the revolts, assertions emphasising the contradictions inherent in the different phases of life prevail. A further shift of emphasis in the scientific publications is shown by the fact that for a long time, only differences in age were taken into consideration; an assumption as to the formation of generations was strictly rejected (4). Now, since the appearance of obviously "historical" changes, works analysing the formation of generations have multiplied at a striking rate (5). It is partly due to this situation that an embarrassing array of views exists in this area of youth-sociology, many of which are mutually exclusive. In order to achieve a degree of lucidity here, a summary of the different statements in a way which clearly indicates their similarities and differences would seem appropriate. In this study, attempts will be made at first to establish such a rough lucidity, after which the critical analysis of the central conceptions of this assertion, i.e. value and value orientations, will be carried out. Finally, we shall try to find theoretical approaches for "explanations" of the ad hoc statements.

Without going into the details of the individual publications, a series of propositions will be put forward, some of which supplement, some of which contradict one another. The sources of these propositions may be found in the various relevant works. The goal of this work is, first of all to arrange ad hoc assertions in a way which will enable us to get a clear picture of the different basic concepts. Once this level of order has been attained, it will be possible on one hand to build the propositions into theories, and on the other to begin systematically to test the extent to which these propositions correspond with existing empirical evidence. In this study, the exploration of some theoretical concepts will be attempted. The systematic testing of the explanations which are presented will take place in future works.

It is only natural that in the course of an experiment aiming at summarising works which have appeared so far only in a few propositions, many details have to be left out, and so a given isolated point may be questionable and easily criticised. Nevertheless, such an attempt would seem to be absolutely necessary.

The individual assertions are:

1. Value-orientations are subjected to change in course of an individual's life. Implicit therein is that: (a) regarding their content, values which are seen as positive will differ at different stages of life, and (b) the intensity of their negative affirmation will change.

2. To the extent that one can differentiate between the different stages of life, one can also note distinctions regarding the prevailing value-orientations. Adolescents and young adults in particular possess quite different value orientations from adults or children.
3. Adolescents and young adults together emphasise values to a greater extent than adults or children.

3.1. Adolescents and young adults judge the acts of others, particularly those of adults, more strictly on the basis of values.

3.2. Adolescents and young adults judge their own acts more strictly and more explicitly (more consciously) on the basis of values.

3.3. As to their concrete behaviour, adolescents and young adults are influenced by values to a considerably greater extent than adults or children.

We may derive six possible different meanings of the above assertions: it is possible that all three are right; that two are right; or that one is right. Furthermore, it may be considered that the "prevalence" of the values in different individual adolescents and young adults need not appear in the same form. However, all of them or at least a considerable majority exhibit one of the three forms. Thus, adolescents and young adults may be described as non-homogeneous and yet at the same time linked by the importance they in general attribute to values.

4. Proceeding from the individual adolescent and young adult, we note three groups of persons who are of central interest for comparison of their value-orientations. These three groups are: (1) parents, (2) teachers and persons who maintain a close contact with adolescents owing to their professional position, (3) peers. While numerous works maintain that transmission of value-orientations takes place through the family, we also find authors speaking of a "sub-culture" of adolescents, whose values differ greatly from those of adults. Many of these authors stress the significance from the mass-media in the formation of a peer-culture. If it is accepted that values of adolescents and young adults differ from those of the other age-groups (the converse of this assertion may also be substituted here) then these assertions are ambiguous too. Depending upon whether it is the individual who is compared to his direct interaction-partner, or whether aggregates (i.e. age-groups) are compared to one another, different results are possible. Similarly, cross-sectional comparisons at a certain point in time might give quite different results from comparison of processes (†). Isochronical value-consensus and phase-specific consensus might in this sense be distinguished.

Concerning the connection between aggregate and individual behaviour, we may assert that the two levels should not necessarily show a trend in the same direction. It might happen that the aggregate remains unchanged, i.e. that the distribution of value-orientations among "youth" corresponds to that among adults, even though the majority of the adolescent children represent quite different value-orientations from their own parents. In such a case, the various individual deviations compensate for one another. Similarly, it could be that "youth" have quite different values from adults, despite the tiny portion of adolescents who deviate from the attitudes of their parents. Such a situation might

(†) A method is often used by which the development of adolescents is taken in account but the simultaneous process in respect to the parents is left out of consideration.
result in a case of different patterns of fertility among the parental generation (††). The most simple way of establishing the quantity of isochronical value-consensus at the level of individual behaviour is to check at specific points in time the degree of consistency of value-orientations of parents, their children, friends of similar age, teachers, peer-group leaders, etc. Comparisons of corresponding segments of the population (age or life-cycles) should be carried out on the level of aggregate-attitudes. However, a reliable check of the isochronical value-consensus can only be obtained by means of longitudinal data studies if the comparisons referred to above are to be made for intervals of several years and not for individual points in time. At the same time, data for phase-comparisons will be gained by carrying out such longitudinal studies. Let us take the persisting conformity between parents and children as a model.

Life-stages of the children generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>life-stages of the parent generation:</th>
<th>children</th>
<th>adolescents</th>
<th>young adults</th>
<th>adults</th>
<th>aged persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>adolescents</td>
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<td>young adults</td>
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<td>adults</td>
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<tr>
<td>aged persons</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>

0 - phase-specific comparisons
1 - possible isochronical comparisons

So it is possible to make two independent comparisons which do not necessarily give the same results. Indeed, it is very likely that e.g. phase-specific conformity will be linked with isochronical non-conformity. The truth of that does not extend solely to the individual level, but also to the aggregate-level. Notwithstanding, on the basis of the reasons mentioned above, transmission of consequences from one to the other level must be excluded. Even though under certain conditions, it might happen that an isochronical conformity and phase-specific non-conformity on the aggregate level result in non-conformity and phase-specific conformity on the individual level. Therefore the data ought to be critically scrutinised with regard to the danger of possible overinterpretation and hasty generalisation. The following hypothetical model for the level of consideration of individual-attitude gives a clear overall view on this non-conformity:

(††) Not fertility as a whole but only the "timing" of the births would differ among the various segments of the population.
From the outset one has to allow for the possibility that in the various life-stages both forms of the consensus do not conform, and that the two processes do not parallel each other. For example, it is probable that conformity between parents and children is very strong during childhood. At the same time, it seems probable that the childhood of the parents differed sharply from that of their children. Similarly, it does not seem unlikely that the adolescents, although they are characterised by isochronical dissent, are very similar to their parents if we compare them phase-specifically.

5. When speaking of a consensus of values, it is assumed that some values are rejected, some affirmed, and some considered as indifferent, thus possessing none of the properties of a value in the subjective sense for the person in question. However, refusal and affirmation are not a dichotomy, but a graduation. Such a phrase in itself is still very unclear, because one has to distinguish between the (subjective) importance a specific value represents in relation to other values, and the essential position (radical-moderate) held by the individual towards values in general. Even an extreme position might be considered as subordinate compared to other values, while it is quite possible that a moderate position might gain subjectively the greatest importance.

If one compares adolescents and young adults, and members of other age-groups, one must consider that conformity and dissent may be stated from several points of view:

(1) from the subjective importance of a value;
(2) from the essential position, where a distinction is to be made among the following possibilities for dissent:
   (a) some people consider a certain concept as a positive value, i.e. affirms it. Others affirm it too, either in a more extreme, or in a slightly more moderate way.
   (b) for some, the concept is neutral, for others it has importance for values.
   (c) it is accepted by some, and rejected by others.

So, for example, conflicts between parents and children might be traced back to a radicalisation of the children's value-orientations, to a more tolerant attitude of the children, to a real reversion of the values or to a simple re-evaluation (for some of
These forms of dissent might be combined with the different grading of dissent on the importance of a value (with respect to acting out or judging a certain action, or also quite generally, "fundamentally"). Therefore it is easily possible that the value-neutrality of a concept will be vehemently advocated (†), while on the other hand a reversion of the values will not be significant because the parties involved consider the valuer in question to be unimportant. It should be emphasised that consensus is by no means the only evidence pointing to preliminary influence (e.g. the transmission of values by parents to their children). The consensus might be influenced by an external factor, or reversions of values, radicalisations, etc. may be caused by earlier influences.

### Intensity of the Value Orientations of Adolescents (as Compared with that of Adults):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Substantial) Deviation of the Value Orientations of Adolescents</th>
<th>Prevalence of Value Only When Judging the Attitudes of Adults</th>
<th>Prevalence Also When Judging Own Behaviour and Attitudes</th>
<th>Prevalence of Values Not Only When Judging Behaviour But Also in Actual Decision-Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Deviation from Parents Prevails</td>
<td>1. Radicalisation</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Deviation from Parents in the Individual Cases</td>
<td>2. Reversion</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Substantial Deviation from Parents</td>
<td>3. Revolution</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Deviation on the Aggregate Level</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Deviations of the Younger Generation on the Aggregate Level</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Deviations of the Younger Generation on the Aggregate Level</td>
<td>3.</td>
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(†) Please note the scientific controversy concerning the "Wertfreiheit" problem.

(x) Each form of deviation can be phase-specific, isochronical or both, so that in each cell 9 different types of deviance can be distinguished.
6. That there is a considerable correlation between social class and value-orientation is proved by a number of investigations, where at any rate larger deviations among the social strata exist only in the "relevant" values, i.e. those goals which are considered to be accessible (x). On the basis of these results, some authors have come to the conclusion that fundamentally a value consensus should exist between parents and children. It should be noted that all of the "points" made above on the connection between aggregates in general and individual attitude, remain valid in this case too.

7. The material presented so far may be summarised in a series of types of statements which would appear roughly as follows:

Type 1. The significance of values to youth is no greater than to other age-groups, and their value-orientations are comparable to those of adults. Values are transmitted above all by the family. Parents and adolescents conform as to their value-orientations. The influence of adults will be increased - assuming it is effective at all - only through the influence of peers.

The following schematic review should make clear the differences among the various statements and, at the same time, it should abbreviate their presentation:

Taken as a whole, there are 112 possible statements, a significant portion of which have actually been applied by the authors. Before proceeding with an analysis of the statements, there is one further problem to be dealt with, namely that of the way generations are formed. The basis for the way this problem will be treated has been found in the distinction between isochronical and phase-specific consensus.

This already complex situation will be further complicated by the fact that there exists enough empirical evidence for the following assertion: the value-orientations of adolescents and young adults are subject to change within a couple of years; values have more significance for one generation than for the subsequent one; conformity with parents is characteristic of one generation, while dissent is characteristic of the next. The term "generation" is used by various authors in different ways. The isochronical non-conformities between parents and children are often referred to as a conflict of generation; the same phrase is often used for making phase-specific comparisons, e.g. that of the adolescents of the 1950s with those of the 1960s. Generational differences or non-conformities, as referred to in the rest of this work, are to be understood only in the sense of such phase-specific comparisons. At present, the direction and form these changes might take (6) cannot be accurately judged. However, the fact that such changes do take place cannot be denied. To give an example: at the beginning of the 1960s, it could have been proved that young adults (college-graduates between the ages of 20-30) in the vicinity of Vienna were much more tolerant in their value-orientations than the adults (college graduates between the ages of 40-50), who had much more radical value-orientations (7). Now, hardly ten years later, to take such a difference for granted would be imprudent, to say the least. The explanation of these "historical" changes and also their long-range results are - as already said - unclear. Some authors suggest periodical gradations according to certain postulated rules; others consider it possible to state single-lined trends, while others deny the possibility of any internal legitimacy and only consider their dependency upon technological and economical changes, and historical events (wars, etc.). One of the most interesting analyses of the influence of social change as a whole was written by Maurice Zeitlin in 1966. He explored the connections between historical events (civil wars, dictatorships, revolution) and political views and value-orientations of workers in Cuba. The formation of "political" generations in such circumstances was conclusively proved in this work.

Naturally, this problem cannot be dealt with in detail in the present work, but a single "formal" aspect will be analysed in particular. This aspect of generation-formation appears in the possible connection between the transmission of values by parents and the resulting value-orientation of adolescents. Having made certain assumptions about consent and dissent between parents and adolescents, we are led to some conclusions regarding generation formation.

1. If a phase-specific as well as isochronical consent between parents and children prevails for a long time amongst a large majority of the population, a new generation will be formed only if the parents' generation is heterogeneous in its value-orientations and if the population (of a like age) has a differing fertility rate. That is, if persons
With quite definite value-orientations have no children, or if they prefer to have children at isolated moments, then a corresponding displacement between the generations of the parents and the children as a whole might take place. For example, if in Austria between 1934 and 1942 persons with well defined value-orientations had relatively many children, and during the same period persons with opposite value-orientations gave birth to relatively few children; and had the ratio reversed itself in the period between 1946 and 1955 (consensus between parents and children remaining constant), then the following would be the result: a significant degree of non-conformity as a whole between adolescents and young adults of the 1950s and 1960s.

2. If an isochronical but not phase-specific consensus exists between parents and children, then on the basis of the above suppositions, the result will be non-conformity between generations.

If an isochronical consensus should prevail for a longer period, it would mean that since there were no differences between the different age-groups, the phase-specific non-conformities would also be omitted. This would be a special case of the situation referred to under item 1., where an absolute uniformity of the value-orientations exists which precludes any formation of generations except under the specific conditions given in item 1. If an isochronical consensus exists only for a period of some years, there is a further possibility of generation-formation, as it is obviously possible for parents to possess value-orientations in their youth which are different when they grow older. However, should the children be in isochronical conformity with their parents, it would mean in this case that they differ phase-specifically i.e. generation formation is possible. For example, in the case of an isochronical conformity between parents and children, a radical youth generation might be followed by a tolerant one, this tolerance resulting from certain experiences (war, destruction).

3. The situation will be more complex in the case of a phase-specific but not isochronal consensus. Theoretically, generation non-conformities might come into being in the same way as presented under item 1. If the fertility variations are absent, generation non-conformities might still exist. However, these non-conformities might be disguised if they are superimposed on two or more generations of different kinds. In this case, generation formations will be obvious only in the internal distinction of the youth. To clarify, let us take, for the purpose of a schematic exposition, the extremely simplified case of two age-groups belonging to different generations, in the sense that the phase-specific process of the value-orientation is different. In interest of simplicity, we will take diametrically opposed forms of development.
rate of those, who are affirming the definite value W1

generation 2 (children of the lower class)
generation 2' (children of the upper class)
proportion in relation to the whole population and proportion in relation to the whole youth (x)
generation 1' (members of the upper class)
generation 2' (members of the lower class)

(x) Assuming that both of the populations, which are marked through the two different phase processes, are equal in number.

generations 1 and 2 mark a parental generation, 1' and 2' mark their children’s generations.

(xx) For example, a differentiation of the generation gap according to social classes was assumed.

So we have a model where sharp generation non-conformities compensate for each other in the population segments, and therefore neither isochronical nor phase-specific differences will be obvious in the population as a whole.

4. In spite of the lack of any consensus, dependence upon parents might exist and might have a generation forming effect, if the typical reaction to parental value-transmission is not represented through consent but through a certain form of dissent (radicalization, reversion, etc.).

On the whole, this analysis shows that non-conformities between age groups due to technical, economic, social or other differences may have effects beyond those on the age groups directly involved: may, for instance, bring about further generation formation in other age groups. The case presented here concerning parent-child relationships may be valid for connections of a quite different type, i.e. for those where values are transmitted. So it might be that during certain time spans a periodicity of generations will arise but in any case, this periodicity could be eliminated or altered through new occurrences.

Any attempt to find a statement of universal validity as to the value-prevalence of the youth must be, therefore, based upon observations over many years, as it might be possible to observe that a value-prevalence will be valid only for a certain generation or generation type, but will not be valid for the youth of another generation.
So far we have tried to enumerate the various possibilities of conformity and non-conformity with value-orientations which might exist between generations. This analysis aimed at avoiding a series of erroneous conclusions and misconstructions which might easily have been made by the interpretation of empirical data. In fact, many authors have made such mistakes. Now an attempt will be made to find a theoretical approach, on the basis of which testable statements concerning value orientations might be made. In this study the various existing theoretical explanations cannot be analysed individually. Rather we shall try to characterise some of them regarding their sphere of thought, and then outline our own position. In this study, only the beginnings of the theoretical work will be done; further papers will develop the theme more precisely. The explanation will not, however, appear as a single trial procedure, but rather in the form of an enumeration of alternatives which theoretically may be tested against one another (x).

Siegfried Bernfeld (1915) has attempted to find a psychological feature characteristic of youth, and he thinks the distinctive feature in this phase would be: "special appearance which takes on the greatest variety of forms during youth disregarding how numerous and how interwoven the various forms are". However, the forms gain their distinct appearance through the "prevailing value-experience": "The value-experience is an essential part of all forms of the youthful spirit and therefore it is quite different from those otherwise equivalent manifestations of any other life-stage". (Bernfeld, 1915, p. 73). Bernfeld considers the principal reason of the characteristic of "the youthful peculiarity for the prevailing value-experience" to be the "discrepancy between sexual need and ability" (p.89). This discrepancy arises from the fact that "physical and psychical maturity do not entirely correspond"; "towards the end of childhood a discrepancy between sexual need and permitted outlets (arises) the forms of which are: on one hand the obscure pushing on 'of the blood' gives rise to ideas and feelings not yet consciously realised; on the other hand, obvious stimuli and sensations are pushing for action, which may not yet be carried out. These two forms create the same state; a very high level of mental restlessness .... In this state each individual is menaced by collapse unless he can find something stable and secure giving him a safe stronghold and last refuge. It is clear from this what significance must be attributed to the value-experience during this time, and it is easy to understand how this value-experience - while comprising the whole spiritual life - creates the real or illusionary foundation on which the youthful psychological structure may be established." (Bernfeld loc. cit., p. 88 f).

Very likely Bernfeld borrowed the idea of the particular motivation of youth during sexual development from Freud. Freud writes in his "Third Essay of Sexual Theory" (the third edition of which was edited in autumn of the year 1914, while the date of Bernfeld's Dissertation is 19 April 1915) on the transformation of puberty: "The object-selection takes place at first in the imagination, and the adolescent, with regard to his sexual life, has no other choice but to give way to fancies, i.e. to imaginations which cannot be fulfilled. In these daydreams, the infantile inclinations in all cases again come forward, strengthened through the somatic stress" (xx).

(x) Comp. to the method of Hans Albert (1968).
Bernfeld's final definition of youth from a psychological point of view is as follows (1915, p. 90): "Youth is the period of discrepancy between psychical and physical needs and abilities. It sets in when the development of the psychical elementary abilities and their rudimentary physical correlates have been, by and large, completed. It is characterised by the prevalent value-experience which, determined by this discrepancy, during the course of adolescence dominates to an ever greater extent the fields of the spiritual existence. The psychical substances with regard to their number, their kind, and their sequence are similarly determined by this discrepancy and by its radiating influences, and also by the general psychical legality. The transition from childhood to youth, and thence to adulthood takes place through a sudden change in the significant attitudes and reaction-modes. Youth ends with the total dissolution of this discrepancy."

Hence this definition of youth as a type speaks neither of defined age-groups, nor of sociological factors. Bernfeld later (1915, p. 92) supplements this definition, inasmuch as he agrees firstly that this type is essentially comprised of persons younger than twenty-five, and secondly, that external circumstances do play a significant role. Elsewhere, he makes some attempt to outline the sociological limitation of this type more precisely (1917, p. 114):

"The physical and psychical peculiarity of youth is granted ..... The question which arises is not what this peculiarity consists of, but whether these qualities as a whole or individually would be considered as valuable and appropriate by a social order ....." Hence, youth is the group "which - on basis of its natural peculiarity - fulfils a defined specific task of an economical or intellectual nature in a certain social order" and "the sociological concept of youth is the general phrase representing the laws, according to which some forms of the classification of youth in the social order are connected to this order". Thus, Bernfeld assumes that values play a more important part during youth than during any other phase of life. It is evident from his deductions that he postulates the "prevalence" of values not only in judgments but also in actions. Statements concerning substantial deviations and conformities are not central. B, explaining the value-prevalence, he refers to the sexual development as an independent variable. The emphasising of values takes place as a result of physiological and psychical processes; it has a vital importance for the adolescent, enabling him to cope with the changes created by the alteration of his instinct structure. In this sense, "youth" always exists. However, whether it behaves as a distinct group depends upon the particular circumstances of a social structure. Similarly, youth is a form of social energy which may be put into action in given circumstances, and which in fact is being put into action now. The use of such a theory makes it possible for Bernfeld to postulate an invariable prevalence of the values of adolescents, at the same time admitting the possibility of "generation formation". However, generation formation here would not take place through the adolescents, but through the extending social structure by the majority of non-adolescents who, in accordance with given circumstances, promote some features of youth, i.e. let them advance to full development, or more or less oppress them. In Bernfeld's opinion the prevalence of values derives from the adolescent's attempts to surmount puberty, i.e. to control the sexual-instinct. Similarly, Elisabeth Devvan and Joseph Adelson (1966, p. 19 f., 80 f) consider the attempt to gain control over instinctive impulses as a reason for the extraordinary significance of values
during adolescence, and chiefly in its early stages. The adolescent is confronted with the problem of finding some form of satisfying his instincts (not only of a sexual character, but other ones as well, e.g. aggression) which can be reconciled with the super-ego which he developed in his childhood. Deviations from the "prescribed" super-ego attitude created by the instinctive impulses can lead to a range of various consequences (e.g. trend to self-annihilation, apathy, depression, defiance of the super-ego; immoral action), of which by far the most frequent is the rise of guilty conscience. Possible reactions to such feelings of guilt are:

1. Ascetic negation of instinctive impulses.
2. Joining a closely knit peer group where, on basis of similar problems, an "esprit" comes into being, hence partly legitimising the deviant attitude.
3. Projection of guilty conscience, i.e. the adolescent perceives rampant unfairness, corruption, etc.
4. Identification with an adult and adaptation of his forms for control of his instincts.

All these reactions to a guilty conscience are relevant for the type and intensity of value-orientations. In the view of an outsider, ascetic negation, as well as identification with an adult, create certain kinds of attitudes which are not driven by necessity, and therefore they make - in the broadest sense of the word - the individual attitude of the adolescent (consciously or subconsciously) dependent on value-orientations. From this point of view, projection of guilty consciences means judging of attitudes - above all those of adults - strictly on the basis of value-orientations. Joining a peer group might lead to a formation of a sub-culture, i.e. certain "new" values might come into being, which are common only among the members of the age group.

Douvan and Adelson emphasise that in addition to the fact that the changes mentioned above are affected by puberty, youth represents a phase of life which is especially suited for an alteration of value-orientations, since on the one hand the cognitive progress in adolescents includes a growing understanding of abstract motivations in value-orientations, and on the other, their aspiration to independence provides greater chances for extra-familial influences. All the same, the authors are of the opinion that real changes in value-orientations are definitely rare. They base this position on the assumption that in the majority of cases, the family, the school, peer-groups, etc. transmit to the adolescent, on a social level, values which are by no means contradictory; which are, in fact, mutually supporting. Furthermore, they maintain that as a rule, excessively big fears do exist on the psychical level about the alteration of already (even if partly subconsciously) accepted values. Certain actions which might seem at first sight to be a revolt against adults' values, will on closer examination be recognised for the most part as comparatively superficial deviations in taste. Consequently, though Douvan and Adelson see an increased opportunity for value-orientation in youth, it remains unused in the majority of the cases. The preliminary conditions for such changes, for the few who make them, are a liberal disposition on the part of the parents and strong assistance on the part of peers. The authors attach great importance to this minority which, they maintain, is decisive in forming the ideological tenor of a generation. Hence the difference between generations should be - as a rule - determined by a small privileged group who,
although they have some influence upon their peers, do not have enough to make their value-alterations the rule.

Summing up, the standpoint of Douvan and Adelson may be characterised as follows:

Youth is marked by a prevalence of values and by an increased opportunity for values to be changed. However, the prevalence of values does not appear in a unified form. In some adolescents, it may appear as criticism of adults due to projection; in others, it is influenced by and dependent upon peer-groups, i.e. to some extent "externally", and in this case the question is, how far attitudes themselves, not merely judgments on attitudes are concerned; in others, value-orientations involve the individual's personal attitude as well, in which case there will develop either a real consciousness and clear value-decisions, the ascetic negation of the instincts, or a nearly complete identification with an adult. Although there is a chance for a change in value-orientation, it will only rarely come about. Differences between generations are created primarily by small minorities. The basis of these facts and processes lies in the appearance of instinct-impulses during puberty: primarily sexual development, and secondarily the cognitive progress and desire for autonomy.

Kenneth Keniston (1969) considers youth is characterised by a rebellion against the super-ego, i.e. not merely distinguished by a rebellion against the essentially external factor of the parents, but also against the part of the super-ego which involves the subconscious, internal value-orientations of the parents. He makes some attempt to outline more exactly the phase-specific development of morality as he calls the development of value-orientations. For this purpose, he takes as a base the works of Lawrence Kohlberg, which are in turn based on the classical experiments of Jean Piaget. According to Kohlberg, three phases in the development of morality may be distinguished. More correctly, what is dealt with here is not the development of morality, but the development of the reasons for the value-orientations represented, i.e. the development of the moral argumentation. In joining these works, Kenniston differentiates the three phases as follows:

1. pre-conventional phase
2. conventional phase
3. post-conventional phase

The post-conventional phase is further divided into two sub-phases. Pre-conventional morality is marked by a comparatively egocentric attitude regarding what is right and what is wrong, in the sense that the guiding principles will be personal gain and the highest possible level of gratification. It is characteristic of the conventional phase that values are considered as objective: objects existing apart from human beings, and as such not alterable by them. It is possible for the individual subjectively to deviate

(x) The experiments of Kohlberg were carried out on middle class American adolescents. Hence the conclusions are limited to this population. Further limitations arise from the fact that the tests concerned male adolescents from urban environments, age 16 – 24.
from these objective values, but these deviations are considered illegitimate, since they are deviations from existing, objective values to which personal preferences are subordinate. Hence, there is no justification for a deviant attitude.

As mentioned previously, the post-conventional phase may be divided into two sub-phases. For one of them, it is characteristic that moral values, i.e. values which are considered as correct, exist on the basis of a social contract, an agreement among individuals who are in relation to one another. In accordance with the contract one must distinguish between correct and incorrect attitudes as well as basic values, which correspond to the public welfare, i.e. to the general benefit secured by the contract.

Thus, values are subject to change; they are conventions, and can be replaced by new compacts. The second sub-phase does not consider social contracts or agreements between individuals as sufficient motivation for the support of certain values. Here again, there must be a general orientation centring on the individual personality. However, the basic precepts are grounded in personally accepted principles, which are not viewed as being objectively "right", but nevertheless bind and stabilise the individual's attitude, and create in him a consistency in behaviour. Thus, the individual behaves in a fashion appropriate to his values, even if there are no external sanctions, even if prevalent values differ from his own. From such a standpoint, it is understandable that the individual will resist a value-orientation even if it is democratically established, or even to doubt such value-orientations and to use his personally accepted principles as a basis for his questioning. Naturally, the establishment of personal value-orientations represents only an isolated aspect of the moral progress. The most important question to raise is whether these judgments are in any way relevant; if they are of any importance for the attitudes of the adolescents themselves. To answer this question, Kohlberg carried out a series of interesting experimental explorations which imply the existence of such a correlation, so that the establishment of personal value-orientations can be adapted as a sufficiently proven indicator. However, the division of the moral progress into various phases does not imply that the entire population passes through each stage of the procedure. On the contrary, a small proportion of adolescents up to the age of 24 never passes the pre-conventional phase, and the vast majority of adolescents and young adults only reaches the conventional phase. Only a third succeed in getting to a post-conventional morality, of which the major portion only attains a comprehension and establishment of individual values through social contract. Not more than 10 per cent of the persons examined admitted the establishment of personal value standpoints through subjective principles, these principles being considered binding but not objectively "correct". In the USA and in other industrialised countries, Keniston believes, a growing portion of adolescents and young adults might be found who do reach the post-conventional phase. As a possible reason for such a change, he quotes three particulars which are characteristic of modern western society:

Firstly, he thinks, independence from the institutions of adult society promotes moral progress. In agreement with Kohlberg and Erikson, he considers that leaving behind the conventional phase is connected to a temporary moral regression, i.e. to a return to the pre-conventional phase, while gaining a job, marrying, or bringing up children form
a handicap for further moral development, as moral regression is no longer possible without neglecting all these obligations. Independence from such obligations, on the other hand, promotes the aforementioned progress. Keniston considers as a second cause the existence of a culture-contact with value-systems differing from those he has learned in his childhood, and whereby value-orientations will be relativised, and a conventional objectivisation will no longer be practicable. The third cause is the discovery of corruption; the realisation that adults, from whom value-orientations had been learned as a child, do not themselves abide by these values. The most likely reaction to this discovery is a moral regression; to some extent a temporary cynicism. On the other hand, it can happen that this very discovery promotes further progress in moral development.

According to Keniston, post-conventional motivation of value-orientations can, like conventional behaviour, lead to dogmatic, self-righteous, intolerant representation of the personal value-orientations. In his opinion, such a trend is manifesting itself in the form of the current student movements. He postulates an asynchronous development of various psychical and cognitive abilities of the individual as a reason for this regression to intolerant dogmatism. In this connection, he speaks of a "moral precocity" i.e. the outstripping all other spheres of life by moral development. Hence - according to Keniston - a large part of today's middle-class adolescents can be characterised by a new kind of prevalence of values, namely asynchronism of the psychical and cognitive development. This leads to the result that in judging human behaviour in general, and personal behaviour in particular, values are considered as absolutes, and are weighted accordingly. Recalling the exposition of Bernfeld, we see that the same empirical criterion might be interpreted as value-prevalence or "moral precocity". Nevertheless, the explanations for this prevalence given by Bernfeld and Keniston are different. Keniston asserts the significance of the sexual development regarding the moral progress. However, at first he tries to narrow his explanation; to consider fewer variables, attempting to obtain in this way an economical theory.

Up till now, we have presented a range of theoretical positions, without elucidating which theory of values and value-orientations we support. In order to construct from the innumerable empirical results our own position, it will be necessary to define in greater detail the concept of "value".

Theorists, applying the concept of value for the interpretation of human behaviour seem for the most part to agree that values influence attitude, but in addition, other dispositions (e.g. needs, instinct) are relevant to behaviour, so that a certain behaviour cannot be directly deduced from a certain value. If we assume that values are relevant to attitudes (which strictly speaking ought to be checked in particulars), a series of questions needs to be explained in order to ensure valid measurement: what other dispositions influence human behaviour, how do they combine with the influence of certain value-orientations; and how do they affect specific and examinable actions? (8) Once again, we have opened up an extremely complicated area for debate, in which most authors are far from being able to advance a hypothesis which can be empirically checked. From this point of view, a dreadful confusion prevails in all investigations. In some cases,
only manifested preferences are interpreted as direct indices of values; in others, values and necessities are mixed up, etc. The situation becomes even more complicated if one proceeds from the assumption of most sociologists that persons' attitudes are not affected solely by intrinsic dispositions, but also by the external situation. Thus, a specific action must be considered as dependent on at least three different groups of factors: values, other psychical dispositions, and the condition of the environment. How the effects of these three components interplay is essentially unknown. If one accepts formulations which have appeared to date, one is led to the conclusion that the measurement of values can only be valid if the other factors are controlled.

In the framework of this short-treatise, it is impossible to produce a stringent, theoretical approach: rather, I will try to increase awareness of the issue. Nevertheless, some hints in this direction are appropriate, whereby the further explanations will be facilitated to an appreciable extent.

An exhaustive analysis of the most frequently cited definitions of the concepts "value" and "value-orientation", namely those by Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), has led the author to the conclusion that an attitude which conforms to values should be considered as an action which, from the standpoint of the specific actor, represents an attitude which ought to be rewarded. An action which deviates from values, on the other hand, represents an attitude which ought to be punished, or at least ought not to be rewarded. Kluckhohn does not express it in exactly these terms. Rather, he stops at the assertion that values actually represent concepts about what is desirable (not necessarily what is actually desired) which affect the decisions and thereby the attitudes of the individual. Values are generalisations and abstractions, and as such they are acquired. The weakness of Kluckhohn's definition, that values must finally be defined by the desirable needs, might be overcome by recurring to the concept "reward". By doing so, a direct reference to psychological theories of learning seems to be possible: namely, that secondary (tertiary, etc.) reinforcements may be acquired in the course of the learning process, i.e. that certain events and acts having been originally neutral (and which for others are still neutral) are considered remunerative on the basis of a coupling with primary rewards (satisfaction of drives). In addition, for certain behaviour which has been rewarded over a longer period of time, compensation will be awaited and expected even if initially it fails to materialise. Thus, values may be interpreted as conceptions which should lead to reward (even if in reality no reward is forthcoming (any more)). These conceptions are products of the learning process and are based on previous rewards. Using such a conception, the fact that the same occurrence may be judged according to different values could be explained by noting that this occurrence took place in different contexts in the individuals' learning processes. The fact that the same attitude may be judged differently by the same person is similarly explicable, if this attitude is demonstrated by different persons. If external rewards for a certain attitude should cease after a given period, so in the course of time conflict between values and satisfaction of drives may be expected. This conflict may, but not necessarily, disrupt learned (internalised) value-orientations (9). An attitude which conforms to values may itself be considered as remunerative. If it is correct that learning, or the formation of certain value-conception, takes place through the sanctioning of a certain attitude
over a fairly long time, then a transfer effect is to be expected from the reward (or
punishment) to the rewarded (or punished) action. An important underlying factor which
might inhibit the satisfaction of drives by a value-conforming attitude may be the fact
that the individual has learned to identify himself with certain values and attitudes; he
has developed an image of himself which implicitly includes the respect of certain values.
The purpose of these values would then be equivalent to the purpose of contiguity in the
individual (Ego-Identity) (10). Conceptions of what is worthy of reward may be, and in
reality nearly always is, more or less bound up with clear ideas as to why rewards ought
or ought not to be granted. Barton (1959) speaks of them as beliefs, and is of the
opinion that they are a different phenomenon altogether from values. Naturally, these
beliefs might or might not relate to objectively measurable facts. If they do, then they
may be proved right or wrong. Therefore, after the change in the external reward
situations, the most important points of application for the changes of value structure
are those beliefs which are bound to values. In order to avoid a falsification of
beliefs which would affect the corresponding values, blank formula-like immunisations of
the establishment of values are often applied ("Leerformeln").

Beliefs are the subjectively accepted motivation of given values. They are naturally
not the actual bases of certain value-orientations. However, Barton's way of
distinguishing values from beliefs can only be approved conditionally because people do
not accept values on the basis of easily rectifiable errors, such as an imperfect
assumption regarding the empirical validity of the values. In opposition to this,
Kluckhohn emphasises that value-orientations themselves imply certain assumptions of
reality. Since they are related to the empirical process, the value-orientations always
require some tendentious motivation which, under certain circumstances, might be a simple
"it used to be so" or "it has been always so" (x).

Following Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), we introduce the concept of "value-orientation" in
order to make this association explicit. A value-orientation is related to a certain
behaviour or a certain attribute, and is composed of "beliefs", i.e. a ranking
(subjectively imagined "explanations") of the state of affairs and evaluation on the
basis of the ranking. Hence, it is supposed that the individual intends to perform two
separate operations: firstly, the ranking of the data concerned in connection with the
surroundings with which he is familiar (an attitude will be ranked as "authoritative",
"democratic", etc.); secondly, the evaluation itself, which takes place within the
context of beliefs, of whether concepts labelled "authoritative", "democratic", etc.
ought to be rewarded. Conversely, the subsequent rationalisation of a subconsciously
based evaluation is of course also possible. Ranking measurements might already be more
or less value charged in any individual case in the sense that they are value-poled on the
basis of previous learning processes. That is, one person might consider one extreme
(e.g. authoritative) as positive and the other extreme as negative, while for others it

(x) An approaching solution is, e.g. to objectify the assigned value as an attribute
of the assessed proceedings, persons or objects and thus to display values, as
empirical realities which need not be motivated but merely accepted.
might be reversed (11). In order to ensure lucidity in the empirical exploration it seems necessary to make a distinction as to whether the goal of such an exploration is to ascertain to what extent and in what way descriptive determinations are value-charged, or to find out which values have an influence upon a concrete attitude and how a concrete occurrence will be evaluated. The aim of the first type is to find out the existing value-measurements in a population. The second concentrates on value judgments of concrete data, or upon examination of values which cause or influence a certain concrete attitude.

This distinction seems to have been often overlooked, and has led to not a little confusion. On the other hand, such value-dimensions seem to have been often rectified in the sense that one has spoken of qualitatively different, incompatible values (which, moreover, ought to form a value-hierarchy with one another). Compare this to, for example, Deutsch (1966), who used words such as: the "nice", the "good", the "true", etc.

Karl Menger (1934) follows the assessment given here, inasmuch as he postulates - if it could be so termed - a single value-measurement: namely "deserving punishment - worthy of reward", (Menger: bad - good) and supposes couplings of this value-measurement with the most various descriptive terms (true, nice, sad, etc.). The question of the comparability or chargeability of different "value-measurements" which will be subordinate in this approach, offers a separate problem which has not been handled empirically. William Catton, Jr. (1954 and 1956) has had encouraging preliminary results; but essentially no further systematic research has been attempted (12). If it is true that different forms of rewards and punishments exist (appreciation, payment, causing pain, etc.) then it is possible that these different forms will be considered adequate according to qualitatively differently described performances, or attributes which, of course, does not exclude the fundamental comparability or chargeability.

Having to some extent limited the concept of values and graded it within a wider spectrum of definitions, we are now confronted with the task of making this concept useful to youth sociology. Our interpretation of the concept of values implies that the acquisition of values takes place comparatively late in life. That is, an inescapable condition is that secondary (tertiary, etc.) reinforcements have already been learned, i.e. secondary needs do exist, and that on the basis of these needs, concepts are formed on which modes of action ought to be rewarded, and which ought to be punished. The process of learning values, therefore, appears essentially as a process of generalisation of single gratifications and frustrations. This generalisation is accessible in different ways. First, it is possible that generalisations deriving from a single gratification- or frustration-situation have far-reaching subconscious effects; that they are not verbalised at all, and have appeared in verbal form before the adolescent; therefore that they are in this sense implicit. Another possible outcome is that abstract generalisations on the verbal level will be offered directly by adults, and they will be learned on the verbal level without any connection to the concrete actions to which the various values ought to be referred. It may be taken for granted that both forms of learning of values take place beginning at a certain age, and the question is only whether and to what extent the two forms of acquisition of values are
connected. The systematic investigation of this relationship between values verbally
declared and values actually adhered to brings to light a new phase in the learning
process. Naturally, sufficient previous learning on both levels is a prerequisite.
Similarly, it is presupposed that this exploration of the correlations in personal
value-orientations, as well as in the value-orientations of others (above all in those
of the adults) is viewed as being worthy of reward. The rewards which will be granted to
juveniles for such an exploration will be detailed later. For the moment, suffice it
to say that adolescence is characterised by precisely this exploration of the correlations
between declared and attitude-relevant values, because the two different forms have been
isolated during the learning which took place in childhood, and the possibility of
consciously relating both levels occurs in adolescence for the first time (13).

A second moment has to be taken into consideration regarding the cognitive progress.
As Claessens (1962) emphasises, most values and norms are combined with certain
tolerance margins. If a value-adequate behaviour is not learned directly through the
performance of corresponding modes of actions but through symbols, it is very possible
that the values will be learned in a stricter sense than was intended. A child is
certainly excluded from a great many relevant modes of attitude, and he may learn the
value-adequate actions for this mode of attitude only through symbols. However, this
can lead to a hypertrophy of symbols which, without further learning, prevents correct
behaviour in real life situations. Although the reaction-modes learned in this way do
result in acceptable behaviour, they make a use of the permitted tolerance-margins, thus
making possible an attitude which enables the individual to deal with concrete situations.
Here we may refer to an expected differentiation found in adolescents. The more strongly
the learning process of the child or adolescent has been determined through objectivised
forms - historically early symbols such as poetry, literature, text-books, etc. - the more
firmly grounded will be the value-dependence of his attitude during adolescence and the
less he will be in a position to manage the given tolerance-margins, since he may not even
be aware of part of them, or he may consider them to be corrupt deviations from the values.
Therefore it may be taken for granted that for these adolescents youth will last longer,
and it will involve more value conflicts than in the case of those who have been orientated
mainly through real life situations. A striking literary dichotomisation of these two
types may be seen in the figures of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.

In view of these suppositions on the cognitive progress of the children and
adolescents, the question now arises of the significance of this cognitive progress in a
given social structure, and of the interaction between cognitive progress and the effects
of the social structure. Some sociological works dealing with the social contacts of
adolescents emphasise familial relationships, others the sub-cultural relations (e.g. with
peer-groups). There is a major controversy on how much significance should be
attributed to the family and how much to the peer-groups. While a decline, if only a
small one, in the influence of the family, and an equally small increase in the influence
of the peer group is generally conceded, the various authors differ enormously on the
extent to which really durable and attitude-relevant changes will be produced by the peer-
group, and the youth will be influenced by his family, even after adolescence.

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In connection with discussions on values and symbols, this controversy took the form of a debate, concerning whether an adolescent sub-culture per se exists or not. As no clear solution is forthcoming in this matter, we shall have to deal with the problems of an adolescent sub-culture and peer-group relations, inasmuch as they are relevant for the question we raised in connection with values and value-orientations of adolescents. If the special form, the "peer-group relationship" were a characteristic symptom of adolescence (and there is no unity of opinion concerning the significance of this feature), a second more elementary characteristic would seem to be universally admitted by scholars; for a period of time (the length of which may vary according to stratum, region, etc.) nearly all adolescents are faced by a situation in which they are excluded from a range of very important attitude spheres, these being reserved for adults. At the same time, they are in possession of very significant suppositions, abilities, and knowledge for the accomplishment of these activities, and they have also learned appropriate value-orientations, which can be applied in the solution of these problems. Thus the fact is that although adolescents possess exact knowledge and adequate value-orientations for a range of attitude-modes, they are excluded from these activities. In addition, it should be noted that a great many of these activities are considered by the majority of adolescents to be positive goals, i.e. as worthy of reward, and so the mere admission to these activities will be sought as reward and goal.

Alliance of peers during adolescence is probably not independent of the structural nature of society as a whole. Thus, Douvan and Adelson (1966) attribute an immense society. This institution is considered as a forum in which the adolescent elite can exercise their influence. Schools and universities are ideal situations for the formation of an adolescent sub-culture, as they are in constant close contact with peers. The decisive influence, in this respect, of the elementary school, where classes are based on age groupings, has often been overlooked. Bringing together peers in educational organisations, freeing them of some duties during adolescence, and excluding them from attitude-spheres to which they aspire, are all parts of the same process, the same feature of our society. To what extent changes in the value-orientations of adolescents are facilitated or caused by such segregation based on age is the central question in our investigation. Should it be proved that such changes are the rule (or at least that they are frequent), one must then ask what processes are produced by them, and what types of process do they represent? Do they concern radicalisation, inversion, or a re-setting of values? Is it true, as assured by Douvan and Adelson and by Kenniston, that change, regardless of the form in which it appears, will be accomplished by a tiny elite, who will then influence their peers, and thus determine the style and general impression of the generation? Would generations be created in a way that not only phase-specific but also isochrome differences would arise? Among the many more or less speculative answers, the explanations of Ralph H. Turner (1964) seem to be particularly important for us. In his analysis of American society Turner proceeds from the fact that when entering high school, which is to them an exceptionally impersonal large-scale organisation, adolescents do try to maintain the primary group-like relationships to which they have been accustomed. He talks of a "simulation of an extended primary-group society". Distinctive requirements of this "society", which are quite noticeable, are loyalty,
intimacy, confidence, which eliminate the conventional reserve and concomitant insecurity. These attitudes extend to all peers with whom direct contact is made. Since at the high school level an enormous extension of the contacts and the primary-group takes place, need arises to simulate the directness of the relationships. The adolescent sub-culture is segmental, although the appearance of a primary group-like coherence is preserved. Other memberships, bonds and differentiation (stratum, family religion, etc.) will be maintained and remain relevant to attitudes. Rivalry and competition will not be actually eliminated, but merely assessed at the level at which the individual understands himself. And with this a second distinctive feature of this sub-culture is implicit, namely, its ritual character. The standards of the youth sub-culture are not really learned by the great majority, but are dictated (primarily by older adolescents) and thus remain essentially external.

According to Turner, the self-comprehension of adolescents differs considerably from youth sub-culture as it actually exists. He does not deny the presence of such a sub-culture, but he emphasises that membership of it will neither abolish internal differentiations and antagonisms nor change decisive value orientations. The conduct of adolescents towards one another is ruled by a simulated or, more correctly, by a ritualised directness. The adolescent develops a personal "adolescent identity", i.e. the feeling of belonging to a special group, with its own attitudes and with its own views. The symbols of this identity are mainly certain youthful activities (at the American high school, e.g. sport, pop-music, fads). Gary Schwartz and Don Merton (1967) have attempted to elaborate the specific characteristics of adolescent sub-culture. The central criterion in their scheme is the fact that different criteria from adults are used by adolescents for establishing the personal values of a given individual, and status attribution takes place on correspondingly different bases (1967, p. 464 f):

"As we have seen, the process of status attribution is quite complex and does not result simply from objective talents and characteristics, for example, a boy's athletic ability, a girl's physical attractiveness, etc. ..... concrete achievement buttresses the crucial mode of presentation of self in the adolescent sub-culture, and it is this self-image and not the concrete role performance which ultimately interests adolescents. Confidence about one's essential masculinity or femininity and the ability to manifest this in smooth performances in many spheres is the essence of high status in this social system."

Accordingly, characteristics of adolescent sub-culture are:

1. standards of value for the determination of personal values; the values of the individual's own personality.
2. special style of life.
3. special world view.

However, this does not imply that there are no differences between adolescents of various social strata, professional groups, nationalities, etc. Rather that within such limits, specific youth-cultures arise which have a trend towards similarity. Youth is characterized, according to Schwartz and Don Merton, not solely by typical psychological difficulties and a comparatively great uncertainty about its role, but also by inventions
and innovations, which are the manifestations of efforts to solve these problems. However, from the actual activity involved in attempts to solve these problems and whatever results may be achieved, emerge specific attitude-modes, adjustments and value-orientations which constitute the sub-culture.

In summary, we may state that peer grouping during adolescence, since it is affected by certain organisations of adult society, ought not to be viewed as isolated from these structural conditions. Therefore, in examining the influence of formation of groups upon the development of value-orientations, one must take into account the fact that group formation itself is in part an intervening variable. Nevertheless, one ought not to disregard summarily the possible influence of peer-groups, since new forms and methods of problem solving come into being through the various alliances.

Let us call a halt to the debate, and postulate, on the basis of these considerations, a set of hypotheses accessible to empirical testing. These propositions are as follows:

**Proposition 1**

The acquisition of values during childhood and (early) youth takes place on two different levels, namely, the verbal and the non-verbal (concrete action).

**Proposition 2**

During childhood and early youth, values acquired on both levels remain essentially isolated from one another. Explicit (verbally learned) values and implicit (learned through concrete actions) values are not related to each other, except coincidentally and point by point.

**Proposition 3**

The cognitive prerequisites for a systematic exploration of the relationship between explicit and implicit values are lacking in children, but develop fully during adolescence.

**Proposition 4**

Children and adolescents are excluded from a range of important activities. In these spheres they learn the right behaviour essentially through symbols.

**Proposition 5**

As a rule, culturally prevailing norms and values are bound up with margins of tolerance for actual behaviour. Deviations within this margin of tolerance are accepted as proper.

**Proposition 6**

In the learning of proper behaviour through symbols, the permitted tolerance margins are not (or only slightly) taken into consideration. The more children and adolescents learn proper behaviour through symbols instead of through direct actions and accomplishments, the less they are able to comprehend these tolerance margins, and the more they reject actions which actually fall within the margins, but deviate from the "letter of the law".
Proposition 7

Adolescents and, to a greater extent, young adults are from an intellectual and psychical point of view in a position to act in a proper fashion and in keeping with the technical requirements, even in those spheres from which they are excluded.

Proposition 8

When adolescents thrust forward into spheres of activity which are barred to them by adults, they are handicapped in the competition with adults because they are not acquainted with the details of the tolerance margins, and so take either no advantage of them or exceed them, thereby provoking "legitimate" negative sanctions.

Proposition 9

Adolescents and young adults want access to forbidden spheres of activity.

Proposition 10

Adolescents and young adults are subordinated to adults in numerous activities which they consider to be important.

Proposition 11

The exploration of the relationships between explicit and implicit values during adolescence is not only possible but is also bound up with significant rewards. These rewards are products of the fact that this exploration, insofar as it is applied to the actions and values of adults, makes possible a criticism of these adults. Since deviations from the generally accepted explicit values in spheres of activity barred to adolescents and young adults can only be determined (and, implicitly, can only be performed) by adults, adolescents can criticise the adults without fear of being themselves criticised.

11a. This tendency is intensified through insufficient learning of the tolerance margins.

11b. A defeat in the competition with adults (should the possibility of such competition arise) might therefore be easily interpreted as a violation (corruption) of values made by adults.

Proposition 12

Superiors tend to formulate their normative requirements as commands and instructions. The basis for subordinates making demands on superiors is by an appeal to mutual value-standards.

12a. Thus, for adolescents value-judgments are the most important ways of influencing adults.

Proposition 13

On the basis of propositions 1-12, it may be taken for granted that the prevalence of values in the majority of adolescents and young adults is of a type which leads them to judge the actions of others more intensively and more strictly from a standpoint of values than is the case with adults.
13a. On the basis of propositions 8-12, it can be anticipated that from the standpoint of values, adolescents judge the actions of adults more strictly than they do their own actions or those of other adolescents, and more strictly than adults judge the actions of others.

Proposition 14

On the basis of the propositions 1-3, and as an indirect effect of the circumstances referred to under proposition 11, it may be taken for granted that for a minority of adolescents, a value-prevalence exists with regard to personal behavior as well, i.e. attempts are made to bring one's personal explicit and implicit value-orientations into harmony with each other.

Proposition 15

Prolongation of formal education has a long-term result in prolonging exclusion from important spheres of activity. Thus, together with the prolonging of education, an intensification of the aforementioned attitude of adolescents and young adults is to be expected.

Proposition 16

Should certain organizations bring adolescents into close contact with peers, the chances of mutual influencing become greater. However, this would imply that tendencies towards value-prevalence as described above will be intensified. Criticism of adults may be established in this way, similarly criticism of the society supported by a group of interests. The minority who apply the explorations of relationships to their own attitudes as well, and so may lead in remodelling values, will have a better chance of influencing their peers.

16a. The probability of generation formations is increased through the processes described in proposition 16.

Common transmitted values may be viewed as important elements in social continuity, while the co-ordination of certain tolerance margins and toleration of such differences as innovations, are seen as elements of social and cultural change. From this standpoint a far-reaching conclusion on the function of youth in society follows from propositions 1-16. Insofar as adolescents retain transmitted values, they can be considered as a conservative segment of the population, insisting upon the observance of cultural tradition. In a situation of rapid social and cultural change, however, the reverse implication will result. As adolescents indicate the ever-widening rift between the value system and the practised modes of behaviour, they increase the general awareness of this issue, and so promote a change in the transmitted values. Should a real transformation also take place in the particular minority of adolescents mentioned above, then these few will have comparatively good prospects of being successful. Should the transformation not accord with, or even conflict with, these developments (the possibility of which is at least as great), then they would provoke other, more properly adjusted transformations through the adult society. In this situation, youth primarily
fulfils the function of destroying the "cultural lag", i.e. adjustment of the cultural and social system to the technological and economic development. Hence it represents a power for integrating society, since the number of deviations will be reduced by the destruction of the "cultural lag". Attention must here be drawn to the fact that the development does not need to be continuous, and might even pass as an experiment. An adaptation of the social and cultural system may be useful for a certain period, so that there is no need to change. It could happen, therefore, that the formation of generations takes place because the value-prevalence of youth operates conservatively for a certain period of time, while the existing value order is being strengthened, until the discrepancy between values and actual behaviour gets so large that the opposite effect emerges in the form of a "revolutionary generation".
Notes


(2) With respect to the differentiation of life-phases, see L. Rosenmayr and H. Kreutz (1968).

(3) Compare to e.g. the Summary at B. Berelson and G.A. Steiner (1964, pp. 557-584), H.H. Remmers and D.H. Redler e.g. try to prove an extremely high conformity between parents and adolescents.

(4) E.g. Herbert Hyman (1959).

(5) It is not meant here that there have not been any works on generation formation; only that these have been practically without exception of a theoretical nature. A summary on the older works up to about 1963 is to be found in H. Kreutz (1964).

(6) Compare to further expositions by H. Kreutz (1964).


(8) Parsons, Shills and Olds (1951, p. 58 ff) differentiate two modes of orientation of the actor in relation to the situation in which he acts, these being:

1. motivational orientation: "aspects ... which are related to actual or potential gratification or deprivation of the actors need dispositions."

2. value orientation: "Aspects ... which commit him to the observance of certain norms, standards, criteria of selection, whenever he is in a contingent situation which allows him to make a choice."

(9) In most definitions of "value", the concept of reward is not mentioned; rather, one hears such terms as "desirable", or "worthy of aspiration" (Kluckhein) as well as "good" (compare to e.g. Durkheim (1934), Menger (1934), and the summary of the modern literature by Lautmann (1969)). It is a simple matter to point out the relationship between these definitions. If I say that something ought to be rewarded, I mean that the attitude in question is worthy of remuneration, but I do not of course mean that in my opinion, a great probability of actual gratification exists. The insertion of the phrase "worthy of reward" in place of "desirable" or "good" seems nevertheless justified.

(10) With this remark we have pointed to a further, extremely complex problem, a detailed account of which is impossible within the framework of this study.

(11) It seems that the conception of value orientation has a far-reaching connection with the attitude. A more detailed exploration of this problem is, however, not the goal of this work.

(12) It must not be overlooked that apart from the evaluation (decision as to what should be rewarded (punished)) classification of various events and situations might also take place according to the extent to which they are actually aspired to and rewarded, or actually rejected and punished. By simple questioning of preferences, both dimensions will be, of course, hopelessly blurred.

(13) Gesell (1938) and Piaget (1954) also assume on the basis of their empirical data that the child at first learns rigid moral standards and that the systematic confrontation of values and social reality begins relatively late.
3. The interaction between social status and value orientations

Since the 1950s sociology, at least in German and English-speaking countries, has been intensively concerned with youth. This concern has assumed such dimensions that one can now speak of an independent Sociology of Youth, in which thousands of works have appeared, and hundreds of new ones are published every year.

The Sociology of Youth as a field may be justifiably criticised, in that despite intensive exploration of the relevant problems, and a vast array of empirical research, it did not predict the social development of the late 1960s (insofar as youth was directly concerned). The empirical studies which appeared in the 1950s and early 1960s painted a picture of "youth" which indicated to adults that "it" was completely adjusted.

Certainly no unrest amongst youth was sensed; quite the contrary, many critics were of the opinion that this generation of adolescents was too well adapted, too realistic, that there was not enough idealism and value orientation among them. The empirical data available at that time concerning superficial aspects of behaviour led to theoretical formulations and generalisations such as that adolescents and their behaviour patterns were largely dependent on and determined by their families, that adolescents should not be ascribed any potential innovation, and could be perceived as being relatively well attuned culturally to the world of the adults (e.g. in Rosenmayr, 1963 or Musgrove, 1964).

By the end of the 1950s, Friedeburg pointed out a remarkable discrepancy in the analysis of the adolescent situation: that most of the theoretical works outlined a picture of a maladjusted youth, by no means free of problems, whose attitudes gave rise to fears for the stability of the socio-political system. Empirical researches seemed to reveal a contrary picture of a thorough conformist and well-adjusted youth, whose members had no problems; a youth which should certainly not be viewed as a separate force pressing for change.

The empirical research of this time was also characterised by its failure to take historical changes from the realm of scientific research into account (1). In the investigations published at this time in Europe, there are no references to trends or other possible important changes in the behaviour patterns and attitudes of youths. Adolescents were a more or less faithful reproduction of their parents. Social dynamism was not to be expected from this section of the population. The scientific conception held at the time interpreted differences in behaviour patterns and in the attitudes of individuals of different ages as a result of the processes of maturity and education; a corollary of the ageing process. In short, these effects were seen as a natural product of differing ages. Proponents of this ahistorical position went so far as to deny the philosophical validity of the concept of generation. They did not even attempt to differentiate between the factors of age difference, and the historical differences between separate generations. The youth of a given time or epoch was studied as though a simple generalised "youth" existed, appearing in the same form at all times.

The events of the 1960s made it abundantly clear that sociology cannot ignore historical currents. When considering a concrete case, not only must one investigate the effects of age, but also the factors stemming from the particular generation to which the subject belongs (2). The perhaps surprising corollary of this observation is that
the Sociology of Youth can no longer be treated as an isolated, special sub-field of sociology. If in investigating the effects of age differences one has to take into account the possible existence of generational differences, then one cannot study just one age group. All the living conditions of the time or epoch under consideration must be included. The Sociology of Youth is therefore only conceivable within the context of a macrosociological entity, and it desperately needs a theoretical foundation which will extend it beyond youth sociology in the traditional sense.

Acceptance of this approach does not necessarily imply opposition to the Mertonian concept of gradually unfolding a sociological theory with the help of theories of middle range. Merton himself did not mean by a theory of middle range what many authors since him, using his work as a basis, have assumed; namely, the relatively arbitrary imposition of limits on statically conceived areas of research (an assumption which has led to a multitude of individual special sociologies). The essence of Merton's concept was more that with theories of middle range, one can and should incorporate specific social processes; specific events in society. Then, when the different individual processes of the entire society have been analysed in adequate detail, one may arrive at a usable macrosociological theory.

An examination of the empirical youth sociology of the 1950s and 1960s reveals that the issue of discernment was always in the foreground; discernment of similarities and differences between groups of people, and the "explanation" of empirically proved differences through statistical correlations. Also noteworthy is the fact that almost without exception in these studies of youth there were no provisions made to enable one to compare adolescents with adults, nor adolescents at one point in the time with those at another (3). While an historical comparison is certainly difficult, and in an isolated experiment not easy to do, comparisons between adults, and adolescents and children are not so complex, and could have been carried out in many of the better financed investigations. Most of these works, however, are not what one would traditionally call "the Sociology of Youth", because they are not in a position to assert empirically the extent to which adolescents are different from adults or children. It is an almost unbelievable fact that nearly—all the so-called "sociology of youth" explorations only took adolescents into account, and thereby deprived themselves of any possibilities of exact, empirically supported comparisons. After the end of this rather unhappy period of development one is left with the difficult task of deciding where one should theoretically and empirically attack the issues. For the future, there are two concrete postulates to be kept in mind: the first, as has been mentioned, is the historical approach; the question of to what extent and in what form individuals of the same age differ at different points in time, the extent to which differences appear which are due to subjects belonging to different generations, and the extent to which these differences can be traced back to social, political, or economic events which affected either all or part of society.

Secondly, the position of adolescents in society and the relationships between adolescents and adults must be taken into account. In particular, the question of what function adolescents perform in society as a whole must be explored, with particular
emphasis on their function within the society's political system of control. It should be noted that a change in the basic function of youth within society is an ever present possibility.

An analysis cannot, however, cease with the determination of the function of youth for society at large. Structural elements of society which are connected with a particular function or role of youth must also be explored.

True as it is that one must take the entire society as well as historical aspects into account, it is still a mistake to proceed from this viewpoint to a renunciation of the treatment of individual processes of learning, particulars of maturity, and questions of age, and not to include these elements in the scope of a theoretical approach.

In spite of the manifold and heterogeneous details which must be considered relevant for a comprehensive theory, we are still dealing with a theory of middle range, insofar as the subject of the theoretical assertions concerns only part of the process of socialisation, which is moulded by society and has a reaction on the structure of society itself.

Siegfried Bernfeld (1913) spoke of a characteristic Wertprävalenz (prevalence of values) in his studies of youth. With this phrase, he asserts that during the stage meant by "youth" or "adolescence", the individual is going through a phase in which attitudes toward values are particularly important, and during which realism recedes into the background in favour of value-relevant opinions.

It is thus asserted as a characteristic of youth that facts and realities are not the interests and subjects of intellectual discussion nor the motives for behaviour. These are replaced by values and goal-orientations, dealt with and conceived of, in part, in utopian terms.

The process of "youth" is, for Bernfeld, in principle separable from a particular age group. It can take place early or late in an individual's life, last a long or short time, or may even not take place at all. It is relevant, however, that in any particular form of society, youth as a process usually takes place within a certain period of life. The process therefore runs its course under the given social conditions, and (at least in particular social strata) in the vast majority of cases takes place during a phase lasting from about the 10th year to anywhere from the 20th to the 25th.

But acceptance of Bernfeld's concept of Wertprävalenz gives rise to another problem. As has been mentioned, youth at least in the 1950s and early 1960s was found to be decidedly realistic and opposed to value orientations and utopian concepts. There appears to be a direct contradiction here. Bernfeld emphasises the importance of values, and the empirical findings, at least for a short phase of social development, show the opposite.

But in considering the present situation, with respect to students at any rate, one may confirm a characteristic Wertprävalenz, and so more or less agree with Bernfeld. But such an agreement does not ensure the general validity of his thesis. The contradiction mentioned above exists only superficially, because Bernfeld did not claim that Wertprävalenz is an invariable characteristic of youth, i.e. of those roughly between 15
and 21. He was referring more to the concept of "youth as a process", a change in personality closely bound to the prevalence of values. This change takes place in the majority of individuals under well-defined social conditions. For individuals living in similar social economic conditions, it will usually happen in the same phase of life.

We may therefore state that there are times when a pronounced Wertprävalenz is characteristic of youth, while there are also times when (under different structural conditions in society) contradictory behaviour and attitudes will be exhibited.

We need therefore a theoretical approach which will include explanations of the problems of why some times Wertprävalenz can be observed in the entire population, or in certain segments of youth (i.e. students) while at other times the central characteristics are reality, conformity and willingness to adapt.

Bernfeld attempted to find such an approach, and in this connection referred to Freud, in particular to the interplay of somatic and social factors. Of central importance in his explanation of Wertprävalenz is the fact that a discrepancy arises during youth between sexual potential - as he expressed it - and permitted sexual behaviour. A type of psychic motivation is generated by this discrepancy encouraging aggression toward existing society, its devaluation in the eyes of the adolescent, and attempts to enact changes in it.

To deal properly with the phenomenon of youth, then, there are two characteristics which must interplay in a well-defined fashion. The first is the position of youth in society; the second, the development of the sexual life. With respect to the latter, Bernfeld essentially follows in the steps of Freud, and adopts a two-sided approach to the issue of sexual development. The older adolescent is somatically at least fully grown. He can perform all the functions of an adult, but he is hindered by his subordinate position in society. This discrepancy leads him, in a more or less unconscious fashion, to oppose society, to question it, and to accept or develop alternatives of his own, i.e. utopias.

With this approach, an interesting attempt is made to relate individual behaviour with the position of youth in society as a whole. In many respects, however, this approach appears too monistic.

At first glance, it might seem impossible to compare the sexual restrictions imposed on adolescents before World War I and those of today's youth (particularly students). It would appear, then, that just on the basis of sexual restrictions the described lines of arguments cannot be pursued (4).

Nevertheless, one point in this approach appears correct and thought provoking: there exists among youth a particularly sharply outlined discrepancy between aspirations, goals and wishes on the one hand, and actual range of opportunity within society on the other. If one adds to Bernfeld's conception the observation that this is a far more general phenomenon than he claimed, and that the theory does not necessarily lose its validity when not applied to primarily sexual themes, then one has obtained a somewhat wider approach which promises to deal with today's situation as well.
In many respects, the youth of today appear to be a privileged part of the population, and one which, economically speaking, enjoys more favourable living conditions and possibilities than adults. To the extent that this diagnosis is accurate, adolescents as consumers have a relatively large quantity of money at their disposal, and are allowed a relatively large proportion of leisure time. Furthermore, in many respects, perhaps even to a greater extent than adults, they may exhibit deviant behaviour without being punished. However, through the very prolongation of the school system, through the lengthening of the time allotted to education and concomitant concession of personal freedom and space, adolescents are excluded from activities reserved for normal adults in our society.

Of course, these activities are accompanied by trying moments, and are therefore not always viewed in a positive light by adults. Nevertheless, they form an area of freedom of choice denied to adolescents.

The above assertion is unequivocally supported by the following facts: there are no adolescents who have at their disposal power over means of material social production, there are no adolescents in formal positions bestowing on them authority to order others, and there are no adolescents who can make decisions concerning their own work, i.e. in most cases their education, its goals, or the actual material they are taught.

Adolescents are thus controlled by others and dependent on the regulation of adults in essential respects. But as we are aware today, adolescents are not only essentially somatically developed, but are also in command of an excellent intelligence and psychic disposition, which would enable them to assume responsible and complex assignments in a relatively short time.

(It is irrelevant whether adolescents are actually in a position to acquire in an equally short time the detailed knowledge necessary to hold positions of authority. What is relevant is how they perceive the situation, and whether it is apparent to them that once they are in full possession of their physical and mental powers, a real influence is possible, at least over their situation and activities.) In short, I assert here that in today's situation adolescents are excluded from relevant areas of behaviour (Bernfeld confined this narrowly to the area of sexual behaviour). In this sense adolescence has an under-privileged status in today's society.

If the subject of the status of adolescents is to arise, there is an immediate corollary question to be answered: can one speak of a unified status of youth, i.e. of youth as an individual social stratum. This is, in fact, possible (as was assumed in the previous paragraph) if one does not accept a determinist model of strata, but rather follows Geiger's (1932) probabilistic conception. Geiger distinguishes a segment of the population and its co-ordinate stratum as follows: a segment of the population, defined by clear, objective living conditions, comprises a recruiting field for its co-ordinate stratum. The members of the stratum, however, are bound not only by a commonality of objective living conditions, but also by a consciousness of belonging, and similar interests. In other words, the social stratum is a kernel, and as such a source of social movement. The recruiting field of a stratum is a segment of the population which lives under certain conditions, conditions which may themselves be far
from sufficient for the development of an appropriate consciousness, but which generate among those living under them - more or less unconsciously and irrationally - sympathies easily channelled into kernels of social movement.

If one accepts this thesis as developed for the analysis of social classes, one must also accept its corollary in the context of today's situation: the small, active core of the student movement cannot be ignored with a reference to its miniscule membership in relation to society as a whole, and the student movement therefore seen as socially irrelevant. One must consider the possibility that what is involved here is the small core of a social movement, which actually commands a wide circle of sympathisers. Such a circumstance would account for the ability of a small group to act and be effective in ways inexplicable with reference to its direct participants alone.

The assertion is that "youth" in our society is a status in and of itself; that adolescents comprise a segment of the population distinguished sharply enough from the others to be a crystallisation point for the formation of strata, and that the core of such a stratum does develop during youth. Proceeding from this thesis it is logical to examine the social conditions which have led to such a distinction, which are responsible for the creation of such a separate status, and could eventually effect a change, an intensification or relaxation of the status differences between age groups. Here, one is actually dealing with general sociological theory, and it is in this fashion that the sociology of youth merges into a specific aspect of society as a whole.

However, this still does not deal with the question of why values and attitudes toward values are so important for adolescents. And it is still not immediately evident why opposition to established society must lead directly to "Wertprävalenz".

It is doubtless evident that to legitimise attacks on existing relationships, where alternatives to the relationships are not at hand, it can be of use to invoke generally accepted values as a basis for protest. This theory implies, then, that values are important for adolescents because they legitimise a rejection (the desire for which arises due to the adolescent's disadvantageous status) of existing relationship, and allow, either by argument or by direct action, the adoption of positions opposing adults.

Values are well suited to such a purpose; they may be used to confront the actual behaviour of adults. An adolescent may ignore the relationship of his own behaviour to the values, because he is excluded from several spheres of activity. He can level radical criticism at adults without fear of his judgments being applied to his own behaviour, because he is forbidden a priori from "behaving" within these fields.

By comparing culturally accepted values and actual modes of action, the adolescent can demonstrate that the behaviour of adults differs considerably from the very values they profess to uphold. He can hand down judgment without himself being involved. One could say that values are weapons for adolescents, and the more they are excluded from certain realms of activity, the wider the range of the weapons becomes.

Going beyond Bernfeld in this context, one must also consider the cognitive development of children and adolescents. The works of Piaget and Kohlberg are of central importance here. These authors indicate that precisely in the adolescent phase, a
particular state of discernment, a form of thinking is reached, which is not present during
childhood, and which fulfills the requirements for the abstract comparison procedure
described above.

It is essential to note that in our society, the exclusion of youth from a variety
of activities is not bound with an unconditional coercion, and that exclusion does not
always manifest itself in the same form amongst different segments of society. To a
certain extent one can argue that our society tends more and more to cause adolescents
to retain their youth status through long-term effective positive sanctions. The longer
an adolescent contents himself with this status, the earlier he can, as an adult, reach
an advanced and interesting position. If he should abandon youth status after only a
short phase (which is certainly possible), he loses his claim to the positive sanctions,
and may look forward to a relatively low status as an adult. Important and interesting
positions are de facto out of reach.

One should not overlook in this context that the lengthening of the educational
process has as a corollary in this situation, a fact felt most strongly by the
adolescents themselves.

It has been shown that value judgments are essentially tactical means used by youth
to enhance their position. It is important to add that at the same time youth qua youth
is attempting to improve its position: i.e. adolescents are attempting to change the
power relationships between themselves and adults. Here, the goal is the mobility of the
entire stratum, and not of the individual. Thus the better the chances for an individual
adolescent to achieve a rapid personal advance by his own actions, the greater will be
the tendency among youth as a whole to join together as a stratum. Therefore, the more
unconditionally the long educational period is required, the more hopeless it becomes to
combine rapid advancement of the individual with good prospects for life as an adult.
But as the chances to reach a high status as an adult through individual efforts and
adaptation to the adults become smaller, the more intensive will be the striving for
"stationary emancipation", i.e. for improving the status of youth (5).

The degree of difficulty an adolescent encounters in leaving his under-privileged
status is dependent upon the socio-economic situation of his family. The youth from a
working class milieu finds very little opposition to his leaving adolescence, as it is
differentiated in society. His counterpart from an academic family, however, finds it
spectacularly difficult, in fact essentially impossible, to avoid becoming an academic
himself.

In this work, the facts have been intentionally arranged in reverse to the usually
propounded theory. The aim was to make clear that the status of youth is essentially
no longer unalterably imposed, but officially granted, that possession of this status
represents more or less a privilege granted by adults. An individual may break free of
this status, but such action leads to disadvantages, the effects of which continue to be
felt throughout the individual's life.

Considering the fact that values are transmitted elements of a society, and that
they are in part quite old and therefore stable parts of a cultural tradition, it is
elegant to note that the very emphasis on values in actually existing
relationships is normally conservative. Values, norms, and their expression through laws transcend particular situations. Their formulation is such that they may maintain their official validity for decades or even centuries. In our society we practise a method of education which takes children out of real life situations, and socialises them into a traditional world of values. Values and norms are taught in a total rarefied atmosphere, completely separated from reality and actual modes of behaviour. In fact, a primacy of values over actual modes of behaviour is conceded. This circumstance is a further reason for the emphasis which youth places on values. But it also creates a situation in which adolescents reproduce subconsciously in their value judgments earlier social conditions, which actual social development has already outstripped.

One could argue in this context that something like newly developed "progressive values" could exist, and that it is not unequivocally the case that traditional values will be unilaterally (de facto) propagated or defended. With respect to this argument, one must admit that there is no logical necessity for the principally conservative function of value judgments. However, one must add that even in the formulation of new values, the most obvious path, owing to the process of socialisation, is to adopt, adapt, and modify already existing values, and then to apply them for whatever purpose is intended. With their emphasis on values, then, adolescents comprise a decidedly conservative segment of the population. It would, however, be a complete misconception to draw from this statement the conclusion that they fulfil a conservative function in society. In order to estimate correctly the function of youth in society, one must examine one additional structural element of society as a whole: the gap between accepted values and actual behaviour.

The exact determination of this gap in a pluralistic society is naturally much more difficult than in a monistic society. Nevertheless, in principle it is not impossible.

Adolescents choose from a pluralistic array of values on the basis of their own social position, their own status. The particular attraction of "leftist" philosophies for today's youth is therefore essentially due to their position in society.

It can be demonstrated that within a society there may be at different times, different levels of tension among adults between the value and norm system, and actual behaviour. There may be times when the gap between the normative cultural framework and actual behaviour is relatively narrow. On the other hand, there may be times in which the rift widens and finally reaches such proportions that actual modes of behaviour and traditional values and norms correspond no longer. Thus, the function youth fulfils in society is clearly determined by the overall societal context in which it emphasises traditional values. In a society which has already carried out reforms of the cultural framework, and in which the correspondence between values and behaviour is relatively close, youth appears as decidedly conformist. It represents in such a society one of the segments of the population which, in spite of incurring personal disadvantages, supports and affirms the existing system. It will be quite reality-oriented, and adapts relatively easily to existing relationships.
It should be noted that the carrying out of major reforms must lean tendentially more heavily on the younger members of society, since these are not in a position to see themselves endangered by changes in the status quo. One may therefore assume that reforms normally offer greater chances to young adults, and that youthful conformity in such a society has direct socio-economic roots (6).

If, however, the gap between the cultural framework and actual behaviour is very wide, deviant tendencies will be strong among youth, and they will be led through their emphasis on values into sharp conflict with adults. Finally in this type of society adolescents will force a revision of the cultural and normative framework. That is, youth in such a phase of society represents through its maintenance of a conservative position a decidedly progressive force, while during a phase of agreement actual behaviour and values they fulfil a conservative function.

If one accepts this thesis, then it is clear that, according to the conditions of society, youth will appear at one time revolutionary and insurgent, and at another in conformity with the orientations of society as a whole. Their function, then, is essentially that of preventing the gap between actual behaviour, the real system of interactions, and the cultural-normative framework from growing too large. They operate as a constant force to inhibit or rectify too large deviations, i.e. to avoid the condition of pure social anomie. Conversely one could view the behaviour of adolescents as an indicator of the degree of anomie present in the society.
Footnotes:

(1) An example of a work in which the historical perspective was included is that of Friedeburg et al. (1968), which dealt with the free university and political potential of students. But this work appeared after the onset of student unrest.

(2) Meanwhile, this observation has led to a vast array of theoretical works which attempt to relate the concepts of age and "generation", and to deal with them operationally. See H. Kreutz (1969), B. Buchhofer et al. (1971).

(3) See the empirical results in the second part of this work.

(4) Although one should not overlook that the changes (at least in the case of students) took place mostly in the area of norms, and not as extensively in that of actual sexual behaviour, as the work of Giese and Schmidt (1968) unequivocally demonstrates for West German students.


(6) The attempt to propose this sort of encompassing "reasonable" reform in reaction to student unrest may be found for example in the USA in: Instead of Revolution, the Ripon Society (1971), New York.
4. Conclusions

This brief summary of a theoretical approach to the sociology of youth is based on a thorough analysis of the standard theoretical works in the sociology and psychology of youth (e.g. Eisenstadt, Parsons, Erikson, Keniston, Matza, J.S. Coleman, Gottlieb and Reeves, Bourdier, Schelsky, Musgrove, etc.), and the theoretical work in Europe of the last decade. In this text only the absolutely necessary literature references are cited, in order to give as clear and continuous a presentation as possible. The synthesis of the different works was the result of personal consideration of the problems and approaches by the author himself, and not by an eclectic arrangement of citations of individual authors.

Of the general theoretical approaches, the treatment here was aimed primarily at analysis of social stratification (above all the work of Geiger) and the development of values (with particular reference to Bernfeld, Kohlberg, Douvan and Adelston and Keniston). Thereby, the argument aims to connect an historical perspective with elements of the functionalistic way of thinking (e.g. Eisenstadt) through use of the concept of generation (stemming from Mannheim’s ideas). In this respect, however, social antimonies and conflicts are not harmonised, but on the contrary are viewed as motive forces in the social dynamic. Thus, research concerning adolescents is on the one hand performed within the framework of an analysis of society as a whole, and on the other classified under a general theory of socialisation. To provide a clearer summary, the important theoretical points relevant to this approach, but outside their strict boundaries of the sociology of youth, are listed here once more.

- Theory of social classes and strata (stemming from Geiger’s work), including consideration of the approaches to analysis of the processes of social mobility, status crystallisation, status inconsistency, and status differentiation.
- Investigations concerning the role of “intelligence” and science in society (after works of Habermas and Touraine).
- Theories of democracy and democratic participation (after, among others, Naschold).
- Analysis of the concept of generation and theories of social change (Mannheim).
- Theoretical works on the role and function of age groups in society (with particular reference to Eisenstadt).

Concerning a general theory of socialisation:

- Development of values and value orientations.
- The role of aspirations and anticipations.
- Psychoanalytically orientated theory of development.
- Theoretical works on the influence of mass media.
- Theoretical works on the importance of peers and the emergence of an adolescent sub-culture.

In the last decade the development of a theory in the field of youth research in Europe has been very slow, and has led to practically no new insights. The theoretical
discussions are characterised by a sequence of unproductive controversies, which were in part taken over from American sociology. Such a "classical" problem as the question of whether an adolescent sub-culture really exists or not absorbed a particularly large amount of effort and did not lead to much more than arguments about definitions.

At least from 1968 onwards, the question of the origins of student-riots has influenced the non-empirical literature concerning youth as well, and the number of publications dealing with youth and adolescents has multiplied. But the major portion of even these works proceeds from an ad hoc and narrowly defined area of enquiry, which hardly permits productive theoretical work. Conclusions and assertions have been directed and shaped by student unrest since 1967 in the same way that they were previously by the apparent conformity of adolescents with adult society.
PART II

AN EVALUATION OF EMPIRICAL YOUTH RESEARCH

1960 – 1970
1. ORGANISATION AND RESULTS OF YOUTH RESEARCH

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND ITS APPLICATION

The methods and results of scientific work can only be judged effectively in the light of their social, economic and organisational conditions. In particular, suggested measures aiming at a qualitative improvement of research cannot be propounded independently of the financial and organisational limits of the scientific work. A comprehensive analysis must begin by questioning the function of the social sciences in today's society, since the general conditions of research work and those most difficult to change can only be understood in this way.

While technology and the physical sciences take over more and more the role of the most important productive capacity (see e.g. Habermas, 1968 and Touraine, 1971) the social sciences have not nearly attained this status. Their function in today's society is still rather unknown, and therefore open to debate.

A range of authors is of the opinion that the primary task of social research at present is to legitimise with its results political decisions already reached (see e.g. Krutz, 1972). Insofar as it is true that social research in many respects has taken over the former function of ideology (namely, the primarily irrational ex post facto rationalisation of decisions according to personal interests), it is natural that quality of research and reliability of empirical results have become of subordinate importance, and they will remain so as long as the public itself is not in a position to judge the quality of social research. On the basis of these considerations, the following assumptions may be made:

1. Insofar as social research has a legitimising function and those who legitimise certain decisions are not in a position to check the scientific soundness, the quality of research will be of secondary importance, and the scientific standard of such works will reach only an easily attainable minimum level. But if one can prove empirically that the quality of the empirical works does not satisfy scientific standards, then the above thesis is unsubstantiated. But proceeding from the basic supposition, one may maintain that if those who commission research works are not really interested in the application of the results in practice, but only in the scientific legitimisation of their policies, a variety of further circumstances will be observable, namely:

2. "Legitimising research" is relatively poorly endowed, i.e. only enough financial support is provided to allow imprecise works, without the application of really exact techniques.

3. Since data are needed at specific times to support the various decisions the time schedules under which the works operate are very tight, and a continuation of research over years or decades is, at best, only coincidentally possible.

4. In the case of legitimising research, the "customer's" judgment of the research takes place neither in accordance with the predictive value or the validity of the results, nor on the basis of their practical applicability, but merely with regard to their "argumentative value". The argumentative value of a work is determined by
the extent to which its results allow the individual, without danger of contradiction, to prove and scientifically support his policies. Allotment of commissions to certain institutions or researchers is therefore dependent neither on the explanatory or predictive value of the data produced, nor on its applicability to objective problems, but merely on its argumentative value. In the context of the present work (which likewise suffers from lack of money and time), a real testing of this statement is not possible. A range of data relevant to these issues will, however, be presented, which will at least facilitate a statement as to whether the suppositions contradict the actual conditions or whether they are in accordance with them. This fact is mentioned here because it cannot be deduced from an analysis of the individual research, but is based on general assertions.

It may be stated that financial support of the social sciences is ridiculously poor compared to that of the physical sciences, and allows practically no large-scale work (compare with the data on European situation e.g. in the Research Report IV of the Bundesregierung, Bonn, 1972).

The extent to which social research has other functions besides that of legitimising political decisions cannot be stated with certainty. Clearly, however, research aimed at legitimising is unsuitable for other purposes. Those who commission such researches must bear in mind that the results will be neither adequate explanations, nor even half-way assured recommendations for action or proposes.

Should other functions be assigned to social research, as all indicators point to in the future, then there must also be a new approach to research practices. The social sciences seem in fact to be confronted with such a new task.

They will be expected more and more to develop a "social early-warning system" for detection of crises, and to assist in the carrying out of structural reforms necessitated by revolutions in technology.

So, for example, the report of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Science claims (x):

"The Federal Government considers reform policy and research policy as associated. This association is particularly close in fields where, due to technical-structural alterations, the necessity for reform arises."

"Social sciences can indicate social developments and alternatives as well as the necessity for decisions, before structural instability actually leads to damage. A social "early-warning system" can supply information concerning possible future alterations of the society and the environment."

Presumably, we are dealing here with a "progressive" conception of research policy. The intent is to assign to the social sciences the task of assisting with the adaptation of society to a development stimulated by irrational economic interests. Also this

approach implies the beginnings of an understanding that concurrently with these new tasks demanded of the social sciences, new opportunities must be granted. Thus, we may hypothetically distinguish a "conservative" role designation (the function of legitimisation) from a "progressive" one (the function of assisting in adaptation) (x). If one intends to change from the "conservative" definition of the social sciences over to the "progressive" one, then radical changes in finances, regulation and organisation of research are in order.

In the following section, a few aspects of scientific work will be briefly dealt with, which are of central importance in this context. In order to obtain an adequate explanation of the issue at hand, together with a usable prediction (which are from a structural point of view, identical), there are certain long-range requirements for scientific research.

Apart from the financial ones, some of the most important requirements are:

1. Effective communication, as quick and extensive as possible.
2. Possibility for objective testing of researches.
3. Institutionalisation of criticism and control of the quality of the data.
4. Continuity of research work; possibility of carrying out long-term projects; possibility of replications.
5. Giving access to relevant data to the scientists, possibilities for carrying out the relevant observations.

With regard to the present situation of social research, and especially that of youth research in Europe, we may state at the outset that the requirements have been poorly met at best. Relevant assumptions have been dealt with by the author in a 1970 paper "Methodological problems of Sociological Youth Research", Committee for Out-of-School Education and Cultural Development, Council of Europe, CCC/EES (70). That paper is reproduced in the appendix to this work.

The following specific suppositions were made, the consideration of which should lead to a critical evaluation of the empirical research work of the last decade: communication among researchers is to a great extent impeded, which hinders the general view of the individual. Thus, analogous researches are frequently carried out completely independent from one another.

The most important blocks may have been created by the following circumstances:

5. Interchange of scientific information in Europe is very limited due to national, linguistic and political barriers. Thus, national research traditions are developed which take scarcely any notice of one another.

(x) The denomination here is as used by the parties referred to; of those considered, no subjective evaluations are intended here. Efforts at emancipation are essentially lacking in both concepts.
6. Even within the political and cultural areas, further information blocks exist, primarily due to the fact that representatives of different scientific disciplines take scarcely any notice of one another, and their education does not allow them to carry out interdisciplinary work. Moreover, within the individual disciplines different schools have developed, and followers of an individual school infrequently refer to the works of a researcher of a different school.

7. A significant proportion of research executed is secret, and is only accessible to the party who commissioned it.

8. The existing channels of communication are to some extent overloaded, or they are either not at all or not adequately utilised.

8.1. Every year, a flood of publications appears, which devours huge numbers of man-hours, and a significant part of which does not even meet minimum scientific standards. The overloading of this channel of information leads to a situation in which important new works are overlooked, or have only mild effects.

8.2. Communication between theoretically and empirically oriented researchers is dreadfully bad. A vast majority of theoreticians do not evaluate the results of empirical research in a systematic way; and when they do consider them at all, it is in a biased and arbitrary fashion. On the other hand, empiricists do not ground their work in theoretical approaches, and very seldom orient their approaches around a theoretical core of enquiry.

8.3. The existing data resources are neither provided for reference nor utilised by the majority of research institutes. Therefore, comparative secondary analyses are rare and are problematical insofar as a real comparability between surveys is rare.

8.4. Conferences, meetings and international seminars are, for the most part, converted into academic markets, where business is concluded and influential contacts are made. Interchange of scientific information plays a subordinate role at these meetings.

8.5. Due to technical, financial and organisational circumstances, there is a large temporal gap between the execution of a research and its publication. Therefore, published information lags years behind actual development.

The existing situation for opportunities to communicate lessens, on the one hand, the possibility of objective checks; and on the other, is partly due to the very lack of institutionalisation of criticism.

9. Overall, the chances to check objectively empirical works are very limited, since several conditions which would be necessary in order to judge the procedural methods and the results are not taken into consideration from the outset. Furthermore, in many cases, circumstances which were considered in the investigation itself are not mentioned in the publication or in the interpretation of the results.

10. The decision as to whether and in what form research is published is complex, and depends primarily on commercial and non-scientific conditions (position of the author, prestige, access to grants, etc.). The quality of the work is only a secondary consideration. In most cases, professional criticism does not play an important part
in the decision. Technical-methodological details of the research have frequently to be shortened or omitted altogether because of financial considerations. The reviews in social-scientific periodicals attach only slight importance to methodological aspects of research, and seldom fulfil the function of a critical and objective body.

11. The party commissioning the work has seldom the opportunity for or interest in a critical examination of the methods of research or the reliability of the results.

12. Since at present social research is not in any way subjected to detailed, systematic criticism, and since, on the basis of the publications, this kind of criticism is expensive, an exact determination of the standard of knowledge attained is impossible, because the reliability of the existing data cannot be estimated. On the basis of the research at hand, then, inductive generalisations are not scientifically possible.

13. The concepts applied in empirical research are only slightly clarified and are operationalised arbitrarily and used randomly. Even such basic terms as e.g. "youth" or "adolescents" are applied imprecisely and differently.

14. A long-term research project is an exception, as research is dependent on tightly scheduled commissions of different themes.

15. Duplications are almost never carried out. This may be attributed to the fact that on the one hand, it is hard to find people who support such research, and on the other hand, duplication studies do not have high prestige among researchers, and are therefore not popular.

16. The following types of research into adolescents are predominant at the moment:

16.1. Commercially supported research, produced ad hoc in a relatively short period.

16.2. Work produced to complete academic requirements, such as theses, etc., and work furthering an individual's academic reputation, appointment, etc.

16.3. Occasional work carried out when a more or less coincidental advantageous situation for research arises.

All these works have the character of ad hoc research; they are not extended to long-term investigations. With regard to the function and restrictions (temporal, organisational and financial) of these works, it is understandable that in many of them the questions are not carefully considered, possess no theoretical relevance, and afford no basis for inductive generalisations.

17. In the case of commissioned research, the questions are only vaguely sketched by the principal. In addition, communication between the researcher and the principal is impeded to such extent that a direct, practical evaluation of the results is questionable. Moreover, the principal is generally not in a position to judge the quality of the data delivered. The poor means available for the commissioning of research is, therefore, distributed neither efficiently, nor with respect to salient criteria.

18. Means are mostly available for the unearthing of new empirical data. The translation of these data into theoretical concepts on the one hand and its use in the development of practical measures and methods on the other (as in the technical development in the natural sciences) are neglected, and are almost never commissioned.
19. Since the researcher is to a great extent dependent on commissioned work, he attempts to combine his scientific interests with the different orientation of his "contract", the result often being that the goals of neither are realised.

20. If the assumptions referred to above are valid, it is to be anticipated that the majority of empirical works:

(1) do not seek more than ad hoc hypotheses without any greater theoretical or practical relevance.

(2) are carried out according to routine schemes without a great deal of consideration, and little attention is given to the quality of the data.

(3) consideration of validity is disregarded and reliability and objectivity of the data collection techniques are neglected.

(4) in order to endow the data with a high argumentation value in spite of these deficiencies, a great many subjects are called upon, and/or high powered mathematical or statistical devices are applied for the evaluation.

(5) research is presented as though it were representative, which in fact it seldom is. Likewise, high powered mathematical or statistical procedures are not checked with regard to their preliminary requirements and are not applied for the sake of a better interpretation but with the aim of presenting the results with a greater "scientific" emphasis, and in general to gain more professional reputation. Representativity of the investigations and use of mathematical methods serve as an immunisation strategy to criticism.

21. Even in commissioned works, the researcher is denied access to relevant data and relevant social situations. Therefore (and also because of the decreased expenses and simplicity of the process), the data are based almost exclusively upon the statements of persons concerning social processes and situations and not the direct observation of these processes and situations. Therefore, existing "knowledge" is based almost entirely upon verbal behaviour. Measures are rarely taken to ensure a correspondence between the statements made and the actual processes. Already existing definitive means of control are never applied to their limits.

In summary it may be stated that youth research of the last decade hardly satisfies scientific standards, even with a minimum definition. Furthermore, this unsatisfactory situation has been created by the function of social research with its concomitant possibilities and limits. The scientifically unsatisfactory conditions may be traced back to the fact that hitherto social research has been given the job of legitimising decisions. Some signs point to the possibility that in future it will be used to a greater extent as an aid in making decisions connected with necessary reforms. However, certain requirements will have to be met before it is able to fulfil this function adequately. In its present form, social research will soon be seen to be clearly overburdened. Even if one does not want to or cannot attribute any emancipatory influence to it, if one anticipates from it more than legitimisation of decisions...
already reached, a far-reaching reform of social research and its connection to those who actually make the decisions is unavoidable.

The thesis, that in the past social research has had to fulfil primarily the purpose of legitimisation was developed elsewhere (compare to "Kreutz, 1970 and 1972"). This is clearly not a position which can be proved or disproved on the basis of a few facts or some data.

Neither was it developed to criticise traditional practice. It is rather a direct result of considerations on the role actually played by social research in post-war Europe. The basic approach here proceeds from the assumption that if scientific research has a social function, its results and progress will be influenced by this function. The thesis is tested on the basis of the empirical data obtained in this work. Should the data prove to be in agreement with the thesis, a greater confidence in it would be appropriate. Should the data indicate contradictory tendencies, then both the empirical method and the theoretical approach would have to be revised. However, it must be emphasised that alternative possibilities for explanation are not excluded, even if the thesis is supported by the results. One could expect of the thesis formulated here that it enumerates exactly the measures which have been legitimised through research. This cannot be complied with here, since it would require further documentation, time and expenditure. Notwithstanding, a partial answer can be supplied. The approach used here is not intended to imply that a clear connection must exist between each particular research and a measure to legitimise it. What is meant is that through social research an institution has been created, which would be called upon at any time to supply such legitimacies. Moreover, the very existence of social research may be applied as a basis for them, namely in the sense that those making the decisions are enabled to refer to it, to ensure that relevant problems are scientifically investigated. Policies concerning youth, for example, may be supported by the allegation that they are based on scientific research.

The very existence of social research may, then, have a legitimising effect.

The suppositions cited under the 21 points can be derived from the thesis that social research primarily fulfils this function. Therefore, they may also be viewed as explanations. The relationships between the individual theses will thus have to be examined more closely. With the aid of the following scheme, it should be evident that a relatively complex system of mutual dependencies and causal actions is being postulated.
SOCIETAL FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH: LEGITIMATION

Only the argumentation value of the research is important

- Important documents and access are refused to the social researcher
- Only a short time allowed for works - for partly short range purposes; no necessity for continuity of research
- Concepts and areas of questioning cannot be and do not need to be clarified
- No necessity for cooperation of empiricists and theorists
- No necessity for inductive generalisation

- Only minimum financial support is made available, since the quality of the research is irrelevant; methodical checks are impossible
- Only the argumentation value of the research is important
- Secrecy about the results to ensure argumentation-value at any cost and to exclude examination and criticism
- Inability to formulate purposes exactly and appropriately for the problem
- No necessity to make purposes or plans precise
- No necessity to staff qualified experts
- No possibility for the person commissioning the works to judge them competently
- Temporal delay between research and publication
- Meetings serve primarily for 8.4 non-scientific purposes

- No commissions for "technical" development, 18 is application of research for improving methods
- No necessity to control the quality of research, since there is no basis for measures, and examination by outsiders is practically impossible
- No necessity to staff qualified experts
- No possibility for the person commissioning the works to judge them competently
- Support of publications and meetings is determined by non-scientific points of view

- No necessity to control the quality of research, since there is no basis for measures, and examination by outsiders is practically impossible
- No necessity to staff qualified experts
- No possibility for the person commissioning the works to judge them competently
- Scientific criticism cannot prevent unsatisfactory publications or conferences
- Overloading of the channel of information

- National schools blocks to communication between different disciplines
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The conditions stemming from the social functions of social research do not actually confine the individual researcher at all; but they do suggest to him certain modes of procedure, while excluding others from the outset. The organisation of the research and the scientific traditions obviously have effects on scientific work. They do not, however, oppose the social forces that are described; in fact, they reinforce them. In addition, they could be altered relatively easily if social research should be given a new function, which must not be ignored. One must expect that the factors emerging from the present organisation of social sciences will at least cause delays.

If, for example, changes in the basic requirements of social research should be indicated at a given moment, this does not necessarily imply that within a short time changes in actual research techniques will happen. Therefore, it is assumed that quality of the research within the decade of observation has not improved (22).

Several factors prevent a rapid alteration in research techniques and practice. The organisation of research institutes is one such factor. Most of these are organised on a strict hierarchical basis, and those at the top have reached their positions through the application of traditional methods, and have gained their reputation within the framework of the hitherto existing organisation of research.

A further relevant factor is that the majority of researchers follow certain authorities and "opinion leaders" in their field, and there is at times a considerable "time-lag" in the acceptance of the most recent literature. Such a time-lag is particularly evident in the reception of the results of American sociology (23).

The thesis formulated and presented here might be expected to describe in detail which concrete measures have now been legitimised by research. This information, in fact, cannot be supplied since it would have required more particulars. Nevertheless, a partial answer will be given by a further explanation of the thesis. The intent is not to imply that there exists a clear relationship between each individual piece of research and a measure which it supports, but that social research is an institution which can supply such support at any time. Moreover, the mere existence of social research can be taken as a basis for support, in the sense that those who make the decisions can always say that the appropriate problems are being scientifically investigated. Policies dealing with youth, for example, can be supported in this fashion by the claim that they are based on a broad range of research dealing with adolescents. Apart from this basic utilisation of social research and the reactionary effects of this function on research itself, a few concrete suppositions regarding the actual consequences for youth research can be formulated, in particular, that it leads - in part consciously, in part subconsciously - to a number of essential biases in the data (24).

The most important "biases" are:

24.1. The extent of deviant behaviour is underestimated in surveys of "normal" youth by only including adolescents living in private institutions, and many peripheral strata are under-represented in empirical investigations (partly in the official census as well). "Outcasts" are not included from the outset. The extent of conformist behaviour is therefore over-estimated.
2. Juveniles are investigated almost exclusively in situations where they must behave in a conformist fashion (e.g. in school, in the presence of parents, in formal organisations, etc.)

3. Verbal behaviour is investigated primarily, which is particularly susceptible to suggestion, and can be directed by the investigator, by a questionnaire or leading themes in an interview.

4. The questioning and the (infrequent) observations are performed by adults, who come into contact with the juveniles as adults and therefore cannot break down the barrier created by the adolescents' view of themselves (in relation to adults in general).

5. The selection and reaction possibilities of the adolescents are drastically limited in the vast majority of investigations. Usually only reactions to predetermined possibilities are included.

6. The adolescent is not offered any increased opportunity for participation by the questioning. The adolescents' criticism and evaluation of measures already taken are likewise rarely investigated.

7. A formal neutrality and indifference is demanded of the interviewer which within a short time will lead the adolescent to the conclusion that one can hardly engage in serious discussion with him, and therefore only needs to give superficial answers.

8. The vast majority of investigations is based on extremely short and hurried contact between the subjects and the investigator. The statements, therefore, seldom reflect the basic problems of adolescents, and the extent of difficult situations with which they are faced is systematically underestimated.

9. There is a tendency to treat deviant juveniles separately to begin with, i.e. to envisage them in separate investigations, and therefore omit them from a sample of "normal" adolescents. Such a method postulates an immovable barrier, and the extent of the problem of deviation is disguised since it does not concern "normal" juveniles, but only a small number of "criminals and disturbed".

The cloaking of the seriousness of deviant behaviour in adolescence begins with the measures of criminality and deviation, which always appear in terms of a calendar year, and as case statistics (and not personal statistics). For example, it is unknown in many European countries what percentage of young adults face criminal proceedings at some time during their adolescence.

10. Adolescents from deprived environments, such as juvenile workers or farm labourers, are rarely investigated; they are under-represented or ignored in the majority of investigations. Researches, therefore, draw a favourable picture.

The list of suppositions concerning possible effects of the legitimising function of social research could be extended almost indefinitely. But since its examination is
possible only to a modest extent within the framework of this paper, we shall not go any further. In closing, however, attention will be drawn to an important characteristic of legitimising research:

In such works, no practicable alternatives are made explicit or discussed. On the contrary, they either renounce practical conclusions completely, or only offer explanations to one of several possible alternatives (25).
2. THE QUALITY OF YOUTH RESEARCH IN EUROPE

2.1. Methodological problems in the evaluation of research articles

On the basis of a detailed methodological evaluation of a few works, it was possible to construct a system of categories for the analysis of a large number of research reports. Whenever possible, the categories were so constructed that the data concerning the reports could be viewed in the context of theories presented here.

The evaluations of the research articles were carried out for the most part by the author, assisted by three further persons. All evaluations were controlled by the author. Owing to the often only rudimentary information available on the methodological aspects of the works, serious problems frequently arose. In order to test the reliability of the evaluations, twenty works were rated independently by two evaluators. The agreement was excellent.

The good reliability of the rating does not, of course, guarantee that the works were adequately evaluated. With respect to the question of the validity of the evaluations, it is essential to direct our analysis to the actual results and procedures as reported in the publications. It is possible that certain works are, from a methodological point of view, better or worse than as presented by the authors. Determining the validity of the actually published statements of evaluation is no great problem: they are always available, and the evaluations may be tested at any time. The construction of categories can be oriented around a large number of normal, textbook techniques of investigation, procedures and rules (which almost all of the authors of the works evaluated would accept). The validity of the individual categories may be checked in detail with the help of the material which follows.

The decision to direct the evaluations of the works to the actual statements made in them seems essentially justified. Accepting the viewpoint that science implies objective testability and builds on objective consensus, it is justified to use as a basis the reports introduced by the individual researchers to the scientific community. This is the only adequate method for judging a scientific discipline. To take into account the possible discrepancy between the reports of the research and the actual procedures, a sample of researchers were asked to judge their own works in a position paper.

For the statistical criticism of the material, evaluations were worked out in a limited number of categories on the basis of the detailed criticism. This procedure was also tested for inter-rater reliability (see appendix).

The collection of research reports and divisions by research topic was extremely difficult. According to the theoretical context (see part I) of the works, the following thematic areas were selected:

1. Social status (inter-generation relationship, and relations with adults in general).
2. Values and their development.
3. Political opinions and behaviour.
4. Influence of the mass-media (exposure and impact).
5. Personal aspirations and anticipations regarding the individual's future.

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An attempt was made to include all empirical works covering these themes, published between 1960 and 1971 in the member countries of the Council of Europe. Because of inordinate difficulties encountered in procuring the works, the investigation is not complete, information concerning the exact number of works included will not be available until the final report is prepared.

The definition of the individual subject areas is, of course, problematical. Explanations for these divisions may be found in the first section of this work. The selection was based either on examination of the individual studies, or on reference to annotated bibliographies or discussions. In addition, requests were sent to a large number of research institutes for copies of the reports.

The decision as to whether a work was to be included or not was made by the author. The reliability of this decision was also checked by the determination of inter-rater reliability.

The following points were taken into account in the evaluation and judgment of the works:

1. Date and duration of the actual gathering of empirical data

   This information was recorded in order to be able to deal with the following issues:

   (a) time-lag as a barrier to communication (time-gap between data collection and publication), (8.5) (x), (23).
   
   (b) the progress made regarding the quality of the research during the period of observation (22).
   
   (c) temporal aspects of the works (scarcity of time, impossibility of long-term experiment) (3), (24.8).

   The analysis was as exact as the information provided in the works allowed.

2. Quotation presented in the works; by date and place (country) of publication

   Issues to be dealt with:

   (a) communication barriers between nations, disciplines and schools (5 and 6).
   
   (b) time-lag in assimilation of the works; in particular regarding the reception of American literature (8), (23).
   
   (c) discovery of schools (cliques) and channels of communication, and determinations of the influence of individual institutes or researchers (8.1, 8.2, 8.3).

   The validity of this measure is particularly questionable with respect to (b) and (c). However, since one may assume that the majority of the researchers tend also to quote works which they have read only superficially, there is no doubt about the direction of the distortion: the communication will be overestimated, and the blocks to communication will be underestimated. One can, therefore, claim that the results indicate a too favourable condition.

   (x) The numbers refer to the theoretical propositions presented in the previous section, and so reveal the theoretical context in which the issues should be viewed.
3. Region and population

The boundaries of region and population were adhered to stringently. All the limitations made by the researcher were carefully noted.

Issues to be dealt with:

(a) (in the context of the sample) objective justification of the researcher's selection (research performed because the opportunity arose? Mistakes or inaccuracies in the basic conception? etc.) (12).

(b) Possibilities for generalising the results; specific peculiarities of the subjects; differences from other groups? (12, 20).

(c) (with reference also to other factors) care in the planning and carrying out of the investigation. Does the actual population embraced by the survey correspond to that referred to in the results? (20, 21).

(d) Is there a systematic bias in the research, so that particular groups are not included? (12, 20, 21), (24.1, 24.9, 24.10).

The categorisation of these factors for a statistical analysis requires a further simplified summary. The following categories were constructed:

3.1. Comprehensive population: 1. "normal" total population of certain age living in private households of one or several States; neither regional boundaries within the States, nor further restrictions of population according to personal or social characteristics.

2. socially and/or regionally limited population, but international comparison.

3.2. Population of medium dispersal: (relatively broad segment of population)

1. "normal", total population of States, but only members of one sex.

2. further limited by regional and/or social characteristics (i.e. not the entire population, but several of its biggest sub-groups are taken into account, e.g. pupils of 6 types of schools in a country, where 10 different types exist)

3. socio-ecological limitation (only rural youth, only urban youth, etc.).

3.3. Narrowly defined special population:

1. regional narrowly limited population (adolescents of only one area, one city, a few arbitrarily chosen regions, etc.).

2. socially limited population (only students, only apprentices, only female workers, etc.).
Since differences are fluid, it was frequently difficult to differentiate between two categories. In case of doubt, the more extensive population was always chosen. Apart from this abstract categorisation, it was determined how often certain adolescents (e.g. unskilled workers, juveniles living in institutional homes) were investigated at all.

4. / Sample and representativity of investigation

Issues of concern:

(a) Care in the planning and carrying out of investigation; to what extent is there an attempt made to allow for the possibility of drawing conclusions about a wider body from the subjects (20.5)?

(b) To what extent does the researcher, through proper display of his experiment, attempt to make his data useful for explanations and/or prognosts and/or practical conclusions (25)?

Categorisation:

4.1. probability sample, representativity can be claimed
4.2. probability sample, but due to loss of subjects or poor execution of the plan of sampling, not representative
4.3. restricted (one-sided) selection of experts; statistically not representative
4.4. experimental framework in experiment, not representative, but random procedures for group comparisons
4.5. quota procedure with minimal checks
4.6. selection completely arbitrary or not controlled at all; use of volunteers

5. / Refusals and other non-participants

Issues of concern:

(a) Examination of the care taken in the execution of the investigation (24.2, 24.3, 24.4)

(b) Does the loss of subjects lead to systematic distortion in such a way that no (or only distorted) data are available for certain parts of the population? (24.1, 24.9).

Categorisation

The categorisation refers to the size of the group not reached in the experiment. Statements about the direction of the distortion thus produced are rare and not systematic, and can therefore not be included in the evaluation.

6. / Number of investigated persons

Issues of concern:

(a) Taking all other data into consideration, the number of investigated persons indicates both the extent to which the results are definitive and the limits of the use of multivariant procedures.

(b) The size of the investigation and the necessary expenses can be estimated from these data.
(c) Together with the number of investigations, the number of persons investigated can be used as a quantitative unit to estimate the total expense for different types of investigations. The statistical processing therefore not only refers to the number of investigations, but to the number of investigated persons as well.

7. / Data collection techniques

Issues of concern:

(a) With regard to the determination of the validity and reliability of the data, it is of interest to ascertain whether the results are based on the parallel utilisation of different instruments (multiple operationalism; see also Webb et al.) (24.8).

(b) The extent to which the data only include verbal behaviour should be determined (24.3) (21).

(c) The degree of preshaping of the results by the research techniques should be determined (24.5).

(d) The care taken in the investigation and the preparedness to allow for objective checks can, among other factors, be inferred from the presentation of the techniques of data collection.

Categorisation:

Categorisation was performed in the light of the situation of enquiry (see point 8).

8. / Situation of enquiry

Issues of concern:

(a) To what extent is data collected in situations where the adolescents are particularly controlled by adults and, therefore react in a conformist fashion (e.g. enquiry during class in school, presence of parents during home interviews, etc.), (24.2)?

(b) To what extent is the situation of enquiry an interaction between adolescent and the adult investigator. To what extent is the procedure, effective in neutralising preformed behaviour expectations of such a situation? (24.4, 24.7).

(c) Does the situation of enquiry permit a controlled collection of data; to what extent is it standardised? (1, 4, 20.2)

(d) With which interests, offices, authorities or organisations does the adolescent associate the investigation, due to the nature of the situation of enquiry? (24.2, 24.6)
Categorisation:

8.1 standard paper and pencil questionnaire sent through the post
8.2 standard paper and pencil questionnaire completed in organisations without direct control of the enquiry by the investigator
8.3 questionnaire with direct supervision of the answering by the investigator
8.4 unstructured or half-structured interviews carried out by scientifically untrained persons
8.5 unstructured or half-structured interviews by experts
8.6 standard interview in the home of the person questioned
8.7 standard interview in organisation (schools, working places, etc.)
8.8 interviews, without further information provided about the type and situation of the enquiry
8.9 parallel uncontrolled usage of written questionnaires and oral interviews (part written, part oral, according to the situation)
8.10 group discussions
8.11 essay under supervision in organisations
8.12 laboratory study; interviews or paper and pencil questionnaires in artificial settings
8.13 participant observations
8.14 content analysis of documents, publications, etc.

The categorisation was in part guided by the works in question. Therefore, a variety of procedures does not appear on the list (e.g. non-participant observation). Such procedures were not dealt with separately here, since they were not utilised.

9./ Reliability and validity:

Issues of concern:

(a) Are possible sources of error taken into account by the researcher? Does he take into account the possibility that his procedures contain sources of error which could distort the data? (24)
    (20.2, 20.3)

(b) Does the researcher attempt to control the errors, insofar as they cannot be eliminated? (9)

(c) Are for example the statements of adolescents accepted as scientific data and viewed as an undistorted portrayal of actual behaviour and conditions? Does the researcher consider it important to check the extent to which his data correspond to reality? (24.3, 24.6)

Categories: Reliability

1/ the problem of the reliability of the data was completely ignored
2/ the problem was seen and discussed; but no controls were introduced to deal with the errors
3/ the stability of the data was checked by the test-retest method, but the test revealed only moderate stability
4/ the stability of the data was checked by the test-retest method, but the results were unsatisfactory
5/ testing of specific aspects of the investigation; e.g. the situation of the enquiry, the effects of the ordering of the experiment, the reliability of the analysis through inter-rater reliability tests, etc.
testing of the techniques of data collection and instruments through consistence analysis, split-half or parallel forms, etc.

comprehensive testing of all aspects

Validity

problem of validity ignored

problem considered, but no measures taken; reliance on face validity

testing for reliability, but no independent tests for validity

use of a few control questions

approaches to multiple operationalisation

criteria validation of questionable value

criteria validation, which offers the possibility to check on the central aspects of the work

factor analysis of some of the statements, for checking the validity of the dimensions assumed

extreme group validation

approaches to a construct validation

The following information was also recorded:

Whether pilot studies were performed, so that the experimentors could accustom themselves to the procedures; the extent to which item analyses were carried out and the instruments were tested in the pilot studies.

10. Operationisation:

Issues of concern:

(a) Of central importance is, whether the theoretical or practical questions actually play a role and are recognisable in the empirical procedures. (25) (20)

(b) Is the use of particular procedures (and not others) well founded? (13)

(c) Does the operationalisation facilitate a true testing of the theses? Can the data serve as a basis for explanations or predictions? (1, 4), (24) (13)

Categorisation:

10.1/ multiple theme questioning without theoretical foundation

10.2/ the investigation is centred on a particular area, but no explicit operationalisation; interpretation ex post facto

10.3/ there is a theoretical foundation; concentration of the investigation on particular dimensions, operationalisation ex ante and explicit, problematical or demonstrably faulty

10.4/ investigation centres on particular dimensions; explicit ex ante operationalisation of the concepts, although at best a part of the indicators are questionable or distorted by errors

10.5/ explicit ex ante operationalisation; indicators demonstrably appropriately selected

11. Analysis

Issues of concern:

(a) Are the data handled appropriately with respect to their content and formal properties; are they not fully utilised or are they overused in order to apply scientific appearing formal analysis procedures? (20.4)
(b) Is the analysis one-sided and distorted, in the sense that particular aspects which appear in the data are not pursued?
(c) Is the analysis objectively testable? (1, 4, 20)
(d) Are multivariant procedures applied to reveal interactions, intervening variables, etc., or are simple connections sought between sets of two variables and naively interpreted?

Categorisation:

11.1/ Simple linear results; literal quotations and qualitative typologies, not explicitly formed
11.2/ Two dimensional tabulations with a few independent variables
11.3/ Two and three dimensional tabulations or correlation analyses: discovery of intervening variables
11.4/ Multidimensional tabulations, or correlation analyses and scales of a few dimensions and/or building of indices
11.5/ Complex, explicitly formed typologies, used further in multivariant analyses
11.6/ The goal of the investigations is the construction and testing of a scale; the procedure was determined by the directives of classical test theory
11.7/ The use of complex statistical or mathematical procedures; for example variance analysis, cluster analysis, path analysis, models for statistical processes, etc.

12. / Comparisons:

Issues of concern:

(a) Are the foundations laid for exact comparisons between youth and adults?
(b) Is there a possibility for historical comparisons between youths of different time periods?
(c) Is there a panel or longitudinal study, to allow the determination of the development of adolescents?
(d) Are international comparisons possible?

Such comparisons could form a basis for explanations and predictions. If the possibilities for comparison are not noticed, then the researcher is either technically unqualified, or the aforementioned scientific goals are for him secondary and unimportant. (1, 3, 14, 15)

Categorisation:

12.1/ Adolescents of different countries at the same point in time
12.2/ Adolescents with adults
12.3/ Longitudinal study or panel
12.4/ Historical comparison: adolescents of different time
12.5/ International comparison of socialising forces relevant to youth (mass media, etc.)
12.6/ Exact comparison with the results of other surveys within the same population, but international or historical comparisons are not possible
In addition to these points, the research topic and source of finances are also included in the detailed evaluations. The ways in which the issues were approached is of course of greatest interest.

They were categorised by the general issues dealt with, as well as by the concrete theoretical or practical problem which gave rise to the work.

The information available on finances is unfortunately cursory and incomplete, so the analysis cannot provide the full data.
2.7 Detailed analysis of three typical research reports

To produce an adequate judgment on the quality of the research, execution of the methodical analysis on three levels seemed to be necessary.

Statistical analyses of a great number of research reports were considered absolutely necessary, in order to avoid an arbitrary selection and an unsystematic use of different criteria of evaluation. Nevertheless, the value of such a statistical analysis is limited, since the numerous possible methods have to be squeezed in only a few categories.

A more detailed methodical evaluation of the individual works seemed desirable. Since more than 100 works had to be evaluated, these evaluations had to be kept relatively short and for the sake of comparability, they had to fit in with prefixed criteria. A more precise discussion of the methodically relevant decisions of the respective authors, therefore, was not possible on this level. For this reason, in the next section three detailed methodical analyses will be presented. When choosing these three works, attention was paid to the comprehension of heterogeneous types of researches. For the sake of an accurate linguistic judgment of the indicators applied, two works in German (and one in English) had been chosen. Questions and questionnaires which appeared in different languages could unfortunately not be analysed in the exhaustive form applied here, since the strength and weaknesses of the questions and categories of answers could, due to linguistic problems, not be adequately judged. The procedure by which the present work was developed was the following: some twenty detailed analyses were carried out; then, on the basis of these analyses definitions of a range of criteria were enabled, these affording the basis of brief judgments. These verbally formulated concise judgments enabled the third stage, i.e. the arranging of the individual works into only a few categories, thus laying the ground for the statistical analysis.

The following section intends to fulfil two different functions in this context; to enable the reader to follow the development of the evaluation process on the one hand, and to explain and to reinforce the necessarily scanty judgments on the numerous works by means of the analyses on the other.
1. A typical "panorama - study"

(A) POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Blücher (1966, p. 337) is concerned with the question of the size of the group "which is actually engaged in, interested in, and frequently occupied with politics".

In order to determine this, he combines the results of the following three questions:

(1) interest in politics
(2) intentions of joining a party
(3) self evaluation concerning personal political activity

All those who chose the categories of highest intensity (very much - quite definitely - often) for all the three questions, were designated as really active. Those who considered it unlikely that they would ever become a party member, and were in addition not interested in politics on principle or because of lack of time were designated passive. The large middle group, comprising 72% of the total number of persons contacted was designated "inactively interested" (Emnid, 1966, p. 197 et seq.).

Blücher interprets this data as follows:

3% of the persons interviewed belong to the actively interested group for whom politics is a vital interest, 72% belong to the group of inactively interested for whom politics is one sphere of interest among other concurrent ones. The group of uninterested includes 25% of the persons contacted. This group declines to join a party, and is not interested in politics. Nevertheless, some 10% of them feel that "one ought to deal with politics".

An impartial reader may raise the question of how far "political activity" has actually been measured by Blücher with these questions. Such a criticism of the validity of measurement could be couched in generally accepted scientific terminology. This procedure, however, is very fussy, and it therefore seems suitable to choose a more economic process, and compare the author's conclusions with the nature of his indicators.

Blücher propounds the following theses (1966 p. 343 et seq.):

(1) All forms of political behaviour (also of non-political, in this instance) are orientated around the power system of democracy, as practised in West Germany.

(2) The reasons cited by those who do not actively participate in politics do not contain any expression of opposition to the system.

(3) "Young people are 'open' to the democratic form of life."

(4) In spite of these facts there exists an estrangement from the intellectually pretentious political life.

"From the politically indifferent great majority" the vast majority has obviously no "relation to politics". But they also reveal no "aggression toward our political system" (p. 342).
The conclusions are based upon the above-mentioned three questions, as well as a fourth supplementary one aimed at dealing with the motives of those who reject party membership, and which therefore was put only to those who actually reject it.

Noteworthy regarding the chosen operational definition is that intentions, opinions, and interests are designated as activities, and no observable actions of adolescents are taken into account. In two of the three questions, "politics" is referred to as an abstract conception, without further explanation. The third is concerned with party membership. However, to equate party membership with political activity is by no means acceptable, as there is a significant portion of completely inactive party members, as well as political activity outside the party framework (e.g. in trade unions - or in associations). Political activity, independent of parties, is even rewarded by the system as in the case of independent "expert ministers". The question designed to determine the intensity of political involvement is by no means suitable for this task. It is worded (Blücher, p. 326) as follows:

There are today various opinions concerning attitudes towards politics. Which of the following points of view would best correspond to your own?

I do not concern myself with politics
One ought to be concerned, but one has no time
I deal with it occasionally
I deal with politics frequently
I am very much interested in politics

The question deals, then, with the point of view, and not with the actual activity.

The fifth category, which supposedly aims at determining the maximum amount of activity, is not directed at activity at all, but at interest in politics. In the second category, external factors are taken into account, but not in any of the others. In short, the question deals with four different dimensions:

1. attitude toward political activity (probably a normatively determined factor)
2. interest in politics
3. frequency of dealing with politics
4. intensity of the effect of external restraints which inhibit political activity

It is impossible to state which points of view determined the individual adolescents' answers. A classification of the subjects on the basis of this question is, therefore, entirely worthless.

Similarly, the question concerning interest in politics is inexplicit, since one does not know the subject's concept of politics, regardless of whether he answers yes or no.

In the case of the supplementary open question given to those who had not joined a party, the answers expressing a fundamental disinterest in politics were handled together with those containing merely a rejection of party membership.

Since these two groups comprise some 30% of all those interviewed, a considerable degree of uncertainty is created by joining them. Quite obviously, the questions themselves and the form of their evaluation do not enable definitive statements on the political activity of youth to be made. There is not even a clarification of the term "political..."
Not a single concrete activity which might be performed by an adolescent specifically acting as an adolescent is explored. Similarly, no reference is made to the adolescents' preparedness to take part in political activities, or the direction this activity might take.
Blücher (1966, p. 312 et seq.) attempted to deal with the "intensity" of information on politics and the sources of this information through the following four questions:

1. Where do you like best to get your information on politics? (L11) (+)
2. How often do you read newspapers? (C5)
3. How often do you listen to the news and commentary on the radio? (C5)
4. How often do you look at political programmes on TV? (C5)

Gradations of the last three questions were weighed arbitrarily (0-4 points) and from the total count of points, an index (weighted arithmetic mean) of "intensity of information" was calculated.

The three questions regarding the frequency of use of various mass-media did not refer to any specific period of time. The answers were based on the subjective estimate of those questioned, and are, therefore, extremely susceptible to distortions due to norms and social desirability. Important media offering detailed information, i.e. books, are not included at all. Similarly, the frequency of discussions on political themes is also not included.

In the case of daily papers, the question was not directed to the reading of political columns, while in the case of TV and radio specific reference to politics was made. Hence, the three questions are not equivalent, and their amalgamation into a single index is not justified. Simple frequency of reading a daily paper is no measure of the intensity of information received by an individual on politics. Similarly, listening to news on radio or looking at equivalent programmes on TV does not necessarily mean that attention is really paid to political themes. Therefore, intensity of exposure to mass-media cannot be estimated on the basis of these questions. The question concerning preference for particular media as sources of information on politics is asked in an unspecific fashion. There is no possibility of determining why the subject chooses one media over another.

Does it depend for instance, on the particular credibility of the media, the staging of the transmissions, their objectivity, or conversely on their partiality, etc.

In other words the function of the various media in the processes of information and influence cannot be explored by this simple method. In summary it can be said that neither the channels of information, nor the relevant sources of influence, nor the actual intensity of the information can be comprehended by the questions used.
(C) POLITICAL ATTITUDES

As previously explained in detail, the term "attitudes" is too wide to apply directly for a concrete empirical analysis. It is advisable to differentiate at least values and concepts as evaluative and cognitive elements from attitudes.

With regard to the governmental power system, Blücher (1966, p. 344) posed several questions to the adolescents, most of which were not clearly directed at cognitive or evaluative aspects. The two aspects were not separately handled in any context. On the basis of the results of his questions, Blücher comes to the following comprehensive result:

Interest in politics is at the same time interest in democracy and affirmation of the existing political reality in the West German Republic. There are no differentiations in this context. Democracy and policy are experiences as a unit. (Blücher, 1966, p. 358)

The author bases this conclusion on the fact that overall fully two-thirds of the items chosen were those interpretable as democratic. It must be added here, that the author does not base his work on an explicit concept of democracy. To check the justification of his conclusions, one is compelled to determine which implicit notions he has attached to his questions. The most detailed instrument adopted by him was a battery of six statement pairs with five possible answers each. These are:

1. political responsibility must be held by mutually political responsibility must be held by a single person
   (1) single person

2. it is better if decisions are made by in general the best result is obtained, when decision is left to a single person
   (2) several persons

3. many advisers are good for the State a single energetic man can produce more than 100 wise men
   (3) State

4. the people know what is good for them nowadays, people must be forced to do what is best for them
   (4) them

5. discussions dealing with varied opinions discussions dealing with varied opinions create chaos
   lead to the best solution (5) lead to the best solution

6. co-operation of the citizens creates energetic measures create peace and order
   an organised co-existence
   (6) co-existence

According to Blücher’s assertion, these questions should facilitate the contrasting of democracy and dictatorship. However, this could not be satisfactorily realised for several reasons:

In questions No. 1 - 3 it is obvious that merely the form of decision made by a single individual is contrasted with those (very different) possibilities, where decision is made in common by several individuals.

It is also completely overlooked that dictatorship is not necessarily imposed by a single individual. In none of the six items is any notice taken of the fact that in speaking of democracy, it is essential to know how the intentions of millions are collected, taken into consideration and transformed into collective action. Some contrast pairs have been chosen carelessly, since they are not mutually exclusive, e.g. co-operation and energetic measures.
If the "democratic" alternative was actually chosen by two-thirds in these questions, it implies at best that the majority feel resentment toward dictatorship of an individual and that intolerance and authoritarian attitudes, if present, are not expressed openly. Obviously, dictatorship is implicitly conceived in the questions as politically "right", and so there is no possibility of discovering attitudes towards various forms of a "left-wing" dictatorship.

The items could have been adapted as a scale for measuring authoritarian attitudes; they have the advantage of being not one-sidedly formulated, in contrast to similar techniques (1). At the same time, however, they have the disadvantage of being too general and too abstract, and their limited number does not allow for any differentiation of attitude dimensions. The statements used are so abstract, that affirmation in principle, even from quite different political standpoints, is possible; the extent to which they apply in particular to the democracy as existing in West Germany in 1964 cannot be determined and agreement with the "democratic" alternatives does not imply approval of the power structure. What is involved here is a group of abstract, formally democratic concepts, which could in principle also apply to a dictatorship.

The second instrument adapted by Blücher consists of a "staple scale", as he calls it.

The following question was asked:

"What sort of position would you take regarding our present form of government if it were attacked in a public discussion? Please mark it on this scale card. If you would defend the State vigorously, please mark the top white box; if you would reject it, then the bottom black one. The other possibilities lie between these extremes."

A card as shown below was handed to the subjects.

![Staple Scale Card](image)

(1) Which does not necessarily exclude the affirmative answer effect; for instance, if all the questions were presented with the "democratic" version first. Unfortunately,
Blücher is very proud of his method, since in his opinion the subject is in a position to choose the preferred item without being biased by verbal suggestions.

Objectively, however, it is clear that a more vigorous influencing in favour of the State through a question is scarcely possible. In the formulation of the question it is obvious that it is always our State which is attacked. Thus, in- and outgroup mechanisms are put into operation which stimulate a defence of the existing State. In addition, the alternatives to the symbols "plus", "white" and "top" or "minus", "black" and "bottom". A better text book example of suggestive questions would indeed be difficult to find.

A third instrument used by Blücher is the following individual question: "Nowadays, each adult can take part in the election of the 'Bundestag'. What significance has this election in your opinion for the individual elector?" (L4)

Two-thirds of the subjects chose the following alternative:

"Through the election one takes part in the determination of future policy."

This question is relatively concrete, and therefore allows for more distinct conclusions than those mentioned previously. It must be borne in mind, however, that the question is not related to the subjects themselves. At the time of the interview, the majority of the subjects were not entitled to vote. Nevertheless, the question could have been raised as to what significance they attributed to the fact that they would be able to do so in a reasonable time. The result might be founded partly upon realistic observation of the surroundings, and partly upon projections of the individuals' ideas and value orientations, and are therefore not unequivocally interpretable. Moreover, the extent to which the subject believes in the participation of the individual in politics is unknown. Does he believe that the elector can choose from fundamentally different alternatives, or, merely from inside the narrow frame of some predetermined ones? Do adolescents think that the influence of electors is relevant, or are the desires of electors considered only superficially? Since these and other important questions are left unanswered, the conclusion that youth thinks and acts in conformity with the system is unjustified.

The fact that, although all the indicators in themselves are deficient they gave independently the same results, would speak in favour of Blücher's thesis. This argument would be acceptable if the distortions inherent in the various questions were of the same nature, as is the case here. We have been able to show in analyses of the individual question that each of them, in many ways, draws a too favourable picture of the existing political regime. Even if one accepted the assertion that some two-thirds of those contacted have a rather positive opinion, the conclusion, that youth is in conformity with the system cannot be so simply accepted. One ought at least to know how certain the individuals' views are, i.e. how susceptible and how prepared they are to show their political convictions in action. Further the actual existence of this two-thirds majority could only be confirmed by secret voting. One must bear in mind that the individuals' attitudes and opinions are affected by the situation. Adolescents give (without necessarily lying) different views to an adult interviewer than to peers. By using interviewers who are not members of the subculture in question, some social researchers have succeeded in "proving" that certain subcultures (such as adolescents) do not exist at all. But the subject will not actualise the conceptions and values of "his" subculture to an outsider and so his answer will also not hint at such...
Further, it must be kept in mind that persons having different views may be collected in different groups and organisations in such a way that the majority of the whole population is not necessarily represented by the majority in the most social aggregates.

In short, the determination of a certain attitude distribution over the total population is in itself not a sociological finding, and direct conclusions based on the results of opinion questions are too hasty, if not completely misleading.

Blücher only dealt peripherally with attitudes to various political institutions and organisations. He does cite from a range of previous explorations some results of questions demanding overall judgments of different political parties, and on trade unions and employer associations. However, a differentiated analysis of the adolescents' reactions to the established authorities is lacking. Blücher considered the union and association membership of adolescents (p. 170 et seq) in another context and concluded that number of adolescents included in organisations had declined to a greater extent. "The interesting discrepancy is that membership of trade unions and political groups decreased by half in the period between 1953 and 1964, while on the other hand young people have become politicised in the sense of modern democratic politics in exactly the same period." (p. 358). On the basis of this finding he comes to the following conclusion:

"The form of government is unequivocally approved, but there are grave reservations about political life itself" (p. 358).

It is doubtlessly relevant that during the period in question, there was a considerable drop in membership among youth organisations. However, Blücher supports the supposition that there was a concurrent increase in affirmation of the existing regime (re criticism of concrete institutions) by a methodologically deficient comparison. He refers to a single question; whether one would be prepared to defend "our present state" against verbal attack during a discussion; a question which has already been criticised exhaustively. Concerning the temporal comparison, there is the additional problem that these listed questions were given with 8 gradations in 1953 and with 10 gradations in 1964. In his analysis Blucher reduced the 10 gradations to 8 by combining the extreme categories at both ends. Since it is known subjects do not like to choose extreme items as a rule, it is likely that such a comparison will yield distorted results.

Moreover, probability samples were never drawn, and consequently the comparison is fundamentally untenable.

Blücher noted the permanent decline in the number of members of youth organisations, indicating a disintegration of youth from the adult society. But as we have seen, he neglected it in the exploration of political attitudes and political behaviour to the extent that his conclusion speaks of an increasing integration of adolescents.

Blücher attempted to deal with the stability of political attitudes and their relevance for actual behaviour with the following single question: "Four young people were talking about how they make their political judgments. Which of the opinions in this list corresponds most closely with your own?" (L4)
The items in this question are inconsistent, not detailed, and not mutually exclusive. Experienced democratic opinion formation is assumed by Blücher in the case of those adolescents who chose the statement: "I examine all attainable information systematically, in order to develop a judgment" (22% of the subjects). On the other hand, those choosing the statement: "My opinion is pretty firm. I know what I want", were denoted as inflexible. However, these two attitudes by no means exclude each other. The statement "I listen to and pay attention to what is said by others" (25%), classified by Blücher as "open opinion formation", could be combined with both types and is no alternative. The fourth item, "I am not interested in politics" opens a completely new point of view. In the statements, interest in politics, form, intensity and depth of information, as well as susceptibility to influence by others or the mass-media are dreadfully mixed up. Blücher's attempt (1966, p. 356 et seq) to draw conclusions from these questions is a hopeless undertaking.

The task of the sociologist would be to distinguish susceptibility to emotional or ideological influences from preparedness to revise one's personal opinion on the basis of facts, and the separate treatment of the two problems. Little susceptibility, however, does not necessarily imply rigidity. Similarly, absorbing a great amount of information does not exclude the possibility that one's opinion will be formed primarily on the basis of irrational influences. Hence, the question chosen by Blücher does not assert anything concerning the degree of cognitive and evaluative stability of political attitudes.

The situation is nearly the same regarding the exploration of the behaviour relevance of the declared attitudes. Regarding this problem, Blücher has at his disposal the answers to several questions, but none of them deals with the relevant problem. He can also refer to the answers to the following question put to grammar school pupils and soldiers on active service in the year of 1965: "Is there, in your opinion, any idea which is worth committing yourself to?" Since a "free, democratic order" was considered by 42% and 35% respectively to be such an idea, and the basic human rights by a further 14%, Blücher believes himself to be justified enough in concluding that adolescents are without exception prepared to commit themselves for certain ideas, and furthermore he considers these ideas to be more fully realised in West Germany than in many other political systems. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that the terms "democracy" and "freedom" are so abstract that they could, in different cases, be associated with opposing ideas. The results of a question concerning "personal preparedness to take up arms", is considered by Blücher to be further empirical support for his view that "young people .... (identify) themselves with the democratic manner of life so strongly that they are prepared to defend it against threats" (p. 362).

In this case too, four alternatives were presented which were to reflect the degree of "preparedness to take up arms". The most positive alternative was: "I will defend freedom with arms", while the next one was already: "This is a task for experts" (p. 363). Considering that the most positive alternative was chosen by nearly 50% of those questioned, it should be noted that none of the items expressed an acceptance of military service under compulsion. Since each of the other three questions implied a complete rejection of military service, it is likely that many who accepted only under compulsion and external pressure are counted here as active defenders of a given governmental system. In all probability, different questions would have yielded different results.
In Bličer’s work no relation is shown on the empirical level between goals, plans and expectations of the individual, and his political attitudes. Questions regarding subjective aspirations are scarce, and corresponding cross tabulations of the questions on political opinions and behaviour are totally lacking. The following question may to some extent serve as a substitute for this deficiency: "And now I should like to know your opinion of how one advances in the world nowadays". To this question six possible answers were provided in the form of paired comparisons. Regrettably, the results of the pair comparisons were not adequately analysed. Computing a pair comparison scale yields the following ordering of importance, which was aligned with the individual abilities or features.

1. abilities
2. diligence
3. education
4. influential connections
5. adaptability
6. position and financial situation of the father

On the basis of these results and the finding that nearly all adolescents anticipate positive economic prospects, Blücher concludes: "The great majority of young people feels well-off and secure in its social surroundings. They have grasped some important structural elements of the business community, and a clear majority believes in the reality of social equality." (p.376)

Here again is a one-sided over-interpretation of the results. Apart from the fact that just the anticipation of a positive development of the economy as expected by more than 80% might be a two-edged sword (namely when it does not come about, if only temporarily) the question must be raised whether the results of paired comparisons can be interpreted in the sense cited above. The entire matrix of pair comparisons appears as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position of the father</th>
<th>Adaptability</th>
<th>Influential connections</th>
<th>education</th>
<th>diligence</th>
<th>abilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential connections</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diligence</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abilities</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pair comparison scale: 0, 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, 4.1, 5.1
Clearly, the position of the father is considered by 21% to be more important for advancement than individual abilities, 36% consider education more important than abilities, etc. These results do not all support the view that there are no social restrictions on advancement and success. For adequate interpretation of these data, the primary factor to be kept in mind is, that at any given time the question was which one of two items was more important. Notwithstanding, the subordinate feature might also be considered important, and in this case (also with respect to the adolescents' opinions) ascriptive features and quasi privileges such as education, influential connections, and social descent become relevant at the same degree of proficiency and diligence. However, comparative judgment here is very inaccurate, since one ought to know to what extent deficient abilities will be compensated for by connections, adaptability, position of father, etc.

In addition, a further objection has to be made in that when speaking of prospects for advancement in general, most of the subjects think merely in terms of the narrow segment of the status hierarchy relevant to them, e.g. a worker looks forward at the utmost to an advancement to workshop master. In such a case the perceived actual social boundaries do not even enter into the answer.

Regrettably, the results of these questions are also not cross tabulated with the answers to the questions on political attitudes, so that nothing can be said about the effects of perceived prospects for advancement on political behaviour.
2. A typical focused study

The work of Jaide and associates which was published in 1970 under the title "Youth and democracy: Political attitudes of West German youth" is an example of a social psychological work carried out with the traditional methods of attitude measurement. The authors, however, do not carefully consider the range and problems of classical techniques of measurement, and apply them in a markedly uncritical fashion. Individual questions were not much used. Instead, the authors attempted to construct batteries of at least 10-20 questions to the variety of themes they considered important. In total, more than 400 individual questions and items were used in the main study. These were chosen from a larger selection on the basis of a pilot study, and an item analysis performed on the results of that study.

The authors included an eleven-page theoretical section in their exposition, which, however, they failed to relate to the empirical work. The operation does not in any way correspond to the theoretical discussions, in fact, there is no operating of the theory. The items were selected on a purely pragmatic basis. The questions and statements were collected from the previous works of these and other authors, and arbitrarily supplemented with new items. Nowhere in the publication is it made clear which items were expected to measure which dimensions. The assignation of items to theoretical dimensions was performed ex post facto on the basis of a factor analysis. Therefore, this investigation, contrary to the intentions of the authors, is not suited to the verification of theses. Since the themes were not clarified at the outset, since the assumed dimensions were not translated into concrete research procedures, the results yielded are of hypothetical value at best. As has already been implied, even this hypothetical value is questionable, since the factor analysis, on which the majority of the evaluation and interpretation was based, was performed over an extremely heterogenous population. Separate factor analyses were not performed for the relatively homogeneous subgroups. In any case, the claim of the authors to have clearly verified their seven basic hypotheses must be refused as being methodologically untenable.

After several hundred items, questions and statements were collected in the manner described above, a pilot study was performed. Factor analyses were carried out on the results, by means of which a variety of questions was separated. The main criteria in this process were the "difficulty" and power indices. However, these criteria were again applied in a totally uncritical fashion. For example, all questions or statements displaying a "difficulty" index of under 20 or over 80 were separated. That is, when a question was answered in the affirmative by less than 20% or more than 80% of the subjects, it was automatically not included in the final catalogue of questions. The result, of course, was that extreme political positions were no longer even taken into account. One could say that the 5% barrier, applicable in actual politics, was raised in an almost monstrous fashion here. The authors then proceed to present as an important result the finding that extreme opinions are not to be found among adolescents. This so-called result is a pure artefact of the procedure. When the items which could differentiate among the extreme areas are excluded a priori, it is naturally impossible to separate extreme groups and extreme political views from the majority.
This procedure again represents an example of a technologically oriented methodical approach, which totally disregards considerations of content, and therefore leads to gross errors and nonsense. Since all items were presented in the form of yes/no dichotomies, a strong distortion is likely, due to content-independent reply tendencies. These tendencies, e.g. acquiescence, social desirability, etc., are dealt with in detail in more recent literature. Jaide et al., however, apparently did not consider it worth the effort to concern themselves with such possible sources of distortion. Their lack of scientific responsibility regarding the choice of items is simply absurd:

"The persons questioned are therefore responsible for the choice of items in the item analysis" (p. 19).

This statement reveals an almost painful naiveté. The researcher cannot simply turn the responsibility for the choice of items over to the persons questioned. On the contrary, he must make certain that he has obtained validity in his measurement, and can further ensure this validity through different criteria or at least references. In short, the selection of items was totally pragmatic, and completely unrelated to the theoretical dimensions which were supposedly measured. A true operation of the theories, was not therefore carried out. In addition, it must be noted that the procedure followed in the further item analysis was also totally uncritical. It was oriented around purely technical considerations, and therefore led to nonsensical conclusions with respect to content. The analysis of the results and the majority of the publication centres on these factor analyses. But since such varied groups of adolescents were questioned (from three different types of schools, and both sexes, and from two very different regions of West Germany), it is a moot point from the outset whether a factor analysis can be applied over the entire population, and whether the results of such an analysis have any meaning at all. Factor analyses for fairly homogeneous subgroups are lacking.

Before dealing with the analysis and in-depth results in greater detail, the theoretical questioning must be analysed further and expounded more thoroughly. It has already been noted that most investigations dealing with political opinions assume that the concept "politics" is predefined, and do not outline it precisely nor define it operationally (4).

The authors at least see the problem of imposing general boundaries on the concept of politics, and attempt to posit a nominal definition in which the discussion is limited to democratic politics. Naturally, as can be easily demonstrated, the same problems apply to the concept "democracy" as to "politics". Most investigations lack a definition based on content of what is or can be viewed as democratic. Jaide and associates do not, then, attempt to define "politics", and then proceed to differentiate between different forms of politics. Instead, they only define "democratic politics". Thus it is already impossible at the level of definition to determine what should be categorised under the heading "democratic", and what under "politics". The authors write: "Abstractly formulated, democratic politics is the embodiment of the measures which, under democratic norms, institutions, and procedures contribute or should contribute to a parliamentary decision, and which are to be carried out by a parliamentarily constructed government. The preparation for carrying out and control of such State and socially relevant measures comprises the occupation of the parties and organisations, as well as the communications
It should first be noted that the word "democratic" appears within the definition of terms. Thus, since it is defined by "democratic" norms, institutions, etc., it is still not clear what "democratic politics" is. The concept "democratic" remains an empty formula, not only in the general abstract definition, but in the entire range of the experiment. Some restriction is made, insofar as a parliamentary government is mentioned. But how such a parliament is created, how it works, and how it is chosen - these areas are naturally not touched upon, and so the definition is meaningless from this angle also. Overall it is clear - even in the formulation of the questions - that time and time again the individual is confronted with an arbitrary decision as to what he considers "political". It is, of course, a completely naive and pre-scientific understanding of democracy which conceives of it as though no individual could ever dictatorially impose his will on all others. The fact that certain classes or other minorities of a society and not a single person may establish a type of dictatorship does not enter into the investigation. "Democracy" and "dictatorship" are dealt with on the tritest levels of political stereotype, so that it is impossible to differentiate between them.

There is an additional striking factor - that politics is time and again equated with the relationship of the individual to the State. The work of Jaide and his associates could therefore be classified as an investigation of attitudes toward the State. But this concept of politics is much too narrow. Politics works its way into all levels of society. Every social aggregate to some extent needs its own politics, and in every social aggregate, politics is practised on every level from informal groups to organisations and institutions. One may therefore maintain, with the supporting evidence of the selection of items, that this work is not simply an "investigation of political attitudes". It is essentially an investigation of the relationship of adolescents to the State. However, "State" is also not handled on a general level. The reference is strictly to a concretely existing State: West Germany. Different forms of government are not compared with one another, and so of course judgments of adolescents comparing and contrasting different governments are not available.

The pragmatic fashion of the approach seems to be responsible for the resulting amalgamation of the different areas explored which is labelled "politics".

When such items as the residual effects of the National Socialist regime, societal politics and forms and alterations of business procedures are placed on the same level as domestic politics, then it is clear that we are dealing here with a simple enumeration of items from politics in general considered by the authors to be topical. They annex to their abstract nominal definition what they describe as an historical and material formulation. According to this, democratic politics today can only be viewed in a dynamic, reformed and emancipatory sense as a transformation, but inaccessible to democratic relationships in all areas of life, or as an orientation around the best development system or at least as a realisation of basic laws. With the
exception of the last (the realisation of basic laws), all the assertions are empty formulae. They all deal with making conditions more democratic, but it is never mentioned in the book what democracy is, or what should be viewed as democratic. Therefore, of course, the comparative "more democratic" is completely senseless. Also, the assertion regarding the realisation of basic laws is untenable since, viewed purely formally, the changing of basic laws with a two-thirds majority is a fully democratic procedure. Seen in this light, even repeating such laws is feasible when carried out in the context of certain political forms.

In this material definition, however, the concept of politics is more clearly outlined as it does not refer unconditionally to direct relations with the State. Unfortunately, this more concrete connection to different areas of life does not appear again in the actual procedures, i.e., in the item selection and nearly all items, questions and statements refer to the relationship between adolescents and the State.

Since what should be viewed as democratic is not clarified, the historical and material definition amounts to a classification by the individual, according to his own values and ideology, of what is democratic, and what is undemocratic, fascist, conservative, etc. To this subject the authors state: "The role requirements of a citizen in a democratic political system is critical, distanced, democratic participation, or insight into the necessity for changes. These requirements can only be viewed in the context of the existing socio-political system in West Germany, but at the same time with reference to other democratic systems as applied in the Western World, and in comparison to political systems in Eastern Europe. Therefore the investigation is so constructed that it may seem as related to the system, but not necessarily affirming it or inherent in it" (p. 11). It is noteworthy that participation in change and insight into its necessity are viewed as equivalent activities; that the role requirement of the citizen consists of either one or the other. Surely this is an extremely problematical assertion, considering that it is never mentioned how roles are divided between active and passive parts of the population, or who has, so to speak, the right to participate in the realisation of changes, while the others are assigned the passive role of providing insight. Also, the ideological considerations cannot simply be disregarded here. In any case, this assertion is also essentially empty since its central concept is democratic participation, leaving it to the individual to decide what the word "democratic" means.

Of major importance is that nothing is mentioned about the form of this participation; the possible forms of delegation or direct participation. In short, the question of how the action-intentions of the individual citizen or member of a social aggregate are manifested is not dealt with. Such questions are also not taken into account in the concrete batteries of tests. Also, the implied comparisons to other democratic systems and to political systems in Eastern Europe are actually only hinted at; and again at the tritest level of stereotype. Also in this context, it proved extremely disadvantageous that the authors used only batteries of independent individual questions, which only allowed yes/no answers. If the subject accepted and attempted to answer the questionnaire, he gave in to dealing on the level of these coarse, undifferentiated judgments; a level which for many adolescents simply no longer applies and which could almost be regarded as an insult.
It is essential to note that questions dealing with different forms of participation and alternative types of involvement in the decisions of collectives or corporations are totally lacking. For example, "Rätesysteme" or the question of democracy in business, of participation in management, and the different possible forms of this participation are not mentioned. From the outset, then, there is not only a relation to a system, but an actual system-affirmative tone which creates a distortion in the results; since the basic rules of this system are not questioned and therefore cannot be discussed. "Democratic" is, then, that which corresponds with these basic rules. Since different methods of choice of delegation or participation are not taken into account, deviation from this one model (a model partially realised in West Germany) must be classified as undemocratic. But since democracy is presented in a positive light throughout the study, a one-sided value judgment is implicit, leaning towards supporting the existing system.

The authors designate one dimension; namely, what they call political Engagementbereitschaft (preparedness to engage in politics) as the central variable of their investigation, and their hypotheses are formulated within the context of this dimension. Unfortunately, in the entire empirical section, the dimension is only marginally evident. By far the greatest part of the publication, 47 of 72 pages, is taken up by the presentation of the factor analysis of the 100 questions concerning political opinions. This discrepancy between theoretical weighting and actual investigation is quite striking, and cannot be explained on the basis of any information provided by the authors. Political Engagementbereitschaft was seen as being so important, because the authors considered it questionable "whether our system, as it appears today, adequately reproduces or facilitates in its members compliance with its own requirements; whether it endangers participating and responsible citizens".

Important here is the authors' emphasis on preparedness to engage in political activity, as opposed to the activity itself, and their acceptance of simple verbal indicators of direct or indirect personal participation. As forms of such participation, they designate "elections and actions, membership and work in political or social organisations; and as requirements for these activities: acquisition of information and formation of opinions with the goal of political activity and control". Apart from the fact that neither actual participation nor even concrete preparedness directly or indirectly measured, to participate is dealt with, it must also be noted that acts of pure initiative, for instance extraparliamentary opposition, formation of new organisations, or basic reforms of institutions or of the entire State, are not investigated. All that is dealt with is the verbal admission that participation in politics, in whatever way the subject cares about it, is important.

Due to this procedure, there is a danger that on the one hand only norms and memorised stereotypes will be reproduced, something like: "Yes, it is definitely a good thing to work within the framework of existing organisations". On the other hand, there is the chance that only particular forms of political engagement will be touched upon, i.e. those which are system-affirmative, and are traditional. Regardless of how well intentioned the authors were, their procedure is simply incapable of dealing adequately with divergent tendencies among adolescents, and cannot measure real involvement or even preparedness to become involved in political ideas and concepts. The individual hypotheses of the authors are as follows:
Hypothesis 1. "Democratic 'Engagementbereitschaft' is connected in a significant
and ordered fashion with progressive attitudes" (p. 13).

If democratic "Engagementbereitschaft" is conceived of as the authors attempt to
define it, then this first hypothesis is a tautology. If democratic Engagementbereitschaft
is understood as preparedness to take part in changes in a reformist, emancipatory sense
(which should lead to more democratic conditions), then it aims in the same direction
as "progressive" attitudes. But if democratic Engagementbereitschaft is handled as
simple verbal admission of the validity of such action, then it is identical with what
is referred to as progressive attitude. Even when the two dimensions are measured with
different batteries of tests and questions, the product is not informative result, but
simply a measurement of reliability through parallel test forms. The inverse of hypothesis 1
appears as hypothesis 2 "Lack of political engagement or political apathy presumably
is connected with an immobile-conservative dimension of opinion." To this second
hypothesis, of course, the same objections apply.

The third hypothesis reads as follows: "Political Engagementbereitschaft is
positively correlated with the subjects' command of political-historical information,
information gathering and political activities". To test this third hypothesis.
(assuming, of course, that political Engagementbereitschaft is under adequate operational
control) it would be necessary to obtain a representative sample of questions related to
political-historical knowledge. That is, one would have to select from the entire range
of political and historical events of at least the last fifty years a representative
sample, and formulate questions about these events. Even as a theoretical undertaking,
this appears extremely difficult, and the empirical results of such a procedure are
problematic from the outset. The concrete procedures of Jaide and his associates are
burdened with such problems; and it is in any case never clarified whether the
knowledge-items presented to the subjects were an undistorted representation of the
politically and historically relevant facts. The possibility cannot be disregarded
that the authors, consciously or unconsciously, chose a sample prejudiced to their
own values. This would, of course, have the result that subjects with orientations
similar to those of the authors would appear in a more positive light than those with
other attitudes, even though an undistorted test might show that no such differences
exist. Concerning the dimension "information gathering and political activities", it
must be noted that information gathering activities are not directly dealt with at all,
but appear through a self evaluation. Items such as the following were presented:
"I always compare the reports in different newspapers, so I will know what is going
on in politics" (p. 71).

An even more striking example in this context is the following: "I am confident
that I will always be able to discern which party is moving in the right direction.
Therefore I will always vote" or "I would like to know more about the workings of politics
in business, so I would better be able to judge the intentions of the employers and the
effects of the unions." To use such questions as indices for actual information
gathering activity is fairly dangerous and the validity of the operations is therefore
doubtful.
The fourth hypothesis appears as follows: "progressive opinions are positively correlated with sufficient information, and with the amount of information gathering and political activity". Proceeding from the fact that the authors have conceptualised an actual equivalence of the two variables "democratic Engagementbereitschaft" and "progressive attitudes" the fourth hypothesis can be equated with the third, and the comments directed to the third also apply here.

The fifth hypothesis is: "Political Engagementbereitschaft is positively correlated with a type of openness, as is a progressive understanding of democracy" (p. 14). The thesis also highlights a large defect, since an essential intervening variable was not taken into account. Presumably, adolescents who are in compliance with the behaviour patterns, norms and attitudes viewed as common or customary in politics will be able to express freely their opinions without taking any risk. But those who represent deviant tendencies and deviant opinions cannot allow themselves such openness without, at the same time, taking a certain risk. A true test of the assumed relationships must therefore deal with this intervening variable. Without its inclusion, the results are not definitive. The sixth hypothesis concerns the connection between political Engagementbereitschaft and personality factors. The seventh deals with the relationship between intellectual achievement capacity and will to engage, the eighth with differences in social structures, i.e. for example differences between apprentices and students, boys and girls, or urban and rural subjects. These hypotheses are tested separately.

Regarding the judgment of the study, it should be noted that the authors were of the opinion that all the hypotheses mentioned above could be verified. The factor analysis revealed five important and interpretable factors, which the authors also considered relevant in the formation of political opinions. In any case, these five factors together do not explain half the total variance; a not particularly inspiring result. The dimension "immobile-conservative" is proposed as the most important factor. The second most important dimension was "progressive-liberal-democratic"; the third: "disarmament and concessions". The fourth dimension was "fascistic-antirepresentative-nationalistic" and the fifth "fears and anxieties". According to these results, then, the dimensions "conservative-immobile" and "progressive-liberal" are independent. This, accepting the methodology of the factor analysis, would justify the differentiation between hypotheses one and two. The authors present as another important revelation of the factor analysis the finding that there is no extreme left factor; which they infer indirectly from the discovery of a so-called fascist opinion factor, which shows an alienation among youth toward the right—not the left. The authors argue further that all items with heavy loadings on the "conservative-immobile" factor also had relatively high secondary loadings on the factor "fascistic-antirepresentative-nationalistic". They postulate therewith a connection between factors four and five, i.e. between fascist opinions and fears and anxieties about future developments. With respect to the factor analyses, it should be noted (as has been previously mentioned) that they were carried out over the entire population; but on the basis of information supplied by the authors themselves, one may assume that the population was decidedly heterogeneous, and different correlations should appear in different segments. A factor analysis over the entire heterogeneous population is senseless, and is bound to lead to completely...
distorted results. The small number of explicable variations itself indicates the existence of such a disadvantageous situation. The correct procedure would have been these separate factor analyses: for subjects of different sex, of a particular type of school or of a given region. Only with such procedures would one be justified in assuming that one was dealing with homogeneous populations. Serious doubts are therefore cast on the value of the results of the factor analysis.

In addition, the interpretation of the factors appears somewhat arbitrary. In this context, a fact mentioned previously is relevant again: essential aspects of political opinion are not included in the scheme of the investigation, therefore they are not included in the catalogue of statements concerning critical opinions. The failure of the authors to deal with possible variations of political participation, the form of delegation and representation of the individual has already been detailed, together with their disregard of questions concerning possible alterations of society, e.g. a change in the conditions of ownership. Combining these observations with the fact that no extreme left factor was found, it seems obvious that in a procedure such as the authors have chosen one would expect not to find an extreme left factor. The only questions included which would reveal such a dimension were incidental. In addition, possibly relevant items were excluded when those questions with extreme indices of difficulty were separated in the item analysis and not used in the main investigation. The finding that there is no extreme left factor, then cannot be taken for granted, and the authors' statements are pure speculation, based on factors distorted by the methodology applied in the investigation. The further argument that extremism of the left and extremism of the right cannot be equated, must be viewed with the greatest reservation as a simple speculation.

This completely one-sided approach appears even more marked in the interpretation of the factors. The very designation of the five most important factors is extremely problematic, as can be demonstrated by an example. The authors themselves use in their arguments the fact that many items which can be ascribed to one factor on the basis of high loading, also have relatively high loadings on a second and sometimes even a third factor. They concentrate on the investigation of the connection between the factors "conservative-immobile-fascistic" and "fears-anxieties". What is totally ignored is, that the items which can be included under factor two, "progressive-liberal-democratic" also have heavy loadings on the fourth dimension, "Fascistic-antirepresentative-nationalistic". And items which have heavy loadings on factor four, i.e. fascistic attitude, also have a relatively heavy loading on factor two, progressive-liberal attitude. This situation justifies certain doubts regarding the domination of the factors, as well as their interpretation (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Results of the factor analysis of political attitudes
(Jaide et al., 1970)

FACTOR LOADINGS

A. Items with high loadings on factor 2 and high secondary loadings on factor 4 (15 of 23 items comprising factor 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Factor 2 Loadings</th>
<th>Factor 4 Loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will there be a relaxation of tensions between Russia and the West?</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advancement only on the basis of achievement</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the Hallstein Doctrine</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in taxes for higher earnings?</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should USA increase troops in Vietnam?</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct negotiations between Bonn and East Berlin</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. ace supported social security</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should all parties, including communists, be permitted?</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army only with professional soldiers in West Germany</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Europe, third power?</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should politicians or technocrats decide?</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Berlin, part of West Germany?</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should Great Britain, even in defiance of De Gaulle, join the Common Market</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme instead of party leader</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-unification only through free elections?</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Items with high loadings on factor 4 and high secondary loadings on factor 2 (8 of 11 items comprising factor 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Factor 2 (\text{&quot;progressive/liberal/democratic&quot;})</th>
<th>Factor 4 (\text{&quot;Fascistic/anti-representative/nationalistic&quot;})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. Reunited Germany, a world power?</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Agreement with the opinions of extreme leftist students?</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Do politicians betray their constituents?</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Do politicians hide what they are thinking?</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. Town council more trusted than Diet</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63. More concessions to the east by West Germany</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80. Can the NPD do more than other parties?</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87. Laws direct from the people?</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99. Could Hitler regain power?</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64. NATO disbundung because of France?</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only apparent explanations are: that the interpretation in the terminology of the dimensions is senseless; or, as seems more probable, the grounding of the analysis in a heterogeneous population has led to uninterpretable factors, i.e. that it is a matter of artificial constructs which are meaningless and cannot be interpreted. Of course there is one more possibility: that it is actually the case that individuals whom the authors see as progressive, liberal and democratic also show a considerable tendency toward fascist thought. Should this last possibility apply, it would indicate exactly what the authors are attempting to disprove: the similarity in this context between extreme groups of the right and the left. But such a conclusion, due to the methodological defects of the analysis is simply not possible. In the evaluation of the results presented by the authors, one must therefore confine oneself to the following possibilities: first, one may overlook the methodological defects and interpret the results as presented. If one does this, however, one cannot accept the conclusions of the authors, as was demonstrated by the example of the connection between the so-called progressive and the so-called fascist opinion dimensions (1). The second and more adequate and justifiable

(1) It is interesting to note here that the authors dealt with all other secondary loadings, but ignored the link between factor two and four, which was actually the strongest.
alternative is simply to classify the validity of the results, factors and dimensions as extremely doubtful, due to the methodological weaknesses which the procedures and arguments followed do not explain. The authors do not even consider questionable a factor analysis performed over the entire population. They note the fact that they left out many important aspects of political attitudes, but defend it as a legitimate procedure. They assert that it would have been impossible to ask questions about alternative forms of democracy or other forms of political participation, since the subjects would have been overburdened with items and in any case one should not (they asserted) ask hypothetical questions. "It is senseless here, according to the principles of modern experimental psychology to ask adolescents how they would behave in hypothetical, utopian situations, since the answers to such questions cannot be verified" (p. 11).

This reveals a very naïve understanding of science on the part of the authors, insofar as they speak of difficulty in the verification of questions concerning possible alternatives to existing situations. If they mean that answers to such questions of opinion cannot be checked by actual behaviour, they are certainly right.

From such a standpoint, however, their entire procedure must be disregarded as unverifiable, since they themselves made no arrangements to check their attitude dimensions against observable behaviour. In any case, new attitude research has shown that verbally measured attitudes have at best very little predictive value for current or future behaviour of the individual (see for a summary Kreutz & Titscher, 1972). According to such a concept, there is no qualitative difference between hypothetical and non-hypothetical questions of opinion. If one conceives of the postulate of verification simply as the ability to replicate, to produce verbal answers at different points in time which agree with each other, then there is again at most a small difference, by no means qualitative, between hypothetical and non-hypothetical questions.

The procedure of the authors must be further criticised in that such a statement catalogue of hundreds of individual questions must inevitably contain a variety of items either not applicable, not understandable, or not acceptable to each individual. Even the differences among the subjects in education, verbal skills, and interests create uncertainty. Can one, for instance, ask of college students relatively simple formulated questions on the level of political stereotypes? In this respect, the authors have accepted without hesitation the risk of the inappropriateness of the questions and rejected the methodological argument which they employed to justify the exclusion of essential aspects of political opinion.

Critical judgment must therefore lead to the conclusion that the investigation was one-sided from the outset. The authors themselves say that their instruments are relatively sensitive to rightist deviant tendencies from the existing form of democracy in West Germany, but are insensitive to so-called leftist tendencies of deviation. Of course, this casts doubts on the value of all the differentiations along the right-left axis they made. It is essential to note that to the very items around which the arguments of the student left revolve are not even touched upon in the questionnaire. The special stimulation for response provided to certain subjects by these slogans is therefore also absent. Hence, the validity of the entire measurement of attitude must be questioned, since in the normal course of events it is likely that at least a large portion of these adolescents, if not all of them, are in a sense politically activated or interested by these slogans and their implications.
To investigate further connections, the authors have applied the following simple formula to build scales: all questions with high loadings on one of the dimensions were handled in an identical fashion. An affirmative answer (in the sense of the dimension in question) was given a point of value 1, and a negative answer was given 0. The point values were then simply added. Similar arbitrarily constructed scales were also built for the other instruments and theoretical dimensions, e.g. for political Engagementbereitschaft. With the help of these scaled values they tried to compute correlation and regression coefficients with the aim to check the interrelations between the established dimensions.

As previously mentioned, the authors present political Engagementbereitschaft as the central issue of the study. As a matter of fact, two and a half pages deal with this variable. Twenty-four statements were directed at its measurement, three of which were discarded on the basis of the factor analysis. The final scales are therefore based on the answers to twenty-one questions. The authors consider themselves justified in simply adding the point values of these answers and thus erecting a scale which they claim measures political preparedness to engage. They ground this procedure in the claim that the factor analysis showed that all twenty-one questions were in the same dimension. This appears doubtful, however, since for example, seven of the remaining twenty-one questions had factor loadings barely over .30 and certainly under .40. In the factor analysis, only loading on the primary factor was given. Further factors were not even mentioned. Whether there actually existed one-dimensionality of the twenty-one questions appears questionable. Of the statements used, fifteen were positively formulated, i.e. suggested political preparedness to engage, or asked about in a positive fashion, and only six were negatively formulated.

One may therefore assume, that the entire scale is distorted in the direction of political Engagementbereitschaft. Firstly, there is the affirmative answer tendency to be taken into account, and secondly, the distorting influence of social desirability is strongly operative. Such errors of measurement were not dealt with by the authors, and the results are of doubtful validity.

Of the twenty-one questions used, only four concerned political information, while two others asked about the subjects' behaviour regarding discussions. Thus, the twenty-one questions were on communication about politics, no wonder that the scale of political preparedness to engage oneself correlates at .41 with the separately measured scale of political information-collecting activity.

A significant portion of the political Engagementbereitschaft scale dealt with this topic. Two further questions dealt with the subject's self evaluation concerning the extent to which he was politically informed. These could also, in fact, be classified under the heading "Information about politics", giving a total of eight from the twenty-one questions in this area.

Four of the questions relate to participation in unions, and two others to management procedures. For the students, these questions are of course hypothetical and future-oriented. If the greater political Engagementbereitschaft of students is to be cited as a major difference between apprentices and students, then it must be kept in mind that it is doubtlessly easier for the students, due to the fact that it is a hypothetical situation for them, to proclaim their Engagementbereitschaft.
The apprentices, on the other hand, are in a situation where they could become actually involved, and it is more difficult for them verbally to express their preparedness to engage when they do not demonstrate it in their actual activity. Further, it seems a reasonable assumption that adolescents with conservative opinions will be less likely to join a union, which, of course, does not exclude the possibility that they may take part in other political organisations. But if political preparedness to engage oneself is defined as membership and activity in unions, it is clear that a tendency is built into the instruments of enquiry such that a negative correlation is revealed between conservative opinion and political Engagementbereitschaft. Thus, the direction and intensity of participation are mingled in the instruments used, and neither is adequately measured.

One could, for example, conceive of the work of the employer associations as undemocratic. This would, however, indicate a different conception of democracy than is practised in West Germany at present. But this is exactly what the authors want to avoid, and they relate their work expressly to the West German political system. In this sense, their list of items is distorted and based on one-sided values and political orientations. Many further questions (four could be indicated with complete certainty) dealt with hypothetical situations in the future, circumstances which could only be realised when the adolescent becomes an adult. To express political Engagementbereitschaft in terms of such situations is relatively insecurely grounded.

If systematic differences are found between different groups of adolescents on the scale of political Engagementbereitschaft this might simply indicate that different normative systems are at work, stimulating different verbal responses, with no real predictive value for future behaviour. When, for example, such differences are revealed between highly educated students and apprentices, or between boys and girls, the reasons could be traced back to many factors. It could be that in institutions of higher learning, or institutions where males are in the majority, political preparedness to engage or participate in democracy on the whole is given more positive support through actual teaching, or more positive sanctions in general. The answers given as a result of these conditions, although they differ from the norms, do not necessarily imply any consequences for the future.

Furthermore, it is extremely important that none of the twenty-one items even hinted at the possible costs resulting from such a political preparedness to engage, nor that the potential Engagementbereitschaft was determined by what the individual adolescent was prepared to pay. In only one question is there an implication that one might make oneself unpopular by such preparedness to engage. But this is only a vague and solitary reference. That one has only a certain amount of time at one's disposal and therefore often has to decide how much energy has to be allotted to work and earning of money; whether, if any time is left over, one can and wants to spend some for political pursuits, and furthermore, the fact that these pursuits under certain circumstances, can create disadvantages at work or in private life, leads to the taking of risks, or in extreme cases to a curtailment of freedom or defamation, etc.: these issues are not mentioned in the entire scale of political preparedness to engage. The answers remain totally on the verbal level, and are in no way related to aspects of real life. The question of what disadvantages were concomitant with certain political convictions was
simply not explored. But this very dimension how far the individual will go to represent and defend his views, and what disadvantages he is willing to accept, at what point he actively participates and at what point he remains silent, this is a vital dimension for measuring political Engagementbereitschaft. The operation of the variables completely misses this central issue, and the scale is therefore totally invalid from a direct theoretical standpoint.

The fact that the correlations of this scale with questions concerning actual political activity are relatively low is therefore not surprising. Unfortunately, this scale and the items of which it was comprised were not provided in total. Only two or three examples are cited in the publication. It would well be, however, that this scale (which only correlated at .25 with the political Engagementbereitschaft scale) would yield much more interesting and theoretically valuable results than those regarded as central in the actual publication. But as was previously mentioned, both scales were only briefly handled in the analysis and treated as peripheral.

In summary, the work of Jaide and his associates was carried out with an immense display of technical detail and a huge number of individual questions and was quite demanding of the individual subjects. With respect to the investigations of many opinion research institutes, this work had the advantage that it did not use arbitrarily chosen individual questions, and bypasses the common linear results and simple cross tabulations by attempting to apply a more complex analysis.

These advantages are to be balanced against certain failings: the instruments of classical attitude measurement were applied in a very uncritical fashion, so that no real structure could be comprehended, and the dichotomised questions contained manifold variables of measurement, which were not even included in the authors' considerations. In a theoretical sense, the display of explicit theses at the start was certainly progress. The value of this procedure, however, decreased dramatically insofar as these theses were not connected with the empirical investigation, and in the operationalisation of the dimensions the different items were not assigned to the different dimensions from the outset. Had this been done it would have provided checks for certain problems, namely the wide gap between the programme of work which placed political preparedness to engage in the foreground, and the actual empirical investigations because the latter did not deal with political preparedness to engage at all, but with verbally expressed attitudes toward different aspects of the so-called politics.

The concepts of politics and democracy were not presented without any commentary, but they were not clarified. In particular, the concept of democracy remains an empty formula, determined by the opinions and political Weltanschauung of the authors. The work suffers from an uncritical selection of questions, a mechanical and technical application of the analysis, which in all probability resulted in a distortion of the instruments and from an uncritical use of the factor analysis, applied over a heterogeneous population. The results of the work are of questionable value owing to these procedural issues. The authors' assertion that they found a deviation towards the right and not towards the left seems extremely questionable, when they argue from a point of view which equates a conservative attitude to political immobility. This might be explained merely
as a result of their methodological procedure. Evaluations permeate all aspects of the work and are not critically treated by the authors, but are naively attributed to the procedures. They also determine the authors' type of interpretation.

The intention of the authors seems, then, relatively clear, even if they do not explicitly state it anywhere in the work. They want to show that in the final analysis democracy in the form practised in West Germany is not in danger from the left but from the right. They want to check the discrediting of the political student protest movement, if not actually encourage it. They are attempting to give weight to their own political beliefs and points of view by empirical verification. Science is for them a weapon which they use in a rather uncritical way for political argument.
3. **A cross-national survey**

In their book concerning political socialisation, "The Civic Culture", published in 1963, Almond & Verba proceed from the traditional view that political socialisation takes place primarily in the family. Their question is the extent to which political participation is affected by political socialisation and what is the role of the family in it.

The authors designate the type of participation and influence of the child or adolescent in the family as a decisive factor in future political participation. They claim that if the adolescent or child is consistently forced to submit in the family, if he is not allowed to have any influence in family decisions, and if he is not permitted to protest against unjust treatment, then this adolescent or child will not be motivated to participate in political life as an adult. Thus, their basic assumption is that the kind of participation in so-called non-political aggregates is very important for the motivation of adults at a later period.

In opposition to the classical view, they propose a range of modifications and extend this approach as follows:

According to them, the traditional, classical view is based on the following three assumptions:

Firstly, the most important influences on socialisation, occur during childhood.

Secondly, these socialising influences and corresponding childhood experiences are not political in any real sense, what is learned is a range of attitude-modes which will be later generalised.

Thirdly, this early socialising period is not of a political nature, i.e. it is not directed to future political participation or non-participation. It is subconscious, in the sense that those who exercise the influence are not aware of the long-term effects of their actions.

These assumptions of the classical approach, as expressed, for example, in works on the "authoritarian personality" are considered too narrow by the authors and modified as follows:

Firstly, influencing takes place not only in the family, but also in other groups and organisations, e.g. in schools, businesses, etc. In our society the family is constructed in a completely different way to the State or society and uses totally different decision-making processes. Thus, it cannot transmit knowledge and behaviour modes relevant to secondary organisations and politics. It therefore seems likely that precisely those organisations with more direct relationships to the State and political events in general will have a greater influence than the family.

Secondly, this indirect, latent influence, exercised during socialisation, undoubtedly has an influence upon future political participation. However, direct instruction and direct political education must also be considered.

It is likely that this conscious, specific education will also have strong effects.
The authors attempt to check these suppositions by means of retrospective data. In five different countries (USA, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and Mexico), an interview-investigation was carried out, during which retrospective data were collected on socialisation in the family, in school and at work.

If one disregards the methodological weakness of this approach and interprets the data as presented, the results are, in short, that the hypotheses propounded by the authors modifying the classical thesis are essentially verified.

The family is only one among many other influences and its effects are, according to the data, by no means greater than those of the school or the place of business.

A further interesting result is that the effects of the three sources seem to cumulate. That is, if participation was possible for an individual in the family and the school, it is highly probable that he will also seek to participate in political spheres. Should the first two conditions be absent one may expect political apathy. With contradictory influences, a participation of medium degree will be the norm. Influence at work will give similar results; if the employee is allowed to participate in the decision-making process, if his opinion is sought, if he may protest against improper treatment, then in general one may expect active political participation. Thus the family is important, but not in itself decisive. One may even state that school and profession together are more important than family experiences.

The authors have also shown that direct education in political matters seems to influence future political participation by the adolescent. A result considered by the authors unimportant from their theoretical view but which is quite relevant to our enquiry is the fact that in all countries, with the exception of Mexico, school is by far the most authoritarian of the three institutions (family, school, work). Schools permit far less participation in discussions and decisions. The opportunity to protest against unjust treatment is rare and actual protests are seldom. This result is particularly interesting since it shows in this context as well that the school has become particularly problematical institution in our society, that incompatibilities and discontinuities exist between different institutions posing enormous behavioural problems for the adolescent. Regarding the status of the adolescent, the following finding is of great importance: as is to be expected, the more important an individual's position is, the greater his opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Thus the implication that lower educational qualification caused by leaving school early leads to partial adulthood and that a full adult status in significant spheres will never be attained. These results may, of course, only be accepted with reservations due to a range of methodical problems. Concerning participation at work, however, the problem of retrospective answers does not exist, as it does with regard to family and school. The authors themselves admit that they cannot get an adequate description of the socialisation processes from adults in this way, only general impressions of the form of their education. These are, however, very important and the authors believe themselves justified in drawing from them at least indirect conclusions on the actual form of
socialisation. This is a very questionable assumption. But one must admit that it is to some extent plausible, and no significant reason may be traced, which would contradict such a supposition. It is of greater importance that they did not refer to any specific point in time in the questions nor to any specific age. Thus, each subject could choose a period of time for his reminiscences: it could be a childhood adolescent or student phase. From this point of view, then, the data are regrettably unreliable.

In each area, three questions were raised, dealing with influence or opportunities for participation in discussions, liberty to protest against unjust treatments and with actual protest, i.e. in the family, school or at work. Naturally these indicators are to some extent sketchy, and do not embrace the manifold, partly subconscious processes existing primarily in the family. Similarly, the instrument applied for measuring political participation is relatively rough and uncontrolled regarding its reliability and validity.

That the research was carried out in different cultures and in different languages by means of questionnaires tends to support the results. Some confidence can be placed in the reliability of the results. Even if an unconditional guarantee regarding validity and reliability cannot be attained on this basis, the parallel trend in the five independent national investigations is so striking that these results may be considered as having some reliability in spite of the manifold methodological deficiencies.

These data should at least suffice as a challenge and counter evidence to representatives of the classical view supporting a nearly unlimited influence of the family. One must first prove that other sources of influence and forms of learning are meaningless before accepting these traditional views as true.
2.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH REPORTS

1. The population of the investigation

It is assumed that because of the relatively unfavourable situation of youth research today, the population investigated in many surveys often cannot be adequately defined, and that the population to which an investigation refers is often arbitrarily fixed. An extreme example of this practice is represented by certain movements in social psychology, based almost exclusively on investigations of American college students. This example highlights the fact that an unrepresentative investigation of a particular population circumscribes the value of any research.

With respect to research dealing with adolescents in the last decade, it is a fact that problems of one-sidedness do exist. Youths from the social periphery (particularly unskilled workers, rural labour, homeless or unemployed adolescents, etc.) are seldom included in investigations and are not embraced by so-called "representative" surveys in numbers corresponding to the actual proportion of the population they comprise.

Those most often appearing as subjects are male grammar school and college students. Rural adolescents' environs are included less often than urban ones.

Regional restrictions are often imposed by time or money factors. Investigations which even if they are regionally restricted - allow for international comparisons are extremely rare. Less than 5% of the works facilitate such comparisons. In summary, one may say that half the works refer to very specific populations, so that their results cannot be generalised to adolescents as a whole.

The population investigated is:

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{strongly socially and/or regionally restricted} & 51 \\
\text{socially and/or regionally mildly restricted} & 22 \\
\text{representative of the adolescents of a country or at least international comparisons are possible} & 27 \\
\hline
\text{100} \\
\end{array}
\]

(132)

It is certainly not always an advantage to attempt a representative sample of a country's adolescents (with respect to occupation, social background, rural-urban differences, sex, age, etc.) when insufficient funds are available. But important as this point is, it does not negate the fact (as revealed in the tables), that in the majority of the works, restrictions are (sometimes of necessity) imposed on the population, which sharply hint the possibilities for comparisons and complicate or eliminate entirely inductive generalisations.
It could be maintained that in dealing with many issues, it is a property of the topic that only particular portions of the population are investigated. However, although it is true that there are occasionally direct relationships between certain questions and particular segments of the population, experiments including only the necessary subjects are still one-sided. That is, there are situations in which certain subjects must be included, but additional comparisons with other parts of the population can only be advantageous. These unnecessary, even disadvantageous restrictions are clearly revealed by the fact that 30% of the works have strong regional restrictions on the population, and a further 20% have moderate restrictions. Finally it could be argued that the distribution of the works does not say much in itself of their quality. Relatively unassuming investigations of pilot studies, student projects, etc. can and should stand next to well-founded investigations. We have only included publications intended for the wider scientific public. Works produced for educational purposes amongst others have been excluded from the outset. In addition, one has to criticise the small number of investigations conducted in the decade in question and dealing with a representative survey population. It should be noted that the number of subjects included in researches which refer to a narrowly defined population is by no means small. A considerable portion of the already scarce money available for research is used in works which are already of questionable value due to the one-sided and limited cross-section of the population they utilise.

2. The selection procedure and statistical representativity of the investigation

A controlled, undistorted selection of subjects is a minimal requirement for social scientific research. Thus, the representativeness of the results of a survey and opinion researches are allotted such importance that the concepts "representativeness" and "statistical significance" are widely equated with comprehensive criteria for determining the quality of empirical research. Although such an equation is by no means justified, one can maintain in general that a lack of representativeness in the selection of subjects for investigation is a severe handicap to the predictive value of the results. Particularly in non-experimental investigations based on analyses carried out ex post facto of connection between factors, the selection procedure determines the predictive value or the results. In experimental investigations, representative subjects are unnecessary in certain conditions; for example when the formation of control and experimental groups is carried out in a scientific and controlled fashion (e.g. by randomisation), so that the effects of particular experimental influences can be isolated and measured.

The distribution of the investigations with respect to the selection procedure applied shows that the vast majority of cases are not representative.
Completely uncontrolled selection, no information about the selection procedure, representativity viewed as unimportant

Quota procedure

Conscious selection by experts, procedure not statistically oriented

No probability sample, but adequate experimental plan

Probability sample, but inadequate experimental plan

Probability sample with adequate experimental plan

53

3

9

8

5

22

100

(132)

Even if one accepts the selection by experts, almost two-thirds of the reports must, using the criteria of representativeness be regarded as scientifically lacking. Inductive generalisations on the basis of such material are of understandably questionable value, and there is little hope for the distillation of positive empirical knowledge. In almost all previous attempts to evaluate the information on hand, methodological issues are ignored, resulting in a doubtful synthesis of content. There are entire thematic areas in which not one single representative investigation can be found, even within a restricted population!

3. The quota of losses and non-participants

Until now we have only dealt with the sample and the design of the studies, and have not yet examined the actual carrying out of the investigation. Even when an investigation is faultlessly planned, it can of course happen that it loses its value through refusals of the subjects to participate or inadequate performance of the fieldwork.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proportions of non-participants</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 10%</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 25%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 40%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c/f</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-115-
Proportion of those not reached and all persons who were intended to be included in the experiments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>with reference to all investigations</th>
<th>with reference to all investigations in which mention was made of the proportion of non-participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b/f</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60%</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 and over</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no statements at all about non-participants; completely uncontrolled data collection</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-thirds of the authors considered the problem of non-participation in questioning or observational studies so unimportant that they did not even mention it in their reports. In some of the works, refusals, subjects not reached, etc. were ignored from the outset. Even admitting that in a small portion of those works in which losses were not discussed, the actual count of non-participants may have remained within reasonable boundaries, the total picture is anything but encouraging. If one accepts losses up to 25% of the original sample, which itself is a hardly justifiable minimal standard, three-fourths of the report must be viewed as scientifically unacceptable. One must also consider that the quota of losses refers to the total originally chosen group, i.e. a loss quota of 50% means that exactly as many subjects could not be included as actually participated.

4. **The connection between the population of the investigation, the selection procedure and the loss quota**

In order to judge the extent to which the investigations in question may claim to be representative and may be used as a basis for inductive generalisation, the three criteria which have been cited must be viewed in concert.

### Connection between definition of the survey population and type of selection procedures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population:</th>
<th>probability sample</th>
<th>Selection procedures</th>
<th>arbitrary selection) no statements quota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>broad based population; adolescents of one country</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mild social and/or regional restrictions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>narrowly defined population</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>∑</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-116-
Taking both points into account, minimal criteria permit the acceptance of only 22% of the works.

Viewing the selection procedure together with the quota of losses, the judgment is even more negative:

Population of the investigation, process of selection and quota of losses and non-participants in the sociology of youth

(Number of works)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection procedure</th>
<th>Probability sample</th>
<th>Selection by experts</th>
<th>No reference to selection procedure; arbitrary selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota of losses and non-participants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to 15%</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 25%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26% and more</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no answer</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>∑</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(130)

I = Inclusive
M = Medium
N = Narrow

Only 6% of the works satisfy all three criteria. Inductive generalisations could be possible with some caution, on the basis of 17% of the works. Tentative conclusions may be drawn from a further 4.5%. At best, then, considering the various problems of obtaining subjects, only one work in five can be used in an attempt at a synthesis of social scientific knowledge on adolescents. Relying on any of the other works would introduce an incalculable risk into the procedure. One should note that we have heretofore considered only one basic methodological standpoint, and that there are numerous other possible sources of error which can damage the value of the works. Although the representativeness of social scientific investigations is always stressed in public, the majority of those experiments actually carried out do not meet minimum standards in this area. In the decade under consideration, there are scarcely 10 works which satisfy all scientific requirements at least fairly well.
A consideration of the number of subjects in the works and not the number of works provides a basis for judging whether the negative situation as described is due simply to financial constrictions, or whether there are other causes. That is, if studies reveal that the investigations of poorer quality were restricted in the number of subjects they could include, and the satisfactory methodological works had larger samples, then finance could be determined as the cause of failure. This is, however, by no means the case.

Population of the investigations, selection procedure and quota of losses and non-participants

(Number of subjects)

Of the total investigated subjects following percentages were comprised in works of methodical quality as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotas of losses and non-participants</th>
<th>Probability sample</th>
<th>Selection by experts</th>
<th>No reference to selection procedure; arbitrary selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
<td>Population of the investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I M N</td>
<td>I M N</td>
<td>I M N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>% % %</td>
<td>% % %</td>
<td>% % %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to 15%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 25%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26% and more</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no statements</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(286.184)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(286.184)

I = Inclusive
M = Medium
N = Narrow

Works using a probability sample comprise 31.5% of all investigations, but they only include 26.5% of all subjects in investigations of adolescents. 21% of all works have a loss quota of under 15% but only 18% of subjects are included in such works. The comparison of the distributions based on works and those based on the number of subjects shows that the poorer quality works did not necessarily have smaller samples than those of better quality. We can therefore determine that even today some works depend on the magic of large numbers; that methodologically unsatisfactory works are presented as representative, and their results as supported by the large number of subjects (see also the detailed individual analyses of the works). There are even works which attempt to include several thousand, sometimes tens of thousands of adolescents, without the slightest care being taken in the selection. We are justified therefore in saying that a considerable part of the money available is wasted on unsatisfactory works, which do not even meet the mild standards set, for instance, for a student's seminar work.
The poor quality of the selection procedure cannot, then, be attributed to financial constrictions alone. The lack of interest in the statistical reliability of their results of both those who commission works and the researchers who perform them also plays a part.

The size of the sample and type of selection procedure are the methodological aspects to which most attention is paid and about which most care is taken. Far less notice is taken of problems of validity and reliability. If such an obvious and generally accepted aspect of methodology as representative sample is ignored to such an extent, even in works with apparently sufficient financial backing, this implies a prevalent indifference to the general reliability of the results and to attempts at inductive generalisation.

The success of a work and the recognition of the researcher probably depend only to a small degree on the scientific quality of the procedures used.

5. Comparisons

Closely tied to the question of a representative population is the matter of the comparisons facilitated by the results of an investigation. It is of primary importance for the development of a theory of adolescence to compare the behaviour and attitudes of adolescents with those of children and adults. Historical comparisons of different adolescent generations or age groups, and longitudinal studies comparing the same adolescents at different points in time are likewise extremely important.

Of the works included here, 29% supply direct comparisons between adolescents and adults, 5% provide historical comparisons between different generations of youth and 4% represent panel studies, which attempt to compare the same subjects at different points in time. Almost two-thirds of the works, then, concern themselves simply with adolescents at one point in time, without facilitating exact comparisons of any kind. But since the specific characteristics of an age group or generation can only be determined on the basis of comparisons, all these works are of very limited value. An empirically supported explanation of adolescent behaviour in particular social situations is impossible on such a basis.

In addition, many of those works which do facilitate comparisons are not based on representative samples. Only 5% of all works compare adults and adolescents on the basis of samples which are representative of the youth of any region (even restricted); and even in these cases, the samples of the adults are of a problematic nature. Comparisons which are acceptable for both the selection of population and the loss quota and non-participants are practically non-existent.

These are truly catastrophic findings, since the implication is that there is no well-founded basis for inductive generalisations concerning the behaviour of adolescents. The question of how such a practice could have developed has already been adequately dealt with from the theoretical point of view. The empirical results show an agreement between theory and experience at least in their approach: namely, that research as practised during the decade in question can be characterised as theoretically and practically irrelevant.
6. **Validity and reliability**

In addition to the selection procedure, there are numerous other aspects of the empirical procedure which are decisive for the quality of the data. The concepts reliability and validity were developed for judging the quality of the actual data collection. Again, there are many techniques for the determination of these criteria.

Although these criteria and the measurement techniques are generally accepted and discussed and presented in introductory textbooks, research is still carried out which ignores them.

**Consideration (1) of criteria for the judgment of the reliability and validity of data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>validity considered</th>
<th>not considered</th>
<th>sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reliability</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not considered</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In more than half the works, the criteria are not even mentioned, and the research is carried out in such a naive fashion that the possibility of defects in the data collection procedure are not even considered. Not even 10% of the works consider both criteria. And this does not imply that the 10% were actually checked for reliability and validity. In many cases, there was simply an abstract discussion of the relevant problems, without precautions being taken to estimate the bias of the data.

In less than 25% of the works, there was an attempt made to determine empirically least one of the criteria. In half of these researches (i.e. 12.5% of all works), only reliability was taken into account; only in one-fourth of them both issues.

Proceeding from the minimal requirement that in empirical research work, the reliability of the data collection at least must be checked, three-fourths of all research subjected to analysis must for methodological reasons be declared scientifically unacceptable. And apart from the determination of validity, the situation becomes even worse. In those cases in which the reliability is determined, the process does not refer to the data collection procedure as a whole, but only to particular aspects. Thus, for example, in investigations utilising a questionnaire, series effects are checked, or internal consistency is tested, or the questions are examined for suggestivity, etc. Most frequently, the test-retest procedure is used, which in fact only provides a check on the (short-range) stability of the answers, and does not provide a basis for statements on reliability. A comprehensive testing, even only of the various aspects of the reliability of the data collection is not to be found in a single one of the works.

(1) Not determination or measurement, but simply observation or discussion of the criteria.
The data on which our empirical knowledge of youth during the sixties is based are, therefore, largely untested for reliability and validity, and do not permit definite conclusions.

The lack of checks does not necessarily mean that the data are actually unreliable. It simply means that one cannot estimate their quality. Nevertheless, insofar as checks were actually performed, the results show the quality of the data collection techniques common at that time to be highly questionable. The disregard of quality criteria may well indicate a conscious or unconscious (probably in fact intentional) avoidance by the researchers of the unsolved problems of empirical social research. One must note that checks were only performed in the more carefully conducted researches, which unquestionably supplied a better quality data than works which ignored the criteria entirely.

7. Operationalisation

In hypothesis 20.1, it was assumed that the majority of works lacked a theoretical framework and were founded on ad hoc hypotheses at best. Proceeding from this premise, one may assume that in those cases in which there are definite theoretical issues to be handled, their controlled translation into concrete empirical procedures is not performed with care. In those cases in which legitimation of existing facts or procedures is the goal of the research, it is better not to have a particularly direct connection between the issues and the empirical procedures; since otherwise undesired results could be produced by the research. In addition to the hypothesis mentioned above, one may assume that in the case of legitimation researches, the process of operationalisation is carried out in an inexact fashion which leaves it open to several interpretations.

The inexact nature of the operationalisation allows the researcher to interpret the results in such a way that the desired "facts" appear to be confirmed, or the measures already taken appear to have been particularly well chosen.

Research problems and their operationalisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely atheoretical work; no specific questions to be dealt with</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The work is confined to one topic, but no theoretical framework, and therefore no operationalisation of the questions</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical issues to be handled, but questionable or insufficient operationalisation</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical question and explicitly defined operationalisation</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(130)
About three-fourths of the works allow by their very construction practically any interpretation desired. In these works, the concepts applied - as was assumed in hypothesis 13 to be the case with legitimisation - are simply not clarified in a scientific fashion. Only every eighth work is founded on a distinct array of questions, proceeds with explicit use of well-defined concepts and carries out a clear operationalisation.

These data are in full agreement with hypotheses 13 and 20.1. They are perhaps the most clear and lucid indications that the majority of means and energy is used on researches which have no explicit goals and supply no results which can be used for inductive generalisations.

In the last chapter it was shown that in general little care is taken to ensure the reliability and validity of data. Simultaneous examination of the works with respect to these criteria and the extent to which the operationalisation was explicit yields a complete picture of the degree of scientific control exercised over the translation of issues into concrete research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical question</th>
<th>explicit operationalisation</th>
<th>questionable operationalisation</th>
<th>thematically defined, but no explicit questions</th>
<th>completely a-theoretic panorama study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>at least checked for reliability</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at least reliability discussed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no mention made of reliability or validity</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% = 130

The data indicate that with respect to the minimum requirements of operationalisation and observance of reliability and validity, only every twentieth work is acceptable. It should also be noted that these data probably present the actual facts in a too favourable light, since they do not indicate the extent to which the declared theoretical problems were decided upon ex post facto after the observation of the data, and the research actually was carried out aimlessly.

8. Techniques of investigation and type of analysis

Of all the works examined, 99% dealt solely with verbal behaviour and oral expression of opinion. The entire knowledge concerning the youth of the sixties regarding their relationship to adults, development of values, personal goals, and political attitudes and behaviour is based exclusively on the collection of verbal material. Important as verbal interactions may be, it is clear that as long as one relies on verbal data alone, the information gained will remain very one-sided and distorted.
This first result already shows clearly that multiple operationalisation, in which both verbal and non-verbal procedures are used, is not in evidence. Only in one single experiment is such a process applied. But even the simultaneous use of different techniques of verbal data collection is essentially non-existent. In only 5% of all works are dual techniques (i.e. techniques which augment each other) applied for data collection.

The contact with the research personnel is in almost all cases extremely short, as was predicted in hypothesis 24.8. It can be determined (or with high probability reconstructed) that in more than 90% of the works, the investigation is based on a contact of less than two hours. In the majority of cases, the contact lasted scarcely an hour. Such a procedure is certainly economical, but can only offer data of uncertain scientific value.

In likewise more than 90% of the works, it can be determined that the data collection was carried out according to a routine, without concern for the particular situations of the subjects, and the techniques of questioning in use were applied without any particular preparations (compare to hypothesis 20.2). In 84% of the works, only a standardised questionnaire was used. This implies - as was assumed in hypothesis 24.5 - that the adolescents were in principle only presented with a limited number of predetermined choices. Spontaneous free expressions can, of course, not be collected in this fashion. Also in the remaining 16% of the works, the influencing of the answers by the research procedure was probably relatively large. When, for example, an essay theme is distributed in a class (and sometimes by a teacher), freedom of expression is only extant in a formal sense. The normative social influence in such a situation is so large, that only stereotyped answers are to be expected. This effect is further enhanced by the fact that in the majority of investigations there was no detailed pilot study, and one cannot speak of a controlled item analysis or any similar procedure.

The following individual procedures were applied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Procedure</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>standardised paper and pencil questionnaire</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standardised interview</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interview and group discussions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>half-standardised interview</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>free topic essay</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content analysis of documents</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questioning and free topic essay</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>participatory observation and interview</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no information provided</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                                          | 100 |

(130)
The isolated questioning of individuals clearly dominates the picture. As true as it may be that many people will talk more freely and openly in small groups than in the presence of a larger number of observers, it is a fact that limiting dyadic interactions circumscribes the possibility of drawing definitive conclusions about group processes, social influences, etc. (see Kreutz, 1971). In addition, in almost all investigations, the (unwanted) presence of a third person could not be prevented. Although information on this aspect is lacking in most reports, general experience leads one to believe that for example in home interviews, the presence of a third person is in most cases unavoidable. As far as may be reconstructed, the investigations were carried out in the following situations:

| %       
|------------------
| postal questioning | 12 
| home interviews, at the residence | 36 
| in organisations, without scientific control | 10 
| in organisations, under scientific control | 24 
| in "laboratories" | 5 
| not determinable | 13 
|------------------
| 100 
| (127) 

The results indicate clearly that in a large portion of the investigations, the way the data were collected was completely uncontrolled. In investigations carried out by post or conducted in organisations without scientific supervision, this is undoubtedly the case. Home interviews also allow essentially no control of the overall situation of enquiry by the researcher. Apart from the fact that the staff of interviewers only met scientific requirements very rarely, the situation of questioning in the home of the subject can scarcely be influenced by the interviewer. In investigations conducted in school classes, clubs and similar organisations, the situations of enquiry can be at best standardised, but almost never shaped according to the wishes and considerations of the researcher. This point addressed the issue presented in hypothesis 24.2. The investigations were to a large extent actually carried out in situations in which conformist behaviour on the part of the adolescents was to be expected. In experiments conducted in schools or in organisations under the leadership of adults, this is almost universally the case. In home interviews, particularly when parents are present during the questioning, exaggerated conformity is to be expected. As assumed in hypothesis 24.4, almost without exception adult interviewers were used in the collection of data. Blücher (1968) describes a short work carried out by students. Buikhuisen uses young co-workers or students as participating observers. These cases are, however, exceptions, and certainly cannot justify the generalisation of any results. In the vast majority of investigations, adolescents must respond to questions posed by adults in situations determined and controlled by adults. The tendency for the youths to respond according to the expectations of the adults is increased by such a research procedure.
The formal neutrality of the questioner (see hypothesis 24.7) does not decrease this influence; in fact, it intensifies the effect, since it allows the influences inherent in the situation to reach peak levels. When the adolescent is not included in a discussion in which both sides (i.e., interviewer and subject) participate equally, but is simply questioned, (while the interviewer holds back his own opinion), then the adolescent is particularly likely to view the interviewer as a type of generalised adult. Adolescent research during the decade under consideration is, then, in the true sense of the word a research of adults; and although adolescents are the objects of the research, it does not break through the societally determined "normal" relationships (the role-model relationships) between adults and adolescents. The question of what organisations, interest groups or societal forces were perceived by the adolescents as connected with the investigations is difficult to answer, since appropriate data are not available. However, on the basis of the introductory notes and the instructions received by the interviewers as to how they should introduce themselves, it seems highly probable that the investigations were almost exclusively connected with either commercial businesses and interests, or distinguished institutions (of a scientific, political or social welfare nature, etc.) of adult society.

As assumed in hypothesis 20.2, almost all works use the simplest routine procedure for the collection of data. The creativity and care used in this sort of process is at a minimum, and extremely distorted and one-sided data are generally accepted without criticism.

The analysis of the data is extremely simplistic in the majority of the works. The suspicion that pretentious mathematical procedures were used to immunise the results from criticism was premature insofar as the majority of the researchers did not or could not apply these procedures.

The following individual techniques were applied:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistical analysis:</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>only linear data</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>only linear data, analysis of individual cases</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exclusively two-dimensional cross tabulations with a few independent variables</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as above, but also including the construction of typologies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>three-dimensional cross tabulations; cross tabulations with a greater number of independent variables</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scaling on the basis of at least one variable on the basis of an item-battery; multi-dimensional cross tabulation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more complex mathematical procedures, such as path analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis, etc.</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100
(130)
In 57% of all the works, the entire analysis is carried out on an elementary plane. On the basis of their inadequate data analyses alone, such works cannot draw definitive conclusions. The few independent variables included in these cases, e.g. age, sex, occupation, familial status, size of town of residence, etc., allow only a general overview. They certainly do not provide a basis for clearly differentiated situational descriptions.

In the majority of cases which applied them at all, the use of mathematical procedures such as factor analysis, variance analysis, etc. was unjustified by the content. The requirements on which these procedures are based were in virtually no cases met even approximately. The quantification of the variables was performed throughout in a scientifically unsatisfactory fashion, whereby the different possible answers to individual questions were arbitrarily assigned values. The use of this procedure can therefore at best serve heuristic purposes.

9. The connection between operationalisation, observance of reliability and validity, and analysis, measured on the basis of the number of subjects

In the three preceding chapters, an attempt was made to characterise the works in the light of the methods of data collection they utilised. Only the actual number of works was referred to in this context. The second set of figures available for inspection, namely those concerning selection of the subject samples, has not yet been mentioned.

Regarding validity and reliability, this second measure does not reveal a picture essentially different from that already shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Validity observed</th>
<th>Not observed</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not observed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(100)

(286.184)

As a comparison with the overall view based on the number of works (see Chapter 6) shows, the works which were not carried out with care were of greater than average size. Works which totally ignore reliability and validity of the data include on the average not fewer but more subjects than works carried out with greater care. The assumption that the neglect of these criteria can be traced back to lack of financial resources seems therefore improbable.

(1) I.e. not necessarily determined or measured, but simply a discussion of the problems.
A similar situation prevails with respect to the operationalisation. Judgment based on the distribution of the works gives a more favourable picture than judgment based on the subject samples.

**Operationalisation of the individual researches**

(distribution with respect to the number of subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>explicit operationalisation; theoretical ordering of questions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centred questioning, without ordering</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atheoretical work, therefore no operationalisation</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The value is 286.184)

The situation regarding the data analysis is not appreciably different. Investigations which applied only linear procedures or simple cross tabulations dealt on the average with a greater number of subjects than those works containing more complex analyses. All these data imply, as suspected in hypothesis 20.4, that the function of the large numbers of subjects was essentially one of immunisation.

Simultaneous examination of the operationalisation and observance of reliability and validity reveals once again that only a tiny portion of the subjects were included in experiments which are acceptable from a methodological point of view.

**Operationalisation and observance of validity and reliability**

(measured on the basis of the number of subjects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>explicit operationalisation</th>
<th>centred questioning</th>
<th>atheoretical work, panorama study</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reliability and validity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>either reliability or validity</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neither reliability nor validity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The value is 286.184)

10. **National barriers to communication and problems stemming from language difficulties**

In hypothesis 5 it was assumed that language and national barriers are a serious drawback to researches, and as long as legitimation remains the main function of research, there will be little interest taken in international communication. To check on this assumption, the quotations from the works – as have already been presented – will be evaluated.
National borders as hindrances to scientific communication

Nationality of the author and country of publication of the works cited by him:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>works which appeared in the author's own country</th>
<th>works which appeared in the USA</th>
<th>works which appeared in other West European countries</th>
<th>works from East European countries</th>
<th>works from all other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(11,970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual limitation to the scientific production of the author's own country is probably still greater than the data would indicate, since it is probable that in many cases works were mentioned of which the author had only superficial knowledge.

Particularly striking is that the communication between the various countries in Europe is extremely poor. The individual national schools work essentially independently of one another; and at times without even taking notice of one another. American sociology is accepted in the individual countries and leads to parallel developments, which, however, do not profit from one another.

Considering the language barrier, about three-quarters of all quotations and citations fall inside national or cultural boundaries.

The time-lag in the absorption of works (particularly those which appear in America) as assumed in hypothesis 23 appears to be a fact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of publication</th>
<th>Time and place of publication of the works cited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anglo-Saxon authors: quotations of Anglo-Saxon works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quotation up to 4 years before publication of the work</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 9 years before</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 and more years before</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(1097)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-128-
These data show that limitations of scientific communication exist in several respects, and that European works follow American development to a large extent without taking notice of each other.

11. **Summary**

The data discussed thus have allowed for the examination of most of the hypotheses (although not all). Hypotheses 5, 8a, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20.1, 20.2, 20.3, 20.4, 21, 23, 24.2, 24.3, 24.4, 24.6, 24.7 and 24.8 could be directly checked on the basis of the data at hand. In all cases, there was good agreement between the assumptions and the empirical data. And since the individual hypotheses are logically connected to one another and can in part be logically deduced from one another, this partial testing justifies the assumption that the remaining theses also apply. Overall, the empirical testing has revealed that the thesis of youth research as being determined by its social function is supported by a large number of detailed and apparently unconnected factors. The assumption that the central social function of adolescent research was and is the legitimation of political decisions and measures already taken adequately explains the reason for the condition of this research as revealed empirically.

This finding, which in many respects is not positively determined, leads to the conclusion that the scientific quality of adolescent research can only be decisively improved when the research itself is directed at new social goals and purposes. Such tasks (as for instance the adaptation of society to technical-economic development can, however, only be performed when the basic assumptions of research have improved.
PUBLICATIONS OF THE COUNCIL FOR CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

In the same section - Out-of-School Education and Youth

EDUCATION IN EUROPE

Leisure time facilities for young people from 13 to 25 years of age (1965)
Training the teacher - 2nd revised and supplemented edition (1966)
Workers in adult education - their status, recruitment and professional training (1966)
The literature of science popularisation (J. Pradal - 1969)
Today and tomorrow in European adult education (J.A. Simpson - 1972)

COMPANION VOLUMES

The use of television in adult education - European achievements (M.G. Puglisi - 1967)
The responsibilities of women in social life (A. Zucconi - 1968)
Directory of Youth Associations (J. Jousselin - 1968)
The organisation of youth in Europe (J. Jousselin - 1968)
Sport for All - exercise and health (P.O. Astrand - 1969)
The status and training of youth leaders (G. Vessigault - 1969)
Public supervision of correspondence courses - the harmonisation of legislation.
(I.J. Sloos - 1969)
Educational leave, a key factor of permanent education and social advancement
(Mlle R. Crummenerl, M. G. Dermine - 1969)
The place of education by correspondence in permanent education (E.G. Wedell - 1970)
Sport for All - five countries report (1970)
Sport for All - low cost sport facilities: swimming pools (1970)
Sport for All - physical activities and the prevention of disease (is being reprinted)
(Ph. Réville - 1970)
Facilities for cultural democracy (1971)
Sport for All - low cost sports halls (1972)