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Steady-State Staffing: A Second Report

W. Todd Furniss
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Abstract

This is a follow-up report on developments in long-range faculty personnel planning since the publication of Steady-State Staffing in Tenure-Granting Institutions and Related Papers, (American Council on Education, 1973), covering the period from March through December, 1974. Following references to newly available data, the paper deals first with work done at SUNY-Buffalo, Stanford, the University of Pennsylvania, the American Association of University Professors, and the Institute for Educational Development using mathematical models of steady-state staffing. Reference is next made to several institutions at which some tenure-related action has recently been taken: Miami-Dade Community College, the University of Hawaii, Bloomfield College, the Virginia Community College System, the City University of New York, Vassar College, and Colgate University. Attention is then given to four special issues: (1) tenure quotas, and the effects of high and low percentages of faculty with tenure on the chances for tenure of probationary faculty; (2) the cost implications of a faculty evenly distributed by age and rank; (3) the growing limitations on institutional choice imposed by government requirements under the Equal Pay Act and other legislation involving nondiscrimination; and (4) the place that provision for early retirement might have in a long-range personnel plan. Three other unresolved issues are identified: the labeling of all nontenured faculty as "probationary," the problem of shifting student interests within an institution, and the question of what tenure guarantees. Finally, there is appended a two-page listing of "Selected Readings on Steady-State Staffing."
W. Todd Furniss  
Office of Academic Affairs  
American Council on Education  
December, 1973

Selected Readings on Steady-State Staffing

A number of the items listed here have not been formally published or have had limited distribution. However, the sources indicated in the entries marked with an asterisk have agreed to make single copies available upon request. It is possible also that a number of them will be available through the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education (One Dupont Circle, Suite 630, Washington, D.C. 20036) in Spring, 1974.


* Zaharis, John L. "Developing Guidelines for Faculty Reduction in a Multicampus College," April 1973. Available from the author, Director, Division of Natural Sciences, Miami-Dade Community College-South, 11011 S.W. 104th Street, Miami, Fla. 33156.

Annual Meeting
Association of Departments of English
Chicago, Illinois, 26 December 1973

Steady-State Staffing: A Second Report
W. Todd Furniss
Director, Office of Academic Affairs
American Council on Education

When I accepted this assignment, I suggested to Mike Shugrue that it seemed
not very useful for me to go over the ground that I covered in the pamphlet
Steady-State Staffing in Tenure-Granting Institutions, published in March by
the American Council on Education,\(^1\) and that I thought it would be wiser and
more useful all around to pick up where it left off in the expectation that I
could identify some of the growing problems that may not have been fully dealt
with, or even anticipated at all, in the original paper. He agreed, and pro-
vided for you to become familiar with the basic paper, through a couple of
notices in the ADE Bulletin.

Even if you haven't had a chance to look at it, by now you can hardly help
being familiar with the essential issue: how can one establish and enforce
policies for appointment, tenure, retirement, probationary periods, and the like
for a time of no growth or even reduced size? My basic suggestion was that only
a projection of the very long-range consequences of your policies could give a
good indication of what should be done now.

What has happened since March? For one thing, we have some new data on
faculty: a survey of more than 40,000 faculty members conducted last fall by
the Office of Research of the Council. The first run of the data has been
published under the title Teaching Faculty in Academe: 1972-73 by Alan E. Bayer\(^2\)

Among many other things it shows, not surprisingly, that the faculty has aged since the last survey in 1969, and that a good many more have tenure. Detailed sub-studies of these data will be under way shortly, but at least we have something to hang on to that includes the years when steady-state was a reality. I may mention that I plan to do a repeat of the quick Higher Education Panel Survey that we did for the Keast Commission on Academic Tenure in the spring of 1972; this one will ask much the same questions, but for the spring of 1974, and we may see whether the issues that have been raised are having any effects on the operation of tenure systems on campuses.

Apart from faculty data, we have also the Carnegie Commission's projections of enrollment, revised downward from the projections made in 1971, but still indicating that the state will be steady, if not declining. These are confirmed in the New York State Education Department's recent projections (N.Y. Times, 23 November 1973). And the job market is only spottily changed, with the humanities and social sciences down from last year at this time at the Master's and Doctor's levels, according to the College Placement Council. (News Release 10 December 1973.) I expect your Advisory Committee on the Job Market will have more data for you shortly.

Since March, there have been a number of efforts to bring the steady-state issue to the attention of faculty members. At the University of Hawaii, Miami University, the University of Washington, the University of Pennsylvania, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and William Rainey Harper College, to name only a few, the administration or faculty groups have seen fit to open the issues in
formal meetings for discussion with faculty and administrators. And in November, the AFT had the topic as a major one in a meeting in San Francisco.

But the big event of the spring was the publication of Faculty Tenure, the report of the Commission on Academic Tenure headed by W. Rea Keast and John Macy. This has sparked a spate of papers, discussions, meetings, reviews, objections, and institutional studies geared to the recommendations. On the whole, the book has been very favorably received, and justly so. It carefully reviews the desirability of alternatives to tenure, and rejects them. It advocates instead cleaning up the administration of tenure systems and detailed and long-range planning for the future. But one recommendation, No. 20, has sparked more discussion than all the other 46 put together.

The Keast Commission Recommendation #20

Even before the issuance of the full report of the Keast Commission on Academic Tenure in March, preliminary reports of its recommendation #20 made in January began to arouse controversy. The recommendation opens as follows:

The commission recommends that each institution develop policies relating to the proportion of tenured and nontenured faculty that will be compatible with the composition of its present staff, its resources and projected enrollment, and its future objectives. In the commission's nearly unanimous judgment, it will probably be dangerous for most institutions if tenured faculty constitute more than one-half to two-thirds of the total full-time faculty during the decade ahead.
The recommendation continues with several additional comments, unreported in the original release, all of them designed to indicate that the commission was not advocating rigid quotas but rather the establishment of a planning process that might lead eventually to preventing institutions from becoming tenured-in.

In "Steady-State Staffing" I dealt at some length with the question of quotas and I don't wish now to repeat myself, except to point out that my position advocated the use of a number of alternative devices to prevent the loss of institutional flexibility; I even suggested that a high -- but controlled and not permanent -- tenure ratio was not necessarily a bad thing.

Nevertheless, it appears that the troops are engaged on several fronts and that actions have been taken or are contemplated that require a new look at some of the issues.

To get us into the discussion, I want first to review some work done recently on the question of numerical quotas or ratios, then turn briefly to a few cases where decisions have been made with some perhaps unexpected consequences. After that, I'll turn to a consideration of four unresolved issues.

If a quota, what numbers?

In 1970, while preparing an article published in 1971 under the title "Is There a Perfect Faculty Mix?", I inquired of several mathematicians whether they knew of or would develop a formula for a steady state which would answer the question in the title. No one took me up. Only a short time later, however, the steady state was upon us and I can now identify several attempts completed or under way that get at the problem. Some of these deal with general cases:
That is, is there an abstract mix that permits an institution a maximum turnover with a suitable spread of age and experience? Others deal with particular situations: Is there a particular choice of policies for this institution, starting where it is, that will assure a proper relation between turnover and stability? I have available a bibliography referring to these studies which you may have if you wish to pursue the matter. For the moment, let me summarize what I think they say.

In the first place, they generally agree that for institutions or institutional units with around 100 or more faculty members, it is possible to identify some situations that may provide for both stability and renewal and other situations best avoided. They agree that the principal variables are the age distributions of the faculty, the length of the probationary period, the percentages of those probationers achieving reappointment and tenure, the length of service subsequent to the award of tenure, the percentages of new appointments that are made with immediate tenure, and the rate of attrition from both tenured and nontenured ranks. They also agree, of course, that most of these variables can be controlled by the policies and practices of the institution (or, be it said, negotiated in a contract between the institution and its faculty).

The differences among the investigators arise when they begin to test their models, varying first one set of policies and then another.

For example, William Baumer of SUNY-Buffalo tackles the problem by starting from the parameters on tenure quotas suggested in the Keast Commission recommendations, testing the consequences of setting the quota at 50 percent, 55 percent, 60 percent, and 65 percent. His analysis indicates in general that the lower the quota, the lower the percentage of probationary faculty that may earn tenure
and he identifies the group of probationers as the "revolving bottom." Others have identified it as a group of academic nomads, and I want to return to this question in a minute.

Baumer's calculations lead him to a figure of 76.7 percent faculty on tenure as one that is most satisfactory, one that will permit both turnover and the promotion to tenure of a large percentage of probationers. (The same figure was also identified in an internal Oakland University study.) Baumer is frank about his bias toward the maximum granting of tenure, pointing to several factors that must be considered. One is that heavy restrictions on tenure ultimately drive young faculty from academia, with a loss to the persons and the professions of the amounts invested in their training. He suggests that we consider that keeping them on the job avoids that loss, and that some of the "savings" might be invested in repreparation of older faculty whom, because already tenured, we expect to keep. (The loss and savings calculations do make some sense, but are too complex to go into here.)

Baumer also observes that a tenure quota approaching 50 percent by definition provides a complementary 50 percent nontenured contingent in the institution, one that may well be so pursued by insecurity as to look to collective action to better their lot. This can, of course, happen with other ratios.

Other investigators have approached the tenure quota question less directly, and with different conclusions. The calculations of David Hopkins are based on a study of the 415-member faculty of Stanford's School of Humanities and Sciences, using historical data of recent years as the basis for a Markov model for projecting the consequences of future policies. His major conclusion is that,
with a few apparently modest changes in Stanford's practices, a satisfactory steady-state situation can be achieved. Before mentioning these changes, let me refer to a couple of policy changes he rejects. One is a wholesale reduction in the mandatory retirement age: Statistically, though its short-range results permit a small but significant increase in available positions, over the long run this increase is much reduced. Another policy he rejects is based on a University of Rochester scheme which would, by the use of contracts, extend the probationary period to 11 years. He concludes that, although this reduces the percentage on tenure, it also reduces turnover, increases the level of faculty anxiety, and provides perhaps too few tenure slots for senior staff.

For Hopkins's basic scheme to work with mathematical perfection, a change would have to be made in the percentages of probationary faculty granted tenure. With a probationary period of seven years, faculty would be reviewed for contract renewal in the third year and at that point 25 percent would be terminated. At the tenure-decision year, 45 percent of the remainder would get tenure. If you do some quick mental arithmetic, what this says is that of the new nontenured appointees, only 30 percent could anticipate tenure. If I read his historical figures correctly, the past few years at Stanford this figure was not much higher: about 40 percent.

A study similar to the Stanford one was done in the spring at the University of Pennsylvania. It concentrates on the same variable that concerns both Baumer and Hopkins: the percentage of nontenured faculty that can get tenure.7.5/ Let me now turn to some other formulas that have been developed for considering the mathematical variants in the faculty mix problem. One of these is the
observations of the AAUP's Committee Z on the Economic Status of the Profession for 1972-73. In a section of their report entitled "Tenuring-in," this committee constructs tables showing the relations among four variables: the tenure ratio, the tenured attrition rate per year, the annual promotion (i.e., tenuring) rate of nontenured faculty, and the fraction of tenured faculty attrition that is replaced by tenured appointments. Using these, they calculate the policy alternatives and consequences for tenure ratios ranging from 33 percent to 80 percent. And they conclude, correctly, that "the tenure ratio is itself a choice variable."

Another study that should be mentioned is called The Twelve College Faculty Appointment and Development Study, prepared for a group of twelve private colleges by the Institute for Educational Development. As part of its work, the Institute developed a computer simulation model -- called the Faculty Cost Model -- into which each institution can enter data on its own faculty and project the consequences in numbers and costs of various policy changes. In speaking of tenure ratios, the Institute is reluctant to advise their adoption except
as a last resort to preserve financial viability. It points also to the special problem of numerical ratios in institutions with small numbers of faculty members who are not readily reassignable across fields.

Institutional Studies, Policies, Action -- and Reaction

The institutional studies I have mentioned so far, and others at the University of California, the Florida State University System, Oakland University, and the University of Virginia, have had the advantage of time for planning in the absence of an emergency. Other institutions have gone beyond the planning to action, sometimes under pressure of financial emergencies which have forced them to act to reduce staff and thus to consider especially the question of whether tenured faculty must be dropped. Let me mention what appear from the reports I have to be the salient facts about a few cases.

At Miami-Dade Community College, fall enrollment for 1972 was substantially below what had been projected on two of its three campuses, requiring action by the College to reduce the faculty and administrative staff of 1024 by 84 positions by the end of the 1972-73 academic year. Attrition accounted for 5, retirement or leaves of absence for another 23. In selecting who was to be dismissed, opportunity was first given for transfer with full status to programs on another of Miami-Dade's campuses, and 31 transfers took place. But in the end, there were 56 terminations, five of them with tenure. As of early April, six faculty members had appealed to an internal review committee, two to the EEOC. I have not heard yet what effects the reduction-in-force has had on the tenure ratio, but it could not help but be increased, perhaps substantially, and thus reduce the possibilities of future flexibility without dismissals.
In June 1973, the University of Hawaii, faced with the prospect of absolute budget cuts by the legislature, sent nonrenewal notices to about 160 faculty members -- all those coming up for tenure in 1975 or later. The administration explained it did so to assure at least a year's notice of nonrenewal, and that emergency conditions prevented the University from being selective within the time permitted. Although all agreed that some of those getting the notices would be retained after careful selection procedures, the nonrenewals across the board were issued as insurance. On October 1, the Chronicle of Higher Education reported that the notices were rescinded "after protests by the faculty, the American Association of University Professors, and the American Federation of Teachers." The AFT officially represents the faculty in collective bargaining.

A third case that has received some notoriety is that of Bloomfield College in New Jersey, which in June, according to a recent AAUP report, placed "the entire faculty of sixty-seven on termination appointments for the 1973-74 academic year, and divested thirteen of these faculty members, of whom eleven have been tenured, of their teaching responsibilities, their participation in faculty government, and their faculty vote." In another action, Bloomfield's board abolished "the existing system of faculty tenure." By the end of July, the college was engaged in legal action before the Superior Court of New Jersey, and the faculty had voted for collective bargaining with the AAUP chapter as its agent. An account of the planning (and the considerable part that faculty played in it) that led to the decisions is to be found in the Chronicle for October 15.
A fourth case worth mentioning is that of the Virginia Community College System which abolished tenure and substituted a contract system for all now nontenured and new appointees -- another move attacked by the AAUP. A fifth case is that of the City University of New York, whose chancellor, Robert Kibbee, recommended to the Board of Higher Education that a "half to two-thirds" tenure limit be established. Immediately, the Professional Staff Congress, the faculty union, objected. Subsequently, the Board of Higher Education accepted the recommendation. Since then, the union has mounted a major attack on both Kibbee and the Board.

Two less dramatic cases complete my catalog. Vassar College, having denied contract renewal to about 30 out of 100 nontenured faculty members last year, has established a new policy with three features: initial five-year contracts; an additional three-year contract, but only if a tenure slot will be available; and a 50 percent tenure quota. (New York Times, 18 November, 1973.) And Colgate University's Board has agreed to a three-year temporary elevation of its 55 percent tenure quota (established in 1969 with little notice by the faculty) to 65 percent. An extended account of the Faculty-Administration-Trustee negotiations on this action, written by former ACE Intern JeDon A. Emehiser, makes interesting reading.

The Issues

I have deliberately juxtaposed a presentation of the mathematical computations of tenure quotas and steady-state planning on the one hand with some examples of what has happened when action was taken either in a real emergency or in an anticipated one. Mathematically, a steady-state faculty is possible to achieve on a number of models, with the tenure ratio one of the variables. Practically and politically, adopting one of these models may be far harder because of the nonmathematical issues involved. I want now to turn to four of these issues for further exploration.
1. **Quotas**

The rhetoric expended on both sides in attacking and defending quotas has been prodigious\textsuperscript{14} and some of it obvious nonsense. Nevertheless, behind it are important considerations.

First is the question of job security as represented by tenure, and who shall have it. Given a fixed number of academic positions to be occupied nationally, and every incumbent permanent until death, resignation, or retirement (i.e., 100 percent tenure), there will be room for only that number of newly prepared faculty represented by those that die, resign, or retire. The rest -- the ones not chosen -- cannot enter the profession at all. They don even become academic nomads: they're just out, and even the very best ones (and we) lose a large part of the investment in their preparation.

If we agree, however, that these prepared people should have a chance to get tenure, how good should that chance be? Three out of five, one out of two, one out of four? The figure is theoretically within the control of the institution, which can set its policies to raise or lower the figure, by trading off on some of the other variables.

But even when a decision can be made on how large a percentage of probationers may get tenure, it must be recognized that the decision does not increase the total number of jobs available nationally. It merely provides an opportunity for some of the nomads to compete for the available slots. In the end, no more are hired permanently, and after a period of years, the same number are out of academic jobs entirely.
Does it benefit the institution to provide the opportunity for more probationers than it can give tenure? To a degree, it does, if the institution wishes to select as its tenured faculty the best of those it has observed in action on its own campus, and not simply to award tenure to all it hires. But we note that the controlling variable is the number of vacancies it can expect in its tenured staff. As Committee Z's calculations show, the higher the allowable percentage on tenure and the more that vacancies are filled by nontenured staff rather than appointees given immediate tenure, the greater the chances that a particular appointee can achieve tenure. But what is not so clear is that with a large percentage of the faculty on tenure, the absolute numbers of slots for probationers is considerably reduced. Thus, if all U.S. institutions were 80 percent tenured, and vacancies in the tenured ranks occurred at the rate of 5 percent a year, the institution could use the 20 percent nontenured slots for probationers almost all of whom have a chance at tenure without raising the ratio above 80 percent. On the other hand, if only 50 percent can have tenure, and attrition from the tenured ranks is 5 percent a year, that 5 percent of tenured slots would be the target for 50 percent of the untenured staff, of whom only about a third or less could get tenure by the end of the probationary period.

To sum up this part of the case: you can, within some limits, juggle your policies to increase or reduce the chance that a probationer can become tenured, even though the juggling doesn't increase your total jobs. And so the question is, what percentage should have the chance -- a philosophical, economic, and political question.
This leads to a second point in the quota issue. Faculty who argue against the quotas, if my documents are representative, usually begin by being persuaded that some attention should be paid to the preservation of institutional flexibility, and that some proportion of the faculty should, at any time, be untenured. Nevertheless, when they contemplate the actual implementation of a policy, they are likely to be moved by other considerations. First is the prospect that quotas will be set midstream, so that faculty who joined the institution on the understanding that there would be tenure slots for them if they did well will have that possibility cut off arbitrarily and without even the pretense of a review of their merits. This could, of course, happen, and it still seems to me wise not to let it happen if it can be avoided. It seems better if the demand for a program is static and the probationer is fully qualified, to give him tenure even if the department for a time is fully tenured. If, later, demand is further reduced, then financial exigency procedures may have to be invoked and the staff of that department be reduced from the tenured ranks.

But the other part of the argument deals with faculty not yet employed, and it seems to me that provisions for these are far more easily agreed to and established without opposition from the incumbents. As the postdoctoral fellow program at Miami University shows, a one- or two-year terminal appointment is looked upon by many young Ph.D.s as far better than no academic appointment at all. An institution can use temporary or moderate contract appointments until retirement or attrition unlock tenured positions in suitable proportions. The difficulty is having more tenure-ladder probationers already in the citadel than can get to the inner sanctum.
There has been a good deal of opposition to this approach even from within the tenured ranks. It has two motives, I think: the first is the natural desire of those in the catbird (or tenured) seat not to appear unsympathetic to the less fortunate, even to the academically yet unborn, among whom are of course their graduate students whom they meet every day. The other is a feeling on the part of the young, in particular, that the ranks of the tenured, not only the nontenured, should be weeded to make more room for plants of selected quality. Something of both these motives has, I think, gone into the cases in which tenure has been abolished entirely.

To this point, we have considered that a decision on tenure ratios, if one is to be made that can work, is less a matter of mathematics than of social and political considerations. The mathematics will follow -- at least up to a point. But let's turn to a second issue, one that may prevent an institution selecting some of the statistically and politically possible options.

2. Costs

The IED Faculty Cost Model directly shows the relationship between faculty mix by age and rank and the total costs of operation. Although I raised the point that a distribution by age affects salary costs significantly -- and illustrated it in my original paper, Steady-State Staffing -- it is one that few faculty groups, and not all the administrative studies I've seen, have come to grips with.

As long as we make the assumption that the increase in skill that comes with age and experience should be reflected in higher salary, any institution that shifts from a largely young faculty to one balanced in age will increase its costs.
Presumably, the performance will be better, but can the institution already in financial trouble plan with any confidence on still higher salary costs in order to get the advantage of regular turnover that a steady state brings?

Some critics of quotas have cried that institutions setting tenure quotas at 50-66 percent are simply out to get cheap labor: that is, 33-50 percent of the faculty in junior ranks. And perhaps there's truth in this. But they overlook the fact that during the '50s and '60s the growing institutions were because they couldn't help it -- getting even more of the same kind of labor, and everyone was reasonably happy with the results, though exhausted by the recruiting. Now that recruiting is a cinch, I suspect that some would like to continue having a large group of young faculty. But like kittens they turn into cats, and in a steady state they either have to be moved into expensive middle age or replaced.

If we take the long national look, we must be reminded of the Carnegie Commission's observation, that "the '1960s Faculty' will be the largest single seniority block in faculty councils until the year 2000." Apart from the other consequences of this that the Commission notes, we must consider also the costs. This 1960s block will expect -- and may demand, if it is not forthcoming -- continuing increases in salary, so that even if an institution does not try to spread its faculty age mix, the costs of education will rise substantially over what they are now as the bulge of early middle-aged people moves toward retirement. Of course, in the year 2000 institutions might get a breather as these people retire.

There's no easy answer to this problem of the essentially higher costs of a steady-state faculty. A very hard-nosed approach would be simply to offer the faculty the formula: faculty salaries are the mathematical result of the money available divided by the number of faculty. One can raise the salaries by reducing
the number of faculty or by raising the amount of money available, or both. In
days when increasing the funds is harder and harder, reducing (or at least not
increasing) the faculty is the only option. Collective bargaining, of course,
tends to fight for more money, but also (considering the constituency) for
regular raises for each individual faculty member. One may suspect that the
time will come more frequently when there will be periods of no raises, and when
promotions which raise salaries will be withheld only because of the salary con-
sequences. In view of these considerations, it would seem to me that middle-
aged and older faculty might look with some favor on a reasonably large pool of
what they have scornfully called cheap labor.


That phrase, cheap labor, leads me to a third issue that is increasingly
going to show up in our steady-state calculations: that of government influence
on decisions. Specifically, cheap labor is illegal if you are demonstrably paying
some faculty less than others for the same work. You have already read of and
possibly experienced the adjustments in pay required in some institutions under
the Equal Pay Act. In specific relation to steady state and the proportions of
junior and thus lower-paid staff you have, you will likely have to be very careful
to see to it that the jobs the lower paid do are not the same as those your high-
paid professors do.

I don't need to go again into the relation of court action and changes in
policy and procedure. We've all been over that with, for example, nonrenewal
cases, and the returns aren't yet in on the contract-breaking and tenure-abolish-
ment cases. Instead, I want to call your attention to something the Carnegie
Commission recently pointed to, a matter that Hopkins at Stanford arrived at by
his own methods.
The Carnegie point was noted in the 9 October 1973 Chronicle in an article on a technical note which was issued in advance of the Commission's final report. Essentially, what the Commission's calculations show is that, because of the scarcity of vacancies on faculties in the next 30 years (quite apart from scarcities of qualified women and minorities in certain fields), even substantial preferential (or quota) hiring will not make a rapid statistical difference in the proportions of women or minorities on college faculties for a long time to come.

The Carnegie Commission proposes as a first step increasing the numbers of these groups in the "pool" by special efforts to get them into -- and successfully out of -- graduate and professional schools. In addition, as the pool increases over the years, the Commission advocates "special consideration in hiring for women and minorities where their roles as models for students and their special sensitivities to the problems of women and minority students will add to the overall excellence of a department, school or college." Note, the Commission does not say that persons less qualified should be hired in order to meet a quota, but that the need for role models appropriately may tip the scales between two persons equally qualified otherwise.

The Commission goes on to show one model of hiring and its consequences. They note, for women, that if during the '70s 35 percent of college vacancies are filled by women, during the '80s 45 percent (reflecting the increased availability of women in the pool), and in the '90s 55 percent of all vacancies -- the result in the year 2000 could be a faculty 39.2 percent women, just about the percentage of women in the total labor force nationally in 1970. The corresponding percentages for employing minorities are 10 percent in the '70s, 20 percent in the '80s, and 25 percent in the '90s, giving in year 2000 a percentage in colleges of 15.6, a little higher than the national minority labor force figure of 14.9 percent in 1970.
I think we have to be aware that these are at best theoretical projections, which highlight the slow pace of change one can expect in institutions (not only higher education) that are stable in size and make long-term commitments to their workers. Who knows whether in 1990 it will be politically possible to give only 20 percent of the new academic openings to white males? But under present Affirmative Action policies, while you are struggling with a steady state for the next quarter century, you may statistically show underrepresentation of women and minorities.

4. Early Retirement

The early retirement issue is an odd one in that it has been given as much attention as the quota issue, but with much less reason, in my view, at least as it might affect one's steady-state plans. There have been surveys of retirement plans -- one by TIAA-CREF, another of AAU-member institutions by Herbert Coolidge and Alton Taylor of the University of Virginia. There have been records of individual deals made with faculty members. Recently, a few institutions have made early retirement possible, thus joining institutions that have had such provisions for years. Meanwhile, there's a small but loud chorus of complaints from those who are at retirement age, or expect to live to see it, insisting that they should be allowed to continue, like Congressmen and federal judges. One institution -- the University of Hawaii -- was sued by a faculty member who was not allowed to go on beyond the mandatory age of 65.18/

The note I want to stress is that for steady-state planning, although the effect of lowering the mandatory retirement age may temporarily open a significant number of positions, once these are filled, the reduction of the average total term of faculty service by five years doesn't do much to add to the numbers of openings available annually on a regular basis. Some of the other variables we
have noted produce far more significant results. Furthermore, the dollar savings of replacing a high-priced person with a low-priced one are somewhat offset by the higher costs of an adequate pension provided five years early.

The push for early retirement comes from a number of motives, but it seems to me that if it is adopted, it would have to be on grounds other than providing a major part of a good steady-state staffing plan.\(^{19/}\)

5. **Other Issues**

In the course of putting this paper together and discussing it with a number of groups, some additional issues have been raised which will demand our attention in the coming months. I list them only briefly here.

The first arises out of the conventional categorization of nontenured junior faculty as probationary. When all nontenured instructors and assistant professors may expect tenure if they prove themselves, then they are legitimately called probationers. But if, as has been true for many years in a number of our older universities, it is clear that very few junior faculty will be granted tenure, that they have accepted their positions mostly for the experience and the associations, and that in all probability they will move after five or six years -- should this group be called probationers? The question is not only semantic, or philosophical. It may also have some serious legal implications. An internal document that comes to grips with some of these problems was published by the Dean of Faculty at Princeton in October, 1972, under the title "An Information Statement for the Guidance of New Faculty at Princeton University."

Another hard question also has its semantic elements: Some institutions are more concerned with what might be called a shifting state situation than with a steady state. That is, a staffing program that balances tenured and nontenured
staff in the institution as a whole is far easier to achieve than one that accommodates the shifting of students from one discipline or department to another, often in unpredictable ways. Is the answer to hold down severely the numbers of tenured faculty in those departments that may lose students, or to prepare to exercise procedures for dropping tenured staff, or to control inter-departmental mobility by curricular requirements, or to retrain faculty (something that is being studied in Florida), or something else?

A third, and perhaps even more fundamental issue, has to do with the answer to a question that our language doesn't even allow us to ask gracefully: "What is tenure tenure of?" Is there any understanding about the nature of tenure itself that can be translated into common operational terms? Certainly on many campuses that follow AAUP guidelines, tenure is defined partly as a guarantee of due process in termination actions. But when the steady-state crunch is on, we face such questions as: Does tenure guarantee a place in a department only, or in an institution, or in a system of institutions? Does it apply to a particular rank or a particular salary, so that neither can be reduced without the procedures appropriate to dismissal? During a reduction of staff, does the professor with twenty students have as strong a claim on his position as one with three hundred?

You will recall that in Act V of The Tempest, everything works out pretty well. But at the end of Act IV, Prospero is weary -- so much so that he says to Ferdinand

We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep. Sir, I am vexed.
Bear with my weakness, my old brain is troubled.
Be not disturbed with my infirmity.
If you be pleased, retire into my cell,
And there repose. A turn or two I'll walk,
To still my beating mind.
Department chairmen will, I am afraid, need several walks before they are able to fit together the pieces of a new reality. Like Prospero, they will have to be both gentle and hard-nosed, magicians and human beings, and weary before they can rest.
Footnotes


5. W. Todd Furniss, "Is There a Perfect Faculty Mix?", Educational Record, Summer 1971, pp. 244-50.


Footnotes - 2


Selected Readings on Steady-State Staffing

A number of the items listed here have not been formally published or have had limited distribution. However, the sources indicated in the entries marked with an asterisk have agreed to make single copies available upon request. It is possible also that a number of them will be available through the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education (One Dupont Circle, Suite 630, Washington, D.C. 20036) in Spring, 1974.


* Zaharis, John L. "Developing Guidelines for Faculty Reduction in a Multi-Campus College," April 1973. Available from the author, Director, Division of Natural Sciences, Miami-Dade Community College-South, 11011 S.W. 104th Street, Miami, Fla. 33156.