The organizational aspects of the process of innovation diffusion and the planned change and development as applied to an appraisal of international development education (IDE) are examined in this paper. The document begins by describing how effective organizations and institutions should be planned and structured to produce planned change. It considers the general lack of knowledge among practitioners and educators concerning the how and why of organizational behavior. The main body of the paper presents a case study of an East African educational project conducted under the auspices of a United Nations-affiliated agency. The general lack of sensitivity on the part of planners and administrators to the organizational aspects of technical assistance is illustrated. The author additionally considers the ministerial politics in a country receiving aid; the creation of an organization to handle a project; the evaluation of organization effectiveness; the role of organization participants; recruitment for IDE programs; and the effects of race, religion, and culture on the success of a project. The paper concludes with recommendations for solving some of the problems in IDE and with reference to some social science techniques available for inventing needed solutions. (Author/DN)
THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND THE INTERPERSONAL 

IN AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION PROJECT 

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THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND THE INTERPERSONAL
IN AN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION PROJECT

In one of my earlier papers\(^1\) dealing with international development education, the assertion had been made that some failures and many frustrations of those working in the field of 'educational diplomacy' could be avoided by helping them develop understandings and skills in the process of planning and implementing innovation and change. It had been further suggested that through appropriate conceptualization of the process of innovation diffusion, planned change, and development both the limitations and the possibilities of international development education could be realistically appraised. The resulting sense of realism could be good both for educational diplomacy and for educational diplomats.

The present paper seeks to underscore the same point—the need to understand the process of change to be able to make appropriate interventions to improve the effectiveness of technical assistance and international development. Our focus in this paper is sharper since we deal only with one aspect of the process of innovation diffusion, planned change and development — the organizational\(^2\) aspect.
International development educators -- indeed educators in general -- have shown a tremendous lack of consciousness about organizational processes. Most often they have failed to understand that all programs of innovation, change and development must be organizationally-mediated. That is, effective organizational systems and structures must be created before any systematic, large-scale development work can be undertaken at all. Change agents must use some kinds of organizational structures and if those structures are not appropriate or are not well designed the results are likely to be bad, indifferent, even tragic.

The case materials, presented later in this paper, are based on the author's experience of working on a broad impact international development education project in East Africa under the aegis of a UN-affiliated agency. It was an integrated program including literacy, agricultural extension, health education and political education with the ultimate goal of making social change within communities. Of course, what is presented here is only one case, but what we think is a somewhat typical case of broad impact programs organized under bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

The case materials bring out perhaps some interesting facts of organizational life in an international context. First and foremost, one comes across a lack of sensitivity to organizational facts on the part of most planners, administrators, and participants in international development programs. The case materials also bring out the definite 'diplomatic set' within which most international development education work takes place and which consequently gives rise to a host of interpersonal problems peculiar to international and intercultural programs. Again, some very interesting interorganizational
problems inherent in the joint management of projects by national and international bureaucracies are brought out.

A discussion of what might be done to solve some of these problems has been included in the end. Some important social science techniques available for inventing needed solutions to the problems encountered have been referred to even though very briefly.

II

International development assistance, of whatever variety, is an instance of planned change—even if it is not always well-planned change. The transaction is between cultures: a donor cultural group, with the full approval or the grudging acceptance of a recipient cultural group, seeking to make technical, structural, or value-laden substantive interventions in the educational, administrative, social, economic, or military systems of the recipient culture.

International development assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, is organizationally-mediated. Before being able to affect any changes in the lives of the people of a client (or recipient) culture by improving the farmer's productivity or his family's health, by producing more goods or by sending more kids to school, by electrifying rural townships or by providing opportunities for greater political participation, well-functioning systems—that is, effective organizations and institutions—must be built to undertake the construction of new school facilities and factory structures, to distribute goods and services, and to reinforce new behavioral patterns among
individuals in communities. Often brand new institutions may have to be built to handle newly invented social, political, or economic functions. More often existing organizations may have to be restructured to cope with added functions and objectives. Lastly, the appropriate organizations of the donor culture and of the recipient culture that will work together must handle interorganizational problems, and must establish a *modus operandi* for organizing together for work.

While organizational behavior is one of the few areas where social scientists claim to have developed a tested technology—Managerial Grid, T-Group Techniques being only two examples of this technology— the practitioner in the field, the one who is called upon to build new institutions or to make existing organizations become more responsive to new objectives, is often unaware or unable to make use of the technology or the theory of organization development and institution-building. Most often the practitioner is without any understanding of organizations as structures which then have specific propensities and possibilities embedded in them. He does not realize that organizations bring specific constraints to bear on individual and group interactions, and on communication patterns within them, and thereby determine the organizational capacity to meet individual and system goals. For many a practitioner institution-building is merely inventing some designations and inserting them on a flow chart with multi-level hierarchies. Organization development then consists in creating new sections, and issuing fresh office orders that assign new duties to old personnel. The interpersonal within the organization seldom suggests itself as important enough to require attention. This would be inviting trouble!
The practitioner in fact looks at the interpersonal in organizations as so much nuisance to be put up with in organizational life where you have to deal with people. He often assumes that the best way of handling the interpersonal is to neglect it. However, interpersonal behavior defined as "everything that 'goes on' between one person and another (or others) by way of perception, evaluation, understanding, and mode of reaction" has important consequences for organizational behavior and consequently for the achievement of organizational goals. Organizational structures and personality structures of role incumbents within organizations interact and in significantly different ways under different sets of conditions. Organizations as collectivities, by providing specific formats of roles and rules for relating roles, subject interpersonal behavior within them to considerable loss of degrees of freedom. Organizations themselves, at the same time, as structures, might sometimes be drastically affected by the personalities of role incumbents and interpersonal mechanisms they use. It is possible to assume that some organized events may be studied fruitfully using psychological theory. It is because of this bias that we deal with the interpersonal and the organizational together in this paper.

If the practitioners are not knowledgeable about how organizations behave and why, the students and researchers of organizations do not seem to be on a firm ground either. Again, as educators, we need not claim to be the most naive in organizational theory and practice. In point of fact, organizational theory generally is said not to be in a very good shape. Handbook of Organizations describes the study of organizations as a semi-discipline. Bidwell in his chapter on educational organizations contributed to the same Handbook states that a
systematic study of the school as an organization has still to be made. The comment could be applied to all educational organizations of which school is only one. As Bidwell asserts, students of organizations have rarely paid any attention to educational organizations and educators themselves have seldom shown sensitivity to the organizational attributes of educational institutions. Understandably, not even a good taxonomy of educational organizations is available. All we understand vaguely is that elementary schools are different from school districts as organizations and these latter are different from the universities. Again, that public institutions are different, as organizations, from private and parochial educational institutions.

When educators go traveling away from home to other countries and continents to assist in the reconstruction of educational systems in order to make them more responsive to the manpower or developmental needs of a country, their lack of sensitivity to organizational questions and to interpersonal concerns has been no less dramatic than at home; and their performance in those situations no more cause for pride. Indeed the introduction of one more variable -- the international or the intercultural if you will -- makes organizational behavior even more complicated in those settings. If the general organizational theory is in such straits as March would have us believe, it might not be useful to expect much either from the specific theoretical tradition of international organizations. That is indeed the case. Social scientists seem to agree that in the area of international organization theory, again, there are no tested models. Only.
some observed problems are beginning to be listed. To quote:

Inherent in this context is the need for adjustment of the divergent traditions, procedures, and concepts of administration with which incoming personnel may be identified. Illustrations of such differences include methods of handling correspondence, the role of the 'front office,' the relation of budgetary and personnel to substantive (program) units, the career status of employees, the use of informal task forces as an administrative device, and the attitude of male employees toward female supervisors.  

Case materials on organizations, stories of what organizational problems arose, in what kind of organizations, within what sets of preconditions, with what kinds of interpersonal and system implications, and how they were or were not resolved, is something that both the practitioner and the theory builder seems to need, and do indeed ask for. The practitioner hopes to find in such materials parallels between his own problems and those reported in cases and hopes to develop some insights with regard to what he might do to solve a problem or skirt a crisis. The researcher and theory builder looks into such case materials for new hypotheses, confirmation of some old ones or for disproof of some others that he always thought were either too specific or completely spurious.

In this paper we present some case material related to an educational project in East Africa conducted under the auspices of a UN-affiliated agency, hereinafter called the Agency. The project only partially reported here was a broad impact program that used nonformal educational approaches to bring economic development and social change to farming communities. For obtaining fulfillment of these objectives the project had to create a new organizational structure with an identity sufficiently apart from existing ministries and
departments. This was necessary since ministries come to have their own typically specialized and segmental functions with rigid bureaucratic structures that are often unable to cope with comprehensive developmental concerns of a real human community out in the bush.

The case material included in the next section is presented to students of educational change who have interest in the organizational and the intercultural contexts of innovation diffusion, planned change and development.

The case, hopefully, will bring out the general lack of sensitivity on the part of planners, and administrators to the organizational aspects of technical assistance; except that in a personal and private sense individuals do seem to know the organizations in which they work and often use them well to fulfill personal goals, or merely to survive within the organization.

The important part of ministerial politics in an aid receiving country, we will see, is to get a prestigious UN or US-AID project for your own ministry not only for the status of having it, but also for the possible fringe benefits that it might bring to the top hierarchy in the form of access to jeeps and landrovers, projectors and printing equipment, new office machines and furniture, secretarial help, and last but not least, trips abroad to participate in discussions, meetings, and conferences.

We will find that when a broad impact program is to be handled, and no one ministry or department is seen to be primarily responsible, the program is assigned to some one administrative unit; and, invariably, a coordination committee is set up. A coordination committee is created ostensibly to make it possible for all the different organizational
entities—national, bilateral, or multilateral, governmental or voluntary—to make their contributions to decision making and program implementation. However, a coordination committee often works out to be a forum for fighting small and bit political battles between ministries and departments. It might be contributory to feelings of participation, but is often dysfunctional as a body either for laying down policy or for making the needed decisions.

We will find also that in the real world of developmental actions there is seldom an attempt to design and to build organizations or institutions to suit specific purposes and then, as the current jargon goes, to manage them by objectives. Most organizations and institutions are created merely by inventing designations and by putting them on a hierarchical chart. This has far-reaching consequences. Many program operations, and activities do not seem to relate logically to any designation and thus end up being nobody’s business. This means that some things do not get done at all. Then, when crises arise, officials run to the drawing board to make some new organizational charts; and think the problem has been solved since a new chart has been invented.

There are further problems, and even more serious. Experimental programs are sought to be handled by organizational structures designed for service and support. No one seems to see the difference. In this particular case, we will see that the consequences that followed from this confusion of structure and function were indeed tragic. Again, since organizational objectives were unclear and roles ill-defined, division of functions and responsibilities between national and international staffs was unclear, and an organic organization did not develop. What
did emerge was a situation of duality with parallel organizations, one national, one international, with weak interfaces between them, and no monitoring mechanisms to monitor any breakdowns in the system. Different organizational norms and differential experiences of the people involved in the two parallel organizations, articulated the schism even further. As a result of existing duality an adversary relationship developed wherein the international part of the organization had a veto on resources and the national part of the organization had a veto on implementation actions.

The lack of a monitoring mechanism to monitor breakdowns in the organization had dire consequences for the project reported in the following section. The sickness was there, and it was serious, but nobody seemed to know that it existed so as to make an ameliorative intervention and have things moving again.

We will notice what ambiguity of roles can do to the role incumbents and to the life of an organization. Undoubtedly, advisor and consultant roles are new. One cannot, perhaps should not, try writing detailed job cards for advisors and consultants. However, the responsibilities and obligations of the roles need to be defined and the mutual expectations of advisor and advisee roles need to be clarified and cultivated.

Finally, the case materials will bring out an important organizational problem—recruitment for IDE programs. This problem concerns both the donor agencies and the recipient governments. The donor agencies are unable to recruit the very best staff all the time; and sometimes the quality of the staff recruited by them is so low that it could easily bring about a crisis of confidence in the total technical assistance
program. In the recipient country there is the problem of finding enough bodies with suitable qualifications to fill counterpart slots.

The case material will underline the diplomatic setting of all IDE work. Communication researchers point out age, sex, education, and socio-economic background as important determinants of interactions between people. The case material that follows will point out some important variables that are sometimes glossed over or are at least not as much emphasized in organizational literature as they perhaps should be. For instance, the case points out that in IDE work, not only the current politics of the nations whose nationals get together to work, but also the past histories of those nations, come to acquire relevance for present interactions between individuals from those countries. This is particularly so in countries that are recently liberated and are highly politicized communities. The sins of fathers do come to visit upon their sons now engaged in educational diplomacy.

Again, the racial aspect of interpersonal relations will seem to be important: international development work is often interracial work since the developed world is white and the underdeveloped world is black or brown or yellow. At times the fact of belonging to the same religion and church would seem to establish a commonalty between otherwise disparate individuals except in relation with groups that have come to resent white Christianity as one more expression of imperialism and have painted the Christ in their own image. The ability to speak the language of the host country would seem to provide a positive bond while the life-style of the international expert may be resented enough to introduce a tinge of bitterness in interpersonal relations. And lastly, while participants might often begin with stereotypes about each
other, they do end up as persons—not nationalities and abstractions. Competent behavior does generate respect; even affections develop.

III

A Short Description of the Case

With Comments

The following material constitutes a selective presentation of the Case. Only those events, descriptions, and details have been included that seem to bear on the organizational and the interpersonal aspects of IDE work. On the other hand, it has not been possible to present a "dramatic incident" in support of every generalization included later in section IV. This is so because all that was, was not always overtly played out in terms of things said, documents written, and behavioral episodes staged—for every one to see or hear. There was a lot, we think, that was there but barely ever surfaced. Part of the statements in the following are, therefore, attributive, not merely descriptive. That may be bad science but had to be done in the interest of developing the Case. The Case material is set out in six sections as in the following:

1. The Background and the Setting
2. Beginning with Obsolescence: I Semiannual (July–December, 1968)
4. The Second Field Action that was Really the First: III Semiannual (July–December, 1969)
6. A Change of the Guard

It should be noticed from the above that a two-year program period is involved in the following description and that this total two-year
period falls in four consecutive terms of six months each as follows:

The I and III terms were the periods of field action when educational and extension activities were actually organized by the Project for client groups of adult men and women in the bush. During the two January-June terms, the Project withdrew from the field leaving the client groups to themselves and to their agricultural chores. The explanation for this withdrawal from the field was that during the six months of January to June the farmers were too busy with their agricultural work to have any time for organized activities in education and extension.

In organizational terms it meant that the field organization was dismantled and rebuilt every six months at high costs of time and personnel and with high rates of attrition in previous role incumbents. Since most village level workers of the Project were voluntary workers they drifted away during the six months when no field activity was going on. They developed new obligations and were not available during the next session of field actions. New volunteers had to be trained to take their places!

There was a more important question involved. Was a farmer in Africa whose annual input of time in his farm has been estimated at around 300 hours, ever so busy as not to be able to attend educational and extension activities of clear and direct relevance to the work in hand and to the productivity of such work? No answers were available; none were attempted.
1. The Background and the Setting

What was the Project and what was its setting? Who were the actors involved, and what were they doing? What were the configurations of their relationships, formal and informal? What were the linkages? What were the resources available to the Project and to the farmers? Was it an environment of hope that surrounded them or was it despair?

View from Far

What I knew of my work before I left home in India to take up this new job with the UN-affiliated Agency was this: I would be working as a Trainer on a project of IDE in East Africa under the auspices of a UN-affiliated agency. There would be at least one other man on the team, a chief technical adviser, to whom I would report. I had received materials on the general objectives of the project, on salary scales and fringe benefits and that was, perhaps, all. I had no idea of the scope of Project operations, or of who else would be doing what else. No wonder some experts discover when they get to their duty stations that they got into the wrong jobs. Sometimes the Agency discovers that they got the wrong man for the job on hand. I made lots of guesses about the job and its possibilities, but there was no time to ask any questions. In any case both the salary and the status of being an international civil servant were attractive. That seemed adequate information!

I never really understood how I got invited. How indeed, one wonders, do UN agencies get in touch with the right man for the right job? Are the present methods of recruiting at all satisfactory? One thing is, however, obvious and that is that the selection criteria if not
completely political, are at least techno-political. The political aspect of recruitment is indeed built right into the selection and recruitment procedures. For instance, the Agency generally forwards to the host government a list of three eligible candidates. The government then selects one of those, or asks for more names if it finds no one to be satisfactory. While technical needs and considerations are in their minds the host governments use political criteria much more frequently. As I was to learn later, one of the things that went in my favor was the fact that the other man on the list was an Englishman with colonial experience in East Africa and the host country, which happened to be a highly politicized country, did not want a colonial officer back with another designation. By comparison, an Asian must have seemed all right!

IDE work does take place in a diplomatic setting. It is political.

My first stop was the Agency headquarters in Western Europe. Two weeks were given to my briefing. This was an opportunity that could have been much better utilized, but was not. I got my first glimpse of the Agency as a bureaucracy. Briefing included a long and enjoyable retreat in the country: lot of good food and good wine and some talk by junior Agency officials on how to be tactful international civil servants. Some more information was obtained about the project in Africa at the Agency headquarters. I learnt now that there would be eight people on the Project; and that seven of them were already there! I understood for the first time the scope of the work involved and what might be the nature of my duties.

On other days during briefing, I had several 15-minute interviews with Agency officials. Most time was spent, however, in signing papers, applying for salary and travel advances and in making applications for the UN
Laissez Passer. An international civil servant was beginning to be born!

I was not the only one at the Agency headquarters who was going through briefing. There were, of course, several others. We were given lessons in the need to be apolitical in our work with the host country. We were to be "international" civil servants; we had to transcend our narrow nationalisms. We had to remember that we were working on behalf of the Agency and during our mission periods we had to have loyalty to the Agency objectives, and to the Agency constitution. Our role was to be advisory and we were to work through our national counterparts so that we could leave trained national officials and technicians behind us at the end of our various missions.

I also learnt that I would have many different people watching over me and my work. The divisional head in the Agency headquarters would be one of my bosses. The Agency chief technical adviser at the duty station would be another; and then the national director of the project, part of the host country bureaucracy, would be another. To survive long on the Project, one would have to serve these three masters and some more.

My second stop was the capital city of the host country. I was received at the airport by the Russian colleague on the team and sped towards the hotel in style in the Agency limousine. Some conversation took place on the way in hesitant Russian-English that he spoke and accented Indian-English that I spoke. Some experts have been known, of course, to arrive in the field without any knowledge of the language of business in the host-country—contrary to the claims earlier made by them in their dossiers. The UN Agency is too embarrassed at this stage of the game to send them back, and so is the host country. It takes 6 to 8 months for such experts to learn barely to communicate in the new language.
On the next day after arrival I made a visit to the local office of the Agency, and signed some more papers regarding local salaries, customs clearances, arrangements about arrival of my family and then went back to the hotel. I stayed there for almost two months while the host government looked around for housing. The additional per diem paid to me would have built a big part of a house at the duty station in the bush. And if we added the salary paid for no work done the house could have been all built and even furnished.

The Terrain

I learned on arrival at the duty station that the international team of experts was actually three teams—one consisting of four members, another consisting of three members and a third a one-member team. The distances between them were not small. See Figure 17

One team was up North and 800 miles away from the second team on the coast; and this second team was 180 miles from the third. With the kind of facilities available for transportation and communication, the distances were functionally much greater. A telephone call could often take a whole day to get through. Roads in the bush were dirt roads. Flying was not always possible; when possible it was expensive and infrequent.

I came to be a one-man training team. Training was seen by the decision-makers involved as something which is done inside of a training institution, and, therefore, the trainer was sent to where a training institution was! But then I found myself some 800 miles away from the field work area. Imagine designing a training program for field workers whose roles are not clear and who will work in a field area of which the training designer has no first hand knowledge. And imagine doing all that without interacting with other members of the team. A request for transfer
FIGURE 1. The initial distribution of the International Team.
to the field work area was made by me and after 6 months of my arrival I joined the field work team. In the meantime I made three air trips at 1200-1800 shillings per trip to the field work area to participate in the work of the team and to get feedback on training design.

It may be useful at this stage to introduce a graphic presentation of the setting of the Project under discussion showing all the various "actors" involved in the program and the configurational relationship and linkages between them. 9

Even a sight examination of the "configuration plotting" and "linkage typing" attempted in Figure 2 would suggest that the situation is pregnant with organizational problems. One problem, of course, can be seen emerging from the multiplicity of configurations involved in the operation. Again, the international team of experts is divided not only in terms of distances, but also, in case of at least two of its members, in terms of organizational purposes, and loyalties. The multiplicity and overlap of linkages among the international configurations did result, and not infrequently, in communication tangles when different decision-making points in the system projected different perspectives on the same one issue; encouraged and wished for successes in different sectors and aspects of the programs; and when everyone wanted to be informed about progress on various actions.

The part-counterpart linkages also created problems. As Figure 2 indicates, the Chief Technical Advisor's counterpart is far away; and the man in the field office, the National Deputy Director who came to be the de facto project director, is counterpart to another member on the international team.

On the national side again the multiplicity of configurations is obvious; and there is the inevitable coordination committee—a complex configuration in itself.
FIGURE 2. The Project Office with related configurations within the National and the International Systems. The five ―'s indicate part-counterpart relationships between international experts and national officials. The figure presents the Project Office organization after the whole Agency Team had been transferred to the field area.
The most noticeable thing, however, is the National Deputy Director having no staff of field workers at his disposal either for educational work or for agricultural extension in the communities. He was expected to work through the regional officers responsible for development programs in the region who had field staff that they administered. These regional officers not only had their own regular programs to implement but also were of the same administrative status as the National Deputy Director in the Project office. Thus this prestigious international project was to be implemented on borrowed staff time!

Of Language, and Politics

Crowded in the first six months of my stay was a three-week crash course in the local language of the country, in a language school run by American missionaries. None of the experts on the international team, except one, knew the local language and hence the whole international team went to school. The language instruction, I am afraid, was sometimes deadening, but there was tremendous political discussion around the Russian Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the doctrine of limited sovereignty propounded by Breznev. The political crisis in Europe cast its shadow also on the small bush town in tropical Africa. The focus was on the Russian member of the team. The American missionaries in the language school, the rest of the international team (two Danes, one Belgian, one Norwegian, one Finn, one Dutch, one Indian) and an Englishman who was also there were all interested in the Russian point of view, in his explanation of events. Here were all those international civil servants, each acting like a little ambassador trying to project the point of view of his government. I remember with admiration the memorable performance
by the Russian member of the team. He showed neither approval nor disapproval of the Russian Government in relation to this political event. "Who has the facts that the politicians have?" he asked. "How can you evaluate and judge things you don't have the facts on?" There was no avoidance of the issue yet the discussion of the issue was completely noncommittal. My Russian friend was indeed a first-rate international civil servant!

The historical and the political were indeed always part of the personal interactions, but these became much more salient under the shadow of a political crisis. The Norwegian joked about the Danish imperialists. (Jokes are a serious matter, remember!) One Dane joked about the Danish export industry—export of Kings and Queens to other countries of Europe. The Finnish expert talked about the Finn perseverance in the II World War against the Russians and with as much passion argued in favor of Finn Vodka being the best in the world. There were other memories of the II World War, and some ugly wounds were reopened. The political and the historical man asserted itself and not only for that one particular time. He was always a skin layer away.

Of Resources and Commitments

Back at the campus of the training institute where I had been first posted, and months after my arrival, a counterpart was named to work with me. Every international expert was supposed to have a counterpart as understudy to take over from the expert when he left. My counterpart spent the equivalent of two full days with me in some four months of "counterparting". This is the dilemma of underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa. There are not many well trained people to act as counterparts. The trained manpower that exists is heavily committed to other ongoing programs. The result is that either
counterparts do not become available or rather low-level personnel are named as counterparts who then are unable to avail of the opportunities of being understudies in any useful way. The expert becomes a functionary, one more "official" of the government but without any formal power or role in decision-making for he is only an advisor. It should be noted, however, that some ministries and government departments within the same one country may have greater manpower resources at their disposal than others and may thus have greater maneuverability in the deployment of personnel resources. For instance, the ministry of education in our host country, as compared with the ministry of rural development, had much greater resources of well trained manpower. Under the plan of operations, the rural development ministry, administratively responsible for the project, was supposed to work in cooperation with the ministries of education, agriculture and health, but no one in the ministry of rural development wanted to request the education ministry to supply counterparts for the Project. That would have meant loss of control, surrender of initiatives and even of the Project.

Again, the training institute where I was located offered two streams of training—one for rural development workers and another for accountants and local government administrators. The two did not mix. The principal of the institution, a very political individual, had administrative and civil service orientation. He paid little attention to the rural development aspect of training. The training of magistrates for primary courts in the villages made sense; so did the training of accountants, but he did not see much in rural development training. He did not know much about rural development and did not want to know. He did not care to know more about the Agency-sponsored project either nor was willing to commit resources to the Project's training thrusts. That is why no counterpart was initially available to me on any regular basis.
Another problem for international experts arose within the framework of national versus Project commitments. UN policy dictated that primary commitments by the international experts be made to the specific Agency Project. Any impact on national programs of the country had to come through the international project as a fallout. The government was responding to different sets of purposes and pressures and wished to use the international experts on national programs directly. Also they saw some of them doing hardly anything and wanted to give them something to do.

2. Beginning with Obsolescence:
I Semiannual (July-December, 1968)

While I was getting settled in the host country, becoming familiar with people and places, learning about the Project, drilling language exercises, or lecturing within a training program that had nothing to do with the training needs of the Project, the first field action had already begun in the Project areas 800 miles away.

It would be difficult to label this field action as a pilot phase of the Project since it did not test the specific development education innovation that the Project had been established to develop and test. It did in fact start with an approach that was supposedly obsolete and it was the Project's sole purpose to supplant that obsolescent approach. This beginning with obsolescence came, we think, for two reasons. There was a lack of understanding among Project staff, both international and national, about the innovation in
question, and, consequently, they lacked the abilities for operationalizing it. On the other hand there were considerable pressures operating on the Project team for coming out of the long planning phase and getting into action. The Government did not look at the so-called experimental aspect of the program with favor. The word "Experimental" was a good embellishment in the Project title but they did not want those foreigners using them as guinea pigs for their experimental programs. Almost two years of planning antecedent to the period described here had not produced anything much in terms of materials or field actions and thus the pressures for implementing a field program of whatever kind became impossible to resist.

Two things happened during the period under review that had important, though unhappy, consequences for the Project. One of these resulted from the international team succumbing to pressures to work on the program that they had ostensibly come to supplant. When later in the life of the Project it became clear as to what had happened there came a crisis of confidence in the abilities of the so-called experts. This distrust of the experts, I think, haunted the Project throughout its life influencing interpersonal relationships between national and international members of the Project.

Second, the international experts in their anxiety to establish good relations with the host country officials exaggerated both their abilities and the contributions of the National Deputy Director and his overall staff. Everyone heard those loud compliments that the experts handed around during the courtship period to the Deputy Director. They were to find, later on, that the bride not only wasn't a good housekeeper but also had a terrible, terrible temper!
3. Bracing Up for the Right Start:
II Semiannual (January-June, 1969)

The first hurried experience in the field had been bad. It had been a "stale" start and the program as established looked no different from what the Government had had for years before the UN Project came in. What, then, was all the fuss about? Clearly, a brand new beginning had to be made by the Project the next time around. The six months of the II Semiannual (January-June, 1969) were spent analyzing community problem, writing special primers for use by adults, and designing special training programs for field staff. It should be noted that while the program was meant to be an integrated program of literacy education and agricultural extension the Project neglected the agricultural aspect and began looking at the whole program in terms of literacy instruction alone. Of course, the specially written primers talked of farmers and of cotton those farmers would grow but that did not make the program a work-oriented program that taught improved production skills as it taught literacy. Indeed, it could have been possible to coordinate our efforts with the Ministry of Agriculture and to have the Ministry take the initiatives in demonstrating improved agricultural skills and procedures and in providing information and inputs. But no one attempted it and the Deputy Director, additionally, was temperamentally unsuited to working in collaboration with anyone, native or foreign.

Interestingly enough, no organizational measures were taken to effect needed collaborations and coordination for developing a program that would project both conceptual and operational integration between work and words. Neither was coordination with Ministry of Agriculture achieved, nor did the administrative ministry build a field organization of its own. The delivery
system, that is, was left to chance! The nature of the program was such that it had to be an interdepartmental project yet no mechanism other than a coordination committee of high officials, that met once in three months, often, in the capital city, had been created. The organizational implications for implementing the Project were not understood.

The First Intervention

It did not take too long for the operational-organizational problems to surface. The field program was now planned to go into operation at the beginning of the II Semiannual in July, 1969. The training of voluntary teachers, 120-150 in number, was to be completed before that period; also the training of their trainers. And it was already the end of December of 1968. The Agency Trainer had planned as follows: Agency team and the Field Office staff together would first train 20 trainers for two weeks. These trainers then directly under Project Office supervision would train 30 field workers for four weeks as part of a laboratory experience as trainers. Then they would break up into four regional teams of 4-5 each and go on to conduct teacher training on their own in four-week courses in the various regions of the Project. The national Deputy Director did not think training by national trainers, middle level officers drawn from the regional departments of agriculture and rural development was a good idea. He had no trust in the national trainers. He wanted teacher training also to be conducted by the Project Office and he wanted to watch over it all. The trainers' training had, therefore, to be fought through and generated not only discussion but also bitterness. While in this particular case this attitude would have to be explained partly in terms of the personality of the Deputy Director, there
may often be more general causes. Very often recipient country officials
do not have trust in the ability and worth of their own colleagues. Whatever
is done by the foreign expert directly is of good quality, whatever is done
by their own people is not so good.

Some further problems arose about the number of program streams to be
introduced and about the teaching of numerical skills and participative skills
to client groups of adult farmers as part of the modernization processes in
communities. The national Deputy Director did not, again, care to discuss
and negotiate ideas but went ahead and implemented his own ideas which to the
international experts seemed clearly inadequate. As the sole administrator of
the program he could indeed do what he wanted. There was thus a breakdown of
the advisory model. International experts are supposed to advise, but what if
the advisee for reasons unknown refuses to accept advice and does not let you
know why. An attempt was made by the Agency Trainer to get the National
Director in the capital city into the decision-making process. Since no
formal organizational linkage existed and since the National Director would
hardly ever be present at our planning meetings, he was brought into the
picture by a letter from the Agency Trainer to the National Director. Hell
broke loose! The Deputy Director saw it as a personal threat for the letter
did become part of the files. On the other hand, there were no "minutes" of
the meetings and the discussions that had been going on in the Project area
on those issues. Therefore, the national Deputy Director suggested that the
issues in fact never arose, discussions never took place, and what was purported
to be the Agency Team's position on those questions had been his position all
along!! And he wondered why an international expert would even think of doing
such a thing to him!! The resulting bitterness was considerable. The national
Director never did forgive the Agency Trainer for writing that letter.
On several occasions later on he went so far as to make false accusations and invent stories that would embarrass the Agency Trainer.

Personalities can indeed be important in organizational life especially in international work where persons have not only had different histories of enculturation but even look different. It can be hypothesized that when organizational structures have not been properly developed, personality factors become disproportionately important. The Project seemed to have one most important problem in the personality of its national Deputy Director. The international experts were not the only ones dissatisfied with the Deputy Director; the national staff within the project and in the regions was also dissatisfied and, consequently, uncooperative. The Agency Chief Technical Advisor did not write to the Agency headquarters about the Deputy's personal problems lest he himself should be seen as one unable to deal with foreigners, even with difficult foreigners. Again, we surmise that he did not mention the personality problems to the National Director for fear of not getting a proper response from him and being seen instead as interfering with local matters. Also, he was unsure of how the other members of the team would respond if matters did come to a head. The national staff in the Project Office worked under the Deputy and did not want to stick their necks out and earn bad confidential reports. The matters drifted along and came to a head too late. The lack of a monitoring mechanism whereby organizational breakdowns would be registered, did not exist; the consequences were serious.

By the end of March 1969, the middle of the II Semiannual, the Trainer had been transferred to where he should have been from the beginning—the field work office of the Project and into the thick of the Project politics. The team from the capital city would remain there until housing in the field work area was available. This housing was not available until a year later so that
capital city team did not move to the field until towards the end of 1969. They lived not where work was but where housing would be quite up to the mark for international civil servants!

4. The Second Field Action That Was Really the First: 
III Semiannual (July-December, 1969)

The second field action as we have indicated was really the first: it was for the first time that the program taken to the field had been conceptualized as required in the basic Plan of Operations. The first field action as pointed out before had been a stale start and had left a bitter taste in every mouth. Getting ready for this present field action had not been all sweetness either.

This period was an important one for actually testing the ideas that had before been merely contested. Now was the time to operationalize ideas, to put them into action and see what worked and what did not. This would have required a climate of openness, of objectivity coupled with sense of security, requiring the ability to weigh the merit of ideas and actions independently of those who authored or engaged in them.

Such a climate did not exist. On the contrary there was distrust, acrimony, and mutual accusation. Since there was no climate, or the mechanism, for working together, each tried to work individually and privately. But at some time the individually generated ideas or the privately developed materials had to become public; they had to be introduced as activities on
behalf of the Project. At that time everyone saw it fit to attack the idea and with it its author. The national Deputy Director not only punished others, he was punished too.

The War of Minutes

In such circumstances it became very important to recollect as to who said what about the design and implementation of various program activities. It was necessary to have it all written down too so that mutual accusations could be supported by written evidence. We did not have tapes but we had enough paper for writing the minutes. The national Deputy Director decided that there would be monthly staff meetings for making important decisions of which suitable minutes will be kept. That did not solve the problem, however. Manipulating the minutes became the name of the game for the Deputy Director whose recording of the discussions was often self-serving, frequently convenient, and not infrequently willfully distorted. That led to what can be best described as the "War of the Minutes". Every month the meeting started with the introduction of several amendments to the minutes of the previous meeting and minutes of meetings began running into as many as forty foolscap pages. Some six months later it was ordered by the National Director that only the decisions arrived at at the meeting should be recorded, that those decisions should be seen as collective decisions, and that the actual arguments advanced and by whom should not become part of the minutes.

No Dearth of Problems

Many other problems made themselves felt as field actions proceeded. First, the Coordination Committee failed to function as a mechanism for
coordination. It met too infrequently to be an effective decision-making body. When it did meet it had little information on the realities of the field to be able even to diagnose the problems, let alone invent solutions for them. There was subtle maneuvering of positions by one ministry against the other; and the concern often was about how a particular meeting went rather than how the program was going in the field. When the President of the Republic declared that he favored the ministry of education in the country to be responsible for all education, in and out of school, of children and of farmers, the ministry of rural development spent most of its time presenting the Project as a development rather than an educational program to keep it away from the ministry of education and to itself. Lastly, after some decisions had been made at a meeting of the Coordination Committee, the officials from various ministries who had agreed to different actions at the meeting failed consistently to follow up on their agreements by issuing orders to their regional and district officers to do whatever was required to implement those decisions. The decisions of the Coordination Committee were left hanging. No actions followed.

Other organizational problems also hit the Project. The international team did have problems functioning as one team. Distances were a hurdle. The Chief Technical Adviser flitted between his office in the capital and his field office and had problems functioning out of either. In relating with his UN colleagues he tried the university model by letting them work as independent professionals with the result that their activities did not acquire an integrity or a focus; and he dare not try a superordinate-subordinate model for the specialists saw him as a Project Manager rather than as a Principal Investigator. The members on the international team since they were employed and seconded by different UN-affiliated agencies did have different loyalties and that created
additional problems in developing collective purposes. The Chief Technical Adviser became a *de facto* counterpart of the Deputy National Director while he was supposed to be counterpart to the National Director. The Deputy National Director exploited this situation countering with him when it suited but asking him to talk to the National Director first when he wanted him off his back and his mouth shut. \(\text{See Figure 2}\)

Problems also surfaced within the national sector of the organization. Realities of the field made many cherished arguments ring hollow; circumstances exposed some pet rationalizations. First, it became clear that a Project of that size could not be run on borrowed staff. \(\text{See Figure 4}\)

It had been declared by policy makers, both national and international, that the new Agency-sponsored Project should not become so separate an enterprise that it would be difficult later on to absorb it within the mainstream of the governmental development efforts. This was, however, used as a rationalization for employing no staff at all and piggybacking on regional staff. It also became clear that the national Deputy Director could not issue instructions to staff people working to other officers. Within a bureaucratic setting this was impossible, comradeship, self-help and socialist courage notwithstanding. The piggybacking model assumed that the man heading the Project would exude warmth and confidence and could go to people and ask for help without posing any threats. The Deputy Director was not such a person. He was known not to get along with any of the officers he was supposed to be working with. One of the regional officers even threatened that if someone from the Project was in his area without his permission he might be arrested on suspicion by the police and he would not know how to explain his presence there! It had all along been a three-man project (if we took out the eight international experts) and borrowed staff that was not subject to orders from the Project. But, we now really found that out.
FIGURE 3. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TEAM AND ITS LINKAGES WITH THE UN SYSTEM.
FIGURE 4. THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NATIONAL TEAM AND ITS LINKAGES WITH THE MINISTERIAL SYSTEM.
Since the national Deputy Director had no staff, he wanted to use the international experts to do the routine work normally done by rural development assistants. When experts resisted being used as village level workers, resentment on the part of Deputy increased. The Project office was further divided into adversary camps and tension was really high. The Deputy would not even let a letter be typed without his permission! One could not get copies of a document made without his prior written sanction that did not come at all or took too long in coming.

The advisory model was in shambles. The national Deputy Director would not accept advice unless he had to. That is, unless he had no alternative. He resented the "experimental" stance of the international staff even though the Project had been negotiated as an experimental program, and accused the international staff of using the unsuspecting client groups in communities as guinea pigs.

It was ironic that experimentalism was an issue. Even though the Project was meant to be an experimental project, it had been conceived of and structured as a service project. This lag between action and intent—maybe it was mere rhetoric, not even an intent—was created both by the international Agency and the host Government. Hardly anyone on the team, except the Agency evaluation expert, had any research experience. The designations of the team members were operations-oriented; the organizational structure was administration and control oriented; and the criteria for decision-making were non-research criteria. Decisions were made to do things, not to study them. Pressures were political, not those of research designs or sampling needs. The only pretension to research and experimentation was the presence of an Evaluation Expert on the Team.

Tensions during the middle of 1969 were high. The only bridge between the two parts of the Team was one international expert who got along well with
the Deputy. He knew the local language very well, and had given the Deputy's first name to his new born son as his middle name! I always wondered about the Deputy being capable of generating such feelings!

In the meantime, the Norwegian expert did not apply for extension and left without even formal leave-taking from anyone on the Project.

No Monitoring

This was an organizational set-up where there was no monitoring system. There were no fire alarms, nor any fire exits. The result was that lots and lots of opportunities were lost and no one knew what was going on. The National Director's interest was to keep things going, to attend meetings both in the country and abroad, to exercise power without taking up too much responsibility and without having to make any substantive contributions to the program aspect of the Project. He did not have the staff and resources in the ministry to deploy them to the Project—not even the resources which had been promised as part of written international commitments.

There were some questions raised when the Chief Technical Adviser decided to resign to take up another job elsewhere. But, he also decided to "resign for personal reasons" rather than indicate the real ones. In the meantime many more months were gone.

5. Getting Ready for a Resurrection:
IV Semiannual (January-June, 1970)

The IV Semiannual of January-June, 1970 was again time for reflection.
The field actions of the III Semiannual were allowed slowly to taper off; the voluntary teachers were abandoned; the farmers presumably went to their chores in the fields, getting so busy that they would have no time for educational programs!

The lessons of the III Semiannual had been too obvious to neglect. For example, the simple fact came to be understood—at last—that field organizations do not just come into being on their own but have to be created, routinized and stabilized. It was also understood that administrative integration had to be created—slowly, painfully, and repeatedly—starting anew at each different level from the national down through regional, district, and village.

It was at this time that the first-ever staff seminars for officials from all the different ministries concerned were organized and our potential collaborators sat together with us and learned about the Project, and its objectives, and understood both the possibilities of the program and their own obligations to it.

It was also for the time that formal evaluation of any part of the program was undertaken. The evaluation report on the recruitment, training, and utilization of voluntary teachers had many suggestions for the Project. No systematic attempt was, however, made to use the evaluation report to design a more responsive program in the future.

The national government of the country wanted to expand the work in literacy and adult education on a national basis; the President decided that the Ministry of Education should take the responsibility for educating not only children but also adults—be responsible for the education of the whole community. The Ministry of Education was asked to take up the challenge.

Under this national directive the Ministry of Rural Development, the administrative
ministry in charge of the Project, would lose control of the Project. They fought a losing but nonetheless a bitter battle trying to prove that the Project was developmental and not educational. The arguments did not help and the Ministry of Rural Development withdrew in indecent haste and great anger.

At the same time there were pressures on the Project to expand from the experimental stage to a fully functioning Project that "would do something for the people". Better methods were okay and better written and pre-tested materials were great; but better something now than great things later.

The duration of teacher training courses was reduced from a month to a week, sometimes to a weekend. Many more primers were written—for banana cultivation, for rice growing, for cattle farming—by sheer common sense by groups sitting around a table. National pride and political education were mixed with talk about seeds and fertilizers.

6. The Change of the Guard

The administrative ministry, the Ministry of Rural Development, lost the battle to the Ministry of Education. They withdrew their support as if the Project had gone over to the enemy country.

The Ministry of Education had a much greater pool of technical staff from which to deploy resources. Every expert, at last, got his counterpart. There were more teachers to do literacy teaching and best of all the new
national Deputy Director was a man one could work and relate with usefully.

As I left the Project after two years of association, and at the end of the IV Semiannual I would not say that my organizational experiences were terribly happy. The UN-Agency was too far away to be an effective trouble shooter and problem solver. All they would do when the news got real bad would be to send in an expert on a mission to do something about something that was happening over there.

Within the Agency team of international experts within the country there was the same inability to diagnose problems and then to handle them. Most intellectual frustrations were exchanged into physical locomotion—people ran to the bush in a Project landrover whenever they were unable to understand or tackle a problem. In one of my poetic moments I made a jingle that I think was rather expressive of what was happening:

"Whenever in doubt
Run
In any direction
In circles is all right too!"

Having to go every morning to the Project office and having to face the first national Deputy Director was never a happy prospect. The man had his problems: at forty-five he changed his name into a genuine Bantu name instead of the earlier half Christian, half Swahili hybrid. He surely had an identity problem! My memory of staff meetings are, again, most unpleasant. They were not only exercises in futility, but also full of mutual abuse, implicit and explicit.

The other than organizational experience was certainly not bad; it was great. It was wonderful meeting farmers, shopkeepers, houseboys, bar tenders, waitresses, rural development workers, bank clerks, officials, legislators, judges, lawyers, teachers, and churchmen, sweating, selling, teaching,
persuading—all engaged in culture-making. That stupid organizational enclave—thank God—was not the country!

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Clarification of a Bias

For an organization to be studied, the organization must agree to be studied. The researcher then can declare his investigatory interests and some minimal cooperation between the investigator and his subjects can be expected. He can in such cases use his methodological prowess or consult with the expert methodologist in designing his research and in selecting tools and techniques for objective collection of data. However, it is not always that a person with interests in studying what is happening around him can declare his research interests and play a researcher role. Often his substantive duties may be different from that of a researcher and his curiosity may be his own business. He cannot administer tests and he cannot hold structured interviews. His hard data are the documents that the organization produces for public or limited distribution and which come to him in the usual discharge of his duties. His best research tool consists in his being perceptive, that is, particularly observant with regard to the cues and symptoms around him. What results from such reports may not be impeccable research, but should still be useful once the biases have been clarified.

What has preceded is understandably a description with a bias. The more objective techniques and tools for determining organizational characteristics or for judging the quality of interactions and relationships were not used since it was underdeclared 'research' by a person who did not have a formal researcher role. Most of what is said is a description of
what I think happened. There was, of course, a component of this experience that was public: documentation, and behavior patterns and events that did have inter-subject invariance of perceptions.

Again, since the case is written from the vantage point of an international expert, it probably projects the biases of the international team. Indeed, as one of my colleagues in the university pointed out, the story might look quite different when written from the other end with a national bias. All I can say is that I have seen international assistance from both ends—the donor and the recipient; and all that can be hoped is that many such stories from many different perspectives will get written. It might all add up to some kind of a total picture and improve our understandings of what happens when men from different parts of the globe get together in work groups, task forces, and teams, and wish to achieve agreed objectives.

IV
Some Generalizations

We may now restate, by way of summarizing, some of the organizational problems exemplified by the case material and record some of the dimensions of interpersonal behavior seen within the "diplomatic framework" of IDE work. While we attempt some generalizations we will also make some suggestions. Indeed, there are some problems that simply do not seem amenable to solutions in the present realities of national and international life with the disparities of intellect between individuals and material affluence between nationalities. However, there are some problems that administrators could be sensitive to and which they could tackle and even solve.
The Interpersonal

Some of the interpersonal dimensions of IDE work have already been hinted in the description of the case. However, they could profitately be reiterated. Communication specialists while talking of interpersonal behavior (interpersonal communication) refer to such variables as age, sex, socio-economic status, etc. In an international context like the present one where the "diplomatic frame" of work is very strong, there emerge dimensions of interpersonal relations that communication literature doesn't emphasize as much as it might.

Given below are some examples of stereotyping involved in interpersonal relations among the men on the Project.

The Historical Man: The historical, which seldom appears in interpersonal relations in intra-cultural communication, becomes important in the context of IDE work. It is intriguing to find that Scandanavians (who either did not have a colonial history or whose attempts at colonization on the African West Coast failed) are more acceptable than other Europeans who have had colonial histories. Host countries do no seem to like to have experts from metropolitan countries that had colonized them.

The Political Dimension: Development work, whether in education or animal husbandry, is political work. The political dimension appears in interpersonal communication persistently in the context of IDE. Nationals of 'Socialist' countries are less inhibited in their relations with experts from socialist countries for reasons of socialist brotherhood. Any change in the existing political equation between two mother countries of two people involved in IDE changes, it seems, the quality of interaction between them and the climate of the group.
The Racial in the Interpersonal: The racial is inherent in all development work though it is often pushed under the rug and not honestly discussed. The underdeveloped world is black, brown, or yellow. The developed world is white. Development work almost always brings two different racial groups together. The racial, then, necessarily sneaks into the interaction. Racial categories are forcefully thrust upon each other and racial explanations are whispered to explain individual decisions or even simple remarks. This does not apply only to relations between the international team and the host country team, but within the two teams as well. The Gauls may joke with the Anglo-Saxons and the Wahayas may be seen as being too aggressive by the Wasukumas in the same country.

The Linguistic: Knowing the language seems to make a tremendous difference in interactions and might earn considerable endearment for the international expert from the host country team. One does not have to know the language so well as to use it in professional work; the host country officials may themselves be unable to do that! What is important is to know it enough to carry on a social conversation. Even trying hard to learn the language contributes positively to the quality of interpersonal relations. An expert, an erstwhile colonial officer of 20 years in the neighboring country, could be loved in spite of his history, politics, and race since he knows the language and speaks it well.

The Religious: Christianity is often the religion of the developed. This helps across colors, races, and nations. The same God and the same ceremonial pattern of worship seems to help in partaking and participating. For the highly politicized, this may not work for he may reject the Christian Church as another mode of the colonizers' political power.

The Life Style: The life style of the visiting expert living on high, tax-free salary, and on a custom-free status, may be resented by host country
officials. He may be seen as getting so much for doing so little—"for advising, talking, and doing nothing". In this particular aspect the communist Chinese expert living at a level close to that of the native officials is passionately loved and is seen as "one of us". The men of the American Peace Corps enjoyed the same advantage. In shared poverty, feelings of trust and belongingness develop.

From Stereotypes to Persons

Social interaction, over time, always leads to new perceptions. In some cases the initial encounter may have been too dramatic and bitter and may make a later adjustment impossible. In most cases, however, through mutual influencing and communication, new, more positive, more functional stereotypes emerge. It must be said that sincerity of purpose, hard work, and authority born out of professional competence, ultimately earn for the expert both power and trust.

The Organizational

In the following we deal with some of organizational problems and the generalizations that could be suggested about them.

1. International organizations, as we can see, are subject to some special problems in their recruitment. Being subject to quotas and political pressures from member states, the recruitment is not always made on merit. Add to this the fact that international organizations, because of the distances involved, cannot arrange interviews before offering employment. There is also operative in this game, what we may call the fallacy of cultural deduction. It works this way. Developed countries must help the underdeveloped with machines and
skilled manpower. Therefore, machines and men from a developed country must be moved to an underdeveloped one. The fallacy, however, is that any skilled worker in a developed country is not necessarily able to help the skilled elite in an underdeveloped country. Under the pressure to recruit a number of people from one region, technical assistance flounders on the rock of the fallacy of cultural deduction.

2. The teams can also be structurally dysfunctional. The division of work implied by designations may not be operational. Again, international agencies put teams together incrementally and indiscriminately. The team leader has, in fact, very little control in choosing his team members.

3. Another problem, with obvious organizational implications, arises from the fact that program projects must be conceptualized and then put together differently from experimental projects. An administrative type, a program administrator, might successfully administer a program, but he may not be able to function as a principle investigator in an experimental project. An experimental project must have different recruitment patterns, different role designations and different criteria for performance. The particular project that this paper describes suffered from this schizophrenia.

4. The most serious problems in the project arose from the uncertainty of the role of an adviser. What is an adviser? What are his obligations and his rights, if he has any, in the organization? Is he responsible for the decisions made? Is he responsible for the consequences of decisions he made or did not contribute to? These are philosophic questions involved as well in the definition of the adviser role. Should he be non-directive? Should he merely be around, wait to be asked, help clarify problems and crystalize solutions without suggesting his? It sounds philosophically "good" but what does it mean to be around? What does it mean to be an influential without
directing? Can it be possible to be without responsibility and yet be a visible resource or expertise who is supposed to know and who is supposed to help avoid errors and wastage of resources. Is he a planner-influential-technician or is he a therapist? In this project more mundane kinds of questions also arose. On the one hand was the problem of plugging in advice. Since the advisee in this case was personally not open, there was no mechanism of exerting influence or making technical inputs. The advisory model broke down. Yet the responsibility of the experts, whether with respect to the Agency or with respect to the host government, did not diminish. The Agency demanded that things happen. The government also had similar expectations from the international experts. There is clearly need to define analytically the adviser role and to work out the role's operational implications within an organizational context. Where does advising end and implementation begin?

5. The case brings out quite dramatically that sensitivity to organizational problems in the planning of the international Project was hardly present. There were serious personality problems. That underscores even more emphatically the need to create formal mechanisms in an organization to neutralize personality problems. In the case under study, there were no mechanisms for negotiating decisions and there were no mechanisms for monitoring breakdowns in decision-making processes because of personality problems.

6. The organizational problems that emanated from the host country side were not peculiar to this particular country. They are problems common to most developing countries. For example, there are shortages of high level manpower. Many projects cannot be supplied with counterparts. Two things should be noted in this regard. One, that manpower situations in the same country differ from one ministry or department to another. For example, while
A ministry of development or rural development may not have enough trained manpower, the ministry of education with all its secondary school teachers, inspectors, and school and college principals may be able to deploy necessary staff to a project through reallocation. Another consideration may be to use an alternative model to technical assistance whereby the expert supplied by a UN agency becomes an officer of the government with the financial and administrative powers that are due his status in the establishment. This is not always possible to do, especially in sensitive areas like broadcasting and even perhaps development, but wherever possible, this model should be resorted to if counterpart situation is bad.

7. Problems of personnel selection can be better handled by the governments. Since they have to make selections from among their own officers, they should know much more about them. Selections should include ability to get along with people. An affiliative personality structure is necessary and a man with a history of interpersonal problems is better kept away. Understandably this is not as easy to do as it might seem at first sight. Working on international projects accords visibility, status, and some fringe benefits as well, and officials with strings to pull get in anyway.

8. Interministerial problems of coordination can be, and indeed were, a continuous headache of this project as they are in most projects in most places in the world. While we do seem to understand that development problems are interdisciplinary, we have not been able to create interdisciplinary organizations to work on those problems. Perfect solutions have not emerged though in many places temporary systems such as well-functioning coordination committees and executive committees have been tried with some success.
While the researcher and the theoretician may take their hints and go into the directions that they should go, we like to suggest to the practitioner what he might do to alleviate some of the problems we have been referring to.

We like to begin by saying that a problem that has been stated is not necessarily amenable to solutions rightaway. For a long time there may be no solutions to some of the inter-organizational and interpersonal problems of international development work. For example, one cannot wish ministerial politics away; or make racially conscious, nationalistic, historical creatures come suddenly to acquire a new Earthian identity--universal, and humanistic. Recruitment problems will remain, for manpowers cannot be created overnight in developing countries with not enough bodies to fill important positions of management and leadership in their countries.

Many other problems, however, are amenable to solutions.

Personality is a variable which is neglected in organizational theory. Thompson suggests:

There is undoubtedly some interplay between personality and organization structure. This subject has received little systematic attention as yet. To explore it will require a theory of organization somewhat more completely worked out than we have had up to the present time.

To the practitioner, personality sometimes offers the most difficult problem to deal with and one person with a twisted personality in a strategic position can sometimes destroy a whole organization. It is not our intention to suggest a comprehensive theory of organization and personality. The point needs to be made, however, that personality might become more emergent and organizationally dysfunctional where organizational structures around the personality are dysfunctional; that is, we might be able to do something
at the organizational level to make personality variables less important; to make it less possible for the personality to play its personal neurosis on the organizational stage. The strategy to cope with personality need not be shifted completely to the organizational level. There should be, and is, recourse available in such techniques as personal and group counseling and sensitivity training which might be helpful in some cases. But, then again, the organization must have structures that can monitor the existence of a problem.

The questions of interpersonal nature cannot be solved so very easily either. With the kinds of socialization available to most people in this world in their schools and homes and with the limited parochial life experiences available to most human beings, international work does take place within a "diplomatic frame" and men will continue to stereotype each other clumsily and negatively on the basis of race and religion and nationality. Again, within an intercultural setting where the recipients have been "typed" as less efficient, less developed, unpossessive of modern techniques of management and planning, further strains, tensions, and insecurities will be introduced.

Here again, two approaches can be used to alleviate matters. One we have already mentioned, that is the T-Group approach which may be used to improve interpersonal skills, to enable participants to handle personal traumas and tensions, and to build cohesive working teams with free communication patterns.

Another approach should be a much greater emphasis on counterpart training, a more articulated and systematic approach to build competent behavior within the recipient country officials. Using Erik Erikson's ideas, Lucian Pye suggests that host country officials can be assisted in acquiring competent behavior and thereby to acquire a new ego integration which, we might draw the conclusion, will result in integrated behavior within organizations. Of course,
no such thing is possible in projects where international experts themselves have egos that are not integrated or where their own professional behavior is less than competent.

With this comment we come back to the organizational level, at the level of institution building that is, that much more can be done. And, indeed, most of these solutions are technical in nature. At the planning stage, for example, when new organizational structures for handling international development work are being planned, greater attention should be paid to the organizational aspects. Naturally, one should see if the host government has the manpower resources to be able to provide the counterpart officials in numbers and of quality that could make the part-counterpart model of technical assistance possible. If not, projects should be so designed as not to use this model, but to supply experts/officials who won't advise and consult, but will perform, with proper power and responsibility assigned to them by the host government.

Organizational planning and design should reflect organizational goals --"organization building by objective" should be the motto. Hospitals are not organized the way medical colleges are; nor can medical colleges be organized the way medical research centers are. One must make a clear distinction between an experimental project and a service program.

Project team should be built more carefully matching and complementing competences; and open, not restrictive, designations should be used so that new functions as they emerge can be easily assigned. Linkages should be built between team members, between national and international staff and between different work units, sections, departments, and ministries. Cooperative structures like coordination committees should be designed much more appropriately to function as project cabinets rather than as ceremonial do-nothings.

The advisory role should be operationalized. It should be clarified and
understand as to what it means to be an adviser? What does an adviser do? What does an adviser not do? The question of power and responsibility should be discussed and decided upon. But, most importantly, a monitoring system should be built up whereby organizational breakdowns can be immediately monitored and taken care of. This is especially true in development projects which are generally located away from the Capital and in the bush, in the interior or up country, and where these projects can easily become cesspools of conflict, intrigue and stagnation.

Recruitment should be given better attention both by the host governments as well as by international agencies. Incompetent international staff, by no means rare if not common, brings about a crisis of confidence in the whole project and the total international technical assistance effort. More and more use might be made of short-term consultants who do not have to be provided housing and family travel, medical facilities, office spaces, and cars, but who fly in for a 2-month period or less, do the technical job that needs to be done, and go away. Good ones can return again and again.

The host governments should also pay better attention to recruitment. A project can be an opportunity to try important things and therefore must be taken seriously. The best staff should be available. At least staff with a history of interpersonal incompetence or interpersonal problems should be kept away. Also, host governments should make it possible for international staff to move into offices and houses in a matter of hours so that months of highly paid technical assistance is not lost in hunting for houses and awaiting the arrival of an office table and chair.

The moral of the story points to the need to develop better sensitivity to organizational problems and willingness to commit resources to solving them. Bureaucracies, national or international, may not have those resources within...
but they certainly can go to those who can provide them. There is enough known today about organizations to be able to design organizations by objectives; and to create conditions wherein both personal and system goals can be achieved.

Conclusions

The description brings out quite clearly that the modernized elite and the mid-elite working in IDE, in spite of varied interpersonal experiences in many different situations, are yet prisoners of their time-life-spaces in relating with others -- both own and alien. Almost always these men begin by relating with each other through stereotypes of tribe, race, color, faith, history and politics. Some do learn to look at each other as persons later on; some never do. This may seem a little depressing, since we are talking here of the elite themselves, not the unschooled masses! In a discussion of the organizational aspects of multilateral development education work, again, it is the problems that have been the focus of interest in this paper. Altogether the discussion may thus sound rather negative. The conclusion need not, however, be drawn that, therefore, international development work is hopeless, not worth doing and not worth the effort and support. On the contrary, international development work is highly rewarding and certainly worth supporting. Even through the thick fog of stereotypes meaningful relationships do get established; and with all the organizational faults some things do get done, new work patterns do emerge, new possibilities do open up. For most people engaged in international development work the commitments get stronger, the sense of mission gets deeper. To borrow Lord Richie-Calder's phrase, we all have an "obligation for optimism" for the ideology from which such projects flow. This case study has attempted only to suggest some ideas for matching optimism with optimum results.
FOOTNOTES


4Most organizational theory also has taken care of the personal and the interpersonal by neglecting it. Both models and analyses tend to be sociological and pay no attention to the psychological or social-psychological aspects.


