This document provides an analytical survey of interinstitutional cooperation from the theories of organizational change and education. Section I poses the major questions for analysis and reviews some analytical perspectives relevant to the topic. Section II is an overview of several major facets of the phenomenon, including definitions of interinstitutional cooperation, varieties of structural arrangements, incentives and obstacles to cooperation, and management strategies available to administrators. Section III provides an in-depth discussion of crucial organizational issues in an analysis of the voluntary-involuntary debate; and section IV concludes with a summary discussion and offers some tentative answers to the questions posed in section I. (Author)
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INTERINSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

Hannah S. Kreiplin
Jane W. Bolce

Paper P-41
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Preface

This is one of a continuing series of reports of the Ford Foundation sponsored Research Program in University Administration at the University of California, Berkeley. The guiding purpose of this Program is to undertake quantitative research which will assist university administrators and other individuals seriously concerned with the management of university systems both to understand the basic functions of their complex systems and to utilize effectively the tools of modern management in the allocation of educational resources.

Relying in part on ideas generated during a Ford-sponsored workshop on interinstitutional cooperation, this paper attempts to draw together and critically analyze available information in this currently crucial area of higher education. Following the presentation of analytical perspectives and questions, definitions, varieties of structural arrangements, incentives and obstacles to cooperation, planning and management strategies, and the voluntary-involuntary governance issue are discussed in turn. A brief summary and conclusion completes the paper.
Introduction

A number of authors concur with Harold Hodgkinson's comment that there is a "bewildering array" of cooperative arrangements in post-secondary education [17, p. 20]. Patterns of organization vary from voluntary to involuntary, informal to formal, bilateral to multilateral, unstructured to structured. New schemes of cooperation in higher education are being established at a rapid rate, at the same time that more and more elaboration of superstructures for planning, coordination and control is taking place in metropolitan areas, states, and regions. Perhaps cooperation is simply part of a deeper tendency toward coordination and rationalization of higher education, motivated by ideas of cutting costs, or expanding the range of educational opportunities, or setting up new organizations to handle quite new kinds of needs and technologies. Provisions are being made in state and federal plans for the establishment of cooperative centers. Research bodies, such as the Carnegie Commission on the Future of Higher Education, have also recommended the establishment of additional cooperative centers for the purpose of more effective allocation of resources [6, pp. 127-129]. Others looking at organizational problems in higher education share this pronounced interest in the cooperative approach. Yet it is not obvious that consortia—or other forms of interinstitutional cooperation—will work well in some of the areas where they are envisioned as a solution to educational problems; and, if they can be made to work, there is an urgent need for insight into how to get the job done.

Research into the operation of cooperative arrangements among
institutions of postsecondary education is in its infancy. Although several preliminary investigative studies on the topic have been conducted, there is a need for careful analytic treatment of the topic. In order to look at the questions of how, when, and whether interinstitutional cooperation can be successful, the decision was made to conduct an exploratory workshop. This workshop, sponsored by the Ford Foundation Program for Research in University Administration, was held November 2-3, 1972, at the University of California, Berkeley. The composition of the assembled group differed somewhat from most past conferences on the topic. A deliberate attempt was made to ensure diversity of perspective by inviting representatives from sectors of American higher education which do not ordinarily have the opportunity to "consort" together. The participants included:

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This document is not a summary of the detailed discussions of the workshop, but from that background and other research it provides an analytical survey of interinstitutional cooperation from the perspective of theories of organizational change and educational innovation. The workshop proved to be an invaluable resource in this regard, as the discussion
provided insight into many topic areas which are not included in the literature. Comments and observations of the participants are accordingly sprinkled throughout this report. The decision was made to insure anonymity in reporting these comments, and thus individual speakers are not identified. We would like to express our thanks to all members of the workshop for their participation.

The report is organized as follows: section 1 poses the major questions for analysis and reviews some analytical perspectives relevant to the topic. Section 2 is an overview of several major facets of the phenomenon, including definitions of interinstitutional cooperation, varieties of structural arrangements, incentives and obstacles to cooperation, and management strategies available to administrators. Section 3 provides an in-depth discussion of crucial organizational issues in an analysis of the voluntary-involuntary debate; and section 4 concludes with a summary discussion and offers some tentative answers to the questions posed in section 1.
1. Analytical Perspectives and Questions for Discussion

Introduction

Interinstitutional cooperation in higher education is not a new phenomenon. Lawrence Howard makes note of a faculty exchange program between the University of Sankori at Timbuktu and Moorish University operating as early as A.D. 600 [19]. More recently, several institutions of higher education on the East Coast entered into cooperative enterprises during the decade spanning the turn of the last century. Major interest in promoting interinstitutional cooperation among colleges and universities began around World War I as a result of the General Education Board's (Rockefeller Foundation) promotion of higher education for blacks [19, p. 32]. The end of World War II marks the beginning of a rapid increase in such efforts, and these arrangements currently are expanding in number at unprecedented rates.

In spite of the fact that these arrangements are not new to the higher education scene, little analytical attention has been devoted to them until the present. This paper represents an attempt to draw together materials from various sources - both theoretical and practical - to shed some light on the topic. One major source has been literature on innovation theory which provides a useful perspective for analyzing the phenomenon, even though interinstitutional cooperation is by no means the only kind of organizational innovation currently being attempted in higher education nor is interinstitutional cooperation always innovational. Literature on organization theory has also been used to help in lending an analytical perspective to the structural problems involved in cooperation.

Questions for Analysis

Some of the major questions which this report surveys with respect
to interinstitutional cooperation are:

1. What are interinstitutional arrangements expected to accomplish? Can they do this?

2. What are some major obstacles to cooperation? What management strategies exist to aid in overcoming them?

3. Do cooperative arrangements save money and/or cut costs? Can one reasonably expect to raise educational quality and cut costs at the same time?

4. What are some of the potential impacts of cooperative arrangements upon the quality of instruction, research, and public service?

5. When do superstructures cease to be an impetus to educational efficiency and become a deterrent to quality—or, in other words, when does big become too big?

Not all of these questions can be answered and, in fact, some of the major conclusions may be that no conclusions can be made. These are the important questions, however, and the following discussion will hopefully provide some tentative answers. These questions are reexamined in section 4.

Analytical Perspectives

Although colleges and universities throughout the world have engaged in cooperative endeavors for centuries, the combined impact of certain social/structural factors characteristic of the 1960's and early 1970's has produced unprecedented pressure toward greater coordination of American higher education. Many of the changes this pressure has induced are dramatic enough to be labelled "innovations." The "newness" of an innovation may stem from a rearrangement of an accepted procedure in such a
way that it reaps novel benefits. Innovation may be the alteration of an existing form or the employment of that form in a different mode, rather than a totally new creation. "Change" may be defined as "an alteration in the structure of an organization, in any of its processes, or in its goals or purposes." Harold Hodgkinson identifies three general patterns of academic change: (1) the creation of new institutions (e.g., consortia); (2) the radical transformation of existing institutions (e.g., open admissions); (3) the piecemeal alteration of institutional programs (e.g., ethnic studies programs) [17].

By way of clarification, the first two types of change might be termed "innovations," whereas the last type represents "mere" change. The latter type is by far the most common.

The interinstitutional cooperative movement represents but one of many innovative arrangements proposed to alleviate the aforementioned pressures. While social/structural factors rarely represent direct incentives to change, the spelling out of such factors puts educational innovation into clearer perspective. The following sorts of factors have pushed American higher education (as well as other American social institutions) toward change and innovation:

1) increasing division of labor requiring greater specialization;
2) a steady increase in the percentage of persons requiring advanced educational skills;
3) the concept of continuing education;
4) the challenge of new technologies, coupled with the "knowledge" or information explosion;
5) growing pressures on higher education to aid in the resolution of social, political, and economic problems;
6) the need for higher education in hitherto unserved geographical areas;
7) inadequate resources for higher education;
8) A general societal trend toward large-scale organization and systems operation.

9) Internal and external criticism of higher education concerning such things as a pedantic focus, collaboration with a military-industrial complex, the tenure system;

10) Minority demands for educational opportunities.

Probably the major direct incentive for change and innovation in higher education has been the many and varied activities of the federal government. In one sense, the federal government represents the central intervening variable between indirect social structural pressures and educational innovation in the U.S. The federal government has had an impact on virtually every sector of American higher education, including interinstitutional cooperation. In addition, innovation in higher education has been strongly promoted by philanthropic foundations, critics of higher education, and other concerned groups and individuals.

Interinstitutional cooperation may perhaps be seen in a clearer light if compared and contrasted with other innovative arrangements in higher education. Educational innovation may be most simply described in terms of the sphere of activity which particular kinds of innovations address. Recent curricular innovations, for example, include work-study programs, study-abroad programs, credit by examination, area studies, and the like. Administrative innovations include departmental and/or institutional self-study projects, computerized record-keeping, and student representation in institutional decision-making. The above innovations are primarily in the nature of intraorganizational arrangements. Increasingly, however, innovation in higher education is taking the form of changes in interorganizational administration, structure, and operation. That is, greater attention is being paid to coordinating devices which promise aid in the articulation between and among various sectors of American...
higher education. Such devices' include open universities of various sorts; the concept of "regionalism;" state and local coordinating agencies; linkages between traditional postsecondary institutions and proprietary institutions; and, of course, consortia.

Educational innovation, whatever form it may take, is intended to accomplish one or more of the following objectives:

1) expanded educational opportunity and subject-area offerings;
2) improvement in the quality of educational programs and institutional operations;
3) promotion of economies or more efficient use of institutional resources;
4) attraction of external funding;
5) increased service to local communities and regions;
6) strength in state, regional, and national planning for higher education;
7) facilitation of change, innovation and experimentation;
8) individual institutional survival.

A comparison of the above list with that of specific incentives to interinstitutional cooperation (see pages 20-21) will reveal close similarities. This would seem to indicate that innovation in higher education, whatever form it takes, is frequently directed towards similar and overlapping problems.

Interinstitutional cooperation represents a form of interorganizational change, and one objective of interinstitutional cooperation is to effect change within individual institutions. As such, it is subject to the traditional obstacles to intraorganizational change as well as to important obstacles and issues specific to interorganizational change. Organizations in general, and educational institutions in particular, are characterized by certain incentives and obstacles to change and innovation, whether or
not the change takes the form of interinstitutional cooperation. Many of the problems and issues surrounding the interinstitutional cooperative movement are not at all unique to this particular mode of change, yet these factors need to be attended to in any consideration of interinstitutional cooperation. In addition, theories of inter- and intraorganizational change and innovation may aid in identifying those incentives and obstacles to change which are specific to interinstitutional cooperative efforts. At the outset, it is apparent that interinstitutional cooperative arrangements may run into double-trouble, since they are themselves innovative structures within higher education and one of their central objectives is the encouragement of innovation among participating institutions.

While not specific to interinstitutional cooperation, the literature on educational innovation pinpoints some of the central issues surrounding organizational change. Matthew B. Miles [28] offers, among others, the following general propositions concerning the acceptance of innovations:

1) The following strategies make for effectiveness in innovation: comprehensive attention to all stages of the diffusion process; the creation of new structures, especially by systems outside the target system; congruence with the prevalent ideology in the target system; reduction of pressures on relevant decision-makers; use of coalitions or linkages between existing structures, or between old and new structures.

2) The following strategies are less effective: those which attempt to use only existing structures; those self-initiated by the target system; those which rely on arousing excessive degrees of conflict.

3) There is likely to be widespread suspicion about the genuineness of communication concerning innovations, and the discrepancy between public pronouncements and private reactions to the progress of an innovation is often large.

4) Innovations which are perceived as threats to existing practice, rather than mere additions to it, are less likely of acceptance.

Those interinstitutional cooperative endeavors which involve the
establishment of new organizational structures appear to have certain advantages. Miles observes that through this strategy vested interests are by-passed, protection is provided for the development and trial of innovations, attention to the immediate work at hand is facilitated; and isolation frees the innovative enterprise from the usually anti-innovative norms of the target system. Miles however notes one basic problem with such new structures:

The essential problem here appears to be that of linking new structures with their associated target systems closely enough to aid the construction of innovations which are feasible, meet the realistic demands of the target system, and are likely candidates for trial, while avoiding the problems of restraint associated with too-close linkage with the target system and the tendency to become trapped in its assumptions [27, p. 643].

There are some additional problems in creating new organizational structures. Arthur Stinchcombe observes that as a general rule, a higher proportion of new organizations fail than old. He suggests that this is particularly true of new organizational forms (interorganizations, for example, such as consortia and regional compacts). He argues that new organizations suffer from "the liability of newness," and describes some of the factors associated with this liability. New organizations, especially new types of organizations, generally involve new roles, which have to be learned. New organizations have to get by with generalized skills produced outside the organization, or have to invest in education. The process of inventing new roles, the determination of their mutual relations, and of structuring the field of rewards and sanctions so as to get maximum performance have high costs in time, worry, conflict, and temporary inefficiency. In addition, new organizations must rely heavily on social relations among strangers. This means that relations of trust are much more precarious in new than old organizations. Finally, one of the main resources of old
organizations is a set of stable ties to those who use organizational services. So the stronger the ties between old organizations and the people they serve, or the larger the component of personal loyalty in the consumer-producer relation, the tougher the job of establishing a new organization [42, pp. 148-150].

The area of interorganizational analysis is as yet very undeveloped, although interorganizational arrangements are becoming increasingly common. Richard Lancaster, in a Ph.D. dissertation on cooperation in higher education, defines "interorganization" as:

A formal association of otherwise independent institutions which voluntarily* impose certain limitations on themselves in order to achieve interdependent ends which fulfill them in ways not otherwise possible. This organizational form is characterized by the existence of both conflict and cooperation in its relationships, and by the lack of a strong central authority. This is a type of organizational form emerging in business, churches, nations, and higher education [23, p. 33].

Interorganizational arrangements do not necessarily entail the establishment of new, formally separate organizational structures, although the more complex the coordination task, the more likely that specific coordinating agencies will evolve.

At the informal end of the interorganizational spectrum, Burton Clark describes the initiation and development of the Physical Science Study Committee. The Committee was funded by NSF and had the objective of improving the teaching of physical sciences in secondary schools. In this example, a variety of private groups served as coordinators between large public organizations and various levels of government, but no single specific coordinating agency emerged [7]. At the formal end of the spectrum, one finds the kinds of coordinating structures which have

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*This definition seems to apply equally to certain "involuntary" arrangements.
traditionally been designated as interorganizations, such as interagency compacts, federations, limited alliances, grants committees, and consortia [7]. Such coordinating agencies are formal organizations whose major purpose is to order behavior between two or more other formal organizations.

Interorganizational analysis focuses on organizations, rather than on units within organizations, as the primary targets for analysis. Due to the newness of the interorganizational focus, there is little agreement on matters of vocabulary. Clark makes reference to the need for a theory of "confederative organization" or "organizational alliance" [7, p. 233]. Lancaster describes consortia in higher education as "lateral alliances" [23]. Whatever terminology is selected, a number of tentative hypotheses have been proposed which differentiate inter- from intraorganizational structures and which at least imply certain obstacles to the establishment and management of interorganizations. Eugene Litwak and Lydia Hylton suggest that whereas intraorganizational analysis assumes that conflict leads to a breakdown in organizational structure, in interorganizational analysis, both conflict and cooperation are assumed to be bases for interdependencies [24]. Although James March and Herbert Simon argue that interorganizational conflict is very similar to intergroup conflict within single organizations [25], Litwak and Hylton, as well as Lancaster, propose that interorganizations face peculiar problems with reference to the management and particularly the legitimation of conflict.

Litwak and Hylton also suggest that whereas the typical organization is characterized by a well-defined authority structure, interorganizations are characterized by a relatively unstructured authority arrangement which creates a situation of ambiguity concerning administrative matters.
In interorganizations, therefore, mutual confidence and trust become very important. In addition, Lancaster observes that other bases of authority or legitimacy may be sought, such as "expert power," and "referent power" (influence based on liking or identifying with another person) [24, p. 61]. Administrative problems of single organizations and of interorganizations differ, and it may well be that the relative lack of knowledge about interorganizations leads to peculiar problems in this area. Lancaster argues that interorganizations are probably more "open" systems than single organizations, and therefore are likely more subject to environmental inputs, changing role expectations, and situations of role conflict. With reference to higher educational consortia, Lancaster suggests that this particular organizational form is unusually subject to being used either as a tool or a weapon by those who direct the effort or by others outside it [24, p. 134].

Clark suggests that interorganizational patterns lie in between intraorganizational arrangements and the arrangements commonly found in political arenas characterized by a formal decentralization of authority and therefore to be understood by a theory of political influence [7, p. 233]. Lancaster, in reference to Clark's work, suggests that the toleration of conflict may be the essential difference between the bureaucratic or corporate and the political approaches to understanding organizational relationships [23, pp. 143-144].

A number of authors have suggested that the university is perhaps the least studied of the variety of complex organizations. Nonetheless, certain distinctions between institutions of higher education and other types of organizations, particularly with respect to change and innovation, provide some useful background for this analysis. A number of
characteristics of academic institutions make them even less amenable to change and innovation than the typical complex organization:

1) The purposes and support of schools and colleges are basically conservative [16].

2) The educational system is vertically fragmented [16].

3) Within higher education, institutional reputation is not based on institutional innovation [16].

4) Self-selection in college and university faculties is particularly narrow, as compared to other professions [16].

5) The ideology of the academic profession treats professors as independent professionals [16].

6) Academics are skeptical about the idea of efficiency in academic life [16].

7) Academic institutions are deliberately structured to resist precipitous change [16].

8) Unlike some other organizations, colleges and universities are almost completely dependent on turnover of personnel to accomplish major reforms [16].

9) Innovations in the educational field are frequently low in relative advantage, low in comparability, and low in communicability [37].

10) It is difficult to precisely measure the output of educational systems [27].

11) The distance between lay and professional competence in educational systems is much narrower than in most other systems.

12) Educational systems are operated by persons who are themselves instruments of change.

13) Institutions of higher education are characterized by protectionism and insularity, due in part to difficulty in identifying and evaluating the outputs of education.

14) There is rarely a direct relationship between an institutional innovation and an individual professor's professional or economic welfare.

15) Innovations in education frequently are not supported by scientific evidence documenting their superiority over established practice.
Hefferlin quotes Irving Kristol as stating that "the university has been—with the possible exception of the post office—the least inventive (or even adaptive) of our social institutions since the end of World War II" [16, p. 6]. And Hefferlin himself observes:

In short, not only do colleges and universities share the usual tendencies of any organization toward stability, but they have more than the usual number of constraints and several distinctive characteristics to safeguard their own specific function of education [16].

2. The Phenomenon of Cooperation

Definition of Interinstitutional Cooperation

The task of defining interinstitutional or interorganizational cooperation is not an easy one. In fact, specifications of what constitutes an individual organization vary somewhat, although all fall broadly into Parsons' general definition of "social units devoted primarily to the attainment of specific goals [9, p.xi]."

One can speak of a postsecondary educational institution as being composed of sectors or groups performing diverse sets of functions. The organization consists of faculty, students, administrators, research and support personnel, and others. Each sector is part of the educational institution, and yet the organizational whole is greater than the sum of its constituent parts. In some ways, each sector functions independently of the others in pursuit of its own particular interests. However, all of the sectors are interdependent. Thus, one can tentatively define a postsecondary educational institution as that set of interrelationships existing among various sectors, each of which performs a unique set of activities or functions, shares the commonly perceived goal of education
or pursuit of knowledge, and derives from a common set of funding mechanisms. The manners in which these constituent parts interrelate are subject to much debate.

For the purposes of this discussion, interorganizational cooperation will be defined as a process which involves some form of exchange or sharing of information, values, prestige, facilities, personnel, and/or status between members of two or more institutions. The term "coordination" is aptly defined in the Carnegie Commission Report, "The Capitol and the Campus:"

The term "coordination" implies the existence of separate units, each with some freedom to control its own operations, and thus the need for a technique or mechanism by which they can act together toward some purpose that cannot be achieved by isolated, individual actions [5, p. 24].

There are some connotational problems surrounding the use of the term "cooperation." It is a positive term which implies coordination of an agreeable and voluntary nature. In this report, cooperation means simply some form of coordination or sharing. Not all of the types of cooperation which will be discussed here are either voluntary or agreeable to the participating institutions.

In order to take a closer look at the phenomenon of interinstitutional cooperation, the discussion next turns to an elaboration of certain broad types of cooperative arrangements. Before proceeding, however, one point should be clarified. For the purpose of examining the phenomenon of coordination in higher education, this discussion considers together a variety of structurally different organizational forms. Thus, voluntary consortia, regional compacts, multi-campus universities, and state coordinating councils are sometimes lumped together. All of these structural arrangements seem to be characterized by similar incentives and obstacles to change, management difficulties, and problems of evaluation.
Additionally, they are all susceptible to similar techniques of economic analysis. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, their similarities frequently seem to outweigh their differences.

Varieties of Structural Arrangements

Informal cooperation.* It is impossible to categorize all the different kinds of informal cooperative arrangements existing among institutions of higher education. No one institution stands alone in self-sufficient autonomy in the American higher educational scene, and so to this extent all colleges and universities are engaged in some degree of informal cooperation. Exchange of information, research materials and so forth alone produce a significant amount of cooperation among institutions. This informal cooperation exists between independent private colleges and public colleges and universities and between individual campuses of multi-campus systems. Much of this cooperation is carried out by individual faculty or students on their own initiative. Informal exchange of information among various administrative and institutional research officers is also common. The basic difference between informal and formal cooperation is that the former does not necessarily threaten intra-institutional relationships to any significant degree. This is not always the case with formal cooperative arrangements.

Formal cooperation.

a. Limited purpose – minimally structured types.

There are many limited-purpose, minimally structured arrangements between two or three neighboring institutions. These are usually narrowly conceived in scope and number of programs. They often take place without the sponsorship or coordination of separate staff agencies. Many types of joint purchasing or other physical-facilities sharing programs fall into this category. These types of sharing programs frequently blossom into more structured multi-purpose arrangements, as in the case of limited. [This typology was adopted from Salwak and Deminoff [38].]
physical-facilities sharing among Amherst and the University of Massachusetts which eventually grew into the Five Colleges arrangement. Thus, such arrangements can serve the function of bringing two or more institutions together for a preliminary "feeling-out" period prior to embarking on more structured forms of cooperation.

b. Multipurpose - structured types. These groupings are characterized by sponsorship of diverse programs in both instructional and non-instructional areas and usually have separate staff agencies for the purpose of coordinating and administering programs. In more advanced stages, this staff agency operates on its own budget (usually funded in part through annual membership dues) which is agreed upon by the participating institutions. Constitutions are drawn to formalize commitments, and controlling boards (usually composed of representatives of each college or university) emerge. In many cases, formal articles of incorporation are agreed upon which establish the agency as a non-profit, tax-exempt educational institution. Once incorporated, it is legally entitled to seek grant monies through separate funding agencies in order to finance and administer activities. Examples of this are the Five Colleges (Amherst, Smith, Mount Holyoke, the University of Massachusetts, and Hampshire College) and the Claremont Colleges (Pomona, Scripps, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont Men's College, Harvey Mudd, and Pitzer College).

These multi-purpose groups vary greatly in size and type of participating institutions, geographic location of members, and scope and breadth of program content.* Membership varies from associations of institutions which are relatively similar in size and structure to those comprised of

*Those who are unfamiliar with the many diverse types of programs sponsored through interinstitutional arrangements are referred to Schwenkmeyer and Goodman [39].
both small and large institutions. Private schools cooperate with small private schools, with large private schools, with large public universities, and so on across the board. Geographically, members may be located within a single city or metropolitan area, within regions, states, or spread out in diffuse patterns among various states. Most consortia, which Grupe [12] defines as:

1) a distinct, corporate entity which is separate from, although closely identified with, the institutions they have been created to serve;
2) employs own staff;
3) serves three or more voluntarily associated colleges or universities;
4) attempts to provide a variety of cooperative programs for the member institutions

fall into the category of structured multi-purpose arrangements.

A special type of multi-purpose cooperation emerges in the many joint endeavors sponsored by Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965. This Act provides funding for developing institutions. In these arrangements, established schools assist smaller developing colleges and universities. As defined by the Act, the purpose of Title III is "to assist in raising the academic quality of colleges which have both the desire and the potential to make a substantial contribution to our national resources in higher education, but which because of a lack of finances (and for other reasons) are struggling to survive and are isolated from the main currents of academic life" [45]. There is a plethora of arrangements funded through Title III. They are extremely significant in the current postsecondary educational scene. This report does not deal explicitly with these arrangements and readers who are interested in
a detailed treatment of the somewhat unique Title III cases are referred to Hodgkinson and Schenkel [18].

**c. Limited purpose but structured groups.** Other groups concentrate their efforts on fairly limited purposes, but are fully organized, staffed, funded, and operate with a clear set of objectives. For instance, the Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), which includes Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, MIT, the University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Rochester, and Yale, has as its objective the establishment and operation of large-scale research facilities supported by governmental and other funds, for the benefit of institutions of higher education in general.

**d. Interstate compact agencies.** Another type of cooperation is the interstate regional agency. These agencies - such as the Southern Regional Education Board, the New England Board on Higher Education, and the Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education - are established through legislative action of member states for the purposes of fact-finding and research into the needs and problems of postsecondary education within the region, and developing and administering interstate or interinstitutional arrangements to provide adequate facilities and services for postsecondary education. Legally, politically, and financially these agencies are dependent upon the compacting states. They are authorized by the states, financed by the states, and must depend upon the states for their continued existence. Participation by individual states or institutions is entirely voluntary, as none of these agencies has any legal authority or control over policy matters, although within the various states participation may be mandated. Lacking external sanctions, they must work (as other voluntary cooperative arrangements work) by building consensus among participating
groups, using persuasion to secure agreement among states and institutions on mutually advantageous projects.*

e. Intrastate coordinating agencies. Another phenomenon which should be mentioned here is the existence of state coordinating councils in 48 states [see The Capitol and the Campus, 5]. These councils are established by legislative mandate and are designed to plan for the growth and coordination of postsecondary educational institutions to best meet the needs for education in the state. One of their many functions is to promote intrastate interinstitutional coordination. These councils may differ substantially in the power which they exert upon the institutions involved. Some, such as the California Coordinating Council for Higher Education, do not have legal power to direct policy decisions for educational institutions in the state, and so to some extent cooperation with the master plans developed by these councils is voluntary.** There is, however, an important incentive for cooperation in that institutions may suffer from lack of financial or other legislative support if they choose not to go along with the agency's decision. Other states, such as New York, Wisconsin, and Illinois, have "super boards" which have legal power to plan and direct coordinated activities among and between postsecondary educational institutions in their states. In these states is found one of the few examples of cooperation among institutions of higher education that is legally involuntary.

Issues Relating to Structural Matters

A major question raised by this discussion of structural arrangements is that of how the structure of a cooperative facility relates to its function. The issue is what size and structure are optimal for the performance

*See Kroepsch and Kaplan [22].

**This situation may be currently changing in California, as the legislature is seeking further legal controls over postsecondary education in the state.
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of which functions. This is a difficult question to answer because of the numerous problems involved in program evaluation and assessment of quality. Nonetheless, it would appear that there are certain rather obvious rules of thumb which can be agreed upon. The most basic is that what "works" for one institution may not work for another. The size, location, and nature of the various participating institutions in any cooperative effort dictate that each arrangement vary somewhat. The problems stemming from attempts to transplant pre-existing structural arrangements to newer conglomerates can be overwhelming. Another rule is that institutions have different needs to be addressed by cooperative programs. Certain programs, such as those utilizing new educational technologies like video tapes and programmed instruction, may not be appropriate for some groups due either to differences in program needs or lack of technical expertise in the subject area. Successful implementation of a program in one area does not mean it could be equally successful elsewhere.

Perhaps the most crucial issue in this area relates to the voluntary/involuntary dichotomy. There are two very distinct schools of thought lining up on this issue. The "voluntarists" maintain that cooperation must remain completely voluntary for the endeavor to be at all successful in attaining the goal of increasing diversity and educational excellence. The other camp holds that educational efficiency can only be realized when alternatives to cooperation are eliminated. This issue is discussed in more depth under the following two headings in this section and in section 3, Organizational Issues.

Incentives to Cooperation

The discussion now turns to a review of the stated incentives for interinstitutional cooperation and the perceived benefits and problems
resulting from such arrangements. General social-structural incentives to change in higher education are discussed in section 1. These factors have combined to generate an atmosphere in which educational administrators seem to perceive that while "in the past it was practically possible and perhaps educationally advantageous for colleges to operate unilaterally, each determining its own purposes, goals and programs and promoting its own resources [26, p. 142]," currently:

Colleges and universities in the United States are . . . confronted by what may prove to be their greatest challenge: achieving or maintaining traditional standards of excellence while simultaneously meeting ever-increasing demands on curriculums, facilities, faculties, and finances. Increasing enrollments, coupled with advancing knowledge and rising costs, have placed an unprecedented burden on these institutions [29, p. 248].

These factors, coupled with general social-structural pressures, are reflected in the following most frequently stated incentives for inter-institutional cooperation:

1. to improve the quality of educational programs and institutional operations at a minimal cost;
2. to expand educational opportunities without growing larger;
3. to achieve economies and/or to promote more efficient use of institutional resources;
4. to promote educational diversity, and strengthen developing institutions which are perceived as alternatives to the mainstream of postsecondary education;
5. to improve an institution's ability to attract external funding;
6. to promote concern with social, political, and economic problems in the community and region;
7. to promote a greater voice in state, regional, and national planning for higher education, in part through reduction of inter-institutional competition;
8. to save oneself and/or strengthen responses to threats of invasion or new competition, in part through reduction of interinstitutional competition;
9. to facilitate change, innovation, and experimentation;
10. to promote greater heterogeneity of students and faculty on campuses; and

11. familiarity with other cooperative arrangements and/or the desire to emulate others in an educational fad.

The above list approximates the order of stated importance, although there are variations, depending on individual institutional characteristics (public vs. private, large vs. small).

Two of the major stated incentives towards change in higher education, rising enrollment demands and inadequate supply of faculty, were more pressing factors for many institutions during the 1960's than they are as the 1970's progress, yet the cooperative movement continues to expand. At a more general level, certain incentives may well come into conflict with one another: how does the goal of upgrading quality relate to the objectives of more community service and extended aid to less-developed colleges? What are the limits of improving quality while expanding opportunity? What is the optimal balance between heterogeneity and homogeneity on campuses?

The issues of improved quality of educational programs and institutional operations and expansion of educational opportunity, the two most frequently mentioned incentives, may be most fruitfully discussed together. Since the number and variety of cooperative programs falling into these categories is almost unlimited, several of the most common types of programs, student cross-registration, sharing of library resources, and common admissions procedures, have been selected as illustrative cases. In each instance, the available literature suggests that the potential net benefits of such programs have been limited because the need for concomitant supportive programs has been unforeseen or rejected by cooperating institutions. Some of the reasons for this will be discussed with reference to the two
major obstacles to interinstitutional cooperation— notions of institutional autonomy and educational diversity and organizational problems of interinstitutional arrangements—to be discussed below.

Turning first to student cross-registration, the idea sounds simple enough, given reasonable geographic proximity between cooperating institutions. However, some statistics suggest that the idea is not so simple. In 1965-66, out of 48,000 graduate students enrolled in the 11 institutions (The Big Ten Universities and the University of Chicago) composing the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC) cooperative arrangement, only 117 students took advantage of the traveling scholar program. This program permits students from one of the participating institutions to reside at one of the other campuses for periods of one semester or longer in order to obtain instruction or use facilities not otherwise available on the home campus. The program was engineered after diligent efforts on the part of the CIC, including the necessity for legislative action in some cases to remove out-of-state tuition requirements for the traveling scholars, and yet it seems to have failed to attract a large number of enrollees. And of the total of about 180,000 course registrations per year (with a student population of 23,300) in the Five Colleges cooperative endeavor, in 1968-69 only 1,081 students participated in the undergraduate semester exchange enrollment plan. The total number of cross-registrations in the Claremont Group is about 12.5% of all course registrations. Some of the reasons for such low cross-registration figures are suggested below:

1. In the case of all three of the above examples, the student cross-registration program is explicitly highly selective, presumably to maintain quality standards.

2. Efficient and inexpensive transportation facilities between campuses promote cross-registration; in the case of the CIC arrangement, this is not available.
3. Reaching agreement concerning course equivalency, transferability, credit, major and minor requirements, grading standards, examination schedules, financial aid policies, disciplinary rules, and residence requirements can prove to be difficult, if not impossible.

4. A common catalogue of course listings is helpful; in each of the above three cases this is not available.

5. Academic counselors and advisors may not be informed about all of the institutions involved in the cooperative arrangement and may not be familiar with the procedures involved in cross-registration.

6. Common daily and semester calendars facilitate cross-registration, the absence of these (and agreements to achieve common calendars can be difficult to reach) can prove to be a major obstacle to cross-registration.

Potential benefits of library cooperation have rarely been realized because the typical program of library cooperation limits access to upper-division and graduate students and faculty and/or permits only students enrolled in exchange courses to use other libraries, and frequently then only to meet the requirements of the specific course. Few cooperative arrangements have developed the following necessary supportive programs:

1. common cataloguing procedures and joint library listings;

2. standardized library regulations, common circulation procedures, standardized ID cards, and common loan policies.

Likewise, programs of cooperative admissions have been hindered due to recruiters' lack of familiarity with all institutions involved and a failure to establish common admissions timetables, application forms, decision dates, entrance examinations, and reporting of data.

Such examples as the above do not answer the basic question of whether or not quality improves and opportunities expand with interinstitutional cooperation. Defining "quality" is beyond the scope of this paper (and, presumably, beyond the scope of any other paper written on education, even the current debate over the meaning of "educational quality"),
but one might well question the identification of increased quality with increased variety - is more necessarily better? In theory, opportunities for students, faculty, and sometimes administrators are expanded through a variety of programs. In fact, in most cases participation is so limited that little general expansion of opportunity occurs. The question then becomes one of whether or not quality is increased by the mere presence of opportunities, or whether the programs must be taken advantage of to increase quality. One suspects that most institutions of postsecondary education utilize the former criterion in their assessments of quality.

Aside from the incentives relating to quality and expansion, those relating to economies of operation are most frequently mentioned. Herbert H. Wood notes that because of problems concerning accurate cost-benefit analysis of interinstitutional arrangements, benefits tend to be measured not in terms of specific benefits against the cost of specific projects, but rather in their cumulative effect upon the well-being and attractiveness of the participating institutions [47, p. 257]. During interviews with consortia personnel, Grupe investigated the extent to which economies actually do represent incentives for interinstitutional cooperation:

Perhaps, I thought, even though it is generally agreed that cooperative centers do not save money "per se," the decision to form a consortium must be strongly based on such a belief. Since that time I heard frequent references to the general belief that while a pressing financial need was probably of primary importance elsewhere, it was not in the location I was visiting. Contrary to the premise, a financial crisis for individual institutions or groups of colleges simply had no bearing on the willingness of institutions to cooperate [14, p. 24].

Discussants at the workshop on interinstitutional cooperation, for the most part, reiterated this position, stressing that financial pressures did not constitute a significant incentive for cooperative programs. Others expressed the opinion that while the incentives for cooperation may well
be financial, the benefits of cooperation did not include cost savings. Nonetheless, it would appear that pressures for cooperation are frequently financial, and it is implicitly assumed that cooperation will save money— if not initially, at least in the long run. Thus, although most will agree that "cooperative centers do not save money 'per se," it appears that this incentive for cooperation remains a significant one.

Unfortunately, very little detailed information is available concerning the potential or realized economies of cooperation. The available literature suggests that most students of cooperation agree with the following observation of Lewis D. Patterson, who says in regard to consortia:

One of the few clear-cut answers regarding financial implications of consortia is that an institution will increase its operational costs, not diminish them, as a result of joining a multipurpose consortium... consortia are misconceived if viewed as a source of financial relief. Their more significant benefits come in the form of improved quality, efficiency, and relevancy, and economywise, by "getting more bang for spending an extra buck [33, p. 20]."

Unquestionably, in a number of cases the availability of funds (almost exclusively external in source) has been a primary incentive for interinstitutional cooperation. Federal and state governments, foundations, and corporations have all encouraged interinstitutional cooperation through the provision of funds. Title III and Title VIII of the Higher Education Facilities Act are restricted to funding cooperative proposals, and opportunities for funding are also available under Titles II, VI, and VII. Certain National Science Foundation programs give special advantage to applications from combinations of institutions. States such as New York and Connecticut have passed legislation promoting interinstitutional cooperation, and providing (in the case of New York) for the establishment of regional cooperative centers. The private philanthropic and business-
related foundations have been a major stimulating force. Donald M. Typer reports that the annual budgets of 12 consortia he studied ranged from $17,000 to $972,678, with an average of $190,445. In 1967 foundations provided 47.3% of all income, whereas they accounted for only 27.1% in 1969. Membership fees amounted to 32.8, 33.4, and 30.4% during the three-year period. Government sources provided 17.5% of all income in 1967 and 30.0% in 1969. Corporation support was only 1.6% in 1967 and 5.3% in 1969 [44]. One can readily see that these budgets are miniscule in comparison to the operating budgets of individual institutions. Only infrequently does a member institution's financial commitment to the cooperative endeavor approach the cost of a single faculty member's salary.

Typer predicts that membership fees will increasingly become the basic source of support for consortia, although federal and perhaps state governments will continue to provide substantial support. Federal funding has apparently been rather erratic in the past, and indications are that it will become increasingly more so in the future, so that consortia cannot depend upon it from year to year. Foundations seem to be less interested than formerly in those types of projects which are peripheral to the major problems of the institution, although they exhibit a growing interest in projects which direct educational institutions towards the solution of social and economic problems. Grupe observes that while the availability of external funding is a persuasive motivator for forming consortia:

Such statistics may mask the difficulties of obtaining external support. As their number increases, the competition between consortia rises as well. The invocation of "cooperation" in proposals has ceased to command immediate reverence from foundations or other agencies [13, p. 751].

Wood argues that consortia should not seek outside money unless there is
already a solid base of support and competence among the cooperating institutions [48], and Grupe suggests that externally-induced motivation alone is not likely to be capable of maintaining lasting interrelationships among institutions [14]. Messersmith observes in this context that the requirement of matching grants forces greater involvement and commitment among cooperating institutions [26].

While not usually a major incentive, except in the case of specifically "urban" consortia, the idea that cooperation can provide more effective relations between institutions of higher education and local communities or regions, and can promote educational concern with social, political, and economic problems, has played a part in the growing cooperative movement. At least one author, Howard, argues that the main objective of interinstitutional cooperative arrangements ought to be to direct institutions of postsecondary education towards greater responsibility for meeting major social problems. Others have commented on potential difficulties surrounding this incentive to cooperation. Lewis Patterson observes that until institutions are better able to relate to each other, they will find it difficult to cooperate with the community-public [33].

Although evidence of cooperative efforts designed to provide institutions a greater voice in state, regional, and national planning for higher education is sparse, this incentive is mentioned frequently. It would appear that the objective is not only to provide a clearinghouse for institutional participation in state, regional and national academic affairs, but more specifically to balance leadership at these levels and to ensure that individual voices are heard, especially if they are dissenting ones. The following quote from the Self Study Report of the College Center of the Finger Lakes suggests the flavor of this incentive:
The importance of the CCFL experience is that voluntary planning can be achieved at a time when statewide coordination has become necessary and, if excessive, potentially damaging to the coherence and integrity of all institutions, public and private [32, p. 85].

Similar statements have been made with reference to regional and national coordination efforts.

In relation to the necessity of preservation of diversity in American higher education, another workshop participant noted the following incentive:

I suppose that rearing, or educating, the young is one of the oldest of human activities. We still don't know with any certainty the best way to go about it. This, I take it, is the main argument for a variety of approaches to the problem. Hence, the presumed desirability of diversity among institutions for postsecondary education. In one sense, we could be as efficient as all get-out by simply putting all institutions of higher education in the country under one leader who would merge neighboring institutions, allocate resources rationally, and the like. I doubt that anyone would advocate this. We would, no doubt, save a good deal of money, but the loss to society would be enormous. On the other hand, neither can we any longer afford the incredibly costly duplication of resources which has characterized the development of higher education in our country. Accordingly, cooperation seems to be a way out.

The incentive of preserving diversity is related to the fear of many institutions that their existence is threatened, both because of financial problems and because of the presence of the one-dimensional status system in higher education described by Hodgkinson [17], which leads to pressures to emulate the multiversity model. For many types of cooperative arrangements, a clear incentive for participation is that of "saving oneself." This is especially true with respect to private institutions, although it is clear that public institutions may also feel threatened. Given Grupe's narrow definition of "consortium," there are approximately 75 or so of these arrangements currently in operation, with private institutions making up 77.3% of the membership. Yet the private sector's share
of the total enrollment in the nation's institutions of higher education dropped from an already low 27% in 1969 to 26% in 1970, and some authors have predicted the demise of the private sector altogether. It is, therefore, much more likely that the incentive of "saving oneself"—strengthening responses to threats and competition—characterize consortia composed of private institutions, especially those of a sectarian nature. Private institutions see a variety of benefits to interinstitutional cooperation:

1. It offers a constructive and practical balance to exclusive public control of higher education.

2. It can help to insure the survival of smaller institutions—liberal arts, residence schools—which might otherwise find themselves washed out of the mainstream of higher education in competition with large multi-purpose universities.

3. It provides an opportunity to challenge the actions by some large state universities to limit the growth of smaller institutions within their system or state.

4. Public institutions need the private sector as yardstick, experimenter, friendly competitor, and countervailing influence [2].

The "survival" incentive is quite obviously the raison d'être behind the Title III arrangements, which are specifically designed to aid "developing institutions" and to bring them into the mainstream of higher education. It has become increasingly apparent over the last few years that institutions which are out of this mainstream find that their existence is severely threatened, and accordingly many feel that cooperation is, if not an outright cure for their plight, at least a good band-aid.

In some instances, however, institutional insecurity may represent an obstacle to interinstitutional cooperation, especially when there is the real or imagined fear of objection to cooperation on the part of accrediting associations, alumni, or parent religious denominations.
Concerning the incentive of familiarity with existing cooperative arrangements, and/or the desire to emulate others in an educational fad, Grupe makes the following observation:

. . . I have come to believe that it is of distinctly greater importance for people now considering establishing cooperative activities to be motivated by familiarity with existing programs and centers which are of inherent interest to them and which demonstrate that progress is possible rather than by appeals to ethereal ideals, through surveys of opinions or through consultants' records . . . The best evidence that a center can succeed here is that they are succeeding elsewhere [13, p. 26].

He notes that there now exists a substantial base of experience among established cooperative centers, so that much of the groundwork concerning articles of incorporation, bylaws, budgets, and such are readily available to the novice. He warns, however, against assuming that a new consortium can adopt the projects of an established consortium on a wholesale basis.

Others remain unconvinced that this incentive is a valid one, pointing out that it is difficult to determine where and why "successful" cooperation has occurred. As one workshop participant noted:

I'm of the opinion that copy-catism is a tremendous ill in higher education, and I wonder how much of this cooperation is simply that. We can't say that we know what we're doing in administering even a single institution, and it seems that this problem is compounded greatly in cooperative arrangements. We should know more about how we work individually before we get ready to jump on this bandwagon.

One final incentive for cooperation, although rarely identified as a significant factor in the literature, is the desire of many institutions to share the values and status of other, more prestigious institutions. It is difficult to gauge the import of this incentive for any one arrangement, but one suspects that it is critically important for some institutions. There is little doubt, for instance, that the fledgling Hampshire College gains greatly in status because of its affiliation through the
Five Colleges cooperative arrangement with institutions like Amherst, Smith, Mount Holyoke, and the University of Massachusetts. Indeed, this sharing of intangibles could well be one of the most significant benefits of cooperation.

Obstacles to Cooperation

As has already been made evident, obstacles to interinstitutional cooperation are overabundant, to say the least:

History is replete with instances of theory outpacing practice, but no example is more relevant than that regarding cooperation in higher education. The appearance often seems to be that preference is given to finding reasons not to cooperate rather than to do so. Individualistic staff members, institutional autonomy, distances between institutions, individuality of administrators, influences from boards of trustees, variations in the quality of performance in institutions, complications arising from the source of support, amounts and kinds of vested interests, and size of projects to be undertaken... are such reasons.

It is a sad and unfortunate truism that despite their rapid growth in number and magnitude, interinstitutional cooperative associations have not produced the results that were expected or were possible ten years ago when the ground swell for cooperation, as it is currently envisioned, developed [30, p. 14].

Two categories of obstacles to interinstitutional cooperation may be identified:

1. concepts of individual institutional autonomy and uniqueness;
2. organizational problems surrounding interinstitutional cooperative arrangements.

The American system of postsecondary education has traditionally been characterized by diversification, decentralization, local autonomy, and free competition. Lyman A. Glenny makes reference to the "happy anarchy" which dominated American higher education until after World War II [11, p. 86].

Harold Hodgkinson notes:

There is a bitter irony here, as one of the main forces that resists needed change in higher education is institutional
uniqueness—"what happened at X is interesting, but of course it has nothing to do with us—we have a different heritage"—and institutional uniqueness is a myth. Often one finds two institutions within a mile or so of each other, so much alike that they could have been stamped out of the same cookie cutter, yet denying each other's existence... One of the major threats people on campus feel when a major change is proposed is some diminution of institutional autonomy, even though that autonomy is seldom used for productive alteration of program or mission. Autonomy is interpreted often as the right to do nothing [17, p. 277].

Of course, interinstitutional cooperative arrangements represent only one of many real or perceived threats to individual institutional autonomy and diversity. Other such threats include accrediting associations, state or local governments, scholarly societies and professional associations, and alumni [46, p. 26].

Although the notion that colleges and universities have traditionally managed their own affairs unchecked by external constraints is certainly a myth, it is true that cooperative arrangements challenge institutional autonomy. According to John Minter:

When autonomous systems agree to cooperate in some joint venture, specific restrictions are placed on certain decisions and actions in order to allow the individual systems to act in concert... In the new relationship... the ability of the system to respond in the usual manner to preexisting demands from its environment may be handicapped [28, pp. 20-21].

Minter's main conclusion in his Ph.D. dissertation on "The Impact of Interinstitutional Cooperation on Institutional Autonomy," a study of the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California, is that coordinating agencies do indeed restrict the decision-making autonomy of their member institutions, particularly in the areas of faculty time and new appointments. In his view, the question is not whether the institution will lose decision-making autonomy over its programs if it engages in interinstitutional cooperation, but how much it will lose [28, p. 79]. On the other hand, William H. Starbuck notes that while organizations in general
give up autonomy when they cooperate, they receive in return some influence in the decisions of cooperating organizations [40, p. 50].

A few illustrations may clarify the potential impact of notions of individual institutional autonomy on cooperative arrangements:

1. Formal and/or informal operating procedures may exist which prevent a reallocation of decision-making authority.

2. It is entirely possible that specific programs may serve either the individual institution or the greater good of the coordinating agency but not both.

3. Faculty and administrative officers may see cooperative arrangements as drains on their own resources and as potential interferers with their own priorities. As Stuart M. Stoke observes, with reference to the cooperative Five Colleges astronomy department:

   Faculty members are apt to resist. Indeed I might admit that our joint department of astronomy began one year when all of our astronomers, with a single exception, died, retired, or resigned. That is not easy to arrange [43, p.105].

4. Member colleges may view the cooperative center as a vehicle for making inroads into the resources of the other colleges, while restricting access to their own [15, p.19].

5. Some institutions look upon the cooperative center as a special-purpose foundation which exists to support any ideas their own institution cannot fund. Some administrators may feel that it is easier to suggest that the center might be interested in a poorly developed project than to discourage it [15, p.19].

6. Institutional rewards are not designed to make participation in cooperative programs attractive to faculty members.

In reference to (6) above, several of the workshop participants stressed the necessity of altering faculty reward structures in order to achieve any kind of educational innovation, and particularly to achieve faculty participation in cooperative endeavors. Current reward structures in most colleges and universities work directly against faculty participation, and thus lack of faculty enthusiasm for cooperative endeavors can prove to be a major obstacle. The concept of institutional autonomy also contains a strong element of departmental or disciplinary autonomy,
due primarily to faculty specialization and professionalism, and this may represent a serious obstacle to cooperation. It should be stressed that faculty objection to cooperation represents defensible behavior, given the current institutional rewards, and that this obstacle can be removed only by creating benefits for faculty who participate.

Turning to the "myth" of individual institutional autonomy and the concomitant emphasis on diversity of educational offerings, a growing number of people are coming to agree with Hodgkinson's argument.

Taken as a whole, the amount of institutional diversity in American higher education is decreasing. This is due partially to the pervasive existence of a single status system in higher education, based on the prestigious university offering many graduate programs and preoccupied with research. There are few alternative models to this system now functioning [17, p. xv].

One concern, of course, is that interinstitutional cooperative arrangements will further undermine diversity of educational offerings. There is little evidence as to whether or not this fear is justified. The "voluntarist" argument is that cooperation is designed to promote diversity. Certainly the diversity characterizing the Claremont group would suggest that cooperation can be successful in doing this. Nonetheless, there is considerable disagreement on the issue of whether or not the American higher education scene is now or ever was one characterized by diversity and, moreover, whether or not cooperation promotes or diminishes this diversity.

Leaving unsettled the question of whether institutional diversity is declining in the U.S. and whether cooperation promotes or undermines it, certain traditional distinctions between institutions of postsecondary education are seen as obstacles to cooperation. These include, high quality vs. low quality; public vs. private; sectarian vs. nonsectarian; proprietary, two-year, four-year, technical, professional, Ph.D., large vs. small; geographic proximity vs. geographic distance. The potential obstacles to
public-private cooperation will be discussed here, since this distinction is frequently seen as the most important and since it touches on the matters of highest degree offered and institutional size.

While in some instances one incentive for interinstitutional cooperation is to protect private institutions from public dominance or take-over, in other instances an incentive may be to explicitly and actively discourage competition and promote cooperation between such institutions. The former incentive was discussed above. In this context, a general observation of Grupe's deserves attention. He suggests that rather than arguing that interinstitutional cooperation reduces competition among individual institutions,

It would be far more accurate and useful to assume that cooperative programs have been and will for foreseeable future continue to be thought of as techniques for competing by other means [13, p.752].

The self-study report of the College Center of the Finger Lakes states:

The most significant finding is that the unhealthy competition which is alleged to exist between private and public colleges need not occur, and indeed did not [32, p.85].

There are problems as well as advantages with respect to public-private cooperation. The advantages are most apparent from the private perspective. Public institutions involved in cooperative arrangements with private institutions are almost always larger in terms of size of offerings and offer the most advanced degrees. Private institutions, therefore, have access to extensive resources (courses, faculty, physical facilities) and faculty have the opportunity to work with graduate students and to use research facilities and materials. The advantages of public-private cooperation for public institutions include the following:

1. Access is provided to eminent scholars and teachers who prefer the atmosphere of a smaller institution.
2. Small colleges can offer teaching internships to Ph.D. students.
3. The pool of faculty colleagues is expanded.

4. Private institutions may aid the large university in its relations with the state legislature.

5. Private institutions may offer very specialized academic areas (advanced classics, Swahili).

6. Students have contact with more diverse student bodies.

7. In the case of the Five College arrangement, originally the cooperation of the colleges was essential to the University of Massachusetts' development as a graduate institution. This last advantage has now become a problem of some sort in the Five College effort. The University has now become largely self-sufficient.

It is probably not realistic to expect it to make binding agreements not to expand into fields that it does not presently cover, and to continue to depend on coverage of these fields by the colleges [10]. All public institutions are under pressure from a variety of sources (parents, students, alumni, organized professions, state legislatures) to offer "everything." Other problems in cooperation, from the viewpoint of public institutions, include: differences between public and private institutions in per pupil instruction costs and in fees and tuition; the larger institution usually has the most to contribute in nonfinancial resources and the least to gain; there may be legal restrictions on public institutions which inhibit cooperation. Obstacles likewise exist from the perspective of the private institutions. When elite private colleges cooperate with large universities, as in the Five Colleges arrangement, real or perceived differences in admissions and grading standards may exist. And private institutions may fear that the large public institution will, over time, absorb them into its orbit. Finally, faculty from private institutions may become so enamored with graduate teaching and research opportunities that they lose sight of the undergraduate teaching mission.
Adherence to traditional concepts of institutional autonomy and diversity can have a fatal impact on cooperative program development and on the inter-institutional arrangement itself. The potential benefits of cooperation will only be realized through the development and implementation of programs or projects with visible impact on member institutions. Yet highly visible efforts strike right at the heart of fears that institutional autonomy and diversity will be eroded. Because of this, cooperation involving matters tangential to the central interests of the institutions is most easily accomplished. In contrast,

Difficulties are more likely to arise when interinstitutional cooperation demands basic internal changes that are essentially subtractive rather than additive—when a department must stop giving a major because it is being offered by a stronger department at a nearby cooperating institution or when a researcher must refrain from seeking a grant on his own because a group of researchers from several cooperating universities or colleges can command more money to do a similar piece of work on a larger scale [3, p.267].

This proves to be a real obstacle when cooperative programs are attempted, it is very difficult—to put it mildly—for any one institution to decide what to sacrifice to the cooperative endeavor. Because of this difficulty, and due to the fact that individuals' livelihoods are frequently sacrificed along with institutional programs, basic internal changes tend to be avoided as much as possible in cooperative programs until (as in the case of the Five Colleges astronomy department) the faculty either "die, retire, or resign."

One complication relating to the limited nature of the cooperative organization as well as to the issues of institutional autonomy and diversity enters the picture here. While visibility is essential, cooperation is probably more likely to proceed from the specific to the general than from the general to the specific, and from small-scale efforts to large-scale ones rather than vice versa. A number of authors recommend that
cooperative activity be initiated in areas which lie away from the mainstream of academic activity—away from the "mission" and "academic heart" of the institutions involved [8], and in new programs and facilities rather than in those already provided by the individual institutions. This quotation illustrates the likely result of following such advice:

If we look at GLCA, its greatest activities are basically unrelated to the on-going processes of the campus. In every case, we are talking about something off-campus or some mechanism on-campus that meets in a motel, and that is exactly how most campuses want it, no matter what people say [32, p.29].

Granted that high visibility is sacrificed, the assumption seems to be that tangential cooperative endeavors will lay the foundations for later, more extensive cooperation. Cooperative recruitment of students and faculty and specialization of academic offerings at different institutions seem to be the areas of cooperation most likely to conflict with conceptions of institutional autonomy.

A variety of organizational problems surrounding interinstitutional cooperative arrangements present serious obstacles to the realization of potential benefits. In the first instance, "consortia deal with what is inherently peripheral [32, p.345]." That is, cooperation is inevitably a secondary institutional commitment. As Bunnell and Johnson observe:

Few associations operate really major programs on their own (measured by the members' own major programs), and even fewer have any new overall organizational program to manage. That is not to say that they should be but merely to recognize them for what they are—inhomely limited but as useful as the members wish them to be [3, pp.253-254].

Other organizational problems may be most fruitfully discussed in terms of problems of general organization, leadership, communication, and commitment. At the outset, it is apparent that the nature of the cooperative organization represents a very real challenge in itself, aside from matters of individual institutional autonomy and varying structural
features of cooperative arrangements (incorporated vs. not incorporated, large staff vs. small staff, and so forth):

All the cooperative associations of colleges and universities have built-in limitations, necessarily and understandably. Rarely, if ever, can they submerge or override the autonomy of the member institutions or put a member under any obligation contrary to its will. Their powers are derived, not original. They have no constituency of their own and no basis for separate loyalty. They may be fortunate in having no alumni, but that fact points also to their limitations. The loosest association has limitations in purpose; the tightest federation has limitations in method [3, p.251].*

If the above problems do not present an adequate challenge to the cooperation-minded individual, the following more specific issues should suffice:

1. The new governmental form must be harmonized with the existing ones out of which it grows [3].

2. Organizational and representational machinery must be made congruent with the tasks to be done [3].

3. Central secretariats tend to expand and take on more and more functions, thus foisting more tasks upon already overburdened members [14], and in some cases they grow to function as semi-autonomous agencies that occasionally compete with member institutions rather than promoting cohesion among them [32].

4. New cooperative commitments are normally assigned to collegiate machinery already overoccupied with existing independent commitments [3].

5. The necessity of sharing information about potential sources for financing joint programs may represent a threat to individual institutions, as may the potential exposure of institutional myths [13].

6. Most cooperative centers have been in existence only a few years, whereas their member colleges have been in existence a long time [4].

7. A preoccupation with matters of charter, bylaws, and formal jurisdictional questions can develop [48].

8. Cooperative projects take time to authorize, plan and implement,

*These remarks apply primarily to voluntary cooperative arrangements; they may not be appropriate for institutions under the aegis of superboards.
which poses problems when one or more of the participating institutions considers a project to be urgent. No institution wants to risk the possibility of having no program because a cooperative program did not work out, or could not be worked out rapidly [10].

9. While the fact of incorporation seems to promote a greater realization of cooperative potential, incorporation requires a significant institutional commitment [31].

10. Two to three years may pass before major projects leave "ground zero." This requires both patience and faith [13].

11. Cooperation may pose problems related to unanticipated interdependencies, overlapping system membership, and dual loyalties and responsibilities.

Summary of Major Issues - Incentives and Obstacles

Several major issues relating to the potential for successful cooperative endeavors have been raised in this section. To briefly reiterate:

1. The "benefit" issue: what are the benefits of cooperation given the numerous obstacles to the successful implementation of programs? How successful is cooperation in realizing the "institutional needs" of

   a) expanding student and faculty opportunities;

   b) promoting greater managerial efficiency;

   c) cutting costs of education, or "getting more bang for the educational buck" when costs per se are not reduced;

   d) promoting experimentation and change;

   e) promoting educational exchange through interpersonal contacts among the members;

   f) increasing and/or maintaining educational diversity.

2. "Managerial" issues: How can managers work to minimize obstacles and maximize potential benefits to cooperation? What planning and management strategies are available?

3. To what degree is institutional autonomy threatened by participation in cooperative arrangements?

Planning and Management Strategies

The discussion of incentives and obstacles to cooperation indicates
that obstacles to successful implementation of cooperative endeavors can be overwhelming. Educational administrators sorely need strategies which aid in managing these efforts. While information of this sort is largely unavailable in the literature, the workshop proved to be very useful in this regard. Much of the discussion centered around possibilities for planning and management strategies, and a vigorous give-and-take of what "worked" and what didn't ensued. This section attempts to reiterate these strategies in a somewhat distilled form. Some of the statements may have to be qualified with respect to statutory arrangements, since most of these comments were made with reference to voluntary arrangements managed by a coordinating agency.

For the purposes of this discussion, planning and management for cooperative endeavors will be viewed as a four-stage sequential process: preliminary investigations, planning, implementation, and evaluation. This paradigm is adopted for illustrative purposes only; the evidence seems to suggest that this is not a linear process; as the stages can occur simultaneously or in a variety of orders.

Preliminary investigation. In this stage, institutions go through a "feeling-out" process to ascertain whether or not cooperation is feasible and/or desirable and to attempt to establish some bases for cooperation. During this period of initial negotiations, institutions attempt to define their areas of commonality and differences to identify those areas where cooperation may take place. In many instances, this may not go beyond the "we should do something together because it makes sense" stage. Some of the participants agreed that in this stage, each institution should identify for itself what is crucial to its own vitality, viability, self-image, and the like, and then consider how it might share with others on less
central concerns. Others demurred, saying that this is next to impossible
to accomplish:

It sounds like a fine idea. The difficulty is, of course, that very few institutions are able to do this in any rational
way. The tendency is for any institution to say that everything it is doing is crucial unless someone comes along with
a meat axe to cut x percent out of the institution's resources. Failing that, about all one can do is chip away.

It may well be difficult to clearly identify these core sets of activities; nonetheless, it is apparent that some preliminary investigation should take place prior to entering into the planning stage. Several participants suggested that one strategy for overcoming some of the obstacles inherent in this preliminary stage would be to hire the services of a consulting agency to survey the possible areas of cooperation. The potential benefits arising from having suggestions made by a neutral agency without vested interests in the operation could be very great. An example of this was provided by one of the participants: three very different types of institutions are considering a computer-sharing program. Each institution, of course, feels that its facilities should be used by the others, and is manifestly uninterested in sacrificing any of its own. A consulting firm was hired jointly by the institutions to investigate the problem. Its final suggestion, that two of the smaller schools use the larger facilities of the third—although not yet acted upon—has been received with a good deal more grace than had it come from the larger institution.

To summarize, in the preliminary state the institutions begin to get seriously acquainted with one another in order to assess their areas of commonality and differences and to consider which areas might be good ones in which to cooperate. In addition, there should be some attempt by the institutions to make explicit their assumptions about the goals of, and
benefits expected from cooperation. The assistance of independent consulting agencies in helping to define areas of cooperation can legitimate suggestions about the direction cooperation should take.

Planning. Once the institutions have decided that they should proceed with cooperation, they get down to specifics and begin to prepare for implementing programs. The workshop participants entered into a very healthy debate about whether or not careful planning should be attempted at all by the coordinating agencies. The argument centered around whether attempts to draw up joint plans constitute a good investment of time and energy on the part of the coordinating staff and representatives of member institutions. Given that most cooperative enterprises have difficulty in defining goals and establishing priorities, many argued that it can be a waste of time to attempt corporate planning. Others insisted that planning is necessary if only because it provides some clarification of goals vital to the successful functioning of a joint operation. Some argued that the decision costs incurred in getting several presidents or other administrators together to iron out plans were far too high, given the low probability of success in planning; others maintained that the pay-offs of getting these people acquainted with one another and familiar with their respective institutions constitute a valuable investment toward establishing a good environment for cooperation. The consensus seemed to be that it is not rational to completely forsake plans, but that it is equally irrational to believe in them once they have been drawn up.

One of the clearest points which emerged from the discussion is that long-range planning is not possible for most cooperative agencies in the early stages because there has been no demonstration of success in the endeavor and institutions are understandably reluctant to commit themselves
to any long-range plans. Participants agreed that it is preferable to begin by launching a pilot project which can result in fairly quick, measurable pay-offs, and then get down to long-range planning. These pilot projects usually focus on physical-facilities sharing, where some of the obstacles to cooperation, such as faculty resistance, are not as pronounced, and which yield readily measurable benefits in cost savings. Thus, joint purchasing programs are very often the first programs attempted by cooperative enterprises. Once the participating institutions see that benefits are possible, they are more willing to attempt planning.

Most participants agreed that cooperative operations grow more or less incrementally and that well-developed master plans could easily scare off more skittish cooperators. Long-range goals ideally should be established which both maintain the sanity of the coordinating agency's staff and develop enterprises making maximum use of the cooperative machinery. Beyond this, most discussants agreed that the most important function of the coordinating agency is to establish an environment in which cooperation can flourish. As one participant noted,

A long planning and analysis session is rarely fruitful. The important thing to establish is not a long-range plan, it seems to me, but a process through which the "chipping away" can be effective. The process should probably start with some agreed principle.

**Implementation.** Programs are put into operation after some sort of planning and other negotiations have cleared the way for their implementation. Once the decision has been made to go ahead with a program, it is the responsibility of the coordinating agency's staff to see that something is done. As one of the participants noted, this involves much more than merely engineering coordination, as he described his experience with two institutions:
The plumbing aspects of the integration were much less painful and difficult than the problems of cultural combination—not that the institutions were all that different, but they perceived themselves as being so. Stereotyping problems arose—institution X was seen as being conservative and hard-nosed, while Y was supposed to be full of liberal fuzzy-thinkers.

The difficulties of "cultural combination" were generally conceded to be the greatest barriers to implementation. How, then, should agency personnel best work to overcome these problems? The question of the role which the agency should take becomes crucial. The participants agreed that the best way for cooperation to come about is (1) to eliminate all other alternatives, and (2) to guarantee a quantum leap in quality as a result of cooperation. There is little question that the coordinating agency personnel are relatively powerless and have little or no authority to "eliminate alternatives," even in some of the currently operating "involuntary" arrangements, and it is difficult to assess how and if educational quality can be improved through cooperation. How can cooperation result under these conditions?

The workshop discussants agreed that the agency personnel must take the role of catalysts, working behind the scenes wherever possible to help create an environment where cooperation is considered. There were many different techniques discussed about how to do this, varying widely depending upon the individual personalities and institutions involved. Some of the strategies are discussed below.

One of the most effective ways to surmount the obstacle of faculty objection to participation is to cajole the faculty into initiating the programs themselves. The most obvious way to do this is to devise rewards and sanctions which make it beneficial for them to do so. Thus, money available for new programs, equipment, library facilities, and the like can greatly stimulate faculty interest in cooperation. The role of the coordinating agency here is to advertise the availability of these funds
and to promote interest and stimulate discussion about the possibilities for their use.

A second way a catalytic role can be effective is in helping to bring about an environment of trust and mutual accommodation in which cooperation can take place. Making sure that the various deans and presidents meet periodically to discuss the possibilities of sharing, for instance, is important. As one participant noted:

[The presidents] have ... agreed that proposals of internal decisions within their several institutions for a faculty appointment, a new academic program, a new course, or a major new facility should include evidence that alternative resources in the other institutions have been examined, give reasons why these do not satisfy the need originating the proposal, and indicate how the proposed addition will relate to the resources of the other institutions. Once that is established, then, one has to make sure that the operation of the principle is effective within the several institutions. We haven't got all that pinned down, and I don't expect we ever will have; but it does work, more or less.

The successful coordinator seems to attempt to avoid the administration of programs, and for obvious reasons. Institutions which find that control of programs has slipped beyond their grasp and into that of the coordinating agency can become very nervous about loss of autonomy and refuse to go along with anything else that the agency promotes.

As previously mentioned, a useful strategy for bringing about the implementation of cooperative programs is to start in an area which is somewhat peripheral to the central concerns of participating institutions and which can yield fairly quick visible results. Once it has been demonstrated that cooperation can be successful, then programs can be attempted which more directly address the crucial concerns of the institutions. As one participant noted, "The notion that because something is ephemeral it isn't useful simply isn't so—it may be exactly what you want."

Once a program has been established, the agency still has the
responsibility to (1) see that it is properly advertised, and (2) make sure that it stays alive. Proper advertising includes much more than yearly reports to funding organizations or other coordinating agencies. It involves making certain that relevant individuals on the various campuses are informed of the program and aware of how to use it. Student cross-registration, for instance, can work only when students are aware of the course possibilities on other campuses and faculty advisers can aid them in the logistical problems involved. Library cooperation is another example of an arrangement that must be advertised in order to be useful. The task of seeing that programs stay alive and vital can prove to be a very difficult one, given that relatively few programs are directly administered by the coordinating agency staff. One participant noted that he had attempted to deal with this problem by hiring facilitators to work directly with the people involved in the program to provide expert guidance and assistance in overcoming some of the operational difficulties inherent in new cooperative programs.

3. Issues of Governance: the Voluntary-Involuntary Dichotomy

Perhaps the most crucial structural issue relating to interinstitutional cooperative endeavors is the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy. One concern mentioned in a number of contexts by workshop participants focused on the potential impact of federal, regional, and state enforcement of interinstitutional cooperation on individual institutions and on currently operating and planned voluntary consortia activities. This issue was voiced with reference to varieties of structural arrangements, incentives and obstacles (external mandates may represent either or both), and management strategies (external mandates may be spurs to individual institutional action).
Although both private and public institutional representatives voiced concern about externally enforced or statutory coordination, the comments made suggest that their views differ in certain respects. Representatives of both sorts of institutional arrangements do share the fear that statutory coordination will threaten individual institutional autonomy, diminish educational diversity, and undermine the oft-lauded American traditions of voluntarism and democratic pluralism in higher education. However, public institutions in many states are already familiar with certain forms of externally enforced cooperation such as master plans, regionalism, and coordinating councils. The concern of public institutions is not a "what if" but a "given that." Given federal, regional, and/or state mandates requiring cooperation, how best to preserve individual institutional viability? In contrast, a number of private institutions seem to still hold the "what if" attitude, or to view the intervention of federal and state governments as threats to their very existence—and some cooperative arrangements have indeed emerged as responses to such threats. Lancaster observes that the interdependency of private institutions, even those involved in voluntary consortia, is not at all as clear as in the case of statewide networks of public institutions. He suggests that private institutions have not traditionally seen themselves as units in relationship to other sub-units within an open system [23, p.10].

Over the two-day discussion period, several themes emerged with respect to externally induced coordination: a) participants seemed hesitant to openly discuss concerns about federal, regional, and state enforcement; b) there was some uncertainty about how to distinguish "paper" master plans, for example, from plans with a real "bite;" c) many workshop attendees appeared uncertain about how to most effectively ensure their
consortia and/or institutions a voice in the planning and implementation of mandated coordination efforts—that is, how to operate in an increasingly bureaucratized political arena.

At this point it should be made clear that the promotion of interinstitutional cooperation is only one objective of mandated coordination at the statewide or intrastate-regional level. Statutory coordination is generally viewed as a means of enforcing greater efficiency and accountability among the institutions of higher education in a given geographical area. Such enforcement may or may not specifically involve interinstitutional cooperation. For example, in the Report of the Joint Committee on the Master Plan for Higher Education, prepared for the California Legislature, the "encouragement of interinstitutional cooperation and consortia" is listed as one of eight responsibilities of a proposed regulatory commission [21, p.35]. However, statutory coordination at the statewide or intrastate-regional level is increasingly seen as the favored vehicle for encouraging interinstitutional cooperation.

The voluntary-involuntary debate may be briefly stated. The voluntarists argue that their approach is the only way to preserve educational diversity and institutional autonomy in American higher education. Implicit in much workshop discussion was a desire to figure out how to structure and manage voluntary cooperative endeavors so that they may represent a viable alternative to externally enforced cooperation. The voluntarists assume that statutory coordination will inevitably result in the excessive standardization or even "nationalization" of American higher education, and fear the sacrifice of the private sector to the public.

Those promoting mandated cooperation argue that voluntary cooperative endeavors can have only a limited value in fostering truly effective
interinstitutional cooperation, because such efforts do not have the potential to significantly alter existing organizational frameworks or to facilitate cooperation across the whole range of institutional functions [1]. Externally induced coordination can, in theory, occur at a variety of levels. Few students of higher education favor federal or national coordination, along the lines of the national ministries of education found in many European nations. Some quite dramatic results have been achieved through interstate regional coordinating agencies such as SREB and WICHE. Centralized coordination at the statewide level, a popular notion during the 1960's, is currently being supplanted in some states by the concept of intrastate regionalism, which implies decentralization. The argument can be made however that regionalism may actually result in less independence for individual institutions, since another bureaucratic layer is created dividing them from the state legislature. The major objective of regionalism is to group institutions of higher education on a basis of geographical proximity in a manner which reflects their physical, economic, and human resource relationships [41, p.2].

A number of unanswered questions surround this debate. What actually are the differences between voluntary and statutory cooperative endeavors in terms of structure, management, and objectives? In this context, it would be worthwhile to examine those arrangements which seem to blur the distinction, the Claremont Colleges and the Kansas City Regional Council on Higher Education, for example. While formally designated as voluntary, both of these appear to have certain statutory components. Are certain types of cooperative activity more amenable to voluntary as opposed to statutory coordination? What is the relative impact of voluntary as opposed to statutory coordination the various dimensions of individual institutional operation? Why is
involuntary cooperation seen as a particular threat to individual institutional autonomy and diversity?

A report concerning doctoral training prepared for the Regents of the State of New York includes an appendix outlining the strengths and weaknesses of voluntary as compared to statutory cooperation. For ease of exposition, the relevant sections are reproduced below:

**Strengths of Formal Voluntary Cooperation**

a) Provides for maximal freedom of choice, as institutions retain the right to choose whether or not to participate in any given consortium program.

b) Provides the greatest likelihood of achieving consensus, as joint programs are generally not undertaken without at least the nominal consent of all members.

c) Can embrace a potentially wide range of institutional members, cutting across conventional boundaries to achieve great heterogeneity or homogeneity as the proclaimed objectives seem to require.

d) Provides greatest likelihood of promoting cooperation at the sub-institutional level (e.g., department heads, middle-level administrators, etc.) as a "spinoff" effect from higher levels.

e) Facilitates self-generated program development at all hierarchical levels, with the consortium staff generally serving more as facilitators than legislators or promoters.

**Weaknesses of Formal Voluntary Cooperation**

a) Asymmetrical arrangements are likely to be controlled by the more wealthy, powerful, or prestigious institutional members.

b) There exists a powerful tendency to follow the status quo, since until a genuine sense of cooperative interdependence is established, only peripheral programs unrelated to the central core of the institution's missions are generally attempted.

c) Consortia staff generally lack the facilities, funding, and expertise necessary to engage in comprehensive long-range planning for individual members.

d) Often institutions are not impelled to join such arrangements until the environment becomes most threatening, and at this point, their available resources to support voluntary activities may be minimal.

The financial security of such arrangements over the long run is unpredictable at best.
f) There is often great difficulty in identifying those joint goals which can be achieved, particularly when the concern is for some approximate equity as regards benefits received . . .

g) Staff personnel in formal voluntary arrangements possess only delegated powers, while the actual decision-making centers are located in each of the member institutions.

h) Such arrangements require "unusual attention to consensus-making machinery, representation, and tapping of creativity, out of all proportion to the motivation felt by the members [20].

Strengths of Statutory Coordination

a) Centralizes planning, policy making, and/or governance responsibilities for a group of institutions, which ideally should lead to more rational resource allocation and more effective integration of effort.

b) Provides a unified voice from the higher education community in the legislature, thus ideally reducing the likelihood of legislative intrusions into the educational process, or at least channeling such interventions through an established mechanism.

c) Is inclusive of all institutions so designated by the relevant legislation, thereby "insuring" a stable membership and providing for maximum program breadth.

d) Has provided for (and recent studies indicate, the trend is accelerating) a greater public role (e.g., more non-institutional and non-central staff) in the determination of educational policy.

e) The legislative grant of authority provides a greater assurance that individual institutions will comply with legitimate agency decisions.

f) Available evidence seems to indicate that coordinating agencies have been more successful vis-a-vis legislatures (e.g., appropriations, provisions for new construction and new programs) than individual institutions acting on their own behalf might have been.

Weaknesses of Statutory Coordination

a) The composition of the coordinating board, its conception of leadership, and its supportive staff are critical elements, upon which the board’s success in fulfilling a mediating role between the institutions and the legislature will be contingent.

b) There always exists the possibility that stronger or more prestigious institutions will attempt to "end run" around the coordinating agency in order to deal directly with the legislature.

c) Under certain conditions, this form can increase the probability of political interference in institutional affairs.

Excessive centralization of direction by the agency can lead to diminution of the distinctive character of institutional members.
e) Expertise within the institutions may be neglected in favor of agency staff utilization, which in turn may lead to further enlargement of agency staffs and proportionately less institutional involvement.

f) Unless so mandated, the coordinating agency may be unable to integrate private institutions into a comprehensive planning framework [35, pp. 7-10].

A central issue, perhaps the central issue, has to do with the structure and management of the coordinating agency or agencies, specifically with matters of power and authority—how much and vested in whom? In section 1 it was suggested that coordinating agencies, by their very organizational nature, are characterized by relatively unstructured authority arrangements. The voluntarists tend to de-emphasize matters of power relations and to rely heavily upon mutual confidence and trust to cement weak authority structures. Although even in voluntary arrangements the main impetus for cooperation generally comes from external sources, considerable reliance is placed on the "good intentions" of individual institutional representatives. It has been argued that cooperation involving the whole range of institutional functions requires a much stronger authority structure than that which characterizes the typical voluntary cooperative endeavor. The implication is that voluntary arrangements are inherently unable to muster the power and authority to do the job, and that when they do; they become less than voluntary. Lancaster observes that the coordination of public institutions has become increasingly stronger and more bureaucratic in recent years. One might hypothesize that externally induced coordination is likely to approximate more closely the bureaucratic model than is voluntary coordination.

It was also suggested in section 1 that interorganizations are characterized by interdependencies based on both cooperation and conflict, and that one function of a coordinating agency that distinguishes it from the single organization is the technique of management and legitimation of
conflict. Lancaster identifies three types of potential interorganizational conflict: 1) institution-central office; 2) institution-institution; 3) within a single institution. Given that voluntary cooperative endeavors typically focus on areas peripheral to the "heart" of individual institutional activities, there are apt to be fewer fundamental conflicts and thus the management of conflict becomes a much less significant issue for such arrangements. In fact, voluntary efforts frequently survive precisely by avoiding areas of conflict and competition. Although Lancaster refers to a philosophical ethos of voluntarism as one type of conflict management mechanism, it would seem that when voluntary arrangements develop mechanisms of adjudicating areas of dispute and begin setting standards of behavior, they perhaps necessarily take on a statutory character. Externally induced coordination encompassing the whole gamut of higher educational activities inevitably involves the management of conflict.

Drawing further from some of the ideas presented in section 1, both voluntary and statutory arrangements have their advantages and disadvantages. Voluntary arrangements can probably more easily establish linkages with the participating institutions, but only because they deal with peripheral matters. Involuntary arrangements probably slip more easily into the position of competing with member institutions rather than promoting cohesion among them.

As mentioned above, the voluntarists argue that voluntary coordination promotes and protects individual institutional autonomy and educational diversity. Given that voluntary efforts only infrequently challenge either autonomy or diversity, the price of this advantage may be high, since it is achieved by operating outside central institutional concerns. The argument is made that institutional diversity is desirable because it can counter trends towards sameness. Given this contention, it may be
that externally mandated coordination has certain advantages over voluntary coordination in promoting diversity. Voluntary organizations are more self-selective than statutory ones, and in some instances cooperative endeavors clearly illustrate the axiom "likes attract likes." In such cases, diversity is probably not promoted. In contrast, one primary objective of regionalism is to promote diversity through linking geographically-related but complementary types of institutions and through recognizing regional differences in educational and social needs.

If interinstitutional cooperation is to be at all extensive, some sort of formal interorganization, whether voluntary or involuntary, is required. And it has been suggested above that change and innovation are much more likely to occur when new organizational structures are initiated, rather than relying on existing structures (assuming that the new structure can "survive"). The report to the Regents of the State of New York points out that coordinating agencies may be structured in such a way that they adopt a strong, initiatory posture over public and private institutions, or so that they adopt a more moderate, supportive, and less initiatory stance over all institutions [36, p.72]. The California Joint Committee Report outlines four basic approaches to statewide coordination of postsecondary education which have been utilized in the United States:

- voluntary coordination: without a state mandate, institutions voluntarily come together and cooperate

- advisory coordination: a coordinating board established by statute, with purely advisory functions

- regulatory coordination: a board, commonly designated as a commission, with broad regulatory powers to plan and to approve specified policies and programs, but without administrative responsibility (except over federal programs)

- superboard: a single statewide board which both coordinates and governs [21, p.32].
The Report recommends that California higher education abandon the advisory approach and adopt a regulatory coordinating arrangement. A glance at the emerging models of regionalism in New York and California suggests somewhat different approaches to the voluntary-statutory issue with respect to the design and/or utilization of formal interorganizational structures.

The regionalization movement in New York received its strongest impetus in 1970 when Governor Rockefeller issued an executive order calling upon all state agencies, including those dealing with higher education, to establish regional units for their planning, operation, and fiscal management. The objective of regional organization in New York higher education is to decentralize the State University of New York (SUNY) and to strengthen the state's private institutions. The Regents responded to the executive order by dividing the state into eight regions. The Regents' plan calls for the voluntary establishment of an advisory council for each region, to be formed, in most cases, from existing consortia and to be made up primarily of the presidents of the colleges and universities in the region. The regional councils are to guide the development and operation of regional activities, and regionalism is to be encouraged by the Regents on a "gradual and voluntary basis" over the next several years [1, p.35]. Preliminary discussions have taken place between public and private institutions and some informal groups are beginning to develop. The presidents in each region have been asked to decide upon the kind of formal or informal structure (whether new or existing) which would best meet the objectives of higher education in their area [41, p.12]. So while the fact of regionalism has been imposed upon the institutions of higher education in New York executive mandate, organizational decisions concerning the coordinating agencies have thus far remained voluntary.
The State University of New York (SUNY), consisting of 67 institutions of higher education, is also promoting regionalism and has developed its own structure for regional planning and administration of the SUNY institutions, based on a four-region division, each of which incorporates two of the Regents' regions. In the SUNY plan, however,

The early development of a formal regional structure which could inject a layer of staff between the campuses and each other as well as between the campuses and the central staff has been avoided. In most instances, it was believed that this would stifle rather than stimulate progress ... At the same time, to depend upon informal good will to provide accomplishments would be equally foolhardy. What was required was for an operating system such as the State University to be in a position to provide staff assistance to a region as programs needing such assistance are developed and to place the basic operating responsibility for the programs where that can be exercised most effectively, at the level of the faculty and local campus President with full accountability expected ...

The most important emphasis in all of the steps the University has taken has been a consistent avoidance of any structure or organization which could interpose an additional layer of bureaucracy between the campus and the central staff [41, pp. 15-18].

SUNY has attempted to use its existing structure to implement the concept of regionalization rather than to create new organizations.

There are serious problems with regionalism in New York, the first of which is the existence of two different mappings of the regions. Also, one workshop participant observed that the regions are not at all equal in terms of institutional representation. Both the Regents and SUNY are promoting regionalism, but with somewhat different approaches. The Regents' major interest is planning and organization, whereas SUNY's main concern is operation and function [41]. Finally, the Regents' request for legislative funding of regional projects was denied in 1972. A report prepared by the Academy for Educational Development suggests that if funds are not forthcoming, it is possible that the initiative for regional organization will shift from the Regents (who have long been closely allied with the state's private colleges and universities) to SUNY. The authors of the
report argue that sooner or later the Regents or SUNY will have to prevail, although it is not clear at present which has the best chance.

Regionalism in California is still in the planning stages. The Joint Committee Report argues that interinstitutional cooperation among California's institutions of higher education has been seriously hindered by the tripartite system of public higher education in the state (university, state university and college, and community college). The authors note that there has been some intra-segmental cooperation but very little intersegmental cooperation. The report by the Academy for Educational Development, prepared for the California Joint Committee, states that for the above and other reasons, direct legislative action will be required to expand programs of interinstitutional cooperation in California. Drawing from the Academy report, the Joint Committee observes that "A dozen years ago voluntary cooperation was deemed inadequate for California. It is even less desirable now [21, p.32]." The authors of the Academy report observe that if the Legislature is to encourage greater interinstitutional cooperation, it must answer the question "cooperation for what?" The report distinguishes limited efforts which do not significantly alter existing organizational frameworks from the facilitation of cooperation across the whole range of institutional functions, and argues that while the typical voluntary consortia can accomplish the first type of cooperation, to develop and promote regional cooperation in a wide variety of primary and secondary activities will require the creation of a new structure to link together the individual campuses in each region and to serve, if necessary, as a catalyst for cooperative effort [1, p.51]. The Joint Committee concurs with the Academy report's recommendation for the establishment of permanent regional councils throughout the state which will not only promote increased interinstitutional cooperation
within each region but also serve, eventually, as the basic units for planning and coordinating the utilization and development of higher education resources of all kinds, public and private, throughout the state.

Such councils should have a close relationship to the state planning agency, [the specific agency is left unspecified] which should for that reason have a major role in determining how the councils are to be established, their membership, and their principal responsibilities [1, p.56].

In contrast to the New York version of regionalism, the authors of the various California reports view the initiation of new coordinating structures as a prerequisite for effective cooperation. They also recommend that the structure and operation of the regional councils should be in good part mandated by the state planning agency. This is in sharp contrast to the voluntarist approach adopted by the Regents of the State of New York and to the attempt by SUNY to avoid new mediating organizational structures.

In addition, it would appear that New York is making a stronger attempt to integrate the state's private institutions into the emerging statewide and regional coordination arrangements. The Joint Committee's discussion of the role of private institutions in cooperative endeavors is relatively "soft:"

Since independent colleges and universities are such a vital element in California's educational capability, it is important that there be cooperation between independent and public institutions at state and regional levels. The Postsecondary Education Commission and the regional councils ... should include representation of these institutions and consideration of their needs, though in such a manner as not to jeopardize their independence and autonomy [21, pp.90-91].

Private educational institutions have, of course, been the vanguard of the voluntary cooperative movement. It remains to be seen whether or not voluntarism can work, and if so, how to articulate the voluntary and statutory approaches to coordination.

Although many states are moving towards regional coordinating arrangements, two questions need to be asked: 1) Can regionalism, mandated or
voluntary, indeed encourage greater interinstitutional cooperation? and 2) is the very concept of regionalism, whether mandated or voluntary, a sound one? At the present time, there is no clearcut answer to question one. There are, however, a number of criticisms of the notion of regionalism which deserve attention. In the first place, some students of higher education fear that the movement towards regionalism will hinder interstate, national, and even international affiliations among and markets for institutions of higher education. In this context, the Carnegie Commission report on The Capitol and the Campus recommends that voluntary coordination efforts seem most appropriate in those situations where there is a necessity for including units responsible to jurisdictions of different states [5, p.25]. Intrastate regional coordinating endeavors need not necessarily compete with more broadly based cooperative efforts and individual institutional activities, but it is well to keep in mind that they may. And it is not clear just why voluntary as opposed to statutory arrangements are preferable when, for example, state boundaries are to be crossed. More generally, planning and coordination on a region-wide basis may not be as appropriate for higher education as it is for, say, health services.

A proposal to encourage interinstitutional cooperation in California through regionalization was drafted as legislation and introduced in the 1969 and 1970 sessions of the Legislature but failed to attract much support. Only time will tell whether regionalism and interinstitutional cooperation really do represent partial answers to some of the problems in American higher education. And at this point in time the voluntary-statutory debate is unresolved, although one suspects that in typical American fashion, the end result will be a blending of the two types of arrangements.
4. Summary and Conclusions

Although educational innovation is optimistically viewed as guaranteeing solutions to problems of higher education, the preceding discussions make clear the many obstacles to, and problems surrounding, educational innovation, particularly with respect to interinstitutional cooperation. Cooperation threatens traditionally revered notions of individual institutional autonomy and educational diversity. It may be perceived as striking at the heart of cherished notions of institutional "character," reflected in quality of students and faculty, size and breadth of library facilities, buildings and grounds, athletics, and the like. Although any sort of innovation is likely to prove threatening to involved institutions and/or individuals, certain innovations contain a greater potential for threat than others. Within the context of interinstitutional cooperation, for instance, the sharing of leaf-raking equipment is certainly much less threatening than the combining of three previously separate French departments. At the intrainstitutional level, for instance, innovative physical facilities design rarely arouses the concern that closing departmental or area libraries does.

Innovations of certain types and in certain activity areas clearly pose particular problems. One such problem area, the voluntary-involuntary debate, is discussed at length in section 3. Another crucial and yet highly sensitive problem area relating to interinstitutional cooperation is that of evaluation. One has to acknowledge that there are not now available the comprehensive measures of effectiveness, efficiency, or quality in higher education—either full indices of "output" or ratios of input to output—for which many perceive a need. This is equally true for inter- and intrainstitutional situations. This paper has raised the
question of whether or not the difficulty of identifying and measuring outputs has been a deterrent to success of interinstitutional organizational schemes. There seems to be an understandable reluctance on the part of many persons involved in higher education to buy goods whose value remains substantially unknown. The feeling appears to be one of "we may not quite understand what we have now, but it does work, somehow, and we don't want to upset the delicate balance."

Although it is indeed difficult to draw specific conclusions about the effectiveness of interinstitutional arrangements, this paper does not rest on the assumption that the current delicate balance "works" and therefore should not be disrupted. In spite of the fact that all the evidence is not yet in, some tentative answers can be made to the five questions posed at the beginning of this report:

1. What are interinstitutional arrangements expected to accomplish? Can they do this?

As shown on pages 20–21, incentives to cooperation include everything from raising standards of quality to improving community relations. Many educational innovators feel, with a good deal of messianic zeal, that their particular brands of change can solve all kinds of societal ills, as reflected in the list on page 5 of social-structural pressures for change. Enthusiasts of cooperation are no exception, and expectations about what cooperation can achieve are high. The evidence suggests that no one particular brand of cooperation can right all these wrongs or deliver the promised benefits. Certain structural arrangements may accomplish some goals, and others may be able to produce different kinds of benefits. A good structural-functional analysis of cooperation arrangements—as impossible as it may be to do at this point—would be very useful.
2. What are some of the major obstacles to cooperation? What management strategies may be useful in overcoming them?

As shown in section 2, obstacles to cooperation are many and varied and one can easily conclude that—whatever the nature of the arrangement—cooperation is not easy. Major objections to cooperation center on fears of loss of institutional autonomy and concurrent loss of educational diversity and academic freedom. While this paper does not assume that such fears are justified—it questions the validity of assumptions concerning the sacred nature of these concepts—there may well be good reasons to fear an educational environment that promotes effectiveness and efficiency at the expense of free inquiry and good education. There is, however, no reason to assume that interinstitutional arrangements necessarily threaten free inquiry or a "good" education any more than do some intrainterinstitutional arrangements.

Subheading 5 of section 2 discusses some management strategies which can be useful in overcoming obstacles to interinstitutional cooperation. They include: solicitation of faculty participation in coordinating programs; use of outside consulting agencies in making recommendations for cooperation; and starting programs in areas somewhat peripheral to the "heart" of the participating institutions in order to construct a climate of trust and mutual accommodation. Another strategy which can be employed in highly centralized environments is that of fiat or coercion: make the institutions offers which they can't refuse.

3. Do cooperative centers save money and/or cut costs? Can one reasonably expect to raise educational quality and cut costs at the same time?

The evidence which has been presented here suggests that—except in
the case of certain single or limited-purpose arrangements—cooperative centers do not cut costs. The reason for this conclusion is that it is very difficult to conduct a clear-cut cost/benefit analysis of cooperative arrangements. The costs—including many "social" costs incurred in ancillary adjustments to cooperation*—are difficult to trace. Benefits are equally hard to identify, because many may be somewhat ephemeral in nature, such as increased status as a result of cooperation with a prestigious institution. This is why cost savings are apparent only in those relatively small, single-purpose efforts where intrainstitutional adjustments to cooperation are not multitudinous and readily measurable outputs exist.

It is doubtful, in any case, that one can reasonably expect to save money and raise educational quality at the same time. What evidence is in suggests that quality education costs money. This is why administrators of cooperative programs are wont to identify cost savings as "more bang for the buck." Perhaps over time, cost savings will become apparent, but at the present time, indications are that cooperation costs money.

4. What are some of the potential impacts of cooperative arrangements upon the quality of instruction, research, and public service? Given current attempts at measuring such an intangible as quality and the difficulty of identifying the outputs of cooperation, one can conclude only that it is not possible to reach a conclusion at this time. Cooperation is purported to improve instruction,...

*For a detailed discussion of social costs, see the Ford discussion paper number 14, An Examination of the Social Costs of Cooperation, by Frank Schmidtlein.
research, and public service (see list of incentives on pages 20-21), but it is unclear whether it does do these things.

5. When do superstructures cease to be an impetus to educational efficiency and become a deterrent to quality—or, in other words, when does big become too big?

If it were possible to construct an "efficiency-quality" curve, then one could discover that point where critical mass is achieved and instruct institutions not to grow beyond that point. It is, of course, impossible to do this, and thus one can only speculate about the impact of size upon quality.* Perhaps one answer may lie in an examination of the voluntary/involuntary issue. It is possible, for instance, that a multi-campus organization like the University of California is "too big" now, and yet a potential effect of involuntary participation in regional centers would be to decentralize operations and effectively "shrink" the University. Another possible effect of regionalism would be the construction of even larger superstructures which would further detract campus attention from its educational mission. One doesn't know for sure.

*Additionally, the problem goes beyond that of size, and questions of the complexity of an organization and the location of authority—which may not be associated with size—become crucial.


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