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ABSTRACT
                This study sought to discover the extent of the
parallel between the processes of curriculum evaluation and literary
criticism in order to clarify the evaluation process. A consideration
of both literatures confirmed the presence of the analogy and allowed
the development of a concept of descriptive validity as well as the
identification of three different types of descriptive data. In
addition, a process of judgment and justification was presented and a
concept of publicly reasonable judgment developed. Lastly, six
traditional literary devices were introduced and their analogies in
curriculum explained and exemplified. (Author)

Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism:

The Explication of an Analogy

by

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Curriculum Evaluation and Literary Criticism:
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> A century ago the Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt foresaw
> that ours would be the age of "the great simplifiers," and
> that the essence of tyranny was the denial of complexity.
> He was right. This is the single greatest temptation of the
> time. It is the great corrupter, and must be resisted with
> purpose and with energy.
>
> Daniel Patrick Moynihan

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Implicit in Ian Westbury's review of the literature on curriculum
evaluation (1970) was a belief that the traditional perspectives on
curriculum evaluation were narrow and could profitably be expanded to
include concepts, methodologies, and strategies from other fields.
Westbury noted the relevance of the writings of Mann (1969) and Olson
(1965) and said that the analogies relating curriculum evaluation and
literary criticism "seem to be worth explicating." (p. 247)

Under new slogans and armed with bold jargon--terms like "accountability,"
and "performance criteria"--the evaluator of educational and social programs
attempts to describe accurately and judge fairly. The methodology of
behavioral science, of scientific inquiry, and of empiricism generally, have
been his arsenals. They have given him force and accuracy, though--as is the
way with arsenals--not always wisdom in the choice of targets and standards.
He needs still more aid.

My technologist friends, for example, can locate a person in the
seventy-fifth density band of a discriminant plot and say that this idealized
person is closer to the centroid of one factor than to the other. Not really
so different, I have thought, from what Harden Craig has done with Hamlet;
just another kind of univariate analysis (one on a side) or multivariate
complexity (the human dilemma). What you end up with is analysis; the one
a literary sort, the other statistical.

I am assuming here that both the professional critic of the arts and the
curriculum evaluator hold as one of their primary goals the development of
descriptions of the phenomena they observe. Also, I am assuming that
description, no matter the mode or excellence, can only lead to a reconstruc-
tion and not a duplication of reality.

My use of the term description follows Smith (1968) who distinguishes between four principal, yet overlapping phases of critical activity. These are description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation. He defines description as involving "naming, identifying, and classifyir , a kind of taking stock which inventories cognitively established aspects of a work of art ...." (p.22)

Description is a process whose goal is a reconstruction of an object or process. Analysis, like description, employs a point of view* to identify the object or process parts. Analysis is conducted to determine to what extent a particular concept or structure may be present in a phenomenon. For example, a curriculum can be analyzed to determine if it contains an element of spirality, or whether it is proposing a methodology that encourages divergent thinking. Moreover, Smith (1968) is correct in his suggestion that it is difficult to maintain the four phases of the critical process as mutually exclusive. The elements of analysis, interpretation, and evaluation frequently become mixed with what is intended to be only description.

The difficulty of maintaining the descriptive intent of a passage without employing some analysis, interpretation, or evaluation is illustrated by the following excerpt from A Comprehensive Curriculum Evaluation of tne Christian Ministry Academy - 1970 (Eash, 1970). The intent of the passage is to provide "a brief description of the school in its social setting...." (p. 15)

> Located in the West Garfield Park area on the West
> side of Chicago, CAM Academy is in an area that is largely
> a black ghetto. The academy is housed in a former bank
> building which the Christian Action Ministry has purchased
> for its programs.... The building provides adequate space
> for the present organization of the Academy, and offers
> limited room for expansion.

> An important determinant of the Academy and its
> curriculum is the surrounding environment. The building
> housing the Academy is located on a busy street within
> a small business district containing a variety of retail
> stores. Off the adjoining side streets are the usual
> carryout food shops, dry cleaning, small grocery shops,
> laundry, beer joints, and record stores. Within this
> area and scattered among the small businesses are vacant
> stores, a number of which are burned out, visible evidence
> of the fires that swept this area three years ago...
> There are few new businesses moving in the area other than
> occasional small businessmen, and to all appearances the
> one large chain store, while maintaining its present
> outlet, is not expanding, nor are the other large businesses
> establishing stores in the area.

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*My use of the term "point of view" is after Taylor (1961) as a value stance that would imply certain standards and also prefer the examination of some variables to others. Economics, aesthetics, ethics, and psychology are examples of points of view, as used here. Unless expressly indicated, the term is not meant in the sense that it has been used in literary criticism. (See Wellek and Warren, 1942.)

West Garfield Park has been in transition for the past
decade, but it is now a solid black neighborhood. (pp. 15-16)

Many of the words, phrases, and sentences employed in the passage
serve a descriptive function. "Located in the West Garfield Park area
on the West side of Chicago," begins a paragraph that tells the building's
location, recent history, present occupancy, and ownership. Eash has
evaluated the present space available to the Academy as "adequate" but
"limited" as far as expansion is concerned. The passage goes on to state
that the surrounding area is an "important determinant of the Academy
and its curriculum." With the use of the term "important determinant,"
the evaluative elements first observed in the use of "adequate" and "limited"
are continued.

Although the passage begins by suggesting that CAM is located in "an
area that is largely a black ghetto" and concludes with the powerful metaphor
"... is now a solid black neighborhood," the majority of the descriptive
statements could be verified by an examination of the area described. On
the other hand, phrases and terms such as "solid black neighborhood,"
"adequate," and "important determinant" suggest a normative standard. While
such statements as "housed in a former bank building" and "on the West side
of Chicago" imply attention to an obvious time-space dimension, the use of
metaphoric and normative phrases implies an external mode of analysis,.
interpretation, or evaluation that has been imposed on the phenomenon by
the observer. Possibly more important, the writer has chosen to single
out and identify the ethnic character of a neighborhood. The solidity of
the neighborhood, the adequacy of space, and the importance of the environ-
mental determinant are all judgments that result from an external frame of
reference. Their presence signals the difference between simple description
as compared to analysis, interpretation, or evaluation.

"Solid black neighborhood" is a metaphor that is used to characterize
a place. Much like old words and old girlfriends, "solid black neighborhood"
doesn't carry too many surprises anymore, although there may be threat of
some, I suppose. It has lost whatever ulteriority it may have had. But it
helps to characterize the place for the reader by associating it with black-
ness and solidity and offering the entire extension of these concepts for
the reader's response. To say that all the rooms in a twenty square block
area are occupied by blacks is to say something different from "a solid
black neighborhood." The former is concerned with numeration, the latter
with suggestion and characterization, the association or coupling of one
thing with another.

When descriptions are intended to function as the contextual component
of an evaluation report, the mixture of literal and figurative language that
will be used is subject to the idiosyncracies of authorship rather than to
some external guide to description. For example, the following description
appeared in the report of a site visit to an Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) Title III project in Illinois. The project consisted
of a nature study center designed for students from local school districts.
The following passages were intended to describe the Center building and the
surrounding area.

One is immediately struck with the isolation of the
location...from communities, from schools and homes, from
mass urban environments. The location is a "natural"....
forested, birds, river, unpaved access road, nearby corn-
field, limited public facilities...rural, pastoral. In
contrast, the Center building is a beehive of human activity
....bright colors, materials and equipment, files and desks
...neat, clean, orderly. Indoor space with a tile floor,
chairs in rows, tables in their places, museumlike exhibits
...ready for the day's activity. Displays, models, cages,
instruments to provoke, to interest, to entertain, perhaps
to distract. A classroom-like space for multiple tasks...
for orientation, for inclement weather, for follow-up, for
meetings, for laboratory work, for in-service, for talking
and looking out for emergencies, for testing.

Some forty-five acres of the site are across the river
from the Center building. An absence of signs that tell you
do or don't, no labels, no tricky gimmicks to call your
attention to this or that. No printed words to invade the
privacy of your thoughts and feelings. A solid structure to
cross the waters to the larger site area...massive posts and
timbers, firm and solid, not shaky or swaying, engineered
to last. Like the entrance to another world...away from the
familiar and commonplace in a child's life, outdoor space
with design, rhythm, texture, freedom from restraints,
unschool like, a retreat. (Denny, and others, 1969, p.2)

In what is a mixture of description, characterization, interpretation,
and evaluation, the passage establishes the atmosphere of the Center in
addition to detailing the factual characteristics of the structure and
its surroundings. This is accomplished in a fashion unlike the more
factual intent of the lines describing CAM Academy. Not only does the
passage establish the isolation of the area, but it also suggests dimensions
that are more aesthetic than factual. "Like the entrance to another world...
away from the familiar and commonplace in a child's life...rhythm, texture
....a retreat." The paragraph shows a wide spectrum of rhetorical and
figurative devices that includes contrast, understatement, metaphor, simile,
personification, and hyperbole. Compared to the description of the CAM
Academy building, the description of the nature center is richer in language
and more evocative in intent.

When I imply the value of descriptions, I am saying that it is important
for the evaluator to be able to reconstruct the object of his evaluation. I
am also saying that in the reconstruction, the evaluator must be concerned
with sufficiency. I say this in the belief that one of the roles evaluators
can usefully perform is the development of ways of telling people what
happened. It is important for the audience of an evaluation to have some
good basis on which to decide whether the judgments and conclusions that have
been rendered in an evaluation are sensible in view of the type of program
that was in effect and the conditions under which it existed. It is
important, moreover, for the evaluator to learn how to increase the shared
experience of the curriculum. One basis that will help to bring about this
sharing is the program description.

If the Eash and Denny examples are useful because they illustrate attempts at description that allow us some vicarious share in the experience of CAM or the Title III site, it is reasonable to inquire about correspondence. Traditionally, descriptions of educational programs have been constructed around a set of measures that were supposed to have some relationship or correspondence to a set of outcomes of concern The emphasis has been on predictive validity, the search for a set of measures that will correlate with a criterion. Unfortunately, although a multitude of available independent measures may allow the construction of powerful regression equations, those same observations may prove inadequate as a program description. When the intention is to develop predictive power, the investigator's concern with any independent variable may be centered on the instrumental value of that construct, an instrumental value that is indicated for some by a beta weight. Powerful research designs and analyses, although necessary in attempts to predict and explain behavior, have a limited application to program description. If a judgment on descriptive adequacy is not to be found in predictive validity, how should one determine the acceptability of a description?

Descriptive Adequacy

Descriptive adequacy is analogous to the concept of content validity as found in the theory of measurement. It requires that the description reconstruct the object of concern and not some other object or phenomenon. One of the difficult problems involved in the creation of a description is to know how far off the mark we can be and still be able to say we've described an "X" rather than a "Y."

To speak of the difference between describing "X" and a "Y" and to consider the possibility of adequate description becomes rather problematic when one maintains at the same time that descriptions of reality are but reconstructions of it. If reality can only be reconstructed rather than duplicated, how does one ever know that he has described it adequately?

Consider the following assertions as three simple descriptions.

A. The glass is full of water.

B. I have a pain in my neck.

C. I enjoyed his class.

Sentence (A) is a descriptive sentence that is empirically verifiable. It can be determined by examination whether or not the glass is full of water. With reasonable certainty one can know to what extent the glass is full, and what it contains. Although the case is limited by the accuracy of measure, the assertion can be reasonably verified.

The case alters somewhat in sentence (B), "I have a pain in my neck." In this assertion, the opportunity for verification is denied. For example, it would be logically odd for someone to respond, "Prove it." As Malcolm (1963) suggests, the statement is self-confirming. I would add though that the evidence of its descriptive adequacy lies in the simple fact that it was uttered. Although it will not submit to empirical verification, the speaker himself may be assessed for credibility or trustworthiness.

I take statement (B), "I have a pain in my neck," and statement (C), "I enjoyed his class," to be of the same type. (B) and (C) both prohibit public verification. They are self-confirming assertions, and it would be logically odd to ask for verification. Insofar as "I enjoyed his class" is a statement descriptive of a personal response, it is different from the statement, "His class is enjoyable." Where the first exists in the past tense and is a description of a state of affairs that is over, the second implies a response in the future as well as a generalization to an unnamed group external to the speaker. It would not be logically odd to respond to the statement, "His class is enjoyable," with a request for verification, as long as it was clear from context that the remark was directed toward bringing someone other than the speaker into agreement with the statement.

There are two criteria that must be satisfied for the attainment of descriptive adequacy. They are (1) that the description prove satisfactory upon re-examination or introspection by the actor, and (2) that the description prove satisfactory to a knowledgeable public. I say knowledgeable public to allow that some people may require descriptions of greater specificity than others, and further that some people will want descriptions that are located in differing points of view.

Three Descriptive Mediums

Descriptive adequacy is a relational construct that is achieved through the use of one or more of three descriptive mediums. These three mediums are (1) Depiction, (2) Summarization, and (3) Configuration.

Depiction is the use of the whole range of sensory devices and their combinations that allow an actor to record or portray an object. Examples of depictive devices include photographs, films, maps, drawings, etc., and those sensory-perceptual mediums that allow a dimensional representation.

Summarization is the use of verbal or mathematical symbols by an actor to reduce or transform pre-established characteristics of an object in order that they may become part of a description. Summarization techniques frequently employed in descriptions include the literary precis and paraphrase, verbal narratives, and the entire range of descriptive statistics. Unlike the depictive technique which filters the object through a particular medium in order to obtain a dimensional representation, summarization techniques require that a characteristic of the object be pre-specified and that this characteristic's presence in the object be presented through a transformational process. For example, in an attempt to describe a particular audience, photographs might be taken (depictive medium). The number of individuals in attendance might also be counted and in other ways coded (summary medium). The summarization process, as used in the example of audience description, requires the transformation of an audience characteristic, i.e., size, into an indicator of size, in this case, the number in attendance.

Configuration is the use of any verbal or numerical symbol or other pictorial device to produce a representation that is an <u>extrapolation</u> of aspects of an object that are not directly observable. Configuration is achieved through the association of at least one characteristic of the object with some other object, concept, or process. Utilizing a verbal device such as metaphor ("a solid black ghetto") is the result of configuration just as is the Flanders ID ratio.* Attempts to describe the velocity of an object, the interest or attention level of a group, or the aesthetic form of an object are all configurational efforts.

From another point of view, the three descriptive mediums can be differentiated according to the extent of their distance from the object under examination. Depictive techniques should be differentiated from both summary and configurational ones in that they require less inferential treatment, where inference is an attempt to draw conclusions that are warranted by evidence. For example, the photograph may possibly stand alone, with the actor involved only in the process of angle selection, and the audience drawing their own inferences from their individual mental sets. In both summarization and configuration, on the other hand, the actor is involved in more than a process of selecting for the audience's view certain objects of importance. For through these processes the actor is proclaiming to the audience that such and such elements or relations <u>are</u> important. As the medium becomes more esoteric, as one moves further away from the phenomenon, statements about that phenomenon become more subject to counter-statement, and reliance on the guides of inquiry and public indicators of confidence can increase.

Descriptive Types

The following descriptive types characterize the range of descriptive applications:

1. General-specific

2. Internal-external-contextual

3. Object-centered, process-centered

4. Idiosyncratic-consensual

General and specific descriptions are different in <u>scope</u> or <u>range</u>. While general descriptions concern themselves with extensive object/process phenomena, specific descriptions are limited to a subset of a category, or a carefully defined entity. An example of a general description would be an attempt to describe an entire school's curriculum, while a description of a particular lesson that composed part of that curriculum would certainly be more specific, more molecular in its consideration. The terms are relative; relative to each other and to the objects, processes, and contexts

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*The Flanders system develops two such ratios. They indicate the ratio of statements that may be classified as indirect versus those that may be classified as direct.

to which they are applied. General description could concern the depiction, summarization, and configuration of one student in that lesson.

While the general-specific dimension indicates the scope or range of a description, the internal, external, and contextual dimension details the focus. For example, to describe the interest and attention level of an individual or class might compose one aspect of an internally oriented description. An author's effort to describe the emotional state of a man standing before a firing squad would carry the same internal focus. External and contextual descriptions, located in similar circumstances, would portray the way the man looked, what he said, what he did (external); while a contextual concern would focus on setting or scene and would move toward establishing the action of the execution within a particular environment or context.

The distinction between object-centered and process-centered descriptions is clear in that the former focuses on observable phenomena and the latter requires descriptions of relationships, sequences, and activities that are only indirectly observable. Such distinctions seem to characterize the curricular literature where there has been some considerable effort to describe the process of education, and to describe progress toward educational objectives and goals.

To say that a description is idiosyncratic means that there is little likelihood that the same object or process would elicit the same description from someone other than the original actor. On the other hand, consensual description carries an agreement between actors that the rendered description does, in fact, reconstruct the phenomenon to a reasonable degree. Yet the two should not be seen as mutually exclusive. Especially within the arts, in painting and literature, what may have begun as a totally idiosyncratic rendering can become, in time, the consensual expression of a large group of people.

Lastly, it appears that as description moves away from the idiosyncratic and toward the consensual, the tone of the piece may alter. Whether the object be a play, a painting, or a student, the attempt to employ a language of wide acceptance and to consider those aspects of a phenomenon that are widely held to be important, limits the individuality of the thing by controlling the personal, the allusive, and the stylized. In the absence of those things that indicate authorship, the audience may fail to develop a feeling for the tone of the thing. It is in the tone of the piece, whether it be an evaluation of a curriculum or a criticism of a painting, that the audience comes to know that the description has been rendered by a person, for other persons. In the realm of description, it may be that some fear of the subjective, some long-standing warning to control and monitor the personal response and to attempt an objectification have combined to encourage the writing of incomplete descriptions that leave the audience with the feeling that there were probably no people there.

Possibly the physical scientist brings some consensus to his descriptions of controlled phenomena. He certainly can draw from a content and methodology that is conceptually reliable and less perplexed by dispositional constructs. The presence of clearly exposited theoretical networks and proven procedures allow him a description that is, as yet, only a hope held by some social scientists. Consequently, the curriculum evaluator is faced with an idiosyncrasy that moves some to strive to combine the creative

brilliance of the disciplined artist with the serendipity of a disciplined inquiry that can engender a new paradigm. Still it is not difficult to sense, especially when the dialogue is tempted to prescription, a vague mistrust of both the art and the science of the thing called curriculum evaluation.

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Furthering the Analogy between Criticism and Evaluation

In addition to a common concern with description, literary criticism and curriculum evaluation are analogous in their concern with the process of judgment. They differ because the first is concerned with literature; the second with curriculum. What follows is a presentation of the additional ways in which the two are alike and different.

The characteristic of the two analogous processes that is immediately evident is diversity. In literary criticism it is a diversity that is related to social and scientific forces that have provided it with different perspectives over the past two thousand years. The critical point of view has altered, for example, as it moved from that of the classical period, through the romantic, impressionistic, and analytic considerations of the modern schools. The guise of classicism and its emphasis on a set of fixed rules and universals as the basis on which art should be judged, brought the criticism of art to a concern with workmanship as judged against these fixed criteria. The achievement of some limited pattern or form became the cri- rion of artistic performance, and criteria such as the three unities of the Gr k theater and the classical rules of musical harmony were applied. The po c was was that there existed a set of criteria against which art was to be assesed.

By the late eighteenth century, what has come to be called the modern romantic view of art grew to wide acceptance. Kant held, for example, that art was founded not on rules but on genius and that beauty was consequently a matter of taste rather than the satisfaction of some external set of criteria. Organic conceptions of art, poetry, and drama were developed that emphasized the _internal_ structure and consistency of a work rather than an _external_ basis of judgment.

It followed as a natural outgrowth of the romantic conception that the writings of Walter Pater and George Moore should begin to build the rationale for impressionistic criticism. Pater and Moore both identifed the function of the critic as one directed toward a sympathetic response to the genius of art and literature, and moreover, that this response be expressed in an artful, suggestive, and finished fashion.

The burgeoning of the scientific method in the nineteenth century set some critics onto the use of the genetic or historical method in the arts. Here the effort was to unravel the structures, forces, and factors that had led to the production of the work. Widely popular in Germany, this emphasis on "historical erudition," (Gotshalk, 1947, p. 194) can still be seen in the approaches of many American graduate universities.

One way to differentiate the broader movements in criticism is to identify their orientation toward the work or art. Classicism and romanticism, for example, can be distinguished by the first's orientation toward an external set of standards against which the work is compared, while romanticism maintains a concern with internal aspects of the piece. In a similar sense, while exegetical criticism or historicism seeks to relate the work to factors at rest in the past, impressionistic criticism generally seeks to vivify the experience of the work in the present.

The parallel in curriculum evaluation is a subtle one, yet it is important for what follows. The principal forces that have shaped curriculum evaluation are the behavioral research tradition, the accreditation movement in American education, and the measurement and testing tradition. Although their influence is hard to designate in a chronological fashion, people in education have had a long-standing concern with all three. The influence of measurement and testing on American education had its birth during World War I when the concern of the armed forces with the efficient selection and assignment of personnel led to an increased demand for refined selection procedures. The present widespread use of testing within the school systems, and its applications in guidance and counseling, are the outgrowths of that concern.

As an influence on curriculum evaluation, the movement is harder to describe. Certainly the role that testing has played in certain types of evaluation efforts cannot be denied. Consider, for example, its role in the Eight Year Study as described by Smith, and others (1942). The use of tables of test specifications that divide objectives into subject content and student behavior also illustrates how a concern with testing has encouraged the specification of instructional outcomes. (Anastasi, 1968, p. 161) One could wonder about the reasons why we measure and what the proper functions of that activity are, what assumptions it makes about reality and what its relationships to evaluation are, or should be. Considered within the parallel between criticism and evaluation, measurement and testing take on a different and interesting hue.

A parallel between measurement and criticism exists in the application of two theories of measurement. To interpret a test score from either classical theory or generalizability theory is to adopt a point of view on questions about the nature of true score and also on the relationship of the total score on a measure to the entity being measured.

These two theories of measure may be compared to two alternative theories of criticism. Within classical test theory, where the conception of the observed score is that it is composed of a certain amount of deviation or error that separates it from the unknown "true" score, the parallel consideration lies in the classical consideration of criticism where the effort of the critic is directed at describing and judging a work in terms of how well it approximates the satisfactory fulfillment of an idealized conception of artistic truth. That is, within the classical theory of criticism, as in the classical model of measurement, the process centers on the designation of a discrepancy between the actual and the ideal, between the observed and the possible. They both deal in approximation; they both assume an ideal.

On the other hand, generalizability theory is contrary to the discrepancy approach in that it seeks not to identify the error component of an observed score so much as it strives to express how well that score may represent a universe of possible scores. Within literary criticism, the analogue for generalizability theory lies in the romantic view of art and literature. Both generalizability theory and the romantic theory of criticism allow the score, the work, or the individual, to remain intact (rather than considered in terms of an error component or discrepancy) and to be represented among a wider universe of possible scores of art objects. In a sense, the oneness or organic unity of the art or the score, is preserved. The object is viewed not in a discrepancy model but rather in a relational or dispositional one.

A Rhetoric for the Curriculum

The phrase "a rhetoric for the curriculum" refers here to a group of concepts originating in literary criticism that can be used to develop curricular critiques. As the initial elements for a critique, they compose a two-edged sword, and it is in this sense that the rhetoric will have two uses. First, it will provide a basis for a consideration of curriculum according to concepts that are more commonly thought of as the property of literature and its criticism. Second, the rhetoric will provide a basis for examining curriculum evaluation. There is a double applicability; first as a way of talking about and conceiving of a curriculum, and second as a way of investigating the manner of a curriculum evaluation. Examples will be given to illustrate the application of the concepts to curriculum evaluation.

The four concepts discussed as a rhetoric for the curriculum are metaphor, point of view (voice), plot (order), and theme. The role of metaphor is given precedence, since it colors much of what follows.

Metaphor

Most people recognize metaphor as part of poetry. The better case would be to say that metaphor composes most of common language. It is a way of saying one thing and meaning another. Its delight and part of its utility is that metaphor allows what Frost (1930) called "the pleasure of ulteriority." (p. xvi)

To say that metaphor is a way of saying one thing and meaning something else doesn't much help, but possibly an example will. To say, for example, "terrible beauty" is to say a metaphor. To say that he had a "a broken heart" is to say a metaphor, just as much as to say that West Garfield Park is "a solid black neighborhood" is to say a metaphor. What strikes one is the ulteriority of the thing, saying one thing and meaning another. The "otherness" of the thing is its ulteriority. It may be clear to those who look for literal meaning that West Garfield Park is "a solid black neighborhood" means that there are predominantly black residents in the blocks comprising it. The "otherness," the ulteriority of the thing, is that solidity, mass, organization, power, and hurt identify that section of Chicago.

It helps with metaphor to see it as composed of a vehicle and a tenor (Richards, 1965, p. 97). The vehicle is literal; the tenor is affective, allusive, and ulterior. Taken as a relational thing, a verbal attempt to bring two unrelated notions together, the vehicle of a metaphor is the succession of images that compose it. In the case of West Garfield Park, the vehicle is the images of solid neighborhood and black neighborhood which are brought together. The tenor of the metaphor, "the underlying idea or principal subject which the vehicle or figure means" (Richards, 1965, p. 97) is singularity and mass.

But isn't the tenor subject to my own response, one might question? Couldn't that metaphor mean something considerably different from "singularity and mass"? Usually, yes. Metaphor provides a range of response that is open in its extension and both affective and cognitive in its mode. The limits that control this range of response to the tenor of metaphor are established by context and previous use.

The contextual limit of metaphor, or of any figure for that matter, is a result of the definition that is provided by the images, figures, and implications that precede and follow it. In context, the neighborhood metaphor functions as part of a description within an evaluation report. In the first case, the reader is prepared to receive the metaphor on the neighborhood by the preceding descriptive elements. It is within the context that the tenor of the metaphor must be interpreted. Within the context of the poem, a poem about rebellion, revolution, courage, and death, the tenor of "terrible beauty" carries an air of wondrous sorrow, of sacrifice, and fear that is in part the product of the succession of images and supportive figures that surround it. Its "meaning" within this context differs from the one it would carry in the context of a beauty pageant, for example.

Still "solid black neighborhood" could have been replaced by a phrase like "predominantly black neighborhood," or "95.4% black neighborhood." But those phrases would not have offered that broad range of responsive meaning. Those phrases appear to provide in its place a sense of precision that some would say is lacking in metaphor. To suggest, though, that the phrase "95.4% black neighborhod" is more precise than "a solid black neighborhood" is to misconstrue the whole of metaphor.

To say this is to misunderstand the distinction between the literal and the figurative. "95.4% black neighborhood" may be taken as a literal statement of fact that can be verified. As a literal statement it should adhere to the lexical definition of percent, ethnic group, and neighborhood. To say "95.4% black neighborhood" is to say that this percentage of the residents of a particular neighborhood are black. To say "a solid black neighborhood" is a figurative statement that has both a literal and a figurative meaning. Literally the phrase means that the neighborhood is inhabited almost totally by blacks; figuratively it means that the neighborhood suggests solidity, mass, and singularity. The metaphor has the opportunity of being equally literal as a literal statement. As a statement designed to convey information, it may function equally well, but in addition to its literal message, the metaphor carries a figurative meaning.

The limit of previous use is one of history. Insofar as most words and figures bring with them a history of use, they can be interpreted according to that history or what is frequently called usage. In the realm of figure, it is this history of use that stands as the metaphoric boneyard. The poet's, the writer's attempt to freshen language, to invent, to startle, and to create alternative metaphors, is at times an effort to avoid the hackneyed, the cliche, and the trite. It is in some respects an effort to be original, but it is equally a challenge to employ the discipline that wards off confusion and the peril of obscurity. The poet warns of this danger. Frost warned about going too far with metaphor, of letting the figure get control to the point that the tenor becomes too obscure to be realized.

Metaphor is most of language. It characterizes most of the languages of the classroom that I've known and the language of students and others who have set themselves to describing and judging what was there. The child who once told me that my lesson was "a real waste" may have meant a waste of talent, or money, or energy, or presence, or all of those things. He used metaphor. (Synecdoche maybe, in some kind of substitution of the part for the whole.) The point is that by employing a figure as one of his descriptors of the classroom, the child identified a relationship that he would ascribe between one thing and another.

Whether or not it be a precise language, much of the day-to-day language of critical discourse that occurs within the classroom is filled with metaphor. Whether it has occurred as a result of a quest for precision, the application of a particular technology, or some other factor is unclear, but I am rather certain that curriculum evaluators have not made much use of metaphor.

On the contrary, those who function as reviewers of plays make extensive use of it, if the following quotation from a review by Clive Barnes is representative.

"Subject to Fits"...is a mad, mad play that is a joy to encounter. It is a cerebral play of dazzling intellectuality, manic wit and calm literacy.... It is a young man's play, bubbling with talent, almost arrogant in the joy it takes in hearing itself speak. It is an intricate play that is poised perilously on its own cleverness, its literary conceits and elegant stagecraft, but it balances and it works.

(Barnes, 1971, p. 4H)

The passage is filled with figure. Barnes could have sought out the specific structural components that composed the "balance" of the thing and expressed them in a literal fashion. He could have been extended and literal in his summary of the play, yet he chose principally metaphor to convey not only his observations on the play, but also his judgments on its effectiveness. Further on in the review, Barnes wrote that "The result (of the above) is something absolutely thrilling--a soul trip, an adventure of the heart and mind." What has occurred, from one point of view, is that the tenor of the metaphors of the introductory paragraph has been stated as emotional and intellectual thrill. The student who figured my classroom

as "a real waste," although considerably less eloquent in his approach, was clearly speaking about the absence of that same emotional and intellectual thrill. The metaphor was his expression of my failure. The performance had flopped.

Metaphor in Curriculum Evaluation

The language of curriculum evaluation is characterized by a metaphor of measure. As an illustration, consider the use of the following from Lindvall and Cox (1970) and their monograph, The IPI Evaluation Program. In their discussion of the need for criterion-referenced tests, the authors make the following statement which illustrates how the metaphor of measure further characterizes this language. (The metaphors have been underlined.)

> Given that the IPI curricula are based in sequences of behavioral objectives organized into areas, levels, and units, it becomes the task of the test constructor to provide instruments that allow for placement of pupils at proper points in these sequences and that facilitate the continuous diagnosis of pupil achievement. If the instruments are to be used to help make decisions about pupils in reference to specific instructional objectives, then criterion-referenced measures are required. Criterion-referenced measures are designed so that they yield scores which can be interpreted in reference to the instructional objectives and give rather exact information as to where a pupil is in a learning sequence. (p. 15)

Even without specifying the tenor of the metaphors, it is clear that the language is specialized and that several very powerful assumptions have been made about the people ("pupils") in the program. The obvious ones are that "achievement" or "progress" can be viewed and measured in a linear fashion, and that the outcomes of a curriculum can be pre-specified in a behavioral fashion and "progress" toward (or away from?) these objectives measured in an exact fashion. In addition to the metaphor of measure, the passage itself suggests a metaphor for a curriculum that is structured in a microscopic fashion; that structure implies that efficiency and its increase have a strong relationship to worth.

A similar language typifies the report of a formative evaluation conducted by the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) (1970) on life science materials for the educable mentally handicapped. The following paragraph is taken from the discussion of the results of that evaluation. (The metaphors have been underlined.)

> The data indicate that age, WISC total IQ, race and cerebral dysfunction are not significant predictors of success on the reduced postest. The pretest, however, is a highly significant $(P < .01)$ predictor of success on the postest. Sex is also a significant $(P < .05)$ predictor of success on the postest. The results indicate that prior knowledge of the concepts measured by the test instrument was the best determinant of whether or not the E_M_H student attained a high score on the postest. Test analysis shows that 2/3 of the items were aimed at baseline information, hence this conclusion is not surprising, especially since achievement items were for the enabling objectives and were at a low cognitive level. (p. 25)

Although it may be unclear exactly how each of the above examples qualifies as a metaphor of measure rather than of research or statistical inference, the point remains that the language of some curriculum evaluators is marked by a highly specialized figure. Just as Frost warned the poet against letting metaphor get out of control to the point that meaning is obscured, the curriculum evaluator could profitably re-examine the influence that the metaphor of measure has had on his way of examining and describing curricula.

Point of View (Voice)

Within the tradition of literary criticism, and certainly as that tradition has focused in the new criticism, attention has been paid to the function of point of view in literature. More recently, acceptable jargon suggests that the concept be somewhat broadened and called "voice." Although definitions of the terms vary across traditions and theories, point of view has generally been taken as the manner in which the action* of a story is related. Sometimes referred to as the angle from which the author views a work, and more appropriately construed as the psychological frame within which the narrator speaks, differing uses of point of view have assisted the critic's discrimination among artistic works.

What role has point of view played in curriculum evaluation? It is all too clear that most curriculum evaluations have been conducted from a very discreet point of view. Although it may remain undisclosed, the angle from which education, learning, knowledge--its nature and value-- have been considered within an evaluation are the consequences of point of view. Similarly, the way the evaluator generally describes the program, the aspects he chooses to attend to and to dismiss, reflect his point of view. Usually, it remains undisclosed.

When he developed his theory of descriptions, Bertrand Russell understood that to describe an object adequately would logically require collecting an infinite number of descriptions, each representing one of the infinite number of points from which an object could be seen. Clearly, the evaluator will never seriously consider such an effort, any more than Russell did. But if point of view is to be a concern, what the evaluator will have to consider is how he can best select an appropriate point of view, and when he will want to present divergent points of view.

Another aspect of point of view is suggested by Hastings, Wardrop, and Gooler (1970) as they present a model for evaluating geography courses. In reference to point of view, they said that after a systematic evaluation had been conducted to consider a wide range of complex costs, interests, and benefits,

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*Fergusson (1961) has said that the Aristotelian concept of action held it as a psychic energy that worked outwards from the drama itself. Action was the whole working out of the motive of a plot to its end in success or failure. In the sense that action is motive, it may be distinguished from activity which is instrumental to the working out of the motive.

> The evaluator would then present a summary of these costs and
> benefits in such a form that his audience would be able to
> make judgments about the value of the program, from any of a
> number of points of view. (p. 1)

The implication is that not only can the evaluator adopt and present a wide
range of points of view, but the audience can also choose to interpret the
information from an equally diverse range of perspectives.

If there is a caution here it is that the evaluator's decisions about
focus and design, about what he will attend to and dismiss, necessarily
limit the applicable points of view that any audience may take on the story.
Just as in literature, if an author chooses to place the point of view in a
character who is but a child, the reader perceives a portrayal that is
framed by that child's perspective. If the evaluator chooses to consider
only program outcomes, for example, the points of view available to the
audience are limited. The evaluator, like the author, must remember that
the selection of a point of view can void alternative ones.

In addition to point of view, it is through the development of a
voice that an author establishes part of the tone, and humanity (or the
lack of it) of his narrative. Moreover, it is partially through a sense
of voice that critics and reviewers of literature have been able to establish
themselves as meaningful and believable people who have responded to a work,
felt it and assessed its worth. One thing that is absent from most curricu-
lum evaluations is the sense that the evaluation was conducted by a real
person who had some stake in the matter and who actually responded to the
performance.

The concept of "voice" tells how the narration of the action sounds.
Much as one can speak of the tone of a remark, one can consider the tone
or attitude reflected by a narrator. Hardy's "voice" in Tess is at times
sympathetic or brooding, at others, sarcastic and mocking. Hemingway's
omniscient voice in The Old Man and the Sea, on the other hand, is more
matter of fact, yet it, too, betrays a deep concern and understanding of
the old man's loss and foolishness.

It is through the voice of the narrative that the attitudes and values
of the narrator are disclosed. His biases, his descriptive preferences,
and the tone of the presentation are suggested by this term. Taken together
with point of view, the two elements qualify the presentation. While the
angle from which the narrator views the object limits the range of things
that he can say about that object, the voice that he adopts limits the
range of attitude and value (tone) that will be reflected in the narrative.

The following quotation from a student-developed volume of teacher-
course evaluations, illustrates the presence of a voice that reflects an
attitude toward the instructor.

The 362 students who deigned to tell all about History III
left this unanimous and clear-cut opinion of lecturer McKay:
He is a slightly weird and genuinely enthusiastic teacher with
a sharp wit that everyone was too tired to catch as he rambled
in circles like an unorganized, mousey inspiring revival minister
with a cold.

What that means is that this was the usual survey course
with the usual bell-shaped student reactions. McKay was just
adequate for most of his students. He loves his subjects and
shows it, but most students just didn't respond well. (Hansen
and Simon, 1970, p. 141)

The idea of voice seen as a way of expressing the person of the speaker,
of letting the reader know where the narrator stands and how he feels about
the subject is a device that some evaluators have used with effectiveness.
(See, for example, Denny and Hoke, 1969)

Plot (Order)

E. M. Forster in Aspects of the Novel (1927) distinguishes between
"plot" and "plot-line" according to incident, time, and causality. Plot,
as a series of incidents ordered in time showing a causal relationship,
is distinguished from plot-line, a simple ordering of incidents over time.
As a paradigm case for plot-line, Forster suggests, "The king died and then
the queen died." As a paradigm for plot, he suggests, "The king died and
then the queen died of grief." Forster makes it clear that plot is intimately
tied to characterization. The one begets the other.

Just as an author creates plot as he builds character through dialogue,
activity, and description, the curriculum evaluator's effort to reconstruct
the plot of a curriculum is based On his ability to collect pieces of it and
to rebuild it by telling what people have said and done. Conceived as a
designation of experience, those aspects of the curriculum that the evaluator
chooses to depict mold the plot that will appear in the evaluation. As
different evaluators attend to different elements, shifting their emphasis
from what people said to what they did, from what was observable to what was
inferable, the picture of the plot that is suggested also changes.

The question of adequacy has to haunt the evaluator again. Faced with
the realization that it is hard enough to decipher the plot and subplots that
lie embedded in a curriculum, he has the additional worry of whether or not
his evaluation of that curriculum has been able to capture sufficient
complexity. To say that the king died and then the queen died, is probably
a great deal to say about a curriculum. To say, moreover, that the king
died and then the queen died of grief is to have unraveled mystery.

Some evaluators act as if there is a mystery in curriculum and that it
is the responsibility of the evaluation to unfold it. Some feel that the
curriculum evaluator ought to be more concerned with causality, with the
"why" of the queen's death. (Hastings, 1966) In order to do so, in order

to infer causality, the evaluator must borrow from science the designs
for causal inference.* But in so doing, he rarely has the control or the
budget, the widsom or the tenacity to pursue causality. Audiences for
curriculum evaluations, much like audiences for literary criticism, are
frequently not concerned with the why of the thing. Many times they want
to know what happened next, and whether it was worthwhile.

There is still another important sense in which concern with plot or
order may be seen as a similarity between criticism and evaluation. Both
the critic and the evaluator are, at times, bemused by the proper designation
of the object under consideration into units or parts. For the evaluator,
a language principally from the research tradition has brought the use of
metaphors like "the unit of analysis" (meaning the student, the class, or the
school, usually), and for the critic, it has brought terms like "incident,"
"episode," and "period." Whether the attempt has been to evaluate a work
of literature, or an educational program, the analytic effort has frequently
been devoted to the designation of the object into a subsystem of components.
In literature, analysis and grouping of related incidents can lead to the
identification of secondary orderings of sub-plots that can be related. Thus
terms like "loose" and "tight" can be applied to a narrative's plot and
structure.**

Gagné (1967) has used the idea of a "unit of content" as the basis for
a definition of curriculum. He said,

A curriculum is a sequence of content units arranged in such a
way that the learning of each unit may be accomplished as a
single act, provided the capabilities described by specified
prior units (in the sequence) have already been mastered by the
learner. (p. 23. Emphasis his.)

Thus a "unit of content" becomes "a capability to be acquired under a single
set of learning conditions, among these conditions being certain specified
prerequisite capabilities." (p. 22. Emphasis his.) Based on this conception
of curriculum, Gagné shows how a system of task analysis can be employed to
construct and monitor a curriculum. Gagne was probably correct when he
wrote that such a methodology for

specifying a curriculum by deriving a hierarchy of capabilities
beginning with educational objectives that described human performance,
seems to have some important implications for research. (p. 38)

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*Wardrop (1971) has suggested how a concern with "most probably causes"
can be of help here.

**The concept of structure in literature has been widely debated. See,
for example, Wellek and Warren (1942, pp. 127-29) and Crane (1963, pp. 102-09).
The term has also been applied differently to the poem (Blackmur, 1946) as
compared to the novel (Van Ghent, 1953). In curriculum, it has been identified
with scope and sequence and defined as "the parts of an object and the ways
in which they are interrelated." (Ford and Pugno, 1964, p. 2)

Considered as a technique for curriculum evaluation, Gagne's strategy raises
all the questions and reservations inherent in the problem of specifying
curricular outcomes in a behavioral fashion. (See, for example, the
excellent discussions by Popham, and others (1969).)

Just as the quest for a unit of curricular analysis may lead to
efforts that deny the integrity of the thing, Forster's concept of plot
has clear limitations in literature, and these are reflected in its analogue
in curriculum. Conceived as a causal ordering of incidents over time, it is
easy to understand the confused dismay that met the publication of Ulysses, not
to mention Finnegan's Wake. The literature of free association or stream of
consciousness, for example, does not readily submit to an analysis that seeks
linearity and chronological ordering. The role of cause, and consequently,
change, receives an alternative conception that does not anchor their referent
in some evident logical reference. Rather, the rendition of action is based
in the phenomonology of the individual and his alternative perceptions of the
environment. Analogically, the search for curricular plot, best identified
possibly with concerns over the "scope" and "sequence" of a curriculum, may
prove somewhat inapplicable when they are imposed on a package that is not
ordered through time or cause, but rather seeks an ordering that lies in the
responsive psychology of the individual. For the curriculum evaluator, the
search for logical contingency, for example, may be inappropriate in some
alternative or "open" curricula where the ordering and contingency lie not in
the logic of the thing so much as in the principals' perceptions of the motifs
and meanings of experiences.

Theme

It makes sense to place a discussion of theme after those of metaphor,
point of view, and plot, since much of literary theory sees theme as closely
related to these other elements. Theme is usually defined as an idea. Some
clear voices from the realm of literary theory and poetry have encouraged the
cessation of the search for answers to questions like, "What's the theme?" and
"What does the story (poem) mean?" To this question, the poet has answered
eloquently,

> A poem should be equal to:
> Not true.
>
> For all the history of grief
> An empty doorway and a maple leaf.
>
> For love
> The leaning grasses and two lights above the sea--
>
> A poem should not mean
> But be.   (Mac Leish, 1955, pp. 272-73)

To move toward a clarification of the concept of theme, it is best to
begin by employing the word in the plural form, since it is more accurate to
seek the themes of a work than it is to search for a single one. Just as it
is proper to discuss the major and minor plots of a story, its principal and
minor actions, and its surface and deep structure, it is appropriate to speak of
primary and secondary, or principal and minor themes. The identification of
alternative themes within the same piece has long been both a delight and a
debate for the literary critic.

Much as I have discussed point of view and plot, theme is one of the elements that relates them. Residing in plot, evidenced by action, and supported by the structure of the work, theme works as a cohesive force. Like plot, it lies implicit in literature. With the exception of those instances where a hortatory or didactic emphasis is chosen by the author, the statement of theme is rendered as part and parcel of the work.

The experience of the theme may be found in a series of related images, symbols, or figures. It may be represented by some incidents of plot, supported by others, and in turn, set in contradiction to itself by others. It can be twisted, played with, expanded, and compressed. Theme may be found in some unfortunate statement of conflict that pits man against nature, or it may reside in the tension of fear, and the balance of juxtaposed emotions. It is the limitation of the precis, the paraphrase, and the summary, for example, that taken as attempts to declare one of the themes of a work, they are inadequate to the task.

In curriculum evaluation, Stake (1970) identified the statement of educational goals as judgmental data. The case is the same for theme. Its statement also represents an inference, an effort to draw a conclusion from experience. The concept of a goal or higher level objective is no less abstract than that of theme. Broadly conceived, goals are statements of intent, statements about events planned for the future. In a curriculum, the search for themes suggests that to consider statements of goals or objectives as one basis is to place them outside the realm of action and experience and be forced to consider the "intended themes" of the curriculum. The notion seems somewhat contradictory to the analogical concept in literature.

It is probably here that the traditional point of view of the curriculum evaluator and the potential contribution of criticism are most sharply focused. Where the conventional role of the evaluator has been one of verification, an attempt to evaluate practice by an examination of consequence and a comparison of intention to outcome, criticism suggests that he consider the materials and practices of the curriculum as representative of a series of choices reflected in point of view, plot, and structure, and to account for these as expressions of meaning or what is better called curricular themes.

John Mann (1969) has discussed the idea of curriculum criticism. His presentation is greatly concerned with the elucidation of curricular themes as part of an evaluation. Developing the concept of a disclosure model, Mann builds a good case for saying that alternative themes are present in the curriculum and that one of the jobs of the critic is to extrapolate them. His conception of the curriculum implies that it will present a rich and highly allusive object for the critic and the evaluator to interpret.

Mann's hesitancy to say that any one critique or interpretation of a curriculum should be sufficient to capture or disclose its alternative themes is mirrored by Stake's (1967a) proposal for the evaluation of the Pilot-Demonstration Phase of the Follow-Through Program. Realizing that programs contain a multitude of themes, and that the importance of some of them is possibly emergent rather than evident, Stake made it clear in the proposal that any number of a broad range of possible ideas suggested by Follow-Through might become a subject for summarization.

The Use of the Curricular Rhetoric

Someone has said of literature that it presents life not lived, but life framed and identified. It would be unfortunate and a contradiction to my purpose if such a conclusion were suggested here. Much to the contrary, the plots, and themes of the curriculum exist in a world of real people. Children and adults live there. As Mann has said, "Curriculum...is a form of influence over persons, and disclosures of meanings in a curriculum are disclosures about the character of an influence." (p. 12) My development of curriculum as based in experience, and the exposition and teasings of the rhetoric have been presented as some first thoughts on how the curriculum evaluator can attack the problem of curricular disclosure, the problem of criticism.

Such an effort will not be an easy one. Not only will the evaluator or critic have to be concerned about locating the alternative points of view, plots, themes, and metaphors that will lie in the curriculum, but he will have to bear the equal burden of wondering whether the descriptions and judgments he presents as an evaluation will maintain a sufficient resemblance to the curricular object. Failing this, his becomes an exercise in delusion.

The problem of the critique is further complicated by the mutual dependency of the elements of metaphor, point of view, plot, and theme, They do not function in any mutually exclusive fashion. They are meant to be understood and used together. It is in the search for themes, as they appear in plots and metaphors, and as they are emphasized through point of view, that the evaluator can maintain a holistic approach to the experience of the curriculum and avoid the danger of simplification.

iii

Having considered description and the elements of an alternative rhetoric for curriculum criticism, I turn now to a brief exposition of the processes of judgment and justification as they relate to literary criticism and curriculum evaluation.

A lot of description and judgment goes on in small tiled alcoves in front of theaters. Experience in both those alcoves and their counterparts that front the auditoriums and classroooms of schools convinces me that the conversations that occur there are similar. Maybe we can begin to understand something further about description and judgment by imagining two conversations that could have occurred in a theater alcove one evening after a performance of Arthur Miller's The Death of a Salesman.

Possibly the chap from down the block might have said something like, "...and what an unfortunate set.... It was an interesting play about a social loser. I'm getting rather tired, really, of Miller and O'Neil and their stories about social losers.... Sure, I enjoyed it but...a play about a fat, old man who kills himself because he has become a terrible salesman...."

But consider another man thinking about what he might write about the play for the morning press. "...and the creative use of the set...maybe something about--about Cobb's portrayal of Loman--what that guy is able to do with a line is brilliant. Loman, something of the anti-hero all right. Miller's got himself a good, sensitive script about a man overcome by his past

failures and surrounded by a technology he can neither control nor understand.
He was a man who should have worked with his hands, not his mouth, I guess.
People ought to see it."

There's not just a naming of parts, a description of the action, going on
there. There's more than an analytic attempt to separate, to dismember. Both
statements carry judgments, judgments of worth at that. They are rather the
same in the elements of the play that are used as evidence to support the
conclusions of "interesting" on the one hand and "brilliant" on the other.
Not just a naming of parts at all, but a loading, an evaluation of the
particular elements and an implication in regard to the overall worth of the
thing. And if the speakers were challenged, if one were brash enough to ask
why it was that way ("...a terrible salesman," "good, sensitive script") if
one were that brash, we'd probably get discriminations.

I've heard it said with confidence that "I know not seems." What
happened on that stage was pretty clear to both of those "critics." Some
would venture that it was self-evident; certainly beyond the call of justification.
Evident to what person, one might want to ask in reply.

I might believe parts of what they've said, all of it, some of it,
none at all. I guess that that's probably the way with it. We rarely
accept the entire review or the entire report. Even without meaning it,
most audiences are rather selective in what they choose to accept or dismiss,
or possibly, overlook entirely. There's a question of credibility in all judg-
ments, something of a social ganglion that ties all of this together. When
I examine my experience, I see myself returning to the critics and men next
door whose judgments have had the greatest similarity to mine. They have agreed
with me, would be another way to put it. But then I wonder how much arrogance,
bravado, wit, and style have to do with it.

It matters little whether it's the man next door or the critic, since
when they come to judgment, the process is the same although the outcomes may
differ. Judgment is a central likeness. Their points of view and standards
may be their central differences. The case is the same for the critic and
the curriculum evaluator.

The Centrality of Judgment in Criticism and Evaluation

I've already mentioned Smith (1968) and his inclusion of evaluation as
the last phase of the critical process, and I have described, as he did, how
the four phases rarely remain discrete, but rather how they overlap in practice.
In his discussion of the evaluative phase, Smith points out that evaluation
"implies some kind of summation or assessment of the merit of the work of art
in question. The simplest kind of verdict is one saying that the work is good
or bad, based on an examination of its aesthetic qualities, say, its degree of
unity, complexity, intensity, or some combination of these." (p. 26) Describing
the function of evaluation within education, one is struck by the similarity of
the following definition from Scriven (1969), "It's his [the professional
evaluator's] task to try very hard to condense all that massive data into one
word: good or bad." (p. 22)

Whether the reference be found in the literature of aesthetic criticism or educational evaluation, the importance of judgment to both is clear. Addressing himself to the issue of judgment in evaluation, Scriven (1967) made it abundantly clear that from his point of view there was, and could be, only one certain goal of any evaluative process and that was the attainment of an assessment of worth. Again, in remarks prepared as a critique of the Phi Delta Kappa volume on educational evaluation, Scriven (1971) reaffirmed his position by suggesting that one of the shortcomings of the volume was its failure to stress the necessity that evaluators conduct evaluations so that not only a judgment of the relative match between a set of intents and outcomes is accomplished, but also so that the worth of the intents themselves is judged. It was his suggestion that such judgments of worth be rendered at both the beginning and end of a development process (this in view of the fact that programs frequently alter their intents while under development).

Scriven's development of the goal free evaluator position (1973) presents an intriguing parallel to the position of the literary critic. Much as Scriven would have the evaluator remain free of constraint by purposely avoiding any certain statement of intent on the part of the program under examination, the critic rarely has or seeks a pre-performance statement of literary or theatrical intent.

Imagine the displeasure some would feel if the Broadway critic or local film reviewer never got to saying whether or not the production was worth seeing. Possibly even without the broader awareness that there do exist legitimate, complicated, and useful critical points of view that do not necessarily eventuate in a judgment of worth, the public has developed the expectation that critics and reviewers ought to judge. Scriven would have the same case hold for evaluators, and would hope for a comparable expectation and press for this type of evaluative responsibility.

What is notably absent from Scriven's evaluation suggestions (despite titles to the contrary, i.e., "The Methodology of Evaluation") is a delineation of the steps to follow in coming to and defending such a judgment of worth. It may have been partly as a result of the realization that such a judgment, rendered by an individual evaluator could be so idiosyncratic as to be easily dismissed, that Stake (1967b) suggested curriculum evaluators set about the task of collecting alternative judgments. Stake expressed his hesitation about whether or not evaluators would accept the challenge of judgment offered them in the form of an imperative by Scriven.

In order to exhibit the range and number of problems involved in a judgment of worth, and to suggest some practical guides for the curriculum evaluator to use when he encounters them, the remainder of this paper considers the following:

1. Description: Its relationship to judgment, and prescription.

2. Analytic and prototypic approaches to judgment

3. The publicly reasonable expression of judgment.

4. The justification of judgments and the question of credibility.

5. Publication and credibility.

Description: Its Relationship to Judgment and Prescription

Consider these three statements that exemplify the relationships between description, judgment, and prescription.

1. Mr. Becker talked 33% of the time his class was in session.

2. Mr. Becker's limited amount of talk is consistent with his expressed philosophy and goals.

3. Mr. Becker should continue to minimize his teacher-talk level.

Statement 1 is a descriptive proposition that denotes, in a summary fashion, one aspect of Becker's verbal interaction with his class. It states the percentage of time of the total period that he talked. Statement 2 is a judgment that is, in part, based upon the descriptive observation given in sentence 1. In sentence 2, the use of the terms, "limited" and "consistent" denotes the judgments that have been appended to the descriptive statement. Implicit in the statement is the presence of at least two standards that have been used as comparison bases; one to judge the "talk" as "limited," and the other to judge the congruence between a set of intents and a practice as "consistent."

The third sentence represents a move from description and judgment to prescription. In its present form the use of the term "should continue" is an indicant for future behavior that implies a rule or principle for practice. This means that the use of the term "should continue" is based on some other rule or principle such as "A teacher's behavior should be consistent." On the other hand, it might just as well be based on empirically generated evidence that suggests such a prescription would have utility. Prescriptions may be justified in essentially two fashions. They may be justified by showing how the prescription follows from some more inclusive set of principles or rules, or by showing empirically that the prescription, when followed, leads to desired results.

Statements like "Mr. Becker is a good teacher," and "That was a wonderful lesson," exemplify the descriptive-judgmental problem. The distinction between descriptive and judgmental statements has been widely debated in the philosophical literature. On the one hand, some have held that statements of judgments are based in value terms that are primarily the expression of desires, attitudes, or feelings rather than the assertion of anything. They are taken to have emotive meaning but little else.* For example, to summarize a lengthy and complicated proposal, it was Ayer's position (1952) that statements such as "Mr. Becker is a good teacher," are simply emotive expressions that do not assert anything. Consequently, Ayer would argue, it is not possible to demonstrate empirically the truth or falsity of such statements. Similarly the idea of beginning with a set of value statements and then generating prescriptions for practice has been opposed. R. W. Burnett's (1958) warning that "... there is simply no formal way by which the philosopher of education can logically deduce specific educational practices from metaphorical, epistemological, or axiological premises," is a case in point. (p. 357)

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*See, for example, Ayer (1952), Carnap (1935), and Stevenson (1937).

Sidney Hook (1956) has referred to this type of deductive behavior as eventuating in "garr lous absurdities." (p. 148)

Dewey (1939) held, on the other hand, that there are "distinctive valuation-propositions" that can be empirically examined, and Scriven (1966) has taken a position very similar to this.* In this matter, I agree with both Dewey and Scriven. The examination of value-oriented statements <u>can</u> be conducted if they are considered as taking the form of an "if-then" statement. In other words, the examination of the statement, "Mr Becker is a good teacher," would consider the question, "If Mr. Becker is a good teacher, what can be expected of Mr. Becker?" The better portion of Dewey's instrumentalism was an expression of what that expectation might be.

In regard to the relationship of value to prescription, few summaries better represent my own point of view than that composed by Phenix (1966).

> The clearest case of prescription is the imperative, which discussion shows to be a close logical kinsman to the value judgment. The irreducible logical difference between statements and commands is that the former are indications of <u>believing</u> something, while the latter are attempts to induce action. Moreover, because of this logical difference, no amount of factual information can ever by itself add up to an imperative conclusion. Every imperative conclusion must be justified in part by reference to some imperative premise.

> This analytic insight about the irreducibility of prescriptives to indicatives is of fundamental importance for moral instruction. It suggests that responsible moral persons can never be nurtured by being taught only facts. No accumulation of information can tell anyone what he ought to do. The ideal of the teacher as one who remains uncommitted and adhered to objective facts without involving himself in judgments of value or affirmations of obligation thus proves to be far from ideal. Sound moral judgment requires not only knowledge of the facts but a substantial stock of well-tested moral principles (prescriptions) for the guidance of conduct.

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*The following summary of John Dewey's "Theory of Valuation" (1939) is taken from Burns and Brauner (1962, p. 208):

1. People do <u>in fact</u> prize, desire, or value certain existential situations; these can be said to constitute (under certain conditions) ends in view.
2. Ends in view serve as plans or guides to behavior so that prized existential situations (ends) can be realized; ends in view are thus means to ends.
3. Propositions about values are thus propositions about existential means and ends; they are "if-then" in nature and, being hypothetical in nature are no less susceptible to the empirical test than any scientific "if-then" generalization.

Important as principles are, they are not sufficient for moral growth. The other essential element is practice in making deliberate choices. The centrality of choice making comes out with particular force in Hare's analysis of the meaning of the term "good." He argues that "good" is not an indefinable quality like "yellow," as G. E. Moore and other intuitionists held, but that "good" is to be defined with reference to the act of choosing. One regards a thing as the "best" among several alternatives if it is the one he would choose to fulfill the function for which it is intended. That is to say, the choice is guided by some standard of preference. This holds both for nonmoral efficiency, and for moral choices, where non-functional standards of virtue apply. In every case, the essence of evaluative judgments is rational preference manifest in making choices. (p. 40)

Analytic and Prototypic Approaches to Judgment

Clive Irving reviews television programs for the superslick New York magazine. His review of a CBS television offering called All in the Family appeared in that magazine on February 15, 1971. Charles E. Silberman is a member of the Board of Editors of Fortune Magazine. His 1970 review of American education was called Crisis in the Classroom. Although Silberman's work focused on education and was the product of a three-year, $300,000 study, it bears some similarity to Irving's column review.

Both pieces utilized a prototypic approach for drawing judgments about the objects. For Irving the prototype was a forerunner of All in the Family called Till Death Do Us Part, which was a highly successful BBC production for four years. For Silberman, the prototype for American classrooms that he described was the new English primary schools. From among all situation comedies, Irving chose Till Death. From among all possible classrooms, Silberman chose the new English primaries. Before accepting Irving's judgment that All in the Family is "inferior to the original" in artistry, consider the use of a prototype in judgment.

Taken for its lexical definition, prototype can mean, the first of a kind or the original form or model. It is in this rather narrow sense that the term has been used to describe certain airplanes and cars, for example, as the forerunner or models for others.* It is not at all in this sense, that the term is used here. When I speak of a prototype for judgment or a prototypic judgment, I mean the use of an existing object, well-known to both the judge and the audience for the judgment, that is used as the embodiement of the applicable criteria. In this sense, Irving's selection of Till Death as a prototype was unfortunate since the show was not widely known by American viewers.

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*It appears to be the case that Norman Lear, producer and writer for the series, did, in fact, model it after Till Death Do Us Part. (Cf. Rowland Barber's interview with Lear in TV Guide, May 29, 1971, p. 32)

Taken as a basis for judgment, the prototype is not necessarily the first, the original, or the model. It is an existing hopefully well-known basis to both judge and audience, that will allow the appropriate comparison.

I've heard the prototype used by students in their judgments of teachers. "Mr. Franklin is great. You'll like him a lot. Smith is terrible. Too bad." Given that, I had some basis for comparison; I could watch Franklin and see for myself, if I wanted to. In so doing, I would come to know about the judgment the boy had made; whether I agreed with him or not. Maybe Franklin would be "great" for me too, and maybe I, too, would want to use him as the prototype for the teachers in the school.

Most children know enough to know that there are a lot of things that, taken together, make up their "great" teachers. Most teachers and evaluators know that, too. Yet it never quite seems to make it when they start trying to itemize man. "Excellent lecturer, good dresser, easy marker, nice guy to be with." That's different from saying, "Mr. Franklin is great...Smith is terrible...." The first is analytic; the second prototypic. The first tries to identify specific criteria and then grade on some standard. The second is holistic. It takes the object and presents it rather than a set of criteria and standards.

Flexner (1925) tried to use some prototypic comparisons when he judged the medical schools of America. He had some trouble because there was only limited knowledgeability. Consequently, his comparison study, his indictment of American medical education, goes to great lengths to describe the prototypes that are the basis of his judgments.

The curriculum evaluator can find prototypes. The mass media and increasing experience are helping to expand the knowledge of IPI, "The Great Books, "Motessori, and the Parkway School. Dartmouth Conference English is getting pretty clear to some. The search for prototypes in curriculum evaluation will want to distinguish between prototypes for theory, for program, and for method. Today, it's pretty hard to speak about the "open classroom" as a prototype because it still lacks sufficient knowledgeability. Not only for curriculum, but also for its evaluation, the consideration of some prototypes can make it easier to judge practice.

The Justification of Judgments

I remember trying to convince a childhood friend that Roy Campanella was a better catcher than Yogi Berra. And I recall that when we got down to arguing about it, the words went something like:

    Why?

    Just because.

    Well, because why?

    Just because he is; that's why.

    But because why?

Somehow, in youth, some seemed to know that to ask "why" was to ask a powerful question. Somehow, in youth, everyone on the block seemed to have some kind of pat answer; it was just because, that was all. (No one ever wanted to be caught dead saying, "Because my father said so." You only said a thing like that once, and then you knew better.)

It's not hard to turn a discussion of justification and judgment into a polysyllabic nightmare that can become less instructive than the childish "just because." What can happen is that the words can make you forget that what was important about the conversation about great catchers was not that someone won or lost the thing; no one ever seemed to do that. What was important was that the challenge was made, and some went away wondering exactly what the "just because" really was.

It seems to me that one good way to begin a discussion of justification is to say that it's mostly an effort to develop a "because" and then a "because why." Much as the child can drive you dumb in his irksome quest for cause, the process of justification can be seen as an irksome quest for "why?" I say "irksome" because it seems to be the case that we rarely ever know the answer for sure, or for long, after a certain number of "whys." What also seems to occur is that after a time, some seem to lose their fear of saying, "Because my father said so," or something of that order, some suggestion of authority or evidence that warrants assent. Sometimes you can do that and remain credible, not get laughed at.

To speak of justification without remaing sensitive to credibility is to be unrealistic about the thing. There is a certain ease with which a questioning process of the "Why?"/Because why?" order leads toward infinite regression, a process that has no stopping until it has probed back to what appear to be the first principles of the game. In the pages that follow, the process of justification that I describe tries to show how a publicly reasonable expression of judgment can rely on a probing of "why" and "because," and how that process can avoid some of the problems of infinite regress by utilizing the factor of credibility.

A Publicly Reasonable Expression of Judgment

A publicly reasonable expression of judgment consists of three parts which are: (1) a statement of the judgment or verdict, (2) a statement of the reason or reasons for the judgment, and (3) a statement of norm or set of norms that shows the reasons to be good ones. A simple example of such an expression of judgment would be, "Jackson High School's English curriculum is an excellent one because it stresses talking, reading, and writing as the three avenues to self-expression and awareness, and these were the recommendations of the Dartmouth Conference." More realistically, the form of such an expression might cover several pages or chapters of an evaluation report. What is gained through the use of such a form of expression is that three important components of the judgment are made initially explicit, and it is possible to begin probing for further reasons and norms, if desired.

It's probably important to say "if desired," since in the case where all parties are in agreement on the judgment, there is little likelihood that a request for justification will arise. However, even in these cases, rare as they may be, it would be unfortunate if either judge or audience was to accept a verdict without having plumbed some of its implications.

Probing for Justification

Some of the implications of an expression of judgment can be made explicit through a verbal probing process that seeks to unfold the "whys" of the judgment. Although it has been other-wise described, the purpose of the probing devices is to assist the publication of judgment.* In those instances where there may be less than agreement on the reasonableness of the expression of the judgment, the demonstration of the justification will focus on the two claims that every normative judgment makes. These claims are, in the first place, that the object either met or failed to meet a particular norm or set of norms, and in the second place, that these norms were themselves appropriate to the judgment. It is the demonstration of the veracity of this "double claim" that is the object of the probing process.

Taylor (1961) has summarized the focus of this effort nicely.

The aim of the evaluation process is to arrive at a judgment in which we make the claim that the evaluation (object) either fulfills or fails to fulfill the norms.... (Evaluation) is the logical method which a rational person would follow if he were trying to come to a careful, reflective decision about the value of something.... Every process of evaluation and every value judgment contextually implies that the norms being used are appropriate and valid. By "contextually implies" I mean that anyone who understands that an evaluation is being carried on, or that a value judgment is being made, considers it legitimate and proper to question the appropriateness of the norms, and expects the evaluator to be able to give reasons showing that they are appropriate.... A double claim is involved whenever we evaluate something. First there is the claim that the evaluatum fills or fails to fulfill the given norms, a claim explicitly made when we utter a value judgment. Second, there is the (contextually implied) claim that it is valid or appropriate to apply the given norms to the evaluatum. Unless good reasons can be given in support of both of these claims, a value judgment cannot be justified. (pp. 4-5)

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*Taylor (1961) presents a method of justification that assumes the existence of a hierarchy of standards and rules, a subsumptive system, up and through which the process of justification must proceed. Such assumptions of higher and lower order standards and rules are not implied in my discussion.

The first of these claims, that the object fulfills or fails to fulfill
a norm, denotes the level at which most curriculum evaluations have labored.*
The evaluations are usually partial; partially explicit, partially implied.
They rarely move beyond the level of verification, the level of saying whether
the object meets or fails to meet a standard.

Publication and Credibility

To call for the use of a publicly reasonable expression of judgment and
to suggest, at the same time, that such a device will assist in the disclosure
of the implicit standards and rules that have been the basis of evaluations,
raises several difficult questions. One of the more important ones concerns
how such a process of publication can occur without logically eventuating in
a process of infinite regress every time it is employed. Would one want to
consider judgmental disclosure when such an effort might prove so time
consuming and so filled with endless "because why" questions that the evaluation
report might never conclude nor the dialogue never end?**

It is just such a state that is the true stance of any normative discourse
of merit. There must be no clear end to it. The thing may pause in ellipsis to
allow decision, but it should rarely terminate. Unlike the civil judge, the
evaluator does not seem to have the opportunity to say, "Case closed,"so much
as he may have the chance to say, "We'll look again tomorrow." It is in this
sense, in the sense that most of our judgments begin and end in a partial
evaluation, that we should be most concerned with credibility and its relationship
to any kind of probing for justification.

Credibility

Credibility means believability. To be credible at something, is to be
believable. Credibility becomes important when you think you have something
to say or to do, and you want others to believe that you have something to
say or to do. Credibility becomes important in evaluation when evaluators
want their audiences to believe that the evaluation has something to say;
sometimes even to believe that it is worth doing in the first place. To
speak of credibility is to speak of being credible to somebody, about something,
within some circumstance.

To speak of a reasonable publication of judgment is to speak of credibility.
To suggest that there is such a thing as a reasonable publication is to suggest
that it is possible for two individuals wrapped in a normative dialogue to
achieve a degree of exposure that both elicits their standards and rules and
yet allows them to maintain their credibility before each other. Yet I began
with the suggestion that there are times when we do not want to disclose that
Campanella was better because our fathers said so. To be reasonable, to give
reasons for the judgment, is not necessarily to be credible.

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*Daniels (1971) goes to great lengths to support the position that the
 preponderance of curriculum evaluations have been directed at questions of
 verification rather than validation.

**The problem of infinite regress is also encountered in attempts at
 explanation according to a subsumptive theory. It is appropriate to suggest
 in both explanation and justification (validation) that the explainer or justifier
 need not go beyond what is sufficient for his audience.

Within the process of probing for the justification of judgment and the achievement of publicly reasonable expression of judgment, the evaluator will come close to tampering with credibility. The publication of reasons and norms comes near the quick of the thing. To probe for verification and to ask for and give reasons for a judgment is to reveal the evidence of the verdict. Different people, indeed, different evaluators appear to accept some types of evidence as more credible than others. Reasons become a question of evidence in the case of verification, and insofar as there are differences in belief systems, there will be a range of greater and lesser credibility in evidence.

The case is somewhat different with norms. When the dialogue and the disclosure get to validation, there is little credibility in evidence. To probe for validation and to seek a reasonable expression of the norms that give merit to the reasons is to question the very basis on which people value. Where verification may have recourse to evidence, validation forces a confrontation with principle that is unrelenting in its disclosure of person. Evidence may be gathered and presented either for or against a proposition. To state a norm in the form of a standard or rule is to render a dictate for worth. To judge the worth of something, and what is more, to do it in a way that is publicly reasonable, is to try to balance the credibility and confidence that comes with evidence against the "because why" of the normative discourse.

It is precisely into the center of this discourse that Scriven's (1967) prescription places the curriculum evaluator. To be directed toward a judgment of worth and to achieve that goal through a process of publicly reasonable expression of judgment, does not let the evaluator escape the onus of judgment. Within the normative dialogue, as the alternative norms and counter-evidences are uncovered, it is the evaluator's task to determine inconsistency, contradiction, and subterfuge, and then to render his own verdict.

In order to do this wisely, he must balance many things. One of these will certainly be his own credibility against the ease of pleasantry and efficiency. Earlier, I wondered aloud how much bravado, wit, and humor had to do with credibility. Presently, I'm still not sure, but to this trinity I would add humility.

The processes of judgment and justification that have been examined here, seem to force attention directly on the question of criteria. Where do they come from? How are they to be found? In his discussion of education's perpetual search for criteria, Harry S. Broudy once commented that "It is perhaps not too much to say that our search for criteria is impeded far less by their elusiveness than by a vague and persistent dread of finding them." (Broudy, 1967, p. 12) Faced with a similar realization, although pointed in a somewhat different direction, Remarque's young hero in All Quiet On The Western Front muses over the fact that Kantorek, his teacher, had filled him full of pious hopes and stupid zeal when he was in school. Paul says, "Naturally we couldn't blame Kantorek for this, Where would the world be if one brought every many to book?" (Remarque, 1928, pp. 11-12)

Used indiscriminately, the process of probing for reasons and criteria can force the adoption of positions that are not representative of true sentiment. Mr. Sammler, the principal character in Saul Bellow's Mr. Sammler's Planet (1969), said it nicely. Thinking of explanation, he mused,

> You had to be a crank to insist on being right. Being right
> was largely a matter of explanations. Intellectual man had
> become an explaining creature. Fathers to children, wives to
> husbands, lecturers to listeners, experts to laymen, colleagues
> to colleagues, doctors to patients, man to his own soul,
> explained. The roots of this, the causes of the other, the
> source of events, the history, the structure, the reasons why.
> For the most part, in one ear and out the other. The soul
> wanted what it wanted. It has its own natural knowledge.
> It sat unhappily on superstructures of explanation, poor bird,
> not knowing which way to fly....
>
> A Dutch drudgery, it occurred to Sammler, pumping and
> pumping to keep a few acres of dry ground. The invading
> sea being a metaphor for the multiplication of facts and
> sensations. The earth being an earth of ideas.
>
> (pp. 7-8)

And Sammler may be right, "in one ear and out the other." That may be the greater part of explanation and justification.

Sometimes there is little opportunity for justification. When the Montgomery County Sentinel used its front page to publish its gradings of the county's 22 senior high school principals as either "outstanding," "good," "poor," or "unsuited," there was little opportunity for justification. (Phi Delta Kappan, 1971, p. 635). Public response from school board members, staff, and community spokesmen was swift and angry. The paper was criticized for being "presumptuous," "shallow and inaccurate" in its evaluation of a complex institution. "Other critics [of the grading] claimed that such judgments required more specific criteria and the expertise of professionals." (p. 635) The Sentinel replied that "principals, like other public officials, are subject to evaluation by the public, and declared that one 'does not need a Ph.D. in education to opine whether a principal is good or bad.'" (p. 635)

The Sentinel was right about what it takes to opine. Certainly not a Ph.D. The question is better asked, "What does it take to make it stick? To satisfy people that these judgments are sensible?"

One way to tell someone that you don't believe is to start to ask for criteria and standards. One way to start the debate going is to put it on the line and make a public judgment. I have suggested some of the problems in that debate.

Language has been most of it. The principal focus of the discussion of language has been on the development of a rhetoric for the curriculum. The presentation has shown how four concepts from the realm of literary criticism (metaphor, point of view, plot, and theme) can be used to construe a curriculum and to consider the evaluation of it. The consideration has built a rationale for one language of curriculum criticism.

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