This document, the first of seven essays, investigates the relationship of the church, the university and urban society. A description of the basic conceptual focus and theoretical framework of this 2-year project is presented. Urban society is defined in terms of power, and the role of church and university in it is viewed as essentially marginal unless and until they enter at the point of power. Varieties of power are assayed and strategies for their use are discussed. The essay forms a backdrop for much we have written elsewhere in this series. Related documents are HE 004 366, HE 004 355, and HE 004 367. (Author/MJM)
THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY AND URBAN SOCIETY: A PROBLEM IN POWER

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Paper number 1 in a series of seven reports produced for the project on "Church, University and Urban Society" of the

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY AND URBAN SOCIETY:

A PROBLEM IN POWER

Parker J. Palmer
Elden Jacobson
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As one of these essays indicates, a project on "Church, University and Urban Society" calls to mind the classic question, "Define the universe and give two examples." The size of the subject is matched by the variety of responses which colleges, universities, and churches have been making in recent years to the urban scene, and by the urgency, not always supported by clear directions, which they have felt seeking to confront the pressures and demands of urban America.

The Department of Higher Education of the National Council of Churches, together with the boards of higher education of a number of denominations, came to believe in the late 1960's that the problems of urban society were some of the important intersections of common concern between church and university.

The Department was pleased, therefore, to receive in early-1969 a substantial grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation which was joined with special funds from church agencies, both in higher education and national missions, for a two-year action-research project on "Church, University and Urban Society." Defining the issues has been a continuing task of the study itself, as will be seen in these reports, but the basic purpose of the project was to discover ways in which to increase the capacity and the commitment of churches and academic institutions to meet the problems of urban society.

The project was carried on from mid-1969 to mid-1971 by two able sociologists, Dr. Elden E. Jacobson and Dr. Parker J. Palmer, Senior Associates in the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, Washington, D.C. Dr. Jacobson received his Ph.D. in the sociology of religion in 1966 from Yale University and Dr. Palmer received his in sociology in 1970 from the University of California at Berkeley. Both men had research and teaching experience before coming to the Washington Center and both participated in the comprehensive Danforth Study of Campus Ministries, undertaken by the late Kenneth Underwood and published under the title, The Church, the University, and Social Policy (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1969).
Elden Jacobson and Parker Palmer were eminently qualified for this current study by their academic training and their search for new styles of professional life, by their religious commitment and their search for new modes of corporate religious responsibility. The Department of Higher Education is deeply grateful to them for the imagination and insight they have brought to this undertaking. We are particularly pleased that the ideas and styles they have developed in this project will receive a continuing embodiment in a new center to which they will be attached, the Institute for Public Life in Silver Spring, Maryland.

The following persons served on an Advisory Commission to the "Church, University and Urban Society" project:

Morris T. Keeton, Vice-President of Antioch College, Chairman
Edwin G. Bennett, National Staff, Team for Ministry in Higher Education, Episcopal Church
William Cannon, Vice-President for Programs and Projects, University of Chicago
Harvey Cox, Associate Professor, Church and Society, Harvard Divinity School
Charles W. Doak, Campus Minister, University of California at Los Angeles
Brooks Hays, Director of Ecumenical Studies, Wake Forest University, former Congressman from Arkansas
John Jordan, Executive Secretary, Office of University World, National Division, Board of Missions of the United Methodist Church
Arthur Paris, Graduate Student in Sociology, Northwestern University
Hans B. C. Spiegel, Professor of Urban Affairs, Hunter College of the City University of New York
George Todd, Associate for Urban and Industrial Ministries (Board of National Missions), and Secretary, Joint Office of Urban and Industrial Ministries (with COEMAR), United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.
Charles Z. Wilson, Jr., Assistant Vice-Chancellor for Educational Planning and Program, University of California at Los Angeles

The Department of Higher Education is indebted to Dr. Morris Keeton, chairman, and all the members of this Commission for the time they gave to meetings and occasional special assignments, and for the advice and interaction of ideas they afforded the staff throughout the project.
It will be understood that the freedom of the staff, Elden Jacobson and Parker Palmer, is enhanced by issuing these reports over their own names. They do not necessarily express the views either of the Advisory Commission or the Department of Higher Education.

The Department expresses its gratitude to the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies for making possible the services of the staff, to the Sloan Foundation and church agencies for providing financial support, and again to Messrs. Jacobson and Palmer for giving themselves so generously to it.

William N. Lovell
Executive Director
Department of Higher Education
National Council of Churches
INTRODUCTION

Church-University-Urban Society: Such is the fashion--old coin for academic and theologian alike--by which our pretensions exceed our reach. This booklet, one of seven in a series, is the work of two academic sociologists, invited by the Department of Higher Education, National Council of Churches, to investigate the marvelous amorphousness this project's title suggests. For two years we have invested nearly all of our professional interest and time, and a good bit privately, in exploring these three ideas--two institutions and a given context--both as separate, identifiable foci of curiosity and as interacting social institutions in this society's increasingly urbanized work and life.

The style has been activist; we have not hesitated to intervene when invited to do so, and we have likewise set into motion a variety of projects in which all involved were self-consciously pressing for more adequate ways of "getting it together." So it is, we argue, that one learns.

The possibilities, of course, were overwhelming; our response partial and uneven. Yet it is not mere modesty or a sense of caution that leads us to say so. This project was originally but one of six major, interrelated inquiries conceived in 1968 by nationally known academics and churchmen, inquiries that spanned quite nearly the whole of higher education. Yet the practical realities--of time and money and political power--were such that only some parts survived, this one funded at one-eighth the amount initially sought. An instructive process, to be sure, one depressingly illustrative of the usual manner this society seems bent upon confronting the demonic forces now corroding its inward parts, wherein the grandeur of purpose seems dramatically at odds with achieved result. We mean no disrespect to our immediate sponsors; on the contrary, the Department of Higher Education, and our parent institution, the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, have shared with us that extra mile in amazingly good grace. But the lack of careful, sophisticated, thoughtful
experimentation with new forms and new potentials within both church and university is dispiritingly evident to those who have looked. This society's capacity for selective inattention seems scarcely capable of overstatement.

Yet straws there are—often laden with rhetoric and self-protection—but straws none-the-less. And it is those straws that commanded our greater attention as they, first in fact were and are, and as, secondly, situations that hold wider promise. As the briefest of introductions to these seven papers, the following descriptive statements are offered to the reader:

1. The Church, the University and Urban Society: A Problem in Power.
   In this essay, we describe the basic conceptual focus and theoretical framework of the two-year project. Urban society is defined in terms of power, and the role of church and university in it is viewed as essentially marginal unless and until they enter at the point of power. Varieties of power are assayed and strategies for their use are discussed. The essay forms a backdrop for much we have written elsewhere in this series.

2. The Church, the University and Urban Society: Focus on the Church.
   This essay focuses the general concerns of the project on the church. In it, we are particularly concerned with the parish or congregation, that much-neglected but essential component of the church at large. We also explore some of the problems inherent in the specialized ministries (particularly campus and urban), national offices and agencies, and the seminaries.

3. The Church, the University and Urban Society: Implications for the University.
   This essay explores the conceptual, that is to say, the disciplinary, basis of the modern university. In it we conclude that the changing nature of social reality is increasingly undermining fragmented disciplinary inquiry, which in turn is and will continue
to constitute the universities' real "irrelevance." Because we see no grounds for believing that it will fundamentally re-order itself, alternatives to the university will be, and are being, created.

4. The Power of Development: Some Possibilities We See.
This is an analysis, from our experience, of middle- and upper-middle-class suburban life, and the crisis of authority now endemic within social institutions—with emphasis upon the church—that purport to serve this society. We believe these two phenomena are closely related and that church bureaucrats have not been particularly imaginative in their treatment of either. The question of "development" is explored as one partial means of rethinking national/local relationships.

5. Urban Curricula and the Liberal Arts College.
This is a report of our examination of the liberal arts colleges' response to things "urban," with particular attention to "urban semester" programs and their conceptual and practical weaknesses. Drawing sharp distinctions between universities and colleges, we have tried to suggest alternative ways for addressing what is surely a critical dimension of modern society; the focus now upon the role of "citizen" and "social invention." We have also commented at length on the academic politics of getting from here to there.

In this manual, we describe a basic methodology of the project, "action-research." The essay is of the "how to do it" breed, with a detailed description of the stages in an action-research project, some of the basic research tools, and suggestions regarding organization. Action-research, in which research is conceived as a process of political action, has demonstrated its utility as a training device for professionals and students and as an organization tool for citizens' groups wishing to make an impact in their community.

This final essay in the series articulates our concern for the "public life" in the context of church, university and urban society. For us, the public life involves not only traditional political institutions and processes, but the emerging options to them. We discuss the question of options as a critical one, given the crisis of contemporary life and politics. This essay also has a strong "how to do it" dimension in its description of one of the field experiments which continue beyond the life of the larger project—the Institute for Public Life. It is in the Institute that we continue to act out the implications of our two-year effort for the National Council of Churches.

As with these seven essays so, too, with the project itself: they emerge from two persons whose unity of purpose and mutuality of spirit have come to constitute unique experiences for us both. Written words, self-evidently, must finally derive from a single pen and for the sake of form, names appear on each title page with the principal writer cited first. Authorship, however, is fully shared—in concept, result, and intensity of feeling—and we make no distinctions in our defense of and responsibility for the whole of this series.

Each essay has been written to stand largely on its own merits; as such, repetition occurs from time to time, from one piece to the others. We trust it will not distract the carefully attentive reader.

We warmly acknowledge our considerable indebtedness to the Reverend William N. Lovell, Director of the Department of Higher Education, and Dr. Royce Hanson, President of the Washington Center. Both of these men were very supportive without imposing direction, and we moved with complete freedom in the shaping of this inquiry of involvement. We wish also to thank the members of our Advisory Commission; despite the inadequacies of this particular form of securing advice and assistance, several
of these men served both us and the people we studied in exemplary fashion. We likewise thank that multitude of people who literally reside from coast to coast within those situations we discuss. They have taught us much, and are thereby responsible, to a most considerable degree, for whatever merit our writings contain.

All deficiencies of analysis and interpretation are, of course, ours alone.

Elden E. Jacobson and Parker J. Palmer
Washington, D. C.
June, 1971
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I. INTRODUCTION

In April of 1969, "The Church, The University and Urban Society" was launched. A vessel that massive is clearly meant to sail the high seas and needs a direction lest it flounder. So, somewhat arbitrarily, we set out on the lodestar of "power." We hoped that the conceptual vastness suggested by the words church, university and urban society would best be charted by such a fix.

Now, in the Spring of 1971, we can report that the theme of power has remained central to our work over these two years. The present essay, then, is something of a flagship for the series which the project has produced. Here we lay down and elaborate the basic theories and hypotheses which have shaped our field experiments. These have not always borne the weight we thought they would; but because they gave us clarity about what we thought we were doing, they have also given us some insight into what actually happened.

"The Church, the University and Urban Society." It reminds one of the classic quiz command—"Define the universe and give two examples." If a person is interested in anything at all, his interest is likely to be related to the terms of this project. That being so, we have discovered that under our rubric, we can either do no wrong or no right—depending on the audience.

There are some people who hear those three words—church, university, urban—and know with final assurance that they are on congenial ground. No matter where we locate ourselves within that cosmos, they are with us. Then there are others who know at precisely which intersection of the three one ought to stand. No matter which of the multiple intersections we explore, they always want to know why we are not working somewhere else.
Although the former reaction is flattering and the latter maddening, we have come to distrust both. For both spring full-blown from the preconceptions of the listener and fail completely to come to grips with our case. Both reactions are, in fact, as mindless as the title itself!

This entire essay (and the six others in the series) are an effort to establish "our case," so no simple statement will suffice. But we can make a beginning by quoting from "A Preliminary Statement of Purpose," issued two years ago as our work was getting underway:

The purpose of this project is to discover how to generate, organize and direct power within the church and within higher education to interact toward increased awareness and accountability for these institutions' current roles, and experimentation with alternative roles, in the urban environment.

A single-sentence definition of a two-year project is bound to be a bit inelegant. But the sentence has the virtue of (a) showing where we started, (b) being remarkably close to where we came out, and (c) isolating some of the important factors at work in between.

Power is our focus. We argue that urban society is not so much a place as a process, a process that is essentially one of power. If church and university wish to "relate" to urban society, and its problems, they will do so only marginally unless they relate at points of power.

The dimension of "power" in urban society may be seen on at least three levels. Historically the city has been the place where power has changed hands and been redistributed; one of our modern crises results from the abortion of that classic process with regards to Blacks. Sociologically the city is the place where shared values and community have been eroded as the cement of human relations; increasingly, urban relationships are held together by forms of coercion or power. Finally, the problems of the city today, while clearly problems of substance, are even more fundamentally problems of political process or power;
while we know the technical "answers" to many of them, we do not know how to distribute power or break the power-jams to implement our solutions.

These propositions become most interesting when one recalls that church and university are two institutions in American society which understand themselves as above power, beneath power, beyond power or without power. (Only the law, among other major institutions, sees itself similarly.) The church has defined itself as the Body of Christ, an image which suggests not worldly power, but humility and suffering in the face of it. The university has understood itself as the free Community of Scholars, which again suggests anything but the powers of kings and governments.

By these self-images, we suggest, church and university have rendered themselves marginal to the urban crisis. If they wish to move from marginality toward centrality they must locate their inherent powers and learn how to "generate, organize and direct" them toward urban purposes. To help church and university learn what these powers are and how to use them—that was our hope as the two-year project began.

How we proposed to learn these things was as important as what we proposed to learn. Perhaps the best early statement of methodology is from the "Six-Month Progress Report," issued in October of 1969:

We are interested not in pure observation and analysis, but in combining those activities with personal involvement and intervention. We are interested in helping things happen, and studying the total process—including our own roles.

This activist, non-neutralist style has characterized all of our involvements in this project. Because it is a style which one cannot honestly maintain at long distance, many of our efforts were close to home: Washington, D.C.; Springfield, Virginia; and Silver Spring, Maryland. But there were also experiments in farther fields: Roxbury, Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; Chicago and New York.
Our method in this project can be described in terms even more appropriate to the present essay. In each of our field sites, we actively engaged in the manipulation of power. Or, to modify slightly, we tried to remain self-conscious about the kinds of power one does, or can, wield when he purposefully enters social situations.

The "data" we draw on in this essay, then, are from personal experience as well as from our own more disciplined "research" and the work of others. We do not disparage the discipline of research, but we must testify that because of our personal involvements in power, these essays and the prescriptions of the project are quite different than cognition alone might have dictated. For one thing, we have been restricted to forms of power that were within our reach—not someone else, not forms we wished we could have deployed. While this is a limiting factor, it is also a reality factor, and we hope it has brought our conclusions within the realm of the reader whose own power limitations may be similar to ours.

Perhaps most important, the style of this project has put our total selves on the line, insofar as one has a total self in this kind of society. Thus, what is summoned forth in the writing of these concluding essays is a whole life, not simply the theoretical portion. What is said here comes from a context in which ego, career, income, emotion "and so forth" have been at stake—as well as concept or idea. The result may lack intellectual elegance. We hope, however, that it retains the ring of truth. (These issues are discussed more fully in Implications for the University in this series.)

Finally, because power is so much a function of social location, we should say a word about our own. The authors of these essays are both White, middle-class, professional academics who live in the suburbs and are involved in the life of the church. We do not apologize for these facts, but simply present them for the reader's advisement. Whatever bias they may create will be more evident in the pages that follow than in the simple telling of the facts themselves.
II. POWER: TWO CAUTIONS

Old Hegel, we suppose, could have warned us: Push any thesis too hard and you end up on the other side. We have been pushing the power thesis very hard, and it must certainly appear that two "cautions" about power, before we have even said what we think about power itself, indicates that we have come up on the side of the antithesis.

That is only partly true. We have certainly experienced the antithesis in the form of frustration, weariness and even some nausea over the use of power. But the point of any Hegelian dialectic is to reach a synthesis. We lay these cautions out early in hopes of transcending them in some higher and larger resolution.

During the sixties, many Americans became enamored of power, at least verbally. Among the dispossessed, a new consciousness emerged. As Marx—the locus classicus on power—suggested, the false consciousness of servitude crumbled, and with the development of lower-class power a new consciousness emerged. Black power, red power, people power, flower power. The word, dusted off from the halcyon fifties, had been spoken.

For middle and upper-middle class people, especially the well-educated, a new, "tough" form of political perception came into being. Gone were the pluralistic assumptions of the past. Gone was the blind belief in blind justice. Instead, the world took on the steeley grey tones of power. There were deals to be made, bargains to be effected, forces to be arrayed against other forces. All of this was done, of course, on behalf of the dispossessed. It was the real politique of the altruistic reformer.

Thus, "power" has been celebrated of late, and we suspect that this fact alone explains why our efforts in this project have been well-received in certain quarters. That is, a celebration tends to be
an uncritical event: one merely shouts the right words, and joy reigns supreme. While we honor the validity of celebration, we do feel a need for a critical approach to power. The stakes, both personal and social, are simply too high.

Our first caution deals with a crucial distinction between power and paranoia. As already suggested, middle-class Americans (especially church and university types) are late-comers to the self-conscious use of social power. They seem still a bit inept: the WASP culture breeds none of the power instincts that one associates with ethnic politics (e.g., Tammany Hall). It is tempting, therefore, to diagnose the WASP condition as a bad case of political naivete, and prescribe education and exposure for the cure.

But the problem lies deeper than that. WASP professionals are not total strangers to power. The problem is that they tend to use that power largely for their own ends and on one another. The possibility that the power of professionalism could be arrayed against the conditions that keep people poor and enslaved—this possibility is undercut by a pervasive paranoia endemic to the nature of professional life itself.

Some people wear an appearance of power. In the course of this project we have encountered this type and assumed them to be, if not allies, at least worth watching. It has come as an occasional shock to discover that the man who is reputed to be so adept at "making things happen" in the world outside is, in fact, proficient only at maintaining his internal oligarchy. He uses power incestuously because over the years he has developed a keen nose for threat, for invasion of "turf," for protection of "territory." His nose has become so keen that it now smells things which are not even there. He continues to maintain the reputation of a man of power with whom one has to "check out" any important move. But in a culture which is constantly confused between appearance and reality, it goes unnoticed that his power has turned inward, away from stewardship for the world.
A recent book called The Paranoid puts the point well:

Paranoid thinking manifested by a leader easily eludes recognition, couched as it is in terms of political competition, national security, foreign intervention of threatening warfare. The mode of thinking is masked by the thought content and often the opinions of the leader remain unquestioned.

Although these examples are drawn from the realm of international political leadership, the parallels in church, university and urban society are readily seen. We should become expert at spotting these cases, for playing along with them is at best a waste of time, at worst counter-productive. Until we can learn to identify a paranoid "mode of thinking" underneath the most relevant "thought content," our politics will remain a good deal less than it might be: it will continue to be a fruitless middle-class game.

"Our second caution about power relates directly to the first, for it suggests one response to the conditions that breed paranoid politics. We refer to an historic religious stance—the transcendent devaluation of power. In this posture, one hears the judgment of the holy over against all forms and exercises of human power—a judgment which relativizes and even mocks that power as contrasted with the power of the deity. This is not a posture which has been much evident in the church's social action over the last decade. Perhaps for that reason alone it is worth looking at once again.

The transcendent devaluation of power is voiced in the proclamation of Paul: "We have this treasure in earthen vessels to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us." In this statement, human power is not denigrated; men are not advised to deny themselves the tools of power. Rather, human power is put in perspective. Its secondary status is clearly indicated, and if one can apprehend that message a sort of relaxation about power sets in.

The contemporary representatives of this point of view are not hard to find. They are men who, in the midst of their horizontal rele-
vance, have maintained the vertical dimension of transcendence. Thus, the ironic, even sarcastic, tones of Thomas Merton:

The city is the place where the mythology of power and war develop the center from which the magic of power reaches out to destroy the enemy and to perpetuate one's own life and riches—interminably if only it were possible. But it is never possible. Hence, the desperate need to placate the gods, to have the gods on our side, to win: for this, the most dramatic and "effective method" is human sacrifice. Wars have to be won in order to keep the gods of the city supplied with the blood of conquered victims... Urban culture is then committed to war "as the elixir of sovereign power and the most effective purgation of sovereign discontent with that power" (Mumford). We live, of course, in the most advanced of all urban cultures.

The message of Paul, filtered through Merton, when we live it out serves to take the murderous cutting edge from the instruments of power: these are instruments so sharp, that the natural nervousness with which we use them draws more blood than our purposeful aim. Again, there is no counsel here that we totally abandon the means of power. Merton himself, though cloistered in a monastery, exercised the power of language throughout his life. But Merton makes painfully clear the demonic potential of human power—a potential that is constantly fulfilled, to the consternation of beneficent men of power.

Perhaps it is too much to expect that the words of a monk could speak to the social activists of church and university. But similar words have been spoken by a prophet of the technological society such as Jacques Ellul. We are indebted to Ellul for the very phrase "technological society," but even more so are we indebted for his insight into the city as a place of power. Ellul's recent book, The Meaning of the City, consists of a systematic Biblical exegesis of the meaning of urban life; it is not an easy exercise for socially-minded Christians to follow.

Ellul sees the city as the historic and symbolic pinnacle of man's exercise—and worship—of his own power. As such the city (to twist an old cliche) is the pinnacle of human sin, for it is the total embodiment of man's self-assertion over against transcendent power. Consequently, the city will be judged by God—and Ellul finds the Biblical
record perfectly confirming and consistent on this point. Time and again has God brought the city to ruins for its apostasy. Time and again has man reasserted his own ego against the divine; and the cycle has repeated itself. Ellul has little hope that the optimism of modern social engineering and the power of the dollar will be able significantly to alter this cosmic drama.

All of this could, of course, be taken as a counsel of despair, a path to seclusion and false piety. But it is not. It is simply one more element in the critical mix of "fact" and "myth" that must surround us as we work at shaping our common life. No; it is more than merely one more element: it is the unique element that the church has to contribute to the development of perspectives on power. Unfortunately, those people in the church most willing to talk about power are those most immune to this insight. Perhaps because their own penultimate salvation has been found in the exercise of power.

Which brings us full circle to the confusion between power and paranoia. Any man who is saved by the use of his own power is a man to watch out for, a man more likely to be paranoid than genuinely power-full. The church has a critical ministry at this point, both within and without its walls. It must be on constant watch for that confusion between man's role and God's role which results in the confusion between power and paranoia. With its transcendent devaluation of power, the church must help us relativize our own accomplishments, and relinquish our own sense of territory to the point that genuine power can be developed and exercised. Without this ministry, the very death which makes our accomplishments and turf so negligible anyway will become our lot in life as well.
III. THE PROBLEM OF POWER

Thirty years ago, Bertrand Russell asserted that "the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics." (Power, 1938) In a similar vein, Harold Lasswell has noted that "When the emphasis in the study of government and law moves toward the facts of life, the focus is upon power." There is no dearth of consensus about the centrality of this notion.

But at the same time, as Robert Dahl has rightly observed, "scientists have not yet formulated a statement of the concept of power that is rigorous enough to be of use in the systematic study of this important social phenomenon." This should come as no great surprise. The very fact that power is such a central and massive characteristic of human life also makes it unamenable to "rigorous, systematic study." The phenomenon is simply too rich and too complex to be captured within the conceptual asceticism of science.

We cannot provide here any sort of conceptual breakthrough in the definition of power. What we have already done, of course, is to suggest that there are approaches to knowledge of power which do not rely on the asceticism of science but are capable of yielding insight nevertheless. We have used such an approach in this project—but we still owe the reader some disciplined statement of the benchmarks we have relied on in pursuing the theme of power.

Definition is always a matter of making distinctions, and one of the most critical distinctions made in the definition of power is that between power and authority. According to this analysis—and it is a classic one—the life of a body politic is held together either by forms of coercion and constraint (that is, power) or by forms of consensus and consent (that is, authority). Of course, these are ideal types; in real life we would expect to find mixtures of these modes at work.
By this definition, power is based on forms of leverage external to the individual's life. The man who wields power does not depend on the good will or motivation of the people he wishes to move. Instead, he presses from without, using the tools of law, of arms, etc. Authority, however, is rooted in the kinds of leverage which are internal to the individual's life. Authority is at work whenever a person acts out of a sense that the act is right and proper; that it ought to be done out of moral obligation. Authority, then, is voluntary in the strict sense of the word: it is based on an act of human will.

The key difference between power and authority is the normative element in authority which is absent in power. Something is authoritative when it commands assent on the basis of principles which are given in the culture of a particular society. The impetus of authority, according to this definition, is linked to the strength of the perceived moral order. Power, on the other hand, depends on no moral order, only on the normal care a human being takes for his health, his wealth and his status. The weapons of power threaten any or all of these, and thus exercise their control over human behavior.

The distinction between power and authority has the attractiveness of simple clarity on first glance. But as one probes it further, the problem once again becomes complex. For example, let us try to classify some social institutions using this distinction. Let us say that the church and the university operate in the mode of authority, while a city police department operates in the mode of power. But both church and university are permeated with elements of power: the voluntary theological assent of a church member may be heavily colored by the power of the threat of damnation; the assent of a college student by the state's power to conscript him. Conversely, a police department, though it relies on guns and the law, could easily be overrun in an urban uprising; the fact that such does not frequently happen may have something to do with a subtle but profound authority regarding social order. (Such authority need not be moral in order to be effective.)
But the problem becomes even more difficult as one pushes it further. In intellectual history, the distinction between power and authority arose out of the French Revolution and its attack on traditional authority—that is, on the loci of popular assent. The Revolution was illumined, in part, by the insight that forms of "legitimate authority" may in reality be mere masks for raw power. It depends on whether one is in or out of the ruling class; in or out of that segment of the society on whose behalf the ruling class rules.

According to some, we are in the midst of a revolution today—and this one, like its French predecessor, is raising critical questions about the nature of power and authority. If the majority in a society is calling for adherence to "legitimate authority" while the minority is striking out at what they regard as "raw (and unjust) power," whose terminology shall we accept? A distinguished social scientist recently penned an article about the university titled "When Authority Falters, Raw Power Moves In." His plea for a recognition that authority and power are not the same and that the latter is less healthy than the former was marred by only one thing: his failure to perceive that one man's (or one class's) authority may be another's raw power.

The classic theory holds that authority functions partly to regulate and limit the use of power. But one of the revelations of a revolution is that authority may, even more, function to regulate and limit the reactions of those subject to power. Instead of having a balance of power and authority, then, we have authority which serves the narrow interests of those in power—which simply extends their leverage over the "subjects."

We have no final solution to the dilemmas posed by this terminology and by the analytic and ethical decisions one must make in regard to it. But we have, as the title of this essay indicates, decided to use the term "power" in preference to "authority" or "power and authority." There are several reasons for this decision. First, power seems the
more generic term of the two; it is certainly the more popular, and a case can be made that while authority is a form of power, the converse is not true. Second, we use it because the dynamic of the city seems increasingly to be one of the touchstones of this project. Finally, we chose "power" as something of a prod to the dominant thinking within both church and university. Both these institutions have pictured themselves as possessors of only a fragile authority, of no substantial power. But that case is simply not true for the university, and must be modified substantially for the church. In the case of the church, of course, its traditional authority has long since begun eroding, and if it cannot think more broadly about questions of power it will make few ripples in the social sea.

When we use the term "power" we mean to suggest a broad definition rather than a restrictive, coercive one. We intend the term in its generic sense, inclusive of certain types of authority and not exclusively concerned with forms of constraint. But at the same time, we mean to suggest that the power realities of urban America are very real; that they will not be solved by simple ministrations of authority; that forms of countervailing power must be generated if the claims of justice are to be honored; and that church and university need to direct their social vision along these lines.

Given this rough delineation of the realm of power, it might be worth rehearsing some of the common fallacies associated with theories about power. If we have only a crude idea of what we are looking for, we have some rather sharp ideas of what we are not looking for.

The first fallacy involves picturing power as monolithic. The monolith, in turn, summons up images of power as unitary and as massive.

In our view, power is not unitary; on the contrary, it is diverse and pluralistic. One of the common errors of radicalism is the assumption that power in America is solely economic. This mistake was first made by a genuine radical, Marx, and led to the confounding of his pre-
dictions on the fate of capitalist society. The workers did not gain control over the means of production, but they did gain other kinds of power: the power of organization (labor unions), the power of the vote, the power of consumer choice. We make no normative judgment here; it could be argued that workers were thus "coopted." We only mean to suggest that descriptively, American history has shown the forms of effective power to be plural, not unitary.

The psychological consequence of seeing power as an economic monolith is, of course, frustration and withdrawal. Few can have access to the seats of such power, especially when it is realized that economic power is not mere possession of dollars, but control over the value and generation of those dollars. The view of power as plural may, in addition to being more accurate, have better motivational consequences.

A monolith is not only unitary, it is also massive. And some of the popular images of power follow suit. In this project we have been much concerned with questions of "scale," and some of those questions center on the problem of power. What is the actual scale of power? What is the effective scale of power? These are important questions, again, because of their consequences for personal action as well as for descriptive truth. When we view power as massive, out of human scale, the result is almost always personal immobility.

One of the most significant themes of the contemporary counterculture is the human scale of power. It is a view which permeates Reich's *The Greening of America*. But it has even more honorable sources than that—we quote William James: "I am done with great things and big things, great institutions and big success, and I am for those tiny, invisible molecular moral forces that work from individual to individual, creeping through the crevices of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of water, yet which, if you give them time, will rend the hardest monuments of man's pride."
Clearly, this cannot be the only view of power in America—and we will develop others later in this paper—but we offer it as an important part of the total picture.

A second major fallacy in much thinking about power is to regard the distribution of power as a zero-sum game; that is, as a situation in which the "amount" of power is fixed, so that empowering the powerless means taking power from those who have "it." (It seems likely that the zero-sum fallacy grows directly from the fallacy of seeing power as a monolith.)

Clearly, the objection to this view is that power is not a fixed commodity; that it can be generated de novo (perhaps even ex nihilo); and that failure to recognize these facts inevitably results in fruitless attacks on the current bastions of power rather than the creative development of countervailing power. Indeed, if this approach does not lead to fruitless attacks, it leads to fruitless petitionings of those centers of power, as if only "the recognized authorities" could grant the qualities of life a movement seeks. In addition to the fact that "given" power is never real power, such a view is needlessly restrictive of the potentials inherent in our capacity to create power. It is, again, a view that inhibits rather than frees.

Finally, we may point to the fallacy of assuming that power is always "the capacity to get something done." Even more prevalent in a complex society or complex organization is "veto power"—the power to prevent something from getting done. We do not recommend veto power; indeed, its use generally gives rise to a static, non-productive state of affairs. Once one veto gets exercised—as when a university department refuses to allow a curricular innovation in another department—then an institution will likely see a long string of retaliatory vetos cast. The result can only be stalemate.
The capacity to accomplish, rather than preventing accomplishment, is quite a different art. It is not likely to be developed if we are unaware of the realities of veto power and are constantly surprised by the failure of "all that power" to produce so little.
IV. POWER IN AMERICA: 1970

We have now explored several dimensions of power, but one critical question remains unanswered: Power to what ends? Commonly, we understand power as a mere instrumentality, a means to some goal. So it is natural for the reader to wonder what purposes the writers of this essay wish to pursue with power.

We would suggest that power—both psychologically and politically—can be seen as both means and end. Psychologically, a man may be strengthened by a simple "sense of power," without regard to whether he has a clear picture of what he wants to do with it. So it may be the goal of a therapist to help develop a feeling of power quite apart from any plan of uses for that tool.

Politically, a polity may be strengthened by a better, more equitable distribution of power without immediate regard to the ends which are sought with that power. Thus, a legitimate social objective may be the empowering of those who do not have power as an end in itself. Power, in such a case, is also a means—for only with power as a means can one move toward a better distribution of power as an end.

It would be nonsense to suggest that our only commitment to the ends of power is to a better distribution of power. Clearly, we have some substantive commitments as well, and some of them have been acted out in the course of this project. Thus, in Roxbury, Massachusetts we were committed to aiding the creation of an alternative to public education in the Black community. In Detroit, Michigan, we were committed to aiding a private Black college serving those who did not have access to the normal credential system. In Springfield, Virginia and Silver Spring, Maryland, we were committed to aiding middle-class Whites develop the power of competence to push claims in the public realm.
But note that each of these commitments—and they are spelled out in detail elsewhere in this series of essays—can be seen as an example of the general commitment to the redistribution of power. Redistribution, then, is the common theme running through all our particular commitments to the ends of power.

Let us put this a slightly different way. Our commitment is to the use of power to enlarge human freedom. Freedom, according to one definition, lies in the capacity to make choices. If men are to make choices, they need not only goods to choose among, but the power to create and appropriate those goods. Thus, freedom can be maximized only as power is decentralized and distributed.

Another way of expressing our commitment is in the language of pluralism. Pluralism is a word much used, much abused, and much misunderstood. But it is a critical work whose various dimensions can lead us to a better understanding of power in America, 1970.

"Pluralism" is sometimes used simply to describe a sociological situation of ethnic and racial heterogeneity. Thus, the proposition "America is a pluralistic society" means simply that America is a more heterogeneous society than Victorian England or South Africa. Those who are regarded as legitimate members of the society come from many backgrounds and can be sub-classified in many ways.

Sometimes "pluralism" is meant to describe a political rather than a simple sociological situation. In this sense, the proposition "America is a pluralistic society" means that power in America is divided among all relevant groups, each of which is capable of pursuing its interests on a parity with any of the others.

Put simply, our perception is that sociological pluralism is an accurate description of America, 1970. Political pluralism is not accurate, but it is a norm by which we should be judged and after which we should seek.
Sociological pluralism is, itself, a radical statement about American society. For once we have recognized and affirmed that life in the United States is and ought to be pluralistic in this sense, then we have abandoned and renounced the great American myth of the "melting pot." The historic vision in this society has been one of initial diversity but emerging homogeneity: the society could absorb refugees from all over the world only because of its faith that they would be Americanized in due process. (The single exception was, of course, the Blacks. But as they have pressed their claim in recent decades, the melting pot myth has reasserted itself with the proposition that Blacks could have a rightful place to the extent that they were willing to assume the image of the Anglo majority.)

If we recognize and honor social pluralism, then we will have to affirm political pluralism. For social pluralism breeds the conditions for political pluralism as well as creating a situation in which political pluralism is the only viable, democratic resolution. If the only power to reconcile the claims of conflicting groups resides in some super-agency, then the conflict is likely to grow more bitter, or there will be a massive relegation of the right to decision to the super-agency. The former state of affairs describes the society on the edge of social dissolution. The latter describes the fascist state. Neither condition is tolerable in a democracy.

The maldistribution of power is intolerable not for moral or normative reasons alone, because men "ought" to have freedom to posit alternatives and make choices. It is also intolerable because of what it presages for the functioning of a social system. Neither social dissolution nor fascist autocracy is likely to be in the best interests of any of us. Yet one of those—or the two in sequence—will be our fate unless many and diverse efforts are bent to the redistribution of power.

On the face of it, the redistribution of power in America appears to be largely a task of empowering the poor, and the Blacks, to press
their own claims against the society. But we shall argue that a much more comprehensive approach to the problem of power is needed, and will try to build toward that argument through a class-by-class analysis of power in America.

It is easy to wax romantic under a heading like "power and the poor" or "power and the Blacks." At this point we are generally swept up in a sea of rhetoric about how the poor/Blacks are "getting their thing together" and seizing power over their own destiny. But that is far from the truth. Writing about the powerlessness of the poor, Paul Goodman rightly observes that most of them "simply stop trying, become dependent, drop out of school, drop out of sight, become addicts, become lawless." The sad facts of powerlessness amidst poverty and prejudice simply do not fit any of the available rhetoric.

But it is equally clear that those remarkable places where the poor and the dispossessed are, in fact, generating power to shape their futures, are the places where others of the same situation in life will find the vision and the energy to "get their thing together." Such help will not come from the middle class—no matter how liberal or well-meaning.

The middle class can enter into the empowering of Blacks and the poor only indirectly, through indigenous centers of power. These centers will set their own agendas and develop their own techniques: the middle class can best relate to them in terms of the symbols of legitimacy, the influence of contacts, and, in general, the "power of development." (We have devoted an entire essay to "ministries of development" so will not explore it further here.) This is an important task. But it is not the only task which makes sense or needs doing as we talk about the redistribution of power in American society. Part of the reason for this is that it now makes no more sense than it ever did to place Messianic hopes in a given stratum of society.
The redistribution of power in American society is not a task defined solely in terms of the Black and poor because the society is a system. Any adjustment in one part of the system will have consequences for other parts. So the empowering of the poor and dispossessed may have as much to do with work on the lower-middle and middle classes as it does with organizing in the ghetto.

Among the lower-middle class there has been a growing awareness of powerlessness, especially economic powerlessness, over the past decade. As has been noted often and well, the reformist focus on the poor, especially Blacks, has caused a significant backlash among the lower-middle class. The blue collar worker, barely making it with each hard-won paycheck, is not likely to label it "social progress" when his own son cannot get into college while Black youngsters are admitted free under compensatory programs.

The universities have, by and large, overlooked the children of the lower-middle class, and there is a major gap to be filled here. We do not suggest filling it with B.A. degrees for all; perhaps a strengthened and legitimated form of vocational education would be better. But we do suggest that there has been a certain myopia in the university's sense of mission to the powerless.

The churches, especially those with regional and ethnic identities, play a major role in the life of the lower-middle class. And we shall speculate later about the powers which the church might deliver to this group. Suffice it to say that there is no coincidence in the fact that the Roman Catholic Church has been one of the prime agents in the organization of ethnic minorities around Chicago and other cities. It seems clear that, depending in part on the economic climate, unless some creative response is made to the powerlessness of the lower-middle class, the reactionary potential is high.

Then comes the middle class, the great unwashed majority, the group that the writers of this essay belong to. It is normal, we suppose,
that we gain insight into ourselves well after we have pierced the veil of everyone else. Only recently have Whites begun to understand that they are the larger part of the Black man's problem and have plenty of work to do without every carrying a basket to the ghetto. Only recently have we begun to understand the special role played by the middle class in this country's maldistribution of power.

Most observers have seen the middle class—and the middle class has certainly seen itself—as the people in power. If only we could wrest that power from them (the analysis ran) the poor would prosper and justice would reign. But suppose that veil, too, gets torn aside. Suppose we picture the middle class not as having power, but as a group for whom "the system" has found it convenient to work over the past few decades (say, from the New Deal to Vietnam). Then, the system falters: a war goes on over middle-class protests, the economy inflates against middle-class interests, and young people from middle-class families strike at the very heart of their parents lives. Viewed this way, the middle class suffers its own version of powerlessness.

The real pathos of the middle class is their refusal to disengage from the system which, as Goodman points out, renders them powerless. They continue to be its defenders, to react in agonized horror when it is attacked. Their reactions, of course, grow out of two decades of happy relations with the system, a period during which housing, jobs, education for the children and many other amenities were provided in abundance. Now, the gravy train has broken down. The housing market is tight, more and more professionals are having difficulty securing employment, and the educational system is in a shambles. But little has changed in the way the middle class perceives its relations to the society.

The point here is not that things will continue to deteriorate. Things may get better. But during this period of decline, the essential powerlessness of the middle class has been revealed. That core fact will remain whether things get better or not. And because of that es-
ential powerlessness, the quality of middle-class life will remain tense, anxious and unfulfilled. For the professional middle-class-hater, that may be of little consequence. But for one who perceives the political relevance of the quality of middle-class life that fact will be of considerable import.

Elsewhere in this series we elaborate on the "political relevance" of the middle class. Let us simply quote Paul Goodman here by means of illustration: "In my opinion, middle-class squeamishness and anxiety, a kind of obsessional neurosis, are a much more important cause of segregation than classical race prejudice which is a kind of paranoia that shows up most among failing classes, bankrupt small-property owners, and proletarians under competitive pressure." (Conquered Province, 108)

Squeamishness and anxiety are symptoms of powerlessness. Neither they nor the racism they help breed will be dealt with unless we can begin to understand the necessity of empowering the middle class. That is not the kind of proposition one normally makes when talking about the redistribution of power in the United States. But, we shall argue here and elsewhere, empowering the middle class in certain critical ways is a necessary component of empowering the poor and the Black. In subsequent sections of this essay, we shall explore what some of those ways may be.

One final comment about power in the American context. The democratic norm is that power be exercised in public, where it can be watched, criticized and checked. That is, the norm holds that power should be vulnerable. Naturally enough, people in power do not always see it that way; indeed, power and vulnerability are generally regarded as a contradiction in terms. But the contradiction is at the heart of the American vision, and to relinquish it is to abandon the vision.

A good deal has been written about the "privatization" of life in American society--mostly on the societal level, and largely about the
middle class. But it is important to recognize (a) that privatization is characteristic of all social strata and (b) that this fact about social relationships has important political consequences. The pervasiveness of privatization is due essentially to the pervasiveness of production-consumption as the way of American life. When economic activity becomes prime (earning a wage and spending it) there is no need for a community which transcends the individual, his relatives and friends. The political implication of this is, of course, the privatization of power. For in the absence of a community different from friendships or the marketplace, there is no time or place for watching, criticizing and checking the exercise of power. So in our list of concerns and caveats about power, the distinction between public and private becomes key.
V. THE CITY AS POWER

If we understand the city simply as a place, we misunderstand it. Throughout history, and especially today, the city has been a place only incidentally; more fundamentally, it has been a set of forces generated by and impinging upon the total society. Once we categorize "city" as a place, and concentrate upon its boundaries and demographic ingredients (after the manner of much urban sociology) we miss this more fundamental dynamic aspect.

The fact that "urban" is more than geographic space is quickly established by casual reflection on the relations of suburbia and exurbia to the central cities. Reapportionment—a formal redistribution of power—has made the mind and mood of the suburbs more critical than ever to the destiny of the central cities. For ours is now a "suburban nation" (defined in terms of population concentrations) and the redrawing of legislative districts reflects that fact. As for exurbia, there are now being made decisions about zoning and the laying of sewer lines in rural areas which are more critical to the future of cities than many decisions being made in city halls. As with reapportionment, crucial exercises of power form the dynamic bond between downtown and countryside, a bond which spatial definitions ignore.

The city can be understood as power in at least four ways: historical, sociological, in terms of problem-solving, and from the viewpoint of the individual.

Historically, the city has been the place where new constellations of power have emerged; the city has been the locus of challenge to established power, and of defeat, accommodation or victory for the challenger. Even in ancient times when power was more firmly fixed by means of ancestry and caste, the city served this function; it was built as a protection against the ravages of war, and thus it regularly attracted that violent form of shifting power to its gates.
In American history, the flux of power has not, as a rule, been quite so violent as war, but the city remained the locus of changing patterns of control. It was in the great cities that immigrants—Irish, Italian, Jewish and others—ascended to power through urban politics, business, organized crime and the church. Such mobility was not only permitted by the arrangements of the city, it defined the uniqueness of the city.

Let us quote William Birenbaum's interpretation of this fact:

It is not the mere presence of slums, pollution, and corruption (and the presence or absence of high-priority programs for their eradication or control) which distinguishes a city from a non-city. The land surface occupied and the density of population are relevant but not conclusive "city" indices. What counts are the configurations of these elements plus other conditions which produce certain attitudes and styles among the leaders and those led, conditions which influence attitudes toward these problems and the parameters for decision making.

Foremost among these conditions are the opportunities for mobility, for the movement of people, ideas, and things—movement from place to place and from status to status, social, cultural and economic; mobility in coming to possess and use power—all kinds of power including political.

... The very essence of "city" is the promise of a redistribution of power. The point of mobility, choice, and ongoing conflict is the opportunity to change the distribution of power. The dynamics of "city" is the ongoing process of power redistribution. (Overlive: Power, Poverty and the University. New York: The Delacorte Press, 1969.)

Birenbaum's novel definition leads him to some new and even startling insights about "the city." Detroit is classified as an example of a non-city for the simple reason that power in Detroit tends to be monolithic and frozen (according to Birenbaum). And the urban ghetto is understood by Birenbaum to be "anti-city." That is, the ghetto, far from being the essence of all that is wrong with the city, is the personification of all that the city has stood against in history: for the ghetto is a place of immobility, where there is no promise of the redistribution of power.
Thus, power is an historical attribute of the city. It is important to remember that fact, for its memory sets the contemporary city in a new and often strange light.

The city can be understood as power, next, from the sociological point of view, the viewpoint of human relations. This understanding is inherent in all the great typologies of human communities—from gemeinschaft-gesellschaft to folk-modern to rural-urban. Typically, in the former, more primitive state, human relations were thought to be held together by a common culture—that is, by shared values and commitments. But as communities evolved, many factors intervened to break down this cultural bond. Populations became larger, thus increasing the chance of heterogeneity. A complex division of labor developed, better suited to servicing the community’s needs but separating men from one another and from common tasks. Technology developed apace and created new kinds of barriers between people and the more primitive sources of communality.

In these ways a social vacuum was created between people. The traditional "glue" of culture was eroded. In its place flowed another kind of human bonding agent: power. Thus, every theory of the city (the gesellschaft, modern, urban type) specifies law and its enforcement as key sources of social cohesion. That they cannot be the sole sources is clear, but the balance has shifted toward them in a human setting which does not possess a common culture.

There are those, of course, who believe that the city does have a culture, one which is infinitely richer and more complex than that of earlier settlements. But if this be a culture, it is strangely lacking in the elemental norms of human relationship. One suspects it is not so much a culture in the generic sense as a "high culture" in the aesthetic sense, and certainly the city is the undisputed source of that. Even if there is a culture of sorts in the city, the existence of the ghetto is evidence (a) that the culture is not universally shared and (b) that it lacks the norms necessary to create a
sense of communality. For the ghetto is anti-city; its culture is
the underside of the majority culture. Yet ghetto and city are locked
in a common life whether the culture recognizes that or not.

There is another, perhaps more revealing way to pose this problem.
The city has seen the decline of a "normative" mode of social inte-
gration, and in its place has developed a coercive mode. This develop-
ment is closely tied to the breakdown of the historical process dis-
cussed above: the distribution of power among emerging minorities.
We suggest that the necessity for power as the prime source of urban
cohesion has increased as the process of power distribution has slowed
down or ceased. For with that cessation, the city came more and more
to resemble a congeries of warring camps, each seeking in coercive
ways that distribution of rewards which was not forthcoming through
the legitimate political process. This is not the only factor at work
in the breakdown of common values, but it has been a major and often
unrecognized one.

Next, we suggest that the city is power from the point of view
of "urban problems" and their solutions. The standard approach to
urban problems is to devise a conceptual solution; and, thanks largely
to the universities, we have many of those. Whether it be transporta-
tion, housing, Black business, pollution or better government, we have
on paper a model resolution, replete with cost estimates, technical
specifications and parameters of possibility.

What all of these considerations neglect, of course, is the prob-
lem of power. For the resolution of urban problems lies less and less
in the question, What shall we do? as in the question, Who shall have
power to decide and to do it? Solutions—even good ones—which come
from agencies of a government perceived as unrepresentative and unjust
will not, for the most part, succeed. For the technical correctness
of a solution is of secondary importance to the political implications
of accepting it and its source. Until we have a better distribution of
political power, many good answers to difficult problems will not see
the light of day.
Finally, the city is a problem in power from the point of view of the individual. The complexity of urban life has created in many people a sense of utter powerlessness. This is rooted in at least two facts bred by complexity: the increasingly technical nature of urban problems, and the isolation of people one from another. Competence and cohesion are two prime sources of a sense of power, and both of these are lacking in large numbers of individuals in the urban setting.

A "sense" of powerlessness is different, of course, from the objective reality of powerlessness, but the two operate in a dialectical relation. With a sense of powerlessness come frustration which, depending on the social stratum involved, can breed revolutionary explosion or reactionary implosion. Both phenomena have been observed in the contemporary city, and both deserve close attention for the important political facts that they are.

Thus, the city as power—seen historically, sociologically, in terms of problems, and from the perspective of the individual. In each instance we have seen how not power alone but the redistribution of power is at the heart of the thing called "city." From these observations we should be in a position to look with a fresh eye at university and church.
VI. POWER IN THE UNIVERSITY

In recent years, both church and university have expressed regrets about their past apathy over "urban problems" and have projected great hopes for the future. In both institutions, literal battles have raged around these claims. Some have argued that the integrity of church and university depends on insulation from the city and its crises. Others have held that nothing will do except the razing of church and university, with their members then manning the barricades against a racist society.

From the perspective of our definition of "urban," this whole debate seems strangely premature. Before considering the whether and the how of church/university involvement in the city, we must confront the fact that by our definition both institutions have traditionally been non-city and even anti-city. For the classic definitions of church and university have suggested that these institutions were above, beyond, beneath or without power—and that the very essence of their being stood over against power. Let us look first at the university, then at the church.

The classic vision of the university is that of the free community of scholars. "Free" is the central image here, and it has been variously developed in the history of higher education. Thus, the "liberal arts" have been understood first as the education befitting a free man, and then as an education for freedom. Thus, the arena of scholarship has been regarded as open to any combatant, with truth as the only weapon necessary to victory. Thus, the university has been seen as the free critic of society. In all of this, the image of freedom stands in distinct opposition to the press of power.

Reality never corresponds to imagery, of course, and there is little sense in berating the university for permitting a gap to exist. But if we are to think about "the university and the city" then it is
imperative that we understand the power realities of university life. For despite its protestations, the university does have power—internally and externally. It is the external power that interests us especially, for with it the university has already exercised influence on the wider society, the shape and value of which must be considered as it seeks better relations with the city.

The university's typical response to urban problems is perfectly consistent with its denials of power: it is rational, cognitive and verbal. This is not to deny that "knowledge is power." But a university conference on institutional racism, followed by an elegant scheme for the elimination of same, is not the kind of powerful knowledge that Bacon had in mind. For such a scheme was generated above the fray, in a setting without accountability to the political forces at work in a city.

The university seems to have a faith (which survives massive evidence to the contrary) that "good ideas" will have a life of their own. But good ideas which are developed above and beyond the political context of urban life will not have a life of their own, for the power process is the very source of urban life. Furthermore, in the midst of the "knowledge explosion" it appears that good ideas are easier and easier to come by. What still comes hard is the wisdom which will get us from here to there—and getting from here to there is inevitably an exercise in power.

In this regard, we have come to believe that the university could cultivate the power of "development," if by development we can mean broadly the art of getting from here to there. Every university has a development office, and having worked with several development officers in the course of this project we have come to appreciate their special competence. But the university has other developmental resources as well. For example, it often has the capacity to make things "legitimate," and without legitimacy no project can even begin a development effort. This is a power which universities might employ on behalf
of promising efforts in alternative urban schools; such an approach makes more sense to us than another conference on "What Should We Be Doing in Urban Education?" (For more details on the power of development, see the essay in this series.)

Another important power of the university is the power of the credential. For America, as Ivan Illich has pointed out, is a society which puts credential ahead of competence. The credential alone is the passport into social mobility and all the attendant goods of American life.

It is at this point of power, of course, that the university has been under heaviest attack by Blacks, Chicanos and other minorities. They have pushed hard for more and more access to the credentialing process, and in some places have achieved signal success. Thus, in New York, the city university system has declared a policy of "open admissions" under which any city high school graduate may matriculate.

Open admissions is certainly one responsive use of the power of the credential. It is not self-evident, however, that it is the best use. For a system of open admissions, imposed on a traditional elitist curriculum and faculty, may simply self-destruct, leaving behind a shell of an institution and a taxpayer's revolt. It may be that a determined effort to diversify the credential—to honor a much wider range of types of training than we now do—would be the best use of this university power. In any case the point we wish to make here is that credentialing should be high on the list of university powers, and we must be self-conscious about its urban relevance.

Another critical power of the university is the power of competence, or the capacity to create competence. But there are at least two serious reservations one must make on this point before thinking about its application to the urban situation. First, as we have already indicated, the credential tends to be more highly valued than competence in the society and in the university. Witness the young
woman with secretarial skills but no B.A. who cannot find clerical employment. Witness the poet without academic training who tries to find a job in an English Department.

Second, the kind of competence the university most readily produces is that for which the society has the most obvious economic need. The "production" of competence, as the imagery suggests, is in part a market situation, and the buyer determines the nature of the merchandise to some considerable extent. There is a larger market for narrowly trained scientists and technicians than for anarchists; thus, contrary to popular opinion, the university produces infinitely more of the former than the latter.

The kind of competence that has interested us most in the course of this project is the competence of "urban citizenship," the competence necessary for citizens to understand and press claims against an urban polity. This is a form of power which the university is not well-organized to produce; to change the situation requires a process aimed at the university toward fundamental curriculum revision. (Because of the importance of this point, we have devoted another essay in this series to it; see Urban Curricula and the Liberal Arts). But this is a power which the university could help develop, and thus enable serious citizen engagement with the urban condition.

The university also has the power of landlord in the urban setting. It is this power which has been made most visible in the battles between the University of Chicago, Columbia University and their respective cities. In any number of well-publicized cases, the university has exercised this power on behalf of a narrowly-conceived self-interest and with total disregard for the neighboring population. In collusion with dubious "urban renewal" programs, universities have attempted to build barriers between themselves and the city. It is thus obvious that the power of landlord exists; how it might be used is another question.
A fourth kind of university power is economic. In terms of annual operating income, most universities have little to spare. But the economic potential of the university goes well beyond student tuitions and other accounts receivable. It includes large endowments, close working relationships with foundations, and other "lines of credit." As critics of university investment policies have pointed out, the way in which the academy exercises these powers speaks volumes about its operational social and political commitments.

We have skinned over this list of university powers, actual and potential, simply to provide a counter to the standard picture of the university as powerless. In this project, we have been particularly interested in the powers of development and the creation of citizen competence; full reports on our experiments in that regard are found elsewhere in this series. For the moment we simply want to suggest that the power thesis has immediate and sensible applications to institutions of higher education.
VII. POWER IN THE CHURCH

The church has been even more adamant than the university in denying that it possesses any form of effective power. We do not have reference to Bonhoeffer and his followers, whose assertions of the church's "powerlessness" are made to point to a power which transcends all human forms. Rather, we refer to those who would deny the salience of the human dimension of the church--its real estate, its assets, its bureaucracies, its mass membership--and speak as if the "church invisible" were the total reality.

The imagery and mythos of the church has always been so rich and complex that within it persons poles apart could both find support for their views. In this respect assertions of the church's powerlessness have more initial credibility than those regarding the university. After all, the root metaphor of the church as the "Body of Christ" summons up images of suffering and sacrifice which are the antithesis of the imagery of power. The most common form of such denials, of course, is the claim that the church's job is saving souls, not saving society. While this claim borrows rather heavily on non-Biblical American individualism, it still has powerful referents in the complex of Christian symbols.

The church differs from the university in this regard in that these symbols have been used most vigorously not by a leadership elite trying to control a mass institution, but by a rank-and-file membership trying to divert the direction of elite leadership. In the university, on the contrary, it is the rank-and-file who have been challenging the dogma of powerlessness, and it is the leadership who have been wielding the symbols of tradition in a futile effort to stem the tide. If this analysis is correct, then leadership in the church has more initiative and is in a more hopeful position than leadership in the university. How these assets should be used is, in part, the subject of another pamphlet in this series.
But we cannot give church leadership terribly high marks for their efforts to alert the church to its power and their potential use in the dilemmas of the city. For by and large, the ecclesiocrats, even with their perceptions of power, have fallen back on the standard modes of rationality and verbalism in attempting to mobilize church resources. Thus, the sermon has shifted from a conveyor of the Biblical Word to a purveyor of the sociological word; an effort to inform the presumably ignorant masses that there is injustice in the city and to persuade them to do something about it. Similarly, the national pronouncement on racism, militarism or whatever has been intended to show those who stumble in darkness the light of day.

Of course, the assumption in all this is that the problem is largely one of communication and information. For example, the church has responded to the "crisis on campus," and the attendant reaction of many church members, by attempting to educate those people to "what's really happening" so that their reactions will be more supportive and moderate. What is missed, of course, is that plenty of people already know "what's really happening." Or at least they intuit, accurately, that the turmoil on campus somehow signals a profound threat to their own life-styles, privileges and prestige in American society. They rightly sense that the problem, in a word, is one of power. And all the information in the world does not speak to that problem.

When the church has moved away from the rational-verbal model of motivation, it has tended in the main to move toward highly personalistic modes of sensitivity training. If right knowledge will not do the trick, the assumption runs, then right feeling will. Thus, T-Groups, marathons and encounters (including the Black-White variety) have been riding the crest of a wave for several years.

Sensitivity training begins to get at a realm of psychological power that mere information does not even approach. But it still falls far short of the sort of power we are stressing here: power as the
capacity to operate in the socio-political arena. More and more one sees churchmen whose increased sensitivity may be their downfall, for they are incompetent to translate that sensitivity into effective action.

An inventory of the church's powers resembles that of the university in certain respects. Thus, we would argue that the church also has the power of development, for it is an institution whose classic function has been legitimation and delegitimation. Clearly this power has waxed and waned historically, and the church of the middle ages was in a better position to exercise it than the church today. But still the church can lend credence to activities which cannot generate credence for themselves; through its membership, the church can reach into other legitimating institutions of the society and further stimulate this function.

Second, the church has the power of real estate and financial assets. Especially in the realm of real estate, the church has engaged in some notable exercises of power on behalf of the powerless. Thus, the Highland Park Free School in Roxbury, Massachusetts occupies valuable property deeded to it by the archdiocese. Frequently, strategies of this sort are also in the interests of the church, for much ghetto property owned by the church now sits empty and idle, with staffs and congregations having fled "transitional" neighborhoods.

The sheer financial wealth of the church should not be minimized, either. Recent declines in pledging and the necessity for cutting operating budgets do not alter the fact that the church at large is a wealthy institution. The Black Economic Development Conference focused on this fact, of course, although the results at best have been mixed. But those who understand the economic power of the church need to keep working this front.

A third power of the church is seldom discussed—the power of religious symbolism—unlike legitimacy, money, members and real estate—
is a resource unique to the church, around which one might think its distinctive mission would emerge. But it is also understandable that the power of religious symbolism is usually dismissed, for this is the age of secularization, with religious symbols having run their course and lost their clout.

Or, at least it is that way for the scholars who write about the age of secularization. Whether religious symbols have atrophied for all parts of the population seems to us a moot question indeed. In fact, much research and experience indicates that traditional forms of religiousness still run high among certain critical elements of the society; in particular there seems to be a high correlation between religiosity and reactionary politics. There could be no more critical conjunction for those of us interested in the church's powers, and it may be that the power of religious symbolism is the only effective countervailing power to the demonic forces of political reaction.

Fourth, the church has the power of its powerlessness. This theme, in its depths, has theological connotations which we cannot explore here. But it also has an effective sociological surface. In many situations, the church will be an entirely unexpected source of power from the predictable places. Again, the church's norms regarding the morality of life together, as weak as they are as mere spoken words, can help surround the exercise of power with sanctions which soften its effects. In all of these regards, the church has the paradox of a power that comes from powerlessness.

Again, we have listed these powers simply to provide an alternative to the notion that the church is powerless. Our experiments with particular churchly powers are reported elsewhere in this series. The point is, simply, that the church as a human institution operating in a human context has intrinsic powers which can and should be used.
VIII. STRATEGIES FOR THE USE OF POWER

The language we use and the acts we take are often intimately related, for language has a subtle way of shaping and judging action. The rhetoric of "power" is a superb example. "Power" is a massive and masterful word, suggesting that acts informed by it should also be massive and masterful. Presidents, captains of industry, generals of the army: these are men of power, and the rest of us are puny in comparison. Thus, the language of power has become a nettle of frustration and a cause of resignation for most of us. Our every act seems to fall far short of power's Olympian standards.

As long as we understand power that way, power will become in fact, as in myth, the property of presidents, captains of industry and generals of the army. The trepidation with which many of us use the language of power becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: we know we cannot attain to power's norms, so we remove ourselves from all possibility of gaining power.

Having written much about the substance of power in church, university and urban society, we turn now to some final comments on the use of power in that context. What we say here is intended as a corrective to the linguistic overkill which theories of power tend to create. There are, we think strategies for the use of power which lie within the reach of most people; we have tried to illustrate some of them elsewhere in this series. As they are employed, the reality of power will itself become more diffuse and decentralized.

We begin with an observation which seems trivial until we realize that less than one percent of the population, especially the population of bureaucrats, seem to believe it. It is that we depend on people much more than policies and programs. To put it more precisely in terms of power, it is in people, not policies or programs, that power ultimately resides.
Too many attempts at generating power begin with a denial of this assumption. We have in mind six or eight worn-out, insecure and objectively inadequate people sitting around trying to develop a policy or program which will start a juggernaut of justice in motion. It won't work, of course. For despite all the sociologisms-in-the-world ("the group is greater than the sum of its parts") human beings cannot create outside of themselves anything greater than they have inside of themselves. The point is not that worn-out, insecure and objectively inadequate people should be replaced by their opposites; there are not enough replacements to go around. It is simply that such people must begin with themselves and the cultivation of their own resources, for that is the root of power. Lacking that, the most brilliant of policies and programs will be of no avail.

Such a thesis does not correspond well with modern theories of the institutionalization of power. We are nothing if not consistent on this point. Not only do we recommend beginning with people rather than programs and policies; we also suggest that power can be developed and used effectively outside of large-scale institutional contexts. The advocates of institutional power have made it seem necessary that one become a corporate officer before the tools of power will be within reach. Even if more than a few were to do so, their ideas about what work must be done with those tools would have shifted radically in the process. Thus it is vital that we undermine the myth of institutional power.

What we are getting at might best be expressed as the power of guerilla warfare against the Department of Defense. In many cases the enemy may share organizational characteristics of the D.O.D. But fighting him may not necessitate girding one's self in similar organizational armor. Indeed, he may have become an enemy precisely because his armor was so cumbersome that humane responsiveness became impossible. While it often happens that one takes on the appearance of his enemy in the course of a battle, there is no sense encouraging it.
It is possible to work not only outside the walls of massive institutions but also to work in the cracks which have appeared in our institutional monoliths. In many institutions, creative use of established power is well nigh impossible. But creative use of power at the interstices, or open spaces, of the institutional web is more and more possible. A good deal of ferment is taking place in such locations already, and it is likely that it will increase. As Warren Bennis has said, "For clues to the future, we must look to the imaginative little groups that flourish in the armpits of giant bureaucracies." And, to extend the metaphor dangerously, we ought not try to deodorize those efforts. Despite the fact that they are a form of "working within the system" they are also decided threats to established power, as much as attacks from the outside.

As for "external" power, it need not always be cast in terms of massive counter-attacks on institutional directions. For what lies outside, or external to, an institution is simply the context of that institution's politics. Sometimes it is possible simply to alter that context to gain leverage on power rather than having to set institution and environment totally at odds.

For example, we have worked with groups of students on altering the context of faculty politics. The normal procedure is for students with a "good idea" to take it to the faculty for deliberation and decision, since the faculty are masters in their own house. But the results of that process are generally predictable. We have experimented with an alternative process in which students first take their idea to people who might become part of an altered environment for faculty decision-making. If these people—alumni, local business and political leaders, national figures, etc.—join with the students in presenting a notion to the faculty, at very least the faculty have a good deal more explaining to do than they would otherwise. There is no reason why we need accept the normal environment of decision-making as the only one or the proper one. Efforts at altering that environment become a new form of wielding power externally, one that does not necessitate a clash of the leviathans. It merely creates a new "audience" for the decisions of established bodies.
Much of what we believe about strategies of power can be summarized in the proposition that you do not have to be governor in order to govern. (Indeed, we suspect that there are more and more instances in which being governor makes it impossible to govern.) The notion that power flows only from a center has to be challenged in a day when the center is not holding, or when there are so many systems that there are a multitude of centers.

Theories of the "decentralization" of power have been popular for some years now, and are gaining viability in such diverse areas as education and the police. But there is still an unfortunate tendency, especially in voluntary organizations like the church, to think in terms of centralized control. Frequently, this tendency manifests itself as a plea for "better communication" (which often means that the pleader is nervous about what is going on and wants more information for the sake of greater control). Sometimes the press for centralized control takes the more overt form of an effort to establish "priorities." He whose priorities finally get established has command of institutional resources for some time to come.

These tendencies are especially prominent in voluntary associations because of the anarchy always lurking beneath the surface of any human group brought together by will rather than law. There is always someone in the crowd who panics and wants to legislate the strengths of voluntarism out of existence.

It may seem strange (but not, we hope, inconsistent) that we opt for anarchy against centralization. We do so for several reasons, all pertinent to our interest in developing strategies of power on a human (rather than institutional) scale. First, efforts at centralization frequently consume so much energy and use up so many resources that there is little left to mobilize whatever potential has been centered. Second, even if considerable potential has been centralized, the energy required to maintain that position of ostensible strength frequently drains energies needed for the use of that strength. Third,
centralization violates the basic need, especially in voluntary associations, for feelings of "ownership" on the part of participants. Whatever power there is in voluntary collections of people lies in the act of will which brought them together. Centralization of power, which inevitably means elitism and bureaucratization, destroys that source.

Throughout we have argued for the use of power on human scale. That can be achieved only as the objectives we hope to accomplish with power are themselves framed on the same scale. For human scale means can only balloon or self-destruct if the ends in view are overwhelmingly large.

We must, then, rid ourselves of the "masterplan mentality" which has characterized so much of our thinking about the social objectives of power. Again, the linguistic trap: we seem unable to speak that massive word "power" without envisioning sweeping change in the quality of community life. But this is the course to further frustration. We must learn, instead, as Paul Goodman suggests, to work for changes of two or three percent. It is on that scale that work will get done; it is on that scale that our powers can become real, can be tested and might even grow; and, for all we know, a cumulation of two-or-three-percent changes might someday add up.

This last caution will be most difficult to honor in the context of "the church, the university and urban society." For, to return to the point at which we started, that phrase summons up problems of galactic scale. But we have, in this essay, tried to plot a more modest course through that interstellar space. The extent to which we have been able to implement our theoretical course in concrete, effective actions can only be measured by reading other pieces in this series.