This essay is the third of seven papers designed to investigate the relationship of the church, the university, and urban society. This essay explores the conceptual, disciplinary basis of the modern university. It is concluded that the changing nature of social reality is increasingly undermining fragmented disciplinary inquiry, which in turn is and will continue to constitute the universities real "irrelevance." It is noted that alternatives to the university are being created. Related documents are HE 004 367, HE 004 366, and HE 004 356. (Author/MJM)
THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY AND URBAN SOCIETY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNIVERSITY

Elden Jacobson, Senior Associate

Parker J. Palmer, Senior Associate

Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies

Washington, D.C.

Paper number 3 in a series of seven reports produced for the project on "Church, University and Urban Society" of the

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY
THE CHURCH, THE UNIVERSITY AND URBAN SOCIETY:

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNIVERSITY

Elden Jacobson
Parker J. Palmer
Price list for seven reports from the project, "Church, University, and Urban Society":

Single copies of one report - 50¢ each.

All seven reports (one copy of each) - $2.50.

Ten or more copies of any one report - 30¢ per copy (representing a 40% discount on the single copy price).

Send orders to:  Department of Higher Education
475 Riverside Drive, Room 770
New York, N. Y. 10027

All Rights Reserved.
PREFACE

As one of these essays indicates, a project on "Church, University and Urban Society" calls to mind the classic question, "Define the universe and give two examples." The size of the subject is matched by the variety of responses which colleges, universities, and churches have been making in recent years to the urban scene, and by the urgency, not always supported by clear directions, which they have felt seeking to confront the pressures and demands of urban America.

The Department of Higher Education of the National Council of Churches, together with the boards of higher education of a number of denominations, came to believe in the late 1960's that the problems of urban society were some of the important intersections of common concern between church and university.

The Department was pleased, therefore, to receive in early 1969 a substantial grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation which was joined with special funds from church agencies, both in higher education and national missions, for a two-year action-research project on "Church, University and Urban Society." Defining the issues has been a continuing task of the study itself, as will be seen in these reports, but the basic purpose of the project was to discover ways in which to increase the capacity and the commitment of churches and academic institutions to meet the problems of urban society.

The project was carried on from mid-1969 to mid-1971 by two able sociologists, Dr. Elden E. Jacobson and Dr. Parker J. Palmer, Senior Associates in the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, Washington, D. C. Dr. Jacobson received his Ph.D. in the sociology of religion in 1966 from Yale University and Dr. Palmer received his in sociology in 1970 from the University of California at Berkeley. Both men had research and teaching experiences before coming to the Washington Center and both participated...
in the comprehensive Danforth Study of Campus Ministries, undertaken by the late Kenneth Underwood and published under the title, The Church, the University, and Social Policy (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1969).

Elden Jacobson and Parker Palmer were eminently qualified for this current study by their academic training and their search for new styles of professional life, by their religious commitment and their search for new modes of corporate religious responsibility. The Department of Higher Education is deeply grateful to them for the imagination and insight they have brought to this undertaking. We are particularly pleased that the ideas and styles they have developed in this project will receive a continuing embodiment in a new center to which they will be attached, the Institute for Public Life in Silver Spring, Maryland.

The following persons served on an Advisory Commission to the "Church, University and Urban Society" project:

Morris T. Keeton, Vice-President of Antioch College, Chairman
Edwin G. Bennett, National Staff, Team for Ministry in Higher Education, Episcopal Church
William Cannon, Vice-President for Programs and Projects, University of Chicago
Harvey Cox, Associate Professor, Church and Society, Harvard Divinity School
Charles W. Doak, Campus Minister, University of California at Los Angeles
Brooks Hays, Director of Ecumenical Studies, Wake Forest University, former Congressman from Arkansas
John Jordan, Executive Secretary, Office of University World, National Division, Board of Missions of the United Methodist Church
Arthur Paris, Graduate Student in Sociology, Northwestern University
Hans B. C. Spiegel, Professor of Urban Affairs, Hunter College of the City University of New York
George Todd, Associate for Urban and Industrial Ministries (Board of National Missions), and Secretary, Joint Office of Urban and Industrial Ministries (with COEMAR), United Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.
Charles Z. Wilson, Jr., Assistant Vice-Chancellor for Educational Planning and Program, University of California at Los Angeles
The Department of Higher Education is indebted to Dr. Morris Keeton, chairman, and all the members of this Commission for the time they gave to meetings and occasional special assignments, and for the advice and interaction of ideas they afforded the staff throughout the project.

It will be understood that the freedom of the staff, Elden Jacobson and Parker Palmer, is enhanced by issuing these reports over their own names. They do not necessarily express the views either of the Advisory Commission or the Department of Higher Education.

The Department expresses its gratitude to the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies for making possible the services of the staff, to the Sloan Foundation and church agencies for providing financial support, and again to Messrs. Jacobson and Palmer for giving themselves so generously to it.

William N. Lovell
Executive Director
Department of Higher Education
National Council of Churches
INTRODUCTION

Church-University-Urban Society. Such is the fashion—old coin for academic and theologian alike—by which our pretensions exceed our reach. This booklet, one of seven in a series, is the work of two academic sociologists, invited by the Department of Higher Education, National Council of Churches, to investigate the marvelous amorphismness this project's title suggests. For two years we have invested nearly all of our professional interest and time, and a good bit privately, in exploring these three ideas—two institutions and a given context—both as separate, identifiable foci of curiosity and as interacting social institutions in this society's increasingly urbanized work and life.

The style has been activist; we have not hesitated to intervene when invited to do so, and we have likewise set into motion a variety of projects in which all involved were self-consciously pressing for more-adequate ways of "getting it together." So it is, we argue, that one learns.

The possibilities, of course, were overwhelming; our response partial and uneven. Yet it is not mere modesty or a sense of caution that leads us to say so. This project was originally but one of six major, interrelated inquiries conceived in 1968 by nationally known academics and churchmen, inquiries that spanned quite nearly the whole of higher education. Yet the practical realities—of time and money and political power—were such that only some parts survived, this one funded at one-eighth the amount initially sought. An instructive process, to be sure, one depressingly illustrative of the usual manner this society seems bent upon confronting the demonic forces now corroding its inward parts, wherein the grandeur of purpose seems dramatically at odds with achieved result. We mean no disrespect to our immediate sponsors; on the contrary, the Department of Higher Education, and our parent institution, the Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, have shared with us that extra mile in amazingly good grace. But the lack of careful, sophisticated, thoughtful
experimentation with new forms and new potentials within both church and university is dispiritingly evident to those who have looked. This society's capacity for selective inattention seems scarcely capable of overstatement.

Yet straws there are—often laden with rhetoric and self-protection—but straws none-the-less. And it is those straws that commanded our greater attention as they, first in fact were and are, and as, secondly, situations that hold wider promise. As the briefest of introductions to these seven papers, the following descriptive statements are offered to the reader:

1. **The Church, the University and Urban Society: A Problem in Power.**
   In this essay, we describe the basic conceptual focus and theoretical framework of the two-year project. Urban society is defined in terms of power, and the role of church and university in it is viewed as essentially marginal unless and until they enter at the point of power. Varieties of power are assayed and strategies for their use are discussed. The essay forms a backdrop for much we have written elsewhere in this series.

2. **The Church, the University and Urban Society: Focus on the Church.**
   This essay focuses the general concerns of the project on the church. In it, we are particularly concerned with the parish or congregation, that much-neglected but essential component of the church at large. We also explore some of the problems inherent in the specialized ministries (particularly campus and urban), national offices and agencies, and the seminaries.

3. **The Church, the University and Urban Society: Implications for the University.**
   This essay explores the conceptual, that is to say, the disciplinary, basis of the modern university. In it we conclude that the changing nature of social reality is increasingly undermining fragmented disciplinary inquiry, which in turn is and will continue
to constitute the universities' real "irrelevance." Because we see no grounds for believing that it will fundamentally re-order itself, alternatives to the university will be, and are being, created.

4. The Power of Development: Some Possibilities We See.
This is an analysis, from our experience, of middle- and upper-middle-class suburban life, and the crisis of authority now endemic within social institutions—with emphasis upon the church—that purport to serve this society. We believe these two phenomena are closely related and that church bureaucrats have not been particularly imaginative in their treatment of either. The question of "development" is explored as one partial means of rethinking national/local relationships.

5. Urban Curricula' and the Liberal Arts College.
This is a report of our examination of the liberal arts colleges' response to things "urban," with particular attention to "urban semester" programs and their conceptual and practical weaknesses. Drawing sharp distinctions between universities and colleges, we have tried to suggest alternative ways for addressing what is surely a critical dimension of modern society; the focus now upon the role of "citizen" and "social invention." We have also commented at length on the academic politics of getting from here to there.

6. Action-Research: A New Style of Politics; Education and Ministry.
In this manual, we describe a basic methodology of the project, "action-research." The essay is of the "how to do it" breed, with a detailed description of the stages in an action-research project, some of the basic research tools, and suggestions regarding organization. Action-research, in which research is conceived as a process of political action, has demonstrated its utility as a training device for professionals and students and as an organization tool for citizens' groups wishing to make an impact in their community.
experimentation with new forms and new potentials within both church and university is dispiringly evident to those who have looked. This society's capacity for selective inattention seems scarcely capable of overstatement.

Yet straws there are—often laden with rhetoric and self-protection—but straws none-the-less. And it is those straws that commanded our greater attention as they, first in fact were and are, and as, secondly, situations that hold wider promise. As the briefest of introductions to these seven papers, the following descriptive statements are offered to the reader:

1. The Church, the University and Urban Society: A Problem in Power.
   In this essay, we describe the basic conceptual focus and theoretical framework of the two-year project. Urban society is defined in terms of power, and the role of church and university is viewed as essentially marginal unless and until they enter at the point of power. Varieties of power are assayed and strategies for their use are discussed. The essay forms a backdrop for much we have written elsewhere in this series.

2. The Church, the University and Urban Society: Focus on the Church.
   This essay focuses the general concerns of the project on the church. In it, we are particularly concerned with the parish or congregation, that much-neglected but essential component of the church at large. We also explore some of the problems inherent in the specialized ministries (particularly campus and urban), national offices and agencies, and the seminaries.

3. The Church, the University and Urban Society: Implications for the University.
   This essay explores the conceptual, that is to say, the disciplinary, basis of the modern university. In it we conclude that the changing nature of social reality is increasingly undermining fragmented disciplinary inquiry, which in turn is and will continue

This final essay in the series articulates our concern for the "public life" in the context of church, university and urban society. For us, the public life involves not only traditional political institutions and processes, but the emerging options to them. We discuss the question of options as a critical one, given the crisis of contemporary life and politics. This essay also has a strong "how to do it" dimension in its description of one of the field experiments which continue beyond the life of the larger project—the Institute for Public Life. It is in the Institute that we continue to act out the implications of our two-year effort for the National Council of Churches.

As with these seven essays so, too, with the project itself: they emerge from two persons whose unity of purpose and mutuality of spirit have come to constitute unique experiences for us both. Written words, self-evidently, must finally derive from a single pen and for the sake of form, names appear on each title page with the principal writer cited first. Authorship, however, is fully shared—in concept, result, and intensity of feeling—and we make no distinctions in our defense of and responsibility for the whole of this series.

Each essay has been written to stand largely on its own merits; as such, repetition occurs from time to time, from one piece to the others. We trust it will not distract the carefully attentive reader.

We warmly acknowledge our considerable indebtedness to the Reverend William N. Lovell, Director of the Department of Higher Education, and Dr. Royce Hanson, President of the Washington Center. Both of these men were very supportive without imposing direction, and we moved with complete freedom in the shaping of this inquiry of involvement. We wish also to thank the members of our Advisory Commission; despite the inadequacies of this particular form of securing advice and assistance, several
of these men served both us and the people we studied in exemplary fashion. We likewise thank that multitude of people who literally reside from coast to coast within those situations we discuss. They have taught us much, and are thereby responsible, to a most considerable degree, for whatever merit our writings contain.

All deficiencies of analysis and interpretation are, of course, ours alone.

Elden E. Jacobson and Parker J. Palmer
Washington, D. C.
June, 1971
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE NATURE OF SOCIETY 6

III. THE SOCIAL LOCATION OF THE KNOWER AND ACTOR 17

IV. PLURALISM AND ALTERNATIVES 24
I. INTRODUCTION

... but if we [social scientists] choose we may also hear—
in any serious piece of social science writing, as in any
poem—the cry of a soul calling attention, obliquely but obsti-
nately, to who he is, what he wants, what he suffers, where he
is, who is with him and against, what is struggling and reaching
dramatic recognition, in the existential flux that neither he
nor the poet can fly over or escape from.

John Seeley, The Americanization of the Unconscious

Strange. Less than ten years ago, Clark Kerr could write—and none
cried "wait"—that "the university has been a remarkably unstudied insti-
tution . . ." Unstudied? For decades it was simply there, the self-
evident bastion from which scholars and pretenders alike "studied" what-
ever they would. Which historically, as Kerr intimates, has been nearly
everything but themselves.

Now, of a sudden—as academic time is reckoned—all this has changed.
From the mindless platitudes so evident everywhere to the compassionately
thoughtful musings of a Henry David Aiken, "the university" is verily
threatened by academic surgeons, the overwhelming number self-appointed
and driven by a new-found sense of mission more traditionally associated
with saints and fools. Our shelves, as must be theirs, are lined with
the volumes they produce for one another:

Each in its turn, the convulsions of this society have insinuated
themselves—often hastily and with bizarre effect—into the "higher
learning," there to compete for legitimacy and support, and with whole
new bookshelves left in their train. Or, if the contestants be both
sophisticated and tricky, they have compelled the addition of still
further rooms in academia's house of intellect. Many, perhaps most,
thereafter wither as some other limb of the social body is jerkingly
seized and attention shifts correspondingly. Some hang on, increas-
ingly a part of the academic woodwork, an aspect of "what is," against
which the newest will rail. And now higher education itself is convulsed. But where does one accommodate fundamental internal disorder? Perhaps it is the spastic nature of this enterprise that is finally so depressing.

The more so if one comes to suspect, that for all but the most obvious and well-plowed purposes, "the university" is a fiction. More precisely, "the university" is a generic term under whose expansiveness is now subsumed a bewildering array of activities, concerns, institutional arrangements and persons, from whom no set of goals, unitary themes or values can presently command allegiance or consent. As a corporate entity, of course, the university is real enough and deservedly must be held to account for its corporate life. Of these problems, much has been said and they are things worth saying. But of these, we offer nothing novel or unusual.

Likewise, as the only legitimate gatekeeper to full participation in the fruits of this society's largess, "the university" remains rightly an object of deep and abiding concern, its credentialing powers having enormous implications. And while persons here and there can be heard to call for abrupt displacement of our ancestral faith in the college degree (mostly persons who already have theirs), we see no reason to suppose the credentialing dilemma will disappear within any readily foreseeable future. Yet, here, too, the issues have been probed, poked at, argued over, beyond which we have little to offer.

Another self-evident aspect of "the university"—if published verbiage be our criterion—partakes of its "relationship to the society," in the society, on behalf of the society, wherein every conceivable ideological position has sought to enlist its banners. To be sure, there remain those isolated scholars who insist—plaintively, to be sure—that "the university" is or could or ought to be, as former President Rosemary Park (without intentional humor, we suppose) phrases it, "a purely rational and critical institution." But this very insistence, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, makes of it a quaint, albeit decorative, artifact of another period.
Some seem inclined, as with Clark Kerr, to give it a name and call it good. Many more, of course, cry out in anger or frustration because "the university" does not do enough, "enough" here meaning such societal services and clienteles as are presently believed slighted or left out. Not many seem overly concerned that the "university" has become a remarkably variegated cafeteria, if only their particular tastes are adequately served.

Well, who can deny the critical nature of these questions? As the oft-unquestioned repository of learned men, "the university" has most willingly accepted the courtship of society; academics, it has been said time without number, consult, do studies, travel and advise, all in the name of "the advancement of knowledge." That such liaisons have frequently produced grotesque offspring within the commonweal (witness, for example, the poverty program) not many wish to deny. That these may make of the university a highly selective harlot is less commonly discussed among professors, at least those who benefit most from these aspects of "the university's" charms.

But these questions we have probed elsewhere. And, in any event, institutions are not finally seduced; men are. "The university" does not serve, or deny, or thwart, or busy itself with self-seeking and self-justifying; men do these things. It occurs within corporate entities, to be sure, but that very fact has served to continue the highly convenient but misleading fiction that it is the entity itself against which attack must be mounted if change is to occur. Hence the literature is replete with normative declarations and imperatives demanding that "the university must" do this, or contrarily, that. As the dean of one respected university recently insisted, "we need a complete revision in our concept of higher education." Complete? A single concept? Such literature presumes that 1) "the university" is a unitary entity 2) subject to imposed, purposeful, internal direction. And, further, most such literature seems premised upon the inherent persuasive power of the
word, of logical analysis and rational choice. None of these seems remotely descriptive of "the university" as a whole save in the limited corporate sense we have identified above.

We, too, covet "institutional change." We have come to suppose, however, that the more interesting, and more fundamental, aspects of that issue have to do in significant measure with institutional "conditions of life." What is facilitated, what is denied? To what extent does the structure of knowledge, upon which the very conception of a university is based, still correspond with what is now perceived by some—if haltingly and without precision—about the larger society? And what is the meaning of one's social location within these institutional arrangements—the department, the discipline, the prevailing reward system, and its current folkways and value commitments—for the life of inquiry, especially if that inquiry is but the means to larger societal purposes? In brief, the crises (how easily and matter of factly we mouth the word) now evident within many institutions of higher education reside not so much within corporate policies, disgruntled students, or academic entrepreneurs (the importance of these is not, therefore, denied), but with the growing, deeply disturbing, recognition that present disciplinary fragmentation, has likewise fragmented the humanness of life itself, and for many, the professional role is now in shambles. If we may paraphrase the late Dean Sperry of Harvard:

Here lies John Professor
Born a man
Died a sociologist.

Such assertions are easily stated and difficult of explanation. For those who understand, explanation will appear superfluous. For those whose propensities and vantage positions are elsewhere, no explanation is likely to suffice. Yet we shall try, in no small part because as fugitive academics, we speak of what we have seen and where we have been. At least temporarily, we reside beyond the university's pale, both bereft of and free from its physical environs and normative dictates, convinced
that understanding, expression and wholeness of the professional, profes-
sing life dictates it so. It is a choice not lightly made, though with
less psychic discomfiture than only recently seemed possible.

Two additional comments may be in order. We write here, primarily,
for professors like ourselves, for men and women within the academy
troubled by the disturbing realization that, like most social institu-
tions, universities now suffer, but for reasons likely more profound
than commonly assumed. But we also write for concerned church people,
there still remaining in the church, especially among laymen, the un-
examined assumption that universities and colleges are, in fact, dedi-
cated to the education of persons. That they are not—indeed, by the
very nature of their conceptual organization cannot be—is still a
notion not easily accommodated within this society's general honoring
of "education." Too, we have come to believe, in reasons set forth
below, that for all of his very considerable insights and wisdom,
Kenneth Underwood and his monumental study of church and university
did not seriously enough confront the universities' own inte...d is-
order, and otherwise knowledgeable people within the denominations' na-
tional bureaucracies now speak, in Underwood's name, about an academy
that increasingly will not be, if it ever was.

Secondly, our remarks are confined almost solely to the social
sciences and to sociology, largely because we are sociologists. What
seems itself appropriate enough, given the primary position the social
sciences now occupy within academia and the larger society. But to the
extent our argument contains validity, the plight of social inquiry is
the plight of the universities themselves. And that is—or should be—a
source of consternation to all that labor within them and to that host
dependent upon them from without.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE NATURE OF SOCIETY

"History: A Discipline in Crisis?"
Oscar Handlin article in The American Scholar
Vol. 40, No. 3 (Summer, 1971).

"Has Sociology a Future?"
Book review essay by Tom Bottomore in the

We sometimes forget what we really should not: knowledge may be
organized in many ways, of which the disciplines are but one. A crucial
way, to be sure, as the history of university scholarship readily attests,
but still only one. Hence, what is known as human life, especially
corporate group life, could in fact be formulated into themes (and depart-
ments) delightfully, perhaps even usefully, at variance with what now is
—love, justice, peace, and human potential, to suggest four not al-
together fanciful possibilities. And from these emanate organization,
research questions, and elaborate theoretical constructions whose conse-
quences can only be conjectured.

None of us thinks about such questions much; the disciplines—and
the conceptual mentality and "scientific" assumptions they presuppose—
determine the processes of formal schooling almost totally in this incredi-
bly school conscious society, at whose grand pinnacle is impaled graduate
education. The disciplines are, after all, the university, regarding
whose "standards" (the usual euphemism for professional guild bias and
self-protection) and expectations most of us have been carefully instructed.
While perhaps dispiriting, therefore, it can scarcely be thought surprising
that the question of option or alternative has seemed faintly amusing and
slightly tainted.

For some, of course, it is not now so amusing as all that. Handlin
and Bottomore are but the most recently available manifestations of a
by-now endemic dilemma: serious doubt among many scholars about the
efficacy of their own work. Note, too, that we here cite no Staughton
Lynd or Theodore Roszak (although we might have). On the contrary,
Handlin and Bottomore are highly esteemed practitioners within the spheres of labor about which they so tellingly, even movingly write. And while both choose titles in the interrogative form, neither leaves a trace of doubt regarding what they consider to be the only viable response possible. Sociology may in fact now confront a most precarious future; history most certainly is in "disarray." Indeed, most of the social sciences now seem sucking at increasingly dry paps.

That is a harsh judgment, though by no means original, it having been said before and better. But not by us. As sociological apprentices, we were well-versed in the sociological literature of dissent, in Mills' challenge, for example, that there existed a "sociological imagination" to which we ought and could lay claim. Yet the intellectual challenge of a Mills or the early Gouldner generally remained only that within the ranks of graduate students, the windmill against which our critical, argumentative lances were formed. Useful men, these disciplinary outriders, and exciting, too, as they rode roughshod over sociology's sacred calves. But to be taken seriously as suggestive of alternative academic styles in which sociology was but the tool to purposes elsewhere? That was the route of do-gooders, a self-imposed sociological exile. Yet that is where we are and the Handlin and Bottomore pieces readily illustrate. From Handlin: "... intellectual pressures emanating from within that have fragmented the discipline, loosened its cohesive elements and worn away the consciousness of common purpose."

Wise men, those Harvard professors, and we honor the perceptive nature of this gifted historian. Yet we, for two, are left with the edge of disappointment, not clear in our own minds that "intellectual pressures... from within" do full justice to the chaos now visible. What Handlin decries—excessive reliance upon quantitative measures, fragmented specialization, "the decline of craftsmanship"—can scarcely be faulted on their own terms, and his call to repent seems befitting of an academic patriarch. But it may conceivably be that the faith itself is now in doubt. Bottomore is instructive here: for him, the same attributes to which Handlin ex-
licitly refers are themselves signs of an "intellectual crisis" within the very presuppositions and theoretical constructs that make any discipline even possible. Norman Birnbaum makes the same point:

In one case the possibilities of internal development of a system exhaust themselves; the system's categories become incapable of transformation... In the other case the realities apprehended by the system in its original form change, so much so that the categories are inapplicable to new conditions. It is clear that these two sets of conditions often obtain simultaneously, particularly for systems dealing with the historical movement of society...

This is, insists Bottomore, the present state within the realm of sociology. Or, stated somewhat differently, the dilemmas are in substantial measure objective, having to do with the very categories through which we imagine ourselves to be a distinctive field of scholarly inquiry, and the degree to which these still find correspondence within the "real" world.

The key word is "correspondence." By definition, "to correspond" is "to agree with," "to be congruous or in harmony with"; additionally, there is conveyed "communication, of interchange," a reciprocity, the movement between in the spirit of congruence or similarity. By "correspondence," hence, we mean to imply the nature of relationship that may be thought to exist between the tasks of scholarship and the objects of its scrutiny. That is, "correspondence" suggests a dynamic rather at variance with "active" scholarship and "inert" object; attention is called rather to mutuality of hearing, seeing, and change.

Especially is this to the point in social inquiry, where the very categories by which the society now understands itself derive significantly from the language of the social scientist, even as those categories and the scholarship which produced them have been thought validated by their seeming presence within the examined society. Yet even as both society and scholarship continue to speak the words—organization man, other-directed, counter-culture, alienated are, after all, but four of the countless intellectual constructs derivative from the social sciences
and now part of everyday language—such words may no longer adequately, accurately reflect social reality. Correspondence—a mutual hearing, a reciprocal learning—gives way to an increasingly pedantic scholarship that sees only what it wishes. And that, it would appear, describes the present.

It's a strange state, really. For even as sociology has struggled to fashion and articulate an identifiable—let us here invoke Robert Nisbet—"nucleus or core of ideas that gives the tradition its continuity from generation to generation and its identity amid all the other disciplines," that nucleus now appears suspect as never before in sociology's checkered past. And it is Nisbet who, though inadvertently, clarifies this curious circumstance with his brilliant accounting of "the sociological tradition," the enduring themes and historical conditions first giving rise to the discipline. Their recitation is familiar enough—community, authority, status, the sacred, and alienation—derived from the newly-experienced, profound dislocations of agrarian societies made industrial, bureaucratic, and urban. As Nisbet so clearly shows, it is here, in the radical chaos of the latter 19th century, that modern sociology was stitched together. From it has emerged the paradigm—"the prevailing constellation of values and beliefs shared by the members of a scientific community" (Bottomore)—that has sustained this most tenuous of "scientific" pursuits, and through whose ideas we sociologists still see and interpret the social world.

Well, here again, these matters command little attention within the workaday world of sociological inquiry; most sociologists seem poorly versed in philosophical, historical issues, and not much given to critical self-examination of what they think and why. Thus the categories of prevailing thought—system, social control, functionalism, system stability, equilibrium, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, Parson's theory of social (in)action, assumptions regarding regularity and replication come randomly to mind—have long seemed natural and self-evident in the Order of Things.
And to the extent that social dynamics were energized by the emergence of industrial societies, that unexamined assurance seems warranted.

Suppose, however, that the very nature of a now-emerging world society vitiates these categories. Then what? Again, Bottomore appears much to the point:

The rapid and profound transformation of economic and social structure which has been going on in the industrial countries since the war, and the cultural and political movements of opposition to which it has given rise, pose the question of whether we are now involved in a major change from one form of human society to another, comparable in its extent and significance with the first transition from agrarian to industrial society. The possibility of such a fundamental change seems to underlie much of the recent self-questioning among sociologists.

The self-questioning has been, in some quarters, highly sophisticated and provocative. Bottomore's review alone treats four such endeavors: Gouldner, Dreitzel, Bendix, and Runciman. And to the extent they are widely read, vigorously discussed, and their implications for disciplinary revision or alternatives acted out, these writings do honor to us all.

It will not happen. Who among us now commands the leisure for reading "outside the specialty," or for reflective rumination? Most of the colleagues we have known seem very much driven by the twin fears of "falling behind in the field" and the failure to secure research funding. Yet they lead the discipline, set its publication criteria, and preside over its self-protective machinery. Gouldner is much more talked about than critically read (a truism), and who is Hans Peter Dreitzel?

The ostensible sanctuaries and false comforts are several, of course, not least our retreat into quantifiable, statistical certainty. Brown and Gilmartin document what most would have suspected:

In collecting the data, the sociologist employs a remarkably narrow range of techniques ... In actual practice, the sociologist today limits himself rather generally to the construction and conduct of questionnaires and interviews.
The desultory result is prominently displayed, month after month, in the American Sociological Review, there for all to see. What is seen is a blizzard of statistical snow whose precision and elegance leave us momentarily unmindful of how little is in fact being learned.

Equally fashionable, especially among those who attempt it least, must surely be the recent rage for "interdisciplinary studies," predicated, it would appear, upon the curious notion that two or more heads are more adequate than one. Or, if we be academic, that any given subject for investigation can be examined by two or more disciplinary perspectives, the combination of which yields up a larger, composite understanding. Well, what could be more reasonable? Only the churlish could reasonably fault such a self-evident proposition.

Yet as a trivially practical matter, most so-called "inter-disciplinary" efforts have been depressingly unimpressive within academic contexts. "Interdisciplinary seminars"—no one now seems to hold classes—proliferate as the mushroom, watered by student demands for serious examination of "large-scale problems" (any phenomena that cannot presently be accounted for within the disciplinary boxes). Yet nearly without exception, they amount to serial presentation of several points of view, or if really daring, the grunting effort of two or more academics in defense of their respective faiths. "Research centers," "institutes," etc., likewise emerge as potential responses to disciplinary inadequacy, but here, too, most of those with which we are acquainted remain captives of the discipline—joint appointments that "protect standards," etc., etc.

That we imagined it would be otherwise is for us the greater wonderment. All academics, sociologists no less and perhaps the more, speak in tongues that, to the uninitiated, have the feel of a Yiddish variant. Yet language is itself but the most obvious expression of the paradigms each discipline has so elaborately constructed, whose principle moral premise seems often to be a sophisticated agreement to disagree. Well, why not? What else within an academy where the department rules supreme?
But for the moment, improbably assume that such debilitating impediments are resolvapq: We must still confront the unsettling assumption upon which "interdisciplinary" so erratically perches: social understanding primarily requires an amalgam of what now is. But to whose heart does that proposition bring cheer? Not, we'd surmise, present critics of the social sciences, for whom the collaboration of little with little still amounts to little. We do not know—and derive little comfort from the recognition that none appears to know—by what theoretical touch-stone a more-comprehending analysis of social transformation may yet be secured. As Bottomore notes in his four-book review, "Only in Dreitzel's volume is there some indication of .w. directions":

... [it] deal[s] not with "stable democracy" but with the experiences and potentialities of "participatory democracy," not with status and mobility but with the relations between classes and the rise of new classes as elements in political struggles, not with political institutions and voting behavior but with the emergence of movements of social protest.

Bottomore further notes the "promising attempt" that derives from Alain Touraine's "post-industrial society," a phrase meant to convey the substantial possibility of technologically-eliminated scarcity. Freed from industrial work by cybernetically-controlled, automated machinery, men will have to strike new balances between work and leisure "but in which at the same time the problems of which arise from centralized and bureaucratic regulations are exacerbated and provoke new kinds of social conflict, already foreshadowed by the rise of the student movement."

Those foreshadows have fallen elsewhere as well in very recent years, wherein the rhetoric of personal participation and local control—Hannah Arend's "public happiness," if you will—is now heard among those middle- and upper-middle-class folk who are, by any traditional standard, this society's most favored groups. And that is a curious, maybe highly significant, thing to have happen, accustomed as we are to identify the voice of protesting lament with those outside demanding
to be admitted. Admitted to what? Well, status, mobility, equality of opportunity, and fair treatment, currency still highly prized, and rightly so, in the liberal programming of big government, big church, and big university alike. Yet the drive for fair treatment and equal access to opportunity, buttressed by the horizontal interest groups—labor unions, farmer's organizations, chambers of commerce—that have sustained it, must now confront a social order in which the earlier notions of an open market and legislative political systems have given way, as Stanley Hoffman writes, to the "specialized hierarchical organizations that make up most of the government and the society." And having declared for admittance into, "today's problem is that of the ends of the organizations in which fair treatment is assured." For those ends, vested by default and accretion in the governmental executive and the corporate manager, seem ever-less susceptible to any open, accountable political process.

It will not sell. Not for the poor and Black, where the voice of protest and demand is justly loudest. But not, either, for an awakening middle class which, having arrived (as they say), still chums with anxiety and concern. That was not supposed to happen. Edward Shorter, reviewing Clark Kerr's most recent excursion into print, felt constrained to respond thusly:

Kerr has no conception that technological society itself is in a crisis, that the inner group is as badly affected as the outer group. The crisis will not be solved by giving Blacks more access to the inner group, or giving students a voice in choosing their professor. It will be solved only by drastically reordering the system itself, by striking at the roots of the technocratic mentality... (Review of Clark Kerr, Marshall, Larx and Modern Times: The Multi-Dimensional Society (Cambridge University Press, 1971) in The American Scholar, Vol. 40, No. 2, Spring, 1971.)

What peculiar language: "...drastically reordering the system itself...striking at the roots..." And, completely warranted when sufficient allowance is granted for the hyperbole apparently necessary these days even to be heard. But what do sociologists know of
"systems" and "roots" and those places of critical leverage that might in fact lend credence to "reordering"? Alas, if the past two decades of academically-inspired governmental social engineering be offered into evidence, not much. Oh, we use the words, right enough; "systems" presently enjoys a vogue of sorts within our disciplinary circles. Its like that leg bone, man. It connects to the hip bone, which connects to the back bone, which . . . ; ultimately, within the context of things good and true, all is linked to all. Hear John Bodine, for example (president of the Academy of Natural Sciences), as he looks at the "city":

Urban problems are so interwoven, so interdependent, that scholars can only consider them together; in other words it has been found necessary to consider the urban situation as a system in its own right, inescapably transcending the traditional disciplines. What Bodine has discovered, of course, is the intricate, inter-related nature of urban complexes—"systems," as it were. Such complexes are, in important measure, "wholes," wherein action or events in one sphere are discovered, usually belatedly and without prediction, to have exerted influence and change in spheres ostensibly far removed. Individuals, groups, structures, value systems, physical entities, patterns of communication, bodies of knowledge—these are but the most rudimentary elements that collectively begin to make up the incredibly complex maze we now know as the "urban system." And, it is occasionally acknowledged, linking these together are systems of influence and power, systems that, often dramatically inconsistent and in tension with one another, determine shape and direction.

Yet, even as the language issues forth, social scientists seem not to much mean it. Or, said differently and perhaps more fairly, precisely these pressures toward a synthesizing wholeness may now help account for the disciplinary—let us employ the mildest possible word—discomfiture about which so many now write. For "system" is nothing if not flux, movement, relationships; in Ripley and Buechner's concise phrase, "system" involves an "interacting whole that evolves as a unit through time." Yet even the most cursory consideration of their generative phrases—interacting, whole, evolve, unit, through time—bespeaks
the dilemmas that academics in the social sciences now confront, academics whose principle tool, we have noted, has become the questionnaire! How pale and disappointing as it snatches for its static slice of what isolated persons said at a given moment in time. Even as the social order has seemingly succumbed to our categorizing fragmentation, the impact of systemic thought—as the ecologist has known for several decades—has forced our attention not only to bodies of knowledge but more crucially to the connections and relationships that occur between them, to the ways in which, and under what conditions, pressures on behavior in one sector influence behavior in another. Attention is directed to process, to time, to anticipation, and to power. The imagery is dynamic and relational, where the concept of "act" implies a response through which the act itself is no longer the same.

Even the language has become specialized and reasonably esoteric; people who think about these questions with much sophistication have been seemingly compelled toward new imagery and descriptive phraseology like ecosystems, process, interacting whole, through time; tertiary effects, due dates, etc. Or, again in the name of precision, it is language whose custodians until now have been few and without significant voice.

Well, that can hardly be wondered at; systemic thought appears to be, in its fundamentals, the antithesis of discipline-oriented fragmented specialization. And we seem to have scarcely begun, within the academy, any serious consideration of the implications that antithesis urges upon us. Which returns us to the intellectual spectre already noted in Bottomore's unanswered query: are all of us now witness to "a major change from one form of human society to another" whose form we do not presently grasp? On the face of it, that question would seem simply descriptive, susceptible to investigation, and verification or negation; it is, so to say, what social inquiry is about. But the dilemma is at once confronted anew as we note that description itself depends
solely upon the conceptual categories by which order, selectivity, and meaning are given to what is, or is not, observed and investigated. Yet precisely those categories are now challenged as deficient.

Where, then, is the new paradigm? How shall these incredibly difficult relational issues be given order and logic? By what theoretical system will the "post-industrial" society be rendered intelligible, and its implications anticipated? These perplexities now confront the very basis for sociological "knowing." Maurice Natanson assists us here:

An epistemology of the social world . . . would have as its task the determination of those structural elements and forms of knowing which make the experience of the social order possible.


Ah, but who among us wishes to be seen with his epistemology showing? We have already observed the degree to which most sociologists—we may surmise not only they—exhibit minimal interest and sophistication in matters "philosophical." We want to know, certainly, and we assumed our analytic instruments, designed to yield up intellectual mastery of such empirical data as we thought we saw, insured that we would in fact know. That they worked, and work yet, few will doubt. Shall we, then, slip easily into intellectual impotency, as with Natanson's professor, who for thirty-five years reread that same scintillating set of notes to thirty-five classes of benumbed students?

He was in the middle of his thirty-sixth reading of the passage, "... and so each year, that is to say, annually, over ninety million tons are deposited on the banks of the Mississippi . . . when a student broke a generation of silence with the question, "Pardon me, Professor, but ninety million tons of what?" The old gentleman looked down toward the lectern, scrutinized his notes, and finally looked up, replying, "It doesn't say."
III. THE SOCIAL LOCATION OF THE KNOWER AND ACTOR

And so we confront, it would seem, a crisis in theory and knowledge that may fairly be said to indict the disciplines as at no time previously, the more so as social science academics continue to rely upon methodologies valued more for their elegance of design than their power to elucidate and explain. If this incipient crisis were only that, the possibilities for resolution might yet seem reasonably manageable. If, in brief, we had but to observe an objective out there, with such skill and even daring as social scientists most certainly exhibit from time to time, precedent for future optimism seems readily enough available. Yet the epistemological perplexities that lie here are not likely exhausted by the discussion thus far; indeed, we seem scarcely able to clearly articulate such perplexities, given the ways of doing by which the discipline is carried forward. The very act of objectifying our malaise is to ignore our subjective relation to what we would know. Our malaise, if that it be, resides equally within, calling to account our standard assumptions of the disinterested, descriptive, and detached. We have supposed, as sociologists, that to know was to know about, resorting perforce to the protective cloak of "truth's pursuit" and "the discovery of knowledge" as though only the pure of method might finally lay claim to salvation.

Common enough, surely, an heritage shared with sociological colleagues, one conveyed in school and reinforced by professional practice. We knew, at least as an intellectual proposition, that all men lived within complex sets of perceptions and rationalizations that Mannheim taught us to label "ideology," and we had not previously questioned, at least with the seriousness it deserved, the seemingly-obvious fact that the social scientist also resides in that same ideological house. Mannheim, of course, apparently believed that dispensations were possible for the elect, a finding that social scientists have uncritically, enthusiastically embraced. Yet how could that be? Mannheim suggested, and our professors so argued, that we could, as it were, defy history,
that time and place would yield themselves up to the dissolving acids of dispassionate scholarship. To which neither of us—nor any of our budding colleagues—thought it necessary to inquire: where, then, does one find that Archimedean point from which is leveraged this exemption to the human world?

We have no interest, even as the point is stressed, in melodramatic statement. We are not Paul struck blind by revelation. Both of us came to this inquiry two years ago reasonably secure in our distrust of the discipline, grateful to some whose own competence we would emulate, yet profoundly distressed at the psychic cost that academic life extracted. Despite these propensities, we did not predict, because we could not have, that within these two years, events would derange our self-understanding of profession and place beyond recall.

We sought to know, of course, to understand those situations that have commanded our attention throughout this extended period, the more so as we were perceived to care, to honor persons and groups by reason of a shared dismay. The unexpected element, occurring repeatedly and without benefit of forethought, was the striking recognition that we could know because we cared. And that knowing—ever-more appreciatively and discriminately—was intimately entwined with the wholeness of men's lives, to be seen, to be understood, even as that wholeness was lived in and shared. We were, always and identifiably in each of these contexts, academic interveners whose interests were in study, evaluation, and reporting, the fruits of which in part constitute the written works we have produced. But we were also more—in several situations, much more—involved in the human hurt and pathetic disappointment of persons without recourse to the skills and perspectives that academics simply assume as givens. And through the act of sharing, through the accountability that comes from intimate knowledge, there emerges some imprecise intimation of the larger, human context that gives meaning and reality to hurt and disappointment.
The words, so obviously foreign to the sociological journeymen that we are, come with difficulty. And while without either John Seeley's competence or compassion, we would have him speak on our behalf:

Despite anything we knew how to do and did do to maintain distance and due detachment [in his Crestwood Heights study] . . . we were drawn into genuine, profound, human, and affectional relations that gave, as a minimum additional aim, the preservation, so far as possible, of these priceless bonds and the protection and preservation of those with whom we were thus socially, morally and affectionately bound up. (Americanization of the Unconscious. New York: Science House, Inc., 1967.)

We should have known; Weber insisted decades ago that the sociologist's task was the understanding of human action in terms of the meaning such action contained for the actor himself—Verstehen, the understanding of the larger framework only within which any specific action can be said to have meaning. That is, men act intentionally; their acts are not only open-faced "objects," but derive from systems of meanings, from an interplay of past and anticipated future. And "act," we need scarcely suggest—even articulate, purposive act—partakes of existential flux and uncertainty, emotional and empathetic relationships, in which the purely verbal and/or cognitive is lifted out only imperfectly.

Our concern, as Natanson says, is the "conceptual clarification of the interpretive descriptively involved in the affairs of common-sense men in daily life." Yes. And that clarification would seem to demand multiple ways of knowing, not only of current sociological theorizing and the methodologies attending thereto, but likewise of the achievements that characterize other forms of human endeavor—the moral, the philosophical, the religious, and the esthetic. The point, we now believe, comes to this: "knowing about," a cognitive, objective analysis of the phenomena that excited us and drew us into its ongoing life was itself not possible without attention to and involvement in the affective, experiential motivation, action, and change that made up that phenomena.
Maybe we should not have known after all, schooled as we were in the exquisite distinctions that set apart the "pure" scientist from lesser folk who could not, or at least had not, given themselves over to the higher calling. "Pure" vs. "applied"; the battle rages yet, not, as one might anticipate of rational professors, at the level of explanatory adequacy and the power to illumine, but as a moral problem!

... there is a clear line of ethical distinction between pure and applied research... Applied research is not so important as pure research.

This particular high priest is Robert Engell, in the recent The Uses of Sociology, wherein he depressingly insists that these moral niceties excuse ethical indiscretions for the purist—the invasion of privacy, among others—not permitted those who merely toil in application. And we wonder, sometimes, if the very stridency of these self-selected guardians does not but heighten the doubt as to how such a position might even be possible.

Yet the ethical problem, if indeed it be that save in the minds of purists still certain they are inadequately funded, is the lesser one. As before, again here: a social science that purports to stand outside, beyond the cultural, societal context enveloping all else. And we ask, how can that be when the very act of cutting into the social fabric—exposing to the light of critical analysis our received culture, challenging self-images and the collective mythos, forcing consciousness of what was previously latent and assumed—is itself integral to the revolution of awareness that grips this world's societies? To such a view we add only that the "pure" social theorist seems to differ from his colleagues only in his denial of accountability. But we need not tarry; the argument is fruitless, there being noble and self-serving delusions on every side, most of which seem remarkably sheltered from intellectual influences. We would simply echo Seeley again: "... detached sociological innocence is not possible as a defense for the practicing sociologist."
And so we return to the academic scene, confronting anew the constipated methodological imagination that issues from constricted "knowing" and its isolation within the university. For if we have perceived with the slightest accuracy the multiple modes of knowing, and the investigator's own necessary relationship to the context he would in fact "know," university departments and the guild systems that support them seem increasingly peripheral. Not only because we presently face very substantial crises in the structures of knowledge upon which the disciplines were constructed, but equally and in dialectic tension, because we have been isolated and removed by—-weird happenstance!—our own choosing.

We seem left with the peculiar anamoly of the social scientist whose own semi-mythic articles of faith exempt him from culture and history and set him over against the society he purports to interpret. Small wonder, then, that he defends the university against challenges from without, it providing the physical temple and spiritual comfort beyond the masses who surround him. Milton Friedman approvingly quotes a colleague, George Stigler:

The university is by design and effect the institution in society which creates discontent with existing moral, social and political institutions and proposes new institutions to replace them. The university is, from this view-point, a group of philosophically imaginative men freed of any pressures except to please their fellow faculty, and told to follow their inquiries wherever they might lead. You bet that's just what they sure do.

But why, then, have these "philosophically imaginative men" seemed so removed from their objects of inquiry, burdening themselves as we have already noted with methodological procedures that make of their objects atomistic entities, divorced from the nuances of flux and meaning that is in fact the lives they lead? Why, in short, does correspondence seem minimal? Time without number, the questionnaire is thought to produce, on the basis of verbal response, the raw material
from which the texture and shape of reality is delineated. To achieve this delineation, however, the investigator is compelled to assume that persons in fact know—consciously, verbally—the salient features at work within their own lives, that the questionnaire in fact expresses those features without significant residue, that the investigator’s query raises in the respondent the mental image its framer intended, that overt statements and action may be taken at face value, and that, for purposes of prediction, each response is roughly equal in social and political weight. Need we suggest that any one of these is vulnerably open to effective challenge? Taken compositely and in no particular order, the more unnerving puzzlement must surely be the abiding confidence so lavishly bestowed on this pauper-made-king.

Critics of the university don’t often speak of these issues: of the academic’s psychic isolation, his physical and emotional location within an institution he often perceives as a self-contained intellectual sanctuary. Outside of events, indeed outside of society itself, at least to the extent he imagines himself integral to its ongoing, work-a-day life, his Archimedean point exists after all—the university itself from which the sweep of society lies before him. How much greater the folly, then, if it should turn out that that “sweep of society” is simply the wrong way view through a very large telescope.

And so it is that the internal vicissitudes of university life presently make of it a troubled scene, wherein for older men the fruit of long years, acknowledged and occasionally acclaimed by their larger publics, is now seriously threatened, by external pressures, to be sure—students, governing bodies, dispensers of traditional support. But internal challenge, too—the small minority who now insist that quality of academic life can no longer be equated merely with its length. Hence, deeply and despondently, within such persons themselves the agony is felt.

Item: the much-perturbed chairman of the sociology department in a large urban university who on a Sunday between semesters called
us to confess, in effect, that "I simply cannot confront my students another day in the only fashion I have ever known. What shall I do?"

Item: that unforgettable photo of the weeping senior professor when confronted by unprecedented passion in demonstrating students.

We need scarcely belabor these issues—all academics can now testify to the meagerness, even petty meanness by which life in the academy is so frequently, dispiritingly lived. "Quality of life," we needlessly note, was traditionally "out there." Even now, "quality" retains a tinny sound, to be bought with environmental manipulation or "more-effective" university "governance." But "quality" has finally to do with attributes of humanness and humaneness. And upon these considerations do so many now flounder. For we are pressed as academics to speak wise words to a world in travail, where men suffer from crippled and infantile understanding, to be sure, but from maimed visions, too. What, however, may we offer? How does one speak to the larger society when he lives among, as Aiken would have it, "the grubbiness, pretentiousness, and vulgarity of the multiversity"? Or, more prosaically, its routine blandness, its denial of simple civility and personal caring?

Do we exaggerate? We do not think so. Many would explain—or explain away—these internal distresses as aberrations susceptible to this attention or that, prescriptions for which we have in superfluous abundance. If we are at all perceptive in our own argument, however, the university's malaise may inhere within the very nature of the institution itself. As Seymour Lipset so unblinkingly asserts, the university—as "a highly specialized and segmented system"—utilizes "adult standards of performance" to "weed out" the childlike students." That the specialized trivia so characteristic of disciplinary fragmentation can be equated with "adult standards of performance" would, in circles outside the university, be dismissed as drivel. That it describes the modern university and those therein, however, we retain virtually no doubt.
IV. PLURALISM AND ALTERNATIVES:

In these pages we have argued thus far that:

1. The press of social forces at work within the industrialized nations of the world is increasingly eroding the capacity of the social sciences to effectively understand, hence explain, those forces.

2. That is so because the paradigms and their resultant methodologies upon which social inquiry has been constructed and elaborated have less and less correspondence with these emerging forces.

3. Fragmented into ever-proliferating disciplines and sub-disciplines, functional specialization has found a home and become synonymous with the university.

4. The presuppositions of the disciplinary academic regarding his social location—in history, culture, institution, and discipline—and its resultant isolation, have effectively separated him from what is, in fact, going on. It could scarcely be otherwise, given his general penchant for static, statistical quantification.

5. As a consequence, academic life now suffers from a congeries of internal disorders, many of which appear endemic in that institution's increasing lack of correspondence to the world coming into being around it.

That, we have come to believe, is the genuine "irrelevance" of the "university," an irrelevancy not susceptible to the much-in-vogue rhetoric of "community involvement" and the "solution of problems." Men now press their demands—and their approbation—upon it, the university having no defense (as Edgar Friedenberg so usefully reminds us, chastity can be unsuccessfully defended only once) against the ignominies now endured. Sold once, it has sold itself time without number. It would like to reform no doubt, the more so as these involvements turn brackish and sour. And it has, though peripherally and without much visible effects: research facilities lacking sufficient moral purpose are given independent lives, thus cut off from ever the slightest civilizing impulses still attributable to academic life, and/or the university "adopts a neighborhood" in which men believe it will do for them what it congenitally has denied to itself.
Yet the dismay, for us, is not so much the university's inherent organizational limitations—cognitive fragmentation in a world desperate for vision and wholeness—as it is the monopolistic control its inhabitants now exercise over the systems of reward and legitimation that support social inquiry. We do not deny the university's right to be: even less would we question the scholarly pursuit of Tibetan life-styles and measures of significance at the .00001 level. That the disciplinary pontiffs, hence the university, effectively preclude the knowing and acting out of professional lives not consonant with prevailing styles would seem to be quite another matter, however, and one of some importance. The mythos would have it otherwise, certainly—"pursuit of truth" encompasses what it will. In actuality, as measured by criteria of promotion and publication, hence of survival, the rhetoric lies. But no matter; we are again belaboring, as so many do in our time, the university for being simply what it is.

From these remarks, thus, two reasons really appear of surpassing importance as we rationalize our (present) self-imposed exile, neither of which, in light of that already said, or said in the further publications of this series, requires extensive comment.

1. The first is simply understanding. Change, it is now a truism—pervasive, relentless change—constitutes a fundamental defining attribute of American social life, both as forces that impinge upon persons and institutions, and as persons who react to them. If that be so, its additional attributes seem hardly avoidable—its longitudinal nature, its multiple ambiguities and constantly gyrating pressures, its differential meanings and power, both through time and within social levels—attributes understandable, we now imagine, largely as the observer participates in and is involved with those persons and institutions where change is manifest. The point is finally very simple: one wishes to know the why as well as the how of human action, and to test what men say with what they in fact do. And the why, especially within those middle- and upper-middle-class groups wherein our professional lives are currently lived, has very much to do with the demons, seen and unseen, with which such persons presently contend. It has likewise to do with whole series and combinations of person's acts over time. That is not an incon-
sequential matter, we'd argue, given the extremely common assumption that, whatever the "quality" and "qualities" usually ascribed to suburban life, personal impotence and powerlessness are not among them. The assumption is in no wise accurate; its consequences could be literally staggering.

These are the issues that conceptually challenge and intrigue the two of us. They seem finally susceptible to analysis only through methodological interventions dramatically at variance with disciplinary canons of order, replication, and universality. Nor do they rest easily with the image of "disinterested" and "value-free." Make no mistake; our objective is to "know"—hard questions of fact, harder still of interpretation, hardest yet for enlightened action. Thus we are a bit put off by, for one, a Theodore Roszak end his posturing belief that, as with the philosophes, the academic life must be one of "criticizing, clarifying, dissenting, resisting, deriding, exposing . . ." Perhaps so. Before assuming the contorted position of society's conscience, however, it behooves the most of us to understand that society.

2. The second remark has to do with enhanced possibilities as professionals and as men. Not illogically, this concern grows from the first. As with Seeley, we have parts in the play, honoring competence no less but something else the more; use of that competence, minimal and inadequate though it be, in the freeing of human possibilities. Again, the words seem more dramatic than the doing of them, yet we would not minimize their importance, at least to ourselves. As recipients of the finest training this nation's universities can offer, the unavoidable, compelling question of, if we may paraphrase Lynd, "training for what" has simply become inescapable. It is not the world made over but we ourselves, as selves among selves. And that making over, the deliberate, if frequently inchoate, effort to probe the fullest possibilities of life together, we choose to do amid like-willed souls where the essential criterion is mutual learning. That does not frequently happen within the universities we know. Perhaps it cannot; perhaps it should not.

But where, then? That is by no means an easily resolved quandry in a society where monolithic institutional establishments—the university being only one—determine fashion and respectability. We mean nothing sinister here, no intentional collusion or willful malice. We do mean
that institutions appear unlikely, as a dependable postulate, to underwrite their own demise; we also mean to suggest that a remarkable congruence of prevailing wisdom seems operative at the highest reaches of big government, big university, big church, and big foundation, the latter's golden rain almost always falling on the middle of the road.

Yet if we are correct, if it is in fact true as we believe, that pluralistic tendencies in this society seem now more potent and actively at work than at any time within living memory, the building of alternative institutions is both creatively possible and genuinely exciting. Whether they be new colleges, wherein teaching gives way to a humanizing learning, or the revitalized parish church where life in community is a lived experience, or the commune, or our own Institute for Public Life, or any of a hundred other imaginative groups that presently strive to flourish within the social "cracks," alternative institutions can permit that critically needed context for the life of learning not divorced from the life of feeling, of relationship and humane accomplishment.

As for the university, who can say? To that academic whose role as disciplinary specialist no longer satisfies his own complexities as both scholar and person, we can only suggest, "come on in. The water's really very nice."