This survey paper attempts to demonstrate that there is a functional interaction between race and the city. Given the basic features of slums, squatter colonies, rapid immigration, patchy industrialization and chronic unemployment, together with political instability (induced both internally and externally), the author attempts to show that race is the intervening variable in the evolution of the Third World urban plural society and the perpetuation of the ghetto and exclusivism. The following topics are discussed: (1) the evolution of the city; (2) race relations within the city; (3) the colonial legacy; (4) race in the city today; (5) the implications of race for city management; (6) town-planning and race; (7) the future of race in the city; (8) some research suggestions: 'tribalism' in the city; consequences of public policy on patterns of settlement; employment and ethnicity; political ideologies and movements. [For related documents in this series, see UD.013 731-UD 013 744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in the Third World, see UD 013 745-747.] (Author/SS)
An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation

Race and the Third World City
This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
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Race and the Third World City

by

Hugh Tinker

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITY

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

RACE RELATIONS WITHIN THE CITY

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RACE FOR CITY MANAGEMENT

THE FUTURE OF RACE IN THE CITY

TOWN-PLANNING AND RACE

Employment and ethnicity

The consequences of public policy

Political ideologies and movements

"Tribalism" in the City

SOME RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

Page
5
11
15
21
26
46
48
49
53
INTRODUCTION

In preparing this paper, I found considerable difficulty in turning a static analysis into one which is dynamic. It is a straightforward task to describe the evolution of the city and its present characteristics. It is also not difficult to describe the evolution of Third World 'urban plural societies, and the perpetuation of the ghetto and exclusivism. But can we demonstrate a functional interaction between race and the city? Given the basic features of slums, squatter colonies, rapid immigration, patchy industrialisation and chronic unemployment, together with political instability (induced both internally and externally) - can we demonstrate that the addition of the race factor makes a qualitative difference? I believe that we can. But we must beware of interpreting phenomena by deducing race as an independent variable when it is actually an intervening variable.

Before considering the normal, let us examine the abnormal: the city in a condition of dysfunction - the urban riot. In general, throughout the Third World, riots, and all forms of violent protest are common, and are mainly staged in the city. But the race riot is exceptional. Whereas, in the United States, the race riot - the violent confrontation of Blacks and Whites - has become a constant, cyclical phenomenon. Earlier it took the form of White attacks on Black victims; now its paramount form is that of
Black attacks upon White property, and sometimes upon (symbolically White) police. We do not find any such general pattern in the Third World. Let us consider some of the principal "race riots" since World War II.

The nearest equivalent to the U.S. pattern is probably the Singapore riot of 1956 over the case of Bertha Hertogh. She was the child of Dutch parents, who were interned by the Japanese. They gave the little girl for safe keeping to their Malay nurse, and Bertha was brought up in a Malay village. Some time after the war, the parents located their child, and asked for her return. The Malay foster mother resisted. Pending a court hearing, the girl was hastily married to a Malay husband, having gone through the form of conversion to Islam. The Singapore court took her into custody. The protest of the crowd against the police custodians escalated; rioting became widespread, several Europeans and Eurasians were killed; the British army had to restore order. What is noticeable about this case is that it had nothing to do with urban grievances, and it took place amid an urban population that was three-quarters Chinese and was not identified with the Malay-Islamic protest.

A major riot also broke out in Singapore in 1964, after the arrest of Communist organisers within the Chinese-language high schools. The protest was rapidly contained and suppressed by the implementation of a master-plan to isolate sections of the city between road blocks and patrols.
Frustrated, some of the young Chinese rioters vented their fury on Malay taxi drivers, etc.

The overthrow of the Zanzibar regime, soon after independence, was accompanied by racial revenge meted out by Africans against mestizo Arab-Africans and Iranian-Africans who formed the ruling elite and the merchant aristocracy. The Zanzibar persecution of the mestizos still continues.

Indonesia, the rising which began as a move to change the army leadership, and ended with the downfall of Sukarno - the so-called "Gestapu Affair" of 1965 - was virtually decided within the capital, Jakarta. The students and military turned upon the Jakarta Chinese, and murdered hundreds: on the excuse that they were part of a Communist conspiracy.

A lesser riot occurred in Rangoon in 1967, when the Burmese became incensed at local Chinese youths flaunting the little Red Book. They beat up the local Chinese and assaulted the embassy of the Chinese People's Republic.

Most important, in terms of damage caused, was the Kuala Lumpur riot of May 1969. After the general election, in which the opposition parties did unexpectedly well, crowds of their supporters - all Chinese - staged a victory march through Kuala Lumpur. The Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) of the State of Selangor (which surrounds the federal capital) brought out his Malay bully boys, who ran among the Chinese. When the army intervened, the troops
all Malays directed their fire at the Chinese. Perhaps a thousand were killed.

We can also produce evidence of many urban riots in India, where Hindus have slaughtered Muslims, while the murder by West Pakistan troops of Bengalis in Dacca and elsewhere was, in effect, a race war. But to explore these conflicts is to over-extend the analysis. It is evident, first, that "race riots" are largely confined to South-East Asia in the Third World; and second, that in each case mentioned the race element was secondary to the political element: race exacerbated a conflict begun for other reasons.

The "motiveless" race riot, sometimes identified in the United States, has no Third World counterpart. Race has not assumed the hypnotic proportions in the Third World city which appears to characterise the United States.

I begin with a "profile" of the Third World city; to establish a framework for myself, if not for my readers. I then define the main types of "racial" pluralism in the urban context. An attempt is made to isolate some "racial" situations which have implications for city management and town planning, and brief excursion into "futurism" follows to

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*I shall not attempt to define "race" in this paper. Any ethnic or cultural difference which is perceived by those concerned as immutable is a racial problem, for my purpose.*
explore possible urban trends which take us beyond race, tribalism, and communalism.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITY

The cities of Asia and North Africa visited by medieval European travellers fell into three categories. Most important was the throne. Many city-sites were chosen for the strategic control they gave over the realm and its would-be invaders. The throne-city was the centre of military and administrative power and influence. Many states took their name from the capital city. Of secondary importance was the bazaar city, a centre for international trade in costly goods. The third form of city was that centered on the temple, the centre of pilgrimage. Each of these three types included within its population numbers of foreigners; whether envoys, merchants, or pilgrims. They had their own special area of residence, as did the various indigenous tribes and trades. Thus, Jerusalem was (and is, within the walls) divided into the Christian quarter, the Armenian quarter, the Jewish quarter, and the Moslem quarter. Often the subdivision of the city went much further. Thus, traditional Hanoi city was virtually a congeries of dozens of villages, all impacted together. Each city-village had its own surrounding wall and gates, and when all the gates were closed at nightfall, Hanoi reverted to being just a number of contiguous villages.
As the Third World fell under Western colonial rule, so the character of its cities was modified to conform to Western needs. Wide roads were driven through the crowded bazaars. The city walls were levelled. The city expanded beyond the walls, to accommodate new trading and industrial complexes, as well as residential zones for the military (cantonments) and for the civil servants and business men. In addition, the colonial overlords built new centres, as ports or staging posts. These reproduced the old ethnic divisions (both Calcutta and Madras contained a White Town and a Black Town) and the European business district was separated from the "native" business district (though often they were alongside each other). All along the Indian Ocean seaboard, in ports and inland towns, the influx of Europeans was accompanied by an influx of Asians—mainly Indians and Chinese. They came to fill all the intermediate positions in trade, industry, and the public services. A great many arrived as labourers, and the image of the cooly was implanted in the minds of Europeans, other Asians, and Africans. But they also filled all the middle positions, leaving the Europeans at the top. A few Chinese and Indians also emerged at the top as partners in Western firms and as senior officials. Such was the concentration of overseas Asians. Chinese formed a numerical majority in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital of Malaya/Malaysia, while Indians swamped out the Burmese from Rangoon.
The settlement pattern was roughly as follows. In the centre was the Western business district and main government offices. The next ring was formed by the "alien" Asians, with their homes and shops together. Then came the circle of European residence, in suburban situations. Beyond this, the outer circle was inhabited by the "natives", often in market-garden or service occupations (vendors of milk, etc.). Thus, the "natives" were virtually excluded from their own capital in many cases.

Beyond the city was the countryside. The contrast was (and is) almost complete. There would be market towns, and various administrative headquarters towns. But these belonged to the countryside and were part of it. There was (and is) nothing like South-East England where the entire landscape consists of industrial, residential, and other urban areas, linked together by a transport network, with only a carefully preserved rural barrier (the "green belt"). Or the sprawl between Boston and Washington, which thins and thickens as one flies overhead but never entirely abandons its urban aspect. In Asia and Africa the "primate city" is the unique, dominant urban element. Thus, metropolitan Manila contains only 9 per cent of the total Philippine populations, but it contains 90 of the country's biggest 100 corporations, all major newspapers, all commercial television stations, all major universities and colleges, and most government offices. As M. S. Ginsburg points out:
Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population live in cities of 1,000,000 population or more, in South-east Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. (Ginsburg, 1955).

In some instances, as a nationalist movement developed in Asia and Africa, its first target was a takeover of the 'alien' city at its centre. In Rangoon and Singapore, for example, this provided a rehearsal for the take-over of the country. However, we ought to note to the contrary that several national movements deliberately turned their backs upon the city as a foreign cancer, opposed to the indigenous cultural tradition. It is remarkable that some of the most authentic ideologies that have influenced the Third World urge the need to recreate the rural community as a means of rediscovering the spirit of the nation: this is true of the Gandhian sarvodaya movement in India, Nyerere's "African socialism", Mao Tse-tung's mobilisation of the communes, and the Israeli kibbutz philosophy.

Since World War II and the gaining of independence, Third World cities have expanded as never before, with an annual growth rate (population) of between 3 and 8 per cent. One scholar states that there has been an overall world urban expansion of 350 million during the last decade, of which over 200 million has happened in Third World cities. Huntington estimates that whereas, in the early 1960s, 80-85 per cent of the population of South Vietnam was rural, by 1968 about 40 per cent of the population had moved into the
cities. In Western cities the population shows a dominance of females, but in the Third World cities there is a definite male dominance, especially in the 15-40 age group. Sometimes (especially in South-East Asia) the rural-urban movement reflects the disturbed state of the countryside. Everywhere, the movement reflects the gradual concentration of agricultural land in a more limited occupation, and also the mechanisation of the progressive farmers which lessens the demand for labour. Almost everywhere, the proportion of total population on the land is still high (between 70-80 per cent) but, as the population continues to rise and the cultivated area remains more or less static, the surplus inevitably makes for the town.

The pattern of urban settlement has changed vastly. Some middle-class Asians and Africans are imitating the Europeans and moving out into new suburbs. Often, trading estates are formed outside the town to accommodate new industries. But the main new land-use on the outskirts of the city is the unplanned, outlawed squatter colony. The immigrants enter the labour market at the bottom, and therefore try to live near their prospective work (many join the pool of casual labour). Many, therefore, will move into the existing inner city housing, turning already overcrowded dwellings into slums. Others will settle in the inner city interstices - on sites of destroyed or derelict buildings, or on what is supposed to be pedestrian or recreation space.
But a great many will be forced out into the fringe colonies.

Writing about Indonesia, Wertheim has referred to all this as "static expansion": meaning that though the city population gets bigger, there is no qualitative change in the urban condition. Others have spoken of "pseudo-urbanization". For, although industry expands, it remains to a great extent dependent upon the role allotted to that particular Afro-Asian country in world production. Calcutta subsists on its jute mills. Singapore still relies heavily on its naval dockyard. Many of the immigrants join the vast army of those who are trying to make a living by offering services which are really totally unwanted: the street vendors with their trays, the shoe-shine boys, car-washers and plain beggars.

These folk live in a state of chronic instability. Their flimsy matting dwellings are vulnerable to fires which burn out entire squatter colonies. They are liable to be raided by the municipality which will summarily evict them and banish them to a remote wilderness. Their livelihood is uncertain from day to day. They acquire petty debts, and fall under the duress of some mobster. Whatever security they possess comes from association with a "network" deriving from the rural past — whether of kin, tribe, or village. There seems to be a great difference between the migration patterns of North America and Western Europe and those of the Third World. Thus, the American Negro heading
for the northern city, may come with his immediate family, but he will have no other support. They will take lodgings with some anonymous landlord, wherever lodgings may be found. In desperation, the man may drift off, leaving the mother to bring up the children on Relief. The Afro-Asian migration is quite different, as we observe for ourselves in Britain. Gravesend, a Thames-side industrial town below London, has a colony of about 7,000 Sikhs. All come from the same district in Punjab, most from three villages; many from a single village (which is now said to have a member from every village-family in Gravesend). The men come first, take lodgings with a village-mate; then bring over their families to live in a house rented from a fellow-Sikh and eventually buy their own home, and let out rooms. There is a Sikh temple, and the parties which strive for control of the temple are projections of the village-factions back in Punjab?

It is suggested that this transplantation of village society into the Third World city has the effect of 'ruralising' the urban environment. In part, this is a direct transplantation; the keeping of chickens, goats and even cows in the narrow alleys between the shanties. More important, it is the perpetuation of a rural life-style, as Philip Hauser suggests:

"Although the large cities of Asia have great size, their pluralistic composition and characteristic dual economies have enabled indigenous group to live.}
under essentially 'folk' conditions within the boundaries of the city. Little has occurred in the way of increased sophistication, rationality in behaviour, cosmopolitanism of outlook or innovation and social change." (Hauser, 1957)

If this is correct - and the evidence is cumulative - then there is some form of group support for most immigrants in the Third World city. But the pressures of the unknown remain; and any departure from routine - perhaps an industrial or political strike - can precipitate the immigrant into an unmeasureable situation of irrational stress.

Perhaps because they are aware that the city is unhomogenized inchoate, the leaders attempt to force upon it a role which has been termed "orthogenetic". The city, formerly the centre of foreign colonial domination, must become the symbol of the newly imagined national consciousness. Presidential palace, parliament, independence square, liberation boulevard, are the scenes of parades and rallies designed to associate the peoples with the national mission. All this is inspiring - except that it is so often possible for a rival to steal the national thunder. Ngo Dinh Diem, Sukarno, Nkrumah, and many more have discovered that the application of a relatively limited quantity of force within the capital city can be sufficient of overthrow the whole system of government. Although the urban guerrilla is now the centre of attention, the palace revolution remains a bigger factor in the see-saw of Third World politics.
RACE RELATIONS WITHIN THE CITY

Consciousness of difference is likely to peel off at four main levels. There are the Whites, remote and dimly perceived, but still the embodiment of affluence and dominance. There are foreign Non-Whites, who are a more permanent feature of the city scene, and a more immediate threat. There are the men from out of town, the interlopers from another part of the country who seem to be doing well out of us. And, finally, there are the people who have lived two blocks away for all their lives - and their fathers before them - but who remain strangers and not brothers.

THE COLONIAL LEGACY

The ethnic pluralism between city/countryside, market export economy/subsistence, community economy, and modernising society/traditional society developed in the colonial period and has not changed fundamentally since independence. The Europeans provided the superstructure of government, commerce and the "modernising" agencies; "Brown Europeans" - those who early adapted to the colonial situation (e.g. Bengalis in India, Tamils in Ceylon, Indians, Ceylonese, "the Queen's Chinese" in Malaya, Indians, and Creoles in Africa) - provided the infrastructure, while "the natives" remained spectators. As self-government
approached, selected "natives" were co-opted to join superstructure.

In the leading cities, and especially in the capital cities, the foreigners sometimes formed a especially in the majority. Even when the "natives" had an actual majority of the overall population, they frequently had to accept minority status. Thus, in pre-war Rangoon, the Indians formed over half the population (1931: 212,929 out of 400,415). All the cities of Malaya - Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang - had substantial Chinese majorities. Although the ethnic division was obscured by citizenship laws, Bangkok and Saigon-Cholon had Chinese majorities. In South Africa, Rhodesia and Kenya, the Africans were the largest community (cf. Narobi, 1962: African, 156,246; Asian, 86,453; European, 21,477) but were confined to the outskirts of town; and the business and residential districts were (are) European, with some "brown European" (Asian, Coloured) penetration.

After independence, a major effort went into reversing this situation. With political power in the hands of national leaders, the government sector was rapidly "nationalised". The new men in the top offices also moved into the top residential areas; thus Kenny Hill the smart suburb of Kuala Lumpur, assimilated Malay politicians and senior bureaucrats. The elimination of the alien Asian or Creole infrastructure was less smoothly accomplished. One solution is
to co-opt the former middle-men of the Europeans as middle-men for the new ruling elite. This occurred in Thailand during the last decade (not, of course, formally a post-colonial situation) and also Tanzania. The more drastic solution is to put pressure on these aliens. The Malay leaders of Malaysia could never hope to take over Chinese Singapore: therefore, Singapore was expelled from the Federation. But Indians could be expelled from Rangoon and from Nairobi and Kampala; and this process is on the way to completion.

RACE IN THE CITY TODAY

Let us now look in more detail at the post-colonial scene. The Whites, although deprived of formal political control, still remain. There are vestiges of the former colonial presence. In former French West Africa, French civil servants and technical advisers remain in virtually the same numbers as before. Dakar is still, recognisably, part of metropolitan France. Western business interests preserve much of their former power (with certain minor exceptions – Cuba, Guinea, Burma) and despite pressure by the new regimes towards the recruitment of a sizeable number of their own nationals into the Western firms, "-isation" has made little difference: indeed, the arrival of international monopoly combines (American, Japanese) alongside the old-established "Agency Houses" has reinforced this sector. Some military bases
remain - a few are British (Singapore, Cyprus), but most are American. Thus, the American naval base in Subic Bay, Philippines, has created a satellite shanty city, Olongopo, of 80,000 inhabitants to provide services for American navymen. The Vietnam war has created a new entertainment network in Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore. These cities have sprouted new hotels, nightspots, gambling joints, to meet American requirements. They have attracted a massive new immigration from the villages (many, of course, girls) and they have vastly inflated the cost of living: thus, entrepreneurs go up, civil servants and professional people go down.

The Vietnam war may end, but a new pattern of tourism has come to stay. North Americans and West Europeans and Japanese are just beginning a mass tourist invasion of the Third World. Because tourism makes heavy demands for personal services, the Third World is a good proposition with its abundance of labour and its tradition of accepting service and attendance as recognised and, indeed, esteemed occupations. International hotels of the Hilton variety are likely to invest substantially in Third World cities. The impact of the blue collar tourist upon Third World susceptibilities may become a major factor in creating racial attitudes in their cities and resorts.

The external Asian may have come under pressure, but he is likely to show tenacity in clinging to his former preserves; after all, has nowhere else to go. The Chinese
Overseas do not want to return to Communist China, and few South Asians find much to attract them to return to present-day India, Ceylon, or Pakistan. A few have reached the top of the economic scale, and thereby seem to have acquired that immunity from arraignment which wealth enjoys everywhere in the non-Communist world. (Thus, in East Africa, the really big Asian capitalists are immune from the persecution which has fallen on the small fry.) A great many Asian aliens are still at the bottom: still coolies or peddlers. They are likely to be left alone, because they are doing the unwanted jobs (refuse collection, heavy labouring, machine-minding for long hours) which nobody else desires.

As an under-class and an "over-class", the alien Asians may be acceptable: but the greater part of their activities are in between, and are required by the local people. The shopkeepers are the most "visible" section, and the first to come under pressure. The infrastructure of banking is also largely under Chinese, Indian (and, in West Africa, "Syrian") control. From the money-lender who provides week-by-week credit to the workers, up to the compradors of the big European banks in charge of deals with affluent "natives", there will be an alien Asian in control of the purse-strings. Public services and public transport are

Thus, in competitive Hong Kong, a young professional Chinese, pointing out the seaside villa of a local Indian tycoon dismissed the matter by observing: "As you know, the Indians are either very rich or very poor."
also likely to employ their intermediate-type skills, while the profession (law and medicine especially) are alien-Asian dominated. Attempts will be made to oust them from their near-monopoly of these occupations and profession by the newly-emergent elite who are natives - of the country, although probably not of the city. A remarkable feature of Third World countries is the speed with which they change from deficit to surplus in intermediate educational and semi-technical skills. The alien Asians have their own "solidarity" or clannishness with which to resist replacement; but the "natives" have the power of government - not over-burdened with liberal scruples - behind them.

Meanwhile, the "alien" Asians form a solid population bloc in the inner city of the Third World; often attaining densities of 100,000 per square mile on sites with buildings of no more than two or three storeys (McGee, 1967).

Although Latin America exhibits important differences from Asia and Africa, there are certain similarities. The apex of business and industry is firmly held by American and, to a lesser extent, British interests. The Anglo-Saxons retain exclusive cultural enclaves in cities like Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The indigenous city population splits on income/ethnic lines. Thus, in Lima, Peru, the 0.3 per cent of the population with incomes over $8,000 are of European origin. The mestizo mass (80 per cent) of mixed White/Indian/Negro origin earns between $300-$1,500. If we regard the
rural Indians only now migrating in poverty to Lima en masse as the "native" population, then the parallel is significant.

Quasi racial difference are perceived also with groups who belong to the "national" or "native" population but who are classified as strangers, and even enemies. The phrase "sons of the soil" is often rather curiously applied to those who truly belong to the city. All "out of town" men are regarded as intruders, and in the Third World city (as in the American or European city) the majority are likely to be immigrants from out of town. This feeling is strong in India. The Shiv Sena party in Bombay symbolises the resentment of the Maharashtrians (concentrated in the lower income groups) against the Parsis, Gujaratis, and British who come from outside and who exploit them in the mills. The true Calcutta-lok scorn all who do not belong to the metropolis, including all those crude, illiterate people from northern India; but special resentment is directed towards the Marwaris (originally from Rajasthan) who are engrossing trade and industry. In Delhi, the fear is expressed that the Sikhs are taking over the city. (Before 1947 they were numerically insignificant; today, they form 8-9% of the Delhi population.) They are conspicuous as police, taxi drivers, and, increasingly, as entrepreneurs. The Hindu Jan Sangh movement (which seized control of the municipal machine) has mobilised the Hindu backlash.
The hatred which engulfed Bangladesh, as Punjabi soldiers stamped upon the Bengali resistance, can be accurately described as a race situation. Dacca has witnessed the worst of the hatred; though, of course, this is not an urban phenomenon, as such. In Nigeria, the mutual hostility between the Ibos, the Hausa, and northerners like the Fulani, reached breaking-point because the Ibo and Hausa formed dominant minorities in the "strangers' town" of northern cities like Kano.

The last, and strangest form of quasi-racial hostility takes place between city groups which have lived alongside each other for generations, yet feel insolubly divided. In Northern Ireland, the Catholics and Protestants of Belfast and Londonderry are linked together in a web of historic mistrust and misunderstanding. The cities of India are breeding grounds of this strange internal exclusivism, between Hindus and Muslims. Although rural communal enmity is not unknown, it is the Indian city which has kept communalism going.

There are not many parallels to the Indian situation of enmity between ancient neighbours, but there is a residual situation in Istanbul between what is left of the ancient Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities and their Turkish neighbours, while the ultimate in urban division is the "Green Line" in Nicosia, Cyprus, separating Cypriots—who are Muslim and describe themselves as "Turkish") and those who are Orthodox and, therefore, Greek.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RACE FOR CITY MANAGEMENT

As I point out in my essay, "The City in Asia" (Reorientations, 1965), the concept of municipal, local government only has real meaning for an entrepreneurial society; and in Asia, only makes sense when urban leaders are cosmopolitan, not nationalist in sentiment. A Shanghai dominated by Americans, British, Baghdadi-Jewish and Parsi magnates invested a good deal in the municipal style of government; the same was true of Bombay with its trade and industry controlled by Parsis, Gujaratis, Jews and British; and, to a lesser extent, it was true of Rangoon and Singapore. Calcutta never made a success of civic government, because its councillors - who once included Subhas Chandra Bose as Deputy Mayor - were nationalists first and only incidentally civic leaders. Independence has witnessed the decline or total eclipse of civic government in cities like Nairobi, Lagos, Rangoon, Jakarta. In Singapore, where the bid for independence was preceded by an assault on the city hall (with Goh Keng Swee applying Oliver Cromwell's words to the mayoral mace: "Take away that bauble"), the shrewd Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has decided that he needs British and other Western investment, and he has therefore brought back some of the old civic style. But in most new states the government of cities has become a branch of national government. National civil servants and national (or state) politicians are in charge.
If previously the city public services were manned by city people (with heavy emphasis upon recruitment for alien minorities), today they are nationalised. This is often entails a marked drop in the level of performance in the public services. Given that these are the facts of life, there is not much point in suggesting that to establish a sense of justice and equity there would be advantages in a quota system for the public services which would:

(a) enable the disadvantaged and deprived "natives" to claim their proper stake in the system, while also ensuring
(b) that the skills of the "aliens" would be available to sustain technical efficiency.

In any recruitment system, it seems bad policy to allot different departments to discrete groups. When, as, in Singapore, the collection and disposal of refuse and garbage is carried out by a single group of low-caste Indian Tamils, this clearly damages the image of that group and of all Singaporeans of Indian origin. Similarly, the preponderance of Sikhs in the Delhi police links that community with repression in the consciousness of other groups.

Given that the European style of civic government —

*Of course, there is nothing specially Third World about this: in New York, Irish cops, Black garbage gangs, and Jewish schoolteachers have contributed to the creation of stereotypes.*
which flourished from the sixteenth through the nineteenth
centuries, and now is somewhat in a decline - cannot be graff-
ted onto present-day Third World cities with much prospect of
success, is there a possibility of finding authentic, indi-
genous substitutes? A style that would rest upon authentic
tradition would be that of city government sub-divided into
a hundred or more local areas of ward local self-government.
As we have seen, in the past the cities of Asia and the Mid-
dle East were largely made up of autonomous "ghettoes" with
recognised leaders and spokesmen who gathered together from
time to time to represent their own folk to the city govern-
lor. The recreation of the urban community by means of rec-
cognising the existence of local communities within the city
has been advocated by the Indian social philosopher,
Jayaprakash Narayan, while "urban communés" have been deve-
developed in China and other Communist systems. This, of course,
means accepting the "ruralisation" of the city, and departs
from the accepted trend in the Western world in which the
"Greater London" or "Greater Tokyo" model of overall govern-
ment of megalopolis is gathering way. It also means making
a reality of the "localisation" of the city; giving the var-
ious localities adequate resources (or access to resources
which they can initiate). Thus, in Delhi experiments have
been made in city community development; but these have not
really provided the localities with resources. The Delhi CD
units have put on organised games, and have quite literally
white-washed (or rather, green-and blue-washed) the walls of the dingy tenements; not really a liberating experience!

The localities might improve the nature of city life by being responsible for locality policing. In almost all Third World cities, the police are perceived as the "occupation forces". It has been normal to recruit the precinct police from the country areas: these recruits are supposed to be physically superior and uncontaminated by city vices. Most big city forces have a reserve contingent of riot police, similar to the French Garde Mobile. These are often composed of foreigners: thus, both Calcutta and Singapore police forces still (or till recently) include a Gurkha contingent, trained in the use of arms, and specialising in crowd dispersal. Some regimes (notably those of South Vietnam and Thailand) have created what is virtually a special city army, with tanks and heavy weapons, in order to enforce security in the capital, so essential to the survival of the regime. To introduce locality police would be to reverse this trend towards "over-kill" in the city. However, to substitute a system of security based upon a local sense of community responsibility for one based upon repression and fear, would do much to create stability and certainty, where now there is uncertainty and instability.

If this proposal appears to be politically implausible, it may be worthwhile to investigate the Singapore institution of neighbour hood, community associations. These came into being after the new working-class high-rise apartments
were built, and the danger of the characteristic atomisation and anomie of multi-storey living was anticipated. The associations are also, of course, a convenient political device whereby the anglicised, professional leaders of the PAP government can keep in touch with Chinese proletariat. The local PAP member of parliament is always a leading figure in the association. However, this is an attractive experiment which could lead to the growth of genuine local community traits, amid the pressures of modernisation. The associations do have access to resources, and there is a genuine two-way traffic between local leaders and the top-level leaders. Will Lee Kuan Yew's government have sufficient commitment to local democracy to have regard for the local will when it conflicts with the top-level will? We shall see.

This analysis of the dichotomy between the new nationalism and the possibility of creating a new, local community consciousness has thus far not touched upon race. A "neighbourhood" system of local government and local policing would clearly lend itself to "fitting" ethnic localities; and, as we have seen, there is a close correlation between the "racial" group and a defined locality. Such a solution might encourage a degree of pluralism which could soon become divisive; especially, if locality units rather obviously corresponded with economic differentials of striking inequality. But the ethnic neighbourhood unit within the
metropolitan whole might contribute to the formation of a national artifact based on something more substantial than rhetoric.

**TOWN-PLANNING AND RACE**

Planning and public building in most Third World cities aptly illustrate the two eras of city development: the colonial bourgeois cosmopolitan, and the new independent, national era.

Before independence, town-planning was largely devoted to maintaining adequate standards and services in the middle-class areas, while mainly ignoring the needs of the proletarian areas. Building regulations and zoning laws were drafted when cities like Rangoon were laid out on a gridiron pattern. But the regulations were subsequently flouted by slum landlords, squeezing in tenements in the inner city. It was always possible to "fix" the municipal inspectors. Municipal administration — never noticeably impervious to corruption anywhere — was riddled with "understandings" and deals from the municipal councillor down to the meanest employee. As new areas were opened up (as in the Bombay "Back Bay" scheme) they were developed as middle-and upper-class housing. The provision of working-class housing was left to private enterprise, except where some enlightened mill-owners provided accommodation for their operatives.

Municipal services seriously fell short of require-
ments, except in middle-class areas: such basic needs as water supply and sewage were often not provided in the working-class areas. Provision of services often produced amenities before necessities: the public library and the high school (often named after a local industrial magnate) came before the clinic or public bath house. About the only service which approximated proletarian needs was often public transport: trams (trollies) and buses, which enabled the people from the outlying shanty areas to get to work.

The population living in sub-standard shanty-type housing was not regarded as a municipal responsibility. About the only recognition of their existence was the periodic demolition of shanties and expulsion of their inhabitants when the shanty-town began to encroach upon a shopping or residential area, or was occupying waste ground which was required for improvement.

After independence, this basic pattern continued. Planning and provision of new housing was likely to be limited to the development of "model-towns" for the foreign diplomatic community who now arrived at the capital, and also for the bureaucracy, whose numbers almost everywhere expanded rapidly after independence. For the ordinary people, the new regime adopted the strategy which Imperial Rome had practised with success for centuries: the provision of public spectacle which, like the Colosseum, should be as big as resources permitted. "Giganticism" is a feature of the capi-
The Biggest Sports Stadium in the World is a specially popular spectacle; though the Biggest National Mosque in the World and the Biggest National Cultural Centre in the World also have their supporters. All these promote the "orthogenetic" symbolism of the capital city. Thus, the national museum in Kuala Lumpur is a massive reproduction in concrete and steel and glass of the carved, wooden, Malay chief's stilted "long house".

New national governments may be moved to substitute for this propaganda-type planning and architecture some attention to the requirement of the masses if they realise forcibly that the urban proletariat could become the means of dislocating and even perhaps destroying their regimes. Thus far, the only attempt to make massive provision for the urban workers anywhere in the Third World is the programme of the (British colonial) Hong Kong government. They have tackled the inflation of the city population in the only realistic way: by building housing complexes which, each by itself, provide space for the equivalent of a medium-sized town. These human ant-hills were at first not very attractive, but more recent projects have much better amenities.

Even during the British colonial period there were attempts to de-emphasise the predominantly Chinese character of Kuala Lumpur by building a "Moorish" Secretariat and a "Moorish" railway station.
They have ensured that folk who previously subsisted in a sub-human existence as refugees and squatters enjoy something like Western standards of urban living. Elsewhere, the record is deplorable. Each Indian Five-Year Plan notes in passing the escalation of the urban housing crisis to even more explosive proportions; and proposes little if anything as a remedy. In Malaysia, in an effort to balance the Chinese majority in the capital, the government has deliberately stimulated the growth of new Malay areas around the city. These already have a kampong atmosphere, and the inhabitants are very much transplanted rural Malays. The next step is to get them into significant areas of industrial employment, instead of the present dependence on driving and servicing and other marginal activities.

Almost nowhere has the attempt begun to redevelop the twilight areas of the inner city. This problem has also baffled most city authorities in the affluent West. The deterioration of property which was inadequate when built a hundred, or fifty years ago, and is now under the pressure of multi-occupation—continues. Perhaps if the "localisation" of the city were implemented, it might be possible to tackle the problem afresh by organising housing associations drawing upon the labour of the local people. If the city could provide materials and technical skills, it might be possible to mount a more effective campaign of re-housing. Near the city centres throughout the Third World there are sites
which are just not being properly utilised. No city can afford to allow derelict or inadequate property to crumble on in the heart of the urban body. Till now, redevelopment has been largely left to the private developer, who pockets the difference in land value, old and new, himself. New countries cannot afford to neglect this asset. Where the central area is redeveloped, the city ought to share in the profit, which could be employed in properly rehousing all those who lose their homes.

Once again, the racial implications of town-planning are implicit, not explicit. We can respond to the obvious. Thus, the build-up of the national (i.e., "native") bureaucracy, and of White big business in the city centre, when the administrators and executives live in the salubrious suburbs, will create the need for spine roads allowing rapid entry and exit around 10 a.m. and 4 or 5 p.m. The alien Asians, living above the shop in the inner city districts, will not require the provision of transport arteries, but will create massive problems of refuse disposal, and ought to receive better services (education, power, water, etc.). But again race is a factor of life-style; not an independent factor.

Where local communities draw their strength from a sense of ethnic solidarity they can be encouraged to reinforce this attitude - or discouraged from it - to some extent by town-planning. Re-development in the Third World
might study more closely that major feature of the Mediterranean city, the piazza. Especially in Italy, the piazza has many functions within the local community. It expresses the architectural ideal of beauty, amenity and utility. It serves as market-place, promenade, sports-arena, entertainment and cultural centre, among other purposes. The piazza can be extended, as it were, when a church or other assembly hall is placed nearby. It then becomes available for processions and outdoor public meetings. If the separate localities in the city were each provided with a piazza, basic revenue would be obtained by letting sites to market men or women. The festivals so prominent in the Third World would have an appropriate setting. The local community council could debate with their constituency in their own piazza. The whole range of social and political activity would tend to come into focus within the community. But is this what the town-planner—and the national leadership—wish to achieve?

If the town-planner attempts to reinforce community solidarity, he may unintentionally, reinforce divisions between communities. A main road, drawn so as to signify the boundary of one community may, in times of stress, become the area of challenge, and eventually the battle-line with the next community. However, a deliberate housing policy of dispersal is also liable to work out unexpectedly. Petaling Jaya, planned as a satellite town for Kuala Lumpur, was
deliberately developed on multi-racial lines. But the Malay, Indian and Chinese new-town dwellers have drawn apart into their own communities: there is very little inter-ethnic visiting, even amongst people who live next door to each other which suggests that ethnic differences may inhibit the growth of a neighbourliness similar to that of Western suburbs. (McGee, 1967)

Probably, the town-planner cannot do much more than try to ensure that all communities are adequately consulted about their future development, and that all feel that they have a reasonable portion of the cake of the future. The town-planner ought to be able to avoid exacerbating existing inter-ethnic tensions. There are obvious taboos - like not permitting a slaughter-house near a Hindu or Buddhist locality - which any municipal official will avoid. But there are more subtle, almost subliminal ways in which rival communities can get their wires crossed, and town-planners of the Third World ought to build up case histories which enable them to acquire techniques which promote benign contacts between communities, while avoiding decisions which could tend to create a sense of grievance on the part of one community against another, or against the city machine.

No town-planning worthy of the name can ignore indefinitely the condition of the peri-urban shanty towns. Early in 1970, the Nairobi City Council destroyed hundreds of shanties, and drove away people with no fixed occupation. The mayor commented that Nairobi might have as many as
100,000 illegal squatters, and L19 million would be needed to rehouse them. These squatters are almost always the rural "sons of the soil": in the Latin American Andean cities, they are Indians; in Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa, they are Africans; and in South-East Asia, poor Malays, Thais, Burmese, etc. These are the people who will feel the keenest resentment against the modest success of Asian aliens. In a democracy this will ultimately have overt political consequences, and under authoritarian regimes there will be covert consequences in deteriorating relations. The difference between squalor and decency is not too difficult to bridge. The first need is for elementary public services, and for some recognised pattern of settlement. The improvement of dwellings can be carried out by instalments. Organisation can assist with advice on the proper use of space and the provision of materials. The contrast between the basic Palestine refugee camp dwelling, and the "improved" dwellings of those refugees who have secured employment and shed the camp mentality is striking. For a specific instance of a suburb which is basically at shanty level but has attained a simple dignity and commodity in its housing, see Villa Socoro, Columbia (Caminos, Turner, Steffian, 1969). Three-quarters of the inhabitants are under 15 years old, and therefore not employed; over 90 per cent of the households have an annual income of less than $860. The houses are "back to back" but deployed on a hillside so that each unit
has its own privacy and its own view of the scene. Simple living is not slum living.

However, any large-scale rehabilitation of the shanty-towns of Asia, Africa, and Latin America would immediately create new problems. The movement to the town from the countryside, already running like a flood, would become even more voluminous if adequate accommodation were accessible. This leads us to our final question: the future of the city in relation to the whole Third World.

THE FUTURE OF RACE IN THE CITY

We are sometimes told that we have advanced beyond Metropolis to Megalophilia. There are further stages still through which Third World cities will pass: to Para'sitopolis, the city which eats up the countryside; and, finally, to Pantopolis, the everywhere city (Wertheim, 1964). The population projections for Calcutta in 2000 A.D. forecast an upper level population of 60 million and a lower level of 35 million. So far, Calcutta has kept up with upper level predictions; so Calcutta will certainly have become Pantopolis.

What kind of cities will they be? Mario L. Corea, an Argentinian architect, writes:

When the industrial society is 'exploding' in violence, inside and outside, is exploding in violence in its campuses, its factories, its ghettos, and is also exploding in violence in Indo-China, Africa and Latin America, there is no other possibility for its cities than violence. A society that has produced all kinds of segregation—racial, generational,
economic, intellectual, etc. - has to produce a degraded environment. The city has, by force, to become a very dangerous place to live in. (Corea, 1970)

The most obvious danger in the city is the challenge of the urban guerrilla, who will become an omnipresent phenomenon throughout Latin America, South and South-East Asia, and in Africa from Algiers to Cape Town. The danger from traffic accidents and pollution is less dramatic, but quantitatively more lethal. But there is an even more diffuse danger in the endemic conflict of city life, and its gradual deterioration and collapse into a concrete (or adobe, or matting) jungle. Even in Western cities, the congested quality of life, and the increasingly unbearable tempo, is rapidly escalating to breakdown-point. The Third World city, with its pitifully-inadequate resource base, is only going to get to that point faster.

The great mercantile European city was a receptacle for wealth. The merchants and city fathers lived in the city. The wealth which they brought in, from the surrounding countryside, and from overseas, was largely invested in the city: most, of course, in their own private enterprises, but some in civic amenities. The Third World city has never really been a point of entry for wealth: indeed, its function is precisely opposite: to provide a point of exit. The godowns and mills are storing and processing materials for the Third World country: they are preparing the products of the country for export to the West. The banks and
insurance companies are not acting on behalf of the local people: they are clearing houses for their clients in the West. While the Europeans and Americans took part in the dominance of India or China, they had some motive for investing in Calcutta or Shanghai. But after independence, this motive was largely gone. Some cities were compulsorily closed to the West—Shanghai, Rangoon, Havana—and the hotels and shops and bars put up their shutters. Other cities became bad security risks, so far as the West is concerned (Calcutta, Cairo), and there was a suspension of all further activity, and a withdrawal of capital, as far as possible. The end of investment in the city is a phenomenon not peculiar to the Third World. A New Yorker need go no further than Newark, N.J. to observe a city which has become a husk. But whereas in the West, the bourgeois and their resources have only moved to outer suburbia, leaving their doubts in the city, in the Third World the withdrawal is beyond the sea. New investment will be in Western transplants (like hotels and commercial agencies), and the Third World capitalists have neither the intention nor the resources to substitute for Western capitalism.

Given that the Third World cities will accelerate towards Parasitopolis and Pantopolis, despite the absence of any kind of investment base, what kind of people are they going to produce? In the past, we have assumed that settlement in the city produces a qualitative change in the city—
dweller: the Londoner, Parisian, New Yorker, is supposed to be a generic type; and clearly the city experience has stimulated certain identifiable characteristics. Can we expect that Metropolitan Man will evolve in the Third World beyond ethnic identifications: for that matter, can we really assume that non-ethnic Metropolitan Man has arrived in the West?

If we consider two Bostonians of the inner city, one of whom is a Negro and the other an Italian: can we assume that they have more in common with each other than the Negro does with his relatives in Mississippi or the Italian does with his family in Sicily? The Bostonian Negro and Italian will have an enormous amount in common. Their life-style will be similar. Their housing, education, employment problems will be much the same. Their encounters with the traffic and with shopping, their perception of their condition through newspaper and TV, their demands and appetites—and their ability to satisfy them—will all be identical. But suppose that the most significant feature of the Negro's life is the Blues, and most significant features of the Italian's life are the Mafia and the Catholic Church—they

*President Kennedy spelled out the characteristics of the Berliner in the memorable speech which ended, "Ich bin ein Berliner." For the transformation of a New Englander by residence in California suburbs, see Alison Durie's witty novel, The Nowhere City.
will then still perceive their two Boston worlds as separate and different.

Potentially, the Italian Bostonian or his children can hope to acquire sufficient mobility, occupational and residential, to move outside the ethnic niche; and the possibility is not completely beyond the aspiration of the Black Bostonian. But the capacity of the city to provide this prospect of mobility is partly related to its economic thrust: and, even in the United States, the "thrust" of the inner city has markedly declined. It is even argued that the "Two Nations" in the Disraelian sense (rich and poor) in the American city are much further apart than previously. In the Third World city, with its "static expansion" of population, the prospect for undifferentiated Metropolitan Man emerging out of the classes, castes, and creeds seems poor. Yet whatever prospect there is for greater homogeneity and closer identity in the new states is to be looked for in the towns. The countryside, still feudal in many ways, the hierarchical and military services, and the political parties with their appeals to prejudice and passion are not going to produce greater homogeneity. In the cities, there is a chance.

How far can the city manager or planner of the future contribute towards a better environment for homogeneity? Here is one view: "Urbanism is apparently not doing its job. The society, apparently, commissions one man to make
its entire environment; dwellings, ways and places are all considered to be within the competence of the architect-urbanist. This is clearly an overloading of the designer, and what society gets in return is apparently what one would expect: the environment thus created ranges from the inhuman to the mediocre, always including elements of both" (Woods, 1968). The shortcomings of the urban designer in the Third World are accentuated by the overwhelming influence of Western technology. He intends to be modern: and he looks for his models to the "modern" West. It is not surprising; he has no other model to work with. Japan presents an appalling example of the effect of layering Western modernity upon East Asian tradition. Israel, Lebanon, and other modernising Third World countries which might provide alternatives do not, in reality, come up with anything except Western technological expertise thrust into an Oriental urban situation. The precedents are not good. Throughout the Third World, airports, hotels, office blocks are being executed for Western requirements in an Eastern habitat. Capital costs at levels which a rich country finds a burden are being fastened upon the poorest societies. Even the great Le Corbusier did not respond to the genius loci of the bare foothills of Punjab, India, and raised up instead a garden city appropriate for an affluent Mediterranean country.

Corea emphasises that "the urban environment cannot be shaped and decided by the designer as an individual; it
should be shaped by the people that live in it, by the society as a whole, in a dialectic-interplay between the society and the designer." (Corea, 1970) In Third World cities, the alien Asians, the Mestizos and Creoles are often the most urbanised, the most involved in the city as its own people. They have, very often, a capacity to interpret the two worlds of the West and the East. They could play a vital part in the development of an authentic Third World urbanism. From the role of marginal man, into which they have been ruthlessly pushed since independence, they could return to their role of middle-man. This is put into focus by Henri Lefebvre in his definition of the urban essence:

It is the form of simultaneity, the form of conjunction, the form of convergence, of the encounter. It is a field of relationships, particularly the relationship between time and space. Urbanity is more or less the making of citizens, instead of the imposition of a system upon them, like a finished book (like the design city). (Lefebvre, 1969)

Above all, the Third World city must return to humanity: it is only just out of reach, not lost for ever, as in the Western city.

Humanity, some claim, is expressed in the society of the squatters. The shanty-towns have already acquired a romantic aura among some observers, in revolt against the inhumanity of tenements and high-rise apartments. There are benign and malign shanties: but the shanty is, in general, the symbol of the forgotten, excluded, and powerless. Voluntary middle-class drop-outs may envy the absence of all constraints, but the
involuntary victims of the inadequacy of the industrial, neo-colonial order are starkly aware of the absence of supports which shanty-living represents. The first necessary move is to recognise the shanties as part of the housing system. The Western world recognises three main kinds of housing. The housing goal is that of the owner-occupier (68 per cent of American housing, and 50 per cent of British). For those who cannot buy, there must be housing to rent: and the commercial landlord is the laissez-faire solution to the need (30 per cent of American housing, and 20 per cent of British). But Western society is divided over whether housing can be left to the laws of commercial supply and demand: welfare societies regard public housing as a major commitment; private enterprise societies do not (thus, 2 per cent of American housing is in the public sector; 30 per cent in Britain is public sector housing). However, in the West, the conventional classes of housing have proved totally inadequate: costs have shot ahead of capacity to pay. In the United States, 40 per cent of the population subsist on incomes insufficient to join the ranks of the owner-occupiers (which means that 8 per cent of owner-occupiers are going to fall out of the system). In the West, the housing "safety-net" is provided by sub-standard housing and multi-occupation. In Britain, 11 per cent of our housing is officially classified as unfit for human habitation. More and more, in the inner city, families are doubling-up and trebling-up in
older houses, because they just cannot afford proper housing. In Britain the crisis has produced a spontaneous, "pop" solution: squatting. For Western societies, squatting is likely to be removed from the category of the abnormal into the normal. It has long been in the normal category in the Third World. Housing managers and architects and suppliers of building materials must now absorb this sector into their operational planning. One remedy suggested is that of "garbage housing": the use of waste materials as the building blocks of a new kind of housing.*

What is required is a recognition that this sector of urban habitation deserves the attention of Western "aid" resources, and Third World rulers and managers and designers in partnership with the squatters. An indication of what could be achieved is the satellite town of Korangi, outside Karachi, erected rapidly to accommodate shanty-dwellers who subsisted in refugee conditions for over a decade. Korangi represents American aid, Greek town-planning, and design; and the drive of the Ayub Khan regime in its first phase of genuine dedication, before corruption set in. What is missing in Korangi is the active participation of the refugees in their own town: and so, attractive schemes for community

activity just have not come off. The squatters are the power-
erless: economically, and to a large extent politically. The test of whether a regime will respect the powerless is one that not many countries - Third World or First World - respond to. It is a test which the regimes in North Vietnam and China have responded to.

A solution to the squalor of the peri-urban shanty town's habitation problems will be insufficient if unaccompanied by new approaches to unemployment. Unemployment is high in every age-group, but it is disproportionate among the youth. In prosperous Kuala Lumpur it runs at 25 per cent of teenagers. When, in Kenya, President Kenyatta attempted to ameliorate the problem by making employers take on 10 per cent new recruits for their labour forces, 140,000 candidates registered on the first day permissible in Nairobi, even though the jobs thus created numbered only 35-40,000. Under these circumstances, there will inevitably be increasing tension between the "sons of the soil" and the outsiders.

Any genuine attempts to arrest the drift into the cities which is accompanied by spiralling under- and unemployment, must embrace the total society: urban and rural. Rabindranath Tagore noted (in 1928) that between the industrial city and the village

A gulf is formed and goes on widening. City and village then stand forth as exploiter and victim. Our modern cities ... feed upon the social organism that runs through the villages. They appropriate the life stuff of the villages and slough off a huge amount.
of dead matter, while making a lurid counterfeit of prosperity.

And so Tagore abandoned the family ransion in Calcutta; and the remainder of his life was devoted to rural reconstruction at Santiniketan, a Tolstoyan community (which, however, is now - almost - just another university campus).

Others have sought to apply the Tagorean solution to urban problems; to reverse the flow, to find refuge from Western urban crisis in Third World rural society. Although the whole of India's nationwide community development programme is designed to achieve the purpose of reconstructing the rural community, it has had no success whatever in halting the urban drift. Indeed, paradoxically, it has actually contributed to the drift: for the beneficiaries of community development have been the progressive farmers who, by mechanisation, are helping to run down the agricultural labour force! In Cuba, the return to the land has been achieved by a combination of compulsion and reward: there are opportunities for bright young people in the new agricultural projects. Although the population of Havana has continued to rise absolutely - as a proportion of the entire Cuban population, Havana has remained a constant proportion (21 per cent) over the last ten years - whereas in most of the Third World the capital city is rapidly swallowing up a rising proportion of the national population. But Cuba has paid a price. The agricultural revolution has left the country as much a neo-colonial dependency as before: though
in the pattern of dependence the United States has been exchanged for the Eastern European bloc. Cuba's economic effort is focussed upon producing a sugar crop of 10 million tons: and 75 per cent is exported to the Soviet Union and its satellites. After the rural revolution, Cuba is in the same situation regarding foreign economic control; whatever internal changes have occurred.

Development policy has not sufficiently considered the alternative strategy of building up the small and medium towns as industrial centres specialising in light and medium types of industry. In the Third World, the primate city (which means the capital, excluding the sub-continental nations, like India, China, Indonesia, Brazil) is from 10 to 5 times larger than the next largest urban concentration. The expansion of the secondary towns requires a much less expensive urban infrastructure than in the cities: the provision of water, sewage, power, and public transport entails a much lower order of capital investment pro rata than in the inner city complex. And the qualitative difference which industry can make to these secondary towns is dramatic. Punjab and Gujarat states, in the Indian Union, have both achieved substantial economic growth (in marked contrast to most Indian states) by the build-up of what were formerly market towns and administrative headquarters into industrial areas. In some Asian and African countries, development on these lines could be accelerated by offering incentives to alien Asians
and other outsiders in the secondary towns. They might be acceptable in a pioneer situation, where they are not acceptable as concentrations in the capital cities.*

However, in any future planning, the primate city will remain as a major factor; and within the city race is likely to remain a residual source of conflict and division.

SOME RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

1. "Tribalism" in the City. This paper has broadly accepted the assumption that groups cling to their past sense of identity in the Third World city, as their main source of support. Probably, like all assumptions, this is too sweeping. Skinner has demonstrated that the urban Chinese in South-East Asia respond very differently to different situations which present open or closed opportunities. The situation created by independence, and by the "youth explosion" of the 1960s and '70s requires us

* An alternative strategy might be the planned construction of New Towns. British experience, however, is not encouraging. The New Towns have made only a marginal contribution to the British housing problem; providing after twenty years about 100,000 housing units. They have used up valuable agricultural land. They have made no contribution to producing a new social or class "mix": the working class and middle class have obstinately stayed apart. The declared aim of the newest New Town, Milton Keynes, to assimilate black and brown citizens is likely to be equally unsuccessful. What the New Towns have done is to provide British industry with the opportunity to modernise on very attractive terms to the owners.
to review and perhaps revise our assumptions about cultural and ethnic solidarity. Besides a continuance of studies of kinship and marriage and community organisations and rules, we need studies of attempted participation in non-ethnic or multi-ethnic associations, and the factors which open or close such possibilities, with special reference to youth opportunities.

2. The consequences of public policy on patterns of settlement: we have seen that this is, at present, largely negative or restrictive. Research should be monitoring any situation which emerges in relation to inner-city alien settlement, or peri-urban "native" settlement which might indicate new policy approaches. Perhaps Latin America has situations which will quite soon be ready for evaluation and which will indicate pointers for future changes in Asia and Africa. The whole subject of South African policy towards Coloured and Black housing has been passed over in this paper: vast changes are being forced upon non-White urban society, with drastic consequences for patterns of family and social behaviour. These are taking place with no attempt at monitoring research - mainly because of the constraints imposed by the Nationalist government - and the greatest upheaval in the Third World (or on its margin), goes unrecorded.
3. **Employment and ethnicity**: especially in relation to the young "under-class". Britain is now joining the United States in accepting the existence of a Black sub-proletariat with a permanent high rate of unemployment, comprising both those who are unemployable (because of educational and social inadequacy) and those who are potentially high-flyers, but who are excluded from normal channels of advance and, therefore, become the "rabble-rousers" and "trouble-makers". The Third World has this problem, with its own ethnic and cultural angles: and the problem is even more explosive, because it is growing at an uncontrollable rate. We need to extend the analysis, which at present is hopelessly spotty.

4. **Political ideologies and movements**: especially in relation to the city in the community. Singapore's PAP government attempts to humanise and localise the urban environment, while emphasising urbanisation and industrialisation as the political strategy. Tanzania, under Nyerere, attempts to avoid the consequences of unplanned urbanisation and to discover a national identity within the rural community. These are two explicit examples of political mobilisation for or against the city which are implicit in most of Third World politics. The two poles imply an acceptance of multi-racialism and cosmopolitanism and its opposite - a rejection of foreign (Western) patterns and a return to the "native"
tradition. There are some political studies on these lines, now that the focus upon independence and freedom movement-type politics is fading: but much more is needed.

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