After reviewing the urban demographic facts and prospects for India as a whole, this report asks one basic question: Who, in the Indian policy, is responsible for urban government and urban development? As with the other-country reports in this series, the main objective is to understand the national perception of the place of urban development in India's development priorities; and to describe, in basic outline at least, the governmental response in urban policy and program. The main theme of this report is urban government and urban administration in India. In relation to this, the following topics are discussed: (1) Urbanization in India: The Demographic Situation Projected; Growth of the Indian Urban Population; (2) The National Planning Response; (3) Center-State Relations in Urban Development; (4) Urban Administration; (5) Implementing Agencies in Urban Areas; (6) Training Programs in Urban Administration; (7) A National Institute of Urban Affairs? [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731-013 742 and UD 013 744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in the Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] [Author SB]
Urbanization in India

An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation
This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff’s own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey’s conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey. But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
Colin Rösler
Frederick C. Terzo
Urbanization in India
by Colin Rosser

International Urbanization Survey
The Ford Foundation
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Readers will quickly detect a strong big city bias running through this report. This is intentional.

The great cities of India—from Amritsar to Allahbad, Bombay to Benares, Calcutta to Cochin, Madras to Mysore—are in growing crisis. It is these cities (150 of them with populations in excess of 100,000) which are bearing the heaviest burden of human pressure from the overpopulated countryside. The plight of these cities, crucial to India's social and economic development, is by no means the whole of the problem of accelerating urbanization. It is, however, its most visible aspect. These big cities, some of them already giants among the world's cities, are most oppressed by the urgencies of time, pose the most formidable management problems, and need development assistance most urgently.

After reviewing the urban demographic facts and prospects for India as a whole, this report asks one basic question. Who, in the Indian polity, is responsible for urban government and urban development?

As with the other country reports in this series, the main objective is to understand the national perception of the place of urban development in India's development priorities: and to describe, in basic outline at
least, the governmental response in urban policy and program. The main theme of this report is urban government and urban administration in India.

This report is not intended as an evaluation of present or past Ford Foundation programs in urban development. The Foundation in India has had a series of major programs over some fifteen years, which have attracted a good deal of attention. The Foundation's office in India is its only overseas office to have a specific advisor in urban planning.

Foundation aid in this broad and complex field has taken place through several programs. Assistance to the West Bengal Government and to the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization has been extended over a full decade, to deal with one of the worst set of urban problems that the world has yet encountered.

A second current program is in a field which is being increasingly recognized throughout the developing world as one of major importance—the rural/urban relationship, particularly at the lower end of the urban hierarchy of settlement size. The Ford Foundation is providing assistance to the Indian Government to undertake a skillful examination of the role of these smaller towns in relation to the support and stimulation of rural development.

The program is known as "The Pilot Research Project in Growth Centers." Since this present report is primarily
concerned with the problems of India's major metropolitan
cities, a discussion of the rural growth center program—
important as it is—would lead us too far afield.

A third current grant provides limited assistance
to the Department of Public Administration at Lucknow
University for the development of a regional center in
Training and Research in Municipal Administration. This
is directly relevant to the subject at hand and is dis-
cussed later in this report.

In addition, the Foundation has provided assistance
to the Delhi School of Architecture and Planning, to the
School of Architecture (planning curriculum) at Ahmedabad
and to the Maharashtra City and Industrial Development
Corporation at Bombay.

We would like to thank our professional colleagues
in the Ford Foundation in Delhi and Calcutta, and our many
old friends among Indian administrators, planners and
academics, who provided invaluable assi—ce—and often
the extra stimulation of opposing views during our field
visit to India and with the subsequent preparation of this
summary of fact, opinion, and conclusion. There is a
great deal more to be said here than can be covered in a
single report, and on that at least we would all agree.
INTRODUCTION

The basic fact about Indian urbanization is the sheer magnitude of urban population growth in a situation of chronic poverty. The basic problem is the assembly of resources, and, above all, the organization of executive action to deal effectively with urban population concentration on this immense scale.

The Census of India, taken in March of 1971 and from which only provisional population totals were available at the time of writing gives the total Indian population as 546.9 million—showing an increase over the last decade of 108 million (an increase roughly equivalent to the total population of Japan, Pakistan, or Indonesia).

Appreciation of this relentless rate of population growth is of course fundamental to all aspects of Indian development. If any emphasis of this central fact were required, it can be observed that since Independence, just twenty-three years ago, India has added to its population almost exactly 200 million people (or the rough equivalent of the total population of the United States).

Though four out of every five Indians live in more than half a million villages in rural India, and though both the level and rate of urbanization are low by international comparison, the size of its urban population (an estimated 109 million in 1971) already far exceeds
the total population of most countries in the world.

This is a demographic characteristic which India shares with several of its Asian neighbors:

Of the seven countries in the world with a population of over 100 million, five are in Asia. These Big Five—China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Japan—have a combined population of over 1.5 billion and account for a little over 45 percent of the world's population. Even if we confine ourselves to South and South-East Asia, we have in our region India, Pakistan and Indonesia with a total population of over 721 million accounting for 21 percent of the world's population.

In terms of the level of urbanization (regardless what definition of 'urban' is adopted) these countries are no doubt the least urban areas of the world but in terms of absolute numbers their urban population is sizeable: India alone has over 100 million people living in urban areas today (1969) according to the definition of 'urban' adopted in the Indian census. It is worth recalling that there is no evidence in the economic history of developed countries of a nation undergoing the process of urbanization with a base population of over 500 million and a rate of natural increase of 2.5 percent, which is the case of India today. It is therefore important to consider not only the level of urbanization but the scale of urbanization.*

The growth of the urban population in India, both in retrospect and prospect, will be considered later in this report. The fundamental fact (as the Fourth Plan emphasizes) is that according to present projections, the urban population is expected to increase from 79 million in

1961 to 152 million in 1981, or roughly double in size over this twenty year period. The number of towns with a population of 50,000 and above is expected, over the same two decades, to increase from 250 to 536. On the evidence of the last twenty years, the major brunt of this spectacular growth will be borne by the 113 Indian cities exceeding 100,000 in population size (in 1961) and, more particularly in absolute numbers of population added per annum, by the twelve cities exceeding 500,000. *

Metropolitan Calcutta, already described as having the worst urban situation in the world, is presently adding some 200,000 to its population each year, or one million in the space of a single Five-Year Plan. Its 1961 population of 6.7 million has already increased, through a combination of natural increase and migration, to well beyond the eight million mark by 1971, and on the conservative projections of the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization, is expected to reach over twelve million by 1986. This giant metropolis, already a city in crisis as its urban environment steadily and visibly deteriorates under the pressure of an overwhelming annual in-

*These twelve major cities are, in order of size: Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi, Madras, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Ahmedabad (all exceeding one million in population in 1961); and Kanpur, Poona, Nagpur, Lucknow and Agra (all with populations in 1961 between 500,000 and one million).
crease in population, will double in size within the space of a single generation. Greater Bombay, with a 1961 population of 4.1 million, had reached 5.9 million by the Census of 1971, thus exceeding the highest population projection of the Bombay Study Group on Demography.* Greater Delhi, the third in rank of Indian metropolises, has added a million and a half in one decade--its 1961 population of 2.6 million now just exceeds 4 million. It is the fastest growing city in India in terms of percentage variation over the decade.

All Indian cities display, in acute form, the three basic conditions which they share with cities throughout the developing countries:

1. Dramatic and inevitable increases in population size which are a product both of high rates of natural increase in the urban centers and also of massive in-migration from the over-populated countryside.

2. High backlogs of deficit extending over the whole range of the urban system, particularly and most visibly, in housing for the lowest income groups, but of course including every aspect of urban infrastructure, social ser-

* Population projection for Greater Bombay given in New Bombay--The Twin City published by the City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra September, 1970 p. 2.
vices, and employment opportunities.

3. A severe scarcity of resources (financial, technical and managerial) to cope with this situation. Perhaps, in the face of this combination of population pressure, deficit, and poverty, the scarcest resources of all are the time to organize remedial action at the scale required, and the political and administrative will to confront this growing crisis of urbanization with the determination and urgency that is clearly needed.

It could be argued that all development programs, in whatever field, require three ingredients for success: implementable and realistic plans, adequate resources for their efficient implementation, and—above all—the political determination to act effectively. The third of these ingredients is the central theme of this report on the Indian experience with the complex problems posed by urbanization at the overwhelming scale of the Indian situation.

Given this factor of population scale, and recognizing the continental diversity of India, a fully comprehensive report on the problems of urbanization in India would, of course, be a gargantuan task. Fortunately this is not necessary for the purposes of the International Urbanization
All the three members of the Survey team have had extensive experience of the complexities of urban development planning in India and can claim a more intensive familiarity with the Indian experience than is the case with the other country reports prepared in the course of the Survey. In addition, at least four detailed reports on major aspects of urban development in India have recently been prepared by Ford Foundation consultants. They are:


b. *Report on India's Urban Housing,* in two parts, prepared for the Government of India by a special Ford Foundation team of experts under the chairmanship of Dr. Louis Winnick, and published in July 1965.


d. *The Ford Foundation Programme of Assistance to the Government of West Bengal for the Development of Metropolitan Calcutta,* a specially prepared report by Arthur T. Row, Chief Consultant of the Founda-
tion Advisory Group in Calcutta, in May 1971. Summaries (with up-dating) of these existing reports would seem less useful than a more selective, and supplementary, discussion of a subject of central importance to the understanding of the response to urbanization in India and yet constantly neglected in the preoccupation in India, and by foreign observers, with the forms and processes of planning. This is the administrative organization in India, at the Central, State and Municipal levels, for dealing with the problems posed by urban development.

A recurring theme of this series of country reports—and indeed of the accumulated observations of the International Urbanization Survey in general—has been the failure, in city after city throughout the developing countries, to re-organize urban government into a more rational and effective instrument for managing the crisis of an explosive growth of the urban population; to establish effective implementation agencies which can translate plans into action; to generate and mobilize the resources needed for implementation; and to train the urban managers and administrators who are so obviously needed to design and set in motion systematic capital development programs, whether for the over-burdened existing cities or planned new towns. Political and administrative ineptia rather than scarce financial resources may indeed be the dominant
factor in the failure to cope with the crisis of rapid urbanization in India as well as in other developing countries.

International attention is being increasingly directed to this vital aspect of urban development. A UN Expert Group, convened to make recommendations on programs in public administration for the Second Development Decade, pointed out:

Changes in population and environment, such as those involved in urbanization and the shift from a subsistence to a market economy, create the need for changes in governmental organization and functions. A governmental system designed for a predominantly agrarian society may not be suitable for one that is largely urbanized, nor is it likely that an administrative system which was designed for a city of 100,000 will be adequate for an agglomeration of millions. Mere organizational expansion does not meet such problems: new organizational and managerial arrangements have to be made to deal with them effectively. Major changes in institutions, methods and personnel will be needed to apply new findings of science and technology to public affairs and to assure optimal use of national resources for economic and social development. Governments must recognize the need for bold action to improve their administrative systems if they are to fulfill their responsibilities in the 1970s.*

---

* UN "Public Administration in the Second Development Decade," UN New York 1971, p.39. This problem has been more specifically discussed, for the urban field, in a recent publication of the UN on "Administrative Aspects of Urbanization" which deals at length with problems on a global basis.
The question which this report seeks to answer is: to what extent is this need for "bold action" in urban administrative re-organization recognized in India, and what is being done to achieve it?

This is a subject of growing interest in India as technically elaborate plans constantly fail, in urban areas as well as in regional development, to produce the substantial development effort anticipated. Conference after conference over the past twenty years has reiterated the urgent need for radical reform in urban government and emphasized the need for the creation of administrative machinery at the regional level for the implementation of metropolitan and regional development plans. Professional administrators, perhaps recognizing more clearly the political complexity of governmental re-organization in urban areas and the consequent deadening inertia of local government at the municipal level, seem to have given the subject scant attention. It was not until 1968 that the Indian Journal of Public Administration decided to devote a special issue to a collection of articles by administrators and social scientists on the administrative aspects of urban development in India. Even at this late
date, the Editor felt it necessary to observe in his introduction:

Though urbanization has been going on in our country over the decades, it has not received the attention it deserves. A re-orientation of our thinking to adapt ourselves to the changing circumstances and to meet the new challenges has become imperative. An appreciative awareness is needed as much in the lay citizen as in the expert and the administrator. For a great majority of citizens, with their roots in the villages, the urbanization process in its modern form is altogether a new phenomenon. To an administrator trained and immersed in traditional rural administration, it presents unfamiliar problems and issues. At the political level, which inevitably influences policy formulation, the nostalgia for a blissful village society tends to inhibit a pragmatic approach to the reality of the developing urban situation and societal evolution that is inexorably taking place.*

Each Five-Year Plan makes its expected reiteration of the importance of the proper and timely implementation of Plans and its familiar exhortation to government at all levels to strengthen implementation capacity. And, as the Fourth Five-Year Plan puts it, "to undertake an analysis of fiscal and regulatory policies, administrative organizations and institutional framework at various levels." Whatever the response to these exhortations in other sectors of Indian development, there is little doubt that this sensible advice receives little if any response in the field of urban development. The chapter of the Fourth Plan (1969-1974)...

concerned with regional and urban development emphasizes this point and observes that, though regional and urban development was accorded "particular recognition" in the Third Plan (with development plans for seventy-two urban centers, of which forty were completed during 1963-1969), little obvious development progress was achieved "through lack of resources—financial and organizational:"

In most of the rapidly-growing cities the limits of corporations or municipalities do not coincide with the appropriate planning areas. It is necessary to create larger planning regions and to provide by law that the plans formulated by the regional authority are implemented by the local authority or authorities. Planning to be effective requires the full legal structure for formulation and implementation. The administrative structure of local bodies needs to be reviewed and rationalised towards better implementation of development plans. Expenditure on specific schemes, such as on roads, sewerage or water supply, is likely to be highly wasteful in the absence of a long-term plan (and if these utility systems are inefficiently managed). In the long run, the plans of development of cities and towns must be self-financing. This is intimately connected with the vexed question of land acquisition and land prices. One of the largest sources of unearned income at present is the rapid increase in the values of urban land. On the other hand, high prices of land are one of the main obstacles in the way of properly housing the poorer classes. The evolution of radical policy in this regard is an immediate requirement for future development.*

Against this familiar background of conference resolution

and plan exhortation, this report will consider four questions:

1. Where does the responsibility lie for urban development and urban administration?

2. What are the major impediments to the radical re-organization of urban government and present approaches to urban development programming, to which attention is so frequently drawn?

3. Who is concerned about these questions, and what efforts are being made to develop more effective governmental action in urban areas both in day-to-day administration and in the implementation of capital development programs?

4. What is the situation with regard to the training of urban administrators and of skilled managers for implementation agencies?

Before turning to a review of these political and administrative aspects of urban development in India it is necessary to briefly present the basic demographic situation, and the range of problems with which Indian decision-makers are confronted.

URBANIZATION IN INDIA: THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION

The record of the eight decennial censuses held in India
during this century show a relatively slow increase in the percentage of the urban population up to World War II, followed by a marked acceleration in the percentage variation by decade since 1941. At the turn of the century the total Indian population was 236 million; by 1971 this had increased two and a quarter times, to 547 million. The urban population during this period had multiplied fourfold, from 26 million to an estimated 109 million in 1971. The demographic balance between rural and urban had changed significantly, the percentage of the population living in urban areas having approximately doubled. This urban share, on the evidence of the censuses since World War II, is now increasing at two percentage points per decade, and producing, in view of the enormous decennial growth of the total population, substantial increases in the size of the urban population with each new decade.

The changes in the scale of the urban population and the slow but inexorable shift of the rural-urban demographic balance in favour of the urban areas is given, for the period 1901-1971, in Table 1.
### TABLE 1

Urbanization in India: 1901-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Total Population*</th>
<th>Per Cent Variation Per Decade</th>
<th>Urban Population*</th>
<th>Per Cent Variation Per Decade</th>
<th>Per cent Urban of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>236.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>252.1</td>
<td>+ 5.73</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>+ 2.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>251.4</td>
<td>- 0.3</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>+ 7.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>279.0</td>
<td>+11.0</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>+18.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>318.7</td>
<td>+14.2</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>+31.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>361.1</td>
<td>+13.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>+39.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>439.2</td>
<td>+21.5</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>+39.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>546.9</td>
<td>+24.5</td>
<td>109 (est.)</td>
<td>+39.0 (est.)</td>
<td>20.0 (est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* in millions

Based on Census of India, Paper 1 of 1962, Final Population Totals and Census of India; Paper 1 of 1971, Provisional Population Totals with adjustment of the 1951 figures of the urban population using the 1961 Census definition of "urban" (see Ashish Bose "Urbanization in the Face of Rapid Population Growth and Surplus Labour-- the case of India," paper submitted to the Asian Population conference, New Delhi, December 1963.)
The important point shown by Table 1 is that by comparison with other developing regions of the world, the growth rate of the urban population is noticeably slow (under 4 per cent a year and less than twice the rate of growth of the total population), but the scale of urban population is increasing sharply each decade. Between 1941 and 1951 the urban population increased by just over 13 million; between 1951 and 1961 the urban population had risen an additional 21 million. Though the exact figures are not yet available from the 1971 census, the estimated increase of the urban population over this last decade is in the region of 30 million. The rate and level of urbanization may be low in international comparison (India is more typical here of the situation in the other great rural societies of Asia than it is of the developing world generally), but the fact to be emphasized is that the scale of population pressure on the existing cities and towns of India is accelerating sharply.

Recent Planning Commission population projections assume a 4 per cent rate of urban growth over the next decade, and estimate therefore a further increase in urban population of some 43 million in this ten year period to an estimated total urban population by 1981 of 152 million.

If this estimate is correct, the Indian urban popu-
ulation will have almost doubled in size in just twenty years: from 79 million in 1961 to 152 million by 1981. This is one basic measure of the task that confronts Indian political leaders, administrators and planners as they seek to devise both development policies and organizational arrangements that could reverse the present deterioration of the urban environment in India's already over-burdened towns and cities.

Detailed demographic analysis of the trends of urbanization in India is greatly complicated by censal changes in the definition of "urban." These changes in definition have particularly frustrated the comparison of 1951 and 1961 census data, which cover a very important decade in India's planning of industrial development.

Prior to 1961, as Ashish Bose points out:

...the definition of 'town' was not uniformly followed in all the States of India and there was considerable scope for the use of discretionary powers on the part of the State Census Superintendents. Apart from the usual test of a settlement having more than 5000 population, the classification of a place into urban or rural was based on a subjective assessment by the Census Superintendents of the presence of 'urban characteristics'.

The Census Commissioner of 1961 introduced for the first time a more precise national definition of "urban" which would enable more exact inter-State and intercensal

* Ashish Bose; op. cit., p.10.
demographic comparisons. There were four elements in this new definition, three of which were clear empirical tests. "Urban places" were defined as those settlements which have:

a) a density of not less than 1000 to the square mile.
b) a population of at least 5000.
c) three-fourths of the occupations of the working population should be outside agriculture.
d) the place should have, according to the superintendent of the State, a few pronounced urban characteristics, the definition of which, although leaving ground for vagueness and discretion, is meant to cover newly-founded industrial areas, large housing settlements, or places of tourist importance which have been recently served with all civic amenities.

This more precise definition has also been used in the recent 1971 census, and will thus facilitate accurate comparison between the censuses of 1961 and 1971.

The change in definition has, however, raised many difficulties and caused considerable debates among demographers over the analysis of the apparent changes in the rate and scale of India's urban development during the

1951-1961 decade.

Using the earlier definition of "urban", the 1951 census gave the total urban population as 63 million. By 1961, according to the changed definition, this urban population had increased to 78 million, a percentage variation of only 25.9 per cent. This caused some observers to argue that the rate of urbanization in India, compared with the two preceding decades, had markedly slowed down. This was a most unexpected conclusion since this was also the decade of the fastest rate of industrialization that India had ever known. Some demographers sought to explain this by arguing that, far from stimulating increased rural-urban migration (as might have been expected), the creation of new employment opportunities through rapid industrialization was merely taking up the slack in existing urban unemployment; that the increasing urban chaos of the major cities was in fact exerting a powerful push-back factor and itself stemming the flow of rural in-migrants.

Had this argument been correct, it could have exerted an important influence on future projections of the urban population. It also could have affected urban development policy. There are indeed signs that it did so in the speeches of politicians during the 1960s, arguing that the best way to keep migrants back on the land was to refuse
investment for urban infrastructure so that the increasing horror of the cities would have a deterrent effect on migration: the push-back factors suggested by demographers, based on the apparent implications of the 1961 census data.

A more careful analysis of the 1951 census has, however, shown this argument to be fallacious. When the new 1961 census definition of "urban" was applied to the 1951 data it was shown that the actual 1951 total urban population was 57.5 million (not 63 million), and hence the percentage variation over the 1951-1961 decade was 39 per cent (not 29.9 per cent).* Hence, far from showing a slackening in the rate of urbanization as had been argued, it was now clear that this decade of heavy industrialization in India was in fact accompanied by acceleration in the pace of urbanization. This discussion illustrates the importance of accurate demographic analysis as a basis for the formulation of urban policy.

* This is according to the analysis of Dr. Ashish Bose of the Institute of Economic Growth in Delhi. His figures for 1951 have been used as the basis for the calculations given in Table 1 of this report. There have, however, been disagreements as to the size of the 1951 urban population. Jakobson and Prekash, for example, conclude that the 1951 urban population was 54 million, thus giving a percentage variation over the 1951-1961 decade as 45 per cent: a spectacular increase in the rate of urbanization.
The results of the 1971 census should be available for detailed analysis by August of this year. They are eagerly awaited by demographers and by planners in the National Planning Commission, and there is no doubt that particular interest will be centered on the pace of urbanization over this most recent decade. This time there will be no problem of definition, as the same definition of "urban" has been used in both the censuses of 1961 and 1971. All the available evidence from sample censuses taken annually during the decade indicates that the urban population is continuing to grow at just under 4 per cent per annum, and that the level of urbanization by 1971 was about 20 per cent (as against 18 per cent in 1961) of the total Indian population. This would give an urban population in 1971 of 109 million, an increase of about 30 million people in urban areas over these ten years. It will be very surprising if precise data from the 1971 census show much variation from the estimated figures given in this paragraph.

For more detailed analysis, we must for the time being continue to use the 1961 census figures. Two im-

* This report was written in early 1971. Although only provisional data from the 1971 census are now available, they do not indicate any basic change in the directions of urban growth (ed. note.)
Important facts which each census reveals are the distribution of the total urban population by size of urban areas, (with the respective growth rates for each class), and the variation in the pattern of urbanization by geographical region and by state within India as a whole.

The Indian census uses five categories of urban area according to population size. Table 2 below compares the distribution of the total urban population in 1951 and 1961 in these five categories:
### TABLE 2

**Population of Urban Areas in 1951 and 1961 According to Size of Towns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class and Size</th>
<th>Number of Urban Areas</th>
<th>Population Thousands</th>
<th>Percent of Total Urban Population in Each Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>2,696</td>
<td>62,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. 100,000-over</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>23,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. 50,000-99,999</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>7,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. 20,000-49,999</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>11,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. 10,000-19,999</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>9,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. 5,000-9,999</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>8,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Below 5,000</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1962, op. cit.; p.xxxv, according to revisions in the data undertaken by the Town and Country Planning Organization, GOI.

**Note:** The reduction from 1951 to 1961 in the total number of urban areas is due to the application in the latter census of a stricter definition of "urban". The effect of this new definition is, of course, more apparent in the identification of the smallest urban centers (Classes V and VI). This equally is the explanation of the difference in the urban total population for 1951, comparing Tables 1 and 2 in this report.
The most noticeable facts from Table 2 are the increasing concentration of the urban population in cities of more than 100,000 population, and the sharp increase over this ten year period in the number of cities of this size in India. In 1951, 38 per cent (or 24 million) of the total urban population lived in 74 cities of over 100,000. By 1961, 44.5 per cent (or 35 million) of the total urban population were concentrated in 113 cities having a population of 100,000 or more.

These "Class I" cities, as they are called, are clearly bearing the major brunt of urban population growth, a very significant fact in relation to problems of urban management. Planning Commission estimates for 1971 indicate that during the 1960s, the number of these cities has increased to 147 (from 113 in 1961), and that the percentage of population in "Class I" cities may have increased to almost half the total of Indian urban population. Table 3 gives the size and growth rates over the 1951-1961 decade for twelve major cities, together with summary information on the other 101 cities in the Class I category of the census.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Range</th>
<th>Population 1951 (1,000's)</th>
<th>Population 1961 (1,000's)</th>
<th>% increase 1951-1961</th>
<th>Area (sq. miles)</th>
<th>Population per sq. miles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: 113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I cities</td>
<td>26,426</td>
<td>38,177</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>2,733</td>
<td>14,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities with 1,000,000 or more</td>
<td>13,982</td>
<td>18,624</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>16,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcutta Metropolitan District</td>
<td>5,370</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater Bombay</td>
<td>2,967</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>24,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi Town Group</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>18,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>1,416</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyderabad Town Group</td>
<td>1,129</td>
<td>1,251</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore Town Group</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities with 500,000 to 1,000,000</td>
<td>2,663</td>
<td>3,563</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanpur Town Group</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poona Town Group</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagpur Town Group</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucknow Town Group</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agra Town Group</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 Cities with 100,000 to 500,000</td>
<td>9,781</td>
<td>15,990</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India, 1961
Table 3 shows, there is considerable variation in the growth rates of major cities (with Calcutta, Madras, Hyderabad and Poona clearly displaying much slower growth rates than the average for the class as a whole). The larger metropolises are, however, growing on average at rates which exceed the growth of the Indian urban population, and this is particularly true for those cities between 100,000 and 500,000 in population size.

The fastest-growing city in India is Delhi, which added one million people in ten years to its 1951 population of 1.4 million. First results from the 1971 census indicate that Delhi has again added well over one million to its population in the last ten years and now exceeds 4 million in population size.

The larger population increases in the urban centers with populations above 100,000 are due to a higher level of migration to these areas, in comparison with the smaller towns. Ashish Bose estimates that during 1951-1961, natural increase accounted for about half of the total growth in urban centers. It seems likely that the rate of natural increase is lower in the larger than the smaller cities, and that this is related to distortions in the sex ratios produced by the sex-selective patterns of migration from the countryside. Characteristically, the rural-urban migrant is a single male in the age-group 15-35,
seeking cash employment in the city, who has left his family behind in his village or origin. This migrational pattern results in larger cities having substantially fewer women, particularly in the child-bearing age-groups, than men. Calcutta, for example, has only 612 females for every 1,000 males. The corresponding figure for Bombay is 663, and for Delhi 785. And the all-India urban average is a ratio of 845 females per 1000 males, which reflects the more even sex balance in the smaller towns.

If the census information heavily stresses the role of the larger cities in the urbanization process in India, a second and equally important aspect that is clearly indicated is the greater variation, by region and State, in the degree of urbanization. In 1961, the census showed 18 per cent of the total Indian population living in urban areas, but a very uneven distribution of this urban population over the face of India.

Table 4 shows this important geographical variation in the level of urbanization among the States of the Indian Union.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and State</th>
<th>Urban Population (in millions)</th>
<th>Urban Population as percentage of total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All India Total</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujerat</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharasthra</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi Union Territory</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Northern and Central Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madhya Pradesh</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southern Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerala</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mysore</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andhra</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assam</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bengal</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orissa</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Census of India, 1961.
The most heavily urbanized regions of India are in the west and the south, most particularly the Western Region, with its heavy concentration of major cities in the two rich and relatively heavily industrialized states of Maharashtra and Gujerat. Over one quarter of the total population of these States lives in urban areas. The least urbanized region is the vast Eastern Region, which contains one quarter of India's total population, but which in 1961 had only 13 per cent of this population living in urban areas. And even this low level of urbanization in the Eastern region is greatly skewed by the impact of the tremendous population concentration in the single metropolitan city of Calcutta. In 1961, with 6.7 million inhabitants, the Calcutta Metropolitan District alone contained 42 per cent of the total urban population of the whole region. The urbanization percentage of West Bengal, including Calcutta, is 24 per cent; if Calcutta is excluded, the urbanization percentage for the remainder of the State drops sharply to 7 per cent. This suggests a basic similarity in the urban character of the rest of the State with its three predominantly agricultural neighbors in the region, Orissa, Assam and Bihar.

Projected Growth of the Indian Urban Population

Recently completed projections for all 735 towns in India which had a 1961 population of over 20,000 (census
Classes I, II, and III), were published earlier this year by the Town and Country Planning Organization of the Government of India. The projections indicate a spectacular increase not only in the total urban population over the next three decades, to the year 2001, but in the number of major urban centers as well. While these projections for individual towns are open to many challenges, they have an important value in indicating the broad magnitude of urban growth, and in alerting policymakers and administrators to the necessity of organizing a more effective governmental response to this scale of expected growth.

The projections for the changes in distribution by size of the 735 towns which in 1961 had a population over 20,000 is shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TOWNS ACCORDING TO SIZE
OVER THE DECADES 1961-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Class I 100,000+</th>
<th>Class II 50,000 - 99,999</th>
<th>Class III 20,000 - 49,999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There will, of course, be a large number of new additions over this period to the Class III category. What Table 5 seeks to show is that within thirty years, India must expect the number of its major urban centers, particularly those above the 100,000 level where the problems of management and infrastructure development pose the greatest difficulties and the greatest demands on scarce resources, to multiply almost threefold.

On the basis of these projections, India must expect an array of metropolises of spectacular scale at the upper levels of the urban hierarchy. Greater Bombay will be 11.3 million by 2001, or twice its 1971 population of 5.6 million. Delhi will reach 9.6 million, or treble its 1971 population. Madras, with a much slower predicted rate of growth, will be 4.5 million. Ahmedabad and Bangalore will have more than doubled to 3.3 million. Poona, Nagpur and Kanpur will all exceed two million. More than a dozen other cities will exceed the million mark, and some fifty others come close to or exceed 500,000 in population size.

Metropolitan Calcutta is not treated in these TCPO projections as a single metropolitan unit. For projections of Calcutta's growth, shorter range projections of the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization are used. At its present rate of growth, Metropolitan Calcutta is likely to exceed 12 million by 1986 (roughly double its 1961 population).
and if its growth continues at this slow but apparently inexorable rate, its 2001 population would exceed 16 million.

Paradoxically perhaps, India's largest city is set in the least urbanized region of India. The Eastern Region, centered on Calcutta and containing the four States of West Bengal, Assam, Bihar and Orissa, had a total 1961 population of 110 million. This was one quarter of India's total 1961 population, but only 13 per cent of this regional total lived in urban areas, as defined by the census. As with the other major regions this four-state region is a closed demographic unit in that net population changes caused by inter-regional migration are negligible. The basic demographic problem, therefore, is to estimate future growth through natural increase, and then to estimate the likely rural-urban distribution of this population that is likely to result from internal migratory movements.

The urbanization situation and prospects for the Eastern Region can be quickly illustrated with a simple set of figures summarizing the intensive demographic analyses and projections produced by CMPO's Regional Planning Wing.

Table 6 clearly demonstrates Calcutta's demographic primacy within this vast area of Eastern India. In 1961, a little under a half of all the urban population of this four-state region lived in the single great metropolitan
city of Calcutta. Apart from Calcutta, there were in fact sixteen other cities of more than 100,000 population distributed throughout the region, but the next largest in size, in 1961, was the city of Patna, capital of Bihar, with a mere 380,000. The demographic imbalance in urbanization has accentuated the magnetic attraction of Calcutta for rural migrants throughout the hinterland, and exerted pressure on Calcutta well beyond the absorptive capacity of its infrastructure, its resources, or its administrative system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Urban Population</th>
<th>Urbanization percentage (Eastern India)</th>
<th>Metro Calcutta Population</th>
<th>% of Urban Population in Calcutta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>110 m.</td>
<td>14 m.</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6.7 m.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>190 m.</td>
<td>30 m.</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12.5 m.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


And the future prospects are bleak indeed. By 1986, the population of this region is expected (by CMPO demographers and the Central Planning Commission) to increase by a further 80 million, to a total of 190 million. And this forecast takes account of the likely impact of family planning programs within the Eastern Region.
Given this basic assumption of total population scale it is possible to forecast: first, the likely change in the demographic balance between rural and urban population in the region over the next twenty-five years; and secondly, against this, the likely rate of population growth of the Calcutta Metropolitan District.

Many different assumptions are, of course, possible for the change in the level of urbanization from the 1961 regional figure of 13 per cent. But, as an illustration of the future urbanization problems of this region, we can take the assumptions that were the basis for the metropolitan planning policies formulated for Calcutta in its Basic Development Plan of 1966.* With an essentially conservative view of the rate of increase of the level of urbanization in the Eastern Region, the Plan concluded:

1. that the urbanization rate in Eastern India could be restricted to an increase of 3 per cent only (from 13 to 16 per cent). But even this would mean that the urban population throughout this region would more than double, increasing by a further 16 million, from the

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14 million of 1961 to 30 million by 1986.*

2. that Calcutta would have to accommodate 6 million of this increase (3 million through its own natural increase, and 3 million new migrants), roughly doubling its population size from 6.7 million to 12.5 million. The Metropolitan District would retain its present demographic position by continuing to hold some 42 per cent of the total urban population of the region because there seemed no prospects of any alternative within this medium-range projection.

3. that consequently, a further 10 million new urban inhabitants (including some 2 million new migrants) would need to be absorbed by other urban centers throughout the region by 1986.

4. finally, that major rural development programs throughout the region would be essential in order to limit rural urban migration to this lower limit of a 3 per

of this 16 million increase in the urban population, some 8 million would be accounted for by natural increase of the existing urban population, 3 million by the increase in size of existing small settlements to the point where they come within the Census definition of "urban," and 5 million by rural urban migration.
cent increase.*

Some refinement of these crude figures is likely when the results of the 1971 census become available. But they can certainly be taken, staggering as they are given the present urban condition, as a broad indication of the fierce population pressure on all the cities of the region, particularly Calcutta, which politicians and administrators must clearly recognize as irreversible. A similar analysis could be presented for each of India's four great geographical regions. There are important variations by region both in the level of urbanization and in existing pattern of distribution of the major urban settlements. The basic points are that everywhere population pressure on the urban centers is intense, and that the population of all the towns and cities of India can be expected to double within a single generation, with the heaviest pressure—and the severest management problems—occurring in the cities having over 100,000 population.

A critical element in all these estimates of the future growth of the urban population is, of course, an assessment of the pattern and volume of rural-urban

* This assumption is of doubtful validity in its estimation of the effect on migration of rural development.
migration. And one of the most surprising gaps in current research in India is the notable lack of attention to the processes of rural urban migration, whether viewed from the effects of these processes on the social and economic systems of specific rural areas, or from the consequences of migration on the morphology and functioning of urban centers of differing scale and economic character.

There are, of course, constant repetitions in the literature of lists of assumed push and pull factors, but we could not find a single major study of any significance in India, covering this subject of vital importance to the understanding of the processes of urbanization. The decennial censuses show the well-known age-sex selectivity of rural-urban migration, but far too little is known of this migration pattern, or of the process of circulatory migration (movements back and forth between urban and rural areas) which is, for example, such an important feature of Calcutta's sociology and of the economic functioning of particular industries and of the rural economy. The relative spatial fluidity of the lowest income groups, both internally within the urban environment and externally to and from the countryside, is an important but unstudied aspect of India's urban situation, having many important development implications. Urbanization means the redistribution of population, and a change
in the demographic balance between rural and urban. Large-scale and systematic studies of the processes of migration are an obvious necessity in India and should be encouraged.

Studies, in particular, are urgently required of the extent to which rural development programs (important, of course, as an end in themselves) and policies of regional development affect the flow of migrants from the countryside to the major cities. One hears in India a good deal of widely expressed euphoria about the green revolution and the impact of the vital technological breakthroughs in agriculture on a hitherto stagnating rural economy. The implication, often explicit in the speeches of rurally-oriented politicians, is that these achievements will markedly relieve the population pressure on the cities. The complexities of this situation need thorough examination if urbanization policies are not to be grounded on false hopes. Two facts appear incontrovertible: first, that the green revolution presently affects only a few geographically-favored areas of the country (notably the Punjab and some very important districts of South India); and secondly, that these technological changes in agriculture may well increase redundancy in certain sectors of the labor force in the rural areas concerned.

These points are well made by Wolf Ladejinsky in an
important recent article which is worth quotation at some length since this is of considerable importance to the understanding of the future prospects for urbanization in India:

The break-through in agriculture is far from a full-fledged revolution. For the time being, Indian agriculture has acquired some muscle. All its benefits cannot yet be estimated, but their gradual and cumulative effects on the purely productive side of the economy are inescapable. That for the time being this only holds true for a minority of India's 60 million farm families does not vitiate changes in the making. In some parts of the country the new sense of initiative and optimism are palpable. That this is indeed so is attested by islands of progress even in a state like Bihar still characterised by agricultural primitivism and almost unrelieved poverty.

....one must say that the revolution is highly 'selective'. even if its spread effects are not inconsiderable in certain areas....three-fourths of India's cultivated acreage is not irrigated, and 'dry farming' predominates....vast parts of the country have not been touched by the transformation at all, and equally vast parts can boast of only 'small islands within'.

The green revolution affects the few rather than the many not only because of environmental conditions but because the majority of farmers lack resources, or are 'institutionally' precluded from taking advantage of the new agricultural trends. The changes engendered by the new agricultural strategy have brought these, and other handicaps-into sharp focus at a time when aspirations for betterment are widespread among all classes of farmers, and when most of them need no persuasion that modernization, which stands for bigger crops and higher income, is good for them. Waiting to be part of it and not getting there create potentially disturbing social, economic and political issues. This is the other side of the coin in any assessment of the course of the green revolution....
It is estimated that in 1969 out of a total rural population of 434 million, 103 million owned no land at all and another 185 million operated less than five acres per family. Taken together they represented 67 per cent of the total rural population, and of these 154 to 210 million lived in abject poverty, or at a level of 200 rupees ($21) per capita per year.

Farm mechanization is as irreversible as the green revolution which fathered it, although much of it will not apply to nearly the same degree in the principal rice areas of India. Events are beginning to catch up with Nehru's lament against farm mechanization as a threat to peasant welfare. Even at this early stage of modernization of the bigger farms of the Punjab, the drive is for more equipment and fewer hands. The estimated 35 to 40 million landless labourers in India are bound to increase in numbers and their rate of employment in any other field of activity is not promising; thus the outlook is for an overcrowded, low wage farm market regardless of the scope of the green revolution.*

The major importance of the green revolution lies both in the production of the essential food surplus required to feed India's rapidly-growing urban masses, and in the development, through increased rural prosperity in the favored areas, of a richer and more extensive home market for the products of urban-based consumer industries. It is likely to have little effect on rural-urban migration for India as a whole, and may, on the contrary, stimulate new waves of migration to cities by those displaced by increasing farm mechanization.

The severity of India's urban problems arises not only because of the rapid growth of India's major cities but equally because of the chronic poverty of this urban population. The highest growth rates are found among the lowest income groups, mainly illiterate, unskilled rural migrants seeking any form of employment so as to obtain the cash income needed to alleviate the bitter poverty of their families back in the villages. India's cities have become reception centers for the rural poor. It has been estimated that 90 per cent of Calcutta's vast human agglomeration falls below the stipulated income level of government-subsidized housing schemes designed to assist "the weaker sections of the population."

The great majority of these migrants into cities such as Calcutta remain "outsiders" not assimilated into the permanent resident populations of these cities, in the sense of being urbanized citizens detached from their rural backgrounds. They consider their stay in the city as essentially temporary, dominated by the hard struggle to survive, and save whatever part of their earnings they can to send back to their families in their villages of origin. They camp out in the city (a most significant aspect of the problem of building effective demand for urban housing), sleeping on the pavements or grouped in male "messing families" in ramshackle bustees or jute
lines in conditions of appalling insanitation. They live and sleep inside the shops and offices, back stairways of hotels, docks, factories, or construction sites where they work. They create demands on urban services, contribute powerfully to the dramatic deterioration of the urban environment, but have little stake in the city as such, little concern for civic progress or civic pride, and little interest in the quality of the urban infrastructure or social services.

Writing about Calcutta, observing the extreme but typical case of the chronic poverty of the urban masses, Ashok Mitra notes:

The city sends out annually about Rs.280 million (equivalent to $56 million) through very small postal remittances: the savings of small men without bank accounts sweating away to keep their families alive in villages of every State and Territory.*

The impact on the metropolis of the unskilled and the unurbanized migrants has been great. On one hand, they have supplied the cheap labor which is essential to the industrial and commercial progress of India's major cities. On the other hand, they have joined already poor resident population to strain the city's services in health and hygiene to the point of breakdown. They have contributed

to the continuing high levels of illiteracy in urban areas, and have helped create a well-nigh insoluble problem of inadequate housing and rural slums in the heart of the city, intolerable to migrant and original resident alike.

The giant scale of India's largest cities, the flood tides of in-migrants from their rural hinterlands, the great volume of remittances of small monthly sums to village homes: all these are fundamentally related to the disparities in economic prosperity which exist, and persist between the city and the hinterland. Though there are many inadequacies in the use of this measure, the per capita incomes of urban areas are certainly very much higher than those of rural India. This marked disparity is of course one of the basic reasons for migration into the urban centers.

As Professor Dandekar writes in a valuable and challenging discussion on poverty in India: "urban poverty is an overflow of rural poverty." According to his calculations, the minimum consumer expenditures needed to maintain an adequate diet "as an absolute minimum," is Rs. 324 per capita per annum in rural areas, and Rs. 486 per capita per annum in urban areas.

About 40 per cent of the rural population and 50 per cent of the urban population is found to be living below this minimum. It means that at the beginning of the Fourth Plan (in 1969) out of an estimated population of 532.7 million, 223.5 million
lived below the desirable minimum.*

So far as India's urban areas are concerned, the continued failure of the governmental system to mobilize and allocate effectively the investment required to stabilize the dramatically deteriorating urban environment, has produced a situation of increasing desperation. If Calcutta has the worst urban situation in the world, all the other major cities of India (except, perhaps, Delhi: though even there the prospects seem bleak) seem to be now heading rapidly in Calcutta's direction. Calcutta represents the threat to the urban future of most Indian cities, and indeed of most of the large cities in the less-developed countries.

In the words of Calcutta's Basic Development Plan:

In spite of its awesome size, its wealth and bustling activity, its vital significance in the national and regional economy, Calcutta is a city in crisis. All who live in this huge metropolitan complex have daily experience of its characteristic problems: chronic deficits in basic utilities such as water supply, sewerage and drainage; and in community facilities such as schools, hospitals, parks and recreation spaces; severe unemployment and under-employment; congested and inadequate transportation; vast housing shortages and proliferating slum areas; soaring land prices and rents; administrative delays and confusion of responsibility for corrective action; absence of clear development objectives over a longer perspective than the next five-year plan; limited state and municipal financial

* Professor U.M. Dandekar and Nilakantha Rath: Poverty in India, 1971, a study commissioned by the Ford Foundation in India as one of a series of 12 studies on India in the Seventies.
resources to cope with this situation.

Over the past two hundred years, many boards and committees and commissions have met and deliberated on the problems of the city and issued reports calling for remedial action. The improvements that were made, if indeed any action was taken, were invariably piece-meal, sporadic, and inadequate to meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population of Calcutta. This has continued to be the case. Obsolescence has not been matched with proper maintenance and new investment, and appropriate expansions and re-organizations of utilities and services have not been undertaken to meet population growth. The increase in population has not been matched with the necessary increase in developed land, with consequent land scarcities injurious both to economic growth and to individual living standards. Metropolitan Calcutta, in effect, has grown in spite of itself—haphazardly, unsystematically, without a suitable structure or coordination of the forces of growth, and with a diminishing shre for each of its residents in such amenities as the community affords.*

These two paragraphs might have been written about any of India’s major cities. They are an incitation of the urbanization problems with which Indian planners and administrators are now confronted. The urban scene is everywhere characterized by a dismal catalogue of deficits and growing chaos which promises to continue and expand with the inevitable annual increases in the urban population. There is a related and visible trend of annual deterioration in the urban environment extending over the whole range of the urban system.

India's first two Five-Year Plans contain little evidence of concern for the implications of national industrial development policies and programs on the population growth of cities. Nor is there any indication, even in embryonic terms, of a detailed policy for industrial location directed to producing an orderly system of regional development or of a national geography of urban centers. If urban development is considered at all in these early plans, it is in terms of urban housing and other social welfare elements. The First and Second Five-Year Plans (covering the period up to 1960) omit any systematic spatial or locational analysis, or any discussion of the effects of national economic policy on the demographic concentration of the urban population.

It was not until the Third Plan (1961-1966) that India's national planners began to consider and emphasize the relationship between policies of industrial development and the growth of the major cities. During the 1950s there had clearly been a growing concern with problems of regional disparity. There were arguments for concentrating industrial development in areas of highest economic advantage, and opposing arguments for decentralized industrial investment to secure the spread effects of development. There was concern also with the growing gigantism of Bom-
Bay and Calcutta particularly, as a result of the concentration of industrial growth.

Sachin Chandhuri, for example, in the international seminar at Berkeley in 1960 dealing with India's urban future (the first major discussion of urban development in India, which led to an important publication in this hitherto neglected field) argued:

There may still be time then for planning urban development in advance and in an orderly manner. The sheer magnitude of the problem, the grave social consequences of neglecting it, make it imperative that, instead of being treated as isolated items of social expenditure under the headings of 'slum clearance,' 'public health,' 'industrial housing,' urban development should be integrated into the Plan.*

The Third Plan (as with the subsequent Fourth Plan 1969-1974) continued to see urban development basically as a problem of 'social welfare' identified as one aspect of housing policy, but did seek to evolve the basic principles of an industrial location policy in relation to urban development. The Plan stated, explicitly and for the first time:

Urbanization is an important aspect of the process of economic and social development, and is closely connected with many other problems such as migration from villages to towns, levels of living in rural and urban areas, relative costs of providing economic and social services in towns of different sizes,

provision of housing for different sections of the population, provision of facilities like water supply, sanitation, transport and power, pattern of economic development, location and dispersal of industries, civic administration, fiscal policies, and the planning of land use.*

A formidable list, indeed. The authors emphasized that of this list, "the most decisive are the pattern of economic development and the general approach to industrial location." The Plan continues:

The broad objective must be to secure balanced development between large, medium-size and small industries, and between rural and urban areas. While this is by no means easy to realise, the main ingredients of development policy are the following:

(i) As far as possible new industries should be established away from large and congested cities.

(ii) In the planning of large industries, the concept of region should be adopted. In each case, planning should extend beyond the immediate environs to a larger area for whose development the new industry should serve as a major focal point.

(iii) In community development projects or other areas within a district, the rural and urban components should be knit into a composite plan based in each case on schemes for strengthening economic inter-dependence between towns and surrounding rural areas.

(iv) Within each rural area the effort should be to secure a diversified occupational pattern in place of the present extreme dependence on agriculture.**


The essence of this national urban strategy expounded in the Third Plan was the objective of "balanced regional development," to be achieved through a deliberate policy of industrial decentralization. In practice, as India's national planners clearly anticipated when they observed that "this is by no means easy to realise," the pressures of economic market forces on government decision-makers continued, throughout the Third Plan period, to favor industrial investment (both new enterprises and the expansion of existing industries) in the two great existing industrial concentrations of Maharashtra and Gujerat, on the one hand, and West Bengal on the other. Between 1956 and 1961, two-thirds of all licences for new industrial units or for the expansion of old ones went to Maharashtra and Gujerat (predominantly to Bombay) and to West Bengal (almost exclusively to Calcutta). And this pattern continued, despite planning theory to such an extent that by the end of the Third Plan period, the Planning Commission found it necessary to assert yet more explicitly:

In metropolitan areas like Bombay and Calcutta where urbanization has reached the limits of saturation, it would be desirable to think in terms of other nuclei for development.

There is constant emphasis in plan publications and in a spate of articles and conference papers on Indian development on the theme of industrial decentralization and its corollaries: rural economic diversification, small town development, limitations on the size of big cities. In practice, however, there exists neither the effective administrative machinery for regional development nor the political determination to counter the strong economic market pressures in favor of concentrated investment. And inevitably the existing metropolitan centers have continued to attract both industrial investment and the flood tides of migrants in search of employment in organized industry or, more likely, in the inflated tertiary sector of petty trades and services.

The second major ingredient of rational urban policy in both the Third and Fourth Plans is the familiar set of recommended measures. The Third Plan, for example, exhorts State Governments to a "set of minimum actions:"

(i) control of urban land values through public acquisition of land and appropriate fiscal policies;
(ii) physical planning of the use of land and the preparation of master plans;
(iii) defining tolerable minimum standards for housing and other services to be provided for towns according to their requirements and also prescribing maximum standards to the extent necessary; and
(iv) strengthening municipal administrations for undertaking new development possibilities.*

* Third Five-Year Plan. op. cit., p. 690.
The subsequent six sections of the Plan discuss each of these "minimum actions" in detail, describing in each case what State Governments ought to do, and in the case of master plan preparation, indicating the assistance that could be provided, on request, by the Central Regional and Urban planning Organization of the Central Government in Delhi (more recently known as the Town and Country Planning Organization-TCPO). The Fourth Plan, quoted earlier, continues this set of exhortations, particularly in respect to the need for municipal re-organization and the strengthening of implementation agencies which are seen as the 'main obstacles' to development progress in urban areas.

The basic point that needs to be emphasized here is that whatever the eloquence of the exposition in the National Plans of national urban policy, the policy recommendations, except in the field of industrial location, cannot be other than exhortatory and advisory. Responsibility for urban development in the Indian political system rests not with the Central Government, even if Central assistance is vital, but with each State.

CENTER-STATE RELATIONS IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
To understand the location of responsibility for the formulation and implementation of policies in urban development, one must go to the Indian Constitution which defines
the powers of the Union Government in relation to those of the States. India is a union of eighteen States, each with its own legislature and administration, and eleven Union Territories which are administered directly from Delhi. The States vary enormously in area, population, and political power. The largest State, Uttar Pradesh, had a population in 1971 of 88 million and, were it independent, would rank among the ten largest countries in the world. The smallest State is Nagaland with a population just exceeding half a million. Twelve of the States have populations of over 20 million, six of these having more than 40 million. All the Union Territories are small in size (the Andaman Islands, for example, or Tripura, Manipur or Pondicherry) and only two of them are significant in the field of urban development: the national capital of Delhi and the city of Chandigarh, designed as the new capital for the Punjab, and now administered as a Union Territory pending settlement of the prolonged dispute over its ownership between the new States of Haryana and Punjab (these States were formed out of the linguistic division of the old Punjab State).

The Indian Constitution defines the jurisdictions of the units in this federal system of government, and in its Seventh Schedule allocates in three lists (Union, State and Concurrent) the legal distribution of respon-
sibilities between the Union and the States regarding all sectors of India's administration and development. This of course is thoroughly familiar to all who know the Indian system of government; it is particularly important, and much less well recognized, in understanding the Indian response to the problems of urbanization.

There is no mention of "urban development" as such in any of the three lists, and from this fact flows much of the complexity and confusion of responsibilities in Center-State relationships in the field of urbanization generally.

This omission is significant, and it possibly has its origin in profound anti-urban attitudes which have long characterized Indian political and intellectual thinking (and which have been admirably discussed in an important paper by Leo Jakobson and Ved Prakash*). The intellectual and political climate in India has long been strongly anti-urban, particularly as regards the large cities, such as Calcutta, seen more as hopeless humanitarian and social welfare problems, and even as the unwanted legacies of British colonialism, rather than as modern economic complexes of major importance to national and regional economic development.

Gandhian attitudes to the Indian city are well-known and have had a profound influence (even if this is now fading) on Indian intellectual attitudes toward urban life. Gandhi saw "city dwellers as agents of exploitation of the people of India--every pice that went into their pockets was tainted money." If India's modern economic planners do not share Gandhi's extreme idealization of the village community, there is little doubt that the ideal survives. It can still be traced in both national planning ideology and, perhaps more strongly, in the expressed attitudes of leading politicians at national and state levels.

Like Gandhi, Nehru too was anti-urban in outlook. As Chairman of the pre-independence National Planning Committee, he strongly influenced the tone of a series of reports on national planning principles and administration. These reports can be thought of as precursors to the National Five-Year Plans and contain ample evidence of anti-urban sentiments. Nehru was easily upset at the sight of slums and was deeply perturbed by the differences between the city and the village. In his view, if these vast differences remained, it would not be possible to achieve a balanced economy in the country. The migration from village to the city, according to Nehru, "did no good to the city but they (the migrants) did a lot of bad to the village by coming away from it. It must be stopped."

These anti-urban attitudes still constitute a powerful ideological theme in contemporary India, and are clearly one of the major obstacles to urban reform, particularly among the 'peasant' politicians representing the numerically dominant rural constituencies who form the

overwhelming majority of any State legislature. As Jakobson and Prakash correctly observe:

Ideological and emotional factors largely govern attitudes towards urbanization. The big city is an evil. The discussion of urban problems lacks objectivity, and all too often opinions are based on erroneous assumptions, distorted facts, and the naive desire to recapture the past. Development policies aimed at quickening the pace of industrialization, therefore, express a built-in locational bias in favour of the self-sustained small community even in the case of large industries. Small-scale industry, in turn, is almost always identified with and considered in the context of a rural setting. An urbanization pattern based on limited or medium size towns is to be achieved by balanced regional development and industrial location policies. These policies imply decongesting large cities, limiting the growth of other urban areas beyond a certain size, and establishing new towns.*

The persistence of these romantic attitudes to the village community in the face of the overwhelming facts of demographic concentration has frustrated the "bold action" for the radical re-organization of metropolitan and municipal government which is continually emphasized by the planning technocrats who write the chapters of National Plans. And, equally, it has prevented the emergence of any vigorous political interest in the re-examination of the current divided and confused distribution of responsibility for urban development in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Two allocations in these lists are clear and unequivocal, and of central

importance to the understanding of urban development policy in India.

Industries, and policies concerned with, for example the location and licensing of industrial investment, are exclusively the responsibility of the Union Government in Delhi. This is, of course, one of the key-ingredients in a national urban policy. And, as with the Third Plan, this has essentially formed the basis at the national level (even if the decisions have been subject to heavy political pressure from State Governments) for the growing awareness of the need for clear thinking on controlling the growth of the great metropolitan cities, recognizing that industrial location policy is one major method of regulating the pattern of urbanization in the country as a whole.

On the other hand, local government in both urban and rural areas (and therefore the responsibility for the organization and efficiency of urban administration, a subject of particular relevance to this report) is exclusively the responsibility of State Governments.

Beyond these two subjects, the constitutional position regarding the various aspects and components of urban development is extremely complicated and open to much confusion and bureaucratic delay in practice.

This whole question has been most usefully discussed
in a series of papers* by Abhijit Datta and Mohit Bhattarcharya, two Indian academics at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in Delhi, who have made the study of urban government and urban administration their special field of inquiry. Taking as their definition of urban development "the creation and stimulation of basic facilities for the promotion of the comprehensive areal development of the urban nuclei in the country" (a limited definition in that it is concerned only with the urban environment), Datta and Bhattarcharya indicate the distribution of responsibility for the "components" of urban development in the following Table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Components</th>
<th>List I (Union)</th>
<th>List II (State)</th>
<th>List III (Concurrent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Town Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Economic and Social Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Housing and Slum Clearance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Land Acquisition and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Acquisition of Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Lines of Communication</td>
<td>National Highways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transportation</td>
<td>Waterways &amp; Airways</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Mechanically Propelled Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gas and Electric Duty</td>
<td>Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Water Supply</td>
<td>Inter-State Rivers</td>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Drainage and Sewerage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public Health &amp; Sanitation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though the problems of water supply, sewerage and drainage in urban areas are clearly the concern of the States in which they are located, the position regarding town planning and housing and slum clearance is by no means clear. Neither appears as such in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

Dattu and Bhattarcharya, recognizing the importance in India of the games that bureaucrats play, argue strongly (and, it seems, correctly) for a revision of the Schedule so as to clarify responsibilities for the whole field of urban development. They believe that this basic revision is warranted by the growing urban crisis, particularly in the major metropolitan cities. The Schedule to the Constitution, as one of the basic national documents defining rights and duties at all levels of government, should give a clear direction to the States in urban development, as an inseparable aspect of the States' responsibilities for local Government. A revision would thus strengthen the States' awareness of their essential and inescapable functions in the creation of basic facilities in their towns and cities, as well as lending constitutional support for the legislative authority required for efficient action in urban areas.

This would be an important step forward. It would emphasize the urban responsibilities of State Governments,
but it would not, of course, solve the problem common to all levels of government: the acute scarcity of financial resources, commensurate with the scale of the investments in urban infrastructure that are so urgently required. Revision of the Schedule to the Constitution needs to be accompanied by drastic measures to augment municipal finances, and to allocate to States a larger share of national resources for these urban development responsibilities. This is the crux of the Indian urban problem.

Although the components of urban development appear in the State list, the Central Government assumes a good deal of authority and control over States' jurisdictions and development programs. This situation has evolved over the last twenty years or so because of the post-independence stress on national planning over five-year periods with increasing central control over priorities and resource allocations in State Plans; and the scarcity of resources at the State level to support, without Central financial assistance, major programs in urban development.

Recognizing the need for major assistance to the States for urban capital works programs, the Central Government has formulated, at different times over the last two decades, nine urban development schemes under the direction of various Central Ministries. These nine schemes of financial assistance to the States from the centers
cover four main subjects:

a. The provision of water supply and sewerage in towns and cities;
b. Assistance with urban housing for the lower income groups and including, as one of the schemes, the acquisition and development of land in urban areas for the housing of "the weaker sections of the community;"
c. The preparation of master plans for cities and regions;
d. The initiation of pilot projects in urban community development.

All nine schemes, under these four headings, are currently in operation and each has its own specific pattern of grant and loan financing.

For example, under the Slum Clearance and Improvement Scheme, State Governments can obtain, for programs approved by the Central Government, 50 per cent of the total cost of the urban program as loan and a further 37.50 per cent as a direct central grant, leaving the State, apart from the problem of debt-servicing, to finance only 12.50 per cent from its own resources.

For all programs of water supply and sewerage in urban areas, the Center—under one of these nine schemes—will make available 100 per cent of the cost as a loan to
the State Government.

At the other extreme, for all approved activities of master plan preparation in urban areas and related regions, the Center will bear the full cost as a 100 per cent grant-in-aid from the Center to State Governments, or to the local urban bodies (via the State). Under this scheme, for example, the Central Government in Delhi pays annually to the West Bengal Government the full costs of the establishment of the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization.

In theory, then, there is an elaborate organization for national assistance to States for various components of urban development. In practice, this is more a facade than an effective reality.

Three points need to be made about the implementation of this complex pattern of Central assistance to State Governments. First, though the schemes exist, financial resources are hopelessly inadequate and cannot achieve any significant impact on the desperate problems of urban environmental deterioration with which State Governments are universally faced. The funds available are token and palliative.

The allocation in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-1974) for all these Central schemes in "housing, urban and regional development" for the whole of India is, for example, only Rs. 48.60 crores (the equivalent of some
97 million U.S. dollars).* The competition between States for the allocation of these meagre financial resources is intense.

It has been estimated that finance of the order of Rs. 1000 crores is needed to provide safe drinking water to all the urban areas. At the present rate of progress it would take 10 to 15 years before the (present) minimum needs of water supply and sanitation in the urban areas could be met. The order of financial requirements in metropolitan areas is also staggering. The Delhi Master Plan, for instance, envisaged a capital outlay over a five-year period of about Rs. 135 crores. Bombay's requirements might also be placed at around Rs. 200 crores if the Bombay Master Plan is to be implemented.

The Basic Development Plan of Calcutta estimates an expenditure of about Rs. 100 crores during the Fourth Five-Year Plan for which the State Government is prepared to commit only Rs. 30 crores, and the rest is left uncovered, presumably to be financed by the Centre. Similarly, a conservative estimate of the borrowing requirements of local governments is estimated at around Rs. 100 crores per year.**

We will return later in this report to this basic question of resources for urban development. The point here is that the formidable and complex pattern of Central assistance to States for urban programs is unsupported in national plan allocations by anything other than token funds.

Secondly, this token allocation is itself symptomatic

* Plus a special allocation to Calcutta in the Fourth Plan, largely as a result of a combination of intense political pressure and persistent planning advocacy, of a further sum of Rs. 40 crores to support short-term action programs.

the low priority accorded by the Center to urban development, a situation which is reflected throughout India in the priorities of State Plans. This is explained partly by the anti-urban attitudes of politicians referred to earlier; partly and more understandably by the urgent pressures of other issues, notably food production and rural development in an overwhelmingly peasant country; and partly by the failure, ubiquitous in developing countries, to perceive urbanization as a positive force in national social and economic development. As elsewhere, negative attitudes to urban growth predominate.

Urban problems continue to be identified with social welfare (and consequently with less productive investment) which, given the overriding goals of economic growth, is ranked at the lowest level of priority in the competing demands for the allocation of resources in national and State planning. If these attitudes persist in the face of the massive and accelerating population transfer that is now taking place, from the already over-populated rural areas to the already over burdened major cities, the prospects of India's urban future defy contemplation.

Thirdly, with time one of India's scarcest resources, this pattern of nine schemes, operated by a variety of Central Ministries, is a classic example of built-in bureaucratic delay. Any application from a State to the Central Government for assistance under one of the schemes
requires, literally, several years of correspondence before the program is approved (technically, administratively, financially, politically) and the very modest funds released for work to begin in fact. No one who has worked in Calcutta could possibly underestimate the complications and delays that this system encourages.

For every urban water supply or sanitation project costing more than Rs. 10 lakhs, Central review and approval is necessary. This involves elaborate and often interminable technical analyses, both at the Center and State levels, of standards and regulations, land acquisition proposals (a formidable source of delay in itself), and "project scrutiny." Under some of these Central Schemes, the approval that is required—even for the most modest financial assistance—extends, as in Master Plan preparation for example, to the job description, and qualifications, and pay scales of even the most junior levels of staffing.

It is not difficult to believe that this whole ponderous and complex system is in need of urgent revision, if the nation is to organize itself more efficiently, and to clarify and delegate responsibility, for the large-scale and effective development action that is so obviously required in its increasingly chaotic cities.

There are at least four measures that are immediately required (and these can be used to summarize this particular
discussion of Center-State relationships in urban development):

1. A revision of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution to give clear and exclusive responsibility to State Governments for all environmental aspects of urban development so that programs can be framed in a systematic and integrated manner.

2. The concentration of all Central Assistance Schemes on the major Class I cities and great metropolitan areas, leaving the smaller towns and cities to be dealt with by the State Governments out of their own resources. And, of course, the substantial augmentation by the Center of the funds available for this major city assistance program.

3. The wider use of block grants to States for urban development, and the immediate abolition of the present requirements for Central approval for any individual scheme.

4. The concentration by the Center on an advisory rather than on a direct administrative role.

Essentially this means the decentralization of full powers and responsibilities for urban development, from the Center to the States, supported by increased financial allocations from the Center. This should be accompanied, where necessary, by technical assistance to the States and
to specific cities and urban concentrations.

Perhaps, as Datta suggests, the most important function of the Central Government in this field would be:

the creation of a loan agency for urban development which might take the form of a development bank which could be financed jointly by the Reserve Bank of India, the Life Insurance Corporation, the State Governments and the commercial banks—more or less on the lines of the State Financial Corporations. Such an urban development bank could offer long-term loans to municipal government, water and sanitation boards, improvement trusts and development boards, housing boards and public utility undertakings.*

There are already signs in the Indian Fourth Plan of the formation at the national level of a major new apex organization (with a capital of Rs. 200 crores) for the provision of loan finance in housing. A full-scale national urban development bank, if it can be efficiently organized and managed, would be a major contribution to a more effective response to the problems of rapid urban growth, particularly in the great metropolitan cities. The provision of additional, and large-scale, new financial resources for urban government, both for maintenance and development, is certainly one of the key issues. It is often argued in India that the desperate financial condition of the urban local bodies is the root cause of their weakness and inefficiency. This is far from the whole diagnosis, but few would disagree that an

* A. Datta, op. cit., p. 20.
essential part of the treatment that these ailing urban bodies require is a massive injection of more finance.

**URBAN ADMINISTRATION**

The need for strengthening the responsibility and capacity of State Governments to deal more directly and effectively with their urban centers seems inescapable. It is at this level that power lies; local government is exclusively a State subject constitutionally, and in the British-Indian phrase "municipal bodies are creatures of state laws."

State governments have the exclusive power to create municipalities, to alter their jurisdictions, to merge one with another, to create metropolitan authorities or functional agencies in urban areas and to abolish ("supersede") existing urban governments, either temporarily or permanently, at the will of the State legislature (usually on grounds of financial malpractice or political deadlock at the municipal level). State control covers all aspects of municipal administration, including budgetary approval, project sanctioning, senior staff appointments and dismissals, powers of inspection, audit, and supervision. If urban government is ever to be radically re-organized, and the managerial competence of day-to-day administration improved, the power to do so
resides exclusively with State Governments.

The basic question is why is this power not exercised in the face of the obvious and constantly reiterated facts of municipal incompetence and jurisdictional inadequacy? As Mohit Bhattarcharya observes:

In India there seems to be an inverse relationship between growth in urbanization and the consequent aggravation of urban problems, and the amount of inquiries and research into them. The system of elective urban local government was established (as a British innovation) during the middle of the last century and has remained largely static, although it stands badly in need of repair and renovation. Even the most optimistic observer would express concern about the system's performance and call for thorough examination and suitable reforms.*

These calls for inquiry and reform have thus far fallen on deaf ears among State Government political leaders.

There are five types of urban local bodies in India, of which only the first two (as shown in Table 8) can be considered full-fledged representative urban government:

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### TABLE 8

**Urban Local Bodies in India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Municipal Corporations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Municipal Councils</td>
<td>1483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Cantonment Boards</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Notified Area Committees</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Town Area Committees</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Municipal Corporations and Municipal Councils date, in form, function, and often in fact, from the nineteenth century and remain essentially unchanged to this day. The corporation dates from the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act of 1888, and exists now in precisely this ancient model in all the principal cities. The corporation system is a familiar British export. It occurs in all the major cities throughout the former British colonial empire, from Lagos to Kuala Lumpur. The Indian municipal corporation has the same distinctive features: a statutory distribution of powers among three co-ordinate authorities—the corporation or the council of elected representatives, the commissioner, and the standing committees.
The commissioner (the head of executive administration) is appointed by the State Government. The standing committees derive their power from the Corporation Act itself, or through delegation by the council. The mayor (the head of the corporation) has no executive powers and usually holds office by council election for one year only. The commissioner is the key administrative officer; it is his responsibility to supervise the day-to-day administration of the corporation (and therefore of the city) through his chief officers—the Corporation Treasurer, Chief Assessment Officer, City Engineer, Medical Officer of Health, City Architect, and so on.

It is a system which is simple to describe, and scarcely seems the prescription for the inadequacy, inefficiency, corruption, internal struggles, nepotism, and political irresponsibility, which, in varying degree, are so rightly described as its characteristic features. This is accompanied by the characteristic apathy and disillusionment of the populace with local government in general.

The commissioners of these corporations are usually senior Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers appointed by the State Government, but they often have little personal enthusiasm for managing one of the great cities, or any certainty of, or desire for, lengthy tenure.
in the post. Calcutta Corporation, as perhaps the worst example, has had six different Commissioners over the last decade.

This lack of continuity, extreme in the Calcutta example, in the tenure of corporation officers is characteristic of all metropolitan cities and is itself one of the major ingredients in the failure to develop strong and effective government at the urban level. The low prestige of local government service extends downward from the commissioners through all staff levels. The poor pay scales and service conditions have consistently failed to attract talented and qualified officers, and the vicious circle of low prestige, poor staff, high inefficiency has proved impossible to break.

As so often observed, municipal administration has become a synonym for maladministration. If the internal structure and functions of corporations and municipalities and the attendant problems of personnel capacity and recruitment form one set of ingredients in this maladministration, the second set of problems lies in the familiar jungle of the fragmentation of urban government, particularly in the metropolitan cities. This of course, is a worldwide problem.*

* Discussed in a spate of international and national studies, and most usefully examined in a series of comparative case studies of urban government. (continued on next page...)}
Indian cities are not unique in this familiar conflict of municipal jurisdictions, the confusion of agency responsibility, the irrationality of urban boundaries, the dispersion and dissipation of political control and fiscal...

...ferences in conferences and seminars in India (and in planning documents at both the national and urban level) to the need for radical reorganization of municipalities have not met with any enthusiastic response at the state government level where the power to undertake this re-organization lies. Some major changes have certainly taken place. The jurisdiction of the Bombay Corporation was greatly expanded in the 1950s, through great local political determination, to absorb its suburban municipalities into the single metropolitan government of "Greater Bombay." The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay now has an area of 186 square miles and a population of almost six million in 1971. It is the largest municipal authority in India though, to overcome the strong initial resistances to annexation, it still has to maintain separate...
and reduced assessments and budgets for the outer suburban municipalities which were annexed.

The establishment of the Delhi Corporation in 1958 brought a number of disjointed municipal bodies under unified control as well as the rural areas of Delhi Union Territory, covering about 300 villages. Similar expansions of the main city boundary and annexations of substantial areas of the urban fringe have taken place, often against great local political opposition, in a number of other cities, notably Poona and Kanpur. These, however, have been isolated and 
\textit{ad hoc} actions rather than the full and systematic re-organization of urban government that is obviously required (particularly for the 147 cities, in 1971, with populations of over 100,000, and even more particularly for the twelve great metropolitan cities with populations, in 1962, of over 500,000).

Though an extreme case, Metropolitan Calcutta nonetheless typifies the characteristic Indian urban governmental situation. The Calcutta Metropolitan District contains three corporations, thirty-one municipalities, thirty-two non-municipal towns, one cantonment board, one notified area authority, and parts of four rural Districts (with 426 villages) having, in the Metropolitan District, the Zilla Parishad and Panchayat structure of rural self-government.
This medley of urban government in Calcutta Metropolitan District is composed of units which vary greatly in size but which in general share the common characteristics of inadequate tax resources, irrational areas of jurisdiction, low standards of service, and a governmental and administrative machinery that has failed to grow with the times and adapt to the changing and developing needs of the complex urban agglomeration that is Metropolitan Calcutta today.*

Although there is a basic recurrent theme in the growing literature on urban government in India which emphasizes the lack of specific research on the organization and functions of existing city governments, and the lack of detailed, analytical case studies of city management, there is certainly no absence of talk and pontification on the subject. Ashish Bose, in a recent comprehensive (and skillfully and entertainingly written) * bibliographical survey of this whole field, lists no less than twenty-seven Indian conferences and seminars on urban administration and municipal government over the last twenty years (twenty two of these within the last decade). The bibliography also lists no less than seventy-six government reports, since Independence, on various aspects of municipal finance, municipal law, urban governmental organization, the operation and financing of public utilities in urban

* Basic Development Plan, op. cit., p. 35.

** Ashish Bose, "Administration of Urban Areas". New Delhi, Indian Council of Social Science Research, 1970.
areas, or on the annexation of suburban municipalities and fringe rural areas.

If any general summary of this torrent of words and mountain of paper is possible, it would be that there is in India a widespread verbal acceptance of the following doctrine:

The characteristics of urban growth and its concomitant problems have important administrative implications. First, to fulfill urban development functions government must cope with constant change. Second, its resources and activity must increase significantly. Third, it must be equipped to handle demands of rising complexity and technicality. Fourth, its organization must be adapted to new functions and relationships. Finally it must take account of the future consequences of present actions. The essence of urban growth is change—demographic, social, economic. A basic administrative challenge of urbanization is, therefore, the necessity for coping with change itself. Solution to urban problems require developmental strategies.*

In this field as in so many others there is a vast and often bewildering gap—given the urgencies imposed by rapid urban growth—between diagnosis and treatment. As Ashish Bose concludes his own formidable survey of reports and conferences on the administration of urban areas:

The advent of freedom, far from improving Municipal administration, witnessed a remarkable deterioration....Very few attempts have been made to discard the early 19th century framework (copied from the structure of local self-government of Great Britain) of municipal administration, laws and bye-laws, rules and regulations, procedures and practices. This obsolescence has put a brake on urban development....the five-year plans have helplessly admitted the severe limitations of municipal administration while doing very little about introducing radical changes in such administration....Meanwhile the situation in Calcutta--India's first city--has gone out of control....If this stagnation is not broken, it is difficult to visualise how we can keep conflict and violence out of cities.*

The field studies of the International Urbanization Survey--in a wide variety of developing countries--have consistently indicated the need for a much higher priority, both nationally and in international assistance, to the vital field of urban administration. Cities in the less developed countries in general appear to be trying to cope with what are essentially a whole new range of managerial problems, yet are doing so with the traditional approaches of 'stable' and affluent cities in the more developed countries. As this discussion has illustrated, India is a typical example of this. It is, however, a

good deal easier to draw attention to needs than to specify the actions now required to break out of this morass of governmental, and essentially political, inertia.

In India as in other less developed countries, one is left with a series of questions rather than answers:

1. Will the mounting pressures produced by a combination of rapid urban growth and visible urban governmental failure force State Governments—who alone have the capacity to act—into a major re-organization of the institutions of urban government so as to produce more efficient machinery for urban development action?

2. Will steps be taken to improve the managerial quality of these reformed administrative systems so as to bring to bear a much higher level of management talent than is currently available? In essence, how long is it going to take for State Government political leaders to recognize that the running of, say, a great city like Calcutta or Bombay or Madras requires the highest management skills that the State has available, and that this specialized task should rank in prestige, at all personnel levels, with that presently accorded to the national and State administrative services?
3. Will both the Central and State Government recognize the urgency of augmenting the financial resources available to urban governments, particularly in the giant cities, and permit greater entrepreneurial latitude and autonomy in the allocation of these resources for urban development action? These questions strike awareness, management, resources, and a more effective drive to development action in India's cities. Each State must seek its own answers within the context of its own political framework. With full recognition of the complexity of the problems involved (but also of the vital importance of this question to India's urban future), it seems that the most that can be said is that the Indian Government, as at the Center of this federal system, and international advice (where the opportunity arises as in major projects of internationally assisted capital development works in specific Indian cities), should urge State Governments to seek positive and rational answers as one of the highest priorities in the entire field of urban development.

IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES IN URBAN AREAS

Few reports on an administration in India start without emphasizing that the system was a foreign import and is now a historical relic of nineteenth century British India. Contemporary Indian writers recognize, quite correctly it
seems, in this historical fact an important explanation of the present ambivalent attitudes to municipal government. As Bose observes:

> It appears to us that the prime motive behind Mayo's resolution of 1870 (on local government), and of subsequent resolutions during British rule, was the containment of the national upsurge by giving limited administrative responsibilities to Indian leaders without adequate financial power. The emphasis (in urban self-government) was on the maintenance of essential services like sanitation and water supply, and not on urban development as such.*

The basic policy, whatever the British motives originally, has survived to this day. In the earlier decades of this century, Indian national leaders like Pherozshah Mehta, Gokhale, Vallabhai Patel, S.R. Das, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose—all of whom served as mayors of municipal councils—were clearly more interested in the use of the councils as wider political forums than in urban administration as such (and indeed the system deprived them of the financial powers necessary for a serious interest in the latter). With Independence, the most able and ambitious political leaders were drawn at once into Parliament and the Central Government, and into State Legislatures and the State Governments. Local government in both rural and urban areas occupied the lowest level of prestige and power attracting politicians.

of the most mediocre ability. More recently, local government has been seen as a "forum" to be captured by extremist parties of Right or Left, a curious repetition of the historical pattern.

Real political and financial power, under British rule and since Independence, has been denied to urban government, no matter how large the city. The major responsibility—without adequate finance to exercise even this—of municipalities has been maintenance, together with very limited powers of assessment and tax collection. The only major service, apart from maintenance, for which municipalities are responsible is primary education with an almost total dependence on State government grants-in-aid to undertake this task.

Urban government in India began in an atmosphere of distrust, and so it has continued. This is one of the main reasons, it seems, for the proliferation of special statutory authorities with special powers, financing, and functions in capital development works or in the management of basic utilities and services. Municipalities look after markets and slaughter houses, maintain roads and footpaths, enforce building by-laws, provide inoculation and vaccination services, register births and deaths, and so forth—all with an obvious degree of inefficiency. Development projects are almost invariably executed by special authorities, originally by the Improvement Trusts set up by the British in the belief that capital development works could not be entrusted to the local self-government
corporations and councils which they had handed over to Indian politicians. Apart from Bombay, where the former Improvement Trust has been fully absorbed into the new Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, they still survive in the major cities. The Improvement Trust in Delhi was converted in 1957 into the Delhi Development Authority, with enlarged powers and financing but reflecting essentially a continuation of the same technique of separating development as a function of a statutory authority from maintenance and services as the main functions of the Delhi Corporation.

From this historical separation has grown a complex pattern of special development agencies in urban areas, a kind of substitute for a full-scale system of representative urban government:

Important local functions such as transportation, housing, slum clearance and improvement, planning and development, hospitals, electricity and gas, and even water supply and sewerage have been entrusted to these special authorities or kept in the hands of State departments. It is amazing how the craze for efficient functional administration has led us into a labyrinthine pattern of local administration. Apart from the impoverishment of local government, it has resulted in an uncoordinated administrative mess. Each function has been allowed to be administered in an insular fashion without regard for its repercussion on the allied services. Imagine the confusion in a situation where transportation is left to the charge of one authority, and physical planning to another. 'Housing' is in general entrusted to the housing boards; but water supply and sewerage and drainage, education, electricity, personal health services, public works including roads are assigned to some other authorities....
In fact, in this situation marked by discordant administration, the overall needs of a local area are lost sight of, as there is no single authority to look after the totality of the civic services of a local community. Irrational apportionment of administrative responsibilities has tended to elevate functional administration above comprehensive area administration, and in consequence our local areas have so many authorities but no single all-embracing local government.*

Much of the debate about the reform of urban local government in India centers around this issue of the relationship between special authorities, on the one hand, and elected local councils on the other. Theorists in public administration clearly favor, as can readily be seen by the above typical quotation, what they call "the whole system" of elected and representative government in urban areas. In the passionate arguments that flow from this position, the flag of democracy, a powerful emotive symbol in India, is quickly raised, and rallies to the cause a motley array of local political leaders vitally concerned with preserving their municipal fiefs and with obtaining the powers and finance now denied them in the independent, statutorily-protected capital development agencies.

And, again as the above quotation shows, they have strong arguments on their side, particularly those of co-ordination and of political accountability. Any Indian

urban area, as is only too familiar to anyone who has worked in Calcutta, is a jungle of special authorities, each with inadequate finance, indifferent management, competing and often conflicting powers, and often very low levels of technical proficiency among their inflated staffs. Here are for example more than fifty agencies in the Calcutta Metropolitan District concerned with various aspects of traffic and transportation. This extreme fragmentation exists in varying degree in other urban utilities and services, making inter-agency co-ordination very difficult. It cannot but frustrate the creation and implementation of a rational development plan for any of the great cities of the country. The system is easy to criticize, but it is doubtful if the problems can be solved by the abolition of the functional development agencies in favor of a "whole system" of democratic urban government with integrated capital development and day-to-day administration...responsibilities. Not, at least, in the present atmosphere in India of the almost complete distrust of the efficiency of elected municipal administrations.

On the other side of this debate are the civil servants of State Governments (usually IAS officers) and the technocrats who believe, with much justification, that nothing will be done unless a special statutory agency, protected by law from political intervention at
lower levels, is set up to do it. They see democracy discredited daily in city halls and municipal offices, and have little respect for public administration academics' theorizing. Their weight has been thrown on the side of specialized and functional development authorities in urban areas. But there is more to their case than just a profound lack of confidence in the efficiency of any system run by local politicians.

There is an important and increasing recognition among these civil servants and technocrats that the modern technologies utilized by urban government call for unified and integrated services and plants, based on rationally defined areas of service jurisdiction, so as to take full advantage of the economies of scale in capital investment and to foster the provision of efficient management, operation, and maintenance of the services created.

They increasingly accept that these services—in water supply and sewerage, in transportation, or in garbage disposal—cannot be provided efficiently within the confines of the crazy patchwork of municipal boundaries. Population growth overflows these political boundaries very rapidly. Yet, the municipal boundaries (all over the world) and the vested interests of local politicians in maintaining them must be, without a single doubt, recognized as facts of life, say the State Government civil
servants. Argue about metropolitan government and the radical re-organization of existing municipalities but the only effective way to get on with the job is to pass the legislation in the State legislature to create the separate and independent agency that is empowered by law to ignore existing boundaries in capital development works and service operation. This, whatever the theory and sentiments of elected local government, is the only practical approach.

This line of reasoning has obvious merit considering the realities of the Indian urban predicament. Its great failing has been piecemeal implementation, leading to the maze of specialized but uncoordinated agencies that have become an easy target for the academic theorists in Institutes of Public Administration, and thus the staple of conferences and seminars on urban government in India.

Three practical approaches have been sought to find a rational way out of this characteristic Indian debate. In Delhi, power and support for the Delhi Development Authority has been greatly expanded, enabling it to become a single, all-embracing capital development agency, with commanding powers in planning and implementation. There are still many difficulties, even though Delhi favored, as the nation's capital, with financial allocations well in excess of those for any of the other great cities. But the principle is clear: one plan, one capital develop-
The situation in Calcutta is far more complex, and the Delhi approach is clearly unworkable. The Basic Development Plan for Metropolitan Calcutta made the usual, and necessary, genuflexions towards the strengthening of democratic municipal government and argued for the consolidation of local government units from the existing thirty-five to nine, but without great confidence that much could be achieved with the speed essential to resolving the problems inherent in the Calcutta situation. Or, perhaps, the belief was that this could not be done at all in the political chaos of West Bengal, if done, it would not have any effective results, given the demonstrable inefficiencies of municipal administration in the Calcutta Metropolitan District.

The Basic Development Plan, on the contrary, threw its full weight behind the creation (out of the existing medley of special agencies) of a new system of functional agencies at the metropolitan level, ignoring the existing patchwork of municipal boundaries:

1. A Metropolitan Planning Authority
2. A Metropolitan Water and Sanitation Authority
3. A Metropolitan Traffic and Transportation Authority
4. A Metropolitan Bustee Improvement Authority
5. A Metropolitan Housing Authority
CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN DISTRICT: ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL

STATE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

STATE PLANNING DEPARTMENT
- Economic Planning
- Physical Planning

CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN PLANNING AUTHORITY
- Plan Preparation and Coordination
- Capital Budgeting
- Plan Review and Enforcement
- Planning Information
- Planning Negotiations and Processing

METROPOLITAN FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITIES
- CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN WATER AND SANITATION AUTHORITY
- CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
- MOOGLY RIVER BRIDGE COMMISSIONERS
- CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN PARKS AND RECREATION AUTHORITY
- HOOGHLY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY
- HOOGHLY HOUSING AUTHORITY (10% OF STATE HOUSING BOARD
- CALCUTTA METROPOLITAN EDUCATION COMMISSION

HALDIA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

SILIGURI PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

OTHER AUTHORITIES

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES

EAST BANK DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
- Urban Renewal
- Area Development

WEST BANK DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
- New Township Development
- Local Planning

KALYANI-BANSBERIA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

ADMINISTRATIVE COORDINATION
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION

URBANIZATION IN INDIA
INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
6. A Metropolitan Parks and Recreation Authority
7. A Metropolitan Education Commission

The creation of three new capital development agencies for urban renewal and area development in the Metropolitan District was also proposed: an East Bank Authority greatly expanding the area and powers of the existing Calcutta Improvement Trust; a West Bank Authority similarly extending the existing Howrah Improvement Trust; and a new Authority for the development of Kalyani Township in the extreme north of the Metropolitan District.

The details of these agencies need not concern us here. The principle of the Calcutta Plan was the basic acceptance that if metropolitan government was desirable but unattainable in the short term, a metropolitan approach to effective action was nevertheless essential and could be constructed out of an orderly system of statutory and coordinated metropolitan agencies.

This principle has prevailed in Calcutta, tempered in practice by the political vicissitudes to which this volatile city seems peculiarly and distressingly subject. It is a major step forward in the search for the rational system of development action and governmental reform that India's great metropolitan cities need.

The Calcutta planners saw the Metropolitan Planning Authority as the principal co-ordinating agency (responsible
to the State Government that this system of capital development agencies functional fields obviously requires. With some modification in the original concept, this "command agency" has now been established—the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) was created in 1970, with both planning and development functions for the whole Metropolitan District. CMDA is charged essentially with coordinating capital budgeting functions and with development control over the new metropolitan agencies which have already been created (or are in the process of legislation) and the existing agencies that still survive.

No one would argue, of course, that this "Calcutta approach" to the creation of a system of strong functional agencies is the ideal solution. Its strength is that it is practical, logical, and realistic. It has attracted a spate of criticism from theorists of local government who are fundamentally opposed to statutory functional agencies. It has encountered fierce political opposition by local politicians seeking to protect what they feel are "municipal powers" and "local democracy." But in India's worst urban situation, the basic merits of the approach have been characteristically hesitant at the State Government level.

Whatever its effectiveness in Calcutta, the re-organization attracted much attention in other Indian cities (notably Bombay) and internationally in other great metropolitan cities (notably Karachi) which are faced with the same dilemma of inefficient
urban administration and the need for effective and urgent development action, with clear lines of operational authority and co-ordination.

Bombay has clearly learned from the approach, and indeed has sought to move directly to what the Bombay planners have perceived as the essential lesson of the Calcutta experience. This is the third approach being tried in India to solve the problem of rational but urgent action at the great city level. Bombay, which already has a single metropolitan corporation, has emphasized the basic need for a single "command agency" for capital development action. The problem has been tackled in relation to the bold and ambitious plan to create a twin city, in response to the pressures of population growth:

The City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra (CIDCO) has been set up by the Maharashtra State Government to undertake the planning and development of a twin city on the mainland across the harbour from Bombay.*

The development of 55,000 acres across the Thana Creek for a new city of at least one million people incorporates what is recognized as the basic lesson of the Calcutta approach—an emphasis on managerial and operational co-ordination rather than an emphasis on planning. The con-

ventional approach would have been to prepare a Master Plan, taking some three or four years, and then begin thinking about its implementation. The Bombay Government has avoided this basic error by creating the "command" organization both for planning, and subsequently to direct the multiplicity of agencies and State Government departments that will inevitably be involved in a venture on this dramatic scale.

As the World Bank Mission* to Bombay in November 1970 emphasized, and as the chief executives of CIDCO clearly realize, the development of this twin city is immensely complicated. The development of the new city must be fully integrated with the development of Bombay itself, and this will require a major expansion of the powers and managerial capacity of CIDCO, and eventually the evolution of the full-scale system of metropolitan agencies such as that attempted in Calcutta.

As this discussion has sought to illustrate, in summary form, the development of a more rational structure of urban government for India's major metropolitan cities is a matter of great complexity. It will not be solved in seminars.

Whatever the sentiments and ideologies of urban local government in India, whatever the intellectual attraction of

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* This was a most useful and important example of the contribution to the clarification of the total development situation of a great city of a short-term review team of special skills in fiscal analysis and development programming.
the two-tiered metropolitan structures of Greater London or Toronto (constantly referred to as models for government re-organization) and whatever the claimed efficiency of the American city-manager system (which has its Indian advocates), fundamentally each State Government has to evolve an urban governmental structure for its major cities which is thoroughly grounded in Indian political and administrative realities.

In the view taken in this report, five conclusions seem inescapable:

1. If effective urban government, in its broadest sense, is to be achieved, it can only be practicably done in India by a clear separation of day-to-day municipal administration from capital development action.

2. The central functions of municipalities should be the maintenance of the urban environment and the provision of local social services; their financial resources and managerial capacity should be greatly augmented by State Governments so that they can perform these essential functions efficiently.

3. Capital development programs should be executed and operated by specially-created statutory authorities in clear functional fields, ignoring municipal boundaries, and responsible directly to the State Legislatures which create them. It is
essential to develop, at the State Government level, a command agency for each major city with powers of control, co-ordination, and capital budgeting for the system of authorities in each great city.

4. There is no single urban governmental structure applicable to the varying political and economic conditions, and demographic scale, of all Indian cities. This is a common illusion among theorists of public administration: What works in Delhi will not necessarily work in Calcutta or Kanpur or Madras. The approach must be pragmatic rather than dogmatic.

5. The role of State Governments in urban administration and urban development is crucial, and must continue to be so. Each State Government needs a strong and specialized Directorate of Urban Development, within its existing and presently much neglected Department of Local Self-Government. In the confused pattern of national responsibility for the components of urban development, there has clearly been a failure at the State Government level to recognize its own responsibilities, or to develop the administrative and technical cadre capable of
exerting State influence on urban planning, administration, and development action.

Each of these five conclusions, with the necessary qualifications, could of course form the subject of a full-scale report. This report seeks the central issues and ingredients of an understanding of the Indian urban situation (in this limited field) rather than a full exposition. There is no doubt that each of the conclusions, provocatively summarized, would be hotly debated and arouse passionate arguments. Whether or not such conclusions find acceptance, they would at least appear to have the merit of being prescriptions for practical action. The familiar slogans of "the need for a radical re-organization of urban government" (common to reports on urbanization throughout the developing countries, not only in India) seem of little value except as verbal comforters in the face of the numbing facts of the current and accelerating drives to massive population concentration. There is a marked element of intellectual despair apparent in the constant reiteration of such slogans.

The sheer scale of India, and of Indian urbanization, is itself one of these numbing facts. Few mental activities in India are as likely to translate an Indian administrator, planner or academic in Delhi instantly into a state of transcendental immobility as is any con-
The search for all-India solutions to India's problems, beguiling as this is to those at desks in offices and institutes in Delhi, seems one of India's most common development blind alleys. The Indian obsession with pilot projects, in accord with some national formula, in so many fields of development is a consequence of this national view. This is a fertile source of development delay and token action, which can be disastrous given India's inescapable urgencies of time.

India is not only a population giant, a country of continental scale in geography, and a nation of deep cultural diversity; it is a federal political system composed of eighteen States. Some of these States are larger than any European nation (if with the governmental apparatus and capacity scarcely larger than that of an English county). The view of this report is that the complex problems of urbanization need to be perceived and responded to at the more manageable scale of each individual State, rather than vaguely, and impotently, at the all-India
level. Whatever the role of the national government, each State has the power to act, and its powers, awareness, and technical capacity need greatly to strengthened, without the strait-jacket of some national formula of urban development schemes or urban governmental organization. In essence, the response to urbanization in India must (or so we would argue) be one of decentralization to the State level.

**TRAINING PROGRAMS IN URBAN ADMINISTRATION**

This is not to say that programs of training and research in urban development and urban government may not be organized nationally or regionally rather than at the State level. In fact, the organization and support of these training programs above the State level may well be one of the most useful forms of assistance to States in developing their own capacities to deal with the spectacular urban problems with which each State is confronted. The first requirement for any training program is to

*It is certainly a good deal less important than vastly increased financial support in this field from the Center to the States, as we have emphasized earlier, but the effective use of increased resources requires greatly improved managerial and technical capacity at the State level.*
prescribe its objectives in relation to some organized
operational framework of decision-making and action.
Individuals are trained to work within a system. The
questions of who and what to teach depend upon some basic
perception of by this training effort, and the allocation
of resources it requires, is being undertaken at all.
It is not enough to answer that Indian urban areas need
(as they so obviously do) more efficient administration,
and that this requires better trained staffs. A more
fundamental analysis is needed, to discern India's man-
power requirements, particularly at the senior levels
of urban government and to the content of training pro-
grams.
If the brief analysis of this report regarding
training programs were accepted, then it follows that a
much stronger managerial and technical capacity in urban
development (in its broadest sense) is needed in three
distinct categories: responsibility, function, and opera-
tion.

1. The senior administrative and technical executive
and advisory cadres required at the State Government
level to staff Directorates of Urban Development.
2. The administrative and technical staffs required by
municipalities and municipal corporations to perform
the basic functions of environmental maintenance and
provision of local social services.

3. The managerial and technical staffs, particularly at the most senior levels, required by special functional agencies and urban development authorities for capital development programs.

Little emphasis appears to have been given to the development of training programs except for the second category, and this only in the most general terms. In 1963, the Ministry of Health and Local Government appointed a special committee to examine the training of municipal employees. The committee report recommended the establishment of a Central Training Institute and a number of State Training Institutes. The Government eventually decided to establish (in 1966) the National Center for Training and Research in Municipal Administration in Delhi as a wing of the Indian Institute of Public Administration.

In 1968, three regional training courses were set up as extensions of existing centers of public administration: in Bombay (All India Institute of Local Self-Government), in Calcutta (Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management) and Lucknow (Department of Public Administration, Lucknow University). In 1970, a fourth regional center was established at Hyderabad (Department of Public Administration at Osmania University).

In theory, then, India has a National Center for
Municipal Research and Training in Delhi, as well as four regional centers. In practice, only the Delhi center has thus far developed any strength. The courses at Bombay and Calcutta consist primarily of evening classes attended voluntarily but sparsely by employees of municipal agencies. While they may be of some value, it is difficult to believe that the scale and content of these courses are major contributions to improving the quality of municipal administration. The Center in Lucknow, though led by an experienced academic in the field, seems equally weak. Given at so-called regional centers, these short courses in fact attract mostly junior municipal employees from the neighboring municipalities of the city in which the Center is located and not, because of the distances involved, students from the State as a whole, let alone from other States within the "region."

These "centers" seem little more than token contributions to the fundamental and urgent problem of improving urban government in India. Without a complete re-organization, greatly increased financial support, much higher quality staffs, and new and more relevant courses, they seem destined to remain of little consequence when total need in the field is considered.

This is not completely the case with the Municipal Training and Research Center at the IIPA in Delhi. It has attracted a small group of very able academics, and is
slowly but clearly in the process of developing into a center of considerable importance. It runs several short courses—of up to four weeks' duration—annually, of academic lectures and seminars for municipal officers from all over India. Since 1966, 256 students have attended these short courses, but only just over one-third (seventy-four) have come from the Class I cities of over 100,000 inhabitants, and only one-fifth (forty-one) from the larger municipal corporations, which face the severest managerial pressures and which most urgently need dramatic improvements in municipal efficiency.*

The whole problem of training programs in urban government needs a full-scale re-examination in India—and a report on this subject alone.

In 1971, India has 147 cities of over 100,000 population—eight of these already over one million in size, with another score of cities exceeding or rapidly approaching the half-million size. In ten years, the number of these Class I cities is expected to be 185, with acute managerial problems over the whole range of urban development. Training has to be approached on a scale commensurate with the problem, and in a totally different dimension from

* Interestingly, thirty students from overseas have attended these short courses on municipal government—from such diverse and far-flung countries as Indonesia, South Vietnam, Sierra Leone, Thailand and Afghanistan.
academic courses on administration for random, and mainly very junior, students.

Such a full-scale review of training and research in urban government (which does not now exist at all) would be a major task in itself. It should examine the potential roles of the two major Indian Institutes of Business Management in training executives for urban capital development agencies—and the possibility of developing a special set of courses on urban government for both senior administrative officers of the IAS and for new cadets to this elite service.

And there needs to be a detailed examination of the relationship between the training presently provided in urban physical planning and the development of new courses—and more importantly, a new system of training in urban government.

The major single inadequacy with present training programs, whether physical planning courses or urban government and administration is the absence of thorough, empirical, intensive case studies of the actual situation in specific cities. The preparation of these case studies, not only on the model of the comparative studies of urban government in thirteen cities undertaken by the Institute of Public Administration in New York to which we referred to earlier in this paper, but also including analysis of the
organization and operating practice of special functional agencies in Indian urban areas, can be one of the essential contributions of research to the development of more imaginative and relevant training programs. These careful and skillful case studies are missing in India, and hence the generalities and irrelevance of much seminar and conference discussion in this field and of academic training programs based now on the regurgitation of international literature on public administration.

A NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF URBAN AFFAIRS?

This brief report has omitted discussion of several subjects important to its central theme of the responsibility in India for urban development, and particularly an exposition of the findings of two important Committees set up by the Government of India: the Committee on the Augmentation of the Financial Resources of Urban Local Bodies (1963); and the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee (1968). The reports of these Committees, particularly the latter, would need full examination in any more extended discussion than is possible here.

Equally there has been, due to the limitations of time and space available, no reference to many other matters that need consideration in any attempt at a fuller understanding of "urbanization in India": notably, the
Indian experience with the planned creation of new towns,* or the problems of smaller towns in India; and, in particular, the growing recognition in India of the importance of these smaller District and market towns, not as antidotes to the gigantism of the major cities which is inevitable, but as urban support centers for rural development in its own right, and as an end in itself. These matters and those related to urban and regional planning as such, require separate reports.**

For all the reports and publications and conferences on urbanization in India, many so ephemeral that they seem only titles in Ashish Bose's industrious bibliographies, what is missing is any permanent and prestigious national forum, a sort of national memory bank on all aspects of urban development, and a basis of progressive and informed discussion on the ingredients of an integrated national response to the growing Indian crisis, particularly in the major cities.

Administrators, economic planners, demographers, urban physical planners, politicians, academic theorists of

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** The Ford Foundation Staff Documents by Preston Andrade, Program Advisor on Urbanization in India: "Urban and Regional Planning in India in the Seventies", and "The Pilot Programme in Rural Growth Centres in India".
local government, practical managers of existing implement-
ing agencies, all seem to live in different worlds of
tunnel vision with only fleeting confrontations, usually
in an atmosphere of debate, at conferences and seminars.

Though, in the view of this report, practical
progress in urban development in India must depend very
heavily on the perceptions and powers of State Govern-
ments, there is clearly a need to build at the national
and State levels a much greater awareness of India's
contemporary urban predicament and its fast approaching
future of urban chaos. The awareness of course needs to
be more than alarmist and negative. It needs to be realis-
tic, practical and positive, and based on the acceptance
of the inevitable acceleration of urbanization as both one
of the consequences and one of the great opportunities of
national development.

Currently, important and encouraging discussions are
taking place in Delhi among a varied and extremely in-
fluential group (of government officers, economic and
physical planners, and academics) on the possible organiza-
tion of a National Institute of Urban Affairs with the
following functions:

1. to act as an independent, policy-oriented
organization that will undertake or promote
technical studies and research on various
aspects of urban development in India;
2. to mobilize the available expertise in India
in the field of urban studies by constituting
panels and working groups of consultants drawn
from different institutions and various disciplines;
3. to focus attention on important urban issues,
initiate and sponsor programs and policies
touching the Central, State and local govern-
ments, public sector undertakings and private
industries;
4. to carry out an examination of urban policies
and evaluate master plans for different cities
and towns, examine problems of implementation
of master plans and generate new ideas to
improve the formulation of urban policies and
the execution of master plans;
5. to organize and sustain a continuing dialogue
on urban problems between the government and
civic officials, members of the academic
community, industrialists, businessmen and
others in private life;
6. to serve as a center for advanced study of
urban problems by scholars and specialists
from abroad and to provide research training
to young scholars.
A formidable list of functions from one of the initial and formative working papers of the group concerned with the development of this proposal. It is an important concept. A great deal depends on the skill with which such a National Institute of Urban Affairs is organized and on the vigor with which it is directed. It could, in the Indian situation, as easily deteriorate into a Delhi academic clique as become the vital national forum India needs, and a model for many other developing countries faced with a similar situation of a failure to grasp the facts of urban growth, and a consequent failure to develop an effective governmental response. Only time can tell which of the two courses this concept of a National Institute will take.

But few could doubt, reviewing the Indian urban scene as a whole, that the crisis the nation faces is rapidly approaching monumental proportions. Effective action must be undertaken quickly. The cumbersome administrative apparatus for urban development needs a radical overhaul. Massive new resources must be assembled nationally and allocated to State Governments and, through them, to the great cities. New approaches must be found at the metropolitan level for resource mobilization, efficient administration and development action, fiscal discipline and clear, coordinated responsibility. And all this in a
race against time. The next decade is clearly going to be crucial for India's urban future. The key issue is awareness into immediate short-term action. If a National Institute of Urban Affairs in India can be so organized that it makes a direct contribution to the follow-through that is needed from talk to action, it will be a considerable achievement.