This paper attempts to analyze contemporary Moroccan attitudes and policies toward the cities by tracing their antecedents, and by describing their evolution. It is structured around four central questions about Morocco's urban policy: (1) What exactly did the "French tradition" and the "French influence" entail in regard to urbanization? (2) How did the new Moroccan government approach the problem of the cities, in its general policy and in its development plans? (3) What is the current policy toward urban development, and how has it evolved? (4) What means has the Moroccan government at its disposal to plan for urban development and to implement its policies? The paper also explores briefly the activities of international agencies in the field of urbanization, and the potential for new initiatives and new programs in the future. This paper draws on the author's personal research in Morocco in 1968 and 1970, which involved extensive interviews with government officials at the central and local levels, and with private individuals. It also involved an exploration of archives of the central government and of the city of Casablanca. [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731-013 740 and UD 013 742-UD 013 744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in the Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] (Author/SB)
An International Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in Morocco
The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interest and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey
John P. Robin, Director
Colin Rosser
Frederick C. Terzo
Urbanization in Morocco

by

Katherine Marshall Johnson

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation
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PREFACE

The paper was prepared as part of the Ford Foundation's International Urbanization Survey. Its object is to analyze contemporary Moroccan attitudes and policies toward the cities, by tracing their antecedents, and by describing their evolution.

Though most of the paper is presented in narrative form, it is structured around four central questions about Morocco's urban policy. First, what exactly did the "French tradition" and the "French influence" entail in regard to urbanization? Second, how did the new Moroccan government approach the problem of the cities, in its general policy, and in its development plans? Third, what is the current policy towards urban development, and how has it evolved? And finally, what means has the Moroccan government at its disposal to plan for urban development and to implement its policies? The paper also explores briefly the activities of international agencies in the field of urbanization, and the potential for new initiatives and new programs in the future.

This paper draws on the author's personal research in Morocco in 1968 and 1970, which involved extensive interviews with government officials at the central and local levels, and with private individuals. It also involved an exploration of archives of the central government and of the
city of Casablanca.

The analysis of the contemporary situation is based on a brief visit to Morocco in connection with this project in May 1971, during which I interviewed officials of the planning agency and representatives of the different international agencies.

KMJ

June 1971
INTRODUCTION

Morocco is a land of contrast and contradiction, where the old and the new vie for supremacy. History and tradition are very much alive, but the forces of the present world press their good and their ugly alternatives. Perhaps the best introduction to the complexity and conflicts of Morocco today is through its ten largest cities, for it is in these cities that its diverse history and culture have been shaped.

Fez, a walled imperial capital high in the mountains, seat of one of the world's oldest universities, retains the grandeur of past Arabic and Maghrebian civilizations in its monuments and a wealth of skill and beauty in its schools, mosques and dwellings. The old city of Fez still thrives, and people live there as they must have lived five hundred years ago. Meknes, near-by, another ancient capital of the Sultans, boasts magnificent structures built by Christian slaves in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Marrakesh, in the mountains of the south, is a desert capital. Magnificent also, but more open and more austere, it was a major terminus of trading and warrior caravans that set forth across the Sahara. Tetouan, in the north, is a walled city, marked by its ties with Andalusian Spain in the past, and, more recently, by a Spanish colonial influence.
The cities of the Atlantic and Mediterranean Coasts are more closely linked to the colonial era of the twentieth century. Rabat, a Roman and Arab outpost, with its neighbor, Sale, a center of the Barbary pirates, was selected in 1912 as the capital of French colonial administration. The city is dominated by its administrative role, with well laid out government offices, in pseudo-Moorish architecture, spacious avenues, and attractive residential areas. Kenitra was a completely new city, selected as a French military base. Its port, the presence of an American military base, and an expanding industrial base have made Kenitra the fastest growing city in Morocco today. Oujda also has grown, as a Spanish colonial base and as a capital of Mediterranean Morocco. More recently, it has become a mining center. Safi, a pirate port of old, is one of the newest ports and industrial centers of Morocco. It is growing rapidly.

Tangiers, opposite Gibraltar, was the international zone of Morocco, and retains a unique diversity in its architecture and society, and in the character of the city itself. And finally Casablanca, the industrial and commercial capital of Morocco, exemplifies the depth of the French colonial impact, and the importance of the catalytic forces of the outside world in this century. The city is approaching two million in population; it is a boom town, one of the largest ports of Africa, and industry has thrived here. If Fez looks like a medieval city of Italy or the Middle East,
Casablanca could be a major French provincial capital, with its spacious avenues in the radial pattern of Haussman's Paris, its Versailles-like parks, its cafes and shopping arcades, its apartment buildings and boutiques, its industrial and commercial centers and its working class suburbs.

Morocco's cities have been shaped by three important urban traditions. The Islamic culture brought to North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries was an urban civilization, in theory and in practice, and in North Africa the cities developed in a distinct pattern: walled cities with palaces, mosques and markets, and above all a cultured and powerful bourgeoisie. The Spanish colonial system was also centered in its cities, though in Morocco the Spanish colonial centers were predominantly military outposts. Finally, the French brought with them an urban civilization, and they built in Morocco French cities to house Frenchmen and their enterprises, in the most advanced traditions of French architecture, administration and planning.

It is against this rich and diverse history of urban development that the contemporary problems of urbanization in Morocco must be seen. There is first an historical perspective, for the splendor and viability of the ancient cities underline the importance of traditional forces in Moroccan society, and her heritage from the Arab world and Maghrebian civilization. The differences in the background and orientation of the cities reflect some of the divisions.
POPULATION OF MOROCCO'S TEN LARGEST CITIES

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<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>257,430</td>
<td>682,388</td>
<td>1,000,287</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1,625,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rabat</td>
<td>83,379</td>
<td>156,209</td>
<td>303,244</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>550,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marrakech</td>
<td>190,314</td>
<td>215,312</td>
<td>243,134</td>
<td>285,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fez</td>
<td>144,424</td>
<td>179,372</td>
<td>216,133</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>335,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meknes</td>
<td>74,702</td>
<td>140,380</td>
<td>175,943</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>290,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>141,714</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oujda</td>
<td>34,523</td>
<td>80,546</td>
<td>128,645</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetouan</td>
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<td>80,772</td>
<td>101,352</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenitra</td>
<td>17,601</td>
<td>55,905</td>
<td>86,775</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safi</td>
<td>25,159</td>
<td>56,751</td>
<td>81,072</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
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*Figures for 1936, 1951-52, and 1960 are official census figures. Figures for 1968 and 1973 projects are taken from the Five Year Plan for 1968-72.*

**1968 and 1973 figures are for the Moroccan Moslem population only, thus excluding the Moroccan Jewish population and the sizeable foreign community. Especially in Casablanca and Rabat, these communities are still very significant. In 1960, the Jewish population of Casablanca was about 73,000; of Rabat 14,000. There were 117,500 foreigners in Casablanca, and 35,500 in Rabat. These communities are decreasing, but still at a relatively slow rate.
and conflicts within the society; yet the growing complexity of all cities is a warning not to compartmentalize Morocco into traditional and modern, mountain and plain, or French and Arab. Virtually all the cities, from Casablanca and Fez to the smaller regional centers, are growing and changing rapidly. It is above all with these changes, and with the response of the Moroccan government to them, that this paper is concerned.

THE PATTERN OF URBANIZATION

Demography

Morocco is today one of Africa's most urbanized nations. About 35 per cent of the population (4,610,000 of a total population of 14,000,000) lived in urban centers in 1968, according to the official estimates presented in the five year plan for 1968--72. In 1960, there were over 70 communities of more than 5,000 in Morocco; ten cities now have populations of over 100,000.

Morocco, like most other countries of Africa, is urbanizing rapidly. The natural growth rate of the population is very high—about 3.3 per cent a year. In addition, since the 1920s there has been a significant migration of rural people to the cities, which since the end of World War II has accelerated dramatically. The official estimate of the rate of urbanization—natural growth plus rural migration—was 5.4 per cent in 1968; many
experts concerned with urban problems contend that this figure is somewhat low.

There is considerable variation among the growth rates of individual cities. The physical planning agency estimates that in the next few years Rabat will grow at 7 per cent a year, Casablanca, Safi, Oujda, and the coastal cities at 5.5 per cent a year, Kenitra, Meknes, Tangiers and Tetouan at 4 per cent, Fez at 4 per cent, and Marrakech at 3.6 per cent a year. To a large extent these figures are wishful thinking, or deliberate attempts to minimize the significance of urban growth: Kenitra is probably growing at a minimum of 10 per cent a year, and Casablanca at 6.5 per cent, for example. The official figures do, however, indicate that the major ports and industrial centers are growing fastest, while the older cities, particularly Fez and Marrakech, are developing at a more sedate pace than the newer boom towns on the coast. The 1968--72 plan estimates an urban population of ten million in 1985, out of a total population of twenty-six million.

An important characteristic of urbanization in Morocco is the concentration of population, cities and resources on the coastal plain, roughly between Kenitra and Safi. This area contains the richest agricultural land, the highest population densities, most of Morocco's industry, its largest cities and its most important ports. The rest of Morocco, by contrast, is more thinly populated and much
PATTERN OF MIGRATION OF WORKERS TO CASABLANCA

Each dash represents 20 workers

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY URBANIZATION IN MOROCCO

FIG. 1
poorer. This dichotomy has been a concern of government and planners since the beginning of the century.

Urban Problems

The rapid rate of urbanization, with the attendant changes it brings, is itself the most significant aspect of the problem. The sheer magnitude of the cities now, and the simple statistical projections of their probable growth, have frightened and overwhelmed many officials. The statistics cited above are of dubious reliability partly because no one really knows what the size of the population or the rates of growth really are; however, there has been an ostrich-like tendency to say that growth rates will diminish, or that they are lower than they appear to be, in the hope that saying it, and printing it in official plans and documents, will make it so. Finally, there has been some attempt deliberately to underestimate population figures for political reasons: for example, Casablanca's size is sometimes down-played to justify lower expenditure of government funds there.

Morocco's cities are beset by the urban problems that plague so many cities throughout the world. Most stem from the frantic pace of growth, or at least are exacerbated by it. The momentum of expansion of area and population far outstrips the capacity of government to expand or even maintain the level of services, from water and sewage to housing,
welfare, and education. Older areas of the city, deserted by the wealthy, decay as densities rise, while the suburban areas spread outwards with virtually no forethought or planning by government. The task of providing universal, free education in a country where over half the population is under sixteen is a formidable one. Finally, the poverty of a large part of the urban population, with its demands on government, and potential for unrest, poses a nagging demand for attention on the over-burdened structures of government.

Morocco's cities are plagued by a particularly severe housing problem. It is said that all Moroccan cities are married: their wedding ring is the circle of shanty-towns that surround them. Known in North Africa as bidonvilles, or cities of oil drums, these are vast communities built of flattened oil drums, wood scraps, and any other materials the inhabitants come upon. Several bidonville communities, notably in Casablanca, number over 100,000 residents, and are growing at a rate of about 7 per cent a year. The total population in bidonvilles is estimated at over one million, more than one quarter of the total urban population. Densities in the bidonvilles are extremely high, and increasing. Less dramatic, but perhaps even more serious, are the housing conditions of the older, Moslem-quarters of many cities. In these crowded and airless areas, disease is rampant and there is little sun to relieve the damp and prevailing gloom.
Most Moroccan leaders agree that housing and unemployment are the most serious problems facing Morocco's cities. Clearly, these are closely related, and a solution will only come with general economic development and rising standards of living. Following from this premise, some government officials have suggested that any current action in the cities must necessarily be piecemeal, alleviating some misery in the short term, but contributing little to a permanent solution. However, more recently, the potential for unrest in the cities, underlined by serious riots in Casablanca in 1965, and apparently a genuine concern for the misery of the bidonville residents and for the visible sprawl of formerly beautiful cities, has led to renewed interest in immediate action for the cities, and will probably make urban planning and the development of low-income housing a higher priority in the next development plan.

**Government and Urbanization**

Government is a dominant force in Moroccan society, and King Hassan II is a powerful and authoritarian ruler. The Alaouites are an ancient dynasty, tracing their origins to Mohammed himself, and their hegemony in Morocco to the eleventh century. Hassan is thus, for the moment, the undisputed political and religious leader of Morocco; his traditional prestige and power are enhanced by the identification
of the monarchy with the nationalist movement and the struggle for independence.

The moral and psychological power of the King is today reinforced by a highly centralized, tightly controlled system of government, orchestrated by the Palace. Though economic development and democracy are the avowed aims of government, for obvious reasons security is always a predominant concern. The political opposition, powerful in the late 1950s and early 1960s, an alliance of intellectuals, unionists, and nationalist activists, has been effectively silenced, often by ruthless means. Though its organization is currently very weak, the ideas and discontents expressed in the left-wing movement are always a potential threat to the regime. The army, always a dangerous instrument of power, is recruited from traditionally loyalist areas of the country.

The Ministry of Interior, under General Oufkir, a ruthless and loyal King's man, is a super-Ministry that controls the national police system, local government, veterans' affairs, and urban and rural planning. The governors of the provinces and prefectures are figures with very broad powers over almost all local affairs. They are selected by the King, and report directly to the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry directs through them an elaborate intelligence system that oversees the activities of potential
trouble-makers. Though this network of control under the Ministry of Interior is not as absolute as its authors would wish, though it is plagued with personal interest, corruption, and often inefficiency, and though it is often less than perfectly integrated with the overall national system, it is certainly an important force, with very substantial powers, and a great capacity for action when action is called for.

The fact that the Ministry of Interior has been charged since 1967 with responsibility for urban planning, as well as for urban government, is highly significant. It has meant, first, that there is a stronger potential for effective and swift action than in most departments of Moroccan government. Second, it is important that the urban planners are closely linked with the most important instruments of implementation—local governments. Finally, the role of the Ministry reflects the importance accorded to urban policy by the government: cities are a source of wealth, and potential centers of unrest; they have begun to command attention.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL URBANIZATION POLICIES

Though its goals and instruments have varied considerably, and though it has not always been conscious of the significance of its actions, the government has profoundly affected the course of urban development in Morocco. The shaping role of government has been particularly marked since the
beginning of French colonial rule in 1912, and it has increased in dimension and significance with the expanding involvement of government in the social and economic affairs of the nation. Recent development plans and policies, though often concerned only indirectly with urban problems, have nevertheless had important ramifications for the development of cities.

In tracing the evolution of "government policy," therefore, conscious policies and attitudes must be a primary concern; yet the implications of unconscious policies and attitudes, and of negative attitudes and actions, have often been highly significant. In addition, the neglect of urban development, whether implicit or explicit, must be regarded as one aspect of government policy. In this section, which traces the evolution of government policy towards urbanization from the beginning of the French era to the present, "policy" is regarded in this broader context.

The Beginnings of French Policy: 1912-1922

Morocco's first French governor, Marshal Lyautey,

* For a fuller treatment of this subject, see an excellent paper by a young Belgian architect who has worked in the Moroccan planning agency, Jean Dethier, "Soixante Ans d'Urbanisme au Maroc," mimeo. (Paper presented at a Conference at Princeton University, April, 1970).
concerned himself from the very beginning with the development of cities in Morocco, and his personal interest and ideas have left an important legacy. In his own formulation of the British policy of indirect rule, he sought to preserve and govern through the civilization he found in Morocco: this meant that the indigenous cities were to be left completely alone and respected, unlike Algiers, for example, where the medina, or old city, had been substantially affected by the encroachments of the modern city. Second, Lyautey was determined that the new French communities should be built according to the best and most modern ideas of French planning and architecture. To this end, in 1913 he employed a distinguished French architect and planner, Henri Prost, who drew up plans for new European sectors of the most important cities. He also drew up legislation providing for the preparation, approval, and implementation of city plans; this law remained in force until 1952.

In most cities, these plans were a large measure implemented, and have determined the basic pattern of development of several cities to the present time. In Casablanca, however, the largest and most important French community, which had already been selected as the major port, private interests were entrenched long before the Prost plan was drawn up in 1922. The anarchy of free enterprise, land values, and real estate speculation determined the pattern
of early development. Powerful local interests in Casablanca resisted strenuously the efforts of the central administration to reassert control over this booming and sprawling city. Many of Casablanca's problems today may be traced to the continuing power of private enterprise, and to the failure of government from the beginning to control the basic plan of land use in this fast-growing community.

From this earliest period of government involvement in urban planning Moroccan cities have inherited several important characteristics. First, a tradition was established of government interest and action at the highest levels; nothing but the best quality would do for the cities of Morocco, and it was accepted that government had a responsibility to shape and direct the development of the cities, as well as to govern and provide services for them. Morocco had by 1930 become a model for other French colonies, particularly in the area of urban planning and administration. Ideas and methods were tried here before they were tried in France, and talented young planners and architects found here a wider field for action and greater freedom from political restraints than in the metropole. This keen interest, and the high quality of government activity in the early layout and construction of Morocco's cities, has been a highly important factor shaping the character and the subsequent development of these cities.
It is essential, however, to realize that the beautiful, well-planned cities that emerged were designed and built as French cities, for Frenchmen, in perpetuity, with perhaps a soupcon of Moroccan design to harmonize the city with its surroundings. The policy of "preserving" the old cities meant that there was effective segregation of the French and Moroccan communities, for the Moroccans, of course, were to live in the Moroccan cities, where they were generally left to govern and provide services for themselves. It is true that this system did result in the preservation of these beautiful cities as viable communities. However, pre-French services left much to be desired, and as the population of the old medinas grew, traditional mechanisms were hard-pressed to maintain the cities and their services. The result was a widening gulf between the old and new cities, between French and Moroccan, and between rich and poor.

The Inter-War Period: 1922-1939

The momentum of the early activism of the French colonial administration in urban planning and development, however, was not maintained, and from the mid-1920s until the end of the Second World War central government intervention in urban affairs was minimal. The city planning agency was somnambulant, a shell with minimal staff and no money. The Depression resulted in a virtual stoppage of public funds for planning and development. In Casablanca,
particularly, local government developed as an important force subsuming many functions previously exercised by the central government. Though a few Moroccans sat on the municipal commission, generally in silence, it was an entirely French affair. This local administration was quite active in extending the service infrastructure of the city, but the pace of growth far outstripped their resources and activities.

Thus, during the 1930s, while the cities grew rapidly, the role of government was very restricted. Just as the early activism of government shaped the basic structure of many cities, this period of inactivity also left its mark. Sprawling developments, a lack of forethought for the demands of services, a lack of parks, and narrow streets, mark many of the areas that developed during the late 1920s and 1930s.

Some leaders and officials of the time recognized the significance of government's abdication of its guiding role in urban affairs, in terms of the modern, French cities. Few, however, recognized what was happening in the medinas and the other areas where the Moroccan population lived, for the French administration had continued virtually to ignore these areas. The new French cities had from the beginning attracted an accelerating flow of Moroccans from the countryside, as well as the more visible and prosperous Europeans from abroad. At first the migrants lived in and around the medinas or in the new cities, in areas set aside
for them. By the late 1920s, however, densities in these areas had risen so much that the population began to spill out into new, haphazard private developments, and, above all, into the bidonvilles that have since that time been a permanent feature of Moroccan cities.

The authorities of the French central administration were disturbed by this development, but never formally banned migration. They were less concerned with the phenomenon of migration than with its symptoms—notably the bidonvilles. A number of local authorities outlawed such communities in the late 1930s, by specifying building materials that could or could not be used in the city, and by establishing strict standards for construction in building codes. No one ever enforced such regulations, however, for new bidonvilles sprang up whenever old ones were destroyed, and the government simply did not have the means to enforce its will. In addition, very few officials recognized the magnitude of the problem, and did not see it as a threat until it was too late to do anything about it. There was virtually no thought of government assistance to these communities; nothing was done to keep the people on the land, or to welcome them to the city.

In Casablanca, because city officials feared the bidonvilles might become a threat to health and security, the new settlements were regulated in a rectangular block pattern, with numbered streets and houses and minimal
drainage facilities. Government did little else to assist these communities, however, and the bidonvilles that grew up in Casablanca in the 1930s are much the same today. They are, despite the poverty, dirt, and overcrowding, relatively stable communities with more internal organization and economic activity than many of the newer bidonville communities, or the new public or private "hard house" developments in the city.

In the late 1920s, the city officials of Casablanca, recognizing dimly the significance of the influx of migrants and the severe overcrowding of the old medina located in the very center of the French city, decided to build a new medina on the outskirts of the city. With the assistance of the Sultan, they designed and constructed what was in effect a model Moroccan city, patterned on the traditional medinas of the older cities. This quarter, an example of how the French perceived Moroccan-cities and Moroccan architecture, survives today as an attractive, well-designed commercial and tourist area. After this initial effort, however, money ran out and the officials were distracted by other demands. A new medina did indeed develop around this nucleus, but with virtually no plan or government control. It is today a vast, unbroken, haphazard community, filled with people and commerce, the heart of the Moslem city. Yet the implications of the abdication of government are perhaps best illustrated here: in the narrow, airless streets, the lack
of adequate water and sewerage systems, the absence of parks, and the serious health problems that plague the population.

**The Second World War: 1939-1945**

The Second World War, while it wreaked havoc in the rest of the world, acted as a stimulus to growth in Morocco. There was a great influx of migrants to Morocco, fleeing before the advancing German forces, and the flow of Moroccans to the city was speeded by the bustle of the cities, and by fear of unsettled conditions. Capital also fled Europe, and industries, unable to continue in Europe, re-established in Morocco. World War II saw the beginning of development of a solid industrial base in Morocco.

Despite the surface prosperity and the rapid growth of the economy, the government of Morocco had very little money during this period, and it did virtually nothing to develop services or to guide the development of the cities. By 1942, however, the housing shortage for the European population was so severe that a new government agency was established to promote and assist housing construction. Though the new agency's activities during the war years were relatively insignificant, this was the first time the central government had accepted any responsibility, and the first time it had intervened directly, in this area.

World War II left two important legacies for Morocco's cities. The first was the establishment of industry. The
growth of industry in the last three decades has transformed the appearance, character, and problems of many Moroccan cities. The second stems from the complete failure of government to cope with the development of cities both before and during the war. Beyond a small nucleus of well-planned districts with high quality services, large districts grew up whose plan was determined by chance, land values, distorted by prevalent speculation, or the whim of their developers. The chaos prevailing in these areas and the deficit of services posed an immediate crisis to government.

The PostWar Era: 1946-1956

The period between the end of World War II and 1956, when Morocco obtained its independence, was one of rapid growth and dramatic development. The foreign population was swelled by European refugees, and the economy boomed, as capital and industry surged into Morocco. Morocco was increasingly affected by outside events and pressures, political and economic, during this period, while domestically a powerful nationalist movement brought pressure to bear on the French colonial administration.

France's North African territories were eligible for funds under the Marshall Plan, and since Morocco was included in the French Modernization and Development Plans, economic planning was initiated and developed during these years. Two plans for Morocco, for 1949-52 (later extended
(1950 to 1953), and 1954--57, provided a total of $375 billion francs ($1.1 billion) over a nine-year period. The development of infrastructure was the first priority of the planners, though this period also saw the first of a long series of efforts to stimulate rural development.

The cities posed some of the most serious and pressing problems for government in this dynamic postwar era. The deficiencies resulting from a long period of governmental neglect, exacerbated by the rapid and uncontrolled growth of the urban population during the war, had reached crisis proportions, especially in the large cities on the coast. The growth of commerce and industry, combined with the sprawl of the suburban areas, demanded that planning for economic development take some account of spatial dimensions. The French community of Morocco vociferously demanded government action to solve a worsening housing crisis, and to update and extend the basic urban services that had been far outstripped by time and the burgeoning population. The increasing size and restlessness of the Moroccan population of the cities, bolstered by the nationalist movement and the trade unions, forced the government to recognize and involve itself in their problems as well; there was also an awareness of and increasing preoccupation with a problem that has loomed large in government policies towards the cities since the early 1950s--the problem of security.

The French administration of Morocco responded to
these internal pressures, and to the external pressures of international opinion, with thoughtful planning and vigorous policies. The ideas, programs, legislation, and administrative machinery developed during this period to cope with urban development were probably the best available anywhere at that time, though naturally there were faults and gaps in their scope and tangible results. The system of urban planning then instituted has provided the basis for almost all approaches to urban problems in Morocco until very recently. The material achievements of the French planners and administrators account for a remarkable service infrastructure that functions today much as it did in the 1950s. Most of the impressive housing projects that Moroccans point out today to foreign visitors were constructed, or at least designed, during this period.

As in the initial years of French rule in Morocco, government played a dominant and dynamic role in the development of the cities. Much of what is best in the modern Moroccan cities can be traced to the postwar years: the plans, the architecture, the services, the administrative structure were the finest that France had to offer, and they are still very much part of the contemporary scene. However, many of Morocco's severest problems also date from this era, the products of the inherent failings of the colonial system and of the arrogance and blindness of some of its officials. Most significant, perhaps, is the immense
gap that exists between the wealthy, French districts of the cities, which are as elegant and well-serviced as many cities of Europe and America, and the poor, Moroccan areas, which were largely ignored and therefore have few services of any kind.

Awakening gradually to the magnitude of the crisis that faced them immediately after the war, the central administration in Rabat took several piecemeal and patently inadequate steps to cope with the situation. Most important were some public works projects and limited activity in the area of housing, for both Europeans and Moroccans. In 1946, however, Eirik Labonne, Secretary General of the Protectorate government, decided that a much broader and more active approach was called for, and consequently summoned a distinguished and experienced French planner, Michel Ecochard, to Morocco. Ecochard spent seven years in Morocco, and must be regarded as the principal architect of the Moroccan system of urban planning, and of its housing policies.

Ecochard was appalled by the conditions he found—by the chaos of the cities as well as by the bureaucratic structures theoretically responsible for them. His initial surveys pointed to four major problems, indicating the basic focus of his policies and activity: first, he saw an urgent need to re-awaken the sleeping administrative mechanisms for urban planning (of which France had boasted for three
decades), and to revamp them to meet the needs of the changing Moroccan situation. Linked to this was his concern with the preparation of physical plans to guide the growth of Morocco's cities, plans that would consider all aspects of the city's life, and that would be binding on government and private interests alike.

Ecochard's overall perspective and his desire for government involvement in urban development pitted him from the beginning against the private interests, primarily French, that were firmly entrenched in several cities. Ecochard saw their power as a dangerous hindrance to effective planning and government. He was most concerned with the distorting influence of land speculation and the overweening impact of land values on the development of the cities. He felt strongly that government must exert greater control over land tenure and land use in the cities. Finally, Ecochard insisted that government for the first time must play a major role in housing, and that it was responsible for the housing needs of low income groups. He sought the means and the policies to fulfill these responsibilities. In addition, Ecochard was also troubled by the rapid growth and overwhelming concentration of commerce and industry in Casablanca, which he viewed as an urban monster. He tried to promote a policy of decentralization to secondary urban centers.

By 1947, with the full backing of the French Resident
General, Ecochard established a new and independent planning agency under the Direction of Interior*, which was the central department concerned with all political policy and activity, including security and local government. In the next two years, however, Ecochard became so embroiled in political conflict, primarily with the local French community who feared, quite rightly, that Ecochard's policies implied greatly increased intervention in local affairs, that his agency was transferred to the Public Works Department. It continued to function in much the same form, as a two-part agency concerned with urban planning and housing, until 1967. Ecochard, however, still enjoyed the strong support of the highest French officials in Morocco; nor did his transfer to Public Works lessen the hostility of the private interests whose fears he had aroused.

Ecochard's new agency, staffed by bright young architects and planners he had brought with him from France, spent three years, from 1947 to 1949, doing a series of careful studies of the structure and growth of the major cities of Morocco, and of the housing problems of the European, Jewish, and Moslem populations. On the basis of these studies he prepared zoning plans and some sector plans for the key cities. In late 1949, he tackled what he viewed

*Central Government Departments were known as "Directions" under the French Protectorate; they became "Ministries" after independence.
as the worst urban problem in Morocco, and the key to the solution of all the others—Casablanca. This task involved not only a master plan for the city, but the preparation of a complex new planning law to make it possible to implement this and other city plans. The French Resident General and a special commission approved the new law (which is still in force) and its accompanying master plan for Casablanca in 1952.

The 1952 law on urbanisme built on the basic system of planning established by the first Moroccan planning law of 1914: both, of course, were almost identical to the planning system in force in France, though there were provisions in the 1952 law that were in advance of the French procedures of the time. The 1952 law was basically designed to make the existing system more precise and more coherent, and to add teeth in the form of expanded authority for both local officials and for the planning agency to encourage or enforce the implementation of plans.

The basis of the planning system was a plan d'aménagement, a detailed plan for a clearly defined planning district which showed all streets, parks, and public installations and facilities, and laid down guidelines for public and private development. Prepared by the central planning agency, theoretically in consultation with local authorities, the plan was passed along a long chain of agencies which approved or amended it; this included a provision for rather
perfunctory public hearings. After final approval by the central government and the Sultan, the plan was issued as a Royal Decree, its provisions binding on government and private citizens for twenty years. Plans were subject to amendment by an almost identical procedure. Provisions were included to protect an area from private developers and speculators while a plan was in preparation. In theory, these plans d'aménagement were prepared within the context of a zoning plan for the metropolitan area (which might include the city and a belt extending ten kilometers around it), but the law was less precise about the preparation and implementation of such plans. A simpler procedure was also available for smaller layouts, the establishment of plans d'alignement.

The law, however, did spell out several measures to facilitate and promote the implementation of plans. Existing provisions for building codes were strengthened and clarified, requiring that each municipality have a building code and that all construction be authorized by permit of the local authority. The procedures for authorizing and controlling construction were more detailed and strict in the new law, including a check for conformity with zoning and district plans. Finally, the law clarified and gave more force to procedures for condemning and demolishing buildings. A companion decree issued in 1951 laid down basic procedures for expropriation of land "in the public
interest."

The 1952 law provided a strong and effective instrument for city planning; within the context of a free enterprise system which recognized a certain sacredness of private property. Basically, government had the power to prevent development where and when it chose, but it could not compel private development of any area along the lines it desired without private cooperation, unless a completely virgin area was involved. The French community howled anyway, hurling abuse at Ecochard, his agency, and the central administration that supported him, and various factions hindered the progress of his activities wherever they could. These protests, however, could not obscure the basic rationality of the system and its great potential, nor its weaknesses and inability to enforce its will or to act where private interests opposed action. The Ecochard system was a potentially powerful and effective instrument for action by a strong government, and much was accomplished where the provisions of the law were implemented.

An important characteristic of the planning system established in the 1950s was that it placed very heavy demands on the administrative machinery. The preparation and approval procedures for plans were designed for a complex, efficient bureaucracy; the system could function efficiently only if the administrative apparatus was relatively free from political pressures and influences. The implementation
of plans required a strict, efficient, and smooth system of negative control, in the approval of construction permits, and in the constant surveillance of the city that was essential to ensure that all construction was authorized and properly undertaken. The governmental system Ecochard worked under was well-suited for his law and planning machinery, for it was a well-oiled, well-staffed, and dedicated French bureaucracy. The independent Moroccan government, not surprisingly, does not have a comparable bureaucracy, and it has experienced significant difficulties in working within this system and in adapting it to contemporary demands and problems.

In the area of housing, Ecochard and his associates experimented with a number of different policies. Perhaps most significant, though not immediately very visible in its effect, was their recognition that the demography of urban growth indicated clearly that a great majority of the population of Moroccan cities in the future would be Moslem, and that the area occupied by and designated for the French population was greatly disproportionate. City planning was thus for the first time specifically concerned with the development of housing and services for the Morrocan population of the cities.

The city plans designed by Ecochard, therefore, included large tracts reserved for low-income housing for the Moroccan population. The design of these districts varied
from city to city, but Ecochard's basic aim was to provide for the development of largely self-contained communities, inwardly oriented, with most commercial, governmental, and recreational services located within the cities, as they were known. These community units were located adjacent to industrial and commercial areas: in the master plan for Casablanca, for example, the development of the city was to follow a pattern of alternating industrial and residential areas. The housing projects that Ecochard designed and executed normally formed part of such projected communities.

Ecochard's basic housing policy was the direct construction by government of as many houses as possible for low-income groups, though he did cooperate with semi-public and private companies involved in large-scale construction of housing for middle-income Frenchmen, and a limited number of Moroccans. Ecochard's most important and most controversial idea was a very simple house, basically a windowless square with an interior courtyard, designed as an adaptation of the traditional Moroccan dwelling. These single-story, single family houses were intended primarily for bidonville residents and, in theory, could be expanded as the inhabitants became more prosperous. Large numbers of these houses were built by the central planning agency, the great majority in Casablanca. These developments were usually adjacent to the larger bidonvilles. Ecochard's projects have been subsequently criticized by architects, because
the buildings are too uniform and because they cannot be easily altered; by planners, because even these simple buildings cannot be constructed in large enough numbers to make a difference; by businessmen, because it was money spent in a manner that was not clearly productive; and by city officials, because the large projects of one-story single-family dwellings were difficult and expensive to service.

During this period the planning agency also experimented with a number of other techniques of public housing; some ideas were discussed and plans prepared, but they never got off the ground. One project involved the construction by government, from start to finish, of an entire community, including all facilities. Another was the development of apartment buildings in a number of different styles (though it was the prevailing wisdom that Moroccans would not live in such communal structures). One of the largest projects built during this period was an apartment complex designed for the Jewish population of Casablanca which had been relegated for centuries to an over-crowded, miserable district of the old medina.

Concerned with the problems of land and land values, Ecochard advocated that government buy as much land as possible, especially in the areas designated for low-income housing development. These areas would then be planned and laid out, and, after services were installed, houses would
be constructed by government or by private enterprise with the assistance of a loan program. Though this concept of large-scale developments was never fully implemented at the time, it has evolved into the basic housing policy of contemporary Morocco.

The significance of these efforts should not be underestimated: about 10,000 houses were built in Casablanca alone between 1950 and 1956, which was remarkable considering that nothing had been done before. The efforts were, however, largely experimental, the agencies and policies involved were new and untested. The growth of the cities was much faster than the government realized, or than it was prepared to cope with. The efforts of government in the area of low-income housing, despite a large expenditure of money and considerable good will and creative thought, were a small drop-in-the-bucket, and as independence approached in 1956, the housing problems of the poor were worse than ever.

During the early 1950s, Morocco enjoyed considerable economic prosperity. There was an enormous boom in construction, and the cities grew rapidly. It was, however, the French community of Morocco and, to an increasing extent, an emerging Moroccan elite, which reaped the benefits of prosperity. The housing market failed almost completely where the poorest classes were concerned, and the bidonvilles grew faster than ever.
The housing and planning policies described above must be seen in the context of an atmosphere of economic progress. Prosperity encouraged innovation and forward-thinking. It was also a period when government commanded significant resources: money was available for new initiatives and for more active policies in a number of areas. The momentum of growth and progress, combined with the positive outlook that generally accompanies full coffers, accounts in large measure for the active and creative policies that the French administration of Morocco pursued in housing and planning.

Since this was so definitely the formative period of Moroccan housing and planning policy, it is important that these factors be considered: it was not only the presence of a French colonial system that stimulated thought and activity in the postwar era; economic factors outside the immediate control of government also played a vital role. Likewise, the failure to innovate and to experiment with bold new policies after independence can be explained to some extent by a sluggish economy, an atmosphere of uncertainty, and by the straitened resources of the Moroccan government.

Ecochard's policies and activities were widely discussed and criticized at the time; they were a focus of attention, as the official approach to the problems of the cities. In retrospect, his thought and activity are perhaps even more important, for they represent the antecedents of
contemporary policy. However, these conscious policies and programs represented only a small part of what government was doing in the cities during the postwar era. Other activities, notably the development of urban services (in the French areas of the cities), consumed a far larger proportion of government resources and energies than the more conspicuous and controversial housing and planning activities.

The activities of several central government departments modified the basic structure of some cities, the character and orientation of others, and the pattern of urban services of all. It was during this time that the dramatic growth of the modern economy shifted much of the focus of Moroccan life from the older cities of the interior to the outward-looking, fast-growing cities of the coast; the cities of the mountains, however, began to change also, for road construction and modernized methods of transport increased movement from city to city, and education and radios spread new ideas through the population.

Infrastructure was a key to the economic development plans and policies of government, and though the authors of the plans thought little about the implications of their activities for urban development, it was primarily the cities that benefitted from and were changed by such extensions of infrastructure. For example, the development of the ports, old and new, attracted industry and population to the cities, the growing population always a surprise to the officials.
Industrial growth demanded facilities, and the best skills of French engineers were brought to bear on the problem. The cities were supplied with electricity. The water supply system for Casablanca, built in the early 1950s, was widely acclaimed as the best in the world; the sewerage system, planned at this time, will serve the city for many years to come.

In addition to the direct effects of these activities, government involvement in the development of infrastructure gave a tremendous boost to private enterprise, and fed the construction boom and the growth of commerce and industry. The optimism and prosperity were short-lived, however. Internal troubles and the promise of independence frightened investors and deflated the enthusiasm of government and private interests in the development of Morocco. The momentum of that period has not been equalled at any time since 1954.

Both the traditional Moroccan system and the imported French administrative structure had a strong tradition of central control over city affairs. Except for Casablanca and Fez, the local governments of the cities in the pre-World War II period were basically appendages of the central administration, and sleepy, rather inefficient ones at that. Their responsibilities were very limited, their resources even more so: the local budget was fed by low-yielding local taxes, the most important of which was a cumbersome gate tax that everyone, officials and businessmen alike,
heartily disliked. Local councils of appointed citizens could advise on local affairs, but had no authority to do anything. In Casablanca and Fez, things were more lively and the administration more complex; here, the local councils, still appointed, did have decision-making powers. The extent of their authority, however, was very circumscribed. In theory, the cities, like the central government, were run by a dual government, French and Moroccan; in practice, the French ran everything with an administration that included Moroccans only at the lowest levels.

In the postwar era, there were several important changes in local urban government, the consequences of which are still felt today. Shortly after the war the government undertook a major overhaul of the local fiscal system. The gate tax was abolished and replaced by a tax on products and services, collected by the central government and allocated among the municipalities on somewhat vague criteria of population and relative need. Since, to the surprise of everyone, the yield of the new tax turned out to be several times larger than the old gate tax, the new role of the central administration in collecting and allocating the proceeds gave the Direction of Interior a new and powerful form of authority over local affairs.

There was also a significant increase in the responsibilities of local government, a concomitant of the overall change in the demands on government and the change in the
change in the scope and understanding of its responsibilities. Since the authority of local government is largely residual, many responsibilities that the central administration denied or ignored fell to the city governments. A very important pattern was firmly established during this period—that local, city government was responsible for everything pertaining to the "physical plant" of the city, including the maintenance and extension of roads, water, sewage, street lighting, parks, etc., while the central administration was solely responsible for all activities that related to "social policy," such as education, welfare, trade union policy, planning and housing. Thus, the city administration was to keep away from the areas where political pressure and excitement are likely to be greatest. They were, however, responsible for a wide range of activities, many of which demanded large inputs of capital and high operating costs.

Important reforms in the administrative structure of local government were implemented during this period, designed to modernize and streamline the administration, and to enable it to cope with its expanding responsibilities. Salaries were increased, and financial procedures formalized. In addition, the French began, somewhat reluctantly, to admit an increasing number of Moroccans to the municipal service. Reforms designed to give greater powers to a partially elected local council were approved but never
implemented.

One Frenchman rapturously described the government of Casablanca during this period to me as a "marvelous creation," a clock that worked perfectly, a system of dedicated men, with little corruption and a mighty sense of service. Though this view is clearly rather one-sided, the changes and development of local administration in the postwar period were very praiseworthy. Though not perceived as such at the time, they are a central and important facet of the government's response to urbanization. The administrative system provided a remarkably effective government for the cities, with an efficient, relatively honest bureaucracy, dependent for an increasing share of its resources on the central administration, with an increasing share of responsibility for the development and maintenance of urban services. These local administrations were very active in planning and developing their cities, and their role was a creative one, involving relatively high expenditures of capital in addition to a high tone of management.

There must be one very serious qualification in this characterization of city administration—it applied to only a part of the city. The nationalist movement had incubated and developed among the Moroccan bourgeoisie, in the older cities of the mountains. In the postwar era, however, the base of nationalist activity had widened considerably, and was linked in the larger, modern cities to the discontent
that was rife there, and to growing trade union strength. Faced with poverty, unemployment, terrible housing, and widespread racial discrimination, the urban proletariat grew restive, and there were sporadic outbursts of violence, particularly in Casablanca, where bad conditions were worst of all. From 1953 to 1956, an organized terrorist campaign based in Casablanca wreaked havoc in most of the large cities of Morocco, and widened the deep gulf that already existed between the European and Moroccan populations.

The French responded swiftly and violently to this threat with strong police measures and an elaborate system of political surveillance and control. As part of this system, a political official was posted to each of seven important cities as a "Delegate for Urban Affairs," with broad powers in all matters related to security. As this system evolved, the Delegate gradually asserted control over all activities affecting the Moroccan population, and he came to head in effect a second city government for the Moroccan areas, which he administered with a separate staff. The regular city administrations continued, essentially as they had always done, to administer the French areas of the city.

When Morocco gained her independence, therefore, the major cities had a system of administration that was clearly segregated: while the French sectors of the cities enjoyed excellent services, served by an efficient, objective bureaucracy, the poor, Moslem areas were governed by a separate
administration, often dominated by military officials. Many were excellent men, yet the central concern of this system, quite explicitly, was security and the control of the population, and a concern with services and the welfare of the people was distinctly a secondary matter.

Independent Morocco: 1956 to 1970

The urban policy of independent Morocco was until very recently essentially the policy of the French administration of the postwar era. The formal policies and activities developed between 1946 and 1956 were modified in response to crises, often at the insistence of Frenchmen who had stayed on in the new administration, in the years after independence. In general, however, the planning system remained rigidly faithful to its pre-independence form. It was manned by many of the same people, although many (certainly not all) of the most creative officials returned to France, leaving their deputies behind them to run a well-established system, faced with a rapidly growing population and a shrinking staff and budget. The machinery continued to plod along, using the ideas, policies, programs, and laws of the pre-independence era, trying desperately to keep up with the rapidly changing times, and with the overwhelming problems that faced them.

This apparent fossilization of the planning system was only one aspect of the new Moroccan government's approach to
the cities. What was most significant was that urban planning and housing were accorded a lower and lower priority as time went on. In the first decade after independence, when the government actively thought about the cities, it usually thought negatively. Its conscious policy evolved, therefore, as a general de-emphasis on large-scale development programs and low-cost housing and an increasing emphasis on security and the control of political activity in the urban areas.

This does not mean that government ignored the cities, or that its role was entirely a negative one. Government policies and activities affected the development of urban areas in many ways. However, to a large extent, the new Moroccan government was unaware of the full impact of such activities and therefore did little to prepare for or to avert their consequences. The development of additional port facilities, the encouragement of industry, and further development of infrastructure provide the best examples of unconscious policies that significantly affected urban centers. Local government also came gradually to play more of a role in city development, as the central administration forfeited its initiative.

In general, however, during the first decade after independence the primary attention of government was focused away from the cities and their development; it was also a period when resources were very limited. The cities
grew rapidly, but the role of government in controlling and
directing this growth was a much less positive and active one
than it was in the preceding decade. Government neglect of
planning, and of the maintenance and extension of services
in the larger cities after independence, is readily under-
standable. The costs of neglect are nevertheless high, and
a decade of uncontrolled development has compounded the
problems that face planners and administrators today.

Independence came more quickly to Morocco than either
the Moroccans or the French community had anticipated. The
Moroccans were the first to admit (or to charge) that the
French had ill-prepared them to operate the system of gov-
ernment created to serve the colonial regime. Despite some
fears to the contrary, the transfer of power was accom-
plished remarkably smoothly, and "continuity" and "gradual-
ism" are the words most often used to describe the transi-
tion to independence in Morocco. Despite the violence and
bitterness of the last years of colonial rule, there was no
abrupt turnaround, no large-scale purge of Frenchmen or
Moroccans, and no dramatic exodus from Morocco. Moroccans
assumed key roles in the French colonial structure, and the
former occupants of these positions remained as advisors or
returned to Europe. Administration continued much as it had
before, and though new emphases, new laws and new policies
were instituted, Moroccans accepted the French administra-
tive system almost in its entirety. This often meant
acceptance of ideas and policies of the past and of the officials who had developed them.

What emerged from this initial transitory and unstable period was a new and powerful political system, which the King controlled, more or less absolutely. He had his Palace advisors, a cabinet of ministers responsible directly to him, governors in the provinces, who were selected and controlled by the King and the Minister of Interior, and a very effective system of security. The new political hierarchy, which took elements both from the traditional Moroccan system and from the French network of political officials, extended from the King down to appointed local officials responsible for a village or a small quarter of a city. The officials in this hierarchy, which was directed by the Ministry of Interior, were known as agents of authority. They kept a close watch on what was happening throughout the nation, and were responsible for the maintenance of security and order within their jurisdictions.

Seen within the context of the emerging political hierarchy, the stability of administration, its lack of responsiveness, and its diminishing efficiency are more readily comprehensible. The new Moroccan rulers were at first primarily concerned with the problems of security, and of settling decisively the question of who would make major decisions in the society. Until this was resolved, little time and energy could be devoted to more mundane
details of administration. Since the old system continued to function and promised to continue to do so, the Moroccan leadership was content to leave administrative matters to the French for the time being. At the central level French officials continued to collect taxes, carry out public works projects, and prepare development plans and budgets; in the cities, particularly Casablanca, they still ran virtually the entire administrative system. In a longer-term perspective, however, the emergence of a potent new political hierarchy resulted in significant changes in the basis of government in Morocco, involving above all a shift in power and influence from the bureaucracy to the King and his political authorities.

As the government became more active in social and economic affairs, the deficiencies of Morocco's inherited administrative institutions began to manifest themselves. The huge, expensive, top-heavy bureaucracy had lumbered along, keeping things going as long as they were going the same way as before. However, the system proved to be inflexible and very resistant to change; it was all-equipped to accept and carry out new policies, or to respond to the rapid changes that were taking place in the Moroccan society and economy. The French civil servants who had run the system before and after independence gradually left or retired, and it became increasingly difficult to replace them. The French system required a large, skilled and well-paid
bureaucracy to operate it, and as this began to break down, efficiency suffered and the system moved more and more slowly. Corruption emerged as an increasingly serious problem, lowering morale and public confidence, and distorting the intentions of policy-makers. Most officials agreed on the need for administrative reform—to streamline the system, to adapt it to local needs and capabilities, and to eliminate corruption. The King himself has strongly backed such a program. However, as yet little that is concrete has emerged from the talk and the promises.

The Moroccan nationalist movement and the new Moroccan government had consistently espoused a goal of a "socialist" policy, which generally suggested extensive government intervention to educate the population and to raise their standard of living. In the first years after independence, however, the new Moroccan government had few resources and little energy to devote to these ends, except in the area of education, though they continued to proclaim their devotion to the principles of a socialist policy. Interest in positive and specific government action in social and economic affairs increased gradually as the regime felt more secure about its political stability. The preparation of the five-year development plan for 1960--64 provided a stimulus to think concretely about social and economic problems, and to come up with general priorities and guidelines.

In the broad perspectives of government policy, in its
general activity and programs, and in the economic development plans for 1960-64 and 1965-67, there was no explicitly stated, coherent policy towards urban development after independence. Until 1965, the basic economic policies and programs of the preceding French administration were pursued, with a stress on the development of infrastructure and a continuing attempt to speed the growth of the rural economy. The effort to provide mass education was the most important new policy initiative.

Urban problems figured directly in government policy and programs in two areas: urban planning and housing, and security. There was little new thought about how urban problems should be handled, but the pre-independence planning system continued, with a focus on direct government construction of housing for the urban poor. About 20,000 houses were built in Morocco between 1956 and 1965, but virtually all formed part of projects designed before 1956. Urban housing was accorded a high priority in the 1960-64 development plan, and several million dirhams a year were allocated as public investment in housing. The most important new aspect of policy, though again it was conceived before 1956, was the government purchase of large tracts of land in and around the major cities. This was designed

* $1.00 = 5 Dirhams or DHs (at May 1971 rate of exchange).
primarily to reserve land for future housing projects, and secondly, as an attempt to enable government to exercise some control over land values in areas designated for low-income housing development.

The Moroccan government's concern with the problem of security in the urban centers is a highly complex, often contradictory phenomenon. However, it is the attitudes and fears born of this concern that have shaped most government policies toward the cities in recent years. At the most general level, there has been an ambiguity in the government's perception of the role of cities in a national context. The Moroccan political system is basically a traditional one. The King's strongest support comes from the rural areas and the older, pre-colonial bourgeoisie, religious leaders, large landowners, and peasants. The modern, fast-growing French cities represent the forces that must ultimately challenge this base of power. The King's conservative supporters tend to regard them as an aberration, and as a dangerous evil that must be controlled and contained. Even this extreme position, however, recognizes that these cities provide the momentum for economic growth as the principal source of Morocco's wealth and prosperity.

King Hassan II, however, is not a medieval autocrat, and his authority does not depend exclusively on his traditional base in the countryside and the older cities. Most of his people expect progress, and Hassan recognizes and
accepts the inevitability of change, including the growth of cities. The King's first priority is to remain in power, and since the forces that most seriously challenge his supremacy are based in the large cities—the trade unions, left-wing intellectuals, and the unemployed—the regime has taken decisive steps to exert and maintain its authority in the urban centers. The intelligence and security networks there are extensive, with police, army, and political officials reporting directly to the governor or pasha. The governors enjoy wide power over all government activity within their jurisdiction, and they are held personally responsible for the maintenance of order and the protection of the national interest. Individuals known to hold anti-regime opinions are closely watched, their movements recorded, and their conversations monitored. Arrests are made on the slightest pretext.

This constant surveillance and harassment, together with the fear it has engendered, have so weakened the organized political opposition that its influence today is minimal. The Casablanca riots of 1965 were brutally suppressed by the army, and little mercy is shown to those suspected of plotting against the regime. The system is not as totalitarian as its creators might wish, but its effectiveness should not be underestimated: the control of urban life is real and efficient, and it has significantly reduced the immediate threat of any effective challenge from the cities.
There is always, however, the fear of spontaneous uprisings of the unemployed and of disgruntled youths; such a rising could easily be put down, but it would almost certainly weaken the King's hold over the army and his own political hierarchy.

The early 1960s were lean years for Morocco. The economic slump that began with the prospect of independence, continued. Though planners and government officials gave optimistic forecasts for future growth and development, it became unmistakably clear that actual growth was so slow, it did not even keep pace with population expansion. The agricultural sector was in particularly difficult straits: a series of disastrous harvests, and the consistent failure of government programs aimed at modernizing land tenure and methods of production, had by 1965 precipitated a crisis of significant proportions. At the central government level, severe fiscal difficulties and a balance of payments deficit caused widespread concern, and gave rise to demands that something be done to alleviate these difficulties.

Unrest was rife in the cities. Unemployment in the largest cities was estimated at 25 per cent of the active population, though if under-employment was included the figure reached as high as 50 percent. Inflation was a serious problem, with rents and prices of essential commodities so severely affected that limited government price controls were introduced in these areas. These economic
difficulties were exacerbated by miserable living conditions, for the population was growing rapidly while housing and urban services expanded sluggishly. It was during this period that high government officials began to appreciate the full significance of Morocco's rapid population growth (over 3 per cent a year at that time). The pace of urbanization was also assessed more realistically, and population projections struck anxiety in many hearts.

This configuration of problems and fears led in about 1965 to a major re-assessment of priorities and policies towards social and economic development at the highest levels of the Moroccan government. What emerged was a re-statement of the government's development priorities, and a new determination that it would play a more active role in furthering its objectives for the cities. Perhaps most significant was a new emphasis on rural development as the central objective of government activity, a shift away from the French colonial policy of infrastructure development and the provision of social services.

The Development Plan for 1965--67 was drawn up by a small group of foreign technicians, but it reflected the new orientation and priorities of the King and his closest advisors. Above all, the plan stressed the paramount importance of stimulating growth in the stagnant agricultural sector. The other three priority areas were tourism, the development of industry, and education. The plan also
emphasized the need for effective planning, integrated closely with the means and machinery for implementation. The rationale for the new priorities was stated as follows:

The development and modernization of agriculture are indispensable in order to feed a population that is growing constantly, to create a surplus for export, to expand domestic markets, and to provide the means for industrialization. The structural reforms which must be pursued must contribute to an increase in production and not to a decrease. For this reason these reforms must be undertaken in a manner that will encourage a gradual evolution of the peasantry and will not introduce brutal changes that might disturb the current equilibrium without replacing it with a new one.

The development of tourism will permit the expansion of foreign exchange reserves if a systematic effort is made to plan touristic sites and to develop hotel facilities. But the success of this policy presupposes a clear coordination of public and private activities in the development of facilities and the training of personnel.

Industrialization, though it involves an investment effort that does not depend solely on public investment, is also a fundamental objective. It will permit the gradual absorption of an increasing proportion
of available manpower and will contribute to a steady increase in the standard of living.

Finally, education and the training of specialized manpower must be intensified so as to improve management of the economy, both in public services and in the private sector....

By adopting this policy, the Moroccan government in essence accepted the arguments for rural development. An important element of this argument was the suggestion that by concentrating resources in the rural areas, rural migration to the cities might be slowed. By stimulating economic growth in the agricultural sector, the planners hoped to make it economically feasible and even desirable for rural residents to remain on their farms or in small villages and regional centers. It is this belief that has been most often articulated by government officials; it is a faith widely held at all levels of government in Morocco.

The shift in priorities in 1965 obviously meant that there would be less money available to spend on social programs in the cities. However, there was a further aspect of the government's new policy: a conscious decision not to invest money for urban development. The argument ran that

people were attracted to the cities by the prospect of high-paying jobs, and by rumors of cheap public housing and government largesse. If this was true, then it was dangerous to do anything to improve conditions for the urban poor, since this would only attract still more people to the cities. Many held the view that if government did not build houses or provide services, word of the miserable conditions in the cities would trickle back to the countryside and discourage potential migrants from leaving the relative security of rural life. After 1965, therefore, the paucity of government action in the urban areas was to some extent a deliberate policy.

Explicit policies for urban development occupy two pages at the tail end of the 600-page Development Plan for 1965-67. The Plan recognizes a basic obligation of government to assist the poor in the area of housing: "the principal objective is to combat the development of bidonvilles and overcrowding in the medinas". However, "limitations on financial means force the State to undertake no new programs of rental housing (constructed directly by government and rented to the poor) despite their evident utility. The three-year plan provides only for the completion

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IN THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR 1965-67
(Thousands of DH$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Semi-Public Sector</th>
<th>Private Investment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Agriculture</td>
<td>851,600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>851,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Tourism</td>
<td>134,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>224,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Education &amp; Training</td>
<td>117,744</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>117,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Infrastructure</td>
<td>389,303</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>389,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Energy</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>120,001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>240,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Industrial, Mining Production</td>
<td>532,530</td>
<td>352,310</td>
<td>459,638</td>
<td>1,344,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Education &amp; Social Action*</td>
<td>151,910</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Administrative Facilities</td>
<td>124,098</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>124,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Extraordinary Expenditure**</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Total</td>
<td>2,461,185</td>
<td>472,311</td>
<td>549,638</td>
<td>3,483,134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes Urban Planning and Housing

** Includes 40 million dirhams for the reconstruction of Agadir, destroyed in 1960 by an earthquake
of programs already underway.*

In the new planning period, the focus of housing policy was to be on the preparation of large developments on state-owned land, where private individuals, hopefully from the bidonvilles, could build their own houses, assisted by a program of government guaranteed loans on easy terms. The plan allocated 22.1 million dirhams as direct government investment in such programs; the goal was to prepare about 8,800 lots for construction. In addition, the Popular Bank was to provide loans of about 10,000 dirhams per lot, or a total of 88 million dirhams in credit.**

In addition to rental housing and housing developments, government was to undertake a very limited program of trames sanitaires, which were temporary houses designed as a half-way stage between the shacks of the bidonvilles and regular houses. The plan basically rejected such programs because they were expensive and because they could only lead to the creation of new slums. However, 13.5 million dirhams were allocated to complete programs already underway.***

All these programs amounted to a total government investment

*Ibid., p. 589


***Ibid., p. 590.
in urban planning and housing of 50 million dirhams over the three year period. This represented about 2 per cent of a total projected public investment of 2,461 million dirhams.*

Three other sections of the plan were intimately tied to urban development, though they were not described or considered as part of an urban policy or program. They concerned employment, regional deconcentration, and the development of ports.

High rates of unemployment in the modern urban centers of Morocco are considered by many as the most serious problem of the cities. There is, however, no ready solution to the problem, and most agree that unemployment will continue at its present or even higher rates for many years to come, until the overall growth of the economy eventually produces something close to full employment. The 1965--67 plan acknowledged the importance of the unemployment problem; however, official policy maintained that increasing productivity was more important than the creation of more jobs during the planning period. In some sectors, notably housing and community development, labor-intensive methods were to be encouraged. In addition, government was to promote craft industries and the formation of cooperatives. However, in the most important sectors, a "highly capitalistic" formula was to prevail, and the most modern methods

*Ibid., p. 46.
were to be employed. If labor-intensive methods were employed in these sectors, Moroccan industry "would lose all chance to be competitive without absorbing entirely the excess of available manpower."

The plan noted the unequal distribution of wealth and productivity, and declared one of its objectives to be the equalization of different areas and sectors. The rural areas "on the whole lagged far behind the urban sectors," and the agricultural development policy was in part designed to remedy this inequality. In addition, the city of Casablanca represented 15 per cent of the total interior product and its immediate region 25 per cent. Government must make an effort to assist the neglected areas of the economy; these efforts were to include measures to promote industrial development outside Casablanca, and the encouragement of agriculture in several particularly poor regions. Despite these avowed aims the plan contained few specific recommendations for implementing such a policy of deconcentration and equalization.

The third policy, concerning the development of port facilities, serves as an illustration of the contradictions


** Ibid., p. 44.
in the avowed government policies. It should be seen, however, as only one aspect of investment infrastructure. Over 48 million dirhams were allocated to the development of port facilities. Despite the stated aim of attracting industry away from Casablanca, one third of this amount was designated for the port of Casablanca, which is one of its prime attractions to industry. It should also be emphasized that investment in other, less developed ports was substantial, and investment during these years has stimulated the development of industry in these cities. Investment in port facilities broke down as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>14,965,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangiers</td>
<td>11,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safi</td>
<td>7,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agadir</td>
<td>2,706,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenitra</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Ports</td>
<td>5,435,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Facilities</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48,200,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1967 and 1968 there was a further re-assessment of government priorities in preparation of the development plan for 1968--72. Despite strong urgings from several quarters,

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### Capital Budget of the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Capital Budget of the State</th>
<th>Other Public Investment</th>
<th>Public Credit</th>
<th>Private Capital</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,549,702</td>
<td>55,031</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,764,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dams</td>
<td>745,800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>745,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion Nationale</td>
<td>119,700</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>149,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>171,090</td>
<td>57,236</td>
<td>390,658</td>
<td>151,047</td>
<td>760,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>213,756</td>
<td>213,756</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>509,512</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>300,466</td>
<td>722,552</td>
<td>239,520</td>
<td>1,262,538</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>290,330</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>746,000</td>
<td>1,421,330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Training</td>
<td>276,273</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>276,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth and Sports</td>
<td>19,761</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health &amp; Family Planning</td>
<td>100,753</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>553,922</td>
<td>66,765</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>692,687</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>170,008</td>
<td></td>
<td>21,500</td>
<td>191,508</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban and Rural Facilities</td>
<td>181,573</td>
<td>98,288</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,279,861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Facilities</td>
<td>195,701</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>197,701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Expenditures</td>
<td>139,016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,049,851</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,157,628</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,040,658</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,202,067</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,450,199</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

notably the city planning agency, that the cities demanded urgent attention, there was no major shift in priorities. The new plan stated emphatically that agricultural development was still priority number one, followed by tourism and education and training. The plan also included a list of secondary priorities: control of population growth, industrial development, and the encouragement of saving.*

Despite the continuing emphasis on rural development, the plan itself exhibits a heightened pre-occupation with the problems of the cities and a new concern with their resolution.

The arguments for the establishment of priorities resembled those presented in the 1965--67 plan. Agricultural production was still growing much more slowly even than population; "it is therefore absolutely essential to increase further government efforts in this area, first, by continuing direct action in the form of investment (above all in irrigation projects), and secondly by pursuing a coherent and all-out policy of encouraging investment by the farmer himself..." ** Tourism must be a priority because of its

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foreign exchange earnings, but also because it produces results more rapidly than agricultural policies. Education and training continue as essential though long-term priority.

For the first time, the problem of population expansion is accorded an important place in the 1968--72 plan. The plan sees as the most important consequences of continued growth an increase in unemployment and the over-population of the cities: this situation must be remedied by appropriate measures. The population policy outlined in the plan had four major parts: the institution of a family planning program (through which they hoped to reduce the birth rate from 50 per thousand to 45 or 40 within the five year period!); a policy of job creation in the cities; city planning and a continuing struggle against the bidonvilles; and a policy of temporary emigration of labor to Europe.

The plan treats at some length the problem of the "rural exodus." Migration is acknowledged to be a complex phenomenon, involving many economic and social factors: the two principle causes, however, are seen as the growth of the rural population without a corresponding increase in productivity, and the disparity between income in the urban and rural areas. Migration is a means of social mobility, and a factor of progress; however, "a rural exodus without brake

*Ibid., Vol. I., p. 32.*
becomes counter-productive, because a large proportion of national resources must be consecrated to social expenditure, to the detriment of investment that is directly productive."

Agricultural development is described explicitly as one means of checking the pace of migration, for such policies will "fix the rural population" on the land. Rural housing and the development of public facilities (water, electricity, new markets) were designed to entice people to remain in the countryside. This policy also aimed to promote a "deconcentration" of urban development, by focusing on the growth of smaller urban centers that might serve as satellites to the large urban agglomerations.**

The short section devoted to housing acknowledged the importance of the problem, and notes that much remains to be done. Despite the security of resources, the plan proposed that government undertake new housing programs in both the urban and rural areas. One new twist was an emphasis on using the labor of the beneficiaries of housing construction. Despite this statement of good intentions, however, little money was allocated to public housing. Total public investment in urban planning and urban housing for the five-year period was under 60 million dirhams, or about one per


** Ibid., Vol. II, p. 88.
cènt of total public investments. Almost none of this was designated for the largest cities, where the housing crisis was most severe, for it was concentrated in smaller, less-developed regional centers. The plan also proposed a total of 500 million dirhams of credit to assist private construction. In this planning period, the funds available to the planning agency for housing development have proved adequate only for experimentation and research.

The plan also treated at some length, and rather pessimistically, the problem of unemployment. Once again, the general outlook was clear: unemployment can only be eliminated in the long term, and extensive efforts to institute short-term measures to alleviate it only serve to dissipate resources. The plan projects an increase in unemployment during the planning period, especially in the urban areas. The active population is growing at 3.3 per cent a year; at this rate (which is probably a conservative estimate), 710,000 young people will enter the job market during the planning period. If GDP grows at 4.3 per cent a year, the plan projects the creation of 485,000 new jobs; if the growth rate is 3.0 per cent only, 300,000.


**INVESTMENT IN URBAN AND RURAL FACILITIES IN THE 1968-72 PLAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Capital Budgets &amp; Public of the Enterprises</th>
<th>Public Credit</th>
<th>Private Capital</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housing &amp; Planning</td>
<td>105,060</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Housing</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Housing</td>
<td>51,060</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Housing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Plans</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Zone of Tangiers</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Electricity to Rural Centers</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake Prevention</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Water Supply</td>
<td>.65,163</td>
<td>28,288</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of Agadir</td>
<td>10,900</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>181,573</td>
<td>98,288</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the projected 485,000 new jobs, 275,000 were to be in the agricultural sector, 138,000 in transport and services, and 43,000 in administration. In the entire industrial, mining and construction sectors the plan projected the creation of only 29,000 new jobs. The reasons cited for this were the modernization of industry, and the increasing necessity to employ capital-intensive methods in competitive industries.

In the cities, the plan estimated that 380,000 new workers would enter the job market; using the most optimistic forecast of economic growth, only 180,000 new jobs would become available. These are clearly the most optimistic forecasts the planners could draw from their data which do not even consider the mass of unemployed that already swells the cities. It was clear that unemployment in the cities could only get much worse, a fact which caused widespread anxiety as people gradually understood the full implications of the plan's projections.

The 1968--72 development plan devoted considerably more attention to the problems of the cities than its predecessors. However, the plan illustrates quite vividly the fears and negative attitudes with which many Moroccan officials approached the large urban centers. The cities

themselves were viewed as the problem, and the central objective of the implicit "urban policy" of the plan was to slow their growth and to dilute their influence. Virtually no money was to be spent for the improvement of urban services in the large cities, and the funds available for housing were very limited. It is impossible to find in the plan itself exactly how much money was allocated to each city, for the breakdown is by sector and by province. In Casablanca, where the housing crisis was most severe and where every service cried out for large capital investment, the plan allocated enough money to build about 1,000 houses, and projected no improvements financed by central government for its service infrastructure.

The policy of deliberate neglect of urban problems that emerges from the development plans for 1965--67 and for 1968--72 was accompanied by an increasingly harsh policy of repression in the cities. Speeches and private statements of high government officials talked increasingly of the need to eliminate the bidonvilles. These growing communities were seen not only as a threat to security, but as a blot on the national character and an unmitigated evil. The bidonvilles were literally fenced in, and further expansion or alteration of existing shacks was strictly forbidden; in some places the bidonvilles were actually demolished, though they invariably sprang up again, on the same site or nearby. In speeches and radio broadcasts, the unemployed were
repeatedly urged or warned to go back where they belonged, to their farms. There were a number of instances where jobless men were actually rounded up and shipped back to the country in trucks. There was talk at one time of requiring work permits and thus forcing "vagrants" to leave the cities. These activities were never combined into an effective or determined drive actually to eliminate bidonvilles from the face of Morocco or to banish the unemployed from the cities. They do, however, indicate that there were many officials who would have liked to do so. These attitudes and the piecemeal activities that arose from them illustrate very clearly the negative cast of official thought on the problems of the cities.

During this period the local city governments were left, by default, to cope with many of the most pressing and visible symptoms of their problems. They faced a difficult, often hopeless task. Here too, the efficient, well-oiled French machine began to slow down and in some cases came to a halt. Personnel problems have been particularly severe at the local level, for there is little to attract qualified Moroccans to local government posts. Revenue has grown far too slowly to cope with the demand for increased services, and few grants have been forthcoming from central government for capital improvements. The powerful control of the Ministry of Interior has been exercised largely to forbid initiatives that cost money. The city governments have
performed relatively efficiently, but they have had neither the resources nor the freedom to initiate programs that would permit them to play a dynamic or positive role in urban development.

The Moroccan government's policy of limiting the growth of the cities by focusing attention and resources on rural development has undoubtedly failed. Despite some improvement in agricultural conditions, the cities have grown faster than ever; there is even some evidence that agricultural prosperity speeded rather than slowed migration to the cities, for countrymen with money wanted to come to the city to spend it. It gradually became clear to high Moroccan officials that it was only in a very long-term perspective that rural development and family planning might slow urban growth, though even this long-term hope was far from certain.

Meanwhile, as conditions in the cities worsened, demands for action became more pressing than before. Unemployment rates remain very high, perhaps as high as 50 percent in some cities. The housing crisis had reached alarming proportions. Encircled by fences, more tightly controlled than ever, densities in the bidonvilles had increased rapidly, and overcrowding in other low-income districts had worsened substantially. In the poor areas of most Moroccan cities the dominant impression is one of teeming humanity living in conditions of severe poverty. The contrast between these districts--overcrowded, with narrow streets,
often unpaved, a few crowded water fountains, and garbage and waste strewn about, and above all, the miserable quality of housing, whether shacks or "hard houses"—and the wealthy districts of the same cities is dramatic and rather horrifying.

All is not well, however, in the "modern" districts of Morocco's cities. Wealthy Moroccans have come to expect and to demand a very high level of urban services, equal to or better than those they inherited from the French. However, the service infrastructure developed by the French colonial administration has begun to deteriorate, and the standard of services has tended to go down. Investment in these services has generally proved inadequate even to maintain them, much less to expand them to meet rising demand. Water shortages, bus strikes, perpetual hassles with administrative problems, and the visible sprawl of the suburbs have brought home to many officials the implications of urban problems. This is not to say that the modern cities have deteriorated past repair. The quality of services in the modern districts of Morocco's cities is still remarkably high. Most cities, for example, have ample water of a high quality; most are served by an excellent sewerage system; bus transport functions reasonably well; the major streets are brightly lit; streets in the modern districts are swept and garbage collected daily in some areas; and the parks are green and well-kept. However, it is clear that this situation
cannot go on indefinitely without positive action, and that in many areas the service system is breaking down.

Pride in the beauty of their cities and apprehension at the gradual lowering of standards of urban services have stimulated a new interest in urban problems among a number of high Moroccan officials. Above all, they stress the need for adequate planning to prepare for and control future development, and for increased investment in basic services. This new concern with the quality of urban life and with the need for planning has emerged at the same time that the problems of the poorer districts have impressed upon government the need for social action in the area of housing and employment. Together, these two concerns have stimulated a further reassessment of urban policies and national priorities, and have led in the past four years to the evolution of a new, carefully conceived urban policy that stresses the desirability of extensive and effective urban planning, and the urgent need for action to stimulate the development of low-income housing.

The Evolution of a New Policy: 1968 to the Present

The preparation of the 1968--72 development plan for Morocco was a year-long process, involving a series of specialized commissions for the major sectors of economic and social activity. On the basis of the materials prepared by these commissions and their recommendations for action,
the final decisions on general priorities and allocation of funds were made at the highest level of government, by the King and his advisors.

In 1967, the physical planning agency established by Ecochard in 1949 was reorganized and transferred from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of Interior. The change was designed to bring physical planning and housing activities under more direct control, and to promote cooperation between the planning agency and Local government officials. Under the Ministry of Public Works, the agency had functioned independently, with little reference to other departments, but there had been considerable friction with local officials. The new agency, the Direction de L'Urbanisme et de L'Habitat (DUH--Department of Urban Planning and Housing), formed the nucleus of the sub-commission on urban planning and housing, under the Human Resources Commission; it became involved immediately in the process of elaborating the 1968--72 development plan.

A new research arm of the DUH was established to prepare a program, the Centre d'Expérimentation, de Recherche et de Formation (CERF--Center for Experimentation, Research and Training). This unit was headed by a dynamic and dedicated Frenchman, and staffed almost entirely by highly trained young technical assistants. They embarked immediately on a series of studies of the bidonville's and the slums of Morocco's cities, with emphasis on demography,
income, and social in

The recommendations of the planners to the Human Re-

sources Commission stressed the urgency of the housing cri-

sis. They warned that the situation was already critical

and rapidly getting worse: something must be done to check

the spread of the bidonvilles, and to prevent further over-
crowding in the poor areas of the cities. They also

stressed the need for more effective planning and a more

active government role in urban planning and general urban
development. Their conclusion: government must accord a

much higher priority to the cities, and increase its invest-

ment there significantly. However, these recommendations

were rejected in light of the decision to concentrate the
government's efforts and money on rural development.

Faced with at least five years of meager resources,
the Minister of Interior and his Secretary General called
for a complete re-assessment of existing housing and plan-
ing policies. Their aim was to develop new programs that
would affect more people and that would cost much less than
the expensive housing programs of the past, which had re-
lied almost exclusively on direct construction of entire
projects by government. CERF was again called upon to do
the basic research and experimentation, and it has been
occupied with the task ever since.

The young architects and planners of CERF have under-
taken extensive research on housing and planning problems in
general, and on the specific problems of Morocco's cities. They have explored a wide range of new ideas and alternative policies, and the work they have produced has generally been of a high quality. They have assembled a large collection of materials, Moroccan and foreign, and have encouraged research by other agencies and individuals.

The most serious drawback in CERF's activities is that they have been undertaken almost entirely by foreigners (which is not surprising, since there are not many qualified Moroccans in this field). Also, the agency has been dominated by planners and architects trained in the French tradition; it is only very recently that CERF has sought the assistance of other disciplines, notably sociologists and economists. As a result, although their arguments and ideas are imaginative, their presentations excellent and persuasive, they rely heavily on French ideas and antecedents; in addition, they often seem rather high flown and ambitious, and divorced from political and economic realities of the Moroccan situation. For example, their reports discuss at length how much land is needed to absorb the bidonvilles, what are ideal densities per hectare, and how many houses must be built; there is less concern with where to build them, how to obtain the land, and how to pay for them. They deal only very generally with the economic, social and political implications of the massive programs they recommend for the cities. On the other hand, they have done much of
the background research that must precede any significant planning or housing program. They have also enjoyed very substantial support from the Minister of Interior and the Secretary General, both of whom have followed their activities very carefully. "If they accept the ambitious objectives and programs of CERP, they are as likely as anyone in Morocco to bring them about.

CERP's first major project was a review of past housing policies. Its aim was to develop a long-term policy that would ultimately solve the problem of the bidonvilles without the input of vast capital resources. The first major report was submitted in May, 1968; it was followed by a further elaboration in December, 1968, and a major policy statement by the Ministry of Interior in May, 1969. Further refinements and popularizations of these basic documents have appeared subsequently, but the basis of the new


** CERP, Pour un Urbanisme Operationnel (Rabat: December, 1968, mimeo).

*** Ministere de l'Interieur, Note Relative a la Politique Proposée en Matiere d'Urbanisme et Habitat (Rabat: May, 1969).
policy has remained basically the same. An interesting analysis was prepared in January, 1970.*

The CERF reports gave the most realistic estimates of the rate of growth of the cities that have appeared to date in any official Moroccan documents, though, as privately admitted by their authors, they still underestimate the pace of urbanization. Their avowed aim is to eliminate the bidonvilles as quickly as resources permit, and to ease congestion in the overcrowded slums. They stress that the cities are approaching a state of anarchy and, in an argument calculated to find favor with Morocco's rulers, urge government action to re-establish order in the cities and to control the pace and direction of growth. The CERF documents are insistent on the need for a new approach and new attitudes towards the bidonvilles. They must be regarded not as evil aberrations, a threat and a shame to the nation, but as an inevitable stage in the path of development. They stressed the notion perhaps best expressed by John Turner of MIT (a major influence on the Moroccan planners), that there is much energy in the bidonvilles which government should harness and direct towards positive ends, notably towards

CERF's research and analysis focused initially on what was essentially a variation of a site and service scheme. Government was to plan and provide services for large low-income housing developments, while actual housing construction was to be financed largely by the private sector, assisted by government loan programs. This concept of housing development had first been formulated in the postwar period, as part of Eocharl's general exploration of alternatives for government assistance to housing. It was not until 1965 that any such scheme was put into effect, though one essential ingredient of the program, government purchase of large tracts of land, had formed part of government activity since the early 1950s.

After 1965, the traditional policy of direct construction of houses for rent became financially impossible. Government continued to purchase land as far as its resources permitted, and it began to use its reserves of land for large housing projects. Here, the planning agency would prepare a layout for the area, install basic services (roads, water, sewerage, and electricity), and then sell the lots at prices below their market value. The new owners would build their own houses with the assistance of a low-cost housing loan program. The planning agency offered technical advice; in some cases they even provided the architectural plans and stipulated what building materials...
were to be used. In 1968 several such projects were underway in Casablanca and in Rabat. CERF continued these "experiments," and prepared additional layouts for further projects in these and other cities.

The housing policy that evolved between 1968 and 1971 drew heavily on the experience of the 1965--67 period. The site and service program formed an essential part of the new policy. To this basic approach to large-scale housing development were added new concepts and ideas that emerged from the research and studies undertaken by CERF: these studies had stressed above all the economics of the bidonvilles, and the ability of bidonville residents to pay rent or to construct houses. The final ingredient of the new policy was a new "theory" of housing development; the theory stressed the need for community action, and the desirability of harnessing the energy of bidonville residents.

Self-help, primarily in housing construction, became an important objective in itself. The concern with self-help and a continuing desire to eliminate the bidonvilles as quickly as possible added a second major part to the new policy--the design of a program to improve and develop the bidonvilles progressively.

The new housing policy proposed a three-tiered approach to government action in the area of housing development. The CERF program defined three income groups, and outlined a different approach to government assistance for
each group. Bido-ville residents and slum-dwellers with an income over 500 dirhams a month were to be left to their own devices: they could, said the planners, afford to build houses without government assistance. Those with incomes between 200 and 500 dirhams a month were to benefit from government housing developments along the lines of the site and service scheme. Using public land reserves, the DUH or authorized private developers would prepare serviced lots, and an expanded loan program would permit low-income families to build their own houses. It was proposed that for those in this group who could not afford even the low-cost loans, the DUH would build and rent out some houses in the developments. Private companies also might take advantage of the program to build housing projects for their employees. It was an essential part of the policy, however, that all or most of the beneficiaries of the scheme would eventually own their own houses, and might add to them as time went on.

For the lowest income group (0-200 dirhams a month), CERV emphasized the need to begin with a stabilization of their situation, especially in the matter of land tenure. These people lived in a constant state of uncertainty, for everything about their homes was illegal. Unless some stability was introduced, government would be hard pressed to assist them in improving their living conditions. Assuming that the question of their right to the land was resolved
(and it is not clear exactly how this will be achieved), the CERF proposal involved progressive improvement of the bidonvilles, with the DUH working in cooperation with the bidonville residents. The intended housing developments would consist initially of nothing but bare plots, on which the inhabitants could build any type of building they could afford. Government or private developers would provide services—roads, water, sewerage, lighting, etc.—as government and the residents could afford to pay for them, and the residents would themselves gradually improve their houses, with technical assistance from the DUH. Time limits were imposed for various stages of development, but in general there was to be considerable flexibility in its pace. The DUH has experimented with this program at Yacoub el Mansour in Rabat, and it appears to have worked quite well to date.*

An important aspect of the CERF policies is the enormous scale that is proposed. CERF estimated that in order to accommodate new population in the cities, and to ease congestion in existing housing between 1968 and 1972, without doing anything in the bidonvilles, a total of 240,780 new houses would be required. An additional 200,000 new houses would be required to eliminate the bidonvilles in

*CERF, 1968-72: Moven D'Action dans le Milieu Urbain, provides the clearest statement of this policy.
five years.* It is now 1971; and housing programs have not progressed much beyond the planning and experimental stage; only a very small number of houses have actually been completed; these estimates of how many new houses will be required must therefore be increased substantially. If the goals set by the CERF reports were to be achieved, an enormous increase in resources would be required and, perhaps equally important, an enormous increase in the staff of the planning agency. Looked at from any angle, the problem is an enormous one, and the scale of the effort required to resolve it, overwhelming. Over 500,000 new houses would be needed to "solve" the existing housing problem, and the figure gets bigger all the time.

As CERF's work on housing policy progressed, problems of outmoded land laws and legal restrictions on government intervention in the real estate market loomed larger and larger as an impediment to effective action. Both the site and service developments and the improved bidonville schemes also encountered legal obstacles. Planners in Casablanca wanted to tear down much of the old medina in a large-scale scheme for urban renewal, and found that they had no legal means to acquire compulsorily the land they required. The slow-moving, cumbersome provisions for physical planning also were questioned and criticized. As part of their

program, therefore, CERF drafted a new law that would resolve these difficulties and provide the legal instruments necessary for the execution of their policies.

There has been in the past year a major re-assessment of national priorities at the highest levels of government, and it is widely believed that the most important shift has come in the government's approach to urban problems, particularly housing. The King has not spoken publicly on the issue, but he has let it be known, in typical Moroccan fashion, that he intends the government to devote much more money and effort to urban development in the next planning period (1973-77).

Trying to analyze the motives for the King's decisions in Morocco is akin to Kremlinology: everyone tries to guess from the scant signs and statements where the Royal emphasis lies. The best guess seems to be that the King and his advisors have recognized that the effort to keep people on the land and slow the growth of cities by policies of rural development and family planning has failed, and is unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future. Conditions in the cities are terrible and getting worse, and though the regime's hold on the cities is a tight one, general unrest is increasing. Whether it is fear of urban discontent and riots or a genuine concern for the poverty and misery that has prompted His Majesty's change of heart towards the bidonvilles is not clear. His renewed interest in planning and housing has
brought urban problems into the limelight—cocktail conversation in Rabat is allegedly dominated by urbanization and its consequences. In the Ministry of Interior a major effort to prepare for action is underway.

Perhaps the most significant advance in urban policy to date has been the presentation and promised acceptance of a new law to govern regional and urban planning in Morocco. The Loi-Cadre de l'Amenagement Urbain et Rural is the first significant attempt to re-organize and reform the system of physical planning in Morocco since Ecochard's law was passed in 1952. In early drafts of the law (the first was presented in 1968), the emphasis was on the conditions for government acquisition and sale of land, and on provisions for low-income housing construction and low-cost loans. In subsequent drafts, however, the scope of the law was broadened to cover the entire regional and physical planning processes.

In its present form the Loi-Cadre is a rather grandiose affair, and, if it were enacted without amendment, would give the Ministry of Interior vast power over many departments of government, including Public Works, Tourism, Finance, and economic planning. This fact has embroiled the law in political controversy for the past year, with the result that some of the broad and rather ill-defined powers accorded to the Ministry of Interior will be removed from the final draft. In May, 1973, there were definite indications that the conflicts had been resolved and that the law
would shortly be approved. The Cabinet had appointed a special committee to work out the final details and to prepare the definitive draft. It is always possible that the process may drag on for some time; however, a number of high level officials were confident that this would not happen.

The law itself establishes a three-tier planning structure, including regional plans, master plans for cities or rural centers, and land-use plans. The first, called Schemas de Structure et d'Orientaion, are intended as a general plan for the overall development of quite large regions. They would include guidelines for economic and social development, for the distribution of population centers within the region, for industrial location, and for the development of the transportation network and other major public installations. In the original scheme, the Ministry of Interior, in collaboration with other ministries, would have prepared plans and exercised considerable control over their execution; it is hardly surprising that the other ministries protested. The final law will provide that the plans be prepared by regional committees, headed by the governors of the provinces involved (which, of course, means that the Ministry of Interior will have considerable influence over their activities). The regional committees will be supervised by an interministerial committee headed by the Minister of Plan. A new Division of Regional Planning has already been established within the Ministry of Plan, which is
to initiate and supervise the entire process. Despite these steps, the regional planning system is still very much in a formative stage, and it is not yet clear exactly how it will work. One indication of confusion is the fact that the reasons for regional planning, and the scope and nature of the plans themselves, are described quite differently by the economic planners and the physical planners in the Ministry of Interior.

The 1960-64 Development Plan paid lip-service to regional planning, primarily in the sense of local participation; it was also mentioned in the 1965-67 plan. The 1968-72 plan designated groups of provinces as regions, and a Minister was subsequently assigned to each region. There were meetings of local councils to discuss the plan, but that was all. There is thus no machinery and virtually no precedent for the proposed new regional planning system, and it must begin from the beginning.

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior suggested that at least some of the regional plans be drawn up by small, high level teams of foreign experts, working in close collaboration with the regional commissions and the Ministries of Plan and Interior. Five general regions have been selected for the initial effort, and the Ministry of Interior has submitted requests to a number of international agencies for assistance; such assistance would amount to about $2 million for each region. The DUH itself has
already begun work on a plan for one of the regions, an enormous area from El Jadida to Kenitra. This builds on a detailed plan that has already been completed for the rural hinterland of Rabat and Casablanca; a Czech planner assigned to CERF as a UN technical assistant did most of the work as part of a rural housing scheme; it is very comprehensive and has stimulated considerable interest.* CERF is currently assembling a team to draw up the broader regional plan; if this is as thorough as the first effort, it should be an interesting and useful document.

At the second tier of the new planning system are Schemas Directeurs, or master plans. In theory, the regional plans will designate those metropolitan areas and rural centers that require a more detailed plan. The DUH will be solely responsible for drawing up these plans. CERF officials maintained that the master plans would take a broad approach to the development of the city, orienting it within the regional context, and taking fully into account economic and sociological factors. They have stated quite specifically that they intend to depart from the strictly architectural-urbaniste approach that has dominated past plans; and the law stresses that the plans are to be program and investment oriented.

The Schemas Directeurs are to provide, within the

context of national economic and social development plans and of the Schemas de Structure et d'Orienteation, if they exist, a general development plan for the metropolitan area, including a general scheme for land use, zoning provisions, a design for the transportation network, and proposed public installations. If past efforts at master plans are any indication, there may emerge as general and interesting documents with some rather grandiose proposals (new universities, recreational areas and monorail systems), and some more realistic ones (such as schools and hospitals). What is most important is whether they are based on a realistic assessment of what money will be available, and whether they specify the source of funding for proposed programs. The determination and the capability of the government agencies which are supposed to carry out the schemes will determine whether or not the plans go beyond the level of dreams and hopes. It is suggested that here too teams of foreign experts, in close cooperation with the DUH, would assist in the preparation of the plans.

The third level of planning proposed in the new law would involve the preparation of land-use plans for specific, clearly defined districts of a city, or for an important town or village (Plans d'Utilization des Sols). These districts would be designated in a master plan for the area, or by directive of the Ministry of Interior. The land-use plans would be roughly the same as the plans d'aménagement.
of the existing system. They would map street layouts and designate sites for all public facilities and, in some instances, for commercial and industrial enterprises, all, of course, within the guidelines laid down in the master plan. These plans are almost certain to provide the basis for the large-scale housing developments that will hopefully be designed and constructed in the next planning period.

The DUH officials do not propose that technical assistants draw up these plans. It is almost certain that in principle and in practice the plans will vary little from the pattern established twenty years ago. However, since this French system is orderly and rational, and since it has enough legal clout so that the plans are usually implemented more or less as intended, it could, imaginatively used, prove an effective instrument. The main priority will be to simplify the procedures required for approval of plans laid down in the 1952 law.

The Lo-Cadre also has important provisions relating to land policy and public housing construction, though these have tended to be ignored in the fuss over the overall planning system. The provisions on land law simplify somewhat procedures for expropriation, broaden the State's powers of pre-emption, and provide for a regime of retrocession. The law also permits government or private developers to sell developed land that does not have a full complement of services. There is a provision for a tax on undeveloped land,
and the law proposes the creation of national and municipal land development funds, and of a series of institutions responsible for land development. By these means, government hopes to be able to rationalize and influence land values that have been greatly distorted by speculation. The hope is also that these measures will encourage greater investment in low-income housing. The housing provisions of the Loi-Cadre provide a legal framework for the general housing policies described above, particularly those concerned with équipement progressif.

In connection with the development of the new housing and planning policies, the Department of Urban Planning and Housing has explored possible alternatives for training more Moroccan planners. The architects of the new policies recognize that such training is essential because of Morocco's heavy dependence at present on foreigners, at every level in the planning process. CERF has developed a proposal for a one-year post-graduate course at the University of Mohammed V. The course would train not only physical planners but also, in the inter-disciplinary spirit of current DUH activity, sociologists, economists, and statisticians. The program would graduate thirty people a year. In addition, of course, to providing badly needed manpower, it would permit young planners to enter government service at salaries substantially higher than those offered to applicants without post-graduate education. Since low salaries are a major
obstacle to recruitment of qualified Moroccans; this factor might be very significant.

This proposal is currently under discussion with university authorities. However, when the DUH presented the program to the Cabinet in hope of possible international assistance, the comment was that it was not large enough to interest international agencies. The DUH is therefore proposing a course for 120 graduates a year, with Pan-African scope (Morocco would pick up a similar abortive project from Algeria). The new project was in a very embryonic state in May, 1971, and it was not at all clear what would emerge. Meanwhile, the DUH was continuing its negotiations for the more modest proposal.

The new Loi-Cadre and the housing policies developed by the DUH offer an exciting potential for action in Morocco's urban areas. The question now must be how far this potential will be realized. The first and most essential condition of success is the whole-hearted commitment of the King and his advisors, which cannot be taken for granted. Without such support there can be little effective action: the plans, no matter how well conceived, can be little more than dreams. For the preparation of the plans and the execution of housing projects in any significant numbers, resources of money and manpower will be required on a large scale. Little will be achieved without extensive support from international agencies as well. Morocco simply
does not have the trained manpower or the resources to do it herself.

In the proposed new framework for planning, it is probably the master plans that will determine the success or failure of the overall scheme, and whether it will represent a major new departure, or simply a re-working of old ideas and techniques. The regional plans may materialize, but it seems likely that they will be more closely integrated with national economic plans than with specific plans for the cities. They will almost certainly be very wide-ranging, giving general guidelines for development but few concrete recommendations for action. The temptation to plan or dream for a distant future when resources are plentiful will be substantial.

The master plans are more likely to deal concretely with the realities of development pressures. There have been master plans in the past, so they do not represent a new and unfamiliar concept or process. Most Moroccan government officials recognize the need for them, and have frequently lamented their absence. There is a legal and administrative machinery already in existence, and the new Loi-Cadre takes this existing system as its point of departure. Used in conjunction with the land-use plans, basically as a guide for general directions of development such as a zoning and general land-use plan, as a basic program for investment and as a blueprint for the development of urban
urban services by all agencies involved in local administration, the master plans could provide a much needed framework for government action in the cities.

The new planning law offers an imaginative and well-thought-out attempt to design an effective and rational planning system. Its fate depends partly on political factors—whether the King and his advisors will lend sufficient support to the scheme to make it work. It also depends, however, on whether the existing administrative machinery for physical planning is able to respond to the challenge of its own proposals. Considerable flexibility will be necessary if they are to adapt and expand their organization and their methods so that they can function efficiently and on a much larger scale. Finally, the success of government policy will depend in the long run on whether the departments and agencies that must implement the plans, at the national and local levels, will be able to mobilize the resources to do so efficiently.

THE MACHINERY OF URBAN PLANNING AND URBAN GOVERNMENT

It is all very well to design a rational and comprehensive system of urban planning. Such a system can, however, accomplish nothing if the planning machinery is unable to carry it out. Still more important is the question of how the proposed regional and master plans are to be implemented. The task of translating ideas and hopes into realistic
plans, and the plans into coordinated action must test the
capacity for organization and the flexibility of every gov-
ernment agency that functions in the urban area.

The Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior is the spider at the center
of the web of urban government. The Ministry controls the
political hierarchy that oversees policy and ensures order
in all Morocco's cities. It exercises numerous controls
over the administrative system of the municipalities. The
Ministry is also responsible for internal security, and it
directs the police force throughout Morocco. The urban
planning agency forms part of the Ministry of Interior, and
its local field offices are strictly supervised by the cen-
tral authority. And finally, although other government
agencies are active in urban affairs, the Ministry, through
its governors, exercises a negative control over all local
field offices and, in theory at least, also a positive role
of coordination.

The spider analogy is particularly apt as a descrip-
tion of the role of the Ministry of Interior. First, the
absolute centralization of power and authority is a critical
aspect of Moroccan government, particularly as it affects
the cities. Second, each of the lines of power listed above
is directly controlled by the Ministry. They form separate
hierarchies which report finally to a section of the
FIG. 2
DIAGRAM OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN URBAN PLANNING AND URBAN GOVERNMENT

NOTE:
--- DENOTE INDIRECT CONTROLS
— DENOTE THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS

THE GOVERNOR HAS THE THEORETICAL POWER OF COORDINATION OVER THE ACTIVITIES OF FIELD OFFICES OF NATIONAL AGENCIES OPERATING IN HIS JURISDICTION. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES OF THE PREFECTURE DOUBLE AS MUNICIPAL SERVICES OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF CASABLANCA; MOHAMED AND THE RURAL COMMUNES HAVE SEPARATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY — URBANIZATION IN MOROCCO
Ministry and then to the Minister himself. Third, though the lines of authority for each activity are clear, the activities of the various dependents of the Ministry are linked at various levels of the urban hierarchy. The Ministry of Interior, with its elaborate network of authority and its broad, undisputed powers, is regarded with respect, awe, and fear by most other departments of government.

Urban Planning: The Department of Urban Planning and Housing (DUH)

The DUH in its present form dates from 1961, when it was transferred from the Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of Interior and reorganized as a unified department responsible for all matters of urban planning and housing. The DUH has recently also become involved in rural development projects in a number of areas, notably in rural housing and regional development schemes. The DUH has also assisted with various projects designed to promote tourism, the design of hotel complexes, for example.

The Department has two major operations: a central organization, and regional offices. The central services were recently re-organized into three sections: a central, operational service responsible for the supervision and coordination of planning and housing operations, a research and training arm (CERF), and a new office responsible for directing the preparation of master plans.
The DUH had in May, 1971, eight field offices, three established within the last year. These provincial offices report directly to the director of the DUH, but they are in close communication with all the central departments. They are responsible for undertaking research in their region and for the preparation of plans d'aménagement. They must also approve the issue of construction permits for all municipalities within their jurisdiction, to ensure that they conform with zoning regulations and with the approved plan for the district (if one exists). They are responsible for planning and carrying out all housing projects.

There is considerable variation among the different regional offices. Some have functioned efficiently, producing good plans and carrying them out; others have had a less distinguished record. The best offices are in Casablanca and Rabat, where the organization is quite laborate, the staffing almost adequate for present needs, and the planning system operational. Other offices have a more rudimentary organization, and seem overwhelmed by the magnitude and complexity of their responsibilities. They have been troubled by frequent changes in staff, and there have been instances of corruption and incompetence, shady land deals, and simple rake-offs. Some offices have simply become bogged down in administrative details.

The current professional staff of the DUH is clearly inadequate for the projected planning enterprise. The total
ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF URBAN PLANNING AND HOUSING

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

SECRETARY GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF URBAN PLANNING AND HOUSING

CENTRAL SERVICES

CENTRAL PLANNING SERVICE

PLANNING OFFICE

FIELD OFFICES

ARCHITECTURAL OFFICE

OFFICE OF MASTER PLANNING

REGIONAL OFFICES
- Casablanca
- Rabat
- Tangiers
- Meknes
- Fez
- Oujda
- Marrakech
- Agadir

URBANIZATION IN MOROCCO

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
staff is 44, with 18 in the central services and 26 in the regional offices. Most are architects, though the task of planning has become much less architectural in recent years. The DUH has tried hard to recruit more planners, sociologists, and economists, but with limited success. The department has experienced serious problems in recruiting staff. First, there is not an abundance of trained Moroccans in this area. Second, there is a wide disparity in salaries in the public and private sectors. Private architectural practice is highly lucrative, while government salaries are relatively low; salaries were unchanged between 1956 and May, 1971, when the King announced a 15 percent boost across the board in civil servant salaries. As a result of these problems, the DUH is seriously understaffed, and some of its officials are of rather mediocre calibre. They have also forced the DUH to employ a high proportion of foreigners; problems inherent in such a heavy dependence on foreign personnel in key areas of government policy formulation.

The administrative organization of the DUH is effective and well designed; its basic simplicity should permit it to respond effectively and flexibly to new situations. The DUH enjoys the authority of the Ministry of Interior; lines of communication are clear, and the system combines centralization with some freedom for local initiative. Its problems, however, are substantial ones. The scale of
operations must be dramatically expanded, at the central and regional levels; this will necessitate further division of labor and greater specialization within the local offices, and a streamlining of administration in general. Second, it will require a much larger, more diverse staff, including as many Moroccans as possible. If the proposed planning scheme comes into effect, it should be easier to recruit highly trained Moroccans for there will be far more room for individual initiative. However, the success of the scheme will depend in part on the ability to attract very high level foreign experts, working in teams in close cooperation with their Moroccan counterparts at the central and regional level.

City Government

The government of Moroccan cities might best be described as two parallel hierarchies, political and administrative, linked at the central level and in the persons of the governor and his deputies. Each province is headed by a governor; the governor, in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, appoints an official to head the territorial subdivisions, or communes, of his province: supercaids and caids for the rural areas, and a pasha for each municipality. The governors and the pashas are both powerful figures within their jurisdiction, with authority over virtually all questions of interest to government. The pashas report directly to the governor, and close ties are maintained.
between them at all times. Depending on the size of the city or town, the pashas appoint one or more khalifas as their direct deputies, with general responsibilities for different districts of the city. The local police force reports to the governor and the pasha; they also control their own intelligence network. Under the khalifas are two further levels of appointed officials—chioukhs and mogqa-demines—who have authority within smaller territorial subdivisions.

The governor also controls the administrative system of his province. There is an array of departments at the provincial level, but these are concerned primarily with rural affairs. Each pasha controls a separate and independent municipal administration, arranged in fairly standard departments (administration, finance, municipal works, etc.). The complexity of administrative organization is determined by the size of the city and by its background: cities where the French were prominent have, in general, a more elaborate administrative system, though the Moroccan government has made a serious attempt to standardize the municipal systems throughout Morocco.

Finally, there are the elected institutions of government. Each commune, urban or rural, elects a council, the size roughly in proportion to its population. These municipal and communal councils in turn elect representatives to a provincial assembly. The local councils were created
in 1960, and have functioned ever since without interruption. However, their real powers are very limited, though the strength of the councils varies significantly from city to city. In virtually every case, the opposition parties have been progressively eliminated from the councils, and though they are used as sounding boards for ideas and as evidence that Morocco has taken the path of democracy, the governors and their deputies remain in undisputed control of political and administrative affairs.

This system somewhat modified in the two largest cities--Rabat and Casablanca. Here, a broadly defined metropolitan area is designated as a prefecture, which, like the provinces, is headed by a governor. The governor, however, is directly responsible for the administration of the principal city, as well as the prefecture as a whole. By this means the Ministry of Interior exercises more direct control over the affairs of the political and economic capitals of Morocco; the system is also designed to permit a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to the problems of the metropolitan areas. The port of Casablanca is also a prefecture, headed by a governor, but its purpose and organization are quite different from those of the two urban prefectures. The maritime prefecture was created solely for security reasons, to permit close supervision by the Ministry of Interior of the port area.

The city governments play an important and potentially
active role in urban development in three key areas: first, local administrations are responsible for the maintenance and extension of a broad range of municipal services; second, they are involved in the elaboration of physical plans and in their implementation; and third, the financial system of the municipalities provides separate, though meager, capital funds for urban development, and the cities thus influence to some extent the allocation of resources among alternative demands for government action.

One important legacy of the French colonial system is the general allocation of responsibility for urban services. Eager to retain control over potentially explosive issues, the central administration assumed responsibility for all "social" services; local government was left, almost by default, with what was left: all the "physical" services of the city. This distinction was maintained by the new Moroccan government, which was even more concerned that the city governments not participate in "social" activity. The city governments have thus inherited a broad range of responsibilities, including city streets, water supply, sewerage, electricity, public transport, markets, street lights, and public parks. City governments do, of course, have some role in social services, notably in public health, but the central government has generally forbidden attempts to encroach on these areas. Likewise, several central ministries have intervened to develop some urban services,
to run them, and to expand them as the cities grow.

Local governments have thus been responsible for and, in a sense, have controlled most urban services that affect the pattern of urban development. Because they have had so few resources at their disposal, of money and manpower, and because the Ministry of Interior has allowed them little scope for innovation, their role has seldom been a positive one. Most services have been expanded in a piece-meal fashion, with little planning, and a limited perception of the impact of municipal action on the overall development of the city. There are exceptions: the governments of Casablanca and Rabat, in particular, have often pursued active and farsighted policies. They have had excellent administrators—French and Moroccan—who have viewed the cities' problems and needs with compassion and understanding. However, their efforts to guide and stimulate development have almost always been hampered by a lack of resources or by a veto of the central administration. Such local initiatives include efforts of the city government of Casablanca to build schools and houses, financed by new municipal taxes (almost always vetoed), and a municipal program to renovate the old medina of Casablanca (which may be approved).

The 1952 planning law required the participation of local administrations in the preparation of city plans—both in the general orientation and structure of the plan, and in
determining the location of public services to be provided by the city. The final plan must also be approved by the municipal council. In practice, however, this consultation is almost always a perfunctory affair. The cities have neither the staff nor the authority to participate actively in drawing up plans, and have been forced to abdicate their role to the DUH and its provincial services.

The city governments, however, are responsible for two critical aspects of plan implementation. First, they must provide most services and public facilities in new districts, and second, they supervise the approval of building plans, and the control of construction. The efficiency with which they carry out these roles varies very considerably, from year to year, and from city to city. Where government has promoted the development of a particular district, services are provided, and where government has sought to maintain a high quality of construction building permits are carefully scrutinized, and bidonvilles swiftly demolished. In almost every instance, however, the city governments lack the staff and resources to carry out all plans efficiently and completely. One result of their inability to check all unauthorized developments is a particular irritant to the planners—lotissements clandestins, or illegal developments, generally on the outskirts of cities.

The third aspect of the municipal role in urban development—finance—is intimately related to the first two.
Each municipality has an operating and a capital budget. Roughly two-thirds of the operating budget comes from taxes shared with central government or from direct grants, the other third from a multitude of local taxes. The cities' capital funds come basically from the surplus of the operating budget, though tax arrears from previous years, if collected, may also be used for this purpose. The cities can legally raise loans, though they have not often done so; however, a special fund for local development has recently been established, from which local governments may borrow. Budgets are prepared by the city administration, and must be approved by the municipal council, the governor; the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Finance.

Unless the current allocation of responsibility among levels of government is radically altered, city government must play a critical role in the implementation of both the master plans and the land use plans. If they are to do so effectively, there must be a major reform of the local fiscal system. Most important, more money must be made available to the city governments for their operating budgets, so they can hire more staff and maintain services adequately, and for capital investment, so that they can respond to the service needs of all parts of the city. This will almost certainly involve a revision of the local tax structure (which is long overdue), so that yields are higher, and so that taxes are easier to collect. Government grants must be
stabilized and the procedures for borrowing simplified so that the cities can plan their investment programs for a longer period than one year. Finally, there should be a closer integration of local investment planning with national economic and regional planning, so that urban development activities are more coordinated than they are at present. Such reforms have been under discussion for some time, at the central and local levels. The key to their implementation is a commitment of resources to local government; the rest would hopefully follow.

Local governments cannot develop the cities alone. Major capital works must always be assisted by the central government, which must also undertake some projects directly. However, where it has been permitted enough latitude to act positively, the Moroccan system of city government has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for action. The authority of the Ministry of Interior is an important advantage, as is the clear hierarchy of decision-making. The administrative system, cumbersome, French, and over-centralized as it is now, functions nevertheless quite efficiently and might be streamlined without radical structural reform. It operates with little hindrance from organized political forces which freedom of action is particularly valuable in the area of planning. In sum, Morocco's city governments might play an active and very positive role in urban development, assisting materially in the implemen-
tation of plans, if the resources available to them were greatly increased, if they were allowed enough freedom of initiative to encourage creative thought at the local level, and if the administrative system were streamlined and adapted to meet the new demands that would be placed upon it.

Field Offices of Central Ministries and Public Corporations

Most central government ministries are active in the urban areas, and those whose activities require regular surveillance and attention generally have field offices at the provincial level. These offices vary considerably in organization, function and authority. The Ministry of Public Works, for example, has an elaborate hierarchy of regional offices throughout Morocco, while the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has offices only in the larger cities. However, these offices in all cases depend directly on the central ministry, which provides all funds and authority for action.

The governors are granted by the Moroccan Constitution a power of coordination over the activities of all government agencies operating within their jurisdiction. In theory, the governors may thus ensure that programs of different agencies are coordinated with one another and with the local administrations concerned. The governors meet periodically with representatives of the central ministries to examine their programs. They can cause an official of
another ministry to be removed in cases of grave fault. However, because the governors do not in any way control the development of programs or the allocation of funds within other ministries, their ability to coordinate all activities in their province must be primarily a negative one, and one that relies on the governor's personal influence in the central government more than on his formal authority.

A number of public and semi-public corporations are active in many cities, but these tend to function relatively autonomously. They provide such services as social security, rural water supply, and electricity supply. There are also a number of municipal corporations which enjoy considerable autonomy particularly in budgetary matters. These have been responsible for water and electricity supply and public transport, and there is a proposal to establish a municipal corporation to remove and dispose of garbage in Casablanca. The municipal corporations depend on the city governments directly. They have been relatively successful, and will probably be instituted in more of Morocco's large cities in the future.

Appraisal

The Moroccan system of urban planning and urban government has many deficiencies, and will pose many problems for those who direct the new effort of planning and urban development. The administrative machine has altered little since the advent of independence: most large cities in
Morocco are run by a system designed for a French provincial city. The bureaucracy has slowed down: it can take thirteen years to gain title to a plot of land, five years to expropriate a property on the site of a projected road, an eternity to collect unpaid taxes. The system is bogged down in paper-work and complex procedures. The staff is often large enough, but poorly trained and more poorly utilized. The machinery for coordination is there, but often the initiative is lacking to make it work. And, compounding all these problems, is the poverty of local governments and planners alike. Efficient, energetic and positive government is difficult if there is little money available and if civil servants are badly paid.

The system, however, offers potential for positive and effective action. The close association between the administrative and political systems, at both the central and local levels, gives the bureaucratic system the means and the authority to change and to act. The proposed new planning law will give the Ministry of Interior and its dependents the authority to prepare comprehensive plans and to administer their implementation with little outside interference. The Ministry can, if it chooses, re-arrange provincial and municipal boundaries (as it has in the past), and order the creation or elimination of departments at the local level. If the Ministry of Finance will cooperate, it can re-organize the local fiscal system and streamline administrative
procedures.

Another major advantage of the Moroccan system is its heritage of government involvement in urban development. Planning is not a new and horrifying concept for most Moroccans, and for most officials it is a familiar phenomenon. There is in existence a system of planning, which provides for plans that have the force of law, and a system of control to ensure their implementation. There are problems in an established tradition, for its mentors tend to resist change, and to cling tenaciously to old ideas and old ways. However, it must be easier to build the complex system the Moroccans propose to adopt on a foundation of experience and legal and political precedent than to start from the beginning.

There may be four keys to success in the new venture in planning and urban development. The first is the adaptation of the administrative machine to make the massive new programs possible. Procedures must be simplified, some departments decentralized, and the whole process speeded up. Current staff must be better utilized, and new, qualified personnel recruited if new programs are to run smoothly and efficiently. Second, far more resources must be committed to planning and developing the cities than in the past. Without money and manpower, very little can be accomplished. Third, the activities of planners, of local governments, and of the different central ministries with responsibility,
for urban development must be better coordinated in the future, to ensure the most efficient use of resources and the most harmonious development possible. Finally, urban development planning and the execution of plans and programs depends on political will. If the King and the Minister of Interior put their support behind planning and housing programs, things will happen quickly. Anything, or almost anything, will be possible. However, if the political will is not there, the plans and programs will blunder slowly on, and there will be far more talk than action, and more analyses of urban problems than concrete achievements to remedy them.

ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES IN THE AREA OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The re-awakening of interest in urban problems and urban policies in Morocco and abroad has stimulated a flurry of activity among the various international assistance agencies in Rabat. Most aid programs have in the past had little or nothing to do with city planning or urban services, though there has been considerable interest in rural development. There is, now, however, an almost universal concern for the problems of the cities, and everyone seems to be talking about what might be done about them.

The Ministry of Interior and the DUH, sensing this
concern, have bombarded virtually every agency that is active in Morocco with requests for assistance, for their planning schemes and for housing development. Since they are new to this business, their grantsmanship has lacked polish; they have, for example, submitted virtually the same proposal to each agency, to the annoyance of some of them. It seems likely, nevertheless, that some concrete programs will eventually emerge from what is now a rather confusing and uncertain situation.

The DUH proposals for assistance have followed the lines of the housing programs and the regional planning system described earlier. Their grant requests include the documents describing and arguing for a massive new program for government action in the area of housing; international agencies are requested to provide technical assistance, but, more importantly, large amounts of credit for private housing construction. The dossier also includes the Loi-cadre and a general description of the proposed regional and master plans. Here, the agencies are requested to provide high level teams of experts to assist in planning one or more regions or cities. Finally, the dossier includes the proposal for a university course in planning. To date, the proposals have been quite unspecific about details of programs or the sums of money involved. They provide a general approach to the problems, a description of Morocco's new programs and policies in the area of urban development, and
a general request for assistance.

In May, 1971, I spoke with representatives of the major technical assistance agencies in Rabat. They described their approach to urban programs, the requests they had received from the DUH, and their general reaction to them. This information was generally given in confidence; what is sketched here is a summary of their programs, reactions and reservations. This section also describes briefly two programs which have involved foreign assistance in the past, and which might offer possibilities for new formulations and new direction in the future.

Current Status of Proposals for Assistance to Urban Programs

The USAID mission was among the first to express interest in the activities and proposals of CERF, and USAID is likely to support a large-scale housing program under the Housing Investment Guarantee Program. Negotiations began in late 1970, and at least two teams have visited Morocco to investigate the proposal and to work out details of a program. Most of the individuals concerned were optimistic that the program would get off the ground within the next year. USAID has also been approached for assistance to the DUH's planning schemes, and USAID officials are interested by the proposal. For the moment, however, housing programs are more attractive to them, for they seem to offer more tangible benefits in the short run. They promise to provide
jobs and shelter for some of the urban poor, and thus attack
directly the two most serious problems of the cities: un-
employment and housing.

The DUH has proposed that the U.N. undertake a large
program of regional planning, but as yet the U.N. has taken
no action on the proposal. The World Bank also has been
approached with a proposal for assistance; I was told that
the Bank intends to send a team to Morocco in the fall to
explore the possibilities for action. The German Foundation
for the Developing Countries was also said to have evinced
interest in the new urban policies.

The Canadian assistance program in Morocco is just
getting underway, stimulated in part by internal pressures
in Canada to increase its involvement in francophone coun-
tries. The director was very enthusiastic about the possi-
bility for action in the regional planning field, and indi-
cated that CIDA might be most interested in a project to
plan the Tangier-Tetouan region, since the Canadian program
is already involved in an agricultural development program
in that area.

The French technical assistance program is currently
undergoing a major re-assessment. The present program is
very much a legacy of the colonial administration, and in-
volves mainly the support of large numbers of teachers and
c. 11 servants. The French have also received a request for
asistance to the regional planning scheme, but appear to
have reacted rather negatively to it.

The Peace Corps has about 30 architects in Morocco; most are working in the regional offices of the DUH. They have been well used in some places, designing large housing programs, and participating in all the planning activities of the office. Others have found little to do. At the request of the Moroccan government, the Peace Corps is now trying to recruit urban planners rather than architects, as well as some geographers and economists.

Reactions to Proposals for Assistance to Urban Programs

The international agencies have responded to the DUH proposals for assistance with varying degrees of enthusiasm. All agree to the need for some action in the urban areas; they disagree, however, on whether the Moroccan government and international agencies should commit a significant proportion to social programs in general, and to the cities in particular. They also assess differently the sincerity of the Moroccan government in its statement of concern for the bidonvilles and their determination to plan effectively and to carry out the plans.

The agencies that are hesitant about the new programs for planning and housing expressed similar reservations, along the following lines:

1) The Loi Cadre has not yet been passed, and this might mean that it is still embroiled in politi-
cal conflict. It would be unwise to become involved if regional planning will involve a continuing power struggle between the Ministry of Interior and other Ministries.

2) Most agencies have dealt in the past with the Ministries of Plan, Agriculture, Public Works, Education, Health, and Tourism. They are not familiar with the Ministry of Interior, and are rather apprehensive about it.

3) The proposals themselves are too grandiose, and not realistic enough. No one knows exactly what the regional plans will be, and experience in other countries has soured some agencies on master plans.

4) The proposals are too French in their precedents. There are too many foreigners involved, particularly in CERF, and it is clear that the proposals will depend for their success on the continuing involvement of foreigners.

5) No one knows how much attention and money the government will actually give to these urban programs.

6) Some question the wisdom of a program that would invest so much money in housing and urban planning, since it must in some sense detract from the rural development effort.
These reservations are in some cases substantial ones, and probably mean that those who hold them will not embark immediately on the large-scale programs envisioned by the DUH. However, there is near unanimity on the urgent need for some action to alleviate the most pressing problems of the cities and above all, to give some assistance to the bidonvilles. Morocco's past experience with planning, the beauty of her cities, and the high standards of services which are still maintained in some areas are seen as hopeful indications that the current proposals may come to something. Many who have worked with the Ministry of Interior are confident that there is enormous potential for action.

The Role of the Ford Foundation

The Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, Maati Jorio, was quite specific about what he thought the Ford Foundation might do to assist urban programs. First, he would be interested in research on specific, solvable problems, notably, on cheaper methods of construction that would utilize local materials. Second, he would be interested in a team of experts provided by the Foundation to assist with one or more regional plan or master plan. Third, he suggested that the Foundation might support the proposed university course for urban planners. The Ministry is interested in short tours abroad for planners, but prefers that planners are not trained abroad. The DUH's in-
interest in renovating traditional cities is related to the encouragement of tourism, but for the moment such projects are secondary to the planning and housing schemes.

Promotion Nationale and the "Programme PAM"

Promotion Nationale is a national program designed to give work to the unemployed, and to direct their energies towards the national development effort. It was established in 1961, directed by an agency attached to the Cabinet: it was modelled on the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps. Promotion Nationale was initially confined to rural areas, where it was used for a variety of community development projects. In 1963, it was extended to the urban areas, where men have been employed in grading road beds, gardening, and reforestation. It has functioned since then as a national program. USAID has assisted the Promotion Nationale for some time, with technical assistance and with some money, but mainly with wheat and other foodstuffs provided through P.L. 480.

In some cities an attempt has been made to use Promotion Nationale in low income housing projects. However, the attempt has not proved very successful. Because the number of unemployed is so vast, teams of workers must be changed frequently in order to spread the benefits of the program. There is thus little time for workers to pick up skills or to learn to work together. In addition, virtually
all the labor was completely unskilled. Use of the program therefore tended to slow projects significantly, and it often doubled the cost of construction. *Promotion Nationale* has subsequently been used only for preparing sites for construction and for minor works associated with the housing projects.

The experience of *Promotion Nationale* is relevant as a successful program of public works, using the labor of the unemployed, and as a program which has been supported at least in part by international assistance, and has used it relatively successfully. In its basic orientation towards community development and "self help," *Promotion Nationale* spiritually akin to current proposals for progressive improvement of the bidonvilles, and for construction of houses by their prospective owners. It also offers a number of lessons: that construction costs are bound to rise, for example, and that it is perhaps more difficult than it would appear to use unskilled labor for the rather complex task of constructing houses. CERF is currently undertaking research on ways in which these problems might be overcome.

*Programme PAM* (*Programme Alimentaire Mondiale*--World Food Program) is a part of Morocco's rural housing program and administered by the United Nations Development Program in Morocco. The program was instituted in 1968, and is run by a special division of the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. It was initially
intended to help people displaced by irrigation projects to rebuild new homes, using their own labor and local materials. The government was to provide between 10 and 20 percent of the total cost of each house, in food and in materials, and a similar amount per house for infrastructure in the new rural centers. The original program proposed to construct 60,000 houses over a five-year period. The government estimated the total public investment over the five-year period in the program at 90 million dirhams ($18 million); the total United Nations and World Food Program contribution, in food, money, and technical assistance, was $13 million.

The program got off the ground slowly. The proposed U.N. technical assistance team never materialized; only one technical assistant, a Czech planner, came to Morocco. Actual construction began late in 1969, and in May, 1971, roughly 7,000 houses had been completed or were underway. It was optimistically estimated that about 30,000 would be completed by the end of 1973. As in the Promotion Nationale efforts in the area of housing, there was a strong tendency for costs to rise, partly because people who were building the houses wanted more expensive materials than the cheap, "local" materials that had been proposed. Local authorities also tended to prefer more solid-looking houses, made of brick and stone, to the more modest structures the program was intended to build.
The program has tended to move in two significant directions since its inception. First, the rural housing scheme has served as a basis for a renewed interest in regional planning. It has stimulated serious thinking within the Ministry of Interior about the role and pattern of regional centers, which has, in turn, led to studies and planning about how to plan and develop a network of urban centers in a large region. The research and techniques that accompanied the initial efforts in this area have provided important background for the new regional planning schemes. Second, there has been a marked tendency for the focus of the program to shift from the small towns and villages to large, urban centers, partly because the demand for action is so much greater there. One U.N. expert suggested that the rural housing program is likely to provide the basis for a new program in urban housing.

TOWARDS A POLICY FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO

Urban problems in Morocco have long been a nagging concern for many agencies of government. Inadequate and insufficient housing, high rates of unemployment, and widespread poverty are very tangible and very visible problems, demanding government attention and action, especially in the large cities. Both the cities and their problems are growing and multiplying at an alarming rate. For many years, however, government policy combined an official abstention
from active policies to improve the urban environment with a harsh policy of surveillance and repression, designed to ensure that urban discontent did not erupt into organized or spontaneous opposition to the King and his government. This was above all the policy of the ostrich, for many officials hoped that by turning a blind eye to the problems, and by emphasizing the power and authority of government, the problems would disappear.

Very recently, however, there has been an important change in the government's approach to the problems of the cities. The result has been an effort to formulate a new, official policy for urban development. This is based on a more positive approach to guide the growth of the cities, and to improve the lot of their inhabitants. The essence of the new urban policy is a determination to plan effectively for the future development of Morocco's cities, and to assist in providing decent housing for the nation's poor.

Morocco's new urban policies were not pulled from a hat, nor did they spring full-blown from the head of any official or planner. They are very much a product of the past. They draw heavily on the legacies of the French colonial period. In addition, the experience of the independent Moroccan government in grappling with urban problems, however jaundiced their approach, contributed ideas, attitudes, and programs towards the cities. The cities themselves, in the relative urgency of their problems and the
insistence of their demands, have shaped the evolution of the new policy and the nature of the methods government proposes to employ in alleviating their worst consequences. The institutions for urban planning and urban government also determine in part the solutions that are now offered for the problems they have faced for many years.

The Legacy of French Colonial Rule

The cities themselves are the most notable legacy of French colonial rule. In almost all Moroccan cities the modern districts were planned initially by the French, built by Frenchmen, with French capital. The basic system of government services to the urban population was designed and developed by the French administration in the years before independence.

The modern districts of Morocco's cities thus retain an unmistakably French flavor, in the basic plan of the cities, in their design and architecture, in the shops, warehouses and factories, and in the apartments that house the bourgeoisie. A significant community of Frenchmen still exists in Morocco, mainly in the cities. The main difference between the contemporary situation and the French community of the colonial era is that most of the petits blancs, the lower class Frenchmen and Spaniards and other Europeans, have left Morocco, leaving behind their more wealthy compatriots. Their presence contributes to the continuing
vitality of the French elements in Moroccan urban life. In addition, most planners and architects in Morocco are French or French-trained, and there is thus no immediate prospect that the French character of the modern cities, in their external appearance, at least, will fade.

The squalor of many parts of Moroccan cities also is a legacy of the era of French colonial administration. French efforts to develop the cities, except for a brief period after World War II, were devoted almost exclusively to those areas of the cities where Frenchmen worked and lived. The original Moroccan cities that were built long before the French arrived, beautiful and fascinating in their architecture and structure, were virtually ignored: The French would not "interfere" with traditional culture and government. When floods of Moroccan migrants arrived in the cities they crowded into the old sections, or settled in new, unplanned and unserviced areas developed generally by unscrupulous French or Moroccan businessmen, or in the bidonvilles that sprang up around many cities.

Thus, the cities France bequeathed to independent Morocco comprised three separate entities. The first were the old cities that preceded French rule. These living monuments of traditional Moroccan history and culture were remarkably well-preserved. However, deserted by former wealthy residents who were drawn by the lure of the new French suburbs, overcrowded by rural migrants, with anti
quated services, they had begun to show serious signs of deterioration by the time of independence. The second type of city was the modern French city—generally well-planned, orderly, and clean, looking more like transplanted French towns and provincial capitals than like cities of Africa. And finally, there were the vast areas where the poor Moroccan population lived—dirty, squalid, with almost no services, and houses ranging from shacks of cardboard and corrugated metal to windowless boxes crowded one upon the other. There were other districts ranged between the three separate cities; the proletarian districts where the European poor had lived, for example. But what is most striking is that France left the cities divided—between modernity and tradition, between French and Moroccan, and, above all, between rich and poor.

France's second legacy to Moroccan cities was a system of government and of city planning. The colonial period alternated between intense government activity and periods of neglect. During the years of activism, city planning was a vigorous and often a very effective affair. The central and local administrations worked in concert to develop an efficient system of providing services, almost always to the French population. The system of administration and the planning machinery proceeded sluggishly during the fallow years. Sprawling suburbs, vast unplanned developments, and many awkward urban patterns bear witness to the periods of
neglect, as the wide avenues, spacious parks, and orderly layouts of other districts are a tribute to the success of planning when it was employed. Independent Morocco did, therefore, inherit a system of planning which, if properly implemented, offered an effective means of controlling and guiding urban development, and administrative institutions that governed the cities well and efficiently.

The post World War II period was the most activist period of the entire French colonial era. Local urban government, the legal and administrative machinery for urban planning, and a system of housing development for low-income groups evolved. These have provided the basis for the systems of physical planning and public housing and for the central institutions of local administration that have governed the cities since independence.

The third legacy of the French era is somewhat more difficult to define. It consists basically of pride in the cities, as a focus of culture and civilization, and because they are beautiful in themselves. This pride extends also to the government and services of the cities: a high premium is placed on efficient, well-run services, directed by an honest, public-spirited bureaucracy. Finally, it includes a belief in the need for urban planning, and a confidence that it could be effective in building beautiful and well-run cities. Above all, France bequeathed a consciousness of the worth and potential of the cities, and an
intangible quality of urban life that persisted through the initial period of Moroccan independence.

Independent Morocco and the Cities

After independence in 1956, the new Moroccan government was concerned first and foremost to restore peace, and to establish its authority throughout Morocco. Here began an enduring concern with the problems of order and security in the cities that has shaped virtually all government attitudes since then. The King and his closest advisors feared, the explosive potential of the urban unemployed and other disgruntled groups, and the possibility of city-based organized opposition to his rule. They therefore approached the urban areas, especially the fast-growing modern cities, with apprehension; their primary objective, from a political point of view, was to control the cities.

An economic slump and the manifold new demands pressed upon government by independence forced the new government of Morocco to cut back on many programs and activities initiated by the French, notably urban planning and housing. Strict economy was the order throughout government, and combined with the general pre-occupation with order and security, this served to stifle creative action in the urban areas. Economy measures and the gradual depletion of the French civil service in Morocco progressively lowered standards of administration; this meant that services in all areas, but
above all in the cities, could not meet rising demands, and that such housing and planning activities as had survived limped weakly and not very effectively along.

Around 1965, a general re-evaluation of the government's social and economic policies led to a major re-ordering of priorities for development, and to a more coherent expression of the independent Moroccan government's objectives for economic and social progress. Rural development was designated as priority number one, partly because the stagnation of the agricultural sector was viewed as the principle impediment to national development, but also because the government hoped to check, or at least to slow, migration to the cities. This general policy found expression in Morocco's development plans for 1965--67 and for 1968--72, in the high proportion of resources earmarked for rural development, and the very limited funds designated for urban planning, public housing for the poor, and the development of urban services.

After 1968, however, many high government officials began to re-evaluate these negative policies towards urban development, stimulated above all by the urgency of the urban problems, but also by pride in their cities. The central concern with security persisted, so that it was the Ministry of Interior which controlled urban policies and activities. Under its leadership, considerable effort has been devoted to the formulation of a new, comprehensive
policy towards the planning and governing of Morocco's cities.

Urban Problems in Contemporary Morocco

Almost all Moroccan officials would agree that the two most urgent and pressing problems of the cities are unemployment and inadequate and insufficient housing. The two are closely related, two facets of the central and unforgettable problem of poverty. They are intimately tied to the problems of rural migration to the cities, and of the modernization of the society and economy. The unemployed pose a serious problem to government; however, it seems a hopeless one to most officials, in its vast dimensions, but above all because it is clear that a solution can come only with the overall development of the economy. Most government policies therefore assert that little can be done to alleviate the problem in the short run. Housing, however, is a more visible problem, and therefore demands a more active government role. The bidonvilles are very poor and unattractive communities. Their impact on government is greater because they are viewed not only as a social ill but as a shame and a scourge that must be eliminated for the sake of national pride. Overcrowded conditions in the old cities and in the newer low income districts are also a serious problem, but their needs are generally viewed as less urgent than those of the bidonvilles.
The modern cities also present serious problems. Here, Morocco faces the problems of cities of Europe or America more than those of an underdeveloped nation. The demands on government of the modern sectors of a city like Casablanca or Rabat do not differ generically from those of Paris or Marseilles. They include the provision of water and electricity, the removal of sewage and garbage, the need for transportation facilities, parks, and security, the maintenance, management, and extension of the cities' physical amenities, and the ordering of relations between government and the commercial and industrial interests. Here, however, the similarities end. Though the modern cities of Morocco were planned and built with the resources of a European nation, they must be maintained and developed with those of a poor nation of Africa. The cities must compete with many other urgent needs for scarce government funds. The tax base of Morocco's cities also does not compare with those of her European counterparts.

There are, then, three fundamental dilemmas presented by the modern cities of Morocco. The first is the fact that their needs are much like those of richer cities in more developed societies. City officials in Casablanca also talk and dream of the unquestionable need for mass transport, for monorails and subway systems, of the prospects for urban renewal, of freeways, new universities, and municipal theaters and recreation areas. However, these must be viewed as
luxuries in the Moroccan context. The nation cannot even afford to maintain the modern cities in the style to which they became accustomed before independence without depriving other parts of the country of resources they badly need.

The second dilemma is thus the choice that government must make between investing money in the cities, or focusing on the development of the rural areas, which are poorer and, in an economic sense, more important to the ultimate development of the nation. It is a choice that must be made. There are many conflicting forces at work, and many contradictory pressures. Despite past determination to pursue the alternative of rural development, the pride of many Moroccans in the beauty and modernity of their cities is a factor, and an important aspect of Morocco's urban policy.

The third dilemma arises from the segregation of many Moroccan cities under French rule. Despite the beauty and high quality of services in the central business districts and high class residential areas, the greater part of most Moroccan cities is comprised of poor, dirty, unplanned, and unserviced districts. Since independence, government has had to choose between maintaining services in the wealthy areas (and since the Moroccan elite now occupies them the pressures to do so are substantial), or devoting to energies to improving services in the poor areas (which must inevitably lead to a deterioration of services in the modern areas).
The poor areas of the cities, the bidonvilles, public housing projects, and private developments, suffer from problems that differ markedly from those of the modern districts. Apart from housing and unemployment—undoubtedly the root of all problems—these areas have been poorly planned and lack almost all public services. Like slums everywhere, the inhabitants have neither the resources to improve the areas themselves, nor the political power to attract government interest and assistance. The new Moroccan government has made some attempt to lessen the disparities between the rich and poor districts of the cities, but the gap remains a wide one.

The old, traditional cities must be seen as a separate problem. Unemployment, poor housing, and inadequate services exist here also, but a more distressing phenomenon is their gradual deterioration, and with that, of a way of life. The old cities are themselves monuments of the past, a living testament of traditional culture. In their beauty and their state of preservation they are almost unique. Overcrowding and the deterioration of services, however, threaten their continued existence, and some officials have begun to consider the possibilities of restoring and preserving these cities, primarily because of their value to the tourist trade. Such thinking is still at an elementary stage, and the task proposed is an immensely complex and expensive one. Except for a project to renovate some tradi-
tional villages in the far south, little has been done to date, and there is no immediate prospect for government action. The overwhelming and very immediate demands of the newer cities are a more urgent problem than the preservation of the cities of the past.

The Institutions of Urban Planning and Urban Government

The government agencies responsible for urban planning and for the administration of the urban areas have responded in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion to the problems of the cities in the years since independence. They have had few resources and little support from the highest levels of government in their task; yet they have nevertheless continued to prepare some plans, to implement others, and, above all, to maintain the cities much as they were before independence.

Because of the paucity of resources and a decided effort on the part of the central administration to stifle local initiative, the administrative system has continued in a remarkable state of preservation, serving to reinforce the legacies of the French colonial era. The machinery for urban planning has been modified in the past four years, and an important new law has been proposed; yet both owe a large debt to French ideas, laws, and practices. Likewise, urban administration still functions much as it did before independence, and the service infrastructure of the modern
cities is much like that of many French urban areas.

The institutions of urban planning and urban government thus offer a sound basis for a new effort to plan and develop cities, for there exists a complex but relatively adaptable and efficient organization, a long tradition of planning, and numerous precedents to build on. Yet it is also evident that administrative reforms to streamline antiquated organization and procedures, to upgrade the quality of personnel, and to provide additional resources for the task of development are necessary.

A New Policy for Urban Development

The new policy for urban development is described at length earlier in this paper. Briefly, it has two separate parts. The first is a new law, the Loi-Cadre, that will provide a three-tiered system of regional and urban planning for all Morocco's cities and towns. The second is a new determination to tackle the immense problem of inadequate housing. The government proposes to devote much more resources to this problem in the future, and it is the avowed objective of the new program to eliminate the bidonvilles and to reduce overcrowding in the poor areas of the cities within thirty years.

The Ministry of Interior has been responsible for developing this policy, and it will almost certainly continue to play a determining role in all aspects of urban planning.
and urban development. Its dominant role indicates that the
new interest in urban problems stems at least in part from
concern with order and security in the cities, since that
has long been the primary responsibility of the Ministry.
It also indicates that urban problems have been accorded a
much higher priority since they were confided to the Ministry
of Interior. Finally, it suggests that the new urban poli-
cies are serious ones which stand a good chance of implemen-
tation, for the Ministry is one of the most effective and
active agencies of the Moroccan government.

The policy is the product of three principle concerns
of the Moroccan government. The first is a fear of the ci-
ties, and of potential unrest and opposition in them. Rec-
ognizing that it is virtually impossible to check the growth
of the cities with the resources at its disposal, government
has decided that the reality of rapid urban growth must be
accepted, and that the government must act to guide and con-
trol it rather than to attempt to prevent it. The second is
a concern for urban poverty as a social and economic ill.
Housing and unemployment pose such urgent problems that,
thanks to the theoretical arguments against investment in
housing and urban services, the Moroccan government has de-
cided they cannot be ignored. Finally, the new concern with
urban and regional planning is the product of a tradition of
pride in the beauty and the orderly pattern of Morocco's
cities, and a horror of the urban chaos that threatens to
engulf many urban agglomerations. It is a clear-sighted attempt to plan rationally and effectively for future growth, and to permit government to exercise an active and positive role in guiding the future development of Morocco's cities.

**Conclusion**

In the past, government has intervened actively and effectively in urban affairs at certain periods; at other times, however, the positive role of government was a negligible one, and urban development was shaped primarily in a negative sense, or in ways that were little understood at the time. The legacy of government policy is thus a mixed one, of direct involvement and active programs alternating with periods of neglect, when the impact of government was indirect and often unperceived.

The new approach to urban development that has evolved over the past three years is more comprehensive and more ambitious than any policies of the past. It proposes first that government plan for the overall pattern of urban settlement in Morocco, and that it take steps to ensure the development of a rational hierarchy of urban centers. It also recommends the preparation of master plans for all or most urban centers to guide the future control over the development of all new districts. Even more ambitious, perhaps, is the determination to promote much greater activity in the area of low-income housing, with the objective of
eliminating completely the problems of the bidonvilles and of over-crowding in poorer districts of the cities.

There are many obstacles in the way of the new policies. The scale of the problems, and the demands they make for money and manpower must always be a serious impediment. It is not yet clear that the King and his advisors are willing to devote the energy and resources that will be required. The administrative system also promises to impede effective action unless it undergoes a series of long-promised reforms. Another persistent problem is the question of Morocco's political stability, and whether the King can remain indefinitely in power.

Despite these obstacles, there is great promise in the new approach to the problems of the cities and, given the resources and the political will, great potential for effective government action. The proposed planning scheme provides for much-needed reforms, within an excellent framework which has enough of the old, in its institutional backing and precedents, to move beyond the realm of dreams and hopes. The housing policies also are well-thought out and, if implemented, offer at least some chance that the situation might eventually be improved if not entirely resolved. There is at present excitement and optimism in Morocco about the possibilities for positive government action. Whether the careful thought and policies, and the widespread concern, will be enough to ensure a concerted and determined effort
to plan for urban development and to rehouse the poor, however, must remain an open question.