This report reviews the "Seers Report," which contained policy guidelines for modern development planning in Zambia, and compares its findings to recent findings during the period 1963-1970. The Seers Report found that Zambia was the most urbanized country in Africa south of the Sahara (excluding South Africa). This report finds that since Independence, this country has witnessed a high rate of rural/urban drift, which has been caused by two factors: the relative stagnation of the rural areas, coupled with an unprecedented and unanticipated rise in both real and money incomes in the towns. In connection with these findings, the following topics are discussed here: (1) The Planning Background; (2) The Future Strategy for Rural Development in Zambia; (3) Rural/Urban Migration and Employment; (4) Settlement and Housing; (5) Alternative Approaches to Rural Development; (6) The Second National Development Plan 1972-1976. [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731-013 739 and UD 013 741-013 744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in the Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] (Author/SB)
An International
Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in
Zambia
This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
Colin Rossen
Frederick C Terzo
Urbanization in Zambia

by

Alan J. F. Simmance

International Urbanization Survey
The Ford Foundation
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INTRODUCTION

This paper was originally written in 1970; the First National Development Plan had still nearly a year of its original span to run and only the preliminary results of the 1969 census had been announced. When I was asked in January 1972 to revise the paper for publication the Second National Development Plan had still not been released and it became available in time only for some hurried revisions to the text and for a few of the recent population figures to be included. The concluding section of this paper is by way of an appendix, based on a first reading of the Plan and not on any considered analysis or thought. Nor have I had time to prepare any detailed reference to sources either there or elsewhere in the paper; except where these are stated in the text or in footnotes, the facts and figures given must be taken on trust as deriving from one or other of the two Development Plans, official statistical and manpower publications, the available census material, and a variety of other official documents and reports. It is, unfortunately, only too common to find different sets of figures relating to the same facts, even in the same document; this occurs in the Second National Development Plan itself. It is sometimes hard to distinguish between projections, estimates, and hard facts and many earlier calculations are subsequently corrected or refined. One is not always certain what assump-
tions have been made or how terms have been defined--the meanings of ('urban') and ('peri-urban') in particular, can be stretched or confined according to the assertions of the writer! I should be surprised, however, if any of the figures I have quoted were seriously misleading.
THE PLANNING BACKGROUND

Most of the policy guidelines for modern development planning in Zambia derive from the so-called "Seers Report" which was prepared over a four-month period between November 1963 and March 1964.* No member of, or consultant to, the Seers Mission was specifically an urban specialist so the Report had comparatively little to say directly about the problem of urbanization. It assumed that over the period 1963-1970, there would be a continuing flow of about one percent per year of the rural population (including women and children) to the towns and that the total urban population would grow from 770,000 in 1963 to 850,000 in 1965 and 1,080,000 in 1970. It proposed the creation of a National Housing Authority along with a program of house construction and improvement to bring the stock of urban dwellings in 1970 to approximately 180,000, related to an average family size in the urban areas of five. It suggested that the effect of policies aimed at the reduction of rural/urban migration would not be great, and that the rate of migration could not be expected to slacken for many years. Neverthe-

less, its proposals for rural development were intended "to have a dynamic effect on the countryside, and thus reduce the temptation to migrate towards the towns." These proposals were aimed at greatly increased agricultural production, land re-settlement, and the modification of tribal land tenure systems. The last of these issues was specifically taken up by the appointment of a Land Commission in June, 1965. The Commission submitted its report of nearly 800 pages to the Government in August, 1967, but it has not been published. There has been piecemeal acceptance of some of the Commission's recommendations, but on one of its central proposals--that registered title should be granted to certain lands held under customary tenure--no Government reaction has been announced and no real progress has been made. Some experts take the view that there is no surer way to deprive the peasant of his land than by giving him title to it. If this be so, it is perhaps as well that nothing has been done! Agriculturists, on the other hand, tend to point to the lack of title as one of the major obstacles to farm improvement. All one can say at this stage is that titles outside the State lands have not been given, and that disappointingly few farms have so far been improved.

At the time of the Seers Report (1964), Zambia was already recognized as the most urbanized country in Africa south of the Sahara (excluding South Africa). Although the mode of life of some 70 per cent of the population still lay
in subsistence farming, traditional agriculture generated a total annual agricultural output of only about K50 million,* and the contribution of African agriculture to the gross domestic product had remained static for many years at around 10 per cent. Cash income from traditional farming stood at about K10 million per annum, supplemented by at least K7 million remitted by absentee wage-earning members of rural families. Large-scale commercial farmers, i.e. 1,300 white farmers (now reduced to about 600) produced over two-thirds of the maize and virtually all the Virginia tobacco marketed in the country. Real per capita annual incomes of Africans in the rural areas were about K23 per head as compared to K29 for their fellows in the towns.

One of the eight declared objectives of the First National Development Plan 1966-70 (later extended to 1971), was "to minimize the inherited economic imbalance between the urban and rural sectors," an objective which has been widely interpreted as meaning "to reduce the disparity" or "redress the balance," despite the clear recognition by His Excellency the President in the Introduction to the Plan document that the balance would not be redressed. Whatever the correct interpretation, the fact remains that the gap has widened rather than been reduced. Purely in terms of

* 1 Zambian Kwacha = U.S. $1.40
production, the 1969 maize harvest was 11 per cent below that for 1964. For climatic reasons, the 1970 harvest was a disaster and led to large-scale maize importations. Commercial maize deliveries for the 1970--71 season were only half those for the previous year, which was also a poor one. Virginia tobacco output fell some 40 per cent between 1964 and 1969, sales of cattle fell from 67,500 to 39,000, and milk output was reduced from 4.3 million to 3 million gallons. The contribution of agriculture to domestic income had fallen to 7 per cent by 1970. Admittedly, these figures reflect a decline in commercial yields from white farmers and should be set against spectacular improvements in cotton and poultry production by African producers. But they illustrate the fact that, as a whole, the agricultural sector of the economy was in decline between 1964 and 1970 and that African production for the market failed to make up the gap caused by the exodus from commercial farming. Furthermore, this inadequate performance contributed to a 100 per cent rise in Zambia's bill for imported foodstuffs, from K14 million in 1964 to K28 million in 1969. Receipts from agricultural exports averaged K10 million annually only between 1965--67, or just over 2 per cent of total export earnings and hardly a compensating factor. In 1969, export crops (mainly tobacco) realized only K4.6 million.

More expensive importation routes, via Dar-es-Salaam and Lobito Bay, have certainly been a factor in the esca-
lating food import bill, as has greatly increased demand by a rapidly growing urban population with more money in its pockets than ever before. Even so, self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs is still far away, although there was a bumper maize crop in 1971 and prospects for the 1972 harvest are good. The total value of marketed agriculture production increased from K31.9 million in 1970 to K8.4 million in 1971 and the contribution of rural development to the national economy has hardly outgrown the stage of slogans and resolutions. The Second National Convention at Kitwe in December, 1969, recommended that "immediate steps should be taken to revive, and channel into rural development, the dynamic political enthusiasm of the pre-Independence era."

Time and time again, the national political leadership—from His Excellency the President downwards—has reiterated that rural development must be the central theme of the Second National Development Plan. But how this is to be done tactically, to make the countryside economically productive and attractive to live in, will remain an unsolved question until the revised development strategy is implemented and its results can be assessed.

The comparative failure of the rural economy has—unfortunately, from the point of view of a reduction in urban/rural disparities—been accompanied by a great expansion in economic infrastructure along the line of rail. Many new industries have been established; manufacturing
output increased at an average of 20 per cent per annum between 1964 and 1969, which was 4 per cent higher than the planned rate of growth. But wage increases have averaged between 3 and 4 times the rate assumed in the Plan, probably adding more than an extra K2000 million to consumer demand. The real incomes of workers in the urban areas have risen by over 50 per cent since 1964, which in itself has contributed to a steep rise in the price of urban goods (money wages have risen by about 150 per cent over the same period). The purchasing power of rural cash incomes has been reduced and, as one economist has put it, "the peasant farmer may now be only about half as well off in relation to the urban worker as he was in 1964. This has played an important part in the rapid flow of persons from the rural areas to the towns, causing an increase in urban population of 8 per cent per annum between 1963 and 1969."*

In the same article, Dr. Jolly characterized the failure to reduce the disparity between rural and urban incomes as the biggest shortfall in the First National Development Plan. His strictures hark back to the warning in the Seers Report (Chapter 2, Section 53) that:

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*"How successful was the First National Development Plan?" Dr. A.R. Jolly in "Six Years After"--Supplement to the 'Zambia Mail' November 1969.
"The wages and salaries question is perhaps the most serious problem facing the Government: its decisions on the wages and salaries it pays itself, and the way in which it exercises its influence on wages and salaries in the private sector, may be decisive in determining whether Zambia will become in this century a modern developed country."

The problem has not yet been decisively tackled; even the recommendations of the 1969 ILO Report on Incomes, Wages and Prices (the Turner Report) have not been put comprehensively into effect. The crucial period was during the years 1966/67, when the average annual earnings of wage employment in Zambia rose by no less than 38 per cent, a rate of increase which was sparked off by the 22.5 per cent pay rise to lower-level mine workers resulting from the Brown Commission inquiry into the Mining Industry of 1966 and, to a lesser extent, by the increases granted the Civil Service in 1967 as a result of the Whelan Salaries Report. In contrast, the living standard of the peasant farmer and his family is hardly any better than it was before Independence, real income in the rural areas having risen by no more than 3 and 4 per cent. The drastic gap between rural

*But an Industrial Relations Act providing, inter alia, for the constitution of an Industrial Court was passed by the National Assembly in January 1972.*
and urban incomes grew from about 1.13 in 1964 to 1.18 in 1970, and may well have widened since.* The average annual earnings of Africans in wage employment were K923 in 1970, an increase of 22 per cent over 1969.

Thus, the major failures in economic forecasting since Independence have been the relative stagnation of the rural areas, coupled with an unprecedented and unanticipated rise in both real and money incomes in the towns. There can be no doubt, also, that it is the combination of these two factors which has been mainly responsible for the high rate of rural/urban drift.

It would, however, be wrong to castigate the planners for this result. The first National Development Plan was cautious about the probable success of rural development programs, and neither the Plan nor the Seers Report expressed any optimism that the movement of people from the rural areas to the towns could be stemmed, let alone reversed.** The chief criticism to be made is that Government income policies—or lack of policies despite attempts since 1970 to apply a national ceiling of 5 per cent to annual wage in-

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* But the Second National Development Plan suggests that it has not. See page 40 and footnote to page 14.

** The Seers Report prefaced its assumptions about the rate of influx with the caution that it was quite unpredictable—as, in fact, it proved to have been.
creases--have accelerated the trend. Repeated exhortations of "back to the land" have not been supported by sufficient economic encouragement either to return to the land or to remain on it in the first place.

It is also worth noting that in the planning process itself, strong efforts have been made to impart a regional flavor both to Development Plans and to the machinery for plan implementation and project development for the future. The first National Development Plan was deliberately broken down into programs for each Province. The theoretical organization of the Planning Office gives prominence to a Regional Development Section with the country divided into three macro-economic regions as follows:

- **Western Macro Region**
  - Western Province (formerly Barotse)
  - North-Western Province

- **Central Macro Region**
  - Copperbelt Province
  - Central Province
  - Southern Province

- **Eastern Macro Region**
  - Eastern Province
  - Northern Province
  - Luapula Province

Economists were to be posted to Provincial centers to aid in planning and implementation. The trouble is that
this framework has existed in theory only. The planning posts in the Provinces are unfilled and the staff of the Planning Office is as concentrated in Lusaka as if the regional divisions had never been devised. This is the result both of serious staff shortages and of the reluctance of officers already in post to serve elsewhere than in the capital. Nevertheless, the Second Development Plan is being broken down to incorporate provincial programs to at least the same extent as was the First, and, in its formulation, local priorities and opinions have received considerable weight through the medium of Committees at National, Provincial and District levels. It is described in President Kaunda's foreword as a ('People's plan') and "a typical example of participatory democracy." As a planning exercise, hundreds if not thousands of people have certainly been involved.

The First National Development Plan did designate a total of K88.4 million of capital investment funds to agriculture and lands (out of a grand total of K564 million)*, quite apart from additional substantial sums for roads, education, agricultural training and rural health. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to try to explain why this

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*Actual capital expenditure at current prices totalled K678 million, thus exceeding the Plan target by 20.2 per cent. But of this total the three line-of-rail Provinces absorbed 82 per cent, in contrast to a 69 per cent share envisaged when the original capital budget was prepared. This concentration of investment along the line-of-rail has obviously, as indicated earlier, aggravated the movement to the towns.
investment (of which only 76 per cent was actually spent) has not yet succeeded in significantly increasing either rural production or the amenities of rural life. The problem has proved intractable, not only in Zambia, but in many other parts of the developing world. To say that it has not been solved does not mean that it has been, in any sense, ignored or that a solution may not progressively be found.

THE FUTURE STRATEGY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

The rural development strategy formulated for the Second National Development Plan period from 1972 to 1976 has been summarized as follows:*

(a) To increase rural incomes in cash and in kind, based largely upon increasing the productivity of the family farm through the dissemination of technical information, the provision of more appropriate inputs and at least cost, and the improvement of marketing services for farmers' produce; at the same time to improve nutritional standards by encouraging greater production and home con-

* I am indebted to Mr. P. Stutley, Planning Adviser, Ministry of Rural Development for much of this analysis of the plan strategy.
(b) To improve rural standards of living by providing better social services such as education, health and environmental sanitation, as well as improved communications. Better services will require a measure of village regrouping in semi-urban communities of five to ten thousand people, centered on areas with favorable ecological and economic prospects and constituting a valid alternative to migration to the towns. The identification of these "Intensive Development Zones" (as they are called) is currently being undertaken, and the first four should be announced in March 1972 in the context of the Second National Development Plan. A tentative budget of K17.5 million is being considered for their development over the five year Plan period.

(c) Parallel with the growth of earnings and improved living standards for peasant producers and their families, to give priority to the absorption into agriculture of the majority of primary school-leavers and a high proportion of secondary school-leavers as urban employment opportunities become more scarce. Measures to attract educated young people into agriculture will be linked to
efforts to reduce the unemployment and under-employment traditionally associated with subsistence and semi-subsistence methods, if only because young people reject the standards of living associated with seasonal activities based on a four to five month rainy season.

(d) To pursue methods of job diversification which will help improve employment opportunities, incomes, and living standards in the rural areas. The provision of employment in rural social services financed from the industrial and mining sectors clearly has an upper limit. On the other hand, the growth of agro-allied activities and services depends upon increased productivity per head and improved technology, as well as a balanced policy between urban mass-production and rural intermediate techniques. While the policy is intended to pursue opportunities for rural diversification based upon agro-allied industries and services, the progress, in terms of jobs created, is likely to be relatively slow. Training, particularly for young people, will receive special attention in a wide range of skills not necessarily linked with Project development as such.
(e) To direct increased productivity and employment in the rural areas towards those commodities for which market constraints are least, both nationally and at regional or district level. This supports the national policy of reducing dependence upon copper for foreign exchange by import substitution in regard to food and fibre.*

Only lately has serious attention been given to the connecting relationships between rural and urban development (integration is as yet too strong a word to describe the first awakening thoughts on this subject). Until recently in Zambia, urban investment, wages and infrastructural and social services grew with little or no regard to their disruptive effect upon the rural areas and upon the local environment and its resources. Already there is a danger in many rural districts that too much young and active manpower has deserted the land, leaving the human capacity for developmental effort seriously impaired, for it is precisely these young people who have the ability to respond to extension advice on modern agricultural techniques.

Current official thinking is still equivocal. It deplores the growing disparity between urban and rural incomes but, although the terms of trade have moved sharply against rural producers, the tendency is still to deprecate the cost of living increases in the urban areas which must follow if

*A policy which has not yet been successful; see p. 4 above.
agricultural producer price increases are awarded and the level of consumer subsidies left unchanged. The fact that such subsidies are usually administered through agricultural marketing boards encourages the assumption that they are subsidies to farmers, whereas in fact the greater proportion are designed to keep down the price of food to urban consumers at enormous national cost. The reduction or elimination of these heavy subsidies on basic foodstuffs would generate tremendous savings and significantly reduce the comparative attractiveness of urban life. Unfortunately, it might lead to industrial unrest and disturbances as well, and it is this uneasy prospect which leads policy-makers to hesitate and to persist in subsidy policies which perpetuate the very trends they are anxious to reverse. Whether growing financial stringency will force the issue in favor of subsidy reductions, it may be too soon to say despite the extraordinary levels they have reached. From K4 million in 1965, subsidies rose to a peak of K35 million in 1968 and have fluctuated between K18 and K23 million in the years thereafter. They can hardly have cost less than the entire capital allocation to agriculture in the post-independence period and quite possibly a good deal more.

There is no official policy of curbing the inflow of migrants from the rural to the urban areas other than through the impetus of economic measures designed to increase the attractiveness of the one relative to the other.
Occasional political statements have been made, notably by a former Vice-President, Mr. Simon M. Kapwepwe, M.P., to the effect that legislation is being contemplated to prevent more squatters from coming to the towns and to remove to the rural areas squatters already there. But it is most doubtful that steps of this kind are officially under serious consideration.* The more general view is that the imposition of controls over the movement of citizens within their own country is impracticable, anti-humanistic and smacks of the colonial past. Freedom of movement is also protected by Section 24 of the Constitution, although with the usual provisos that allow restrictions in the interests of public order and public health. The Government acknowledges that it cannot radically influence, in the short term, the rate at which rural inhabitants come to the urban areas**, a rate which has been greatly in excess of the one per cent per annum envisaged by the Seers Report (allowing for natural increase, the actual rate was probably 5-6 per cent). Nevertheless, the overall economic situation will probably reduce the rate at which the income disparity between urban and

* Mr. Kapwepwe has been in opposition since August 1971, which lends even less official credence to his views. He was arrested and detained on the 4th February 1972.

** But see Page 38.
rural areas has been increasing in recent years.* Although there are as yet no indications that conditions in urban squatter compounds are regarded as either intolerable or less attractive than those in rural villages, urban employment is not growing at a rate commensurate with urban population increase. If some real increase in rural per capita incomes can be achieved, this may do something to reduce the influx of hopefuls into the cities. It may also reduce the willingness of their relatives to support them in the unemployed or semi-employed state. The economic survival of many new urban migrants depends upon the tradition of mutual support among members of the African extended family. This is a tradition which is fostered and cherished by many political leaders as representing an important cultural and social heritage from the past. But pressures of urban life and a relative down-turn in the urban economy, coupled with some real improvement in rural conditions, may accelerate its eventual demise, thereby forcing more and more migrants either to go back to their villages or to stand exclusively on their own. There is little to suggest, however, that this has yet begun.

*The Second National Development Plan suggests that the gap has already ceased to widen--see page 40--but only as a general inference. It quotes no figures in support.
Migration from rural to urban areas has continued at a very rapid rate. Between 1963 and 1969, the urban population increased by 441,000, from 747,000 to 1,188,000*, a rise of 60 per cent over six years or more than 8 per cent per year. The overall population increase recorded by the 1969 census was 17.3 per cent since the last census in 1963; the Copperbelt and Central Province recorded increases of 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively, these being the Provinces in which the main urban centers of the country are located. The Luapula and Northern Provinces, from which migration was on a particularly large scale, showed overall population declines of 21,000 and 18,000 people respectively, a loss of 5 per cent and 4 per cent on the totals enumerated in 1963. Actual migration from Luapula Province was 25 per cent, and from the Northern Province 20 per cent of their 1963 population, or 82,000 and 116,000 persons each. Nationally, the urban male population grew by an average of 7.6 per cent per annum and the urban female population by an average of 10.1 per cent per annum between 1963 and 1969, in contrast to a 2.7 per cent per annum population growth rate for Zambia as a whole. Between 1963 and 1969, 336,000 persons, or about

* i.e. from 23,000 less to 108,000 more than the Seers Re-port figures and over a shorter period (see page 1).
14 per cent of the rural population of the country, are estimated to have migrated from rural to urban areas along the line-of-rail alone.

Zambia has long been accustomed to an urban population growth rate at least twice the rate of natural increase since the first copper boom of the 1920s. The migratory pattern has--apart from Lusaka's new prominence as a major growth center--not significantly changed since then. Urbanization is essentially a line-of-rail phenomenon, and of Zambia's eight Provinces, it is the three through which the railway passes--Southern, Central, and Copperbelt Provinces—that attract the crowds. Out of a total urban population of rather over a million, two-thirds are on the Copperbelt and one quarter in Central Province; Southern Province is little more than 5 per cent urbanized, and the remaining five Provinces--Luapula, Northern, Eastern, North-Western and Western are still hardly urbanized at all. The problem is at least concentrated along familiar lines.

The Central Province is now perhaps the most dramatic example of Zambia's division into two nations, the urban and the rural, each corresponding almost exactly to Disraeli's classification of the rich and the poor. The further away from the two main urban centers of Lusaka or Kabwe, the lower the rate of population increase, implying more and more net emigration, until absolute declines in population are encountered in Feira and Serenje Districts. The Lusaka
Urban District has grown by 11.6 per cent per annum since 1963, a total increase of 93 per cent in six years, and there are indications that even this figure is an underestimate. At this rate the city may be expected to double its population every 6 1/2 years, which certainly exceeds the average rate of urban growth in Africa and must make Lusaka one of the fastest growing cities in the world. Kabwe has grown much more slowly, which only seems to emphasize the dominance of Lusaka as the center of a new immigrant population.

Although the rate of growth of population between the two censuses is highest in Lusaka, the total immigration of 201,000 into the Copperbelt Province exceeded the 135,000 into the Central Province by 66,000 persons. All the Copperbelt towns shared in this gain, the overall rates of increase ranging from 10 per cent per annum in Chingola down to 5 per cent per annum in Mulfulira. In all these areas the female population has grown more rapidly than the male, suggesting a move of dependents from the villages (and from subsistence agriculture) to join the breadwinners in the towns. By 1969, 74 per cent of all employed persons were located in the Central and Copperbelt Provinces, 10 per cent

* The urban sex ratio, although still heavily in favour of males (except for juveniles) was much less so in 1969 than in 1963.
in the Southern Province along the line-of-rail, and the remainder distributed over the other five Provinces of the country. In numerical terms, some 53,000 employed persons were spread throughout the five predominantly rural Provinces as compared to over 275,000 in the three Provinces along the line of rail.

Employment is, therefore, very heavily concentrated along the line of rail, particularly in the towns. But it is the hope, rather than the firm prospect, of employment that attracts an increasing number of immigrants to the urban areas. The First National Development Plan aimed at the creation of 100,000 new jobs but, over the original period of the Plan (1965--70), no more than 65,000 of these were generated, a short-fall of 35,000, or just over one third of the planned figure. Even so, total wage-earning employment increased by one third over a five-year period, a substantial advance in comparison with achievements in most developing countries. And the fear of unemployment has not operated as a deterrent to migration to the towns, particularly since wage-earning employment in agriculture has actually declined. Nevertheless, for Zambia as a whole, employment as a percentage of either total population or of the total labor force fell between 1966 and 1969, a period when absolute employment figures were still growing quite rapidly (an annual average increase of 6.5 per cent) and when the national rate of population increase (2.7 per cent)
was lower than had been expected (3.3 per cent in the First National Development Plan). An explicit objective of the 1966 Manpower Report (Table VI, 2, page 48) was that employment should run ahead of both labor force and population growth. The following comparison of the Manpower Report projections with later estimates shows a trend which militates against this objective being met:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Employment (thousands)</th>
<th>Employed %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Manpower Report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>257.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965 (Dec.)</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>298.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,366</td>
<td>407.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Estimated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>3,490.8</td>
<td>256.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>3,728.0</td>
<td>337.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>3,916.3</td>
<td>354.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 (June)</td>
<td>4,054.0</td>
<td>357.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still, the picture may be brighter than these statistics indicate. The employment figures derive from Central Statistical Office surveys which do not include self-
employed persons, a category which should have increased considerably as a result of urban growth. Moreover, taking Zambia as a whole, the proportion of the total labor force of around 900,000* which is not in wage employment is about 64 per cent. In the Central and Copperbelt Provinces, the percentages are 43 per cent and 32 per cent respectively; in the five Provinces off the line-of-rail the corresponding percentages are all in the eighties. It is obvious that the hope of wage employment remains a powerful incentive to migration to the towns and that the disappointing overall employment ratios exert no pull whatsoever in the opposite direction. Of the 382,000 people who told the 1969 census enumerators that they were "seeking work," only 70,000 or less than one fifth, were in the urban areas already. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the increases in employment in the rural areas have almost entirely been due to expansion in the Public Sector (central and local government and statutory bodies). In the rural Private Sector there has been little progress and, in some cases, absolute declines in employment figures have been recorded over the years—e.g. some 3,000 in the agricultural wage-earning group between 1960 and 1970 with a trough of 5,000 in 1966.

* The planning authorities regard the 1969 census figure of 796,000 as an underestimate.
This decline in agricultural wage earning is, however, largely attributable to the abandonment of their farms by white settlers who departed the country after independence, leaving their debts as well as their acreages behind. The number of commercial farmers declined between 1964 and 1970 from well over a thousand to only 600, with much productive land left idle when they departed. In 1969, a national referendum approved an amendment to the Constitution to allow compulsory acquisition by the State of these abandoned farms, and a Land Acquisition Act has now been passed to confer the legal powers required. The way is open, therefore, for abandoned farms to be redeveloped either through State agencies or by transfer to new commercial farmers, of whom at least 100 are Zambians. The difficulty remains that agricultural wages are not competitive with rates in the towns, but at least the prime cause of the decline in employment opportunities in agriculture has been removed. By the end of 1970 an upturn in agricultural wage employment was under way, but the total employment figure of 34,600 in the sector was still 12,400 behind the 47,000 First Development Plan target.

The employment problem is, of course, a problem of youth. Of a total Zambian population of 4,056,995 as recorded by the 1969 census, 45 per cent were in the age-group 0-14, and 8.8 per cent in the age-group 15-19, making well over half the population under twenty years of age.
The main resource of economically active persons, the age-group 20-44, accounted for 31.5 per cent of the population. Only 13.9 per cent of the population was aged 45 and above (men and women), and the great majority of these must be illiterates living in rural areas and of little economic significance in the labor force and the demand for wage employment. But something like 50,000 young people (out of a total of 63,000) left the primary school system at the end of 1969 because they were unable to obtain a place in secondary school. This number is likely to grow to 100,000 annually by 1978 (of which perhaps 45 per cent may be girls). As the incidence of unemployment in the population at large becomes increasingly more serious, the implications for youth employment are sombre. The Government is well aware of the magnitude of the problem and has constantly urged young people to take up careers on the land rather than migrate in search of wage employment to the towns. At the National Convention on the Development Plan at Kitwe in 1967, His Excellency the President pointed out that:

One cannot, these days, address the youth of this vigorous young country without mentioning land. Nothing in the long run will mean as much to Zambia as the proper use and exploitation of our land. Again, who else can I call upon to perform in this field, except the youth....The point I want to stress is, we need
more and more youth to get settled on the land.

In recent years, the President and his colleagues have repeatedly stressed that the over-riding pre-occupation of the Second National Development Plan will be the comprehensive development of the rural areas--"In other words, Comrades, from now on our priority is rural development....our endeavors must be to make the increases in rural incomes self-sustaining." *

But youth remains largely alienated from the land. Practical programs for the full participation of youth in rural development are still far from realization. It can be taken for granted that urban school-leavers seek employment in the urban areas, but so do a significant proportion of rural school-leavers who have joined the urban influx in recent years. Employment as such is probably not their initial aim. "Zambian youth aspires above all else to remain at school or to enroll in a training programme and they are reluctant to consider any such programme as terminal....when they find it impossible to enroll for further training, many youths drift into the labour market." ** Once in the labor


market they are often unwilling to adjust their aspirations to the acceptance of unskilled or "blue-collar" work, particularly in agriculture. The majority are unsuccessful in their aims; job opportunities for the primary school leaver were estimated as not more than 9,000 in 1970, compared to the 50,000 who left school at the Grade VII level (of whom the majority were boys). If one could deduct from this job opportunity figure the unknown number of "unacceptable" jobs, the residue would be small indeed. The basic problem remains how to alter the job-seeking pattern and the motivations that lie behind it, for there is no hope that the gap in the number of places available between final primary and first year secondary school (67,222 to 15,175 in 1970) can be reduced. Pre-vocational training schemes are gradually expanding and a new rural science syllabus in upper primary schools is being introduced. But the implicit purpose of primary education is still to prepare for entry to secondary school even though 80 per cent of primary school youngsters never attain that goal.

Zambia had a National Youth Service until 1971, the motto of which was "Back to the Land." But of 157 youths who completed their training in 1968, 136 were inducted into the Police, with a corresponding figure of 208 out of 294 for 1969. The Service is now being replaced by "National Service" universally based and aimed less ostensibly at agriculture and more towards defense.
The most obvious sign by far of the influx into the cities is the growth of sprawling shanty towns around almost every urban complex in the country but particularly around Lusaka. Over the period 1967 to 1970 the number of such shanty towns or "squatter villages" in the Lusaka area grew from 9 to 32, accommodating over one third of the population of the city i.e. 100,000 out of about 270,000. These settlements are characterized by a lack of any regulated plot demarcation, uncontrolled housing standards, overcrowding, no pure water supply, and no proper sanitation. Their growth has been spontaneous and unauthorized; they are "illegal" settlements, although the law has generally turned a blind eye to their existence and has seldom intervened to evict their populations or restrict their growth. Indeed, the major and most common criticism of both central and local Government policy towards these settlements has been that it has tended to ignore them, hoping (unsuccessfully) to inhibit their growth by denying them services, unwilling to take positive measures to demolish them and dilatory in providing legal alternative housing for their occupants. However, this

* although a Lusaka survey in 1969 found the highest occupation density per house (16.1) in a legal suburb, New Kan- yama, compared with a city average of 6.3.
policy is at last being replaced by a realization that since the squatter way of life is certain to persist for years to come, amenities such as stand-pipe water and sewerage have got to be provided, and security of tenure introduced for squatter plots.

Of the cities, municipalities, and townships in Zambia, Lusaka—with the worst housing problems to contend with and a squatter population of well over a hundred thousand—probably has the worst record, and Ndola the best. At the end of 1969 the Lusaka City Council had a waiting list for housing of 16,345 families and 3,636 single persons. It completed 668 houses during the year, a wholly inadequate figure although an improvement on the 1968 total of 498. Even these lamentable statistics include housing erected by their own future occupants on "site and service" schemes, the Council's own direct contribution to the resolution of the housing problem being considerably less. Yet out of a national squatter population estimated at about 260,000 in 1971, some 40 per cent, or well over 100,000, live in or around Lusaka and most of these look to the local authority to provide an alternative solution to their housing needs. Few employers in Zambia—outside the Civil Service and the Mines—provide housing for their employees, the great majority being content to pay to their workers the statutory housing allowance of K3.50 per month. Moreover, nearly one quarter of local authority housing throughout the country is
rented to civil servants and unavailable to the population at large. The Government already owns about 20 per cent of the permanent houses in Zambia and the Mines about 25 per cent, with obvious restrictions on occupancy in each case. Local authorities own another 30 per cent, the remainder being distributed between company ownership outside the Mines and private landlords.

During the period of the First National Development Plan, national expenditure on low-cost housing amounted to about K30 million, divided between approximately 12,800 units completed by local authorities, and the provision of perhaps 12,000 site and service plots. Actual expenditure fell short of the amount planned by about K3.6 million and actual house and plot construction fell short of planned figures by a combined total of about 2,400, despite the extension of the Plan's duration to six years instead of five. But twice as much money was spent on Civil Service housing as on low-cost dwellings for the populace as a whole—an urgent response to manpower needs which will not be repeated during the period of the second Plan.

Program deficiencies were due to reductions in capital expenditure outlays, erratic timing in the release of funds, and disagreements between local authorities and the Zambia Housing Board (converted in August 1971 into a National Housing Authority with far-reaching powers) over the type and design of houses they should build. There has been no lack of expert reports and consultancy advice on the housing
problem, only a lagging of action behind thought. But the annual low-cost housing budget for 1970 was raised to K12 million, almost double that of previous years, and the Government has instructed local authorities to concentrate on the design and construction of site and service schemes rather than on conventional house construction which is far too costly to meet national requirements. To provide fully serviced houses for current needs and a squatter resettlement program would cost at least K50 million per annum which is unrealistic in budgetary terms.

The conflict between the desire to provide permanent housing in urban areas and the lack of sufficient funds to do so is, of course, a familiar one. The Report of the United Nations Housing Mission to Kenya in 1964* referred to the "hard fact that the resources that can be devoted to housing in Kenya will not in the foreseeable future permit housing of permanent construction in urban areas either of sufficient quantity or, without subsidy, within the means of a vast number of families". This was written of a country where, according to the 1962 census, only 5.2 per cent of the African population was urban and which had a growth rate in the largest city (Nairobi) of 5.9 per cent per annum--

about half Lusaka's current rate—between 1948 and 1962.

"Without the means to do so otherwise," the Mission added, "the only alternative is to attempt to control temporary housing and to make it conform as far as possible to a plan by which it will eventually be replaced when families can afford it....the best method of doing this is to undertake what are commonly called 'site and service' projects." This is now Zambia's favored solution also—local authorities lay out the plots, provide roads, water and sanitation, issue roofing loans, supervise construction and charge modest rents. On one or two of the most sophisticated projects, such as the Munali Scheme in Lusaka, a core housing program, based on a choice of pre-designed house plans, has been combined with the 'site and service' method. There are still varying opinions about the likely success of this approach.

The Second National Development Plan housing program envisages a total public expenditure component of K106 million* although of this amount, only K35 million is intended for the direct provision of housing sites for self-help development, and K3 million for squatter area improvement. However, another K50 million is earmarked for communal

* plus a matching contribution of K100 million from the private sector which, the plan emphasizes, must also play its part.
services, and this will presumably cover many of the facilities and improvements which are needed.

The Plan recognizes, as previous estimates of housing needs did not, that these areas "represent assets" and "require planning improvement" rather than forcible demolition, but it is arguable how much real improvement can be secured from an average national input of K1 million per annum over a five-year period. The Plan aims at the provision of 70,000 serviced plots, which is 15,500 less than its own estimated requirement of 85,500 new urban housing units by 1976. Even this requirement figure may be an underestimate assuming, as it does, an occupancy of six persons per urban unit (the 1969 Census figure for the three urbanized provinces was 5.2) and an annual growth rate in the urban population of 6.8 per cent as compared to 8.7 per cent between 1963 and 1969.

Provided that priority continues to be given to the provision of sites, basic services, and loans for house construction for the urban masses, it is nevertheless still possible that over the next decade, the urban housing problem can be effectively tackled. Local authorities must resist expensive demonstration-house construction schemes which can be proudly exhibited to visiting dignitaries and heads of state. Budgetary allocations must be maintained or increased, rather than--as in the past--reduced at a time of more rapid urban population growth than had been expected.
In 1969/1970, the Housing Board for the first time gave approval to more site and service plots than to houses—4,100 as against 3,600. In 1970/71, as many as 20,000 plots were laid out and serviced and 5,000 houses directly constructed, the latter mainly on an extremely low cost basis.

These are encouraging signs. Even so, the implementation of an adequate urban housing program will require greater acceptance that Zambia is increasingly an urban nation. Phrases such as "the 80 per cent of our population who live in the rural areas" are already out of date—30 per cent now live in the Copperbelt towns of Kabwe, Lusaka and Livingstone alone, and 40 per cent within 25 miles of the line of rail. Overall, probably 45 per cent are already urban or peri-urban in their way of life. To deny essential services to them in the hope that they will go home to their villages, write and tell their brothers and sisters not to come, longer a tenable policy, if it ever was.

Fortunate cognition of this is at least implicit in the advanced developmental plans which have been adopted to allow for urban growth. The area of Lusaka City was legally extended in July 1970 from 36 to 139 square miles, and "Greater Lusaka" will serve expansion needs for many years to come. There are many examples of similar far-sighted initiatives elsewhere.

It needs to be remembered that urban local government in Zambia was hardly more than rudimentary until well after
control passed from the British South Africa Company to the Colonial Government in 1924. The first township regulations date from 1909 and Village Management Boards from 1911, but the basic planning administration of small settler townships remained for many years the main concern. It was commonly assumed that the African would never be a permanent convert to urban life but would return to the village as soon as his temporary employment in the towns was at an end. This view persisted long after the growth of substantial urban communities on the Copperbelt began; it gained strength from the fluctuations in urban populations which accompanied the 1930s slump; the African labor force on the Copperbelt fell from 30,000 in 1930 to 7,000 in 1932. The Government did not believe in stabilizing the labor force and was opposed to "de-triblization" in any form. As late as 1937, a Provincial Commissioners' Conference discussed a proposal for compulsory repatriation from the Copperbelt to rural homes and, although this was never implemented, sites for the establishment of permanent African townships on the Copperbelt were not provided until 1943. Before that only mining and other employers' compounds had any semblance of orderly existence, although much employers' housing was appallingly sub-standard in sanitation and construction. Not until the formation of the African Housing Board in 1956 was it fully recognized that Africans had come to town to stay. The first completely democratic local government elections were
The following extract from the report of the Eccles Committee, set up to investigate "native locations in urban areas" in 1944, is a good illustration of some of the conditions then existing--relics of which can still be found today:

The compound is known as Maramba * and the buildings were taken over by the Municipality from the former Management at a total valuation of one (British) pound. Even this modest figure seems high when the buildings are inspected. Large rows of cells about 7 1/2 ft. square and of brick with iron roofs provide accommodation for the tenants....Ventilation consists principally of the door which must be kept open owing to the heat generated by the low iron roof. The buildings form a squalid courtyard on one side of which is the Beer Hall. Sanitation consists of the unsuitable bucket system and water has to be fetched from taps. A monthly rent of 4/- is charged.

"Out of sight, out of mind" was often the attitude behind this neglect--for those compounds were no conglomeration of self-made habitations but managed housing with

* in Livingstone.
tenants paying rents. A booklet entitled "Lusaka 1935," apparently produced as publicity for or after the visit of the Duke of Kent, records:

The miscellaneous African population of the Capital has, for the purposes of accommodation, been divided into two classes, personal servants and others, and these classes have been provided with separate compounds. It has been considered wise to discontinue the practice of providing each house with its own Native Compound. Quarters are only provided for one unmarried boy on each plot. The other servants with their families live at a distance in the Personal Servants' Compound. Thus, the residential areas are freed from piccanins and other manifestations of domestic untidiness.

The colonial legacy of separate housing areas remains, thinly disguised as low-density, medium-density, and high-density estates. There is little which, with the best will in the world (now, perhaps, eroding as the affluent Zambian progresses from high density to medium to low), the independent Government can do about it. As one looks in the opposite direction from low to medium to high—and too few low-density dwellers ever do—"manifestations of domestic untidiness" increase.

Yet, it is worth mentioning that even in the shanty towns of urban Zambia the standard of self-help housing is
encouragingly high. Shelley's "Hell is a city much like London" is not yet true of Lusaka. Many shanty dwellers, deprived of essential services and Government support, have built houses to a commendably high standard and invested a good deal of money in their construction. They have provided their own amenities to a much higher level than in the average rural village—the lack of piped water, adequate sanitation, and refuse disposal services is not their fault. Anyone who asks, "Why don't they leave these slums and go back to their villages?" has little experience of the realities of Zambian village life. They will not go back, and their brothers and sisters will continue to flock into the cities. Even if the rate of migration is reduced from the extraordinary levels of recent years,* the urban areas can only handle the accommodation problem by expanded site-and-service projects and by improvement of the squatter compounds in the towns. At present, only about 11 per cent of the Copperbelt and Central Province urban population concentrations are accommodated on site-and-service schemes and it seems clear that the provision of regulated self-help housing of this kind must be the policy focus for the future.

* As the Second National Development Plan hopes it will be, from 4.9 per cent to 3.4 per cent per annum for males and from 7.4 per cent to 3.7 per cent for females—see page 40.
The rural development approach postulated earlier in this paper is still somewhat nebulous, and differs little--apart from the selection of "intensive development zones"--from the unsuccessful strategy in the First National Development Plan. The tactics of implementation have yet to be declared. It can be argued that agricultural development in Zambia should be directly geared to increased productivity for the local urban market, with a diminishing labor force working on the land. In terms of this argument, subsistence agriculture must be recognized for what it is--the occupation of last resort--and no longer cherished as a traditional way of life for the masses of the people. Resources for development should be firmly concentrated on actually and potentially productive areas (the "intensive development zones") and not spread like thin butter on stale bread. Much of this can be reconciled with the official strategy providing the strategy does not become so hedged in by compromises designed to "bring the benefits of development to every corner of the land" that it tails. Too much emphasis on producer co-operatives, inspired by the supposed affinity between the co-operative principle and the African heritage of values, may only result in continued misappropriation and waste. Over half of the 900 producer co-operatives established up to 1968 were failures and, despite a new Co-opera-
tive Act with stricter controls, neither the managerial capacity of the societies nor the quality of their leadership is yet equal to the productivity demands which must be met if rural development is to be worthy of the name. The average annual value of the produce marketed by producer cooperatives in 1970 was only K700 each: in a situation as urgent as that which prevails in Zambia's rural areas today, perhaps we should not be too preoccupied with group endeavours which have seldom proved superior to individual enterprise in getting produce out of the soil and to the urban market. This is true not only of Zambia but of other parts of Africa as well.

A modified agricultural strategy might also include:

(1) The allocation to individual farmers, within specified development areas, of agricultural holdings of sufficient economic size along with registered title and farm planning carefully enforced by an improved extension service. The Second National Development Plan is silent on the land tenure issue and on its relevance to agricultural enterprise and farm improvement.

(2) Concentration, initially, on one major crop per farmer (normally maize). Admittedly, mixed farming and rotation will eventually be necessary, but if a man is taught to produce good yields
from hybrid maize, properly fertilized, and to make money from its production, a progressive mixed farmer is in the making. If he is encouraged to plant maize and vegetables, rear livestock and dabble in chickens all at once, he may fail with each.

(3) Compulsory cattle sales and grazing control in pastoral areas along with livestock improvement programs to reduce Zambia's dependence on meat and dairy produce from overseas; the current take-off for sale from the traditional herd is only 3-4 per cent, compared to 17 per cent for the much smaller numbers of commercial stock.

(4) The introduction of rural local authority by-laws to cover the basic elements of soil conservation and proper planting. There are no local authority by-laws in Zambia today outside the urban areas.

(5) A concentration of extension workers in development areas with emphasis on their quality rather than their quantity. There is no safety in numbers where agricultural extension is concerned.

(6) The imposition of some element of basic taxation or contributory payment on the common people,
rural and urban, either by levying a personal tax, or school fees, or both, unpopular though this would be. In terms of direct taxation, Zambia has been largely a free society since independence except for the limited numbers (still mainly expatriates and companies) liable to income tax, and apart from local authority levies which many evade or are exempt from paying. There is no greater incentive to contribute to the cash economy than the necessity to earn money to pay taxes or, even more, to send one's children to school.

(7) Clearer objectives for, and better management within, the Rural Development Corporation, its subsidiaries, and the four agricultural marketing boards on which so much of the effectiveness of the rural development program depends. A good deal of the current disillusionment with rural life stems from a failure to link the production of marketable surpluses with access to the urban market.

(9) Improved Government administration in the rural areas--an issue which is now receiving considerable attention.
Some of these ideas involve a greater concentration of resources and stronger elements of direction and control than in the recent past. Economic affluence after independence allowed the relaxation of many colonial controls and the national ideology of humanism has encouraged a laudable emphasis on "participatory democracy" and free social services, particularly in health and education. However, the price of copper, which reached a peak in 1970, has fallen sharply since then and physical production was badly affected by the Mufulira mine disaster in September of that year. Other African countries have not been able to afford Zambia's combination of welfare services with diminishing fiscal and contributory burdens, let alone expand those services at anything like the same ambitious rate. Scarce resources, and the need to use these to the best advantage, have also made other nations impatient with traditional obstacles to progress against which exhortation, persuasion and example are often not enough. But Zambia's falling revenues and declining balances of foreign exchange are now inducing a new atmosphere of financial caution and restraint. In its approaches to the rural peasant farmer, the time may have come for the Government to be more assertive as well as more austere. There is, after all, plenty of evidence that pea-

* These have fallen from K430 million in August 1970 to about half that sum in 1972.
sant farmers do not resent--up to a point--being told what to do provided they can see positive benefits from compliance with the instructions they receive.

There is a vocal and perhaps growing body of opinion in Zambia today, *spearheaded by Mr. V.S. Musakanya, now Governor of the Central Bank, which argues that with Zambia's vast distances and thinly distributed rural population, all available resources for development should now be concentrated exclusively along:

(a) a strip about fifty miles wide along each side of the line-of-rail, and

(b) a few selected areas of relatively high population and intensive agriculture such as in the Eastern Province and the Luapula Valley, and

(c) certain "strategic" areas such as the Zambezi Valley, financed from the Defense as well as the Development Budget.

* For example, in an article in the Times of Zambia for January 2nd, 1970 a paper entitled "Rural Development for National Development" presented at a University of Zambia seminar on May 28, 1970, and a further article "Development Priorities" in Zambia - Six Years After, an economic survey supplement to African Development, marking the 6th anniversary of independence in October 1970.
The protagonists of this viewpoint seek official recognition of an already predominantly urban or peri-urban character to Zambian life. They tend to come from urban environments themselves and have no sentimental attachment to the graves of their ancestors or to traditional tribal lands. They see no need to compromise between "intensive development zones" and the provision of basic services throughout the land but would abandon the latter in favor of the former. They argue that the people are abandoning the land already, so why throw good money after bad? They no longer believe in the village as the prime basis of African social life. Theirs is still a minority viewpoint but time, economic circumstance, and the facts of the rural/urban drift may yet be on their side. Meanwhile, their views remain anathema to economists both from east and west, experts who live in towns and extol the virtues of the rustic life, who have seen their own nations rise to power through the de-population of the countryside but devote their academic
energies to trying to reverse the trend elsewhere.

SOURCES AND THE SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1972 - 1976

The Second National Development Plan covers a five-year period from January 1972 to the end of 1976. In contrast to its predecessor, urbanization is a recurring theme**, which is not surprising in view of the Plan's own estimate that—at the current rate of growth projected into the future—the urban population would double in nine years. The Plan forecasts that the African population of the country will grow from an estimated 4,336,000 in 1971 to 5,000,000 in 1976 at an annual rate of growth of 2.9 per cent higher than for either Latin America or South Asia (2.8%), for

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* For a solitary dissenting voice, see "Reflections on African Development," Presidential Address to the African Studies Association of the United Kingdom by Sir Joseph Hutchinson, Drapers' Professor of Agriculture, University of Cambridge (1968). Sir Joseph states as a basic principle governing the contribution of agriculture to development "the progressive transfer of labour from agriculture to urban occupations" and sees as the only real problem of the rural/urban drift the need to create adequate employment opportunities in the towns. This is certainly the crux of the matter and the advocates of the urban way of life have not (to my knowledge) spelt out in detail their plans for massive employment generation in the urban and peri-urban belt.

** Page references are not available as I do not yet have a printed version of the plan.
Africa as a whole (2.6%) or, indeed, for Zambia between 1963 and 1969 (2.7%).

However, the Plan suggests that with improved agricultural prices* and the increasing output of Zambian commercial farmers, the gap between rural and urban incomes "has almost certainly ceased to widen." It considers it unlikely that urbanization will continue at the same rate as in the immediate post-independence years, and settles on an expected growth of 6.8 per cent per annum in the urban population as opposed to 8.7 per cent between 1963 and 1969. It supposes a particularly steep decline in the movement of females to the towns on the grounds that the major inrush of wives to join their husbands is already at an end. It is hopeful that the emphasis on rural development will enable the rural areas to absorb higher proportions of the labor force and population and that a lack of adequate employment opportunities and rising costs of housing will act as a disincentive to migration. The following is the tabular summary of the Plan's conclusions:

* The producer price of maize has been raised from K3.50 to K4.30 a bag over the last two years.
Urbanization 1963 - 1976
African population Only
(thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ratios of Urban to total (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>2843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1128</td>
<td>2971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>3027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1882*</td>
<td>3177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2076</td>
<td>3227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The planners believe that the absolute population declines in the Northern and Luapula Provinces can be halted and that the rural provinces as a whole can absorb half or more of their natural population increase over the next five years. Even so, and as the table shows, the most that they hope for is a deceleration and not a reversal of the trend. If their hopes are realized, the proportion of urban to total population will still have risen dramatically over fifteen years even on a definition of "urban" which does not include the so-called rural areas adjacent to the line-of-

* This figure actually appears as 1822 in the table given in the Plan but, from calculations elsewhere in the Plan document, 1882 seems more likely to be correct.
In numerical terms, the urban areas will have to absorb a population increase of well over half a million over the next five years, compared to only 150,000 throughout the rural hinterland.

Whether or not the planners' prognostications prove correct, at least they face the facts more squarely than has been the case before. Much will depend, of course, on the success of the rural development program as a generator of farming and employment opportunity and on whether the smaller urban clusters in the "intensive development zones" prove an attractive alternative to the cities and towns along the line-of-rail. Of the total anticipated growth in the labor force of 334,000 over the plan period, over half (186,000) is expected to be urban (including additions due to migration) and will have to be absorbed within the urban belt. Nevertheless, the urban and peri-urban labor force is expected to grow at a rate only just exceeding that of population growth, whereas in the rural areas the corresponding rate is nearly double as the tabulation indicates:
A sustained effort to improve rural employment opportunities will certainly be required if the competitive attraction of the towns is to be reduced. According to the Plan's own forecasts, the Gross Domestic Product in agriculture will grow at a rate less than the national average, and nearly three times less than manufacturing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Annual Growth Rate 1971-76</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labor Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperbelt and Central Provinces</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The six other Provinces</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage share of agriculture in total G.D.P. is actually expected to decline, although only to a very 

*This annual population growth rate in urban districts is estimated at 6.8 per cent and in purely rural districts 0.82 per cent.
small extent--from 10.9 per cent to 9.8 per cent in the subsistence and from 4.2 per cent to 3.9 per cent in the commercial sector--between 1971 and 1976. Thus the concentration of energies and resources in the rural sector, while real enough, can only be relative; it would be totally impracticable to attempt to disturb the basic orientation of the economy towards industry and mining as the main sources of the nation's wealth. Within these limits, it is still possible for smaller industries to be dispersed and for agricultural output to expand towards self-sufficiency and, eventually, an export surplus. The Plan document calls for an increase in aggregate marketed output of the order of 50 per cent, and sets out a timetable for self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs with only livestock products still short of demand by 1981. So far as cereals are concerned, there is no reason why Zambia should not become a granary for Africa, and certainly no reason why the recent experience of maize imports at heavy cost should be repeated. None of this need mean, of course, that the rural share of the population can be stabilized, let alone increased. But it does offer renewed hope that the urban masses who no longer rely on subsistence agriculture for a living can at least be fed from the agricultural output of the nation.

Compared with Asia, Latin America, and even West Africa, Zambia's urban numbers must seem insignificant indeed. In a country of 290,000 square miles--or, as the official
hand-out puts it, more than France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland put together—the population and migration problems of four million people may not appear particularly pressing.* But their scale is unprecedented in eastern Africa and their impact on a young nation still clinging to its traditions has been great. The demographic information now available has swept away many of the cobwebs. Development policies have been adjusted to take account of the realities of the rural/urban drift and this, much more than the continuing debate over detailed perspectives, is what matters in planning for a balanced nation.

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* Rural population pressures are certainly not a problem; in some areas, rural de-population definitely is. Average population density in the rural areas is only 10 per square mile; in urban districts it is 98.