Chile is unique in its geography and urban concentration, its political history and its present governmental structure. These features are examined in this survey report. Topics for discussion include: (1) The Instruments of Planning, (2) The Planning and Development Structure, (3) The Move to Integrated Economic Space, (4) The Chilean Heartland—The Macro Zona Central, (5) An Inventory of Planning, (6) The Urban Planning Alphabet, (7) The Role of the International Agencies, (8) The Geneva of Latin America. [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731-735 and 013 737-744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in The Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.] (SB)
An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in Chile
This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff's own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey's conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey. But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be — unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey
John P. Robin, Director
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Urbanization in Chile

by

John P. Robin and Frederick C. Terzo

International Urbanization Survey
The Ford Foundation
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Elevations above 1000 meters

URBANIZATION IN CHILE

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
INTRODUCTION

A Chilean would say that his country was "unique." A more detached observer might use the word "atypical," or even "eccentric." No other country in the world is at once so long, stretching for 2,600 miles (which is the distance from Acapulco to Alaska) and so narrow. Valparaiso on the coast is only one hundred miles from the crest of the Andes and the Argentinean frontier; the short journey takes one through the heartland of the country. For Chile's population is distributed in a series of increasing concentrations, much like a set of Chinese boxes. The settlement pattern makes all national calculations of densities per square mile meaningless. More than 90 per cent of Chile's 9,400,000 people live in the central third of the country; the northern third of the nation is desert and mountain, with three large provinces containing only a little more than 6 per cent of the country's population; the southern third is wind-swept, rainy, cold and forbidding, attracting in its three large provinces only about 3 per cent of Chile's inhabitants.

The central portion of the country (where the climate and topography have often been compared to California's)

* We do not yet have the benefit of the latest census, which was taken in September 1970, but is not yet published except for the preliminary announcement of a national total. We believe the data we are using are reliable and will not be significantly altered by the census figures.
has nineteen relatively small provinces whose combined area of 235,000 square kilometers is 31.8 per cent of the national territory of 741,767 square kilometers. As noted, it holds more than 90 per cent of the country's people, but has within it a further zone of concentration, now called for planning purposes the Macro Zona Central, which is substantially the Santiago-Valparaiso axis and area of influence. The Macro Zona now has almost five million people, more than half the population of Chile. And within the Macro Zona Central is the country's final point of concentration: metropolitan Santiago. Its present population is estimated at 3,335,000, which puts one out of every three Chileans in the nation's capital and dominant urban center.

Few countries in the world--developed or less developed--are more urban than Chile. The probabilities are that 70 per cent of the population is now fixed in cities of more than 20,000, and that by 1980, the percentage of urban Chileans (using this definition which is a strict one) will increase to more than 75 per cent.

Chile is atypical in that its rate of population increase is much less than that of its Andean neighbors to the north. We have been accustomed to finding annual increases of 3 per cent or more in Latin America; Chile's rate of population growth has slowed to 1.8 per cent for the decade 1960–1970, which puts it in the range of
Argentina and Uruguay and the more developed countries of the northern hemisphere. The population is European in character, with a relatively small Indian minority, and with a notable component of German, Yugoslav, Italian, and British elements. (One is struck by such prominent political names as Alessandri, Tomic, Vuscovic and Frei.)

It is not only Chile's geography and urban concentration which are unique. Its economic history might be considered eccentric, with inflation a chronic fact of life for eight years, periods of stagnant or declining per capita income, and recurrent unfavorable balances in agricultural exports and imports. It also anticipated, by many years, the establishment of a national development organization to stimulate economic growth—now so common as to be a check-list item in developing countries. Chile created CORPO (Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion) in 1939, and it is still, under the same name and with the same purposes, a major factor in the economic governance of the country.

Chile's political history (which must be considered in any survey of its urbanization and regional development policies) is again unique. It has a democratic tradition of which its people are proud, and it has used its democratic processes to exercise political options which

have made it a focus of Latin American as well as international interest. Its move to the reforming non-Communist left under the leadership of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva,* whose Christian Democratic party called for a "revolution in liberty," aroused the interest of liberally-oriented international assistance agencies, and created an intellectual atmosphere sympathetic to "planning" and "development" goals. The Christian Democrats did not, of course, hold power for the thirty years which they had in their first years of confidence expected; instead, their candidate ran a bad third in 1970, in the election which saw the first ballot-box transition to power of an avowedly Marxist government in the Americas.

Socialism makes "planning" an article of faith, and one would expect the Allende government to use the instruments of planning, created and developed in the Frei administration, to implement its program for Chile. We have tried to determine, on the basis of information now available, what form that program may take in the urban affairs of Chile.

According to John W. Dyckman, a distinguished American urbanist who served as a consultant to USAID in 1970, Chile is also unique in Latin America in the depth of

* We found the article on Frei in Richard Bourne's Political Leaders of Latin America. London, Pelican, 1969.
its planning skills. He wrote: "Chile has the greatest, measured by quantity and attainment, pool of skilled planning talent in South America. The Ford Foundation and AID have helped to mobilize additional resources. At least one major planning research center has grown up with this help. Chileans have assumed a degree of intellectual leadership in the city and regional planning movement throughout Latin America." But he goes on to cite deficiencies in the system, which we will note later, which "belie the picture of ascendant Chilean planning which I had before arrival here."*

In any event, the Allende government will be playing the planning game under its own rules and with its own players. The change of administrations will, it would seem, give more of a historical than a present interest to much of the planning machinery and theory operative under the previous administration, even though assisted by many internationally supplied technical advisers. After Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, William Pitt is said to have turned to his cabinet and proposed that they roll up the map of Europe: "It will not be needed for the next ten years." We would suggest that the map of Chile will not change, and that the stubborn geography of the country,

its high degree of urbanization and the concentrated pattern of that urbanization, and the ratio of Chileans to their natural resources are the material of life in that small country. It will be most interesting to see what "socialist" planning does with it.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF PLANNING

The Allende administration, which styles itself as the "Gobierno Popular" found a planning organization in place as an inheritance from its predecessor. It is the Oficina de Planificación Nacional, known as ODEPLAN. Its general structure and functions have not yet been substantially changed, although its internal structure was modified by Decree 2110, issued on December 29, 1970, "to condition it to the planning requirements" of the new government.

ODEPLAN was established by Law 16.635, dated July 14, 1967, as a body corporate and political ("personalidad jurídica de derecho público") with direct responsibilities to the President, whom it may advise on all matters which might be expected to fall within the responsibilities of a national planning agency. The Ford Foundation and other international assistance agencies had a working relationship with ODEPLAN, with special emphasis in the Foundation's case on regional and national economic planning. As stated in its organic law, ODEPLAN was to:
1. Prepare national, regional, and sectoral economic plans;
2. Maintain the national economic accounts;
3. Advise the President and other agencies of government on economic matters.*

ODEPLAN established regional planning offices known as ORPLANS (Oficinas Regionales de Planificacion) which have been continued and extended under the Gobierno Popular.

The present government has been in power for less than a year, and our indicators of its planning and development policies have been obtained in an interview at ODEPLAN and from the following documents:

--"La Planificacion Bajo El Gobierno Popular." ODEPLAN, 1971
--"Programa Habitacional de Emergencia," issued by MINVU, 1971, which is the acronym used for the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs.

It is not within our survey's responsibility to discuss the general economic and social policies which are being set forth by the Allende government, but not unexpectedly,

* This summary of ODEPLAN's function is that given by John Strasma, Ford Foundation, Santiago, in his memorandum "Notes on Economic Planning in Chile," manuscript, May, 1970.
the planning documents now cite the basic program of the Unidad Popular, the coalition which elected Allende and whose leaders serve in his government. The statement of basis policy assigns an important place to planning "in the process of transformation which will lead the country to a socialist economy" and calls for a national planning system which direct, coordinate, and rationalize the action of the government. Within the area of our direct interest, which is urban and regional development, the announced ODEPLAN program defines its planning areas as global, sectoral, and regional, and extends the coverage of regional planning offices.

There is a new pattern of Regional Development Councils, in which administrative officials, planning technicians, and public representatives will meet to frame proposals for regional development. There are also administrative coordinating committees, which are groups of departmental officials assigned to field offices. They will meet with Intendentes (the governors of provinces who are appointed by the President) in order to facilitate the decentralized delivery of public services. Staff members of ODEPLAN believe it possible that there will be some allocation of national funds to regional development agencies.

The present consensus in ODEPLAN seems to be that previous regional planning work had been too theoretical in concept and practice, but the organization is ready to use
the regions as previously delineated without arguing the matter further at this time. The present theoretical base is away from the "growth pole" as a stimulus for regional development and in favor of "integrated economic space." As we interpret it, the growth pole is out of favor because it does not integrate the urban area with its region to achieve a full extension of the benefits of development, while integrated economic space will be designed to do so.

ODEPLAN, which was not considered to have a strong influence with President Frei, is now considered to be an important participant in the government's Committee on National Economic Policy, along with the Ministries of Finance and Economic Development and CORFO, the traditionally powerful national development agency.*

It seems clear that the Gobierno Popular wishes to dramatize its first year in power by executing a highly visible construction program, which will at once redeem its campaign promises and sop up unemployment. Its plans call for the building of 83,000 housing units and the provision of basic public services to 124,000 existing home sites, for a public works program with emphasis on projects of "immediate social benefit" such as water supply, sewer

* The information cited in the three paragraphs which precede the asterisk was given us in a meeting with ODEPLAN staff members on May 7, 1971.
construction, and irrigation, and for the construction and operation of new facilities for health and education services.

President Allende, in his conversations with Regis Debray, gave some of his own views on urban problems. He believes cities such as Santiago are too big, that urban densities should be increased, and that there should be a social mix in cities, with greater mingling of rich and poor. Projects are already being replanned in Santiago to comply with the President's views as to the economic "desegregation" of neighborhoods. A proposal that new housing should have common kitchen and bathing facilities was, we were told, advanced and rejected.

THE, MORE IT CHANGES.

In the language of the astrologers, Chile is in the doubtful days of the cusp when the signs of the zodiac are changing. The planning documentation of the new government is relatively slight; the volume of publications, reports, studies, and structures developed in the previous administration is relatively enormous. Our problem in writing this survey report is to distill from them what theories and practices were set forth during an unusually active and elaborate planning experience in which international agencies strongly participated; what actually happened in Chile as a result; what new directions the
present government is on record as considering and what value judgments we can make on the basis of the evidence we have. There are obvious changes in statement and theory; the interesting question for the future as to Chile's urban development will be whether despite all the planning (under the Christian Democrats and under the Gobierno Popular) the urban form of Chile will not remain what it historically has been. The more it changes, the more it is the same thing: thus the cliche, thus perhaps the fact.

As recently as 1971, John Friedmann published a discussion of "Urban-Regional Policies for National Development in Chile" in a volume devoted to Latin American urban research.* He wrote that:

....one ventures to say that the urban-regional frame, had been successfully applied in Chile, though the first stage in the effort has been barely completed, and much remains to be done. Regional development planning has become an irreversible fact. The system of regional planning offices throughout Chile, administratively coordinated and backed with research and policy guidance by the National Planning Office, has made possible, not only a much more thorough knowledge of the economic diversity of Chile's regions and their opportunities for growth, but also the institutionalization of a programming process that is leading to a system of regional budgeting parallel to, but obeying different criteria from the traditional sectoral capital budget of the nation....

....city and region therefore became the new units

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for analysis and action by the central Government, and the hope was that local citizens might be organized to collaborate more meaningfully with the central Government by building up their own communities (Ley de Juntas de Vecinos). But the widespread adoption of the urban-regional frame was not simply a formal and relatively neutral innovation; it also added new dimensions to national policy. Each city and region would project its own set of developmental objectives; it would seek to become a full-fledged community. Since local resources were practically non-existent, given the structure of taxation in Chile, the central Government would have to channel development capital toward the periphery in accordance with certain national priorities....

ODEPLAN, under the Allende government, states in its pamphlet "La Planificacion Bajo El Gobierno Popular" that:

...one of the main obstacles to the economic development of the country is the excessive concentration of the administrative apparatus, manifested...by the status of provincial offices of the various ministries and agencies whose functions are reduced to those of simple intermediaries between the local community and the central offices located in the capital; the concentration of public investment in the capital; in the practice of allocating investments in the provinces from Santiago without regard to regional priorities; in the variance that is often found between decisions made at the level of the central government and the aspirations of the provinces and regions of the country; in the lack of opportunity for the communities to respond to their responsibilities and make their own decisions.**

The parallelism is marked. In both cases there is a resolution, through planning and the allocation of resources, to reduce the dominance of metropolitan Santiago.


THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURE

If structure alone can do it, Friedmann is right in his statement that "regional development planning in Chile has become an irreversible fact." The country has established an elaborate structure for it, and for planning at all levels.

Under decree 180, dated February 2, 1971, a National Council of Development was created, directly responsible to the President. It has the responsibility for determining the basic orientation of the national system of social and economic planning. The Development Council includes in its membership:

- The Ministers de Economia, Fomento y Reconstruccion; Relaciones Exteriores; Defensa Nacional; Hacienda; Agricultura; Tierras y Colonizacion; Mineria; Obras Publicas y Transportes; Vivienda y Urbanismo; Educacion; and Salud Publica.
- The Presidents of the Banco Central and the Banco del Estado.
- The Executive Vice President of the Corporacion del Cobre.
- The Executive Vice President of the Corporacion de la Reforma Agraria.
- The Director de Presupuestos.
- The Director of La Oficina de Planificacion Nacional (ODEPLAN).
Representatives of workers, entrepreneurs, professionals, and youth.

The functions of the National Development Council are:

1. State the goals and orientation of national economic policy, and make recommendations based on its analyses and statements;
2. Make general recommendations as to the orientation and norms set forth for the elaboration of development plans;
3. Analyze the plans proposed to the President by ODEPLAN;
4. Recommend financial policies for the implementation of the plans;
5. Reconcile long-range and intermediate plans with the annual plans and budget proposed to support them;
6. Monitor implementation of the plans, formulating recommendations for improvement in accomplishment;
7. Recommend appropriate regionalization of the country and the demarcation of geo-economic regions, using the technical studies carried out at ODEPLAN.

The Council's judgments on these matters go to the President. It meets at his call.

We have prepared a diagram of Chile's national...
planning system which is shown in this report. It elaborates the organization of ODEPLAN, which functions through two sub direcciones: the Sub-dirección de Planificación Nacional and the Sub-dirección de Planificación Regional. It is the second which concerns us. It has three departments: one deals with regional analysis, one makes long-range and intermediate regional plans, and one makes annual plans. The country has been divided into twelve regional planning areas, each of which has (or should have) a local regional planning office, or ORPLAN.*

The regions are shown on the sketch map, Fig. 2. They bear designations in Roman numerals, starting with Region I in the extreme north (Tarapaca) and ending with Region XI where Chile divides Tierra del Fuego with Argentina (Magallanes). The region which includes Santiago is unnumbered; it is called Region Metropolitana. The regions are uncomplicated in their geographic outline. They are simply cross-sections of Chile, each of them extending from the Pacific coast to the eastern international boundary.

ODEPLAN has brief statements in its "Resumen del Plan Anual 1971" as to development in each of these regions.**

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* ORPLAN is the acronym for Oficinas Regionales de Planificación.

THE MOVE TO INTEGRATED ECONOMIC SPACE

The above-cited document is, to repeat, one of the three publications published by ODEPLAN which we were given at that agency when we visited it in May 1971. Its companion pieces are the "Resumen del Plan Sexenal, Valparaiso-Aconcagua, 1961-1976," which deals with Region IV and seems to be the first regional development program to be published in the new administration, and "La Planificacion Bajo Bajo El Gobierno Popular" which is the general policy statement from which we quoted in juxtaposition to Friedmann's reference to the irreversibility of regional development planning in Chile. The general planning document notes that "centralism has created a great under-utilization of the organisms and the technicians working in the provinces, depriving them of the power to make decisions which would solve relatively simple problems within the scope of their capacity and experience. Moreover, lack of community participation in regional decision making has created a feeling of frustration, apathy and suspicion toward the central government."* The announced policy calls for "a strategy of gradual decentralization," increasing local participation, and rationalizing the system by which administrative decisions are made. The

* ODEPLAN. La Planificacion Bajo El Gobierno Popular. op. cit. p. 32.
measures designed to accomplish this will have a "flexible
and dynamic character."

Regional planning is evidently seen as a mechanism of
desirable decentralization and therefore will continue as a
designated area of ODEPLAN activity. We were told at
ODEPLAN that it would have fewer "decorative" aspects, which
we took to mean that there would be less emphasis on
detailed analysis, map-making, and charts.

We have noted earlier the existence and the extension
of the ORPLANS, the regional planning offices located
in the field, created by the previous national administration
and extended by the present one; and the Regional Develop-
ment Councils which are an innovation of the Allende govern-
ment. Some detail as to organization of the Regional
Development Councils will be of interest. They consist of
the Intendente (chief executive) of the province, who is a
presidential appointee, the Jefes Zonales (local heads) of
major governmental agencies and public enterprises, the
director of the appropriate ORPLAN, two representatives of
CUT, which is the Central Unica de Trabajadores or Central
Labor Union, for the province, a representative of the
Consejo Provincial Campesino, the provincial campesino
council, a representative of the Juntas de Vecinos
(community councils) of the province, and a representative
of the local entrepreneurs (small business) association.
The Councils are to meet every three months or at the call
of the chairman, who is the Intendente. All of this is intended to increase local and non-governmental participation in development planning.

The 1971 planning document puts forward the following rationale for decentralization of development and for regional planning:

As a result of the long historic process which formed the Chilean economy, the concentration of economic activity and of population in the Central Zone has become one of the fundamental problems of the country and an obstacle to its development, as particularly demonstrated when the growth of the center is compared with the depression of the other regions. The historical roots of this geographic configuration are to be found in the way in which the Chilean economy became tied to the world capitalist system. The capital city, as a political and administrative center, was the mechanism through which the surplus yielded by the production of the workers in agriculture and mining in the country as a whole was channelized. This productivity went, principally, abroad or was used by the ruling class to build an urban infrastructure in accordance with its wants and standard of living. Capitalist industrial development is, in all dependent countries, unequal and centralized. The same mechanisms which lead to a monopolistic concentration of capital favor industrial concentration at certain points, leaving the rest of the country as a supplier of raw materials, foodstuffs, and labor, all under disadvantageous conditions.

In Chile, industrialization was directed by sectors of the burguesia tied by direct or indirect links to international capital, guided under the restricted horizon of the private benefits to be derived from sectorial investments and protected by the state, which they controlled and used broadly for their own interests. Industrialization as conceived in this way exaggerated centralization, making Santiago very nearly the only truly industrialized center in the country. In 1970, Santiago concentrated about 54% of the
urban population of the country and almost 37% of its total population. In 1967, 45% of the GNP and about 58% of industrial production was generated in Santiago. Seventy percent of the nation's manufactures are produced in the central provinces of Valparaiso, Aconcagua, O'Higgins, and Santiago.

The geographic concentration of economic activity is accompanied by income inequalities and bureaucratic centralism. The administrative apparatus of the state and the financial and service systems of the enterprises themselves have been adapted to the economic structure which contributes to the skewed geographic distribution. For example, as of June 30, 1970, 56% of the total deposits of national currency were in the commercial banks of Santiago.

Santiago concentrates not only production and decision making powers but an enormous amount of poverty as well, represented by the persons who sought better living conditions in the city and have, however, been incorporated into urban life by performing services of very low productivity for which they receive only minimum incomes.

During the last decade, the population of the Central Zone increased from 49% to 52% of the national total, while the area's proportion of the country's industrial product remained stable during the decade of 1957-67.*

Having stated these views, the planning document makes a sharp critique of the growth pole theories and policies which had a strong influence in ODEPLAN under the previous administration. It argues that its own advocacy of coordinated action to promote regional development "cannot be considered as a revised version of the traditional theory of polarized growth." El Gobierno Popular is determined to incorporate the unused or underutilized resources existing in the regions and

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*ODEPLAN. Resumen del Plan Anual 1971. op. cit. pp. 41-42.
to increase the standard of living of depressed areas to the point of achieving a total transformation of the structure of the country in terms of geographic distribution of production and population. The contradictory interpretation of the realities implied in the concept of 'growth poles' and in the application of palliative measures has not been successful in stopping the process of centralization which has, to the contrary, steadily increased. Without attempting to make a critical analysis of the implicit theory of 'growth poles' as an instrument of decentralization and regional growth, it is important to point out some of its contradictions, principally in relation to the role of private enterprise and the state. The policy of growth poles, applied as a policy for the development of peripheral and depressed areas, limits the state to the role of a provider of resources, to make private enterprises more profitable through the creation of infrastructure and equipment, plus some investment in production, whose scale and risk are such as to make the private sector unwilling to undertake them. This restriction leads to the waste or misuse of the surplus produced by the workers and tends only to strengthen and maintain the present social structure. In spite of the enormous waste of resources that marked this policy, the effect on regional development was minimal: the great majority of firms continued to find advantages in the central locations and the desired flow of private investment to the regions was not produced. Mining enclaves such as Chuquicamata and Salvador (and in another epoch, the nitrate mines) and such industrial enclaves as Concepcion are typical examples of nuclear development controlled from outside the region, with a minimum multiplier effect on its development.*

The planning agency, having thus stated its case, says that "the development model of the Gobierno Popular is very different. The economic, social and cultural development of the national territory will not be the random

* Ibid. pp. 43-44.
consequence of the spill-over effect of 'growth poles' [in Spanish "consecuencia aleatoria de la irradación de 'polos'"] but will be the inevitable result of a clear and firm will to decentralize, creating integrated economic spaces ['espacios económicos integrados']."

To accomplish this, the Gobierno Popular will seek out the fundamental economic bases for its strategy. "The transformation of the productive structure...implies the use of enormously under-utilized or wasted resources. In truth, a great part of the reserves which could be mobilized exist in different parts of the country and are not concentrated in specific regions. This is the case, for example, with agricultural land; with mining areas, with forestry resources, fishing and others. A similar situation exists with the unemployed or under-employed labor force."*

The 1971 plan then attempts specificity. It proposes to re-activate regional economies and to mobilize the potential surpluses which each region can, in the immediate future, produce from its available natural resources, productive equipment, and labor force. It proposes to stimulate production throughout the country by increasing purchasing power and consumption, to support medium-sized and small producers by more liberal extension

of credit and by improvement in the marketing and price structure of their products and by "other means," and to effect special and differentiated programs for the various regions.

...in some regions, the potential surplus will be mobilized through structural and institutional transformations; in others, by the setting up of production agreements which, because they will avoid the usual channels of commercialization, will direct to the region the re-activating impact of an income distribution policy. In some regions, the state will intervene to take over 'paralyzed' enterprises and those with low levels of utilization of equipment; thus providing for an increase in production and in productive employment, while substituting the criteria of social benefits for those of private return. Government ownership and control of monopolistic enterprises in the regions will rapidly increase the use of equipment, creating in the regions where they have operated a Social Area which will be the center of progress and development of the economy, as will be the case with the Lanera Austral.† In the northern zone, the nationalization of the basic mining industries will permit the economic, social and cultural integration of the workings of the Gran Minería with the rest of the workers of the region.**

We do not find that the documents available to us are models of clarity or explicitness in stating public policies. It is evident that they were produced in haste in recognition of the need to put on the record, as rapidly as possible, ODEPLAN's posture in the new administration. It does become

* The Lanera Austral is a wool production enterprise, operating in Southern Chile.

** Again, a quotation from Resumen del Plan Anual 1971, pp. 44-45.
clear that the planning agency continues to share the view, if developed on Marxist rather than regional science grounds, that Chile's development has been overconcentrated in metropolitan Santiago and that the capital city and its area of influence are in disequilibrium, both in equity and productivity, with the remainder of the country.

From a report prepared for the Ford Foundation by Richard Mallon, Gideon Sjoberg, and Lowdon Wingo,* dealing, inter alia, with URDAPIC, (the acronym for the Foundation's Urban and Regional Development Advisory Program in Chile), and therefore with regional planning, we quote:

...Urban-regional development is not itself a professional discipline, but a field of public policy, which in the URDAPIC program, seems to draw more on the descriptive capacities than on the rigorous analytical tools of the conventional social sciences. While the process of developing new ideas might properly begin with the compilation of descriptive materials and the sharpening of hypotheses, assurance that the new ideas are relevant to the real world and to the policy issues involved can only be achieved by submitting them to analytical-empirical verification. What we would like to make clear at the outset, however, is that the present guiding ideas of the project, when examined critically from the point of view of any of our individual disciplines, look rather fluffy. This point is so important for our evaluation that it warrants some demonstration.

The summary of a recent paper of John Friedmann, who is almost certainly the basic source of conceptual apparatus underlying URDAPIC, reads in

'We have tried to suggest that the three basic processes of national development--innovation, social and political transformation--are closely linked to yet another process, that of urbanization, which tends to reinforce the latent predisposition to developmental change through increasing communication potential and a change in the pattern of social organization from Euclidean hierarchies to Einsteinian systems existing in time.'

Further on in the paper the question for policy are listed as 'optimal' patterns of spatial organizations, 'optimal' balance between centralization and decentralization, and so forth. Elsewhere we read:

'The following measures are proposed for consideration: Accelerate migration towards social development poles by increasing investment in basic services....regardless of apparent economic advantage. This policy should be actively pursued until population reaches a minimum of 250,000. Beyond this size, the effort may be more directly scaled to economic growth.'

Concepts such as 'latent predispositions to developmental change,' 'optimality,' 'minimum populations,' etc., imply normative judgment which can only be evaluated if they are rigorously defined and subject to analytical or empirical testing....for Chile these ideas involve choice among difficult, sometimes subtle, always costly policy options. Are the advisors assisting the government to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of these options? Or are they simply spreading the faith? While a good technical adviser can be distinguished from the pure academician by his healthy dose of activist zeal, he is distinguished from the ideologist by the degree to which he teaches his client and counterpart to ask the fundamental questions to improve the rationality of his decisions. We have reservations about the wisdom of using the need of a host country for sound guidance and advice as an opportunity to apply broad and untested
social hypotheses, however inspired.*

URDAPIC has passed into history, but we would argue that cautions voiced are, in our judgment, still applicable. Planning agencies, whether staffed with foreign or local experts, are essentially technical assistance bodies by their very nature, and the words just quoted would apply with equal force to much of ODEPLAN's current rationale and product.

We too find the regional planning programs developed and continuing in Chile "rather fluffy." We have a sense that a new acronym could be envisioned: "OVERPLAN"(!). Perhaps we have been over-influenced by our earlier knowledge of India and our recent investigations in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, but it seems that Chile, with its relatively small population and with its geographic and climatic restraints, does not present so complex a spatial problem as the planning energies applied to it and the publiciations dealing with it would indicate. The present population of all of Chile is only one million more than that of metropolitan Sao Paulo; it is probable that Grande Sao Paulo in 1980 will be larger in population than Chile when the 1980 census is taken.

If we too are allowed the privilege of intuitive

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* The Mallon, Sjoberg, Wingo Evaluation, op. cit., pp. 3-4. It should be noted that Dr. Sjoberg entered a dissent from the concluding paragraph.
assumptions, we are ready to suggest that the efforts to
decentralize Chile's population and development are not likely to succeed in the short term, except as they
disperse new urban growth in the Macro Zona Central.

THE CHILEAN HEARTLAND--THE MACRO ZONA CENTRAL

The Macro Zona Central is the name given to a combination of three of the twelve planning regions into which the country has been divided: Regions IV and V and the Region Metropolitana of Santiago. The contained provincias (states) are: Aconcagua, Valparaiso, Santiago, O'Higgins, and Colchagua. The area concentrates 51 per cent of Chile's population in 6.5 per cent of total land area. The 1970 census listed thirty-six communities in Chile with more than 20,000 people. Eleven of these, including the major cities of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Vina del Mar, are in the Macro Zone Central. Concepcion and Antofagasta are the only cities of more than 100,000 population which are outside the Zona. Talcahuano (which is Concepcion's sea port), is the only other city outside the Zona which appears to be approaching the 100,000 population level.

To plan for the Zona, then, is to work with an area of manageable space, extending from the ocean to the Andean crest, and with a population which includes half the country.

Santiago is in the central valley, facing the Andes,
about 125 kilometers from Valparaiso and the Pacific ocean. It is not a memorable city in its design nor in its architecture; it is workaday and rather somber, without the excitement and the architectural style of Mexico, the grand boulevards of Buenos Aires, the glitter of Caracas. Its buildings and its form look like they have been there for a long time, and one would not guess from its central areas that Santiago has grown so fast and so recently. Its major civic improvement now in progress is its subway; a new highway tunnel through the coastal mountain shortens the travel time to "Valpo" and "Vina," i.e., Valparaiso and its adjoining residential and resort city, Vina el Mar. Vina is as handsome a seaside town as we have ever seen; Valparaiso is a working port, spectacularly sited on steep hills which face the ocean. Vina had 115,000 permanent residents as of the 1960 census, and shows a higher than average growth rate. Valparaiso is growing only slowly; its 1960 population of 252,000 is not much greater, in Latin American terms, than its 1940 census figure of 209,000.

Industrialization has brought air pollution to Santiago; its population growth has expanded it callampas which is what the Chileans call the areas which we have noted as barriadas in Peru, ranchos in Venezuela, zonas proletarios in Mexico and favelas in Rio de Janeiro. The Chilean word means mushroom, which suggests how quickly such
settlements appear. The callampas are not, it is said, wholly populated by recent migrants to Santiago as might be assumed; instead, according to an ECLA* study, quoted by Herrick, the ratio of "natives" to "migrants" is what one would find in the city as a whole.

If Santiago had had its way, Allende would not be president of Chile. As capital and center of Chile's bourgeoisie, Santiago province gave Alessandri, the most conservative of the three candidates, 460,146 to Allende's 416,854. Tomic, the Christian Democratic candidate, was a respectable third with 321,001. It is evident that the present government will have to win many new converts before metropolitan Santiago becomes firmly committed to a socialist way of life. It is evident too that the decentralization of Chile's metropolis would be very difficult to achieve, despite what have been assumed to be environmental, managerial and political advantages. As early as 1960, the then chief of CORFO's planning and studies department attacked the centralism of Santiago as a form of regional concentration generally anti-economic, inorganic and politically repugnant, not in accord with the country's economic integration. CORFO's major investments have been made outside the Santiago metropolitan district, and it explicitly stated that "a fundamental purpose of the

* Herrick. op. cit.
program is to achieve a decentralization of production through a suitable distribution of investments, so that the country might develop harmoniously, avoiding the concentration of activities in the capital and its outskirts."

But metropolitan Santiago has continued to grow, through the 1960s, as in the 1950s, and 1940s. As defined by the census, Santiago was a city of 507,296 people in 1920. By 1940, it had approached the one million mark, with a census total of 952,075. The 1952 census reported it at 1,350,409, and the 1960 census count was almost two million, (1,907,378). In the twenty years from 1940 to 1960, the city had doubled in population. We do not yet have the 1970 census for the "official" city.

We do have estimates prepared by CIDU** for "Gran Santiago" and for the "Area Metropolitana Santiago," terms which describe an urbanized area somewhat larger than the census definition of the city. Gran Santiago had 2,256,000 people in 1960; its estimated 1970 population is 3,056,000. The population increase was 800,000 during the decade, an annual rate of increase of 3.2 per cent. The metropolitan area had 2,482,000 people in 1960, and grew to an

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** CIDU is the Centro Interdisciplinario de Desarrollo Urbano y Regional, which is at the Universidad Católica de Chile. The publication from which the cited figures are derived is "Documento de Trabajo N° 33" of the Proyecto Investigación, Macro Zona Central, Cuadro N° 2A.
estimated 3,335,000 in 1970. Gran Santiago is defined as the eighteen comunas which we found to be the generally accepted components of the city. There is also a planning usage which defines still another area, slightly larger than even the metropolitan area, called the "Subregion Santiago." It is one of the five subregions used in the studies of the Macro Zona Central.

No matter what area definitions are accepted, there can be no doubt that urbanized Santiago has grown more rapidly than the country as a whole, indicating a continuing flow of in-migrants as well as a natural increase in the city's already settled population.

There is an old self-deprecatory joke in Philadelphia in which the city is described as "a hot-bed of inertia." We now find that inertia has become a word of art in urban demography and is taken to mean just what the Philadelphians do not imply. Inertia in this sense is the continuance of existing trends, uninfluenced by other circumstances, which keep a city growing because it has attained major size and importance and "because it's there." In 1950, Santiago had 21 per cent of Chile's population. In 1960, it had at least 25 per cent. In 1970, metropolitan Santiago appears to have been the home of 35.5 per cent of Chile's people.

The regional planning exercises of the 1960s did not change the trend toward urban concentration. The
experience seems to show that Boisier is correct in his statement that:

The Chilean regional planning experience can be classified in a twofold way. On the one hand, it is an experience relatively rich in theoretical improvements and advancements; on the other hand, it is relatively poor in showing material achievements. This last feature can be explained in light of three underlying causes: i) spatial transformations are mainly a long run process; ii) the 1964-1970 national development strategy was based on a few large scale locationally tied industrial projects; and iii) the advisory role of the planning office has proved to be a rather weak role when the need has been felt of breaking down the traditional power structure of the public sector. *

It seems to us that an economic and social case for the limitation of Santiago's growth has not yet been made despite the considerable volume of planning studies, and that if it were made and accepted as national policy, the policies necessary to execute it would necessarily be Draconian in their harshness. For instance, no new enterprises would be permitted to locate in the Santiago metropolitan area, and existing enterprises would be permitted to expand only after licensing procedures; government departments would be bodily transferred to other cities; in-migration would be prevented by an internal passport or resident permit check. These are "penalty clauses" for which we would see no justification, and which we do not think a government, no matter how much it favored

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decentralization in space of Chile's population in principle, would be willing to adopt. It is difficult to list "incentives" which would be equally compelling.

We do not see the scale of Santiago's population as unmanageable in the Chilean context, nor do we see that the geography of Chile lends itself to a line of major cities from Arica to Punta Arenas. We would be prepared to agree that the present concentration of interest at CIDU in metropolitan organization for Santiago and for development planning within the Macro Zona Central are of high priority and directly on point as to Chile's urban future.

The Macro Zona Central and its subregions are listed and illustrated in Fig. 3.

CIDU is planning for the Macro Zona Central under a contract from ODEPLAN which was financed originally by USAID. Three stages of the four-part planning study have been completed, and ODEPLAN, under the new administration, has authorized CIDU to proceed with the fourth. Guillermo Geisse and Jose Luis Coraggio, both associated with the CIDU study, have this to say about the debate between centralization and decentralization:

The metropolitan areas of Latin America are the subject of an unresolved dilemma in metropolitan planning. On the one hand, they can be considered as an obstacle to development because they absorb in their growth the resources of the interior, because they incur the higher social costs of urbanization, and because they are the centers through which the world capitalist system exerts control over national sub-systems. On the other hand, they may be justified as a means...
of achieving levels of efficiency in accordance with those of 'developed' countries.

In our judgment, this is a dilemma based on assumptions which will lose their validity in the countries' future development. The first assumption is that geographical concentration is an exclusive attribute of capitalist market economies and constitute in themselves an obstacle to the socialization of the economic surplus. The second is that the conflict between the goals of efficiency and equity is necessarily a conflict between central regions and peripheral regions in the same country. These assumptions have given rise to an ideology of planning which is paradoxically shared in its spatial dimension by ideologies which are politically antagonistic. The consensus which argues for regional decentralization has been supported by Marxist postulates and by priority criteria accepted by American technical assistance programs.

The facts, however, demonstrate that the forces which operate in national development move in directions opposite to decentralization...The central metropolitan areas continue to grow at very high rates, reaching absolute population sizes of such dimensions as to maintain their primacy in the future by endogenous internal growth alone, independent of the migration patterns which originally contributed to their expansion.

...the dichotomy of centralization--decentralization tends to distract attention from the truly important problems of the Latin American countries: the urgent necessities involved in a vigorous social restructuring that will allow all the members of a society to participate in the benefits of economic growth controlled and stimulated by endogenous forces.*

The authors see this taking place in the Macro Zona

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Central, which they conceive as a *gran ciudad*, functionally integrated and administered as a unit. No matter what efforts are made in the development of other regions, they hold that the Macro Zona area will have a predominant role in Chile's life, and that "the concentration of population and of economic activity in the *gran ciudad* can be accepted and planned as a superior form of the environment required by man for his development." On a regional basis, the CIDU authors forecast a spatial separation of future industrial growth and future population growth. "While the metropolitan area itself offers the best opportunities for mass living and the production of goods and services for the internal market, the regions of the 'interior' have potential resources whose exploitation will be based upon capital-intensive machinery and processes." They therefore predict increasing "territorial specialization" in Chile.

Friedmann and Necochea take present issue with the concept of the Macro Zona Central as a *gran ciudad*. They believe the Macro Zona is still made up of "a series of unrelated location points" and that the local urban market is not wholly integrated. The distances, they say, are major ones, with a round trip from Santiago to...
urban sub-systems in the region taking a full day. (With
the construction of the new tunnel, it takes only one hour
and a half to drive from Santiago to Valparaiso. The two
cities are approaching what in the United States might be
considered commuting distance.) They identify five
sub-systems in the Macro Zona: Valparaiso, San Felipe-
Los Andes, San Antonio, Santiago itself, and Rancagua. They
suggest that these sub-regions require initial planning as
separate units, with an attempt to relate them sufficiently
to form the planning base for a future gran ciudad.

Boisier* in still another discussion paper identifies
three economic zones within the Macro Zona Central, and
advances the view that the economic differentials will make
it difficult to plan the whole area as a unit. He finds
that Valparaiso-Aconcagua is a declining region economically,
that O'Higgins-Colchagua is an emergent one, and that
Santiago's economy is in a special metropolitan category.

AN INVENTORY OF PLANNING

In any event, the Macro Zona Central and its sub-regions
are not finding plans and planners in short supply.

We were able to compile only a partial listing of

* Sergio Boisier. "Algunas Hipotesis sobre un Modelo de
Desarrollo de la Zona Metropolitana." Documento de
Trabajo No. 19, Seminario Macro Zona Central. Santiago,
planning documents and programs. The earliest modern effort is the Plano Regulador Intercomunal de Santiago which is a master plan prepared in 1960 by the Ministry of Public Works. Its proposals for highway construction have been followed in the installation of Santiago's new road systems. There is a similar Plan Intercomunal de Valparaiso also prepared in the early 1960s. MINVU, which is the Ministerio de la Vivienda y Urbanismo, has commissioned six pre-investment planning studies of various sections of Santiago, as well as pre-investment studies of Rancagua, San-Felipe, and Los Andes. MINVU has also updated the Ministry of Public Works plan for Santiago, adding to it detailed plans for land use, industrial location, and parks and open spaces. The Ministry of Public Works has continued with transportation planning, primarily as a basis for the new Santiago subway system, now under construction. CIDU has formulated master plans for three Santiago comunas: Providencia, Las Condes and La Reina. CORMU, which is an urban renewal agency, has done planning within Santiago for its projects.

There is also the sequence which flows from ODEPLAN. That agency's first national development plan in 1968, titled Política de Desarrollo Nacional, Directivas Nacionales y Regionales, made planning recommendations for the Metropolitan Region. In 1967, ORPLAN Metropolitano had published Estrategia Regional para la Zona Metropolitana
which proposed a planning system of "dispersed decentralization" which meant, as we understand it, the continuance of metropolitan Santiago as the national center but with new development concentrated in urban areas beyond the city's own boundaries. The ORPLAN proposals were embodied in the ODEPLAN national development plan. The national plan also contained development recommendations for Regions IV and V in the Macro Zona Central.

Further planning recommendations were made for the three regions in ODEPLAN's 1970-1980 plan, titled El Desarrollo Regional de Chile en la Decada 1970-1980. It was from this document that ODEPLAN drew up its terms of reference for the major Macr. Jona. Central study which is being carried out by CIDU.

The CIDU study is, as noted, in four parts, three of which are now completed.

In 1971, ODEPLAN published the three documents which we have already described.

Finally, there is a planning effort which was not physical in character nor developmental in primary purpose. It is the study of an integrated system of public administration for metropolitan Santiago, known as SIADUS. The sponsor was MINVU, but there have been foreign as well as Chilean talents assigned to the work. It has been evaluated by John W. Dyckman in an undated report to USAID, entitled "Report on Metropolitan Santiago Pre-
Investment Study."

This discussion has led us from national development planning to regional planning and, as in many of the planning projects listed in the inventory for the Macro Zona, into urban planning per se. Urban planning and urban housing programs are also of interest to this survey; we will therefore move on to their consideration.

THE URBAN PLANNING ALPHABET

The institutional structure which Chile has employed for urban planning, development, and housing includes the following important agencies: MINVU, the Ministerio de la Vivienda y Urbanismo; MOP, which is the Ministerio de Obras Publicas; CORMU, the Corporacion de Mejoramiento Urbano; CORHABIT, the Corporacion de Servicios Habitacionales; CORVI, the Corporacion de la Vivienda; COU, Corporacion de Obras Urbanas, and the Caja Central de Ahorros y Prestamos (all of which form a group of independent agencies dealing with some aspect of urban development and housing) and the departmental planning agencies in MINVU itself, namely DGFP* and DPDU.**

MINVU was created in 1965 during the Frei administration which had as its goal the construction of 360,000

* Dirección General de Planificación y Presupuesto.
** Dirección General de Planificación del Desarrollo Urbano.
new homes. In the event, it was able to build 260,000. MINVU was to be the policy making body and the programming authority in the national government's housing and redevelopment work. Not surprisingly, it had difficulty in developing the coordinating capacity and the executive strength to control the multiplicity of agencies which were titularly responsible to it or associated with it in a very complex governmental framework.

We have detailed and very informative data on Chile's housing and local urban development programs. It seems to us on reviewing it, however, that it is so local in character that it would not assist the survey's primary purpose of exploring subjects with more general application to urban and regional development. There are, as always, exceptions.

One is Operación Sitio. Another is the Plan de Ahorro Popular, known as PAP. A third is the acceptance of housing construction as a factor in maintenance and development of employment and the general economy, an acceptance which seems to be accelerating in the administration of the Gobierno Popular.

Operación Sitio is a program of "sites and services," which means that in an attempt to reach the lowest income groups, public action will be taken to make available lots with urban services upon which the purchaser can build his own shelter. The site and services program in
Chile has been one of the most comprehensive and well-structured programs of its kind in Latin America. Operacion Sitio began in 1965. By the end of 1970, the program had distributed 110,000 lots in various urban centers of the country. Antonio C. Labadia, who helped to develop the program at MINVU, describes it well:

Operacion Sitio...is fundamentally a governmental program of individual or collective credit. Those interested may use this credit to acquire lots that are made available by public programs but may also take advantage of lots offered for sale by private owners. The operation is administered by the Corporacion de Servicios Habitacionales, CORHABIT. A permanent register of applicants has been kept in those Chilean locations where there is a CORHABIT office. The applicant must, at the time of registration, have at least 20 savings units in his state bank (Banco del Estado) savings book. These savings accounts may be opened individually or collectively. Funds deposited in such accounts are marked as savings deposits and cannot be withdrawn for three years after they have been deposited, except to acquire or build a dwelling. The value of the savings account is adjusted monthly according to the rise in the cost of living, thus protecting the depositor against inflation. In addition, deposits earn two per cent interest from the Bank.

Once an applicant is enrolled....[Labadia continues, he makes payments into his account until he has]...earned the right to receive a semi-urbanized site. Once living on the site, he must continue depositing five savings units a month for 15 months, raising his initial savings to 143 units and giving him a right to a loan of 787 savings units. The total of the loan and initial saving--with the latter's value determined at the time of signing the credit application--is the amount applied toward payment for land and basic utilities and equipment. The loan must be liquidated in 14 years, at a monthly payment rate of five savings units and at...
5% interest per year. The above procedure is Plan 1, which contemplates two stages in the process. Plan 2 requires 50 units as initial savings and a somewhat longer waiting period to obtain the credit necessary for the acquisition of a lot having complete urban utilities and services.

Plan 1 in its initial stage distributes single-family lots of 160 square meters, with wire mesh enclosures, and in complexes supplied with roadbeds, networks of drinking-water pipes and electricity and street lighting. In cases certified by the social welfare service, a 'mediaguan', i.e., a temporary wooden dwelling of 20 square meters, is granted. In most cases, residents own their own 'mediaguan' or 'mejora' which they can transport to their assigned sites. If they do not have temporary housing, they generally obtain it from the 'Hogar de Cristo' Housing Foundation, a private charitable organization which produces such units on an industrial scale and sells them at cost. Participants in the program may also take advantage of a special line of credit at the Banco de Estado permitting them to acquire—under CORHABIT's control—siding and materials necessary for preliminary installation.

In this first stage, there is no provision for sewage, meaning that hygienic services are reduced to privies, whose superstructures can be obtained on credit from the National Health Service. As community facilities the program includes temporary or permanent schools, community centers, and commercial sites. Each project follows the outlines of avenues, streets, and alleys, as well as open spaces and those reserved for community activities and other land uses established by area regulating plans.

In the second stage, construction is completed: electricity and water services begin and meters are installed, the sewerage system is constructed and dwellings connected, and the paving of streets and sidewalks is completed. In practice, there is no precise division between stages because different situations may establish different priorities and because each project usually demands its own special treatment.
In fact, the climatic differences presented by the regions of Chile establish varying priorities, to such a point that in the southern region projects must often include paving and sewerage in the first stage.

The fundamental objective is the installation of a family—albeit in a temporarily precarious way—in its future social and physical environment and community. This goal rests on several preconditions. In the first place, the areas in which projects are developed must be well-located and adequately-connected in relation to the rest of the city. This helps contract the natural tendency of a new social group to segregate itself, forming a barrio in disequilibrium cohering internally only through negative factors: common origin, socio-economic homogeneity, and initial low level of achievement. From this point of view it is also important that projects be distributed throughout the different residential districts of the city and that the size of projects enable analysis and control of the sociological phenomena taking place within each project.

What is really essential, however, is the true feasibility of the process which follows the settling-in of the first stage. What is required is a clear financial program, correct initial evaluation of the possibilities for urbanization, and the technical, administrative, and assistance means necessary to guide the nascent community and channel its efforts toward attainment of the program's goals.

The final stage's construction of actual housing, which may be achieved by means of individual or cooperative credit through the People's Savings Plan or by do-it-yourself projects. In the latter, the application of industrialized building systems opens new perspectives. In numerous Operacion S cio centers, CORHABIT has installed factories turning out panels and parts under an industrial patent whose rights it has acquired, and in which residents themselves voluntarily working 18 hours a week, with adequate supervision, manufacture the materials necessary to construct their own dwellings. In 1970, it is hoped to begin about 20,000 dwelling units of 36 square meters each. Once this has been accomplished, factories will remain in the hands of neighborhood
residents, who will thus be able to continue their productive activity, helping other groups and obtaining additional profit.*

As might be expected, Operacion Sitio has been subject to professional and public criticism. It is argued that the program is simply building more callampas, this time official ones. The reply is that callampas (the Chilean equivalent of the barriadas of Peru and the favelas of Brazil), would occur in any event and that their positive aspects, now recognized by many researchers and policymakers, are strengthened by the official sanction which should accelerate their development into consolidated urban neighborhoods. Another criticism is that the proliferation of the site and service areas into the open areas uses valuable agricultural land, spreads the city horizontally with higher infrastructure costs, and provides no attachment of the Sitio areas with places of employment.

MINVU has in the past replied that the cost of denser housing settlements would be substantially higher, and that if Operacion Sitio did not exist, many of its participants would have occupied open land adjacent to cities in any event, without controls, subject to fraud from unscrupulous sellers, and without the benefit of the subsidy which is represented in Operacion Sitio's operating and

supervisory costs.

Operacion Sitio's "clients" have been financed under the Plan de Ahorro Popular. It is the cheapest of the five housing options open to Chilean families wishing to participate in the country's basic system for providing credit for low-income housing. The Plan was put in operation in 1967 to "rationalize the spectrum of existing loans," again quoting Labadia. It established a series of five options for loan programs on the basis of a unitary savings plan and non-contractual credit: semi-urbanized sites; completely urbanized sites; self-built basic housing; one-story housing of 45 square meters; and four-story apartment buildings. No persons who own real estate, or whose immediate family does, can sign up for the program under penalty of sanctions. For those owning lots, the People's Savings Plan provides—in addition to the basic operations already outlined—seven alternative forms of credit for improving and/or completing improvement, or for building and enlarging up to 40 square meters an existing housing unit.*

When the parties comprising the Gobierno Popular were in opposition, they were critical of Operacion Sitio. It is rejected in the Allende administration's projected housing program, but there are ambiguities in the housing policy statement which might indicate that the rejection is more semantic than real. The government does plan to go ahead with the development of numerous housing lots.

The housing proposals of the present government are

* Ibid.
set forth in a document, "Programa Habitacional de Emergencia 1971," issued at MINVU, and developed by that Ministry's Dirección General de Planificación y Presupuesto. All relevant public bodies are to participate in the proposed emergency program. Its purposes are:

1. To generate employment. This implies labor-intensive construction, which is expected to produce 45,000 direct jobs and 90,000 indirect ones. The action was to have started in April.

2. To secure full use of installed capacity for the production of construction materials, and of the entrepreneurial and operative capacity of housing institutions.

3. To introduce dynamic action in all activities which might benefit economically from an expanded housing program, with its projected inputs into the whole of the economy.

4. To widen the base of popular support for the government. Political goals are frankly discussed, and understood as "the decided support of the working class which permits the carrying out of the structural reforms advocated in the Programa Basico de la Unidad Popular" and to incorporate the people in the exercise of power.*

The campaign commitments of the Unidad Popular to low-income housing programs were heavy, and they are further enlarged in the emergency program. As new policies, it proposes:

1. "Popular" urban renewal, which will change the social stratifications in urban areas;

2. The provision of "social equipment," by rehabilitating and constructing community facilities in existing and new developments;

3. The provision of "housing equipment" which implies the provision of basic furniture to the residents of new housing units;

4. Advanced "technological research" on new construction systems, materials, and methods.

Areas occupied by invasions of the past are to be consolidated if they are properly located, and there will be a program to complete the development of Operacion Sitio areas. The targets are 72,045 new housing starts in 1971 and the completion of 8,643 housing units previously under construction. The number of new building lots is set at 45,000. The total projected expenditure is 4,197,000,000 escudos. The regional distribution of the program is roughly in accord with existing population patterns, with the provincia of Santiago receiving 47,747 housing units, or 59 per cent of the total. The expenditure program is also concentrated in the Macro Zona, which is allocated.
53.8 per cent of the whole.

It is clearly a most ambitious program, drawing heavily upon national resources, the ability to co-opt private construction enterprises, and the organization of the government's own executive, technical, and operative skills.

The political and economic motivations are evident, and plainly expressed. The development of a "delivery system" which will produce the results desired in the time allowed could be rightly regarded as a major achievement.

THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

Socialist planning was perhaps not exactly what many international agencies had in mind when they extended financial support and technical assistance to Chile in relative per capita abundance during the 1960s. And more than in most countries, international assistance had a marked urban and regional interest. USAID, which now has a low profile in Chile, made its first urban-oriented contribution to Chilean development ten years ago when it provided seed capital for the country's savings and loan system. The amount was a five million dollar loan and a five million dollar grant; the government of Chile made a matching contribution of twelve million dollars. In 1964, there was another American loan of $8,700,000. By
1.67, the system thus financed had twenty-three associations in Chile, with 225,000 participants. It had as of that date financed 36,000 housing units. The investment guarantee program for housing construction also became operative in 1961, when guarantees of $2,100,000 were supported to finance construction of 402 housing units. Additional guarantees have raised the total money committed by $4,800,000, and the number of units by 1,250. They are being erected in Concepcion and Santiago.

The USAID mission in Chile has been actively supporting urban and regional planning, with technical assistance extended to MINVU, ODEPLAN, and CIDU and with training programs funded for Chilean personnel in both national and local planning agencies. A Chilean version of the American model cities program was tested in Concepcion with USAID support. This attempts to coordinate national urban programs with stimulated local participation. It was placed in Concepcion because a number of viable agencies there made it a suitable testing area. USAID provided two short-term advisors to assist in the preliminary programming, and a third advisor was scheduled to arrive in 1971 to assist in establishing a local administrative body which could receive and distribute development funds.

USAID followed the Ford Foundation in extending support to CIVU, which is the Central de Informacion de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Information Center) of MINVU, which, as noted, is
the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism. The project which USAID assisted brought American consultants, PADCO,* to design CIVU's data system and outline a procedure for implementing the design. CIVU's functions have been cut back under the new administration but there are indications now that MINVU is again interested in expanding its capacities. Some informal approaches have been made to USAID for additional assistance. USAID has also supplied consultant services to metropolitan planning programs for Santiago, and provided financial support for the studies by CIDU of the Macro Zona Central. USAID financed thirteen out of thirty-two pre-investment studies which were set up and carried out under an agreement between MINVU and ODEPLAN during the Frei administration. These were analyses of presumed urban growth points, with identification of economic, social, and physical development factors, formulation of a "pre-hypothesis" of regional development potential, a diagnosis of available data and previous analyses, all terminating in an indicative general plan for urban development. The pre-investment studies were considered necessary to the implementation of regional development. They now seem to be in ODEPLAN's inactive file. USAID participation was in the form of a $608,000 loan.

* PADCO is the Planning and Development Collaborative International, a consulting firm based in Washington.
Through another agency, the Peace Corps, the American government gave assistance to the Operacion Sitio program. Thirty-eight Peace Corps volunteers worked with CORHABIT as instructors in self-help construction techniques and as advisors in community development. USAID is currently operating with a muted program. While we were in Santiago, the Urban Development and Housing group in AID's Office of Engineering Services was about to close up shop.

Urban programs in Chile have received bilateral assistance from Belgium, which contributed $180,000 to a CORHABIT receiving fund for low-income housing; from West Germany, which also assisted low-income housing, with a contribution of DM 21,000,000; and from the Netherlands, which provided three short-term fellowships for Chilean planners in 1970.

The Inter-American Development Bank has made urban-related loans which total more than sixty million dollars. Eight loans have gone to housing programs, with IDB's financing of $35,300,000 helping to erect 25,200 dwelling units. Water supply and sewerage systems in Santiago, Vina del Mar, Concepcion, Telcahuano, and "other cities" have benefited from IDB loans for such infrastructure.

The Pan American Health Organization, which serves as the regional branch of the World Health Organization in the Americas, had a small program in Chile in 1970. It provided limited support ($21,000) for the training and
research operations of the Schools of Engineering and Public Health at the University of Chile.

THE GENEVA OF LATIN AMERICA

Santiago has been a traditional center of U.N. and U.N.-related agencies. A number of them are concerned with urban and regional development in Latin America generally, and in some cases they have also provided direct assistance to the government of Chile.

The Social Affairs Division of the Economic Commission for Latin America has, for example, a regional development study group, consisting of four professionals now working on an analysis of the urbanizing process in Latin American countries. In addition to its research, the regional group provided advisory services and training courses; Chile has participated in its program.

The Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, known as ILPES, is based in Santiago. It is not technically a U.N. agency but it obtains some support from the UNDP and is housed in the same building as ECLA. The United Nations considers it a "regional project" serving the nations of Latin America. ILPES has a research program and provides advisory services to Latin American governments in economic and social planning and policy formulation. It plans to expand its research program in 1971 to include a
proposed three-year study of regional and urban problems in Latin America. The research proposal has two stages: in the first stage, an analysis of current regional and urban problems would lead to the design of a theory on which new policies and programs in the field would be based. Specifically, researchers are to review the historic allocations of space in Latin America and identify the resulting economic problems of urban development. In the second stage, the theory which is formulated will be tested in case studies, through field work in Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and a country still to be selected either in Central America or in the Caribbean. The case studies are expected to yield criteria for coordinating regional and urban development policies. The research proposal which we have reviewed is dated April 1971, and is still subject to refinement.

The Latin American Demographic Center, CELADE, is another UNDP regional project which is based in Santiago. As part of its research program, it projects population levels in the countries of the region. Current research includes a comparative study of migration to major urban centers, with Santiago, Caracas, and Lima as subject cities. The study for Santiago has been completed and published. CELADE also provides short and year-long graduate courses in the field of demography, gives advisory demographic service to governments in the region, and recently (during
a time when many countries were developing census questions) was active in seeking better information from census returns as to migration, economic factors, and other data which is useful in the formulation of urban plans and policies.

A FINAL COUNT

As we came toward the conclusion of this survey report on Chile, we took a little time to count the sorts, documents, evaluations, plans, surveys, and research proposals which we had read (or scanned) in the course of its preparation. There are more than fifty of them, excluding maps and population tables. Many are the product of agencies which received Ford Foundation assistance such as ODEPLAN, CIDU, and CIVU; some are scholarly publications of Foundation supported personnel who served the Urban and Regional Development Advisory Program (URDAPIC); some are internal Foundation reports such as end of assignment statements; some are professional evaluations prepared for agencies such as USAID and the Foundation.

We found that CIDU had been professionally evaluated by John Friedmann as of May 31, 1969. URDAPIC had been professionally evaluated by Messrs. Mallon, Sjoberg and Wingo as of November 5, 1968. We found that CIVU had been professionally evaluated by John D. Herbert, Senior Vice President, PADCO, as of April 11, 1969.

The evaluations are part of the Foundation's docu-
It would be foolish of us, with our limited time and limited knowledge of the country and its circumstances, to attempt to add to them. Nor would it be within the terms of our assignment, which is to consider future Foundation action in urbanization in the developing countries.

It is within the scope of our assignment, however, to seek in each country we visit and whose experience we explore, those elements in its urban and regional planning and development which may have an international interest and broader applications. It seems to us that the Chilean experience indicates that long-range planning always at risk against the short-term vicissitudes of political change, and that doctrines accepted (if only nominally) by one administration are almost certainly to be challenged (if only nominally) by a succeeding government which has won its victory on the basis of change. Also we see in the planning and development operations an evidence of what Bourne says was a characteristic of the Frei administration, "everything was to be done at once, as could only happen in a genuine revolution—and perhaps not even then."* One finds in the proliferation of writing and the proliferation of plans and planning offices, a sense of hectic activity with all too little evidence of concentration on finite

* Bourne. *op. cit.* p. 156.
goals capable of execution within a working political frame-work.

The whole concept of regional planning for Chile is open, as the professional evaluators have pointed out, to intellectual challenge. Regions usually imply not only defined areas of space but cultural differentiation and historic loyalties. Friedmann himself says that "despite the fact that each has an individual economic profile, the regions of Chile exhibit only small cultural variations. By and large, Chileans are a fairly homogeneous people and their attachments to soil and place are weak. The nation's regions are therefore economic artifacts more than organic historico-cultural entities and have no political expression at all."* If this is the case, it might be thought that the effort to create regional "artifacts" was premature until the political institutions of the country were developed to promote and to administer them. We find metropolitan Santiago a case in point. It is not a federal district unlike most large Latin American capitals** and is composed of either seventeen or eighteen comunas (we have found both figures used in the literature) all very


** Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Bogota, Mexico City, and Caracas are consolidated as federally directed capitals, although urban growth has pushed their "true" boundaries in some cases beyond the territory assigned to them by law. Lima is not.
weak and uncoordinated. The only unitary government is that of the provincia. We have a sense that regional planning without public bodies capable of executing regional development may be futile. We find much lip service in Chile, in the present government as well as in the expressed policies of the Gobierno Popular, to decentralization of public authority. We must confess a skepticism that it has happened or is likely to happen. The metropolitan structure for Santiago proposed at SIADUS is a very weak metropolitan council* and we found no one in Chile—as we would find no one in New York—who believes that the metropolitan area will be brought into a strong and unified administrative mechanism. That the city functions as well as it does is an evidence of man's ability to use ad hoc means to overcome structural chaos.

This may be typical of the country, which has learned to survive inflation and in effect substitute a sueldo vital, an estimate of a living wage, for the usual methods of valuing currency. Chile should, on the basis of its size, its homogeneity, and its population concentrations be a country whose problems and processes could be solved and executed in direct and relatively simple ways. Instead, to no one's surprise, it achieves (and seems to relish) complexity in its politics, its economy, and its intellectual

* Dyckman. op. cit. p. 23.
life. It would be our judgment that its urban and regional planners, Chilean and imported, have gone with the grain of the country: they have been complicators and not simplifiers.