This report is a continuation of a review done in 1958 by the Ford Foundation in an attempt to identify and define a productive role in Latin America. Contained herein are as follows: The Introduction includes: (1) Urbanization in Latin America, The Role of the Ford Foundation; (2) Urbanization in Brazil, the Involvement of the Ford Foundation; (3) The Need for a Frame of Reference in Approaching Urban Problems; (4) Whether 'Urban Problems' Constitute a Cognizable, Effective Category for Foundation Activity; (5) A Definition of Urbanization; (6) The Elements of an 'Urban Frame of Reference'; and (7) The 'Frame of Reference' Origin of the Present Paper. The second section, Urbanization in Brazil, deals with: (1) The Absence of an Urban Tradition; (2) Physical Setting; (3) The Settlement and "Urban" History of Brazil. The third section, Brazilian Responses to Urbanization, includes: (1) 'Societal' Perception of Cities; (2) Governmental Responses to Urbanization; (3) Other Institutional Responses to Urbanization; and (4) 'Urban Policy' in Brazil. Tables and charts are included throughout the text. [For related documents in this series, see UD 013 731 and 013 733-744 for surveys of specific countries. For special studies analyzing urbanization in The Third World, see UD 013 745-UD 013 748.]
An International
Urbanization Survey Report
to the Ford Foundation

Urbanization in
Brazil
This working paper was prepared as supportive material for an International Survey of Urbanization in the developing countries, which was organized by the Ford Foundation late in 1970 and was completed late in 1972. The purpose of the Survey was to provide findings and recommendations to guide the Foundation in making informed judgments on its future participation in programs related to the urban condition in the less-developed countries.

The Survey was directed neither to perform nor to commission original research. Its work was to be reportorial, analytic, and indicative of program choices. To serve these objectives, the Survey was essentially a field operation in which the staff travelled widely in the countries where the Foundation maintains field offices and drew not only upon its own observations but upon the experience of Foundation personnel assigned to the developing countries. The staff’s own field notes on phases of urbanization in specific countries were expanded into working papers both to record observations and to clarify the deductive processes and the analyses of data which were to form a demonstrable basis for the Survey’s conclusions. Additional working papers were provided by Foundation personnel with a depth of field knowledge, and by consultants expert either in specific countries or in topics of special interest.

The Survey working papers and special studies were originally intended only for internal use. It became evident, however, that the body of material had values which argued for wider exposure. Accordingly, the Foundation is publishing the papers for those with special country or topical interests and for those interested in the material as a whole.

The working papers carry disclaimers appropriate to the circumstances of their preparation and to the limitations of their original purpose. The reader should not expect to find in them either the product of original research or a comprehensive treatment of the processes of urbanization in the particular country. Rather, they are occasional papers whose unity derives from their use as exemplary and illustrative material for the Survey.

But unity of form and substance is not the measure of their value. Each report and special study is an essay on some aspect of urbanization in the developing countries. In most instances, they are what a good essay should be—unmistakably personalized and therefore reflective of the insights and the convictions of informed authors.

The International Urbanization Survey

John P. Robin, Director
Colin Rosser
Frederick C. Terzo
Urbanization in Brazil

by

James A. Gardner

International Urbanization Survey

The Ford Foundation
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Fig. 1

Fig. 2
Ibid. p. 134. I should note that while I find Azevedo's maps a useful conceptual tool, I believe they exaggerate somewhat the "areas conhecidos," and the areas "sob a influencia da cidades e vilas."

Fig. 3
Ibid. p. 139, Cf. comment Fig. 2 supra.

Fig. 4
Ibid. p. 145, Cf. comment Fig. 2 supra.

Fig. 5
IBGE Contribuicoes para o Estudo de Demografia do Brasil, p. 218.

Fig. 6
Aroldo De Azevedo, op. cit., p. 228.
(Chart extended to include 1970).

Fig. 7
CHISAM map. CHISAM recently submitted a report to the Ministry of the Interior which projected the removal of twenty favelas and 250,000 people by 1972, clearing the south zone (Jornal do Brasil January 26, 1971 "CHISAM promete extinguir mais 20 favelas em 6 meses...."
"Favelado sai da Zona Sul ate 72").

Fig. 8
From Mario Trindade's lecture at the Superior War School, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1969.

Fig. 9
Ibid.

Fig. 10
Ibid.
INTRODUCTION
URBANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
THE ROLE OF THE FORD FOUNDATION

In 1958 the Ford Foundation conducted a review in an attempt to identify and define a productive role in Latin America. As part of that review a report was commissioned by the Overseas Development Program of the Foundation, to "serve as a guide to problems" in Latin America. The final written report, by consultant Sidney Mintz, was a lengthy statement about Latin America, and "potential program areas" there. The report suggests a number of areas "particularly amenable to focal development activity." The first of these was "urbanization":

...Latin American cities are growing at a remarkable rate. From a purely factual point of view, this urbanization process is not well documented, nor is it well understood. The sociology of urbanization in Latin America is hardly studied, when compared to the same process in North America and Europe. Basic urban sociological research is hence a need of the first order in Latin America. Urban community development programs, designed to deal with the problems which arise in situations of rapid and uncontrolled urbanization are almost wholly lacking....Housing development and housing cooperatives are an essential part of urban development in Latin America....more could surely be done in this field of activity. Urban and industrial planning are not assigned sufficient importance in the curricula of Latin American schools of architecture and engineers, nor is urban planning related sufficiently to sociological techniques and knowledge. Most such planning is done by architects, and the resources of the social sciences are rarely employed in planning activities.
Some fourteen years later Mintz's sweeping generalizations need qualification, specificity and, in some cases, expansion. But his comments do not ring of the cold war Zeitgeist of their origin, or of any distant intellectual vintage. On the contrary, as discussed in the paper that follows, the analysis has aged relatively little over the past decade and a half. Unfortunately, the Foundation's involvement in the urban sector of Latin America has also been relatively little defined or developed over this same period. Confronted with the fastest rate of urbanization in the world, the Foundation has remained relatively uninformed and uncertain in urban Latin America. With several notable exceptions the Foundation's involvement has been characterized by false starts within disparate programs. It has played a modest and less than fully productive role.
URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL,
THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION

Brazil, the subject of the present report, was no exception to this general Foundation trend. An early ad hoc and relatively uninformed approach to the urban sector of Brazil led the Foundation to make an underproductive $220,000 research grant to an action organization, in the field of municipal administration. In reviewing the Foundation thinking behind this underproductive grant, in November of 1970 I discussed the "undefined Foundation role in the urban sector" as follows:

As has been previously pointed out, the Foundation's activities have been defined on a disciplinary basis--agriculture, the social sciences, education, science and technology, and population. The problems to which the Foundation would address itself in the urban sector, however, cut rapidly across these Foundation constructs. Yet, perhaps through some Whorfian distortion arising out of problem and program definition, we have not yet developed and articulated the appropriate role of the Foundation in the urban sector. While this process is now under way internationally (i.e., the Robin study) and in Brazil (i.e., my own embryonic research), this grant was made in the absence of an adequate, articulated "urban" frame of reference....Future involvement in the urban sector should come in the context of a reasoned and articulated (and criticized) rationale of Foundation involvement.
THE NEED FOR A FRAME OF REFERENCE 
IN APPROACHING URBAN PROBLEMS

A subsequent memorandum, of February 1971, discussed the advantages of the so-called urban "frame of reference" as follows:

Posited by the very idea of an urban frame of reference is a greater concentration of our own effort in the area, presumably carrying with it an increased awareness and capacity to make decisions. The capacity to make decisions is obviously related to the information available, and the information available is, by definition, a basic element of the urban frame of reference. Similarly, an urban frame of reference can restructure and 'decompress' the Foundation decision-making process, spreading it out over a greater period of time rather than trying to decide at the same time both how to respond to a proposal and what we should be doing overall. Moreover, the frame of reference should allow us to make meaningful 'linkages' within problem-related but institution-isolated grantees, e.g., the demographers', agricultural economists', and political scientists' related work on rural-urban migration, or the numerous but 'desligado' research projects on urban marginality. And the frame of reference should enhance our capacity to adequately respond to new proposals arising from the urban sector.

At this time we have on file in Rio various proposals and would-be proposals in such areas as favela rehabilitation, urban ethnic attitudes in Brazil, low-cost housing technology research, an urban law program, (two) Master's programs in urban studies and, of course, the municipal administration proposal. And there are more proposals coming down the pike, whether for a high-powered CEBRAP-like urban research center or applications for bolsas and individual grant and study awards. And it is reasonable to expect the Foundation to receive an even heavier volume of requests in the future. I base this assertion on an increasing Brazilian
and grantee interest in urban problems, and on increasing problems inherent with an extremely rapid Brazilian urbanization process. (It has, for example, been predicted that there will be, within thirty years, in a Rio-Sao Paulo-Belo Horizonte megalopolis of 100 million people, half of the country's population.) How, other than by developing something resembling what I have described as an urban frame of reference, is the Foundation to be responsive to these Brazilian interests and problems, how to respond to new proposals, make existing grants more productive and better connected? I don't think we have adequately answered these questions, nor do I feel the recently discussed urbanization conferences or the Foundation's international urban stocktaking can, or pretend to, offer guidelines of sufficient specificity to respond to national and institutional vicissitudes within the various countries of Foundation involvement. We currently have 'disciplinary' frames of reference within Brazil, e.g., in agriculture, population and the social sciences. But in the inherently interdisciplinary urban sector it seems to me we are simply, woefully short on knowing what we are about.
WHETHER "URBAN PROBLEMS" CONSTITUTE
A COGNIZABLE, EFFECTIVE CATEGORY FOR FOUNDATION ACTIVITY

There was, of course, a need to respond to the legitimate question from Foundation colleagues, as to "why we should designate a Foundation program in urban affairs."

In April of 1971 I attempted to respond to one such inquiry as follows:

You query why we should designate a Foundation program in 'urban affairs.' An initial answer would be that any denomination, including an 'urban frame of reference,' carries the advantages and disadvantages of a sort of whorfian 'cognitive set.' 'Urban affairs,' for example, introduces into the Foundation's basically disciplinary weltansicht a conceptualization which is more immediately, and more responsively, interdisciplinary. The more fundamental issue you are raising, I believe, is the very existence of a nexus of problems sufficiently distinct, important and related to be incorporated under the same program umbrella, whatever the 'urban' denomination.

My own reaction is that this issue is about as shallow as it is broad. Basically I think that there are distinct and important urban problems of an interdisciplinary nature, and that it is more responsive and more productive for the Foundation to approach these problems in a coordinated, interdisciplinary way. I have made the latter argument in an earlier memorandum and will address the former briefly here.

Urban and non-urban problems do, of course, frequently have common intellectual, disciplinary, economic and psychological underpinnings, and the oversimplified rural-urban dichotomy or the Redfield folk-urban continuum should not be overstated. At the same time there are some important qualitative differences between urban and non-urban environments. As Leeds has pointed out, favelas are not merely
rural slums in the city (Frank Bonilla's 1961 article and Lewis' culture of poverty notwithstanding). Social organization, residence, occupation and transportation are common urban and rural problems, for example, but they take on a strongly environmental character. Similarly, the more ephemeral problems of participation, identification, alienation, and anomie take on an urban character. (I suppose I would have to cite the Simmel, Park, Wirth school).

Delinquency offers one example of this urban-non-urban difference with which I am reasonably familiar. Quantitatively and qualitatively urban and rural delinquency are quite different. The developmentalists like Erikson and Piaget may find a common psychological base, as do the Freudians, such as Wrong. And some sociologists, such as Durkheim, find a common societal base. Beyond these 'global' underpinnings, however, the more immediate social and subcultural environment is of prime importance, and is empirically and perhaps causally related to various forms of human welfare and behavior, including delinquency. Given this importance, these diverse human environments, including agglomerations, need to be studied and understood in their various forms. It does not make sense, for example, to approach the delinquent acts of Brown's 'Manchild,' Miller's 'lower class milieu,' Thrasher's 'transitional areas' or White's 'street corner society' in the same way one would approach rural delinquency. (Racial conflict and gang warfare, for example, are simply not major problems down on the farm). The motives, acts, and effects of 'urban delinquency' are meaningfully separable from rural delinquency, and empirically, substantively related to the different environments in which the respective acts occur. While there is a certain amount of 'rediscovering the wheel' in saying it, there are demonstrably different or distinct 'urban' problems. Moreover, these problems, such as delinquency, are obviously interdisciplinary and equally obviously important. Given the almost staggering Latin American and worldwide growth of urban areas, I think 'urban' problems
will inevitably become increasingly important for most organizations attempting to 'advance human welfare' on a broad scale. Suffice to say I think there does exist a nexus of problems sufficiently distinct, sufficiently important and sufficiently related to be incorporated under the same 'urban' umbrella.
A DEFINITION OF URBANIZATION

Eventually I was pressed to define "urbanization."

In May of 1971 a very modest working definition was stated as follows:

It has frequently been pointed out that the concept of 'urbanization,' or 'urbanizacao,' does not refer to the same thing when used by Anglos and Latins. Thus when the Brazilian groups working on 'urbanizacao das favelas' describe their objectives and endeavors, the 'urbanization' concept which emerges is demographic, spatial and usually service-oriented in nature. By 'urbanizing' favelas they mean physical planning, and they mean introducing urban services such as water, light, sewage and the access to transportation.

International and Latin scholars have, of course, broadened this conceptualization and definition in a myriad way. There is a demographic focus on "population concentration," looking at rate levels and rates of urban population growth; the sociologists' "urbanism as a way of life," focusing on the social and "urban values" dimension of human agglomeration; the economists' focus on urbanization as a development process reflecting technological and industrial development; the historians', and sometimes the philosophers' view of urban "modernization"; the political scientists' focus on urban political entities.

and participation; and the architects' and planners'
perception of physical design and spatial dimension.²

There is, however, something of a withdrawal from the
multiple variable definitions of urbanization, to a focus
on the demographic and spatial dimensions.³ This more
"functional" approach has the advantage of being consistent
with the "Latin" and Brazilian usage. It also leaves
open, for researcher and "practitioner" alike, the existence
and the nature of the relationship between the urbanizacão
and urbanismo variables. As stated by one writer:

Our preference is to define the city in
demographic and spatial terms. In this
way, a consistent conception can be stated
which is not only close to usage but also
leaves open the question of the socio-
economic causes and consequences of urban-
ization.⁴

2. Alternative definitions have been reviewed at some length
in Albert J. Riess, Jr. "Urbanization", in Julius Gould
and William L. Kolb (eds.). A Dictionary of the Social
Leo F. Schnore and Eric Lampard. "Social Science and the
City, A Survey of Research Needs", in Leo F. Schnore and
Henry Fagin (eds.). Urban Research and Policy Planning.

3. See, e.g., Gino Germani. "Urbanizacion, secularizacion y
derrollo económico". Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 25.

Significance", in P. Gibbs (ed.). Urban Research Methods.
making a similar argument against a more complex defini-
tion, Schnore and Lampard stated this same non-inclusion-
of-potentially-independent-variables position as follows:
"a definition that includes both demographic and organ-
izational aspects virtually precludes any subsequent
analysis of the interrelation between the two." Schnore
By way of emphasis, a demographic-spatial definition obviously does not exclude the broader social and economic concerns that are the principal focus of much of this paper. On the contrary, the demographic-spatial definition "although considered fundamental, constitutes a point of departure which will be complemented by analysis of our demographic variables..."  Thus "urbanization" becomes, as a definitional base, a quantified concept—the demographic and spatial growth of cities.


5. Unikel, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. p. 247.

6. Here I part ways with Davis who defines urbanization as neither absolute growth, nor a rate or form of growth, but rather as a level of growth, the ratio of the urban and rural population at any time; or, more specifically, as the rise in the ratio of the former over the latter. In so doing, the Davis definition allows for "negative" urbanization in a situation involving absolute urban growth, but, vis-a-vis the rural population, relative decline: "Since the total population is composed of both the urban and the rural, however, the 'portion urban' is a function of both of them. Accordingly cities can grow without any urbanization, provided that the rural population grows at an equal or greater rate." Davis, in Gibbs. op. cit. pp. 41-42. As stated by Schnore and Lampard: "The rural-urban population dichotomy may not be worth all that much." Schnore and Lampard, in Schnore and Fagin. op. cit. p. 28.
THE ELEMENTS OF AN "URBAN FRAME OF REFERENCE"

Even given some general recognition of the need for an urban frame of reference and a modest working definition of urbanization, an earlier memorandum was the touchstone for the present paper and the emergent urban rationale of the Brazil office. This earlier memorandum, of February, 1971, attempted to set forth the basic elements of an urban frame of reference as follows:

Ideally a frame of reference should be based on an understanding of the urbanization process in a given country and region, including the historical, demographic, physical, economic, legal, sociological and psychological dimensions. It should be based on, and demonstrate, an awareness of the nature and direction of the present and future urbanization process. And it should contain some analysis of major problem areas inherent in that process. Within this context an urban frame of reference should contain information on and evaluations of relevant institutions, individuals, and projects. We should be aware of the objectives, staffing, research, resources, 'linkages,' impact and, in short, the role and competence of relevant entities. This awareness should encompass Federal, Regional, State and Municipal institutions and the relative role of the Universities, international and private entities (including industry), the various professions, and the legal, fiscal, intellectual, aesthetic, cultural and fundamentally human ingredients that pull the pattern together—or apart. An institutionally immediate element of this frame of reference is the current role of the Foundation and Foundation grantees in the urban sector (both within the country and the region). What grantees are currently involved, with what kind of staff, programs, and research; how do they relate to the overall process of urbanization, to each other, and to prospective Foundation grantees. Within this context, and cognizant of the financial,
institutional, research and human resources available, a frame of reference should set out priority areas of Foundation involvement, hopefully identifying promising institutions, individuals, research objectives and 'linkages' therein. More simply, an urban frame of reference should be based on and attempt to increase our understanding of the urbanization process, and the responses thereto, including our own. And it should begin to identify opportunities for increasing the productivity of present and future Foundation involvement.
THE "FRAME OF REFERENCE" ORIGIN OF THE PRESENT PAPER

The present paper is a part of the "frame of reference" document of June, 1971. There were four major sections in the original paper: Section I--"Introduction," including a discussion of objectives, "urbanization," urban problems, the need for a "frame of reference" in approaching same, and the institutional biases of FordBrazil; Section II--"Urbanization in Brazil," including a description of the settlement of Brazil and the twentieth century emergence of Brazil as a predominantly urban society; Section III--"Brazilian Responses to Urbanization," including an evaluation of the major entities attempting to understand and respond to the urbanization process in Brazil, and containing an analysis of "urban policy" in Brazil; and Section IV--"The Ford Foundation in the Urban Sector of Brazil," including a discussion of the current Foundation activities in the urban sector, principally through programs in the social services, population, and agriculture, also including a discussion of the appropriate role of the Foundation in the urban sector, and a general program statement and recommendation. The present draft omits Section IV entirely, as related more to the institutional interests of the Foundation than the issue of Brazilian urbanization per se. The Section I, "Introduction," is similarly related to the institutional interests of the Ford Foundation. It also
relates to the context, methodology, and qualifications which necessarily embrace the two Sections which follow, and hence is incorporated, in part, in the present "Introduction." As stated in the original "Introduction":

When Banfield says there is no such thing as an 'urban expert,' one can only nod in agreement: I, at least, don't claim to be one and cite this paper as proof. By way of placing cards on the table, my training is in sociology and law. I have worked and lived in Brazil for nearly two years, as Assistant to the Representative. Most of my time has been spent working with grants related to, but not directly in, 'urbanization' (i.e., political science, sociology, social anthropology, administration, law, economics and agricultural economics). I did inherit the one directly 'urban' FordBrazil grant, in municipal administration...And I wear the 'urban' hat in the Rio office when 'urban related' fellowships, conferences, and grant proposal issues arise.

In large measure this memorandum arises out of that experience in general, and out of the municipal administration experience in particular. I became increasingly convinced that urban problems are among the largest, most difficult, and most enduring to be faced by Brazil in the foreseeable future. And I became convinced that Brazil and the Foundation are ill prepared to meet these problems. After ten years in Brazil the Foundation did not have an urban policy. We had no way, other than ad hoc evaluation, of relating the urban component of existing grants, or of responding to urban related requests for Foundation support. Nor did we know where 'urban' Brazil is going, what problems were likely to arise, or the appropriate role of the Foundation with regard thereto. Brazil, meanwhile, was and is becoming an urban country at a staggering rate. The problems of and interest in the urban area increase proportionately. For a number of reasons it became apparent that the Foundation role in urban Brazil needed rethinking. Stated more affirmatively, I became convinced that the Foundation had a
more productive role to play in the urban sector in Brazil.

My methodology has been relatively crude, largely contact with grantees, open-ended interviews, sporadic library research and the interesting role of 'participant-observer.' The time and literature available has been limited, and the number of interviews relatively few. Thus much of what follows will have to pass as professional judgment. It should be added that this is a draft document, quite explicitly requesting discussion and criticism.

The two Sections that follow were quickly written in this spirit. They were written to pull together, principally for myself and for Foundation colleagues, some general information on the urbanization process and the Brazilian institutions responding thereto. While it is obvious that the materials which follow are very general statements and analyses of the Brazilian urbanization process and actors, a few more immediate comments and qualifications are in order.

Section II, "Urbanization in Brazil," is historical and descriptive in its approach, and basically economic determinist in its underlying and unstated theoretical base. It should be noted, however, that the cities of Brazil probably fit a dependencia analysis as comfortably as the cities of any Latin American country. Following this school of inquiry, Brazilian urbanists often look moreconcertedly and causally at the role of external "models" of urban and economic development, first Portuguese, then English, and more recently French and American. And they look to the
role of an "externally" determined economy in rubber, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and minerals, in the development of Brazilian cities. I believe the dependencia analysis is the conceptual first cousin--albeit narrower and more linear in scope and reach--of a more general approach which looks to the subtle and complex interaction between cities and processes of social, political, legal and economic change and "development." Section II does not, however, attempt to develop explicitly a theoretical model of urbanization in Brazil or apply extant models to a "reality" I perceive. Nor does it focus at length on a number of enduring theoretical issues: the more precise relationship between urbanization and "development" in Brazil, between rural and urban sectors, the interrelations between or within systems of cities, etc. In short, Section II is not an explicit theoretical statement; it is descriptive and, in a general way, quantitative, and a synthesis of materials heretofore disparate. It should be read as such, and no more.

Section III, "Brazilian Responses to Urbanization," is composed of two parts, an inventory and brief analysis of the various actors in the urban sector, and an analysis of urban policy in Brazil. The former is a quick general review for the pledge "practitioner" in Brazil's urban sector. Whatever merit this Section has will be fleeting. Brazil's urban sector is, if anything, fast moving. In
fairness to my analysis it should be noted that Section IV, here omitted, supplements this taxonomy with a more specific review of much of the social science oriented urban research presently underway in Brazil. The concluding analysis of "urban policy" will also age, though I believe some of the conceptual propensities identified have greater longevity. It will be noted that I tried to cite my sources rather extensively. This was done because many of the references are not otherwise collated, and because I had access to considerable unpublished material which may be of interest to the Brazilian urban professional.
THE ABSENCE OF AN URBAN TRADITION

One of the most striking characteristics of the urbanization process in Brazil is the absence of any pre-colonial urban tradition. Unlike other Latin American countries, such as Peru or Mexico, there were virtually no urban settlements in Brazil when the Portuguese arrived. Whatever "causal" factors were to play a part in the Brazilian urbanization process, they were to function in the absence of prior restraints or stimuli arising out of any urban tradition in Brazil.
PHYSICAL SETTING

The urban character of Brazil is obviously reflective in some measure of the physical setting. The fifth largest country in the world, Brazil covers 3.3 million square miles, or approximately half of the continent of South America. Brazil's land area is greater than that of the continental United States (by approximately 185,000 square miles). The clay of the northeastern coastal strip and loam of the southern plateau offer rich soil for tropical and sub-tropical crops. The largest part of the land mass is made up of highlands that seldom reach above 3,000 feet. Following the natural tilt of the highlands, however, most of the large rivers drain inward to the interior, and often northward to the Amazon and southward to the Rio de la Plata. Only the Amazon can be navigated far into the interior. A steep slope known as the Great Escarpment rises sharply along much of the Atlantic Coast; for years this coastal wall limited travel into the interior. The interior is even more insulated from the west, by the continent-dividing Andes with dense, almost impenetrable forests covering its eastern slopes. These factors, plus the precious metal orientation of the Spanish colonialists and the politics of Europe, conspired to people the coast of Brazil and extend the ambit of the Brazilian nation over a vast and sparsely settled area.
THE SETTLEMENT AND "URBAN" HISTORY OF BRAZIL

Coastal Settlement—"scuttle along the seashore like crabs" (1500-1600)

Even before the discovery of Brazil, the 1494 Treaty of Tordesilhas granted the Portuguese the right to lands east of an imaginary line situated 370 leagues off the Cape Verde Islands. Lands west of the line were to belong to Spain. Thus Portugal had color of legal claim to the coast of Brazil even before it was discovered. Brazil's actual discovery and settlement was merely a chapter in the European maritime expansion of the sixteenth century. Stumbled upon in the search for another route east, Brazil was initially seen as a barrier to be circumnavigated, but also as a potential source of wealth and power. The idea of settling Brazil arose primarily as an adjunct to the commercial motivation, as discussed by Prado:

The idea of peopling the new territory did not initially occur to any of them. It was commerce that interested them and hence their relative contempt for this primitive and empty American territory. The idea of occupying the new lands by means of effective settlement arose accredibly, as a need imposed by new and unforeseen circumstances....For the commercial ends in view, occupation could not be effected in the form of establishing simple trading stations....It was necessary to broaden this basis, to create a settlement that could supply and support the trading stations established and organize production of the commodities needed for trading. The idea of settling the new lands arose from this need, and this need alone.

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1. Caio Prado, Jr. The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil. Berkeley and Los Angeles, The University of California
Commercial development and transient settlement of the colony began almost at once. Brazil was discovered in 1500. Portuguese expeditions returned in 1501 and 1503, confirming earlier reports of an absence of mineral wealth and spice, and the presence of a valuable coastal dyewood, brazilwood. Within twenty years trading posts dotted the coast. These small, crude and frequently transient settlements were predominantly economic in character. Poppino describes the trading posts as follows:

The trading factories were the first Portuguese settlements in Brazil. Scattered from Pernambuco to Sao Vicente, they were invariably found on the coastline, on islands, bays, or inlets opening onto the sea, for their location was determined by the availability of a protected anchorage near large stands of brazilwood....A few factories became substantial and reasonably self-contained establishments with large numbers of native allies living outside the walls. In these posts the Portuguese not only learned the cultivation of manioc and other products of the land, but also introduced plants, fowls, and domestic animals from the Atlantic islands to supply the needs of the garrison and to provision ships for the return journey to Portugal. In most instances, however, the factory was little more than a simple camp, with a stockade enclosing a few crude structures to house the factor, his staff, and the merchandise being collected for export on the next ship. Such factories were maintained only until the immediate supply of brazilwood was exhausted or until they were

destroyed by the natives or by the French, who long contested with the Portuguese for control of Brazil. 2

Not only the French, but the Spaniards and the Dutch were to threaten Portugal's claim to Brazil. It was largely in response to the early French incursion into Brazilian territory and trade that the Portuguese Crown decided to establish permanent settlements. Thus in 1530 a first "viceroy," Martim Afonso, was sent to Brazil with a broad mandate to run the country, and specifically to establish permanent settlements. Settlers and their families were taken along. In 1532 the first permanent town was established at Sao Vicente near Santos. While the coastal topography and the commercial and political intrigues with the French had some influence on the character of this town, the Pomeranian stamp was indelible. A church was built, a municipal government inaugurated, and town lots and rural lands were apportioned among the 400 members of the expedition. Cattle and sugar cane were quickly introduced and a sugar mill erected. With the help of a castaway turned chief, friendly contacts were initiated with the Indians.

Even before the return of Martim Afonso to Portugal a few years later, the Crown had decided that numerous, permanent settlements would be needed to hold the new

2. Poppino. op. cit. p. 47.
lands. They resolved to dot the coast with "captaincies," a colonization system successfully employed in the Atlantic islands in the previous century. The "captaincy" was a separate colony tract united only by common ties with Portugal. From Maranhao to Santa Catarina the land was divided into fifteen parallel strips, extending inland from the sea to the vaguely defined line of Tordesilhas. These "captaincy" tracts were granted to donatarios, noblemen who enjoyed the king's confidence. The objective of "captaincy" policy was to settle permanently and control the Portuguese domain in the Western Hemisphere. A strange mixture of feudalism and capitalism, the policy met with mixed success. Two generously financed and well garrisoned "captaincies," Sao Vicente and Olinda, prospered initially. A number survived Indian uprisings and economic deprivation and left their names in six states (Maranhao, Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Pernambuco, Bahia and Espirito Santo). By the time the first governor arrived in Brazil in 1549, approximately fifteen towns and villages with Portuguese inhabitants had replaced the earlier, transient trading factories. By the middle of the sixteenth century the largest and most powerful cities in Brazil were Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, and Joao Pessoa, followed by Olinda and Sao Vicente.3

Poppino describes this settlement process, and the emergence of Rio de Janeiro, as follows:

In the course of the prolonged contest with the French, the Portuguese perforce explored most of the coastline from Sao Vicente to the Amazon, conquered or expelled many of the hostile Indians from the coastal area, and established numerous new settlements to hold the land against foreign encroachment. The capital cities of the present states of Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Ceara, Maranhao, and Para owe their origins to Luso-French rivalry for empire. The earliest and by far the most important of the new Portuguese towns, however, was Sao Sebastiao do Rio de Janeiro....With the pacification of the region a Jesuit mission was erected at Rio de Janeiro and colonists were attracted from other parts of Brazil and from Portugal. Because of its excellent harbor and strategic location, Rio de Janeiro quickly became the leading port and administrative center for the southern part of the colony, serving briefly as co-capital of Brazil on several occasions after 1572. Its rise accompanied and contributed to the gradual decline of Sao Vicente, which long marked the southernmost limit of Portuguese colonization in America.

With the "captaincies" came the beginnings of an urban dimension: (i) permanent settlement of the Brazilian coast, (ii) European urban structure, society, and in some measure, values, (iii) the beginning of a plantation system economy, and (iv) according to some authors, the roots of Brazilian regionalism. Poppino describes the "urban" flavor of the colonization of Brazil as follows:

5. Ibid. pp. 53.
Doubtless the two most lasting innovations deliberately introduced during the captaincy period were European-style urban communities and a plantation economy. Both of these were in the Iberian tradition and were specifically indicated in the charters of the respective captaincies....the newcomers expected to live in urban surroundings--primitive though these might be--and under regulations and officials such as they had known in Portugal. Thus the first task of the donatory was to found a town and appoint municipal officers. Almost immediately thereafter, he allotted the adjacent lands to those reputable colonists who possessed the means to make them productive. When conditions warranted, once the surrounding lands were taken, the entire process was repeated with the founding of a new town and the distribution of rural lands at some distance from the first settlement. This was the process by which the donatories sought to expand the occupied area of their colonies, and it was the process that was followed throughout the colonial period nearly everywhere that new lands were brought under the control of the government. Initially, at least, the process was used in part because the Portuguese preferred community life to the isolated existence of the frontier, in part because the town offered relative security to settlers in hostile territory, and in part because the municipal authorities might exert control over the individualistic and often unruly elements among the colonists.6

The character of these emergent Brazilian settlements was heavily influenced by this Portuguese urban tradition, and by the political, economic, legal and religious realities of the Portuguese Crown. This proximity to the Crown meant that the early settlement was, except for its vital geopolitical importance, rather uninnovative in structure and function. At the same time they did develop

6. Ibid. pp. 53-54.
a kind of feudal autonomy from the local state, and isolation from other Brazilian settlements. This parallel "dependence" and autonomy of the early Brazilian settlement is discussed by one urban historian as follows:

The colonial Brazilian municipality functioned more freely at the margin of the state than did the Spanish American, but, formally speaking, it was even less innovative with respect to the metropolitan prototype. Because the Portuguese crown lacked resources for discovery and conquest, overseas territories were infeudated to the opulent Order of Christ, and in the case of Brazil, subinfeudated, as it were, to proprietors or donatarios. The latter were empowered to establish municipal centers to nucleate colonization, but because these were contained in senhorios such centers could be no more than villas. Subsequent eclesiastical organization of the colony forced an accommodation to the fact that bishops, as first-ranking nobles and titular princes, could not be ensconced in villas but required 'cities' (cidades) that stood on alodial land. In creating bishoprics the king, as grant master of the Order of Christ, emancipated the land to be used for the Order's central purpose, service of the faith; then, as sovereign, he elevated the designated vilas to the status of cidades. (Vasconcellos 1916)  

Even when elevated to cidades, however, the early coastal settlements remained isolated enclaves. Prado describes the difficult coastal environment which contributed to their "pocket like" character:

These coastal centers were not only cut off from the interior, but were also isolated from each other on account of the difficulties of overland travel. Luis Tomas de Navarro, a judge commissioned in 1808 to investigate the possibilities of establishing a postal route along the coast from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro,

made notes on the obstacles that isolated the

towns and settlements from each other:
rivers difficult to ford, beaches covered with
thick layers of fine sand that render traveling
extremely difficult, and steep promontories
that advance into the sea from the interior and
involve a steep climb. Hence these settlements
were left to vegetate, forming small separate
pockets whose only outlet was the sea and
supporting a precarious way of life by the
production of a handful of commodities—flour,
fish, and some coffee—for export to Bahia
and Rio de Janeiro. There was still a further
obstacle to development in this unhappy region,
the hostility of the natives. The mountain and
forest served as a shelter and final refuge
for the natives who resisted the advance of
the white man and refused to submit to white
occupation of this part of the colony. The
colonists attacked the Indian tribes in a broad
pincer-like movement from two sides, the coast
and Minas Gerais. Harassed from both sides,
the still numerous survivors were obliged to
seek refuge in this intermediate area, which
still retained its natural cover of dense
forest that colonization had not yet had time
to penetrate, and remained there up to the
nineteenth century. From their strongholds
they descended periodically on the coast,
sacking and destroying the settlements.

This "natural" isolation was amplified by the "exterior"
or European orientation of the residents.

The widely separated clusters of settlement
remained largely isolated from each other
except by sea, although by the end of the
sixteenth century overland routes for riders
and pack animals had been opened between
the towns and plantations from Bahia to Paraiba
in the north, while in the south Sao Paulo
was connected by precipitous trails with the
ports of Santos and Rio de Janeiro. Except
at Sao Paulo, however, the Portuguese continued
to cling to the sea, for they were still
tied spiritually, culturally, and economically
to the mother country and had not yet discovered

EXPLORATION AND URBANIZATION, 16TH CENTURY

FIG. 1

CITIES

TOWNS

Areas probably under urban influence

Populated areas without city or town

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
the mineral wealth that would later lure
many of them permanently into the
trackless interior."

As observed by one of their contemporaries, Frei
Vicente do Salvador, the early colonists were content
merely to "scuttle along the seashore like so many
crabs." The exploration and "urbanization of the
sixteenth century is shown in Figure 1.

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Settlement of the Interior—uti possidetis (1600-1700)

Late in the sixteenth and early in the seventeenth century, incursions were made into the uncharted interior of Brazil. The opening of this vast region is described by Poppino as follows:

The exploration and conquest of the interior of Portuguese America was directed from four principal centers. The vast Amazon Valley—which was separated administratively from the rest of Brazil in 1626—was subdued largely by expeditions dispatched, usually under official auspices, from the town of Belem at the river's mouth. On the southern fringe of the colony, the establishment of fortified outposts on the Rio de la Plata and in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul were primarily military enterprises, supervised at times by the governor-general at Bahia and more often by the crown in Lisbon. In both the North and South, the cross and the flag preceded or accompanied the first settlers. But in the hinterland of the plantation colonies in the Northeast the occupation of the backlands of Bahia and Pernambuco was initially a spontaneous movement by mixed-blood renegades and cowboys, and by the predominantly European owners of cattle herds escaping from the comparatively overcrowded and closely regulated coastal communities. Colonial officials usually made no serious effort to impose the laws of God or King in the Northeastern sertao until the regions had been penetrated and partially pacified by such unwitting agents of the empire. Only in this area of Brazil did the opening up of the frontier approximate the process of the great plains of the United States three centuries later.

The (south-central) remainder of the Brazilian wilderness was first traversed by the bandeirantes from Sao Paulo, who were the most spectacular trail blazers and Indian fighters to emerge in South America. The bandeirantes were so called for the bandeiras, or quasi-military expeditions that they mounted into the interior
for a century and a half after 1600. The men
from Sao Paulo were also the only group to
take part in the exploration and subjugation
of every major region included within the
boundaries of modern Brazil. 12

Several prominent characteristics of these seven-
teenth century settlements are worth noting. As they
were motivated primarily by geopolitical and economic
considerations, the character of these settlements was
often starkly utilitarian and military. And cities of
the interior, as all Brazilian cities, began to modestly
reflect the strongly regional character of Brazil.

"Manifest Destiny" in Amazonia

The settlement of Amazonia was "a deliberate process
of imperial aggrandizement, designed to enhance the
grandeur of Portugal." 13 Motivated mainly by territorial
imperialism, dreams of gold, and the meager economy of
a region that has been called "green hell" and the
"last chapter of Genesis," forts, missions, trading posts,
and fishing villages were established along the Amazon,
including a fort at Manaus in 1669. A few Spanish
Jesuits coming down from the west established missions


13. Ibid. pp. 90-91. "The Amazonian tropas were similar
in organization and composition to the bandeiras of
Sao Paulo. There were few land trails, however, so
that nearly all incursions were waterborne. Thus
canoes and boats powered by Indian oarsmen were
the explorers' chief means of travel into the heartland
of tropical South America. Some tropas were veritable
flotillas, with dozens of boats and more than a
thousand men."
under the flag of Spain (1687), only to be expelled by force. Poppino describes the military and "geographical" nature of the settlement of the Amazon as follows:

Two Franciscan friars from Quito, who had begun to establish missions among the Encabelado Indians in the upper valley, arrived at Belem. The governor of Para, regarding the activities of the Spanish Franciscans as an encroachment of his domain, immediately dispatched a large expedition to claim the area formally for Portugal, and to make this fact known to the Spanish authorities in Quito. The expedition could not have enjoyed royal sanction, for the king of Spain still ruled over the Iberian colonies in the New World. and in any case virtually the entire Amazon Valley lay beyond the line of Tordesilhas. The governor's actions have been explained as a manifestation of resurgent Portuguese nationalism. In October 1637 the expedition of more than 2,000 men, including some seventy Portuguese and 1,200 Indian bowmen under the command of the notorious Indian fighter, Pedro Teixeira, set out for Quito. It returned to Belem twenty-six months later, after accomplishing its mission and completing one of the longest treks in the annals of Portuguese imperialism. In August 1639 at the confluence of the Napo and Aguarico rivers—which marks the easternmost point of modern Ecuador—Teixeira founded the settlement of Franciscana to mark the boundary between the dominions of Spain and Portugal in the Amazon basin.  

Military and Cattle Settlements of the South

The initial settlement of the far south was similarly political in nature. It was also motivated by the cattle

economy of the interior. In an openly expansionist move the Portuguese erected a military outpost on the unoccupied north shore of the river across from Buenos Aires. This was well over a thousand miles from the southernmost settlement in Brazil, and well beyond the line established by the Treaty of Tordesilhas. The presence of this military settlement caused protracted armed conflict with Argentina, again involving missions of the Spanish Jesuits. In spite of a subsequent colonization effort, the "outpost" community remained essentially a military garrison. The Portuguese eventually gave up Uruguay as well as the outpost. But the stronghold in Rio de la Plata allowed time for the gradual settlement of the southern coast. Four small but enduring coastal settlements had been established by the middle of the seventeenth century--Paranagua, Sao Francisco do Sul, Curitiba and Florianopolis.

The Grazing Penetration of the Northeast

In the Northeast, penetration of the interior began from two principal points, Bahia and Pernambuco. The settlements of the sertao reflected an economic impetus.

15. Ibid. p. 109. "The crown's interests in peopling the southern pampas were primarily geopolitical--to strengthen and expand the outpost of empire on the Rio de la Plata--but it was livestock, chiefly cattle, that attracted men to the area and provided the economic basis for settlement."
The far flung cattle settlements related back to the market in the large towns, as described by Prado:

"...it is to the grazing industry that we owe the occupation of a good part of the colony's territory...calculated in terms of the total area effectively colonized, it surpassed that opened up by mining...the cattle estates always spread in a continuous movement from a point that represents the radiation center...the radiation centers generally corresponded to an agricultural nucleus or sometimes to a mining center...The principal and oldest of these agricultural centers, those established along the littoral in the northeast sugar zone from Pernambuco to Bahia, also gave rise to the largest and most important grazing zones."

Prado describes the settlement process in the cattle country as follows:

The rapid advance of the cattle estates is explained, on the one hand, by the growing demand for cattle in the coastal and mining regions, coupled with the low economic density and productivity of the industry, and on the other, by the incredible ease with which a ranch could be established in the backlands. The would-be rancher need only put up a simple dwelling covered with a palm-thatch roof...and throw together a few makeshift corrals, bring in the cattle and his three leagues of land had been transformed into a ranch. Only ten or twelve men were needed to run the ranch. There was a ready supply of labor....Another factor contribution to the rapid increase of the ranches was the system adopted for paying the herdsmen (vaqueiros). The vaqueiro received one out of every four calves born on the ranch; a payment that accumulated to be handed over only at the end of his first five years of work. In this way, the vaqueiro received a large number of beasts at one time and could, therefore, set up on his own.

17. Ibid. p. 219.
"Heartland"

The Brazilian heartland presents a somewhat different and unfolding pattern of settlement. Throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century the settlement of the heartland was practically non-existent. Sao Paulo, for example, was one of the earliest "interior" settlements--an isolated, crude frontier town, heavily influenced by the Indians. Poppino describes the rural, primitive, Sao Paulo as follows:

The frontier mentality and way of life of the Paulistas revealed a strong ethnic influence. By weight of numbers Indians--of whom a majority were free men--predominated in the society of Sao Paulo in the sixteenth century and probably through most of the seventeenth, while mamelucos, both legitimate and illegitimate, comprised a substantial and growing segment of the population. The latter outnumbered persons of European descent at least until late in the colonial era. The leading families, moreover, generally bore some Indian blood in their veins, and those who could claim descent from the Tupi consorts of Joao Ramalho or similar sixteenth century squaw men took pride in their native ancestry....the successful bandeirantes were those who adopted Indian practices that permitted them to find their way and to survive in the wilderness to the North, West and South of Sao Paulo. They seem to have inherited from Indian forebears or acquired by exposure to their Tupi companions a wandering streak that was often merely the sheer excitement and adventure of discovering new lands....They generally wore short trousers and an over-shirt of cotton, perhaps covered by a leather jerkin or vest, and a fur cap or broad-brimmed hat for protection against sun and rain. On treks into the interior they usually traveled barefoot....By and large they used the weapons of their Indian allies and enemies--the bow and arrow or spear. The bandeirantes prized
firearms, especially the shotgun and a long-barreled musket, but possessed relatively few of these expensive arms. Their basic food and many utensils likewise were Indian. Maize, beans, and to a lesser extent, manioc, were staples in the Paulista diet. They slept on hammocks or on leather cots. Imported household items were extremely rare. Richard Morse reports that only one decent European-style bed existed in the town of Sao Paulo as late as 1620. Indian influence extended even to the speech of the Paulistas. Portuguese was always the official language, in which formal records were kept, but few Paulistas were trained in Portuguese grammar or other areas of academic study....

The common speech of Sao Paulo was the lingua geral, a variant of Tupi-Guarani tongue, which served as a lingua franca throughout the interior of Brazil and in Paraguay. The European and mameluco males in Sao Paulo, as elsewhere in Brazil, readily adopted the attitude of the Tupi toward native women. Casual alliances with the compliant squaws were customary, and some bandeirantes were renown for the number of concubines who accompanied them on their ramblings through the sertao.18

While the Sao Paulo bandeirantes traveled through much of Brazil's interior, their contribution to the settlement of the interior is limited, in some cases even negative. In search of labor to work sugar plantations, and always in search of precious minerals, the bandeirantes "traveled as explorers, not as settlers."19 The bandeirantes

18. Poppino. op. cit. pp. 74-76.
19. Prado. op. cit. p. 31. See also Vienna Moog. Bandeirantes and Pioneers. p. 165. Even in criticizing their "predatory and extractive" nature, Moog probably gives the bandeirantes more territorial credit than is their due. "Among us the bandeirante spirit ended by nearly always triumphing over the constructive, pioneer spirit....in the sense of the tamer of the wilds, whose purpose is to create something enduring....the initial absence of a constructive pioneer spirit in favor of the bandeirante spirit, predatory and extractivist,
often "left the interior less populated than they had found it." 20

The pattern of wide exploration and occasional settlement continued throughout the seventeenth century. The military, utilitarian settlements which did result were minuscule dots in the vast interior of Brazil. The larger and richer cities remained on the coast, and the majority of Brazilians remained in or near the growing cities. In the Northeast in particular, a distinctly Brazilian pattern of urban life was beginning to emerge. Based on the sugar economy, the urban character and structure of these Northeastern coastal cities was a synthesis of Portuguese and later Dutch and African influences in a distinctly Brazilian hybrid. There were major ports at Rio, Joao Pessoa, Olinda and Salvador, all dependent on the export sugar economy. The lucrative

was to produce in the long run the inestimable good of the expansion of national territory...." See also Pierre Monbeig. *Pionniers et Planteurs de Sa, Paulo.* p. 171. Monbeig's Sorbonne prize-winning thesis speaks to this point as follows: "....a myth of the bandeirante has been created that has an absolute psychological efficacy. When one wishes to extol a rancher or a planter, the razer of forests, the founder of towns and cities, there is no more flattering title to bestow upon him than that of bandeirante. When one has said of a man that he is a real bandeirante, one has said everything. Let us allow for a very Latin overemphasis and not be astonished at seeing the bandeirante receive an indirect and posthumous promotion to colonizer."

20. Poppino. *Op. Cit.* p. 71. "....the demand for Indian slaves, which reached its peak during the
sugar industry also attracted invaders, and from 1632 to 1654 the Dutch held Olinda and a wide area of the sugar producing Northeast. When they were finally driven out, the Dutch moved the sugar technology and much of the market to the Caribbean. This was the beginning of a long, irregular period of decline for the Northeast. The seventeenth century witnessed the decline of Olinda relative to Recife (though there was continuing rivalry between the two neighboring cities, leading to civil strife in the Peddler's war of 1710-1711). Through the seventeenth century, Salvador (population: 30,000) was the center of beauty and splendor in the entire new world, rivaled only by Rio de Janeiro (population: 12,000). Salvador's rich and numerous churches are a striking contrast to the grim and utilitarian North American counterpart in its day, Jamestown, Virginia. A large portion of the slaves imported into Brazil came to the sugar plantations of the Northeast coast. The African interruptions in the regular African traffic before 1648, supplied the strongest incentive for probes into the sertão....Primarily they were forays by men operating from settlements on or near the Atlantic, who left the interior less populated than they found it."


EXPLORATION AND URBANIZATION, 17TH CENTURY

FIG. 2

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
influence in Salvador is obvious in the Portuguese spoken, as it is in the canhoble, the music, or the pigmentation of this heavily negro and mulatto region. The Southern coastal cities also grew in size and number as immigration increased; sugar and cattle economy eventually developed. The overall settlement pattern of the seventeenth century is shown in Figure 2.

The "Golden Age of Brazil" (1700-1800)

The eighteenth century has been called "o seculo do desenvolvimento das cidades." At the end of the seventeenth century gold was discovered in unprecedented quantities in Minas Gerais and Goias. Brazil was subject to the first great gold rush in modern times. The country and the interior, were flooded by the first great wave of immigrants. The mines also provided a new market for slaves imported from Africa. Although the immigrants, and the miners, were frequently Portuguese Emboabas, the mining migration was of "melting pot" composition. By 1700 there were at least 30,000 residents in the mine region of Minas.


25. Boxer. op. cit. p. 47. Boxer describes the migration into the interior as follows: "Nothing like it had been seen before and nothing like it was seen again until the California gold rush of 1849. The only effective check on the number which came pouring in was the sterile nature of the soil and the impossibility of providing food for all those who wished to come. One of these pioneers recalled in his old age how some of the early optimists had started out on the month or six-week journey to the mines without carrying any provisions at all. Many died of malnutrition or starvation before reaching their destination, and it was not unknown for a starving man to murder his comrade for the sake of a handful of maize.

26. Celso Furtado, cited in Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. 1963. p. 54. Furtado says that between 300,000 and 500,000 Portuguese came to Brazil during the eighteenth century, more than doubling the number of Portuguese.

27. See Jesuit Antonil, quoted in Boxer. op. cit. p. 41. "Each year a crowd of Portuguese and of foreigners come out in the fleets in order to go to the Mines. From
the interior which had previously been largely vacant. More gold was subsequently discovered, major discoveries in 1718 and 1725 and numerous smaller finds. A pattern reminiscent of the boom and bust gold towns of the American West was repeated. Vast amounts of gold were extracted, and reasonably large cities sprang up almost overnight.

The gold provided an incentive for tighter administrative and political control from Lisbon, and several "captaincies" were established in the interior. The "captaincies" were located in the three areas where the mining communities clustered--Minas Gerais, Goias, and Mato Grosso. Prado describes the mining settlement the cities, towns, plantations, and backlands of Brazil, came Whites, Colored, and Blacks, together with many Amerindians employed by the Paulistas. The mixture is of all sorts and conditions of persons: men and women; young and old; poor and rich; nobles and commoners; laymen, clergy, and religions of different orders, many of which have neither house nor convent in Brazil."

28. See Poppino. op. cit. p. 96.

29. Wagley. op. cit. p. 53. Wagley asserts that "... during the eighteenth century Brazil produced 44 percent of the world's supply of gold." See also Boxer. op. cit. pp. 59-60.

30. Wagley. op. cit. p. 54. Wagley estimates that Ouro Preto grew to 100,000. It is presently less than 10,000.

31. The regions developed in chronological order as stated above. For a more detailed narration of these three areas, see Prado. op. cit. pp. 53-58.
pattern as follows:

[The mining communities] impelled settlement in an abrupt drive from the littoral to the heart of the continent; there was no continuity in its expansion. The mines were situated far from the primary sources of the currents of immigration that flowed toward them, and the intervening space remained a wilderness, crossed only by the few lines of communication that had been opened up. These links between the mining centers and the coastal towns, which were their source of life and provided the outlet for their production, did not even follow the routes of the early trails opened up to reach them. Thus, the settlements that sprang up around the mining establishments of central Minas Gerais, which were chronologically the first to be exploited and were destined to remain the most important, were cut off from the original points of departure for the explorers. They were detached from Sao Paulo, the original center from which the pioneer prospectors had pushed forward their discoveries and also the point of departure for the first batch of settlers. They were also detached from Bahia, the second center from which settlement had spread out to occupy them; and communications converged on Rio de Janeiro, from which a route had been opened up only in the early years of the eighteenth century when the mining area was already well populated. The older trails from Sao Paulo to Bahia were relegated to a secondary position. This illustrates the nature of the dispersion of settlement provoked by the discovery of the mines. It was so sudden and so violent that it even lost contact with its original sources.32

Boxer describes something of the character of the early mining community:

The earliest mining camps were naturally of the most makeshift description, and even when they began to take on a more permanent form and become

32. Ibid. p. 51.
embryo townships, the housing elements were very simple. Walls were of crossed sticks and mud, or of poles on end (pau a pique) with roofs of palm thatch, leaves, or straw. The next development was dwellings of the wattle-and-daub type with a cover of thatch, but the floor in all cases was of bare earth. As the settlements grew in prosperity and stability, the walls became plastered, inside and out, wooden or stone floors were provided, and thatched roofs were replaced by tiled. Verandas and balconies were later refinements, and finally came the best type of colonial house with cedar corner posts and sleepers, tile roofs, and plastered-over bricks. This last type evolved slowly, and even in 1711 there was only a single tiled house in Ouro Preto, which was one of the oldest and most prosperous settlements. One of the first indications of permanent settlement was the erection of one or more chapels. These were naturally of the pau a pique or wattle-and-daub variety, though they were usually among the first buildings to be graced with a tiled roof. Vendas, or small trading shacks, sprang up about the same time; whether these or the chapels came first is a problem similar to that of the chicken and the egg. In any event, conglomerations of neighboring mining camps (arraiais) united to form the present towns, which still straggle up hill and down dale, with long winding streets and steep stairways connecting the original nuclei. This loose pattern of town settlement can clearly be seen today in cities such as Ouro Preto, Sabara and Sao Joao d'El Rei, where some of the wards (bairros) retain the names of the original settlers, as for instance, that of Antonio Dias in Ouro Preto.

Finally Poppino describes something of the administrative structure, and the changes in the urban hierarchy, as follows:

During the first half of the eighteenth century a dozen towns and five new captaincies were created in the interior of Brazil as the crown sought to maintain authority over the constantly

expanding population of the scattered mining districts. Initially, the region of the mines was included within the captaincy of Sao Vicente—still nominally a possession of the heirs of Martin Afonso—and the sprawling camps of the Serra do Espinhaco (the mountain range in Minas Gerais) were subject to the jurisdiction of the town council of Sao Paulo. In 1709, however, the crown purchased the remaining rights of the donatory and created the royal captaincy of Sao Paulo e Minas de Ouro. The governor sent out from Lisbon the following year resided in the mining zone. The disturbances of the War of the Emboabas, and the French attacks on Rio de Janeiro in 1710 and 1711—which commanded the attention of the governor—convinced the court of the necessity for permanent administrative organs in the mining camps. In an attempt to meet this need, the crown in 1711 raised three of the larger camps to the status of towns (villas) with elective municipal councils. These were Vila Rica de Ouro Preto, Ribeirao do Carmo, and Vila Real de Sabara. At the same time, in partial compensation for its loss of jurisdiction over the new villas, Sao Paulo was made a city (cidade). In the next seven years five additional mining camps in Minas Gerais were given the rank of villa: Vila Nova da Rainha, Pitangui, Sao Joao d’El Rei, Sao Jose d’El Rei, and Vila do Principe. In 1720 Minas Gerais was detached from Sao Paulo and created as separate captaincy, with a governor appointed by the crown. Thereafter municipal government was introduced into other mining regions soon after rich strikes were reported or a sizable population had gathered....

The captaincy of Sao Paulo, which had lost the southern regions of Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul in 1738, was completely dismembered a decade later, when Goias and Mato Grosso became separate captaincies, and the rest of its territory was placed under the authority of the governor at Rio de Janeiro. Sao Paulo did not reappear as a captaincy for fifteen years....The most compelling evidence of the impact of mining on the colonial administration occurred in 1762, when the capital of Brazil was transferred to Rio de Janeiro.34

34. Poppino. op. cit. pp. 102-103.
The mining settlements were governed through a synthesis of "internal" law and the standardized "traditional" law imposed by the Portuguese Crown. While the former may have contributed to the raucous flavor, and autonomy, of the boom settlements, the Portuguese governance of the mining towns was severe and innovative. Several authors have pointed out that the Portuguese attempted to impose far stricter control on the mining towns than on the coastal towns. Morse has noted that the basic legal order the Crown was imposing on urban Brazil was vintage Lusitania.

By the end of the colonial period neither had the crown ever issued an order specifically concerned with municipal administration in Brazil, nor had any distinctive mutation appeared in the colony itself. The only marks of special recognition accorded Brazilian cities were the award to half a dozen câmaras of the privileges of the municipality of Porto and an occasional concession reserving a câmara's office for the native-born or allowing it to appoint interim governors. Otherwise municipal life was governed by codes promulgated for the whole Portuguese realm.

In essence, then, the mining settlements of the interior were rather crude and utilitarian in character, prospering or declining with the extractive economy upon which they were initially based. Significantly,

35. See, e. g., Boxer. op. cit.
36. Morse. op. cit. p. 41.
however, these communities were both the furthest removed from the Crown, and the most rigidly controlled by the Crown. The strain of this conflict was ultimately to produce the first movement for independence—appropriately from the mining settlements of the interior.

The 1750 Treaty of Madrid--The Law of "Possession"

In 1750 Portugal and Spain signed the Treaty of Madrid, establishing Portuguese dominium over an area substantially in excess of the earlier 1492 Treaty of Tordesilhas (p. 21 above). Although motivated in both cases by a desire to avoid friction, the two treaties reflect an important shift. The earlier treaty was geometric in nature, an externally imposed "property line." The latter was founded in the principle of uti possidetis ("as you possess"). As we have seen, between the signing of the two treaties the interior of Brazil was opened by the tropas, the vaqueiros, the bandeirantes, the military, the clergy and the miners. And it was dramatically, though sparsely, peopled by the small, pedestrian, utilitarian and often para-military settlements. With the acceptance of uti possidetis large and undefined parts of the explored and

37. Prado. op. cit. p. 53. The preamble reads "...each party will retain its present possessions." The criterion and extent of "possession," however, remained ambiguous.
sparsely settled interior belonged to Brazil.  

The Ascendance of Rio de Janeiro

Rio de Janeiro had been a principal population center since as early as the middle of the sixteenth century, second only to Salvador. The "gold economy" and the political and military ferment of the eighteenth century were to signal its primacy. Aware that vast amounts of gold were being mined in the interior, the Crown attempted to collect its "fifth" by channeling all gold through Rio. In 1702-1703 the smelting and minting operations were moved from Sao Paulo, Bahia, and Pernambuco to Rio. The Sao Francisco river route to Bahia was officially closed, but the effort was a failure because the route

38. Ibid. p. 27. Compare Prado's assertion that this treaty "....proves a priori that the Portuguese had in fact colonized the whole of the immense territory that constitutes Brazil. The deciding factor in Brazil's favor was occupation." That the definitional or geographical limits of uti possidetis were not known is shown by the subsequent treaties of 1777 and 1778, the settlement of the Uruguayan conflict in 1820 and the rush to define the western border with the rubber boom of the nineteenth century. Part of the territorial line between Brazil and Bolivia remains undefined "fronteira em demarcacao" even today. The expansion of Portuguese possession via uti possidetis is probably best explained by the precious metal orientation of the Spanish colonists and the presence of gold and abundant labor in the Andean Plateau, the geographical "givens" of the continent, the hard pressed position of Spain, and the force and consistency with which the Portuguese settled, and met "intrusion" (usually by Spanish Jesuits).
continued to be heavily traversed and permanently settled), and the mints were eventually reopened in Bahia and Minas. Rio de Janeiro, however, was the main urban heir to the mining economy. As mentioned by Poppino, early political and military strife with the French, and the protracted conflict with the Spanish in the far South centered around Rio. Although Salvador (population: 50,000) was larger than Rio (population: 40,000) even at the end of the eighteenth century, the former city was increasingly remote from the mining, financial, and military activity in the South. The capital was transferred to Rio de Janeiro in 1763. Rio was to remain the financial and political capital of Brazil for almost two hundred years.

The Settlement of the Coast and the Interior In Perspective

The ascendance of coastal Rio de Janeiro was symptomatic of the overall eighteenth century settlement pattern. By the middle of the century the mining boom was drawing to a close and the settlement of the interior stabilized. After the middle of the century new settlements in the interior were few and small, and usually tied to the cattle economy. Except for these isolated communities, settlement remained sparse. Poppino sums up the settlement of the interior and the "urban" character of colonial Brazil as follows:
There were simply not enough people in the colonies to occupy the land. The population of Portuguese America, which probably tripled during the seventeenth century, and increased again by roughly ten times before 1800, still averaged only one person per square mile at the end of the colonial era. Nor was there a frontier line, in the usual sense, between settled and unoccupied areas. Although the great majority of the inhabitants were concentrated in Minas Gerais and in a few ports and plantation areas along the coast, the map of Portuguese America was dotted with islands of urban settlement. From the Oyapoque to the Lagoa Mirim, and from the Serra do Mar to the Guaporé, these hollow frontiers were surrounded by empty lands, perhaps thinly held in large cattle ranches, but more often left entirely to the aborigines. The Tape Indians in Rio Grande do Sul were not subdued until 1801; Botocudos still dominated from the Province of Rio de Janeiro to Porto Seguro after the mid-nineteenth century, and much of Santa Catarina remained Indian country until the twentieth century. The Indians have since been absorbed or expelled from all but the most remote regions of the country, but the hollow frontier evident in the eighteenth century is still characteristic in Brazil. 39

At the same time the coastal towns, like Rio de Janeiro were gaining importance. As summarized by Prado:

Despite its violent impact on the colony's economic and population structure, the brief heyday of the mines, lasting little more than half a century, was not long enough to swing the balance definitely in favor of the interior. As we have seen, by the end of the century, when the drift to the interior had already long since ceased, the coast still far outstripped the interior in the number of its inhabitants. Its economic importance had similarly been reestablished, and it once more surpassed that of the interior...even as late as the middle of the eighteenth century and the beginning of

39. Poppino. op. cit. p. 112.
The nineteenth territorial disputes had already been finally and exclusively transferred to the frontier zone. Approximately sixty percent of the population, that is almost two million inhabitants, was concentrated along a coastal belt which was seldom more than thirty miles wide.40

One index to this relationship between coastal and interior settlement is the size of major cities at the turn of the century, as follows:41

Salvador...............................50,000
Rio de Janeiro..........................40,000
Vila Rica (Ouro Preto).................30,000

The eighteenth century settlement pattern is shown in Figure 3.

A Comment on the "Urban" Dimension of the Colonial Weltansicht

The Brazilian attitude toward urbanismo as it developed in the colonial centuries is complex and often contradictory. As we have seen, many urban values and structures were brought with the Lusitanos, and

40. Prado. op. cit. p. 32.
41. Azevedo. op. cit. p. 223.
EXPLORATION AND URBANIZATION, 18TH CENTURY

FIG. 3

[Map of South America highlighting areas of exploration and urbanization in the 18th century. The map includes labels for cities, towns, and areas probably under urban influence.]

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modified by the topographical, economic, social, racial, religious, and military realities of Brazil. It has been asserted, however, that there emerged in colonial Brazil a strong anti-urbanismo. This posture finds some generalized support in the positivist and nationalist intellectual history of Brazil. And it finds indirect support in the

42. Ibid. p. 222. "O problema é dos mais interessantes porque nos leva a abordar um tema bastante discutido por sociólogos e historiadores--anti-urbanismo do Brasil colonial. Sem dúvida o fenômeno existiu, porque o homem colonial tinha verdadeira aversão à vida urbana, preferindo viver em suas propriedades rurais."

43. The coastal cities and literature were perceived as "building a European facade for the country... still listening to the lullabies from afar.... They turned their backs on the mystery of the land." João Cruz Costa. A History of Ideas in Brazil. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1964. p. 251. For the emergent "nativist" thinkers, and for Costa, Brazilian thinking had to be filtered through the jungle or echo of the interior to be Brazilian. Their patron saint was Euclides da Cunha. Their hero, the backlander himself: "One man made the nostalgic intellectuals of the coast realize the full significance of the fact that the people who had retreated to the sertão... were now engaged in a jungle revolt to demand a reform; a reform of the Brazilian intellect... Euclides da Cunha [is] the initiator of the reaction against intellectual sybaritism, against the 'the blind toil of the copyists' and 'borrowed thinking.'" This sertanismo of Brazilian writers Eduardo Frieiro asserts, stems from the Volkgeist which in Latin America corresponded to the desire for cultural liberation from Europe. See
nativist movement in Brazilian literature, as manifest in the coroneis of Jorge Amado's cacao region, in the jaguncos of Cuimaraes Rosa's Backlands, or Os Sertoes of Euclides da Cunha. And at least one very perceptive student of urban history in Brazil maintains that the predominant characteristic of the Brazilian city, from the colonial period on, is the pervasive "ruralness," with the locus of wealth, prestige and political power resting in the rural sector. 44 At the same time, other observers have noted the pervasive urban ethos of colonial Brazil. 45 Certainly most of the population in colonial

also Costa. p. 387 n. 320: "...reacting against the cosmopolitan spirit of the urban centers, which they mistakenly believed to be the cause of a depersonalization, the nativists turned toward life on the plantations and the soul of the interior. Hence an exaggeration: that 'life in the sertao is more typical and more representative than that of the cities...stylize the sertanejo, or backlander, depicting him as invariably strong, honorable, brave and manly. In this way the poetic successor to Rousseau's noble savage has been concocted.'"

44. Emilia Voitti da Costa. Urbanization in 19th Century Brazil. To be published by the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

45. See Moog. op. cit. p. 168. "The fact is that during the first three centuries there was no taste for rural life in Brazil. The great fascination was exercised by the city, not the country. Hence the prevalence of the European tendency toward urban concentration on the littoral, causing nearly all the rural landholders of some wealth to maintain a dual residence—one in the country, another in the city....Between the country and city the planters of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not hesitate. They chose the city...." See also Poppino, pp. 25-26 of this report.
Brazil lived in or near the cities, and most of the migrants (including Amado's) flowed into the cities. It has been repeatedly asserted that the colonialists preferred the city.\textsuperscript{46}

Moreover, as noted above, "concentrated" settlement was the official colonization technique, whether of the Indians of the interior,\textsuperscript{47} the Rio de la Plaza or Manaus "territorial" settlements, or the immigration and "captaincy" policy under which the colony was secured and developed. The translation of these contradictory "urban" attitudes into public policy will be discussed at a later point in this paper. Suffice to say these contradictory "urban" currents are well rooted in the history of Brazil.

\textsuperscript{46} See Prado. \textit{Op. cit.} p. 95. "This preference [for commerce] by the Portuguese resulted in the concentration of the white element in the urban centers, particularly in the most important of these. This was noted by all the foreign travelers who visited Brazil at the beginning of the last century; the proportion of whites, small in the rural areas, was in the cities in direct ratio to the importance of the agglomeration...."

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. pp. 96-116. This includes Prado's discussion of Pombal's legislation.
Urbanization in the Nineteenth Century (1800-1900)

The nineteenth century is generally characterized by gradual agricultural and technological expansions under the monarchy and, in the last decade of the century, the explosive changes in the economy and population, and concomitantly in the cities of Brazil.

The Empire in Brazil (1807-1822)

The more dramatic "urban" developments of the early part of the century were technological, political, or cultural in nature. With the approach of Napoleon's army, Don Joao VI left Portugal in November of 1807 to establish the Portuguese Empire in Brazil. He stopped briefly in Salvador, but the royal family settled in Rio de Janeiro. With the Crown came vast economic and social changes for Brazil, and especially for Rio.48 The Brazilian ports were

48. Calogeras. A History of Brazil. New York, Russell & Russell, 1963. p. 55. "....it knew neither hygiene nor sewerage. No provision was made for clearing the streets or the disposal of refuse. The standard of living, in comparison with European cities of equal size, was low. Life was rather dull and drab. Festivities, not numerous, were mostly those organized by the religious orders: processions, Te Deums, sermons. At rare intervals the viceroys gave receptions. Slaves were the mainstay of all domestic and public services. The arrival of the Portuguese court wrought a tremendous upheaval in the placid life of the colonial capital."
EXPLORATION AND SETTLEMENT 1801-1822

FIG. 4

CITIES
TOWNS
Areas probably under urban influence
Populated areas without city or town

0 Km 1000 2000 3000
0 Miles 1000 2000 3000

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opened at once, breaking the Porutguese trade monopoly. The prohibition on manufacturing was also rescinded making Brazil somewhat less dependent on an external market. In Rio de Janeiro schools of medicine, commerce, the military, and fine arts were established, a printing press was set up, the Botanical Garden opened—and the carioca society became, if anything, even more European in outlook. Rio's position as the center of commerce, politics and culture was strengthened considerably. The more general exploration and settlement pattern which emerged under the Crown is shown in Figure 4.

Monarchy (1822-1889)

Between 1822, when independence was declared and Don Joao VI returned to Portugal, to the end of the monarchy in 1889, the development and the settlement of Brazil was a reasonably smooth, slow process. In large measure this reflected the gradual agricultural expansion of the economy.

49. Both Rio and Salvador entered the century with a population of approximately 100,000. By the census of 1872, Rio had jumped to 274,972, Salvador only to 129,109. Azevedo, op. cit. p. 224.
and the population. Spurred on by war in the South, railroad and telegraph linked major southern cities. The war also fostered a minor boom in private industry around Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. There was, during the monarchy era a more general "coming of age" in Brazil, with the great technological innovations in transportation, communications and industry slowly taking hold. For the first time, mass urban infrastructure and transportation facilities were built in the coastal cities. At the same time the power of the rural aristocracy was slowly being balanced by the emergence of a new urban mass.

Poppino describes the nineteenth century urban envi-


51. C. S. Haring. Empire in Brazil. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968. pp. 64-67. See also Emilia da Costa. op. cit. I believe Emilia da Costa would dispute this point, arguing that the nineteenth century Brazilian city was still controlled by the rural agricultural sector, and by the external market. While I have as yet to see her arguments in print, I believe Emilia would deny the emergence of any meaningful urbanismo until well into the twentieth century. If I understand her argument clearly, I believe it will be persuasive in general though perhaps less than fully responsive to what was happening within the cities during the nineteenth century. Any meaningful discussion of these issues, however, will have to await publication of the paper.
ronment as follows:

Many conveniences of urban life that are now taken for granted, such as paved, lighted streets, running water, sewage disposal, and public transportation, were first introduced or notably improved in Brazilian cities in the years following the Paraguayan War. These became symbols of growth and prosperity for the communities that could afford them, and aspirations for the smaller ones that still measured 'progress' in the number of public fountains or square meters of streets paved with cobblestones. The pace of modernization was uneven, for such services were costly to establish and required continuing outlays for maintenance. Yet, by the end of the empire municipal water systems had been modernized, running water had been piped into private residences, and sewerage systems were in operation or under construction in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife, and half of the smaller provincial capitals from Porto Alegre to Belém. Other innovations that spread rapidly after 1870 included gas lighting and tramways. As with railroads, a start had been made earlier in Rio de Janeiro, where a few gas street lights and horse-drawn streetcars had appeared in the central district in the 1850's. By 1880 they were becoming commonplace. Gas lighting had been installed for public and private use in more than a dozen cities and towns, and at least twenty had either trams or street railways linking the city center with sprawling suburbs or adjacent towns....It was a new streetcar line, authorized in the 1870's 'to facilitate sea-bathing for the population,' that eventually made Copacabana beach part of the city of Rio de Janeiro and added a new dimension to the life of the Carioca. A similar change occurred in other coastal cities as public transportation services were extended to formerly isolated beaches, converting them into popular recreation sites. While the beaches did not become fashionable residential areas until after 1920, entire new suburbs were developed and old districts were refurbished by those who shared in the rising level of prosperity after 1870. The increasing comforts and attractions of life in town, plus the ease of rail transportation from the interior, drew many
wealthy planters and their families to the cities for at least part of the year. There they built fine town houses that added to the architectural beauty and air of modernity of imperial Brazil's growing urban centers. At the same time, new working-class neighborhoods sprang up around the factories and workshops that were erected on the edge of town, for the growth of industry, which accompanied the expansion of the railroads and the modernization of the cities was also an urban phenomenon.52

"European" Colonization during the Monarchy--Immigration during the monarchy was relatively light. The Brazilian colonization policy was distinctly ethnic and rural in character. Thus while Chinese and Africans were excluded, there were several attempts to attract rural colonists from northern Europe.53 The settlement of 1,700 Swiss at Nova Friburgo near Rio de Janeiro was one successful, though expensive colonization attempt. Another was the 1824 land grant to the German mercenaries who had fought in the South, resulting in San Leopoldo. An attempt to settle Irish mercenaries in Bahia was, however, unsuccessful.


53. *Tbid.* p. 184. "...because they were believed to be more industrious and to employ more advanced agricultural techniques than immigrants from the Latin countries. It is expected, moreover, that they would improve the quality of the population and help to reverse the progressive Africanization of Brazil."
Thereafter the Crown restricted new European colonies to the temperate southern provinces or the mountains near Rio, and half a dozen such communities were founded. These ethnic agricultural colonies added yet another dimension to the Brazilian settlement pattern.

For decades the agricultural colonies remained small, self-contained, subsistence-level communities which had no direct or frequent contact with the political and economic centers of the province or the empire. Fewer than 12,000 colonists immigrated between 1820 and 1840....as late as 1867 there were only about 40,000 European farmers in sixty-eight different colonies scattered across Brazil from Maranhão to Rio Grande do Sul. In most instances these were located in remote, empty regions where there was little or no local citizenry to be affected by their example of industry and culture. The European colonies thus developed as isolated replicas of the villages from which the immigrants had come. The transplanted Swiss or German farmers retained their own language, customs, and values. Later when colonies of Italians were founded in Rio Grande do Sul and Espírito Santo, a similar situation developed....As the isolated colonies expanded, they imposed cultural patterns of the European settlers....By hard labor and perseverance the immigrants transformed large stretches of wilderness into productive farming areas, thereby hastening the disappearance of the aboriginal population....In the southern provinces the steady expansion of the population--much faster than the trickle of new immigrants would indicate--gave rise to a phenomenon not previously known in Brazil. This was the continuous, inland-moving line of settlements, similar to the western frontier in the United States until 1890.54

54. Ibid. pp. 185-186.
Due to the urban biases of many of the immigrants, however, and the absence of a homestead policy, the existence of slave labor, and the relatively small flow of immigrants during the monarchy, the role of the immigrant in settling Brazil should not be overstated.

By and large the early European agricultural colonies failed to meet the expectations of their sponsors, either as benevolent influences on the native population or as meccas to attract large-scale immigration into the hinterland. Most of the foreigners and the recently arrived Portuguese settled in the coastal towns. Rio de Janeiro alone had received over 4,000 foreigners by 1822, and the influx continued. The quiet colonial capital, which had only about 50,000 inhabitants in 1800, expanded to about 100,000 in 1822, and to perhaps 150,000 in 1830. By the latter year less than 7,000 Germans and probably even fewer Swiss had entered Brazil. By no means all of those settled in rural areas.55

55. Ibid. See also pp. 187-189.
IMMIGRATION TO BRAZIL 1851-1950

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URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
The Turn of the Century—Toward an Urban Society
(1880-1920)

At the end of the nineteenth century a series of developments conspired to bring about radical changes in the urban pattern and urban economy of Brazil. Many of these changes originated outside of the cities themselves, as discussed below.

Immigration

The expanding economy, the abolition of slavery, and the end of the Paraguayan war in 1822 triggered the first great wave of immigrants. Of approximately four million immigrants to Brazil to date, roughly 2,800,000 arrived within thirty years after the turn of the century. The level of immigration is shown in Figure 5.

The impact on Brazil, particularly southern and urban Brazil was substantial. The population of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Espirito Santo increased by fivefold between 1872 and 1920, from 1,916,000 or 19 percent of the total for Brazil, to about 9,750,000, which represented one-third of all Brazilians. As stated by Poppino:
Immigration has also contributed heavily to the spectacular rate of urbanization in Brazil since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Although this phenomenon occurred in all regions of the country, it was most pronounced in the areas that received the largest contingents of immigrants. For while Brazil looked to immigration as a source of agricultural laborers, many of the foreigners preferred life in the cities.

The immigration was particularly heavy into Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.

[Sao Paulo]...was a sleepy country town of 31,000 inhabitants in 1872. Even then 8 percent of its population was foreign-born. In 1890 it had grown to 65,000 residents, of whom 22 percent were immigrants. In the next decade Sao Paulo nearly quadrupled in size to 240,000 and was known as a city of Italians. By 1920 it contained half as many people as Rio de Janeiro and more than twice as many of the total for Salvador and Recife, the third and fourth cities of Brazil. Of its 579,000 residents, 35 percent were foreign-born. This was the high point. While the number of immigrants remained large, they comprised a steadily decreasing proportion of the city's population, falling off to 27 percent in 1940, and to 14 percent in 1950. Rio de Janeiro, as the major port and national capital, had attracted a disproportionately large immigration population since 1808. By 1872 it was a city of about 275,000, of whom 94,000—or 30 percent—were foreigners. Thereafter, however, the influx of immigrants failed to keep pace with the growth of the city. Since 1890 Rio de Janeiro has had a smaller proportion, but a larger number of foreign-born residents than
Sao Paulo. The population of the capital surpassed half a million in 1890, of whom one-fourth were immigrants, while in 1920 barely one-fifth of the 1,158,000 persons in Rio de Janeiro were foreign-born. The immigrant share of the city population dropped to 12 percent in 1940, and to 9 percent in 1950. Santos, Campinos, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, and other cities in southern Brazil followed a similar pattern during the period under review.56

Accompanying this wave of immigrants was a spectacular economic boom at the turn of the century. The expansion not only charged the cities, but it brought foreign firms (particularly British) and professional immigrants who were to play a major role in the development of Brazilian cities.57

56. Ibid. pp. 196-197. See also pp. 230-231.

57. Ibid. p. 203. "The most striking transformation, however, was the revitalization and beautification of the cities after the turn of the century. The improvements in the physical and financial health of the community, and the introduction of electricity as an inexpensive source of power, proved a boon to domestic industries, which still enjoyed considerable, if unequal, tariff protection. Between 1899 and 1910 more than 200 large national and foreign firms were registered to operate in Brazil." This direct foreign entrepreneurship has strengthened the dependencia analysis of Brazilian urban development. For a more comprehensive discussion of the role of the foreign entrepreneur in the development of Sao Paulo, see, e.g., Manoel Berlinck. Dependencia Economica e Estructura Urbana: o Caso de Sao Paulo. (Mimeo.)
One of the most significant immigration and settlement episodes in the history of Brazil involved approximately 4,000 former Confederates who fled the South after the Civil War (to a place where slavery was still legal). Most of these settlers, particularly in the Amazon, were not successful, and most of the immigrants returned to the United States. Some, however, stayed on building lasting communities, such as Americana in Sao Paulo.

The major, dramatic urban changes which transpired in the latter part of the century, however, were those based on radical changes which transpired in several sectors of the agricultural economy.

Coffee

Introduced to Brazil in the 1770's, coffee spread from Rio de Janeiro rapidly southward in the latter part of the century, to the Sao Paulo plateau. In 1796 about 127 tons of coffee were exported. A decade later that figure had risen to 1,200 tons and by 1850, 158,000 tons of coffee were exported annually—more than 50 percent of the world's supply.58 The interior in the South was opened and settled with this "coffee-rush" and for a time Santo was the fastest growing port in the nation. Together with cotton and sugar (and the rail system that transported it), coffee

58. Poppino. op. cit. p. 149.
was to furnish the financial basis upon which much of the industrial south, and Sao Paulo in particular, would be built.\textsuperscript{59}

\textit{Cacao}

The turn of the century cacao boom in Bahian southern coast is hard to separate from the myth that surrounds it. The volume of cacao exports expanded nearly sixtyfold, from an annual average of about 1,100 tons in the 1820's to more than 63,000 tons in the 1920's, making cacao the third most important product in the century.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{59} This is obviously a complex issue, one which cannot be pursued at length here. Suffice to cite G. Edward Schuh, in behalf of the above-stated position and to note Fernando Enrique Cardozo's word of caution in "O Cafe E A Industrializacao de Sao Paulo." Cardozo warns against attributing the development of Sao Paulo simply to the accumulation of wealth from coffee production. Arguing that this could have been invested elsewhere, Cardozo emphasizes the shift of the coffee planting from the Paraiba valley to the western lands and the subsequent development of Santos, the growth of towns and a petty bourgeoisie in the interior, expanding internal demand for industry, and the impetus which coffee planting gave to the profit motive and to the encouragement of entrepreneurship. Without denying the importance of the factors Cardozo cites, and other factors such as the railroads, I remain persuaded that the agricultural economy contributed heavily to, and concomitantly profited from, the growth of Sao Paulo.

\textsuperscript{60} Poppino. \textit{op. cit.} p. 146.
in the Amazon but was soon concentrated on the Bahia coast. From 1890 on Bahia was the scene of explosive expansions of plantations and ports, such as Ileus and Itabuna. Through Jorge Amado's novels we have rich and important narration of the urbanizacao during the period, and an interesting portrait of the hybrid urbanismo and ruralismo which characterized these northeastern cacao towns. The cacao boom was over by 1930. As cacao production increased in other parts of the world, the urban centers of the northeast cacao region slowed their pace.

**Rubber—Fordlandia**

This same turn of the century period witnessed a spectacular rubber boom in the Amazon, in Acre in particular. This area, nominally part of Bolivia, was settled almost entirely by Brazilian rubber gatherers, approximately 60,000 in number. With the rubber boom came revolution, Brazilian intervention, and the final definition of Brazil’s westernmost boundary. Also with the boom came the explosive development of Belem and Manaus (and the construction of the famous opera house in Manaus). These large Amazon cities were economically and culturally oriented towards Europe, and towards the export economy. The rubber boom also engendered numerous small villages along the rivers, utterly dependent on the waterways for
transportation and communication. The rubber boom collapsed in the second decade of the twentieth century, with the increased rubber production in the Far East. With its collapse, the grand cities of the Amazon went into a period of decline. Symptomatic of this general "boom and bust" syndrome is the brief flourishing of another strangely American settlement on Brazil's urban map—Fordlandia. In the interest of institutional modesty I quote Moog's sardonic account:

Around 1928 Henry Ford was in the grip of a fixed idea. He wanted to find a solution to the vexing problem of supplying rubber for his enterprises. He was tired of putting up with the prices imposed on him by the English in Ceylon and the Dutch in Java. And he had decided that the rubber empire in the hands of the English was immoral, and that the way to purify and redeem that empire was to transfer it from the backward guardianship of English capitalism to the progressive tutelage of young, healthy American capitalism. How? By planting rubber in Amazonia. Hadn't the English subject Henry Wickham smuggled the shoots of the Amazonian tree to England? And hadn't those shoots, after being acclimatized in the hothouses of Kew Gardens—the London botanical gardens—flourished in the Orient, becoming the greatest rubber plantations in the world? ... Since, when Henry Ford got ideas, they immediately took form and issued forth to be converted into action and be the object of ecstasy and applause on the part

61. For an excellent portrait of one such waterway community, see, e.g., Wagley. Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics. New York, 1955.
of the American press and people, the world immediately got news of the new plan of the demiurge of Dearborn. England trembled. Brazil exulted. And then the government of the state of Para, with the acquiescence of the federal government, welcomed the emissaries of Ford as it habitually welcomed Americans in general—with open arms. So Mr. Ford wanted to plant rubber in Para. Splendid, an excellent idea. And where did Mr. Ford want to set out his plantations. On the banks of the Tapajos? Perfect. And what was the amount of land he desired for the undertaking? Two million, four hundred and seventy thousand acres? Why, of course. But, converted into square kilometers, how many would that be, more or less? And, more or less, to what could such an extent of land be compared, just to get an idea? Exactly five-sixths of Connecticut. Ah, then everything was fine…five-sixths of Connecticut. Meanwhile in Dearborn, on Lake Michigan, activity was feverish. Ships are being outfitted for the conquest of Amazonia. They are to carry a whole city, disassembled, 'knocked down,' but ready, as if it were a question of automobiles emerging from the Ford Motor Company assembly lines: houses, hospitals, cafeterias, drugstores, cement, sand for the tennis courts, sanitary apparatus, bulldozers, sawmill—a complete city to be set up. Not since the departure from Amsterdam of the fleet with which the Dutch conquered Pernambuco and the Northeast in 1624 had such a well-fitted-out civilizing expedition set sail for Brazil….Once arrived at Fordlandia, they tie up to the river bank. All this time, the world press is shouting. The battle between Mr. Ford and the Amazon jungle has begun. In North America newspapers report the struggle in minute detail. The jungle grows, resists, but retreats. And with it the jaguars, monkeys, parrots, and snakes, as the bulldozers go knocking over trees for the clearing where the city is to be erected….Now the houses have begun to take shape, and the hospital, and the hygienic facilities and tennis courts, and the directors' mansions, and the workers' dwellings, and the cafeteria, and the drugstore, just as in New England or the Midwest. In the Amazonian jungle the Yankee had caused a new city to spring up….In '936 Edward Tomlinson, in the December 12 issue of Collier's proclaimed, full of enthusiasm: 'In the very heart of the region
where inquisitive archeologist and self-styled scientists, bitten by the adventure bug, go out in search of the walls of mythical cities and peoples descended from Phoenician nomads and other ancient peoples, deep in the jungle, Henry Ford is laying the foundations of a civilization. Fordlandia was indeed resplendent. It was, on a smaller scale, an industrial city as complete for the end to which it was destined as Dearborn itself. It had a refrigerating plant that could store food for more than two thousand persons for six months. It had a hospital that was the last word in efficiency and comfort. The Amazonian half-breed, who had never before known anything better than his one-room mocambo, now enjoyed a house with as many as three rooms, and running water... Suddenly, the humble half-breeds turn into wild beasts. They start by smashing up the cafeteria, they tear everything down. A riot. The officials of the Ford Motor Company run with their families, all terrified, for the frighters anchored in the port. The caboclos, armed with clubs like the French in the taking of the Bastille, march on the strongholds of the directorate and management, roaring something unintelligible to the listeners aboard ship. What can they be howling about so angrily? Can it be 'Down with Mr. Ford!'? Can it be 'Down with the Ford Motor Company!'? Nothing of the sort. It appeared that it was a personal disagreement with Popeye the Sailor. What the half-breeds were yelling was, 'Down with spinach! No more spinach!' The breaking and smashing during the night helped to calm them down. Only next day, when the military detachment from Belem arrived, did the managers learn what the affair was all about. The caboclos were full of boiled spinach and well-vitaminized foods; they could not even look at spinach any more. As for corn flakes, better not even mention them. They wanted dried meat, and a feijoada now and then. Hasn't a man got a right to a good feijoada and a shot of rum once in a while?... Meanwhile, Henry Ford was receiving and reading reports. And these told rather different stories from those that figured on the front pages of newspapers. Besides the caboclos riot there were some technical difficulties. For example, the sawmill intended for cutting all the trees of the heterogeneous tropical forest had proved
ineffectual. ... But the worst of all was yet to come. The worst thing was that the million rubber seedlings were dying from the excessive sun and lack of humidity. For lack of the protection of tropical forest shade, Mr. Ford's army of rubber trees was going to die in the sun. ... Afterwards, silence, Fordlandia yielding first place, and the first page of newspapers, to inventors and producers of the synthetic rubber, with which the United States would, from 1944 on, solve the rubber problem. To cut the story short: in January of 1946 the melancholy news goes round the world: Ford Withdraws from Brazil. It was the end.

The whole outcome of the story is summed up in that headline. For that matter the whole history of Fordlandia can be concentrated in the telegraphic style of the newspaper and magazine headlines. And, to reconstruct it, it suffices to gather up these headlines at random, as they were catalogued in its own book by the New York Public Library from 1928 to 1946 under the subject 'Rubber.' They constitute the summary of a fascinating story. In the first phase they reflect the euphoria of great expectations: 'Reply of American to British Monopoly of Rubber.' 'End of British Control of Rubber.' 'Freeing the Rubber Market.' In the second phase expectation becomes certainty: 'Rubber for America: Factory in United States, Plantations in Brazil.' 'Taming the Jungle in the Amazon Basin.' 'Jungle Gold: Fordlandia, where Brazil's Rubber Returned to Life.' 'Ford in Brazil.' 'Ford on the Tapajós.' 'Rubber Plantations in Fordlandia.' 'Miracle City of the Amazon.' Finally, the first unexpected news of failure and the abrupt retreat: 'More News About Rubber.' 'Golden Leaves of Rubber Tree Affected by Sunlight.' 'Synthetic Rubber.' 'Ford Withdraws from Brazil.'

Brasilia and Belo Horizonte

The final and perhaps most important urban development of the latter nineteenth and early twentieth century was the

planning of Belo Horizonte and the formalization of Brasilia. The latter idea dates from the early eighteenth century, with the opening of the mines in the interior. The idea was revived at the time of independence, and was formally included in the Constitution in 1891. Belo Horizonte was inaugurated in 1896, to remove the capital of Minas Gerais from the confinement of the mining hills around Ouro Preto. Both Belo Horizonte and Brasilia are monumental urban planning exercises, subsequently overtaken by a series of unplanned changes, not the least of which was heavy rural-urban migration. Today Brasilia and Belo Horizonte are strikingly modern cities of approximately 500,000 and one million respectively. Growing at explosive rates, and always under construction, these huge planned cities have paved the way in opening the still virtually empty heartland that surrounds them.

Toward an Urban Society, Quantified

During the period of radical change at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian population as a whole increased by 265 percent, while the urban population grew 412 percent.63 The largest Brazilian cities

in the nineteenth century were as follows: 64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1872</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouro Preto</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>274,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>129,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>106,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belem</td>
<td>61,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niteroi</td>
<td>47,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>43,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortaleza</td>
<td>42,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuiaba</td>
<td>35,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Luis</td>
<td>31,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>31,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recife</td>
<td>111,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvador</td>
<td>205,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>239,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>73,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belem</td>
<td>53,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manaus</td>
<td>50,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niteroi</td>
<td>49,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teresina</td>
<td>48,369</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The continued ascendancy of the "cidade maravilhosa," Rio de Janeiro, is obvious in the census figures, as is the beginning of Sao Paulo's rise as an urban power. Also obvious is the continuing growth of the Northeastern cities of Recife and Salvador. These figures marked the prelude to a period of rapid urban growth and transformation which is still under way. Within this increasingly urban context significant changes were taking place. The regional diversity of Brazilian cities became more clearly distinguishable, and the boom and bust pattern of urban development became

an integral part of the development process. The overall urban pattern continued to move erratically and very slowly away from the overwhelming primacy of the coastal city. With the various booms in the interior, and the planning and inception of Belo Horizonte and Brasília, the "Marcha Para Oeste" (March to the West) was beginning. And yet the census figures from the turn of the century reflect the continued absence of heartland cities (other than São Paulo, which has a satellite port in Santos). Within the cities themselves there were analogous continuities and changes. Although the power of the landed gentry and the employer-employee patrão complex served to perpetrate many of the traditional rural values and mores, the emergent urban society was beginning to change some basic political and behavioral dimensions of Brazilian society. Mass political participation and influence increased substantially during this period. For the first time the rural aristocracy was challenged, and sometimes joined or absorbed by, a new urban and industrial elite. A middle and lower-middle-class work force emerged which was to become a major source

of support for the Vargas government and the Brazilian military government later in the century. Several dimensions of this increasing urbanismo will be discussed more specifically later in this paper.

The Twentieth Century--Brazil as a Predominantly Urban Society (1920-1970)

Poppino summarizes the major transformation of twentieth century Brazil as follows:

The growth of industry has been the most striking phenomenon in the economic development of Brazil since 1920, dwarfing the accomplishments of the preceding fifty years. Although the national economy is still heavily dependent on the export of a few agricultural commodities, Brazil has become the most industrialized country of Latin America....Between 1920 and 1960 the number of plants increased more than eightfold....During the same period while the population more than doubled, the industrial labor force in Brazil expanded nearly seven times. The rise of industry in Brazil after 1920 could not fail to encourage and reflect sweeping changes in the urban social structure and to affect the balance of political power between urban and rural areas. Confined, as it was, almost entirely to the large cities and towns, industrialization was both a cause and effect of rapid urban growth...millions of migrants from the countryside swarmed into the cities, drawn in part by the lure of jobs....[this] massive increase in the urban electorate [contributed] to a sharp rise in the political influence of both employers and workers in industrial centers.67

We have seen that the roots of the twentieth century industrial and urban growth reach comfortably back into the latter part of the nineteenth century.68 Spurred


68. I am discussing here an empirical, not a linear or necessarily "causal" relationship between urbanization and industrialization. In this regard see, Alessio. op. cit. The Alessio article concludes that "urbanização acompanha, a grosso modo, onde se concentra o desenvolvimento industrial, mas ha uma tendência para o crescimento de uma cidade independente do aparecimento de industrias."
on by Vargas and the economic nationalists of the early and mid-twentieth century, industrialization became synonymous with development and progress. As the economy became more industrial and the agriculture more mechanized, the portion of the population working in the rural, agricultural sectors decreased steadily. The "urban centered" sector of the economy—industry, commerce, finance, government, transportation and communication—increased proportionally, as did urban unemployment.

69. Poppino, op. cit. pp. 239-241. "Within a single lifetime the goal of an industrial economy was converted from an impractical dream into a national objective...by the 1960's dependence upon agricultural exports was generally decried as a major deterrent to economic development, while a high degree of industrial self-sufficiency had come to be almost universally accepted within Brazil as indispensable to the well-being of the population and the state."

70. See, e.g., the following excerpt from: G. Edward Schuh. "Inter-Relations Between the Farm Labor Force and Changes in the Total Economy". "Farm employment has declined from 13.4 million in 1920 to 5.6 million in 1965. As a proportion of the labor force, it has declined from 26 percent in 1929 to 9.7 percent in 1961...and even further by 1966. Similarly, farm population as a percent of total population declined from 25.1 percent in 1929 to 8.1 percent in 1961. The most rapid decline has occurred since World War II in both the farm labor force and farm population. This decline in farm labor force has been almost continuous since 1929."

71. See, e.g., G. Edward Schuh and Morris Whitaker. "Migration, Mobility, and Some Problems of the Labor Market". "...The labor which is leaving the agricultural or rural sector in relatively large numbers is essentially sealed off from the industrial sector in which average productivity is increasing rapidly. It is forced to take employment in the
Thus much of the manpower for Brazil's industrial and urban expansion was supplied, and sometimes over supplied, by this internal migration, heavily rural-urban, and by immigration and natural population growth. With regard to the internal migration, there are several studies which indicate that Brazilian migration is highly responsive to industrialization and earning differentials. Whatever service sector, driving average productivity down in that sector. The consequence is a partial frustration of the possibility of growth by the simple transfer of labor from the less productive sector to the higher productive sector. Moreover, the fruits of the very rapid gain in productivity in the industrial sector are shared by only a very few. See also Morris Whitaker. Labor Absorption in Brazil: An Analysis of the Industrial Sector. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Purdue University, 1970.

the various motivational explanations, Brazil has witnessed heavy waves of internal migration over the past several decades. Some migration is periodic, reflecting crop changes, or, in the Northeast, draughts. Much of the migration is interregional, and is heavily to, and in, the rich agricultural and industrial states of the South. The census reflects this overall regional and heavy rural-urban shift. Between 1940 and 1950, for example, the urban and suburban population increased by 41.5 percent and 58.3 percent respectively, while the rural population increased by only 17.4 percent. The 1970 census shows many rural areas with actual losses in population. This includes not

American migration research, see Rabinovitz, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. Op. cit. pp. 12-15. See also Browning and Feindt, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. Op. cit. p. 45. I should also take note of my reservations about the motivational "push" and "pull" conceptualization, or at least rhetoric, all too often employed in analyzing rural-urban migration. This oversimplified dichotomy obfuscates more than it conveys about human motivation and the complex mixture of needs, values and perceptions which go into the move from the rural to the urban sectors. Cf. Harley L. Browning. "Migrant Selectivity and the Growth of Large Cities in Developing Societies".

73. IBGE. Contribuicoes para o Estudo da Demografia no Brasil. p. 380. Most of the government (IBGE) population statistics give absolute figures with regional breakdowns. While this regional information is helpful, it does not offer much precision with regard to the rural-urban shifts, inter and intraregional.

74. Ibid. p. 385. IBGE uses two "urban" definitions: (i) political and geographic, the city limits of the seat (sede) of the government, and (ii) demo-
percent. The rate of increase has been rapid and relatively stable, varying between 69.8 percent in the first decade (1940-1950), 78.4 percent in the second (1950-1960), and 70.8 percent in the third decade (1960-1970). By 1980 it is projected that Sao Paulo will be the fourth largest city in the world.

The migration to Sao Paulo, particularly by the young, and often female, continues to increase, from 661,944 in 1940-1950, to 977,600 in 1950-1960, and 1,227,480 in 1960-1970. This migration has been

83. One can sympathize with the mayor's familiar plight: "The mayor of the city of Sao Paulo, Figueiredo Ferraz, stated in a conversation with Congressmen from Sao Paulo in Brasilia that the state capital's growth must be stopped temporarily because it was becoming chaotic. At present only 50 percent of Sao Paulo's streets had water supply and only 33 percent had sewers. Every year the city population increased at a rate equivalent to the entire population of Brasilia and Campinas. Traffic had reached the saturation point. The first stretch of the subway would be ready just in time to keep street traffic from coming to a complete standstill. He urged Congressmen to do everything possible to obtain federal funds for tackling the city's problem." "Sao Paulo's Growth Gets Out-of-Hand". Brazil Herald, June 4, 1971.


85. United Nations General Assembly Twenty-fifth Session, Item 49. op. cit. p. 47. (Larry's Salmen's projection on same, to be published). Berlinck portrays the ascendance of Sao Paulo, and the eclipse of Rio de Janeiro, in terms of percentage of national industrial output, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 90.
only the impoverished states of the North and Northeast, but Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo. As a whole, rural areas may have grown at only 1.5 percent per year over the past ten years. In the 1950's, more than six million people left the countryside for cities, in the 1960's, more than eight million. Looked at over the past several decades, this population shift is a striking phenomenon, witnessing the rapid transformation of Brazil into a predominantly urban society. The census figures are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENSO</th>
<th>URBANO (%)</th>
<th>RURAL (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970*</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Looked at in terms of the growth of specific cities, this urbanization process is as follows:

[graphic, including as "urban" cities of 5,000 or more; in this case they use the latter definition.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro 1,539,538</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro 2,303,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Sao Paulo 1,269,485</td>
<td>Sao Paulo 2,017,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Recife 327,178</td>
<td>Recife 512,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Salvador 294,397</td>
<td>Salvador 389,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Porto Alegre 262,678</td>
<td>Porto Alegre 375,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte 179,770</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte 338,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Belem 167,054</td>
<td>Belem 225,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Santos 158,774</td>
<td>Fortaleza 245,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Fortaleza 142,439</td>
<td>Santos 198,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Niteroi 125,974</td>
<td>Niteroi 170,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Curitiba 101,214</td>
<td>Curitiba 139,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Maceio 60,910</td>
<td>Maceio 99,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Campinas 78,914</td>
<td>Campinas 99,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Belem 380,667</td>
<td>Fortaleza 842,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Sao Goncalo 195,872</td>
<td>Sao Goncalo 270,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Sao Paulo 3,300,218</td>
<td>Sao Paulo 5,901,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Recife 788,569</td>
<td>Recife 1,078,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte 663,215</td>
<td>Belo Horizonte 1,222,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Salvador 638,592</td>
<td>Salvador 1,000,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Porto Alegre 625,957</td>
<td>Porto Alegre 885,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Fortaleza 470,778</td>
<td>Fortaleza 842,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Belem 380,667</td>
<td>Belem 642,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Curitiba 351,259</td>
<td>Curitiba 603,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Santos 263,054</td>
<td>Brasilia 544,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Santo Andre 231,705</td>
<td>Niteroi 342,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Niteroi 229,025</td>
<td>Manaus 303,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Sao Joao do Rio de Janeiro 191,872</td>
<td>Natal 270,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures point up the obvious ascendance of Sao Paulo, and the rapid growth of Brasilia. Also worth noting is the spectacular growth of Belo Horizonte, from the drawing board to a city of over one million in just half a century.
a century. Between 1960 and 1970 Belo Horizonte grew 77.79 percent, making it the second fastest growing city of over one million in the world.76 Manaus grew by 72 percent in the same period, Belém 59.76 percent, Fortaleza 63.59 percent, Natal 66.20 percent, João Pessoa 42.78 percent, Recife 35.32 percent, Salvador 52.59 percent, Curitiba 66.95 percent, Porto Alegre 38.11 percent. The population of the various capital cities of Brazil increased, on the average, by over 52 percent during the ten-year period. There are now some sixty Brazilian cities of more than 100,000 residents, ten cities with more than 500,000, and five cities with more than one million. The greater Rio area has grown to over seven million, the greater São Paulo area to over eight million.77

In the 1970's Brazilian cities should add about nineteen million people to their population, eight million of them from the countryside.78 It has been predicted that Brazil is twenty years away from a Rio-Belo Horizonte-São Paulo megalopolis which might be as large as one

76. Larry Salmen's figures, based on United Nations General Assembly Twenty-fifth Session, Item 49 figures. Housing, Building, and Planning Problems and Priorities in Human Settlements. August 1970. The 1970 Census shows Minas Gerais growing at a rate of 1.4 percent annually, while Belo Horizonte grows at 5.9 percent annually.

77. IBGE. Censo Demografico de 1970, Resultados Preliminares.

hundred million, half of the country's population.79

There are some interesting dimensions in the 1970 census data available thus far. The State of Amazonas, for example, declined in population in the 1960-1970 period, while the capital city of Manaus grew by 72.89 percent to 303,155. Even rapidly expanding agricultural sectors, such as Parana and Sao Paulo, are increasingly concentrating in cities.80 And in the newly opening frontier in the West there is, in some cases, startling urban growth. Thus the fastest growing capitals in Brazil are Goiania (which grew 153 percent to 388,000 between 1960 and 1970) and Brasilia (which grew 284 percent to 545,000 in the same period).81

79. James Theberge. "Some Major Issues Affecting Brazil's Position in the Hemisphere and World by the Year 2000 A.D.". I believe the figure is somewhat high. Isaac Kerstenetzky, Director of IBGE, said at one point that he was comfortable with the 100,000,000 figure, as is Salmen. Harry J. Cole would put it lower, and Morse's 20,000,000 projection for Sao Paulo proper indicates his overly conservative estimate. These figures are from: Briefing at Georgetown University. June 21, 1968. (Mimeo).

80. See, e.g., Constantino Comminos. Aspectos Demograficos da Urbanizacao no Parana. (Reprint). Atypically, Comminos finds the large cities (50,000 and over) and the small ones (10,000 and under) increasing most rapidly. The urban population of Parana was still only 31 percent in 1960, up from 25 percent and 24 percent in 1950 and 1940 respectively.

81. IBGE. Censo Demografico de 1970, Resultados Preliminares. The complete 1970 census including the
COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF BRAZILIAN CITIES

FIG. 6

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
Rio de Janeiro's rate was much lower over the last ten years (30 percent), though it still grew by more than one million and is approximately the eleventh largest city in the world. The growth of Brazil's major cities over the past thirty years is shown in Figure 6.

The Ascendance of Sao Paulo

Because it is so important, and because there is good data available, Sao Paulo offers an interesting case study of Brazilian urbanization. In 1872 Sao Paulo had 31,000 residents. With 8,031,486 residents, greater Sao Paulo is now the eighth largest city in the world. Between 1940 and 1970 it grew from 1,568,645 to 8,031,486, an increase of over 400

urban-rural breakdown is only partially complete at the time of this writing. Sao Paulo, Rio and Minas are not yet complete, though two "agricultural" states, Rio Grande do Sul and Goias, are. In Goias 42.3 percent of the population live in urban areas (there are two cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants). In Rio Grande do Sul, 47.8 percent of the population lives in urban areas (there are six cities with 100,000 or more residents, twenty-four with 50,000-100,000 residents, fifty-eight with 20,000-50,000 residents).

percent. The rate of increase has been rapid and relatively stable, varying between 69.8 percent in the first decade (1940-1950), 78.4 percent in the second (1950-1960), and 70.8 percent in the third decade (1960-1970). By 1980 it is projected that Sao Paulo will be the fourth largest city in the world.

The migration to Sao Paulo, particularly by the young, and often female, continues to increase, from 661,944 in 1940-1950, to 977,600 in 1950-1960, and 1,227,480 in 1960-1970. This migration has been

83. One can sympathize with the mayor's familiar plight: "The mayor of the city of Sao Paulo, Figueiredo Ferraz, stated in a conversation with Congressmen from Sao Paulo in Brasilia that the state capital's growth must be stopped temporarily because it was becoming chaotic. At present only 50 percent of Sao Paulo's streets had water supply and only 33 percent had sewers. Every year the city population increased at a rate equivalent to the entire population of Brasilia and Campinas. Traffic had reached the saturation point. The first stretch of the subway would be ready just in time to keep street traffic from coming to a complete standstill. He urged Congressmen to do everything possible to obtain federal funds for tackling the city's problem." "Sao Paulo's Growth Gets Out-of-Hand". Brazil Herald, June 4, 1971.


85. United Nations General Assembly Twenty-fifth Session, Item 49. op. cit. p. 47. (Larry's Salmen's projection on same, to be published). Berlinck portrays the ascendance of Sao Paulo, and the eclipse of Rio de Janeiro, in terms of percentage of national industrial output, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 90.
particularly heavy to the outlying municipios of greater Sao Paulo (196,895 in 1940-1950, 378,838 in 1950-1960, and 881,271 in 1960-1970).87 In this same 1940-1970 period the death rate decreased, and fertility and the rate of natural population growth increased.88 As a result the increasing migration accounts for a decreasing portion of the greater Sao Paulo growth over the 1940-1970 period.89 The er" result of the migration and natural population growth, and the decreasing growth of Sao Paulo proper is an explosive rate of growth in the outlying communities. This is shown in the following table:90

87. Ibid. p. 93.
88. Ibid. p. 100.
89. Ibid. p. 100. (Migration accounted for 55.1 percent, 50.9 percent and 44.5 percent of the growth for each of the respective ten-year periods).
Population of Sao Paulo State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960 (In Thousands)</th>
<th>1970 (In Thousands)</th>
<th>Yearly Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sao Paulo City</td>
<td>3,825</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninety-one Towns of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30,000 in 1970</td>
<td>3,262</td>
<td>7,160</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns of Less than 30,000</td>
<td>5,888</td>
<td>4,654</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12,975</td>
<td>17,716</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus while greater Sao Paulo grew by factors of 69.8, 78.4 and 70.8 percent over the 1940-1970 period (or 5.45, 5.96, 5.50 percent annually), the outlying municpios grew at 91.9, 106.5, and 130.2 percent over the thirty-year period (or 6.75, 7.50 and 8.70 percent annually). 9

The "Paulista" urban and industrial explosion is obviously spreading rapidly beyond the immediate Sao Paulo area. Even the casual visitor cannot fail to perceive the surging power and drive of the former home of the bandeirantes. 92 A recent study of the nearby valley of Paraiba, for example, showed an explosive rate of industrialization, a gradual decrease in the rural population,

91. See Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. op. cit. p. 58.

92. For a discussion of the "quality of life" in urban Sao Paulo see p. 84, footnote no. 83 and pp. 109-112 of this paper.
and rapid increase in the urban population. As Brazil approaches the last quarter of the century the basis of a megalopolis has already formed.

Potpourri: Some Comments on the Cities of Brazil

Perhaps the most striking feature of large Brazilian cities is their number and variety. Unlike other Latin American countries, except perhaps Colombia, the Brazilian urban reality is characterized by a network of diverse cities rather than the more common pattern of one primary city. From the hungry strength of Sao Paulo, to the crowded, mountainous beauty of Rio de Janeiro, the monumental openness of Costa's and Niemeyer's Brasilia, the raw provincialism of Belo Horizonte, the African and colonial heritage of Salvador, the surging Northeastern growth and poverty of Recife and Fortaleza, the river

93. See Nice Lecocq Miller. O Fato Urbano no Bacia do Rio Paraiba-Sao Paulo. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia, No. 23, 1969. pp. 79-81. Harry Cole's recent study is one of the same "Corridor of Urbanization." The Cole study plans a new city of 100,000, the "Nova Cidade de Porto Real."

94. This off-the-cuff section represents a series of personal observations of the "personality" of urban Brazil. For a general statement on the "urban community" in Brazil see Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. p. 176. Wagley's general view is that "Brazilian cities differ in many respects from North American and Northern European cities—they are comparable in some respects to the Mediterranean cities."
nurtured "sea port" of Manaus, 1,200 miles up the Amazon, the large cities of Brazil have a rich, "personal" character. To this add the urban nooks and crannies of a German Sao Leopoldo, Amado's Itabuna, Tiradentes' cobbled Ouro Preto, a Swiss Nova Friburgo, an American Fordlandia, and the lonely growing strength of the frontier cities such as Porto Velho, Goiania, and Uberlandia. The gestalt is a very rich and diverse urban mosaic. Given the size and the regional diversity and disparity of Brazil it could hardly be otherwise.

Brazilian cities are frequently old. Many of the major cities, including Santos, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife (Olinda), and Natal, were founded in the sixteenth century. By the end of the seventeenth century almost all of the present coastal cities were established. These older coastal cities are often unplanned, with winding, narrow streets at irregular intervals. The pracas and colonial churches contribute richly to the character of these older cities, such as Salvador. But this historical dimension of urban Brazil is rapidly decaying with age and inattention on the one hand, and succumbing to use and desenvolvimento on the other. New, planned Brazilian cities have been built. They often have heavy French influence; open, modern, sweeping, with wide avenues and generous green areas within
a geometric design. City planning is something of a passion in Brazil. Only Brazil has a Brasilia, an expensive, starkly monumental capital of approximately 600,000 people in the heartland. Similarly, Belo Horizonte is a planned capital of over one million; Goiania, a planned capital of over 380,000; and Teresina, a planned capital of over 42,000. Additional new towns are planned, (e.g., in the Vale do Paraíba or along Transamazónica). These are also new, planned "industry" towns such as Ipatinga and Volta Redonda. Harry Cole's private firm recently planned a new city between Rio and São Paulo. He was subsequently asked if he wouldn't like to plan ten more, for the Transamazónica.

As mentioned above, Brazilian cities are large and numerous, with five cities of over one million and sixty cities of over 100,000. While this numerical and geographical diversity begins to diminish, the urban leadership of Rio de Janeiro and especially of São Paulo, can be expected to hold economic "primacy" throughout much of the twenty-first century. With the overall increase in population and the widespread exodus from rural areas,

95. The "primacy" referred to here is not, however, a mere continuation of São Paulo's present status, as the "industrial city" of Brazil. The reference is rather to its emergent role as the most important area of concentration in an increasingly expanding and complex urban and industrial "web."
however, almost all Brazilian cities are growing rapidly: the capital cities are increasing by approximately one-half every ten years. Some of the "interior" capitals in particular grew at explosive rates between 1960 and the 1970 census (Manaus 72.8 percent, Porto Velho 76.76 percent, Belo Horizonte 77.79 percent, Cuiaba 79.61 percent, Goiania 155.35 percent and Brasilia at 284.40 percent). There is every reason to expect these heartland cities to continue their runaway growth. Even so the major cities, often coastal, take the overwhelming brunt of the population and urban increase: thus Belem increased by 240,334 in the last decade, Fortaleza by 327,413, Recife by 281,535, Salvador by 344,912, Rio de Janeiro by 989,619, and Sao Paulo by 2,076,182. The small satellite towns on the outskirts of these major centers are often growing at staggering rates. The overall pattern shows a more rapid rate of growth in the interior and overwhelmingly greater absolute growth in the large and powerful cities, often coastal, of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Fortaleza, Belem and increasingly, Brasilia and Goiania--it is overwhelmingly these larger cities and their satellites that absorb the population increase in Brazil.

The Brazilian cities manifest a very great commitment to the automobile, the bus, and the truck, as the means
of mass transportation. While many "modern" urbanists tend to regard the automobile as the destroyer of cities, the Brazilians have thus far been willing to remove buildings and favelas alike, extend (and isolate) beaches, and rill lakes to accommodate the automobile. As a result the larger cities, Rio and Sao Paulo in particular, are choking with cars (metro systems and additional freeways are now being constructed in both cities). The general commitment to the automobile is also manifest in the "national integration plan" (a highway system), and in the major planned cities of Belo Horizonte and Brasilia. The planner of Brasilia, Lucio Costa, for example, talks fondly of the car as "a member of the family." The value attached to the car is immediately obvious when one looks at Brasilia—or attempts to walk through it.

A second striking characteristic of Brazilian cities is what might be called a "suburban explosion." 97

96. There are, of course, complaints, as in Recursos Humanos da Grande Sao Paulo. "uma via expressa exclui tudo e todos que nao seja o automovel."

97. A dichotomized suburban-core city model is, of course oversimplified and the interaction of the various sectors of Brazilian cities a more complex and subtle phenomenon than the following comment admits. Even given this, however, the suburban dimension seems distinct enough to merit attention as a particularly interesting nuance of a larger and more complex urban process. See, e.g., Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. p. 179. "Brazil friends were always amazed when I told them I lived in a suburb in New York. In Brazil the suburbs are lower-class areas, even for a professor."
It has already been noted that although the cities are growing faster than the population as a whole, the suburbs are growing even faster than the cities. The character of the suburbs is in many ways the reverse of suburbia, U.S.A. In Brazil urban services such as water, sewage, paved streets, etc. are generally better in the urban core, and often do not exist in suburbia. Similarly the zoning laws are more demanding in the city than in the suburbs, where zoning is often nonexistent. In short, the central city is often relatively healthy and prosperous, while the areas of poverty, mixed residential-industrial land use, and totally inadequate or nonexistent urban services are often concentrated in the suburbs. The pattern is both caused by and contributes to a rapid and distinct pattern of suburban growth. The lower socio-economic groups are attracted to the suburban areas by cheaper housing, kinship ties, cultural continuity and, sometimes, the job markets on the periphery. And they are out of the central city either by statutory restrictions and "controlled" migration, by internal resistance (from other lower socio-economic groups, insecure in their own "squatter" communities), or by the sheer realities of central city

98. See pp. 78-79, this paper, showing the suburban areas growing approximately 20 percent faster than the urban areas of Brazil. See also p. 85, footnote no. 87, discussing the same phenomena in Sao Paulo.
housing costs and availability. This so-called "marginal" population is often forcibly "removed" from the central city to the suburbs. These factors combine to create and reinforce increasing economic and social segregation within cities; increasing homogeneity within neighborhoods, and heterogeneity between neighborhoods. In essence, the central city prospers, often at the expense of the periphery. While the political implications of this increasingly "marginalized" suburbia remain to be seen, some students feel it may be a future source of political radicalism and "suburban guerrilla warfare." Whatever the political implications, this reversal of the American core-suburban pattern is a self-reinforcing character of Brazilian cities. The phenomenon sometimes implies a corresponding reversal of urban roles and processes; it can lead, for example, to reverse commuting, with marginalized Brazilian suburbanite commuting into the cities for their domestic or manual employment.

Reflecting the economics of this pattern, the center-city in Brazil is often characterized by high land values and rich and often vertical commercial and architectural growth. The surprising verticality is equally obvious in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and in the striking skyscrapers of the frontier cities in the vast interior—not only Belo Horizonte and Brasilia, but Goiania, Uberlandia, Cuiaba, etc. The starkly modern
and graceful architecture of Brazil, usually in reinforced concrete, sometimes gives the center city an architectural personality more modern than the society which builds it. (A good example of this is the horse-and-buggy provincialism of Belo Horizonte). This same architecture gives concrete form to the disparity of social and economic positions in the highly stratified Brazilian society. Virtually all apartments in Brazil have a front "social" side and a back "maids" quarters, with separate elevators, entrances, baths, etc. The cities also reflect the growth of population and the economy; new construction is a constant fact of life. Apartment construction is particularly heavy, and Brazil is increasingly a country of apartment dwellers (and, via the National Housing Bank, apartment owners).

The presence of the National Housing Bank (BNH) is one of a number of factors which may, over the long run, temper the diversity of Brazilian cities. The growing strength of the federal government and the uniform, national policies of such urban organizations as BNH and the Federal Housing and Urbanization Service (SERFHAU) may have a homogenizing influence, as will the advances and standardization in national education, leisure (soccer), transportation and communications, the standardization of construction (technique and materials), of city planning, etc. The diversity of cities may also be tempered by
increasing interaction between them, by heavy internal migration, by the penetration of generally "urban" values into the rural sectors, and by the partial breakdown and absorption of ethnic subcultures in Brazil. But that is speculation, and some time removed. For the moment, Brazil's urban pattern is one of economic, social, ethnic, physical and regional diversity.

The Quality of Life in the Brazilian Urban Environment

In general it is probably safe to say that the quality of life in Brazilian cities compares favorably with other cities in Latin America, and the world. Many have beautiful coastal topography with famous palm-lined beaches. To the extent that one can generalize, Brazilian cities are often friendly and—except for the manifest insanity of Brazilian drivers—safe places. As commented by Wagley, "one feels more at home walking in dark streets in a Brazilian city than in its North American or European counterpart...one feels safe."\(^99\)

Most manage to retain something of a small "community" character, wherein businessmen traditionally go home for lunch, laborers nap in the midday heat, and friends stop to chat in the street.

\(^{99}\) Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. p. 182.
In discussing the way Brazilian towns seem small and personal in relation to their population figures, Wagley asserted that this was "because only a small segment of the population participate fully in urban life. The great masses of people are unable to make full use of the urban world." While there is great merit in this explanation, other factors are also involved. Physical factors such as the relative scarcity of neon and the abundance of outdoor cafes and pracas contribute to this "community" atmosphere. More important, however, is the subtle "personalism" of Brazilian society. Traditionally reticent about coercion and personal confrontation, urban Brazil seems to have retained or evolved a widely shared system of values and expectations. For me urban Brazil represents the almost anti-institutional society of the jeito ("getting by") and the calor humano (roughly, "warmth"). Although quietly and extensively separated by considerations of class and race, urban Brazilians nevertheless interact relating easily, e.g., in recreation at the beach, the soccer game or Carnival. They are also relatively open with regard to foreigners, for example, freely giving directions and assistance for the asking. In short, Brazilian urban society often seems to be a partial contradiction of a shift sociologists--particularly

100. Ibid. p. 182.
American urban sociologists—usually expect in the urban sector, from "primary" to "secondary" relationships, and to impersonal interaction. Similarly, as will be discussed below, family and kinship ties seem to survive the rapid urbanization process rather better than one might expect. It is a surprisingly personal kind of urbanismo.

There are, of course, many more tangible advantages to be derived from urban Brazil. There are more high-paying jobs, resulting in a level of income approximately three times that of the rural sector. Urban Brazil is also the situs of the much sought after movimento, for example, soccer, music (Brazilian and American), and films (often American, with Portuguese subtitles). There are also advantages of diversity, availability of material goods, services and jobs, specialization of skills, mass communication, centralized educational, political or governmental participation. Even on a fairly visceral level there are numerous factors which would lead one to conclude with considerable justification that Brazilian cities can be rather pleasant and human places to live. Perhaps the best index to the accuracy of this generalization is the confidence and pride most Brazilians feel toward their city—and their distaste for the stereotyped, dangerous and dirty North American city. In terms of "quality of urban life," Brazilians too aim high.
There are, of course, distinct and painful urban problems as well. This paper will focus on them as areas of Foundation concern. Brazilian cities have not escaped the advance of Volkswagen and Honda. As mentioned above, the automobile has an important place and the rapidly rising "automobile population" is only now having far-reaching effects on social behavior. It represents, for example, a technological exception to the "personalismo" mentioned above; Brazilian drivers ask and expect no quarter. In many places the automobile is overrunning the city, particularly the old coastal cities with narrow and irregular streets. It is also having a marked deja vu impact on juvenile behavior, from dating and drive-in theaters (in Rio and Sao Paulo), to mobile peer groups, and an interesting kind of throwback to the automobile ethos of Rebel Without a Cause.* Although I am not sure of the precise figures, I believe the auto accident rate in Brazil is proportionately about ten times higher than the rate in the U.S.

While the general movimento of Brazilian cities may stand out in contrast to the countryside, the cities

* There is, for example, a kind of "chicken" played in contemporary Rio de Janeiro, by sliding around sharp corners for the benefit of a sometimes large and cheering audience. Having lived for two years on the Lagoa in Rio, near the "Curva da Morte," I can testify that this game is almost a weekend ritual, beginning at approximately midnight and screeching on—with occasional police interruption—until the small hours.
themselves would not strike the urbanite of San Francisco, London, Rome or Buenos Aires as culturally sophisticated or active places. On the contrary, except for perhaps Rio and Sao Paulo, most would seem quite provincial.

Moreover, Brazilian cities are not particularly "modern" in technological terms. It is, for example, very common to see a horse-and-buggy stop at a street light in cities as large as Belo Horizonte and Salvador. And there are many everyday technological inconveniences—electricity and water frequently fail, telephone service is often difficult to secure, and unpredictable. These "inconveniences" are, of course, a way of life for millions of urban Brazilians whose standard of living does not include water, electricity or telephone. It is, for example, common to see a cluster of women and children waiting in line at a water outlet, and subsequently walking back to a favela with a lata of water steadied on their heads. In general, Brazilian cities retain a kind of perpetually "unfinished" character, for they are constantly torn up and under construction. The Brazilian reaction to these inconveniences is generally one of rather casual acceptance, and resolution by jeito.

Perhaps the most disturbing dimension of life in contemporary urban Brazil is an ephemeral kind of political indifference, coupled with a sweeping nationalism and a petty materialism, fostered in large measure by the
present political structure. While it is obviously dangerous to generalize, it is safe to say that the cities of Brazil are not politically or intellectually lively at the moment. Rather, the day-to-day urban ethos is one of complementary entrepreneurship, desenvolvimento, and relaxation—vintage Marcuse.

On a more tangible level, Brazilian cities obviously face many of the same "urbanization" and "over-urbanization" problems common to other cities in Latin America and the world. As discussed above, there is a painful lack of good jobs. There is a huge housing shortage, particularly at the lower socio-economic level. And there are pressing problems of air and water pollution (in Rio de Janeiro, for example, raw sewage has made Guanabara Bay an open sewer, unsafe for swimming). Transportation and education facilities are inadequate and overburdened, and there are serious health problems. There is an increasing concern with drugs and organized crime. And there is a familiar paucity of municipal resources. The inadequacy and often total absence of urban services is almost staggering. Approximately 50 percent of the municipalities of Brazil have water systems, and approximately 35 percent have sewage systems. In short, the rural-urban flow and the

101 IBGE. Brazil Series Estatisticas Retrospectivas. 1970. p. 255. BNH estimates the actual figures to be 40 percent of the urban population with water
natural population expansion of the past several decades have conspired to produce a staggering, quantum leap in the urban sector, and the cities have not been able to keep up. As a result, they juxtapose much of the country's wealth and poverty. The most concentrated areas of under and unemployment, inadequate housing, physical deprivation, poor health, and legal and residential insecurity are not in the Northeast or in the Amazon, but in the cities themselves (including those in the Northeast and the Amazon).

Because many of the problems of "over-urbanization" are more visible and pressing in the favelas, this paper will examine them in greater detail. There is an increasing body of literature on lower socio-economic "integration" and "marginality" in Latin America, and on services. See BNH. Abastecimento de Agua Equacionamento Em Nivel Nacional. January 1971. p. 7. Even the above-cited figures are misleading, because these urban services are only very partially and differentially available, even when present. The figures may also be misleading in that the physical reality of agglomeration alters by quantity of water filtration and sewage decomposition process.

the favelas in particular. In general, it is safe to say there are two reasonably distinct "schools" of thought about the so-called "marginal" groups: (i) the "optimistic" school of Leeds, Turner, Currie, Morse and Beyer, emphasizing stability, integration, achievement motivation, upward mobility and adaptation, and (ii) the "tinderbox" school of Haar, Shulman, Burnett and Johnson, emphasizing physical deprivation in terms of health, housing and services, and focusing on frustrated ambition, alienation, crime and radicalization. Some of the statistics and perceptions arising out of these two schools of inquiry are worth noting, as a kind of counter-point "quantification" of the quality of life in these "squatter" agglomerations.

The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro--The favelas of Rio de Janeiro will serve as a case study, in large measure because there is better and more recent data on Rio's favelas, because I know them better, and because they are the focal point of conflicting research on, and responses to, the problems of the favelas


104. See Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. p. 12.
generally. The 1971 census indicates that there are 564,930 favelados in Guanabara, or approximately one out of every seven residents. 105 Twenty-three percent of these favelados are on federal land, 27 percent on state land and 44 percent on privately owned land. 106 The conflicting and sometimes synthesized portrait of favelados which follows is drawn from two recent studies, arising out of the "optimistic" and "tinderbox" schools. 107

Of the relative poverty of the favelado there is little dispute. The Boschi study found 15.26 percent of the families have a total income of less than one "minimum salary" (i.e., Cr$187.20 or US$36.85/month), 35.74 percent have incomes up to two minimum salaries (i.e., US$73.70/month), 22.48 percent up to three minimum salaries (i.e., US$110.55/month) and 12.04 percent earn four salaries (i.e., US$147.40/month) or more. This means that over half of the favelados in Rio have a gross family income of less than US$73.70/month. 108

105. IBGE. Resultados Preliminares do Censo de 1970. This is a very conservative figure; other estimates, including CHISAM's are twice as high.

106. CHISAM. Metas Alcancadas e Novos Objetivos de Programa. p. 77.

107. Ibid. and Boschi and Goldschmidt. Op. cit. These two studies represent, respectively, the "tinderbox" and the "optimistic" schools.

108. Boschi and Goldschmidt. Op. cit. p. 45. The CHISAM study gave the following breakdown: less than one monthly salary 17 percent; one to three monthly salaries 57 percent; three or more salaries 27 percent. CHISAM, Op. cit. p. 77.
The studies are also consistent in showing a rather high number of consumer goods present in the favelas, and erratic but generally very low availability of urban services. In the famous Catacumba favela, for example, the CHISAM study found no sewer system, though 61 percent of the shacks had toilet bowls, 23.5 percent had water, and 79.49 percent had electricity. In terms of basic appliances, 81.36 percent had stoves, 27.24 percent had refrigerators and 19.56 percent had television.\textsuperscript{109} The Boschi study indicated a somewhat higher level of material possession: 47 percent had television, 53.5 percent with refrigerators, 83.5 percent with radio, etc.\textsuperscript{110}

The favela population is generally quite young, enters the labor market at an early age, and performs manual, often unskilled labor.\textsuperscript{111}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{109} CHISAM. \textit{op. cit.} p. 91.
\bibitem{110} Boschi and Goldschmidt. \textit{op. cit.} p. 45. Steven Conn comments on this propensity to invest in portable, luxury goods rather than in homesteads as follows: "given the country wide inflation that makes saving futile and his slim chance of receiving just value for improvements that he cannot carry off if he is removed, the squatter who so invests is prudent." Steven Conn. "The Squatters Rights of Favelados". \textit{Ciencias Economicas e Sociais}, No. 100, December 1968. p. 91.
\bibitem{111} CHISAM. \textit{op. cit.} p. 92. CHISAM reports that 40 percent of the favela population is under twenty years of age, that the labor market is entered at age fourteen, and that 73 percent of the laborers are unskilled biscateiros. The Boschi study (p. 42) rejects the "marginal" model, finding only 9 percent unemployment, 25 percent holding employment for two years, 18 percent for five years, and 28 percent for ten years or more.
\end{thebibliography}
favelados are urban born, a substantial portion are of rural origin. Almost invariably the favelado arrives in the city via a "step" migration from other, often smaller cities. The composite picture which emerges from the optimistic Boschi study portrays a relatively highly motivated, literate, and reasonably satisfied favelado. In addition, Boschi's favelado would not, in most cases, return to a rural area even if given the opportunity in the form of land or employ-

112. Boschi and Goldschmidt. op. cit. p. 48. Boschi found 43.77 percent were of rural origin. In leaving the rural area, of course, the rural-urban migrant frequently gives up the patrão relationship with his "provider," though there is often an attempt to reestablish this kind of paternalism in the city. As stated by Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil. p. 107. "The patrão complex is not a thing of the past. It is still the basic form of relationship between people of different social classes in most of the communities of Northern Brazil and it is far from extinct in São Paulo."

113. Only 15 percent of Boschi's group come directly to Rio; 60 percent made one stop, 25 percent two, and 12 percent more than two stops. This "step migration," confirmed in other Brazilian migration literature, would seem to be substantially different from the "one shot" migration reported in Bogota or Mexico. See Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. pp. 13, 45 and 83.

114. Forty-three percent, e.g., would prefer non-manual or professional work. Boschi and Goldschmidt. op. cit. p. 53. Motivation was found to be higher in those of urban background. Ibid. p. 77.

115. Ibid. p. 41. Boschi asserts that 65.06 percent of the favelados in his study could read and write with various degrees of proficiency.

116. In response to the question "O senhor está contente com sua vida atual?" only 17.06 percent expressed discontent; 55.02 percent were "mais ou menos" and 27.10 percent declared themselves quite satisfied, ibid.
Fatalistic in outlook and concerned mainly with his own occupation and residence, Boschi's favelados were basically affirmative in their view of the government, though overwhelmingly opposed to moving out of the favela for public housing. As indicated above, there is a large and growing body of literature in support of the "optimist" school.

The CHISAM "tinderbox" research is less consistent and less objective than could ideally be hoped. The composite picture of favela life which emerges is sometimes a reasonably "optimistic" view of a well informed, entrepreneurial, and even idealized favelado. At other times the "tinderbox" CHISAM study waxes highly, even

117. Ibid. p. 50.
118. Ibid. p. 55.
119. In response to the question "O que senhor faria primeiro para mudar sua vida, se pudesse?" the first response was a better job (25.50 percent), followed by better house (19 percent), move to another place (19 percent), and improve the favela (12 percent).
120. Sixty-six point forty-five percent "acha ruim" to move to public housing; only 18.46 percent "acha bom." Ibid. p. 58.
121. CHISAM. op. cit. p. 84. "...is little concerned with the country's political regime beyond its relation to his own survival. He is aware and informed about any governmental change connected with his life or the community in which he lives....[he] reads newspapers, listens to the radio and watches television...."
122. Ibid. "a typically capitalist organization with great economic vitality."
123. Ibid. "intelligent, experienced, understanding, orderly and generally peaceful."
emotionally, negative in portraying the quality of life in the favela and the favelado desire to leave. In spite of the authoritarian heavy-handedness of the CHISAM study, part of the focus of the "tinderbox" school may temper some "optimistic" overstatement with regard to the quality of life in the favelas. Although the "optimists" have effectively and appropriately balanced the earlier, overly-negative approach, there are, in fact, problems of crime, health and material deprivation in the favelas, and an uncertain and even "threatened" existence. This "threatened" status is nowhere more obvious than Rio de Janeiro, where hundreds of thousands of favelados are rapidly being moved by CHISAM. Perhaps the most dramatic narration of day-to-day life in the favela is the diary of Carolina Maria de Jesus. The third section of this paper will

124. Ibid. "...it is easy to find adolescents rolling marijuana cigarettes in full daylight, taking part in forbidden games and threatening the persons and property of others....Life in some slums is a school for crime. The promiscuity, in which the majority lives, leads the adolescent to sex crimes, seduction and rape." CHISAM will be discussed later in this paper.

125. Ibid. p. 95. "he continues to show his desire to move," and upon moving "to show his joy and confidence."

126. Carolina Maria de Jesus. Child of the Dark. Signet, 1960. p. 34. "I classify Sao Paulo this way: the Governor's palace is the living room, the mayor's office is the dining-room and the city is the garden. And the favela is the backyard where they throw the
examine the Brazilian response to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

The Casas de Comodo--Concern for the quality of life in the urban environment is obviously not confined to the favelas. At one socio-economic step above the favela, for example, is the casa de comodo, or "house of rooms." A recent study indicates that as many as 200,000 people live in casas de comodo in Rio de Janeiro, and as many as 700,000 in Sao Paulo.\footnote{La.ry Salmen. The Casas de Comodo of Rio de Janeiro. Columbia doctoral dissertation, 1970. See also Morse, in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit.} The casa is frequently an old mansion (averaging garbage....I'm not going to eat because there is very little bread, I wonder if I'm the only one who leads this kind of life. What can I hope for the future? I wonder if the poor of other countries suffer like the poor of Brazil. I was so unhappy that I started to fight without reason with my boy Jose Carlos. A truck came to the favela. The driver and his helper threw away some cans. It was canned sausage. I thought: this is what these hardhearted businessmen do. They stay waiting for the prices to go up so they can earn more. And when it rots they throw it to the buzzards and to the unhappy favelados." (p. 45) "May 27--It seems that the slaughterhouse threw kerosene on their garbage dump so the favelados would not look for meat to eat. I didn't have any breakfast and walked around half dizzy. The daze of hunger is worse than that of alcohol. The daze of alcohol makes us sing, but the one of hunger makes us shake. I know how horrible it is to only have air in the stomach.... I began to have a bitter taste in my mouth. I thought: is there no end to the bitterness of life? I think that when I was born I was marked by fate to go hungry. I filled one sack of paper. When I entered Paulo Guimaries Street, a woman gave me some newspapers. They were clean and I went to the junk yard picking up everything that I found. Steel, tin, coal, everything serves the favelado."
seventeen rooms) sublet on a family per room basis, with shared facilities. With an average occupancy of 3.1 people per room, or fifty-four people per unit, Salmen sees existence characterized by lack of privacy, material deprivation and interpersonal conflict.

The Urban Environment--On a broader scale, there is increasing concern about the quality of human life in the metropolitan areas generally--the impact of the urban environment on material, institutional, behavioral and psychological dimensions of human existence in Brazil. Earlier in this paper I discussed this issue in a personal way. Several pieces of work have recently come out of Sao Paulo, however, which begin to address this "quality" issue directly.

*Recursos Humanos,*\(^{128}\) a government supported research project, points out that material necessities are wanting. More than 50 percent of the families in Sao Paulo earn less than Cr$500.00/month (or US$98.43).\(^{129}\) Forty-seven point six percent of the houses in the greater Sao Paulo area are still made of terra.\(^{130}\) Only approximately 55 percent

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129. *Ibid.* p. 21. If the poorer suburbs of greater Sao Paulo are included, 71 percent of the families earn less than Cr$500.00/month.

of the units in greater Sao Paulo have sewage and 54 percent have water. Thus it is not surprising that the "Paulista's" first concern is urban services.

The Recursos project also discusses aesthetics, the "appreciation" of the city and the more general quality of life. Looking at data on such dimensions as neighborhood societies, lower birth rate, "traditional" achievement motivation, perception of needs, and the divisions of leisure by sex and age, the Recursos project perceives two emergent Brazilian urban types. The first is the rather philistine morador (resident), who has a low "culture of poverty" level of expectation, and is defensively satisfied with his lot. The morador is thus a sort of Brazilianized "tradition directed" man. The model is a migrant who has managed to cut out a niche in the metropolis, then attempts to "humanizar" the city by maintaining

131. Ibid. p. 404.
132. Ibid. p. 31. "...os servicos...sao deficientes, ou pelo menos sao notoriamente percebidos como tal pela populacao...."; other concerns, in order, are "police and security," "communications" and health.
133. Ibid. p. 16. "...no juizo das gentes, a cidade, se nao e considerada feia, no atrai particularmente a atencao."
134. Ibid. p. 17. "...cidade que so serve para trabalhar."
135. Ibid. p. 34. Only 3.1 percent belong to sociedades, 16.7 percent belong to private clubs.
136. Ibid. p. 31.
old kinship structures and contacts, and by defining
less ambitious objectives. 137 For the "cidadao"
(urbanite), however, the city becomes more than an object
to be parlayed and consumed. It becomes a system of urban
values, a new form of communication and a novo estilo de
participacao, modern and mass in character, and homogenizing
in impact (except for the elites). The Recursos analysis
asserts that Sao Paulo's realization of an urbane style
of life has been slowed by the burden of building adequate
occupational, residential and transportation infrastructure
to accommodate the ever-increasing moradores.

There is some support for this general model in an
earlier work on urbanization and family structure in Sao
Paulo.138 This study points up some of the difficulties
inherent in transferred theory, the Chicago school of
urban sociology in particular, and describes a very
distinct system of "help patterns" and traditional family

137. Noting that only 25 percent of those interviewed
were born in Sao Paulo, but that 73.8 percent were
satisfied with their housing, the Recursos document
continues, ibid. p. 23. "...o morador e, antes
de tudo, um migrante que ao conseguir sobreviver
na cidade, alimenta-se, veste-se e abriga-se, gan-
hando o primeiro round de sua batalha." For a
more general statement of the urban worker's not
so mobile station in life see Frank Bonilla. "The
Urban Worker", in John Johnson (ed.). Continuity and
Change in Latin America. Stanford, California,

and Family Structure, in the Region of Sao Paulo,
Brazil.
ties in "urbanized" Sao Paulo society. If the Recursos and Rosen-Berlinck models are accurate it would be reasonable to hypothesize that the major impact of the urban environment on family and society in Brazil is only now beginning to be felt. And it would be reasonable to expect that the evolving urbanismo will continue its particularly Brazilian, personal, bitter-sweet, provincial-urban and morador-cidadão flavor.

Comment—The foregoing does not pretend to even scratch the surface of the "quality of life" in urban Brazil. There is

139. Ibid. p. 87. "Since the urbanization process has been intense and based on a rural migrant population and since the industrialization process has been incipient, many of the traditional characteristics of the social structure could be preserved in Brazil. The gap between the urban growth and the industrialization process has created a labor surplus in the society's economy. As a consequence all sectors of the economy have been functioning under a condition of unlimited labor supply. This labor supply, in turn, has contributed to the reinforcement or the emergence of at least four main structural features in the urban scene: the survival of many relatively traditional industrial and commercial enterprises; the expansion of the services; the maintenance of many traditional family linkages; and the expansion of a marginal urban population. Under conditions of unlimited labor supply, family cohesion and cooperation becomes a functional mechanism for the survival of those relatives that are unemployed."

140. For a recent and comprehensive review of the literature on the urban values and norms, see Richard M. Morse. "Sao Paulo: Case Study of a Latin American Metropolis", in Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. p. 151.
no mention, for example, of the quality of life in the huge standardized public housing units, which house approximately 3.4 million Brazilians, and will probably house twice that number within a few years. Nor is there discussion of the quality of life in 4,000 municipios in Brazil, of

141. The National Housing Bank alone has put up 60,000 units in the last several years, will put up another 600,000 by 1973. I do not know of any research on the quality of this vast and standardized BNH structural environment.

142. See Wagley. An Introduction to Brazil, pp. 154-159. Wagley's is an excellent discussion of the Brazilian municipality, excerpts as follows: "Brazilian small towns are above all bureaucratic and commercial centers. If the town is the seat of a municipio, there are federal, state, and municipal employees and office holders. If it is only the seat of a district, the bureaucracy is smaller but still exists....It is a safe guess that in most small municipal seats at least 20 percent of all families receive at least part of their income from the public coffers. An even higher percentage of townsmen are involved in commerce in one way or another....Brazilian commercialism does not stop at the public market or weekly fair. Municipal seats with as few as 2,000 inhabitants frequently have from twenty to thirty general stores selling the same kind of merchandise....The number of commercial transactions in any Brazilian small town is enormous. Everyone sells something to everyone else....Each Brazilian small town has its upper class, people who are essentially white-collar workers. These people are the local leaders. They are usually, but not invariably, of Caucasoid ancestry. They are profoundly urban in their ethos. These bureaucrats and small businessmen are generally more aware of events in the distant big cities than of the life of the peasantry in the surrounding rural zones. They employ household servants; follow fashion styles and dress in suit, tie, and hat; maintain social clubs; and if they can afford it, send their children to be educated in the city. They look down upon the poorer townspeople and especially upon the rural peasants, who are referred to as caboclos, matutos,
"regional" communities, or ethnic subcultures, and of various dimensions of Brazilian urban life such as the very real and complicated class and racial consciousness, social 

caipiras, tabareus, and other terms that carry the connotation of hick and yokel. Such people feel greater solidarity with relatives and friends of similar social status in other towns and in the cities than with their townspeople of lower status. The class structure of the small Brazilian town means that it is almost impossible to solve local problems through voluntary or cooperative agencies. In all small towns, there is an avid interest in politics. The local upper-class leaders are directly concerned with changes in political regime, since so many of them hold government posts. There is hardly anyone in this sector of a small-town population whose brother, sister, cousin, or some other relative is not dependent on political events. Thus, generally, two or more political parties split the allegiance of the townspeople, promoting intense feelings of hostility between close neighbors and sometimes between kinsmen. Along with divisions of social class, political schisms make any cooperative endeavor almost impossible in most Brazilian small towns. The Brazilian small town in which so many Brazilians live, is not, then, a homogeneous, neighborly, democratic community close to the soil in its way of life. The idea of a New England town meeting would be a joking matter in most Brazilian small towns. In Brazil, the small town is but an extension of the urban scene—a highly stratified society based on differences in the prestige accorded to various types of occupations, widely different degrees of wealth and power, differences of racial type, differences of education, and differences of family background. These same small towns are guardians of old Brazilian traditions, both good and bad, including the compadre system, large families and a large parentela (kin group), and the festivities of Sts. John and Peter. Brazilians regard the small town of their childhood with affection but they like to move out of it."

143. See, e.g., Wagley. Amazon Town: A Study of Man in the Tropics.

and occupational mobility, politics and urban guerrilla warfare, religious movements, urban architecture and aesthetics, etc. In short, this section does not pretend to say what the quality of human life in the Brazilian urban environment "is," or to precisely define problems. Rather the purpose is to state some general and specific observations about Brazilian cities and the quality of human life therein, and to indicate the presence of enduring urban problems which should be of concern to Brazilian planners, policy makers, and scholars— and to the Foundation. Many of the problems are quite ephemeral, as human values and choice, opportunity, interaction, security, "identification" and quality of life. Even these issues, however, may manifest themselves in tangible forms—a high rate of "divorce" and suicide in Brasilia, the removal of several hundred thousand favelados in Rio de Janeiro, or the explosive and unpredictable growth of an area (such as Belo Horizonte). Many other urban issues are as concrete as the "pathological" employment pattern in Rio, Salvador and Recife, the widespread urban unemploy-

145. Reported in an interview with Glaucio Soares, Federal University of Brasilia; Glaucio is now doing research in this field.

146. See Morse, op. cit. p. 163. While 53.7 percent of Sao Paulo's population is employed in the tertiary sector, Rio employs 71.2 percent in that sector. I do not know of good research on the tertiary sector of Brazil.
ment and underemployment, the sewage and health problems
of a favela such as Alagados or a city such as Sao Paulo,
or the sheer statistics of housing, feeding, transporting,
educating and employing Brazil's increasingly predominantly
urban society.
BRAZILIAN RESPONSES TO URBANIZATION
The Brazilian response to urbanization is obviously complex, reflecting the nature of the issues and the phenomena involved. This section will focus briefly on some "societal" perception of cities. Then it will examine the governmental responses in general, and at the various federal, regional, state, metropolitan and municipal levels. There is also a brief discussion of nongovernmental responses. The section concludes with an analysis of "urban policy," including a case study of the Brazilian response to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and a more general statement with regard to the "frontier-oriented" and "underdeveloped" nature of urban policy in Brazil.
"SOCIETAL" PERCEPTION OF CITIES

It has been asserted that Brazil's population is "one of the most rural in the world," that the Brazilian is "a man without a community" and that Brazilian cities are "lacking an esprit de corps." To whatever extent my own observations are accurate, these assertions ring of overstatement and imbalance. Brazilians are obviously not among the most rural people in the world if one looks at the size and growth of the cities, the increasingly "urban" composition of the population, and the distinct and complex urbanismo dimensions of life. On the contrary, Brazil is a predominantly, increasingly urban society. In absolute figures, approximately twice as many people live in metropolitan areas in Brazil as in any other country in Latin America. With regard to "community spirit," Brazilians are as much Paulistas and Cariocas as Americans are "Chicagoans" or "San Franciscans." Perhaps the most vivid statement of community feeling is Amado's narration of the Itabuna-Ilheus rivalries in the days of the cacao boom. The assertion that Brazilian cities lack esprit de corps also seems inconsistent with the


pride in Brasilia, the affection for Salvador, and the national love affair with Rio de Janeiro (the famous carnival song concludes "cidade maravilhosa, coração do meu Brasil"). It has been pointed out that Brazilians are profoundly urban in their aspirations and even the favelados look down on the provincials they left behind. The same favelados have little desire to return to the land. Even the smallest town has an affinity for what has been called an "urban ethos."6

In discussing the conflicting urban attitudes of colonial Brazil it was noted that there was a strong romanticism with regard to the interior. This romanticism

3. See pp. 51-52 and pp. 113-114, footnote no. 142, above.
4. See p. 106, footnote no. 118 of this paper, and see Wagley. op. cit. p. 185: "There is a tremendous social distance between most inhabitants of the concentrated centers and the people of rural neighborhoods."
5. Ibid.
6. Marvin Harris. Town and Country in Brazil. New York. 1956. Wagley discusses one particular dimension of this "urban ethos" as follows: "One of the most complimentary statements that might be made about a Brazilian small town is that it has movimento. This seems to mean more than just commercial activities and a busy social life, but it means these as well. It also means noise and general bustle. A town of any importance has one or more public address systems, often in competition with one another. Records are played; public announcements are made of births, deaths, birthdays, and marriages; advertisements are broadcast for products and stores; and political announcements and campaign speeches are carried through these loudspeakers. They operate at a volume which is deafening to the unaccustomed ear but which is part of the concept of movimento. Many
was rather paradoxically coupled with a preference for life in the city, and with a view of the city as the locus of culture and movimento and the center (if not the very embodiment) of colonization and of development. They represent the centers of wealth (and poverty), education, entertainment, commerce, and national strength and, in Brasilia, identity. At the same time size and concentration are increasingly seen as undesirable per se. There is a common Brazilian refrain—"the city is great but there are too many people." But in spite of a desire to somehow hold the backlander in the overly-romanticized interior, the cidadão and the immigrant alike see the city as the place to be. As stated by Bonilla:

Romanticism about the persistent yearning for a 'return to the land' and the wholesome moral consistency and effective solidarity of rural life notwithstanding, the mass exodus to the cities continues. It does not seem too great a task to make confirmed city people of rural migrants, but the reverse seems almost impossible.

Brazilian small towns depend on diesel-run generators for their electricity, and current is cut off during many hours of the day and at 10:00 or 11:00 P.M. The visitor then gets some relief from movimento.

7. See pp. 50-54 of this paper.


The policy impact of Brazil's contemporary urban-rural weltansicht will be discussed in greater detail. Suffice to say, at this point, that Brazilians are increasingly urban in their existence, and yet erratically and inconsistently rural in their dreams.

10. See the concluding part of this section. It should be noted that there is relatively little information on the perception of urbanization by several of the most important institutions in Brazil--industry, the military and the Church in particular. It would be interesting, for example, to know the Church's view of cities, and the impact of this view on information resources in the rural sector, and perhaps on rural-urban migration.
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO URBANIZATION

The Brazilian government responds to urbanization on three "primary" levels: federal, state and município. The município corresponds roughly to the county in the United States. Made up of distritos (corresponding to townships), each município has a sede (seat) of government which is, by Brazilian definition, a cidade. There are approximately 4,000 municípios in Brazil, approximately one-sixth of them (720) in Minas Gerais. A município may have a population of over five million, as does one of the municípios in São Paulo, or a population of fifty. In areas like Mato Grosso and Amazonas a município may be the size of a European country. Whatever its demographic or physical size, the município is the basic governmental unit between the soil and the various states. There are twenty-two states, ranging in size from the city-state of Guanabara to Mato Grosso, Para, and Amazonas, any one of which is half again the size of France. The traditional locus of political power, much like the American colonies, the states were meaningfully nationalized only in the mid-twentieth century, under Vargas. The federal government is now the ultimate repository of practically all governmental power.

In addition to the "primary" levels of urban government there are two "secondary" levels: "regional" and "metropolitan." The "regional" agencies are primarily
organs of the Ministry of the Interior, such as SUDENE and SUDAM. Though part of the federal government, these interstate agencies function at a regional level somewhere "between" the state and federal government. Similarly there is the beginning of a governmental "presence" between the state and the municipio level, in the form of associations of municipalities and, more important, the beginnings of an inter-municipio, metropolitan government. At the moment the latter does not exist (Sao Paulo, for example, is made up of thirty-eight autonomous municipalities). Enabling legislation to create metropolitan government does exist, however, and implementation is being discussed between the related Ministries of the federal government. What follows is a brief discussion of the "urban response" of these various levels of government.
The Federal Responses to Urbanization

Within the federal government, the executive branch has not focused its attention on the problems of the cities. There are, of course, a myriad of "urban related" federal entities and projects within the open ended and fundamental "urban" definition used in this paper. The Ministry of Labor has a number of programs and research projects with regard to labor demand, flow and absorption. The Ministry of Transportation is involved in numerous transportation projects (the Rio-Niteroi bridge is one example). The Ministries of Education and Planning are supporting the training of personnel for local government, and the Ministries of Industry and Health (among others) are similarly involved in "urban related" problems and policies. The principal federal actors in the urban sector, however, are the Ministry of the Interior and, to a far lesser extent,

11. One exception to this assertion might be Kubitschek and Brasilia. Even this urban focus, however, must be qualified in that (i) Brasilia was site specific; the Brasilia "urban" concern did not carry over in any immediate sense to other cities, or to urban problems in general (on the contrary, Brasilia probably absorbed resources which would otherwise have partly gone to other urban areas); also (ii) the raison d'être for Brasilia, opening the interior via "a marcha para oeste," was more geographic and "interior" than urban in focus. The major concerns of the federal government have been regional (Northeastern and, more recently, Amazonas) and industrial in nature. Even those decisions relating immediately to the urban sector, such as industrialization or housing, have often been conceptualized in relatively narrow terms, not as relating to the overall urbanization process.
the Ministry of Planning.

The Ministry of the Interior

Minister Jose Costa Cavalcanti is the highest figure in the Brazilian government to address the issue of urbanization reasonably directly. Cavalcanti's attention to the urban sector accurately reflects the primary locus of federal "urban" concern, the Ministry of the Interior. Within it are located the National Housing Bank (BNH), the Federal Housing and Urbanization Service (SERFHAU) and the housing companies (COHABs and cooperatives "sindicatos").

The National Housing Bank (BNH)—BNH is the most important single entity in the urban sector. Established in 1966 under the then powerful Minister of the Interior, General Albuquerque Lima, the Bank's initial mandate was to meet a housing deficit of eight million units.

12. "O fenomeno inevitavel da urbanizacao que se constata por toda a parte, e ainda a mudanca de atitude social de grandes massas de populacao...." text of Cavalcanti's address to the Inter American Housing Conference. O Globo, April 8, 1971. p. 10.

13. BNH is discussed below; COHABs are public (state) housing finance agencies, financing housing for families with up to three minimum salaries (Cr$561.60 or US$110.55 per month). The cooperatives are private, civil syndicates or associations of interested parties with family incomes of up to six minimum salaries (Cr$1,123.20 or US$221.10) per month.
estimated to be growing at 5,000 units per year. To deal with this acute shortage, BNH was given access to investment funds which have been estimated to equal 6 percent of the gross national domestic product, and a broad mandate to respond to the housing problem. The total investment of BNH was recently estimated at $US4 billion. In applying these considerable assets, the BNH housing financing program has aimed at home ownership (not, as in U.S. public housing, rental), the rhetorical goal being "a private home in reach of everyone."

The housing finance system established by BNH is

14. BNH-70 (unfortunately there are no page numbers to cite in this and in many of the BNH publications). According to BNH-70 only 127,000 housing units were financed or constructed by public entities between 1939 and 1963.

15. Frankenhoff's internal Foundation memorandum dated May 30, 1969. The major resources tapped by the Bank are (i) the guaranteed employment fund (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Servico (FGTS)), (ii) the speculative savings represented by the sale of Letras Imobiliarias, and (iii) the private resources which come to the Bank through the savings and loan system. The FGTS channels 8 percent of all wages earned in Brazil to the Bank. BNH reports total housing investment of approximately US$3.5 billion over the past few years; BNH also reports that they completed 1970 with net assets of approximately Cr$7.5 billion (or approximately US$1.5 billion) and that 85.9 percent of their credit resources come from FGTS and 8.8 percent from savings and loans. (SBPE, discussed below) BNH-70.

16. Interview with Lordello de Mello.
Quite complicated, but functions through two basic channels: (i) the financial intermediaries of BNH, such as the investment banks, COHABs, commercial banks, social security institutes, private corporations, etc., and (ii) the Brazilian savings and loan system. BNH financing is always tied to the "mini-devaluations" of Delfim Neto's Ministry of Finance, thus offering a monetary correction hedge against inflation. Through these various channels BNH has financed approximately 660,000 housing units by 1970.

By aiming primarily at middle and lower middle class urban housing, however, BNH narrowed its mandate considerably.

17. "The Brazilian savings and loan system (SBPE) has been established to stimulate savings patterns in relation to the housing deficit. The SBPE consists of three major institutional groups: (a) the real estate credit societies—(Sociedades de Credito Imobiliario), and (b) Federal and (c) State Brazilian Societies—(Caixa Economica Federal and Caixa Economica Estadual)." Frankenhoff, op. cit. p. 4.

18. There is, in effect, an additional subsidy for the low cost COHAB housing, via a decelerated, yearly rather than, for example, monthly monetary correction. This allows repayment with inflated cruzeiros. Sometimes BNH also offers a second subsidy, selling public land at below market cost. Interview with Alvaro Pessoa.

19. One hundred twenty-seven thousand (127,000) were financed in 1970 alone; BNH estimates that they are reaching more than 3.5 million people with their housing sector. BNH-70 Resumo Technico-Financeiro.
In the late 1960's, BNH concluded that its housing objectives were being realized, citing the decrease in rent, the decrease in cost per unit, and the development of private construction companies and material industries. BNH resolved that in addition to housing, they would address the area of basic urban "infrastructure" and urban services. In "sanitation" BNH decided to work exclusively with water and sewage problems. Convenios for water systems were signed with 983 municipalities. BNH asserts that the new water plan, PLANSA, will reach 63 million urban Brazilians by the end of the decade. Reflecting an increasing interest in "urban services," the sanitation portion of the BNH budget doubled between 1969 and 1970, from 3 percent to almost 6 percent. BNH is also becoming involved in water pollution problems, as well as construction and material industries. Even before it had

20. Interview with Mario Trindade, President of BNH; also BNH-70 Resultados.

21. BNH-70. The municipios and, via a Fund for Water and Sewage (FAE), the states also contribute to the expenses of the water programs. See generally Abastecimento de Agua Equacionamento em Nivel Nacional. January, 1971. This PLANSA program definition was the work of fourteen colaboradores, twelve engineers and two economists.


23. Cr$411 million (or US$82.2 million) in 1970. This is the so-called RECOM program. BNH-70.
to address infrastructure problems of sanitation, pollution, and construction, BNH had developed a third basic program area, in urban planning and development with SERFHAU (discussed below). Housing finance, however, remains the principal program thrust of BNH. The relative importance of these respective areas is shown by the budget projection for 1971-1973: housing finance Cr$6.3 billion (US$1.26 billion to reach 644,000 units); basic sanitation, Cr$730 million (US$146 million); and local development and planning, Cr$60 million (US$12 million). Research has not been strongly supported by BNH.24

Comment on BNH—BNH is financing the construction of a huge number of housing units, some individual, some block apartments, all standardized. So overwhelming is the BNH "presence" that it stamps the entire federal policy in urban Brazil as, in the first instance, a housing policy.25

24. The Cr$2,818,000 1970 budget shows a similar allocation: housing finance via agencies 78.9 percent; construction materials 15.1 percent; sanitation 5.7 percent; administrative expenses are calculated to be 1.74 percent; if the minuscule "studies, research, and technical assistance" portion (0.12 percent) is included, administrative expenses amount to 1.86 percent. BNH-70.

25. See Charles Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy in Brazil. August 1970. pp.2-3. “Urban development policy in Brazil is an offspring of the national housing systems....the housing momentum of BNH is so strong that it completely overshadows its urban development systems.”
approach is above all physical—houses, sewage and water systems, and housing materials. Most of the BNH staff are engineers, lawyers, economists, statisticians and accountants. Trindade himself is an engineer. Although physical in its orientation, BNH has tended to use the language of economists and urban geographers. Thus there is a focus on "the housing problem and the employment need," analyzed in the syntax of "forward and backward linkages" and labor absorption. And there is much talk of "sphere of influence" and "urban poles of development." Underlying these conceptual currents are several "political" concerns, or motivational theories. There has been an explicit "diffusing of the masses" thread in BNH's thinking.

26. BNH has, however, come under severe public attack by the national architects association in Brazil. See "Arquiteto critica plano e acao do BNH". Correio da Manha, April 1 1971.

27. "O BNH Financia a Criacao de Novos Polos de Desenvolvimento Urbano". A Casa Propria ao Alcance de Todos, suplemento de Manchete no. 991.

28. The basic relationship posited is a direct one, between material well being (particularly housing and jobs) and social tranquility; "more important than the physical or financial results which were obtained was the reduction of social tension through the absorption of manpower" Mario Trindade's lecture at the Superior War School, Rio de Janeiro, July 28, 1969.
There is also a rather consistent view that urban growth, particularly from rural-urban migration, is undesirable. And there is a reasonably consistent theme that concentration is undesirable. The BNH-Ministry of the Interior "response" to this particular conceptualization will be discussed later in this section. For the moment, it is worth noting that BNH and Trindade are obviously aware of

29. In discussing the success of BNH Trindade warned: "the success of this sector has had its price—the raising of the potential of rural-urban migration, due to new enticements...." Trindade further reported that the Ministry of the Interior's response to urban density was the "macro-regional" integrated planning program, the responsibility of the Regional Superintendencies. Ibid. p. 10. This speech to the Superior War School also offered a "strategic" reason why urban concentration would be undesirable: "do we have strategic defenses, when eleven nuclear warheads can obliterate such concentrations in Brazil?" The speech also analyzed "increase in tension" between urban and rural areas, and concludes that the "costs of the trend" are not tolerable. Ibid. p. 13.

30. At least four reasons why concentration is undesirable have already been mentioned: (i) the danger of "tension" in the urban masses, (ii) the danger of tension between urban and rural groups, (iii) the increasing cost of maintenance, (iv) the "strategic" danger of concentration. Trindade also sees concentration as a threat to the social and moral fabric of the society: "O que até hoje nos não sabemos, no mundo inteiro, e se a urbanização por si só e capaz de melhorar a qualidade de vida da humanidade. E se tem demonstrado justamente o oposto, em termos de poluição, em termos de destruição de escalas de valores morais, ou sociais, em termos de aumento do índice de criminalidade ou outros que tais. E para esta busca que nos, que estamos aqui, devemos todos nos sentirmos convocados." Ibid. p. 5-6.
their role as the prime actors in the urban sector, equally aware that there are serious problems in the cities of Brazil, and that housing is not the entire answer to these problems.

31. An awareness of the IBGE urban geographers' rather basic but dramatic demographic data is a consistent intellectual component of the BNH analysis of the problems facing Brazil. See, e.g., "Presidente do BNH preve a duplicacao da populacao do Brasil dentro de 30 anos". Jornal do Brasil, March 30, 1971. This focus and awareness should bode well for those who would have BNH take on a broader urban role, as indeed they are beginning to do (via "sanitation").

32. "A solucao do problema habitacional e inseparavel da solucao dos problemas do desenvolvimento urbano". Conferencia proferida pelo Dr. Mario Trindade no III Congresso Inter Americano de Habitacao, 20.03.71; "the experience of forty-three months work showed the necessity for establishing a 'system of systems,' which would be able to provide the necessary components towards the production and marketing of houses, the promotion of infrastructure facilities, e.g., water, electricity, sewage, planning of integrated urban and local development, methodological definition which would enable better techniques and methods for financing and allocation of resources; training of technical personnel....the establishment of research and development centers...." Lecture at the Superior War School. p. 6. Trindade 'axed even broader in his "quality of life" talk on "Marginalizacao do Desenvolvimento". p. 3. 

....nao era possivel nos atermos, unica e exclusivamente a habitação. Tinhamos de encarar o problema da urbanizacao como um todo buscando....atacar, a partir da habitação como o meio, o problema da geracao de empregos e, a seguir, o planejamento do desenvolvimento urbano das nossas cidades. E preciso que cuidemos da elevacao da qualidade de vida dessas populacoes. E ai, nao valem simplesmente a renda per capita ou quaisquer outros indices qualitativos do padrao medio de distribuicao de riqueza. E para a definicao do que entendemos como qualidade de vida que estamos todos buscando aquilo que chamamos o modelo brasileiro de desenvolvi mento....Definiremos como fundamentais neste trabalho:
The Federal Service of Housing and Urbanization (SERFHAU)--
SERFHAU was set up at the same time as BNH, as a housing
and planning agency under the aegis of the Ministry
of the Interior. Concern on the part of BNH's first
president led to a political struggle in which SERFHAU
quickly lost out. As a result, the principal Brazilian
"planning" entity (SERFHAU) was initially subordinated to
the principal Brazilian "housing" entity (BNH)--something
of a reversal of roles. SERFHAU functioned as a low cost
(COHAB) housing financing agency, the organizational heir
to the Fundacao da Casa Popular. For the first several
years of its existence SERFHAU was an overstaffed, under-
productive appendage to BNH. In 1967 SERFHAU's directorship
was taken over by a Brazilian architect-planner, Harry Cole.
Cole trimmed the staff and turned the organization to
promoting and financing local planning.

As SERFHAU promoted the development of "integrated"
urban planning, the maintenance of an information center
and technical staff became the principal program objectives.
A more recent objective is the support of municipal

pesquisa e desenvolvimento, aplicadas as ciencias sociale e a tecnologia; seja a tecnologia de
planejamento da ordenacao espacial, da ocupacao territorial....seja na pesquisa do conforto humano,
seja na investigacao da qualidade de vida...." Intellectually, if not always programmatically, the
broad gauge concerns manifest in this statement offer
a confortable rationale for a more humane, less
"physical" approach to urban problems on the part
of BNH. (Emphasis mine).
administration. SERFHAU has not yet evolved into a national urban planning or policy agency, although this role is being discussed.

With regard to SERFHAU's planning program there are two basic phases: the 1967-1969 Cole policy involved a two-step planning process, beginning with a "preliminary study" to develop a plano de desenvolvimento local integrado (PDLI). This approach was designed to encourage a federally financed, locally controlled plan, the possession of which would be a precondition to and a guide for the application of federal funds. This planning effort was not particularly successful, in some measure because of its external impetus, the architectural and physical planning bias (in spite of the rhetoric about planejamento integrado) and because of the diffusion of decision making in applying resources to the municipalities (i.e., the plans were often ignored by other agencies). The plans were not even integrated with BNH's own decision making processes.33 The effectiveness of the plan was also undercut in some cases by the Balkanized political reality of the municipios in Brazil, making metropolitan planning difficult or impossible. By common agreement most of the PDLI plans ended up gathering dust in the various prefeituras.

Beginning in 1969, SERFHAU's planning program was incorporated into a Program of Concentrated Action (PAC)

33. Interview with Harry Cole, former director of SERFHAU.
within the Ministry of the Interior. The PAC program selected approximately 457 municipalities as priority areas for the allocation of the Ministry's resources.\(^3^4\)

For the cities participating in the PAC program, there are three types of plans: (i) the "relatorio preliminar" (RP), a simple plan for the smallest municipalities, (ii) a more complicated "plano de acao imediata" (PAI), for cities identified as poles of development, and (iii) the new, upgraded "plano de desenvolvimento local integrado" (PDLI) for large cities, the "poles of macro-region."\(^3^5\)

The actual planning is realized through private agencies selected by SERFHAU (thus offering a substantial subsidy to private architect-urbanists). The plans are often based on modest research, usually from secondary data or a relatively quick survey by the contracted "urbanists," administrators, economists, etc. The planning process is monitored by SERFHAU, in

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\(^3^4\) The participating municipalities were initially quite systematically selected from the 200 macro-regions of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. The "sample" was subsequently enlarged for a number of geographical, economic, demographic and explicitly political reasons (e.g., all state capitals are included). Interview with Herbet Lima at SERFHAU. The PAC cities chosen represent approximately 70 percent of the total number of municipios in Brazil, 50 percent of the population and 80 percent of the productivity. Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU.

accordance with their how-to-plan manuals. By way of quick evaluation, the PAC planning series offers little, if any, improvement on the earlier PDLI. The PAC plans suffer from all of the defects of the earlier PDLI, and they are perhaps more narrow and physical in approach than the earlier PDLI plans. Moreover, the planning process is becoming increasingly bureaucratic within SERFHAU, and the already miniscule local participation has decreased to the point of nonexistence (now SERFHAU picks the planner, supervises and approves or disapproves the plan). The end result is an increasingly "external" and imposed planning process which thus far, has been redeemed mainly by its failure to be applied. This planning process and the private consultant, "quick and applied" research which accompanies it may, however, be establishing an unfortunate tradition and understanding of what constitutes "urban research." In spite of these reserva-


37. This is clearly the explicit view of some of Brazil's better known urbanists. This evaluation is also influenced by my recent trip through most of the major cities of Brazil, and the frequent reaction within
tions about the merit of the integrated planning program, PAC is giving SERFHAU considerable national visibility as the federal fund dispensing and planning agency in urban Brazil.

SERFHAU's urban role was recently broadened when it absorbed the Servico Nacional dos Municipios, thereby putting it in the business of giving administrative assistance and training courses in the various municipalities.38 There are permanent schools for civil servants in several cities (Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Porto Alegre).39 SERFHAU is still struggling to absorb and integrate these new, administrative responsibilities. If they are successful the national presence of the organization will be increasingly felt.

A third role of SERFHAU is one of information gathering and research. With modest assistance from USAID (approximately US$160,000) SERFHAU has established the prefeituras that the plans, in the absence of funds, political jurisdiction and greater depth of knowledge, were not applicable.

38. The move into municipal administration puts SERFHAU and IBAM (discussed below) precisely in the same area, with SERFHAU having the advantage of more direct access to federal funds, IBAM having the advantage of experience and know-how.

39. The courses given are practical and focus on immediate issues as they arise at different parts of the year--how to collect taxes, balance books, etc. Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU.
an information center for planning (CIDUL). With a staff of over thirty, a 1971 budget of Cr$2,704,809 (or US$524,187), and an extremely well-organized system of information retention and retrieval, CIDUL holds out great promise as a national information center. SERFHAU could also become something of an applied research arm of the Ministry of the Interior. SERFHAU was, for example, recently contracted to study internal migration. At the present time, however, their research experience and staff are quite limited.

It has been asserted that "SERFHAU has some of the elements, including the important element of vision, which might permit it to become the centralized, coordinating authority for the development of national urbanization policy" in Brazil. While many highly competent Brazilian

40. CIDUL is not a data bank per se, but rather a sophisticated index to other (often unsophisticated) data. CIDUL is now supported entirely by SERFHAU, i.e., the Brazilian government. The cost of implantation, including computers, is estimated to be US$1,187,000. CIDUL. March 1971. p. 51.

41. Ibid. pp. 19-26, and anexos.

42. The Ministry of the Interior directives of 1971 projects five regional "centers of information," one in each regional secretariat, the center in Rio de Janeiro. See "O Desdobramento Futuro do CIDUL". CIDUL. Ibid. p. 15.

43. Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy in Brazil. p. 19. The person to whom the "vision" was attributed now rejects this assertion. Former SERFHAU staff feel that Frankenhoff's information is dated and that
urbanists are prepared to reject Frankenhoff's assertion in its entirety, the ultimate role of SERFHAU is very much up in the air. Within SERFHAU national urban policy is considered to be a "very delicate question" raising, as it does, the issue of SERFHAU's relationship with BNH, and the relationship between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministries of Finance and Justice. There appears to be little question but that SERFHAU would like to formulate national policy guidelines, and in some measure coordinate governmental urban decisions, including those of BNH. For the moment, however, SERFHAU is lost in politics, and in a bureaucratic and external planning procedure. One well-known urbanist-planner dismisses SERFHAU as "a lost cause."

44. Interview with Vitorio Pareto, SERFHAU. As described by Pareto, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for local and regional development and the Ministry of Planning for national development. There is an increasing awareness of urban and metropolitan problems within these ministries and--as with the current discussions of a metropolitan level of government, discussed below--considerable inter-ministerial "shouldering" into the relatively new but very active urban area. An autonomous Ministry of Urban Affairs, with SERFHAU playing a central role, is reportedly being discussed with the federal government, though the exact organizational or, more important, professional inputs of such a Ministry are still undefined at the time of this writing.

45. See Frankenhoff. National Urbanization Policy in Brazil. p. 2. "In the past SERFHAU has been merely the intermediary between the municipality seeking planning financing and BNH, with little attempt at policy integration. The present trend of thinking in SERFHAU is to become an independent technical institute capable of developing and spending its
is establishing an increasing national "presence" while struggling to manage its programs of planning, administration and information coordination. The definition of SERFHAU's ultimate "urban policy" role may have to await a more systematic handling of these tasks, and resolution of the inter-Ministerial issue of "urban jurisdiction."

The Center for Housing Research (CENPHA)--The Center for Housing Research (CENPHA) is a university-affiliated research arm of BNH. Staffed mainly by a small, modestly trained group of economists and engineers, CENPHA has not shown much strength as a teaching own budget in the area of urban policy." It is interesting to note that SERFHAU recently signed a convenio with the British Government and the OAS for a technical office in SERFHAU, one objective of which would be the "Formulação da Cena Política de Desenvolvimento". SERFHAU. p. 6. My own understanding is that Edinburgh entered SERFHAU unaware that OAS was already there. Edinburgh's input is principally in research (three architect planners in place for only four to six months) and training (again by architect planners, most recently Mr. Leonard who is in SERFHAU for at least one year). The OAS is doing very much the same thing, but they are also attempting to formulate a policy for urban development, to be included in the national plan. The idea is not so much to develop the plan as to have accepted a proposal to elaborate same, with SERFHAU as the policy agency (or Ministry). Personalities will obviously play a role in the SERFHAU emergence as a national urban policy agency. The present head of SERFHAU, engineer Leo Sergio Abreu, is married to the niece of Minister of the Interior, Calvalcanti. (Since the foregoing was written Trindade has resigned from BNH, reportedly with pressure from Cavaicanti, and this change may increase SERFHAU's autonomy).
or research organization. While there are technically six departments, the basic research activities of CENPHA are carried out in the Department of Housing Research and the Department of Technological Research. The former, staffed primarily by economists, focuses on pragmatic housing-related issues such as housing demand and rent level. The latter, technological arm is staffed primarily by engineers conducting research on building materials. CENPHA has subcontracted some research on housing investment (Frankenhoff) and the favelas of Rio (Parisse). It also gives some short technological training courses, often taught by outside staff. In general, CENPHA can be characterized as a relatively low power and technocratic research organization which does not appear to enjoy the strong support of BNH.

Projeto Rondon—Projeto Rondon is a Ministry of the Interior coordinated VISTA-like program to involve young (often)

46. Department of Housing Research, Department of Technological Research, Department of Training, Department of Documentation, the Savings and Loan Research, and Administration.

47. As noted above, BNH spends approximately one tenth of one percent (0.12 percent) on all research. BNH-70.
vacationing) Brazilian students in social action. The five year old program has absorbed more than 14,000 participants, usually from technological or professional schools. The regional focus of Rondon has been predominantly in the far west and the north, specifically in the small municipalities. The connection between Rondon and urbanization is somewhat tenuous, but it is considered by the Brazilian Government to be a part of a plan for regional and urban development.48

The Ministry of Planning

The second major federal entity in the urban sector is the Ministry of Planning, headed by a Yale trained economist, Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso. As indicated above, the overall urban role of the Ministry of Planning remains to be defined. It is unlikely, however, that the Ministry of Planning will become the major urban policy agency in the near future. Rather the federal "urban" responsibilities will probably be fragmented for some time to come. Within the Ministry of Planning there are two principal urban related programs: (i) the research arm

of the Ministry (IPEA), and (ii) the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

The Institute of Applied Research (IPEA)—The Institute of Applied Research (IPEA) is an arm of the Ministry of Planning. While there is a rubrical urban and regional development sector in IPEA, the research program and staff have demonstrated a strong rural and agricultural bias. This led to the quiet departure, several years ago, of IPEA's urban economists, and the virtual closing down of the urban sector. It appears, however, that IPEA has a renewed interest in urbanization. Directed by an urban economist (Hamilton Tolosa, Ph.D. Pennsylvania) its urban sector is planning staff expansion and several research projects. The largest of these projects involves a recent US$472,000 grant to the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC). Its general objective is to encourage research and training in economics and social sciences. One portion of the grant is for research and training in urban and metropolitan development. In IPEA the nascent interest is predominantly in urban economics. Given this very preliminary state of urban-related concerns, the Ministry of Planning and Coordination has generally played more of a coordinating than a planning role in the urban sector. Thus federal initiative in the urban sector usually comes less from
than from the Ministry of the Interior. Perhaps reflecting this tilt to the 'inertia' Ministry, the current "regional and urban development" plans show a strong "regional" and a rather weak "urban" flavor. 49

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)—The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) is also within the Ministry of Planning. Staffed mainly by statisticians, urban geographers and economists, IBGE is the main census, data, and information gathering agency of the federal government. The Institute has strong leadership in Isaac Kerstenetzky, an economist. But IBGE's facilities are limited (they are only now, for example, purchasing their own computer). And its urban staff is undertrained, or perhaps merely of rather limited disciplinary or professional expertise. As indicated by the name, IBGE is the center of "applied" urban geography in Brazil. There is a divisao regional (headed by Pedro Geiger, urban geographer) and a Setor de Geografia Urbana (headed by Roberto Lobato Correia, urban geographer). IBGE is usually quantitative and chronological in approach,

49. See Metas e Bases para a Acao do Governo. p. 97. This document states that the regional and urban development policy is to promote integrated regional development in the Northeast, Amazon, Rio Grande do Sul, Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo. Another objective is to promote the integration of the Rio-Sao Paulo-Belo
often regional in focus. Heavily influenced by the French, the geographers of IBGE deal in the gross variables of agricultural production, transportation, communication, commerce, finance, urban services, migration, population, etc. And they very consistently translate these variables into a visual product, such as a map, graph or chart. The underlying economic or motivational dimensions, however, are only faintly visible in the brightly colored maps and charts, and the grey rows of figures. The IBGE impact on the conceptualization of Brazilian urban "reality," however, is substantial, and, with the generally excellent 1970 census, increasing. Its role, however, is mainly that of gathering data (often within a regional context). They have generally not attempted to synthesize the intellectual or theoretical latch-strings of the urban processes and "reality" they depict.

Horizonte agricultural-industrial axis, and the development of the principal megalopolis of the country, Rio and Sao Paulo, via the PAC plan.

50. See, for example, the urban sector's only publication, Cidade e Regiao no Sudoeste Paranaense. Approximately one-half of the bibliography is French.

51. The IBGE demographic, regional, and census material is probably the single most important quantitative and visual element in the federal and BNH urban thinking. There is a lengthy list of urban-related IBGE publications, e.g., on migration, urbanization, urban services, etc.
Regional Responses to Urbanization

At one level "below" the Federal Government, there are several regional attempts to respond to urbanization. This programmatic "regionalism" is probably a response to the regional diversity of Brazil, and the "regionalism" of Brazilian public policy and of public data. Within the Ministry of the Interior there are four regional secretariats: SUDESUL in the South, SUDECO in the West, SUDAM in the North and SUDENE in the Northeast. Of these the latter two are by far the most important. These regional agencies coordinate the application of government and private resources within their respective areas, though without any coordinated urban component or policy. As a result

52. Most of the "regional" programs originate in the Federal Government, within the Ministry of the Interior and SERFHAU in particular. Since "regionalism" will be investigated at length by the Robin group, my own treatment of this level will be brief.

53. As discussed above, p. 124, footnote no. 11.

54. See p. 78, footnote no. 73 and pp. 144-145 of this paper.

55. This is also true of the various development banks working within these regions, e.g., the Bank of the Northeast, Bank of Amazon, etc. These "regional" banks have not concentrated resources on urbanization per se, though their overall development and human resource approach and their staff and research capacity make them important entities in the "urban" sector.
the "urban policy" of these organizations is an offshoot of their various regional development attempts, e.g., industrialization, housing, transportation, human resources, etc. SUDENE officials, for example, regard their basic urban effort as the program in housing, water and sewage. They leave the urban planning either to the municipios, the state (as in the case of the new industrial city outside of Salvador, Aratu, or the federal government, usually via SERFHAU.

There is a second "regional" response to urbanization, in the form of joint planning and association of municipios in a given region. This SERFHAU sponsored association has mainly been attempted in the south of the country. Even there, however, the collaboration has been limited, confined principally to the elaboration of the SERFHAU plans.

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56. Interview with Dr. Riberato, Director of SUDENE, Salvador.
State Responses to Urbanization

The states attempt to respond to the problems of urbanization in a variety of ways. The various state secretariats, particularly public works, transportation, housing, welfare, etc. are often very "urban" in their activities. In the absence of a viable form of metropolitan government the state has often stepped in to attempt to coordinate the activities of contiguous urban municipios. In some major cities, as in Manaus, this has resulted in state controlled water and sewage services. In Salvador, Recife and Rio de Janeiro there are state agencies set up to work with favela urbanizacao. In Sao Paulo the State Secretary of Planning has established a planning agency (GEGRAN) for the Greater Sao Paulo area. Also involved are the state development

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57. The Rio Agency is CODESCO, discussed below.

58. This agency has spent something in the range of US$8 million over the past ten years, producing three major plans on: (1) mass transit, (2) PUB, the basic urban plan for the city of Sao Paulo (contracted by the municipio of Sao Paulo, but not confined to it), and (3) the GEGRAN state supported plan, recently completed but not yet published. Sao Paulo has relatively little to show by way of implementation of these plans. The thirty-eight municipalities of Sao Paulo remain largely autonomous ("they decide what they want to do") and GEGRAN lacks the political clout or the financial control to make implementation effective. As a result Sao Paulo planning is extremely diffuse, located in the various municipio planning agencies, and the various state secretariats and Federal Ministries. Interview with Joao Carlos Pimenta, Director of GEGRAN. Pimenta estimates that 50-60
banks, the state housing agencies (COHAB's) and several state research foundations. The state is also directly involved in municipal government through the appointment, by the (appointed) governor, of the various mayors. In general it is safe to say that the state itself is one of the most important and least coordinated political actors in urban Brazil.

percent of the money going into urban infrastructure is state money. Given even a superficial understanding of the disjunctive nature of planning in Sao Paulo, it is amazing that the system works as well as it does.

59. FAPESP in Sao Paulo, for example, was set up in 1962 as a state supported research foundation (not unlike the National Science Foundation). FAPESP receives a statutory 0.5 percent of the state budget, which amounts to approximately 12 million dollars in annual income. It has been estimated that FAPESP supports 80 percent of all research in Sao Paulo (even while putting 50 percent of their income into bonds, to build an endowment). The social sciences receive approximately 10 percent of the research budget. These funds are sometimes channeled into the urban sector, though without any clear cut priorities. FAPESP's main activity (40 percent of their budget) goes into human resources training. Interview with a FAPESP consultant.

60. These "appointments" assure some state-municipal cooperation, and mutes any otherwise independent urban voice within the Federal Government.
Metropolitan Responses to Urbanization

The Brazilian constitution provides for the union of the various municipios of a given area, to form a metropolitan government. The enabling legislation does not, however, define the governmental situs of the proffered metropolitan government, whether an outgrowth of an association of municipio; or an arm of the state or federal government. Given the political realities, it is likely that metropolitan government will ultimately be an extension of or at least tightly controlled by the federal government. Even at the federal level, it is unclear which Ministry would have jurisdiction over metropolitan government. At the same time there are some city-wide problems, such as sewage and transportation, which create a pressing need for a metropolitan response. Aware of this, the federal government is currently discussing the jurisdictional issues with the Ministries.

61. Article 1353 "...no caso da metropole, seus diversos municipios poderiam entao unir-se em associacao para atenderem interesses comuns, eventualmente com a participacao da Union e dos Estados." The federal government also has the power to "estabelecer regioes metropolitanas, constituidas por Municipios que... facam parte da mesma comunidade socio-economica." (Article 164).


63. The SERFHAU article, however, advocates metropolitan
of Justice, Interior and Planning. Until this political struggle is resolved, however, or until the problems become sufficiently pressing to force a rapid resolution, metropolitan government will remain something of an occasional affair. It is principally in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Porto Alegre that meaningful attempts at metropolitan government and planning have been discussed, thus far with relatively few results, however.

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64. The major power struggle is apparently between the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for municipal and regional planning, and the Ministry of Planning, responsible for national planning and the coordination of all ministerial plans. There is also considerable opposition to metropolitan government from the entrenched powers within the various municipios. It is reported that the model of metropolitan government currently being discussed at the federal level would consist only of a voluntary association of municipalities, governed by a policy-making counsel composed of managers from the federal and state government, and one each from the municipalities. The counsel would be assisted by a technical advisory board. If participation in such a structure were voluntary it would not bode well for metropolitan government in Brazil. Without some form of metropolitan government, however, it has been difficult if not impossible to make coordinated, city-wide decisions.
Municipal Responses to Urbanization

It has been asserted that the municipios of Brazil probably have more autonomy than similar levels of government in any other country in Latin America. This autonomy is assured by the Brazilian constitution and is further fostered by a tax feedback as revenue sharing systems. In some cases, particularly in heavily industrial or urban municipios, this feedback contributes to a very sizable municipio budget. Many of the wealthier municipios have large urban services departments and separate planning agencies, some of them, as in Curitiba, Porto Alegre and Sao Paulo, quite strong.

As mentioned above, when using their own funds the municipios can and sometimes do disregard attempts at state or federal control. At the same time it should be noted


67. In this plan Brazil is a step ahead of the United States. There is an automatic percentage feedback on taxes collected within the municipios jurisdiction, 5 percent of the national income tax and 20 percent of the state sales tax, via the Fundo de Participação dos Municípios.

68. Interview with Harry Cole. Cole sees the municipio as the most productive level of city planning in Brazil today. Frankenhoff more persuasively asserts that "the municipality is a relatively autonomous political institution which has little control over its development process." Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 19.
that many of the municipios resources come from outside, often from the state and federal government. Even the Fundo de Participacao funds come with many federal strings attached. Moreover, the mayors of many of the larger or "strategic" cities are appointed, placing them in a position of indebtedness to the state government. In the balance the municipios have considerable legal and occasionally financial autonomy, but it is an "autonomy" which is often washed away by the financial and political realities, and controls, of the diffuse Brazilian governmental response to urbanization.
OTHER INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO URBANIZATION

There are also a number of quasi-public entities attempting to respond to urbanization in Brazil. The principal entities are IBAM, the Brazilian Universities, the international institutions, the private planning and consulting agencies, and the industrial and business community, as discussed below.
and the Brazilian government. With this staff and these resources, IBAM provides a number of basic administrative, technical and legal services to the municipalities. It performs well in this role, and is the strongest municipal administration organization in Brazil, and probably in Latin America.

69. The government funds come from the Ministry of Education. IBAM also has Ministry of Planning support for some administrative training courses now being initiated. It has also received considerable support from USAID. IBAM's overall urban role is ambiguous vis-a-vis the Ministry of the Interior and SERFHAU, and vis-a-vis the growing private consulting companies. IBAM has talked of concentrating on the larger cities, and of moving more heavily into training. The Ministry of the Interior appears to be moving (via SERFHAU) more directly into municipal administration. In that SERFHAU is following the IBAM model very closely, with some additional leverage inherent in SERFHAU's institutional position and funding, there is something of an "institutional identity" issue at IBAM. There is also strongly entrepreneurial leadership from Lordello de Mello, rapidly increasing revenue--and expenses--and a backlog of valuable experience.

70. This assistance ranges from quasi-legal "opinions" (pareceres) given in response to specific queries from municipal administrators, to administrative reorganization, to publication of relevant "how to" information, to training of administrators, accountants, secretaries, etc. IBAM also serves in a general way as a national representative for the municipalities. But see p. 137, footnote no. 38 of this paper.
The Brazilian universities are also attempting to respond to the urbanization process. The traditional response has been via the schools of architecture and their departments of planning and urbanization. This predominantly "physical" interest is sometimes complemented by an urban focus in departments of geography and engineering, both of which are traditionally strong— and currently well-supported— within the Brazilian universities. (Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul are three good examples of this architectural origin of the university response to urbanization). Similarly, the schools of public administration are often urban in their focus, and traditionally and currently receive priority treatment within the federal universities. The social science disciplines have only recently begun to address the urban sector in a concerted way. They do so without strong federal financial support, though the "interdisciplinary" university reform has probably hastened the entry of social scientists into the urban field. Urban sociology is beginning to appear, but the discipline

71. Both Brasilia and, more concrctedly, the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC), are moving into the urban sector from a multidisciplinary base, with substantial federal support. See p. 143 of this paper.

72. The department of sociology and anthropology in Brasilia, for example, has a course on urban sociology, taught by a Brazilian Professor, Fernando Correia Dias.
is extremely weak, relying heavily on imported and
generally untested theory. Similarly, urban politics,
urban economics, and urban law are beginning to appear
in isolated institutions—often relying very heavily on
foreign theory, foreign training and visiting professors.
The social sciences are also beginning to enter the
universities "urban response" even more directly via
a number of urban research centers being discussed or
planned. Thus, there are signs that the universities

73. The most obvious exception would be the research of
Mancel Belinck and the CEBRAP researchers in
Sao Paulo. I believe this work represents the
encouraging basis of an urban sociology and social
theory in Brazil. Other "pockets" of urban sociology
include the Museu Nacional and Candido Mendes
Institute in Rio de Janeiro, and the Department of
Political Science in UFMG, Belo Horizonte.

74. The department of political science in the Federal
University of Minas Gerais, for example, has a
course in urban politics, which is being taught
by Judson de Cev, from the Fletcher School; a Harvard
professor, Martin Katzman, is teaching urban
economics at IPE and, on a short-term basis, at
other Brazilian universities; and one university-
based research and training organization, CEDEPLAR,
in Minas Gerais, is setting up an urban economics
program; urban law is being taught at Candido Mendes
by CEPED- and Yale-trained Alvaro Pessoa, and
urban politics at that same institute by MIT-trained
Brazilian Amaury de Souza. All of these examples
are centers of promise. But they are only begin-
ing to develop the "urban component" of their
respective disciplines.

75. The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro has the
idea of setting up an "integrated" urban program,
located in (and strongly influenced by) the school
of architecture; Rio Grande do Sul has set up a
"master" program in urbanization, located within
are moving toward a more integrated response to the urbanization process. In spite of these new and encouraging initiatives, however, the university response is still overwhelmingly concentrated in the traditional Faculties of Architecture, Geography, Administration and Engineering.

the school of architecture; PUC of Rio de Janeiro has plans to establish an urban studies program within the Center of Social Sciences, and Candido Mendes also has very general plans for an urban center at some time in the future.
International Organizations

International organizations have also attempted to respond to the Brazilian urbanization process in a variety of ways. USAID has been involved; its approach was basically physical and organizational in nature, directly complementary to the Brazilian Government policies. Thus, the largest USAID projects were directed at the physical problems of housing and sanitation (predominantly sewage and water). USAID also supported the establishment of CIDUL, the information-gathering service within SERFHAU. And USAID has supported IBAM heavily, for specific training projects, for the development of IBAM's staff, and for the spectacular IBAM building. Reflecting increasing Brazilian attention to precisely these problems, and reflecting drastic reductions in USAID's budget, the Housing and Urban Development Office in USAID has been closed entirely. The United Nations is directly involved in urbanization in Brazil in only one

76. This section will be very brief, both because my own information is very limited and because the Robin group plans to sound this issue in greater depth.

77. The most famous example is the low-cost housing project, Vila Kennedy, outside Rio de Janeiro. This project is generally regarded as a failure, and it is highly doubtful that USAID would follow this same course of action again, even if it had the staff and money. USAID is now conducting an international review of its urban activities.

78. Interview with Mr. Bill Lawson, head of public
BNH-located project. The United Nations is also working "indirectly" in the urban sector through a $5 million human resource development program being set up in conjunction with the Ministry of Planning. The Organization of American States is also working in a modest way for the urban sector. OAS support is located at the Candido Mendes Institute in Rio de Janeiro and takes the form of fellowships to train social scientists abroad, and support for research on selected problems (still to be defined) in urban marginality. A Center of Urban Studies is contemplated for some time in the future. Accion Internacional and Acao Comunitaria do Brasil are active in community development and, more recently, in attempting to set up a research center on urban marginality and human resource development.

administration, USAID. The relevant sub-divisions of USAID were: Housing Construction Division, Housing Finance Division, Housing Guaranty Division, and the Urban Planning Division.

79. This project supports a Stanford-affiliated researcher, Juppehlatz, working within BNH on decision-making processes. The U.N. has also given SERFHAU technical assistance in the past. Interview with Mr. Alberthal, U.N. Director in Brazil.

80. This is a UNESCO, ILO, UNDP project, to coordinate various governmental human resource development projects, particularly those in the Ministry of Planning, Labor, Education and Interior.

81. Interview with Candido Mendes. The OAS is also in SERFHAU, as discussed in this paper, p. 139, footnote no. 45.

82. Included among the research projects will be a
The overseas development office of the British Government has given technical and staff development (fellowship) support to SERFHAU. A number of the international organizations, among them USAID, the Ford Foundation, and IDB are currently reevaluating their involvement in urban matters.

Ministry of Labor-supported project on urban under-employment, looking at five cities: Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, and Recife.
Private Planning and Consulting Agencies

Although it would be very helpful, there is little written evaluation of the role of private planning and consulting agencies in the urban sector of Brazil. It is safe to say that these private entities are among the most important actors responding to urbanization. The governmental response, at all levels, is characterized by heavy reliance on the private firms, whether for the planning of cities or the development of BNH-financed projects. In Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro the large consulting firms may have well over one hundred employees, usually heavily concentrated on technical assistance.83

Although the governmental response to urbanization draws on some university-based research and consulting entities (e.g., CEDEPLAR, Candido Mendes, UFMG political science, etc.), and

83. Some of the Brazilian social scientists and urbanists feel that these firms are establishing a very poor tradition of "urban research," based on secondary data, with a more or less decorative social service input. One obvious exception is the Sao Paulo research organization CEBRAP. A partial exception would be the CEBRAP-affiliated National Institute of Development Studies (INED). The latter nonprofit, private organization was created in 1967 for research teaching and consulting in the area of urban and regional planning. Directed by Rubens de Mattos Pereira, an engineer turned planner, INED has concentrated somewhat more on "integrated planning" and "urban legislation" in Brazil, and the development of a plan for the Vale do Paraiba. Most of the students also come from architecture courses or planning. The CEBRAP staff has participated rather heavily in the INED training program.
on the governmental agency staff (e.g., SERFHAU, or the various state and municipio planning agencies), a very substantial portion of the urban research, consulting and planning in Brazil is done by private firms.
Industrial and Business Communities

With regard to the industrial and business communities, their indirect role in responding to and contributing to urbanization is obviously substantial, though undefined.\(^{84}\)

There has also been a substantial business and industry role in all federal programs—the entire BNH program, for example, is built around the banking and construction community—and a substantial role in the expansion of urban services, and in the loteamerto (subdivision) expansion of the cities themselves. In terms of direct nonprofit response to urbanization, however, the industrial community has restricted itself largely to the factory town situation, as in Volta Redonda and Ipatinga.\(^{85}\) In general it is probably so to say that the business community has tended to view the city as a business matter. Thus the Brazilian business and industrial community has not had a strong tradition of civic participation or philanthropy.\(^{86}\)

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84. See p. 75, footnote no. 68, this paper. See also Bonilla. op. cit. p. 186, "in Latin America the tide of urbanization (or at least the growth of agglomerations) seems to flow inexorably, irrespective of advances in the economy." And see Berlinck. op. cit., as cited p. 63, footnote no. 57 of this paper.

85. See, e.g., Werner Baer. The Growth of the Brazilian Steel Industry. p. 29.

86. Interview with Fernando Henrique Cardoso. If the above-stated observations are accurate it would seem to be a marked contrast to the rather extensive, if often ultimately self-serving, role of the business community in civic affairs and philanthropy in the United States. It should be noted that others, e.g., Salmen, would give the business community much higher marks, citing as an example the support given Accion.
"URBAN POLICY" IN BRAZIL

Somewhere through the interface and synthesis of the foregoing perceptions, entities and programs, there emerges a "Brazilian" response to urbanization. The response is obviously complex, as is the phenomenon. In general, however, it can be characterized as diffuse in structural origin, conceptually underattended and underdeveloped, and ultimately and profoundly "physical" in its nature.
The Acephalous Nature of the Brazilian Response to Urbanization

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the Brazilian response to urbanization is its diffuseness. The response emerges from the varying perceptions, organizations and programs, and the results are often uncoordinated and repetitive if not actually conflicting. The various federal, regional, state, metropolitan and municipal agencies function without a central policy. There is no coordinating entity or individual. Rather, there are a series of intricately related and often ad hoc or situation-specific responses, without much awareness of the broader context. As stated by Frankenhoff, "important decisions influencing the urbanization process are taken without being coordinated with one another." No organization or policy exercises vertical control over the various levels of governmental response. Nor is there horizontal coordination between "parallel" institutions. Obviously Brazilian "urban" organizations are explicitly


88. The BNH housing decisions and the SERFHAU urban plan, for example, are not integrated. As stated by Frankenhoff, "PAC is a highly decentralized program because its efforts have not yet been integrated into the BNH decision making process." Ibid. p. 10. As noted above, SERFHAU would like to move into a national coordinating role.
aware of this uncoordinated, acephalous approach. Organizations or programs capable of coordinating responses to urbanization may emerge, either from SERFHAU, the Ministry of the Interior or Planning, or in the interministerial groups meeting to define jurisdictional issues with regard to setting up a system of metropolitan government, or even from a central, coordinating urban agency or Ministry.

It is reasonable to expect, however, that present diffuseness will continue into the near future. This uncoordinated response—and some of the limitations of "coordination"—are shown in the Brazilian response to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.

89. "Uniao, estado (ou estados) e municipios desempenham atividades autonomas, cada qual exercendo suas atribuicoes de acordo com a reparticao constitucional de competencia com base na definicao de interesse predominante que toca cada um muitas vezes com interferencia um na competencia do outro, sem no entanto, satisfazerem as reais necessidades comuns da area em questao." Organizacao Administrativa das Areas Metropolitanas. SERFHAU, March 1971. p. 11.
The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro--A Case Study of Diffusion and "Coordination"

In discussing the quality of life in urban Brazil the second section of this paper focused in part on the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. By conservative estimate there are well over 500,000 favelados in Rio and the favela population increases approximately 10 percent annually, so the sample is not insignificant. The "optimistic" and "tinderbox" schools of thought with regard to these favelas were noted. In Rio these conflicting schools manifest themselves dramatically in two organizations: the "optimistic" view is manifest in CODESCO, a state organization established to urbanizar (or remover) the upwardly mobile and stable favelas of Rio. The "tinderbox" view of favelas is manifest in CHISAM, a federal organization established to remover or (or desfavelizar) these undesirable areas of crime, prostitution and physical deprivation in Rio. In that these conflicting institutional responses have something significant to say about diffusion and "coordination" in the Brazilian response to urbanization, they are worth looking at in greater detail.

The Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Comunidades (CODESCO) is an entity of the State of Guanabara, though funded predominantly by the National Housing Bank and the federal government. In "urbanizing" favelas CODESCO

90. Approximately 20 percent of the CODESCO budget comes
attempts to: (i) develop basic infrastructure for urban services such as water, sewage, electricity, (ii) pass land title to the favelado, (iii) assist in housing development projects undertaken by the favelados themselves (CODESCO offering low interest loans for material, technical assistance on individual housing design and construction, and overall planning), and (iv) promote community development and social assistance. In essence, it attempts to combine "site and service," "entitlement," and "community development" approaches to the favelas of Rio. The overall approach obviously relies on and responds to an "optimistic" model of the favelas.

There are three specific CODESCO projects in Rio de Janeiro, each of them differing in accordance to the character of the respective favela. The main project, however, is Bras de Pina, in the suburban North Zone of Rio. Bras de Pina was partially "removed" in the early 1960's by the Lacerda government. Before a very large area was from the state government, and the other 80 percent from BNH. Interview with Jorge Romualdo Estrella.

91. The complete discussion of the Bras de Pina experience will have to await the forthcoming book of one of the major figures in this CODESCO project, architect Carlos Nelson. I understand that other concerned professionals of the "optimistic" school, e.g., Leeds and Turner, are also writing about the project.
cleared, however, the removal was halted by violent favela opposition. For a number of years thereafter the government's attitude towards the favela was marked by tergiversation and inactivity. But the favelados of Bras de Pina formed a comitê de urbanização and began to develop their own "urbanization" plan. In 1966 they hired a group of young architects to work with them and, along with the other favelados of Rio, they attempted to mobilize public pressure in favor of "urbanization" of Bras de Pina.\(^\text{92}\) With eventual support from the governor of Guanabara, CODESCO was established in 1968. It was announced as a project for the human development of the favelas; and a rejection of the removal policy which had been a "fiscal, social, economic and political disaster in Vila Kennedy."\(^\text{93}\) CODESCO quickly hired the (Carlos Nelson) team of planners who had been working with the Bras de Pina comite.\(^\text{94}\)


93. Ultima Hora, September 14, 1968.

94. As stated in the newspapers at the time, "Tao competente era a equipe que a própria CODESCO decidiu confiar lhe as planos de urbanização." ibid.
The implementation of the Bras de Pina project is a rich story of community building, and only a quick outline can be touched on in this paper. The earlier aborted "removal" project had left Bras de Pina with a cleared area. This allowed for (and was required for) the "bootstrap" approach which CODESCO eventually used in Bras de Pina: "urbanize" the cleared area, help the residents to build and move in, then "urbanize" the vacated neighborhood, etc. As requested by the favelados, the area to be "urbanized" was first subdivided into matchbook-size regular lots, and urban services were brought in. Then the lots were parcelled out to the Bras de Pina residents, with CODESCO serving in some measure as arbiter. Bras de Pina families were entitled to purchase (for approximately US$90) the lot of their preference. This meant the important parts of the favelados' lives were increasingly structured by the favelados—the shopkeeper moved to the corner, two brothers side by side, a worker away from his mother-in-law, etc. The residents moved their own belongings to the new lot, often with the help of friends and relatives in a kind of "house raising." First a shack would be built, often with materials removed from the former house. Although there was no requirement that a new home be built, most of the residents eventually did so. CODESCO imposed a few basic restrictions (must have a bathroom, must be ventilated in all rooms, etc.). CODESCO also developed
several model plans, based on the favelados own designs. But in each case the individual was responsible for designing and building his own home.

The resultant community is, to my own eye, a Jane Jacobs world. The houses go up in weird combinations of shapes, forms and colors, as desired by the residents. A few are of wood construction, including some two-floor units. Most are of block and tile with concrete overlay. The first buildings that went up were generally simple, one-floor affairs. Now, however, two-floor units are increasingly common (the second floor is often rented to pay off the loan on the materials). The colors of the completed units are frequently clashing and brilliant. Most of the houses are highly personalized, e.g., with small individually decorated patios, and with the ubiquitous surrounding fence. Barber shops, garages and markets edge out on the street at odd intervals, and small merchants and trades abound. There is an occasional private garage and one or two of the new, larger units have dependencias for maids. The gestalt is a copy and a caricature of middle- and upper-class housing in Brazil. It is not a pretty place, with garbage littering the street, and some of the completed houses looking sufficiently dirty

95. As Nelson said at one point, "architects hate Bras de Pina; they see themselves caricatured there."
and cramped to qualify as candidates for removal. Some streets and yards are awash in mud (pigs, incidentally, are not allowed, but chickens are common and dogs are legion). Other houses and streets are solid and clean, and buildings are increasingly sophisticated as the community gains construction expertise. The right (permissao) to participate in the Bras de Pina program has become a valuable commodity, and a resident can now sell out his permissao for as much as US$1,000 (up from US$100 just several years ago). More than 80 percent of the Bras de Pina residents have stayed, however, and the community has been preserved and strengthened. When a house of prostitution was set up in Bras de Pina, for example, it came under such strong community pressure that it had to close. The community was also "legitimized" by the removal of the cloud of "illegality" which formerly defined a favela. And the community obviously has better housing and services because of the project. In my own mind, however, the most striking characteristic of contemporary Bras de Pina is its vitality. On almost every street, and sometimes at every house on a street, individuals and groups are building scaffolding, mixing cement, laying tile, etc. There is considerable social interaction in the street, and an eternal soccer game in the (CODESCO designed) plaza. Bras de Pina is, in short, an uninspiring but enthusiastic community of the morador, complete with stability, upward
mobility, materialism and even petty conspicuous consumption. While many of the problems facing the urban poor, e.g., jobs, persist in Bras de Pina, the project was never seen as a talisman. It was intended to improve and strengthen the community of Bras de Pina, to improve the physical environment of housing and services, and to increase the degree of choice and control the individuals and community exercised over a very immediate and important part of their lives. In terms of these objectives the project was quite successful.

It is interesting to note that CODESCO claims "removal" is prohibitively expensive, that "urbanization" costs approximately half as much. CHISAM, on the contrary, asserts that "urbanization" is prohibitively expensive, as discussed below. And yet the Bras de Pina experience demonstrates in one small place that "the 'urbanization' of the community is economically feasible." For the 900 families and 5,000 individuals living in Bras de Pina, and for those who worked on the project over the past six years, it is at least a partial justification of the confidence the optimist school places in the (former) favelados.

96. Charles Frankenhoff. "An Economic Analysis of Favela Urbanization in Rio de Janeiro". May 1969. It should be noted that Bras de Pina is not an isolated attempt at favela "urbanization" in Brazil. Similar efforts, based on the Bras de Pina model, are under way in Salvador and Recife.
The CODESCO-Bras de Pina project is, however, only one of many federal, state, municipal and international responses to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The diverse programs reflect the diffusion and lack of coordination which characterizes the Brazilian response to urbanization in general. In an attempt to rectify this situation the federal government established a "coordinated" approach to "housing of social interest in Rio de Janeiro." The "coordinated" federal approach to the favelas of Rio was, however, located in a new institution steeped in the "tinderbox" school--CHISAM.

The Coordination of Housing of Social Interest in Metropolitan Rio (CHISAM) is, in fact, something of a

97. "...it was found absolutely necessary that the housing problem be attacked with one guiding policy for the federal government and the state governments of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro. No less than 110 public and private organs were engaged in housing, each of them with different policies, ideas and practice. While some believed in social welfare assistance through gifts, clothes and food, others sought the elimination of the "favelas" at all costs and means. Promotional and electoral measures of all kinds, which were merely palliative, were advocated and carried out by different persons and agencies....What was lacking was a coordination of the different persons and agencies with the idea of delegating tasks and decentralizing their execution. It was decided that the best way of reaching the desired objectives would be through a guiding agency with standard norms to coordinate the agencies of the federal government, the two state governments and private organizations with credentials to do the task." CHISAM. p. 78.
caricature of the "tinderbox" school. Their program is directed basically to the end of "desfavelacao" or removal of the favelas. Directed by engineer Gilberto Coufal (also a director of BNH), CHISAM attempts to respond to the "problem of the favelas" by removing them.\(^\text{100}\)

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98. See pp. 106-107 of this paper.

99. It is probably worth noting the different intra- and extra-favela audience, of the CODESCO objective to "urbanize" (the favelas) and the CHISAM objective to "desfavelar" (the city).

100. As mentioned above, the CHISAM objectives are actually much broader; it was set up in March 1968 to coordinate housing agencies and policy in Rio, including social welfare agencies, new low-cost housing agencies (COHAB's), and entities working in favela rehabilitation (i.e., CODESCO). Although there are many intellectual cross currents in the CODESCO view of the favelado, the basic "externality" of the favela could not be more explicit: "The slum complexes built irregularly and illegally make a contrast with the urban area in which they are located. They do not form part of the city's urban home complex. Since the slum dwellers do not pay taxes and other obligations of legally constructed property, they do not have the right to enjoy the public benefits." CHISAM, p. 79. It is because this "legal" and "tinderbox" view have materialized in the form of a massive favela removal program that I say that the basic end of CHISAM is desfavelacao.

The favelados were also well aware of CHISAM's objectives and united against CHISAM. "Favelado a Negrao: Remocao Para A Zona Norte Nao E A Solucao". Correio da Manha, September 4, 1968. (Os Favelados da Guanabara vao pedir ao Governador Negrao de Lima que no autorize qualquer remocao de favela da Zona Sul para os suburbios e Zona Rural, por considerarem que "as medidas tomadas anteriormente, como nos casas da Cidade de Deus e Vila Kennedy so serviram para agravar os problemas dos transferidos"). A Federation of Favela Associations was formed, which drew up complaints against the idea of living three hours, and
Under the CHISAM program favelados, under the supervision of massed riot police, are removed en masse to public housing. The favela is torn down behind the departing favelado by wrecking crews. The favelados are taken to public housing in accordance with their capacity to two cruzeiros, from the city. "Favela Finca Pe e Nao Quer Mudar". Correio da Manha, September 5, 1970 ("trabalhamos perto daqui e nossos salarios nao dao para pagar os alugueis... nem as passagens... estamos prontos a lutar contra a remocao"; "Moradores da Ilha das Dragas Reagem a Plano da CHISAM". Correio da Manha, September 4, 1969.). CHISAM and Coufal responded with realpolitik flexibility, talking of removing only those who wished, and of urbanizing where that was possible. ("Gilberto Coufal diz que com ele no posto, favelado nao vai sofrer pressao," emphasis mine). The Secretary of State of Rio announced in favor of urbanizacao and against removal, and Minister of the Interior Albuquerque Lima came out for both removal and urbanizacao (O Globo, September 26, 1968.). The favelados called a congresso and, meeting under ana flag, took a position against renewal. "Favelados Fixam Posicao Conjunta Contra Remocoes". Correio da Manha, November 3, 1968. As reported by the papers, the favelados congress was attended by the president of the Leao XIII Foundation, and by two secret service (DOPS) agents. CHISAM and Coufal, however, went ahead with building and removal plans. Initially on an isolated basis ("Desfavelamento Continue". Ultima Hora, February 27, 1969.), but soon promising to remove all favelas from the Lagoa area, CHISAM rapidly developed large plans ("215 favelas do Rio desaparecerao em 2 anos". Jornal do Brasil, July 7, 1969.). They still talked in part of urbanization. At one point favela do Pinto was to be urbanized ("Favela do Pinto sera urbanizada". Jornal do Brasil, March 12, 1969.) but it was eventually removed, burning in the process. In the face of constant government pressure and inducement, early opposition to removal decreased in size and effectiveness.

101. Quite literally the roof is torn off as soon as the family moves out, and the favela is later torn down
pay. 102 The CHISAM removal operations are on a large scale. 103 The removals are expressly out of the wealthier South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, as shown in the CHISAM map (Figure 7).

It is difficult to evaluate CHISAM objectively. At to the ground, and the materials burned. Several years ago the favela do Pinto was burned, accidentally or otherwise, before the residents departed. More recently the favela Macedo Sobrinho was set afire by unidentified parties immediately after removal (see "Incendiario Toca Fogo, Favela Abandonada." O Globo, February 8, 1971). Recently CHISAM has publicly admitted they set fire to the favelas after removal to prevent the favelados from returning or using the materials.

102. CHISAM estimates that they cannot provide housing for 17 percent of the families removed (Jornal do Brasil, January 26, 1971). A recent BNH study indicated that approximately two-thirds of the removed favelados could not afford new apartments (Correio da Manha, May 13, 1970). Salmen's estimate is 70 percent unable to pay (interview). It is reliably reported from within COHAB-Rio that more than 60 percent of the favelados removed have not been able or willing to pay for the new housing. COHAB is now faced with the option of overlooking the nonpayment, in which case they assume it will get worse, or foreclosing which will merely create a new pool of favelados (albeit, presumably, out of the south zone of Rio de Janeiro). There is a legal limit on rental payment (25 percent of family income, not including utilities). CHISAM's figures make it difficult, however, to determine the economic cut-off point (they divide minimum salaries: one, one to three, three and above; the crucial threshold is in the one to three breakdown). Capacity to pay should take into consideration not only housing costs (approximately Cr$90.00-110.00 monthly), but transportation cost (approximately Cr$60.00 monthly for the transportation of each family member working in the city). A solid piece of socio-economic research on removal is very much needed.

103. CHISAM recently submitted a report to the Ministry of the Interior which projected the removal of twenty
a minimum the organization is insensitive to the favelados situation, \(^{104}\) authoritarian in its style, \(^{105}\) and dogmatic in its "tinderbox" view. \(^{106}\) The removal operation does sometimes improve public sanitation (and legal title) for those residents who can afford their new housing. These

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favelados and 250,000 people by 1972, clearing the south zone ("CHISAM promete extinguir mais 20 favelas em 6 meses...." "Favelado sai da Zona Sul ate 72". Jornal do Brasil, January 26, 1971.).

104. See p. 106, footnote no. 120 and p. 107, footnote no. 125, this paper, discussing the "desire" of the favelado to leave the favela and cf. the favela resistance to removal, the presence of the riot police, the burning of the favela to keep the former residents from returning. See also CHISAM's stated Guide Lines and Objectives: "his removal to a distance will cause him economic hardship" (CHISAM. p. 79.), and the fact that all favelados are removed to the distant north or rural zone. This locational policy is explained in terms of a "potential" work market. "As familias devem ser localizadas em unidades residencias proximas da favela de onde sairam, ou do mercado de trabalho do favelado, ou ainda, de local onde exista um mercado de trabalho em potencial." (Jornal do Brasil, January 26, 1971. Emphasis mine).

105. "....the resident's participation in moving is total. When the resident first starts to leave he is anxious for his turn to come....He goes daily to the Housing Coordination group to learn if the order for his moving has been given. He continues to show his desire to move. On getting the moving order, he asks the coordination officials whether he can give his friends things left over, or the building materials... he learns that it is forbidden for the building materials that might be used in building another shack be taken from the slum area. He approves of the idea....he and his family show joy and confidence." CHISAM. p. 95.

106. "Dogmatic" is not too strong a term: "on completing the program of the progressive slum clearance of the greater Rio area, we ran into some problems rising
favelados are satisfied with the move, and there is some support for removal in the press. At the same time, there is no way of measuring the human costs of the removal, not only for those 60 percent or so who are "lost" in the process, but for the "acted upon" status, not to mention the financial and social expenses, even on those who can afford the new housing. Generally there is a surprising amount of strong and even bitter criticism of removal from the press in Brazil.

from ideas, hypotheses, and theories about the 'favelas' slum and its people...We were sure that we would get a reaction from those who believed that the slum should be urbanized or improved, keeping the favelas where they were...the opinions we heard and the books we read did not help much...we chose the hard but fruitful cause of eradicating the slums." Ibid. pp. 83-84.

107. In one study done in Vila Kennedy, satisfaction with the new housing was found to vary directly with the income of the family. See Larry Salmen. "A Perspective of Squatters in Brazil". America Latina, Ano 12, No. 1, Janeiro-Marco 1969, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.

108. Usually in the Jornal do Brasil. When the new governor of Guanabara, Chagas Freitas, took office, the Jornal do Brasil (March 17, 1971) editorialized: "The program for eradication of slums must continue using the same pattern....the new governor should not lend his ears to those who advocate urbanization instead of eradication." See also the bromides of the economic survey of the First National City Bank: "The hillside shantytowns--the favelas--of Rio de Janeiro and other large cities are beginning to disappear as the government opens new suburban apartments for the former slum dwellers."

109. Nem na Catacumba eles tinham tantos problemas....Correio da Manha, January 21, 1971, discussing the high rent, travel, floods and anomie; "{Que}m nao pode pagar vai ter que sair....E ninguem sabe dizer para onde....Para os que conseguirem ficar, sera um pessimo negocio: Os
Comment—CODESCO and CHISAM claim to be working in comfortable coordination, CODESCO urbanizing favelas that have condições, and CHISAM removing favelas that don't. But the deep intellectual and programmatical differences between the two institutions meant they would inevitably clash. In terms of power and financial support CHISAM unquestionably holds the upper hand. It is the dominant federal "coordinating" agency, while CODESCO's institutional position and support appears to be seriously threatened.

110. I predicted in February 1961 the complementary, condições rationale would shatter and the institutions would clash. In that the present conflict is rooted in different and conflicting schools of thought and is a continuation of a controversy which dates back to the 1940's, this was not an especially adventurous prediction. (See "A Batalha do Rio". Parisse, Favelas do Rio de Janeiro, CENPHA, 1969).

111. CHISAM's director, Coufal, is reportedly advocating a "post-renewal "community reorganization" rôle for CODESCO, in effect taking CODESCO out of the urbanização business.
time the economic and human costs of removal are being increasingly felt, as removed favelados are unable to afford new housing and transportation, and as opposition continues in the mass media, the academic community, and within the favelas. It is questionable how long CHISAM will be able to perpetrate their present, large-scale program as these human and economic costs become more apparent. The removal controversy is currently focused on Rocinha, one of the largest favelas (approximately 80,000) in Rio de Janeiro. CHISAM’s position vis-à-vis Rocinha has vacillated from total removal to no removal to partial removal of approximately one-fifth of the favela most threatened by landslides. 112 While CODESCO will probably be overwhelmed in the present situation, it is doubtful that the present "batalha" of Rio will be the Armageddon of the favelas, or of the "urbanization" model. On the contrary, the conflicting models and approaches can be expected to endure, though with varying degrees of acceptance and, I would add, each having

112. Both CODESCO and CHISAM deny having socio-economic data on Rocinha. The one-fifth decision was made on the basis of a geo-technical survey of the terrain. Rocinha’s location in the south zone and CHISAM’s well defined and explicitly stated clear-the-south zone objectives indicate that it is very likely Rocinha will ultimately be removed. See Jornal do Brasil, May 4, 1971. "Fontes da CHISAM informaram que ainda naó ha nada de concreto sobre o futuro da Rocinha, mas adiantaram que a urbanizacao da area esta fora de cogitaco es 'pois foge a filosofia do nosso orgao')."
a radically different impact on the lives of favelados.

In terms of the present analysis, the rather painful "removal and eradication" approach of CHISAM raises an obvious question for those who call for coordination in the urban sector: "coordination of what?" In some circumstances coordination can avoid overlap, repetition, isolation, or even conflict, between disparate programs and policies. And for this reason it should, in general be encouraged in the context of the acephalous response to urban problems. At the same time, the approach obviously offers no talisman, for coordination per se can be bankrupt in terms of the context and the conceptual competence of the policies involved; coordination can even be detrimental, by implementing counter-productive policy more effectively. Stated somewhat differently, the coordination of poorly conceived policy is very likely to produce poorly-conceived, coordinated policy. CHISAM's policy conceptualization has already been discussed. The more general conceptual character and the competence of "urban policy" in Brazil is discussed below.
The Conceptual Competence of "Urban Policy" in Brazil

By way of general comment, there is a surprising dearth of research and published materials on the cities of Brazil and the quality of human life therein. For organizations working on urbanization, as for students of the area, this deficiency is immediate and obvious. There is a general lack of analysis, discussion and understanding of cities, and an apparent lack of awareness, particularly in policy-making quarters, of the Brazilian urbanization phenomenon.113 There is a concomitant reduction of capacity to explain and predict, or to formulate and evaluate public policy.114 There is no solid economic or political science research on such issues as the embryonic level of metropolitan government. And there is a lack of noncorrelative research on policies, e.g., favela removal, highway colonization, or the "integrated planning" program. On a somewhat broader scale, there

113. I am reminded of the saying "the last to discover the water will be the fish."

114. It should be noted that there are a number of innovative urban policies in Brazil, from revenue sharing to state research foundations (FAPESP), to a fiscal incentive industrialization policy, to a rather remarkable record of city planning. In this section, however, I am discussing a more comprehensive focus on urban policy in Brazil, and on the quality of conceptualization and depth of understanding underlying that policy.
is also a lack of information and understanding about the quality of life in the Brazilian urban environment or about the social diseconomies and dysfunctions of metropolitan growth, or the economics of size and spatial distribution of Brazilian cities. Similarly, there are vast untouched areas of urban law, for example, welfare legislation (and, e.g., the impact on migration), zoning laws (e.g., the impact on suburban growth), property laws (e.g., adverse possession in the favelas, the inheritance of favelado property, or the indemnification for removal), criminal law (e.g., delinquency, or the integration of informal controls with the legal system, the levels and exercise of police discretion), tax law (e.g., the impact of the revenue sharing on município government, or more general studies of the tax base and allocation in metropolitan areas). And there is relatively little work on the relationship between the urban and rural sectors, urbanization and industrialization, or urbanization and overall development. 115

115. There are obvious exceptions to the foregoing, including in particular much of the CEBRAP and Berlink research in Sao Paulo, and including Conn's work on favela law, Bonilla's work on the urban worker and a number of research projects being conducted with Foundation support. These and other intellectual resources notwithstanding, it is my impression that the overall level of conceptualization is wanting, and that the conceptual tools available are too infrequently used in the diffuse Brazilian "urban policy."
Without attempting any listing, suffice it to say there are vast and little understood areas of the Brazilian urban sector. There is not even a good general statement or book on urbanization in Brazil, and the research available is under-supported and sometimes disregarded. In general, it is safe to say that urban policy is based on very partial and inadequate understanding of the cities. As Bonilla states somewhat more forcefully:

In Latin America...writing about the city has been left largely to the Sunday supplement panegyrists, tourist pamphleteers and nostalgic literary elder statesmen. While smaller, more compact communities have been

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116. A number of writers, among them Silvert and Morse, have recently noted the growing body of urban research in Latin America. See, e.g., Morse's Trends and Issues in Latin American Urban Researches 1965-1970 Latin American Research Review. Vol. VI., No. 1, Spring 1971. p. 3. And see Rabinovitz and Trueblood. op. cit. Generalization about a lack of research and understanding should obviously not be lightly made, nor overstated. A supplementary and more specific review of Brazilian urban research will be discussed in the next section of this paper. In general it is my impression that socio-economic urban research is qualitatively strong but often of limited "molecular" scope, and quantitatively very thin. Relatively little of the "Latin American urban research" is Brazilian. Much of the so-called "urban" research in Brazil is technocratic in nature, and the conceptualization of urban policy reflects this input.

117. The policy making organizations such as BNH, for example, have thus far supported mainly technocratic research (as in CENPHA), and even this lightly (0.12 percent of BNH's budget). In these projects, as in SERPHAU's "integrated plan" or the research of the private consulting companies, the social science input is all too often decorative, and a broader theoretical understanding of the urban environment lacking. CHISAM goes one step further in its dogmatic
The "Interior" Focus of "Urban Policy" in Brazil--The "Heartland Mystique"

There is one very interesting dimension of urban policy in Brazil which serves to demonstrate a kind of conceptual inadequacy. That dimension is the consistent focus of "urban policy" on the interior of Brazil, and the consistent failure to focus on the cities in any concerted way.

As far back as the first settlement of Brazil, and more dramatically in uti possidetis, the determination to settle the interior amounts to a national passion. In an analysis of Brazilian national aspirations, historian Jose Honorio Rodrigues calls the occupation of the land, "a national dream." The major national efforts of the past decades have been directed in very large measure to opening of the interior, whether via a city (Brasilia) or via a highway and colonization (Transamazonica). The newspapers editorialize that "one of the foremost targets of Brazilian

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"we-don't-find-books-helpful" posture. See pp. 180-181, footnote no. 106, this paper.

118. Bonilla. op. cit. p. 188. In fairness to the Latins and the Brazilians, this entire line of argument should be balanced with a recognition that urban policy, and the quality of urban life, in the United States are also seriously wanting.
economic policy is settling people in large areas of the interior where environmental conditions are suitable. As discussed earlier in this paper, fascination with the interior has deep historical and intellectual (nativist) roots. And it is preserved in the bittersweet contemporary view of the cities, and the interior. In some measure one is tempted to observe that its appeal is particularly strong for those who live in the cities and plan to continue to live in the cities. In any event, the hinterland mystique seems to be less than fully persuasive to the rural-urban migrants who historically and increasingly flock to the cities. The simple fact is that the population in vast areas of rural Brazil is decreasing in relative and even in absolute terms, while the cities continue their unbridled growth. As stated by Wagley, "Brazilians will continue to move, when they can, from the country to the town and from the town to the city." 121

120. Brazil Herald, April 21, 1971.
121. Wagley. Introduction to Brazil. p. 182.
Unfortunately urban policy in Brazil has not separated this "heartland mystique" from the hard facts of urban reality. The response to urbanization is primarily physical and issue-oriented, in terms of houses, sewers, water, streets and city plans. The next level of urban policy does not conceptualize the city as a process or system, as an integrated entity, or as an integral part of a developmental process. Rather, Brazilian urban policy above the "infrastructure" level is "underdeveloped," and often nonexistent. In some measure "urban policy" becomes instead a sort of "conventional wisdom," population distribution policy--to diffuse growth away from large cities, and to hold and settle Brazilians in the interior. Government officials are quite explicit that "a large population should live in Brazil's interior." In advocating settlement of the interior, the Estado de Sao Paulo is equally explicit: "this will reduce the exodus

122. "Urban development policy in Brazil is an offspring of the national housing system." Frankenhoff. op. cit. p. 2.

123. It is perhaps significant that the federal organ most involved is, in fact, the Ministry of the Interior.

124. Minister of Transportation Andreazza, Brazil Herald, April 21, 1971. pp. 2-3. See discussion of BNH's rationale as to why concentration was undesirable, this paper, p. 131, footnote no. 29 and footnote no. 30.
from the countryside to the big cities which has caused difficult problems of unemployment.¹²⁵ This "heartland mystique," and the concomitant underdeveloped or nonexistent "urban policy" is nowhere more obvious than in the most powerful single urban entity in Brazil, the National Housing Bank. In Trindade's important speech to the Escola Superior de Guerra, he not only argues that "national urbanization policy is necessary" but further provides a draft of a national urbanization policy which includes among its basic objectives: (i) by means of the planned urbanization to delay and, if possible, avoid the excessive urban concentration of the megalopolis sort, (ii) to promote the progressive occupancy of the national territory, (iii) to establish interdependent city-country areas, in conformity with the great lines of penetration into the Brazilian hinterland, by means of successive "urbanization

¹²⁵. Tom Sanders recently noted the (related) impact of the interior on population policy in discussing the "The Politics of Population in Brazil," as follows: "Brazilians find themselves caught between the overlapping waves of two attitudes toward population, one associated with its past history, the other with its future. The former emphasizes expansion of population and uses terms like colonization, occupation of space, exploitation of resources, and national greatness through a sizeable population. The other is centered on planned national development and is slowly beginning to incorporate the contribution of demography to the analysis of economics, urbanization, health, and the quality of human existence."
centers" supported by existing or prospective poles of development, and (iv) to concentrate the rural population in new nuclei. While Trindade's speech went into considerable detail, the basic "heartland" and "new settlements" thrust of the national urbanization policy advocated is best demonstrated in Trindade's maps. The following Trindade maps present, in sequence, (a) a view of the interior as "nearly void of population, a natural environment suitable for settlement," (b) a view of "the present population-migration trend," and (c) a proposed "national urbanization program to slowdown rural-urban shift of population," respectively, Figures 8, 9 and 10.

Without belaboring the point, the "interior" focus of urban policy may be very desirable as a conceptual approach. Unfortunately, however, the settlement of the

126. The speech also discussed labor absorption and the need to balance rural and urban income levels.

127. I should emphasize that I have no doubt that Brazil will settle the interior in the long run, nor do I question that settlement of the interior is an entirely natural and important component of urban policy in Brazil. What I doubt is the efficacy of the "interior focus" as any kind of an adequate or comprehensive urban policy. And I question whether contemporary Brazilian thinking about the interior is well developed and prepared, for example, to recognize and deal with the staggering rate of urbanization in the interior. The future of the interior promises "decentralized centralization"--large urban enclaves in the interior, and webs of cities along the coast. Brazil will have to develop a genuinely urban expertise and policy to respond to genuinely urban problems.
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND NATURAL SETTLEMENT ENVIRONMENT, 1960

FIG. 8

Zone suitable for settlement in natural environment

HOT & WET REGION
Needs special environmental design

NEARLY VOID OF POPULATION
Natural environment suitable for settlement

HOT & DRY REGION
Low level of productivity
Less natural environment
Special design required

REGION OF COOL WINTERS

POPULATION DENSITY 1960

- 0 - 5 in Habitants/km²
- 5 - 10 in Habitants/km²
- 10 - 100 in Habitants/km²

0 km 1000 2000 3000 4000
0 miles 1000 2000 3000
PRESENT POPULATION MIGRATION TREND FROM
RURAL TO METROPOLITAN AREAS AND LARGE CITIES BY 1990

FIG. 9

1990 - 52 million persons in rural areas and 49 million in other towns throughout hinterland
VOID HINTERLAND REGION

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL
INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY
A NATIONAL URBANIZATION PROGRAM TO SLOW DOWN RURAL-URBAN SHIFT OF POPULATION

FIG. 10

RETAIN POPULATION IN HINTERLAND WITH URBANIZATION PROGRAMME FOR 62,000,000
62,000,000 REMAIN RURAL

BOLIVIA

METROPOLITAN AREA 1990 - 22,000,000

LARGE CITY 1990 - 100,000

LARGE CITY 1998 - 3,000,000

URUGUAY

PERU

COLOMBIA

VENEZUELA

SURINAM

GUAYANA

PARAGUAY

URUGUAY

INTERNATIONAL URBANIZATION SURVEY

URBANIZATION IN BRAZIL
interior is all too often presented as the urbanization policy, rather than a part of a more comprehensive policy which also takes cognizance of and responds to the problem of extant urban centers, large and small. With regard to the large agglomerations there is something of a conceptual void in Brazilian urban policy. This void is probably hidden and perpetuated by the "hinterland mystique." In Brazil, where it would take half a dozen new Brasilia to absorb the growth of Sao Paulo alone over the next ten years, a parallel policy, focused on the urban areas per se is imperative. At present the conceptualization of urban policy is lacking in analysis and understanding of this increasingly urban character, and lacking in comprehensive policy with which to address urban growth and problems.
The "Physical" Nature of "Urban Policy" in Brazil

The geographic, "hinterland" focus is consistent with another more specific dimension of the Brazilian response to urbanization. As mentioned, the overall response is physical and technocratic in nature. Consistent with the demographic, spatial and service-oriented concept labelled "urbanization," the institutional responses focus on such issues as housing (BNH), water (BNH), sewage (BNH), planning (SERPHAU), administration (SERPHAU and IBAM), statistics (IBGE), renewal (CODESCO), or removal (CHISAM). This conceptualization of "urbanization" and these institutional responses reflect the intellectual training and human resources of the "urban profession" in Brazil, the architects, engineers, administrators, urban geographers and, increasingly, the economists.

The "Urban Profession" in Brazil

In Brazil as elsewhere, the architects were the first professionals to confront urban problems. As indicated in the "Brazilian Universities" section above, it is within the traditionally strong schools of architecture that most Brazilian city planners and "urbanists" are trained. Within these schools (and their departments of urbanization), the focus is heavily on urban planning, frequently "integrado" in name and physical in nature. If there is a second focus of concern it is on housing. As discussed, the federally
subsidized support of local planning further supports the architectural influence, which further strengthens the pool of human resources with an architectural and physical planning orientation working in the urban sector.

Another strong "urban profession" in Brazil is the public administrator. In general, the public administrators have focused on the structural and financial administration of cities and municipios, primarily the latter. And they have focused on accounting and legal procedures (and personnel) necessary to work in the area. The administrators have applied these skills mainly to urban services, tax structures and, to a lesser extent, administrative research and planning. The development of this "urban" profession has been fostered by relatively strong university departments, and by strong federal support. It has been strengthened by the administrative bent of such organizations as the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM) and the Getulio Vargas Foundation, and by the fellowship support of USAID.

The urban geographers have also developed strong support within the Brazilian educational and public information system. Their focus is on demographic and physical change over a period of time, quantified and often reduced to maps. Their approach is usually macro, often national or regional in scope, and their concern is with variables relating to population, migration, services, industry,
communications, transportation, commerce. Strongly influenced by the French school, the Brazilian geographers have made "poles of development" and "spheres of influence" the intellectual touchstones for urbanists.

The planner, the administrator and the urban geographer have often been assisted, and perhaps more often led, by the engineers, the builders of houses, bridges, and water and sewage systems. Thus the approach to urbanizacao has been markedly physical in nature. As indicated above, the economists and the lawyers are also playing an increasingly important, albeit often technocratic role. Only within the last decade have the "softer" social sciences focused on and been applied to the complex urban problems in Brazil.

The "physical" nature of the Brazilian response to urbanization is perhaps nowhere more evident than on the board of CHISAM. As discussed, this agency is responsible for coordinating all activities relating to housing of "social interest," and for the removal of several hundred thousand people from their homes, and the destruction of the favelas. The board of CHISAM is composed of engineers and lawyers. The BNH board is similarly made up predominantly of engineers and lawyers. The national planning agency (SERFHAU) breaks down its professional input as follows:
In short, in terms of "urban professionals," institutions, and policies, the Brazilian response is characterized by its strong "physical" bent. As discussed above, it is also characterized by its uncoordinated and diffuse character. And it is characterized by underdeveloped and sometimes limited conceptualization, a dimension of the Brazilian response which is founded in intellectual inattention to the cities, and manifest in the utopian "hinterland mystique" which often passes for national urban policy.

If there is a general conclusion to this rough-hewn piece, it is that Brazil is only partially aware of the urban era it faces, and partially aware of its own predominantly urban character. For a nation with Brazil's resources, its overall "urban response" is paltry indeed in terms of governmental and intellectual attention, and in terms of policy. A second general conclusion is also
implicit in the foregoing analysis: there is a certain policy and intellectual purblindness in the Brazilian response to urbanization, characterized as it is by institutional diffusion and conceptual underdevelopment, and by a rather limited "physical" and "professional" orientation. In the case of CHISAM and SERPHAU, for example, there are few easy answers with regard to "favela removal" and "urban planning." But it does seem reasonable to argue that decisions on these very human concerns should not be taken in the absence of a better understanding of the urban sector, and in the absence of a strong and effective input from the social sciences. As stated by Beyer:

> The urban problem cannot remain solely in the hands of urbanists, architects and planning experts if among them a marked influence is not exerted by the sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists, jurists and poets....