This thirty-eighth yearbook provides a framework for the teaching of international education and relates recent concepts and ideas in the international studies field which are applicable to the teaching of social studies. A number of educators and social scientists contributed to a series of chapters comprised in four sections of the volume. Each of the major sections deals with a different but related area of international affairs education. Section I suggests ways of organizing materials around the emerging international society and indicates complexities of the contemporary world that students need to be acquainted with in order to live intelligently in a changing world. Offering some reflections about the field of international studies in general and world law and area studies in particular, Part II is designed to assist the teacher in the job of selecting and evaluating new areas of study in international affairs. Four innovative approaches in the social studies that are receiving increasing attention in many elementary and secondary school classrooms—simulation, decision-making, case studies, and comparative studies—are described in Part III. Part IV reports information about a wide variety of materials, resources, and programs available to teachers who seek to improve instruction in international affairs. (Author/SJM)
The publication of this yearbook is most timely. The uncertainties of a condition of peace by terror, the unequal development of newly independent nations, shifting power structures among the nations, our involvement in a major war in Asia, and civil unrest within our own nation all have come within the focus of world opinion and concern. Divisiveness among our own people, young and old, in respect to individual and national values, the goals of American foreign policy, and the role our nation should play in world affairs places upon social studies teachers a heavy obligation to provide youth with the knowledge that will give them an accurate understanding of the character and nature of the world in which we live, and enable them to develop the competencies that are required for effective citizenship in a world community.

The yearbook clearly states the setting and framework for international education. It indicates what is being done in this field, new and needed emphases, effective approaches, useful resources, and the important of teacher education for the effective teaching of world understanding. The overriding theme of the yearbook is that attention to the teaching of world affairs should provide a new dimension for all social studies. This book should be read and pondered by every social studies teacher and social scientist from K through the graduate school.

The Council is deeply indebted to the authors of this yearbook for their dedication in producing this scholarly work and for this important contribution to our professional literature. Particular thanks must be given James M. Becker and Howard D. Mehlinger who planned, edited, and saw this work through.

RALPH W. CORDIER, President
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The National Council for the Social Studies is the Department of Social Studies of the National Education Association of the United States. It is the professional organization of teachers of social studies. It holds a series of meetings each year and publishes materials of significance to those interested in this field. Membership in the National Council carries with it a subscription to the Council's official journal, *Social Education*, the monthly magazine for social studies teachers, and the Yearbook. In addition, the Council publishes bulletins, pamphlets, and other materials of practical use for teachers of the social studies. Membership dues are $9 a year. Applications for membership and orders for the purchase of publications should be made to the Executive Secretary, 1201 Sixteenth Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036.
The successful completion of a Yearbook depends upon the support of a number of people, many of whose contributions pass unnoticed except to the editors. We should like to acknowledge those people who contributed most significantly to the publication of this volume.

First and foremost, we wish to express our appreciation to the 23 scholars who wrote chapters for the Yearbook. Mrs. Jo Linton made our editorship less painful by taking over much of the tedious work of checking references and establishing uniformity of editorial style throughout the publication. Mrs. Jane Lewis and Mrs. Patricia Street typed the manuscript competently and efficiently. And colleagues who shall remain nameless helped by quietly and patiently assuming work that the editors had to slight while distracted by the Yearbook.

Finally, we wish to express appreciation to the current and former members of the NCSS Publications Committee who provided counsel and advice during the preparation of the Yearbook and to Merrill Hartshorn, who assisted our work in many ways.

JAMES M. BECKER
HOWARD D. MEHLINGER
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Man's attempts to explain the world in which he lives have always suffered from a kind of conceptual time-lag. Even the most radical metamorphoses in the condition of human life have a way of occurring gradually—so gradually that it takes years, decades, or even centuries before human understanding realizes the nature and magnitude of the change that has taken place. Nation-states existed for more than a century before the term "nationalism" was coined to describe the process of their formation. The concept of totalitarianism was invented after one of the regimes it described (Nazi Germany) no longer existed, and the other (the U.S.S.R.) was undergoing change to such a degree that the term was no longer fully applicable. People living in the "Dark Ages" did not realize it was dark, and laborers in British factories in the nineteenth century remained oblivious to the fact that they were participants in the Industrial Revolution. In short, virtually no period of human history has been fully comprehended by the people who actually experienced it; it is only historians of later generations who succeed in inventing concepts to describe the major events and important transformations that have gone before.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS IN THE SOCIAL STUDIES

Most of the attempts currently being made to describe and analyze the contemporary world are victims of the same conceptual lag. Despite the fact that vast and critical changes are going on in the nature of relations among peoples and nations, most people today remain bound by outmoded ways of perceiving reality. This mental fossilization is particularly evident in the case of the term "international." At the moment this is the best indeed the only-term available for describing the whole gamut of events and transactions that transcend national boundaries, whether they are relatively traditional in nature or are unique and without precedent in foregoing eras of history. As a concept or descriptive term, "international" is losing its utility; either the word must be discarded in favor of newer, more accurate terms, or its meaning must be systematically and radically altered to fit the new realities that are in existence today.

The term "international," which arose from the necessity of explaining relationships among nations, was a perfectly useful concept when the interactions of peoples around the world were primarily through the representatives of their governments. Of course, trans-national contacts were never completely limited to governments: witness the international interests of the Catholic Church, for example. But today interactions of national governments are far from being even the major portion of contacts among nations. New kinds of relationships, apart from and in many ways indifferent to the traditional contacts of governments, have enjoyed such a sudden and spectacular proliferation that it becomes necessary to think of a change in kind rather than simply in number of trans-national contacts.

Factors that divide one national population from another would seem to be growing relatively less significant, while those that separate groups within nations assume new salience. Today it is possible to perceive the world's population as being organized into horizontal layers of trans-national elites as well as into vertical national units. It is even possible to assert that international elites have regular communication and interactions among themselves that far surpass the intensity of contacts and degree of communication between them and nonelite groups within their own nations.

For purposes of illustration, four types of elite groups might be considered. The "jet set" illustrates an international "social elite." The
group is confined to the very wealthy or the favorites of the wealthy; it is characterized by an interest in and time for the pursuit of pleasure. It appears to be a closed group, entrance being achieved either by wealth, marriage to wealth, or some unusual act deserving of social reward. Membership is not limited to citizens of one nation. The activities of the group transcend national boundaries, earning the group its name. If the newspaper accounts can be taken seriously, members of this elite spend much of their time swooping from one major world city to another, shifting scenes constantly while maintaining the same actors in their play.

There is also a national business elite. Not all businessmen are members; many remain primarily insular, although they too are touched by international interests, as the goods on their shelves will testify. Nevertheless, international business is no longer simply the process of buying and selling goods across national borders. Today American business in particular has expanded abroad to such a point that it is no longer possible to be certain whether the business is a local one or a part of an international combine with headquarters in the United States. Not only do American concerns buy foreign businesses or establish new ones abroad, but they have also invented interesting and unique production mechanisms that resemble practices once common only within nations. Whereas it was once common for large industrial concerns to have many plants scattered across the nation producing components that were finally brought together in one or more final assembly plants, today it is increasingly common for some businesses to ship components for American products abroad for final assembly.

The export of American commercial culture is described in a recent book by the French author Joan Jacques Servan-Schreiber, who concludes that an Americanized Europe will soon become the world's third industrial force after the United States and the Soviet Union. While many Europeans reject American political leadership and vigorously oppose certain aspects of American foreign policy, they are becoming increasingly like Americans: they smoke American cigarettes, attend American movies, watch American television, and shop in supermarkets where they buy frozen and canned foods. Young people in Eastern as well as Western Europe are avid listeners of American jazz.
and popular music; and even at Communist youth rallies throughout Europe, it would not be thought strange for young radicals to criticize American “imperialism” while sipping “Cokes” or “Pepsis.” Of course American popular culture does not always survive in its “pure” form abroad; other nations and peoples often change it in subtle though unique ways in order to make it compatible with local tastes and interests. Nevertheless, the pattern is obvious: Western and particularly American habits, products, and life-styles are exercising a homogenizing influence on the world’s diverse cultures.

If all of this has the ring of American economic imperialism, let it be understood that this form of imperialism apparently is accepted by the “natives.” Increasingly, other countries—aware that the “gap” is more managerial than technological—send their business executives to the United States for training. American universities are asked to establish business schools in such places as Pakistan and Thailand and to sponsor seminars on economics in Yugoslavia. Throughout the world exists a managerial elite that marches to essentially the same drummer. An American electronics executive has no difficulty understanding the problems and accomplishments of his counterpart in Japan, West Germany, or the Soviet Union. Although the “First International” established by Karl Marx more than a century ago was intended to unite the “workers of the world” against owners and managers, workers have remained far more parochial in their concerns than have those the Communists sought to overthrow.

Intellectual elites also operate easily beyond the constraints of national borders. In the arts this has long been true. Music and literature have not been bound by time and place, nor have the artists who bring such works to life. A Chopin waltz is still Chopin whether played on an American stage by a Russian or by an American contestant in the Tchaikovsky competition. Jazz is jazz played in New Orleans or in Sofia, Bulgaria. No longer are movies judged according to their place of origin, but rather according to their artistry and the degree to which they succeed in portraying real human problems and concerns. Thus in 1987, for example, “C’ssely Watched Trains” (Czech), “A Man and a Woman” (French), and “A Man For All Seasons” (American) were all immensely popular with American audiences. Moreover, films themselves are becoming increasingly internationalized, as producers and actors of many different nationalities
cooperate in making a single movie. Marcello Mastroianni, Sophia Loren, Julie Christie, Richard Burton, and many others appear in films produced under a variety of national auspices.

The field of scholarship has also undergone immense change. One of the most visible signs of this change is the movement of people across national borders. More than 100,000 foreign students studied in the United States during 1966-1967, and more than 24,000 Americans enrolled in regular academic-year programs at nearly 600 institutions in 83 foreign countries in 1965-1966. Thousands of additional Americans participated in short-term and study-travel programs abroad that year.\(^1\) In academia it is now considered part of a professor's right—if not his responsibility—to spend some part of his career studying or teaching in a foreign country. While scholars have long corresponded with each other across national boundaries, it is increasingly common for scholars to form a kind of "academic jet set" by periodically attending international meetings and conferences. It was this phenomena that led one wag to announce that a great university is like the Strategic Air Command: it keeps one-third of its professors in the air at all times.

But, more important than this visible gain in face-to-face contacts among scholars from all parts of the world has been the development of a trans-national scientific ethic that binds scientists of all nationalities alike. This body of ideas to which all scholars are bound rejects \textit{a priori} reasoning in favor of reasoning based upon empirical research according to widely accepted scientific standards and techniques. Scholars are essentially uninterested in whether the author of a scientific tract is a Christian, a Buddhist, a Moslem, or a Marxist; they are interested only in whether the author conducted his investigation and reported his conclusions according to scientific rules of procedure. If his "faith" has interfered with his investigation, his work will be rejected not on the basis of his faith but on his inability to rise above it as a scientist.

Trans-nationalism characterizes academic life not only in that the scholarly community shares a worldwide ethic, but also in that individual scholars conduct investigations that are largely culture-free. In

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almost any college or university it is possible to find scientists at work on problems that are of no concern to colleagues in their own institution or perhaps even to scholars in their own country, but are followed closely and with fascination by scholars of other nations. One need only recall the history of research in atomic fission prior to World War II for an illustration of how a particular scientific topic can transcend national boundaries. Moreover, science may be the source of an international language. It is quite possible for two advanced mathematicians to communicate sophisticated mathematical concepts to each other even though neither knows a word of the other's national language.

Internationalism has also affected political elites. Once it was expected that a President should stay at home and mind the national business. Now it has become commonplace for the President to travel abroad to confer with foreign leaders and to receive a never-ending stream of foreign dignitaries at the White House. Candidates for high national office such as the Presidency are judged in large part by their apparent grasp of "international affairs." This sends Presidential hopefuls abroad to visit Bonn, London, Moscow, Rome, Tel Aviv, and many other cities. Moreover, consciously or unconsciously, leaders in high public office are selected in part according to how they will be accepted by other nations.

Chadwick Alger points out later in this Yearbook that international organizations such as the United Nations take on an identity of their own. They become, in part at least, truly international rather than merely an assembly of national representatives. It is not unusual for a delegate to depart from the official position of his government in order to transact "international" agreements. Under such circumstances the delegate perceives the "national" interests of his government as being simply one part of the "international" context.

These four elites—social, business, intellectual, and political—do not exhaust the list of elites that might be named, but they do illustrate the major point: at this time in human history ties among certain peoples are as strong across national boundaries as they are within them. Of course, only elites have been described here; by definition vast numbers of peoples—members of nonelite groups—are only slightly touched by the new phenomenon. Yet this very fact, which is equally true of all nations, is in itself a new trans-national reality. The well-
Conceptual Lag

educated black African, a member of the political, social, and intellectual elite in his country, may confess that he feels much more at home in London, New York, or Paris than he does in the African village from which he came. So, too, an American intellectual frequently has more in common with his counterpart in Brazil, Germany, or the U.S.S.R. than he does with the backwoodsman or slum dweller in his own country.

It should be added that the process of “trans-nationalization” owes its existence not only to new modes of face-to-face contact, but also to modern means of communication, which maintain an incessant barrage of information across national boundaries. Thanks to the communications satellite, the television, and the ubiquitous transistor radio, people everywhere are beginning to tune in to the same wave length: to a growing extent, they have access to the same music, similar entertainment, and—perhaps most significantly—shared anxieties about world political crises.

Americans have only recently discovered the “disadvantaged.” Similar “disadvantaged” exist in all countries. The underlying core of their shared disadvantagedness is that they are trapped in parochial cultures that are left increasingly far behind by new, more powerful, internationally oriented cultures. Each nation continues to have its misty-eyed, sentimental Neanderthals who hold desperately to the past, whether the past consists of life in the tribe, on a peasant farm, or without “foreign entanglements.” But the sweep of events is unmistakable. As Barbara Ward has so aptly described it, we are all passengers together on spaceship earth, bound together, sharing a common fate.

Political Socialization

An important research thrust in contemporary American political science is the study of the political socialization of children, that is, the process by which Americans acquire their political values, attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge. These studies have, almost without exception, been directed toward learning the dispositions children have toward their nation. At the same time these studies are conducted, however, there is increasing evidence that a trans-national socialization is underway, cutting across national boundaries.
Both political alienation, in the form of "hippie" movements, and political activism, in the form of radical political groups, may be observed among the youth of many nations. Members of such movements—either those who drop out or those who become highly politicized—probably share more in common with their counterparts in other countries than they do with those of their own age in their nation who do not share their views. For example, Students for a Democratic Society, although organized in the United States, feels itself to be closely tied to similar youth groups in other countries. Political events of international significance—such as the war in Vietnam—are watched closely by young people throughout the world, who may know more about such events than they do about most political events in their own nations. What the ultimate effect of an "international socialization" might be is difficult to predict, but one point seems obvious: it is likely to become increasingly difficult to win support for foreign wars by appealing to ethnocentrism and hatred toward other national groups.

Together with a new and different kind of socialization, there has come a trend toward larger, more complex, and more powerful political units. Once Americans felt a primary sense of loyalty to their state or region. Political socialization studies make clear that primary identification is now with the nation. Once Americans looked chiefly to local governments to satisfy immediate needs. State and local governments provided police and fire protection, built and operated schools, and constructed roads. The federal government existed primarily to provide national security and to regulate foreign commerce.

This is no longer true. Despite our reluctance to admit it, the United States now has a national system of education. In addition, most of the funds for highway construction, as well as the specifications for building them, emanate from the federal government. Local police find it convenient to cooperate with federal departments of police investigation. What were once state and local government activities have become concerns of the federal government.

In like manner the federal government finds many of its historic functions and prerogatives no longer completely under its control. National security cannot be guaranteed by building defenses on the borders of the nation. Realization of this fact led to the establishment
of the United Nations; it also led to the creation of mutual security agreements, such as NATO and SEATO. Despite regional arrangements to provide military defense, it is clear that no one on this earth is secure until everyone is secure. Missile systems and nuclear warheads make all people potential victims of a common fate. And because we run the risk of dying together, it is evident that we must together find ways to diminish the hazards of living together. Nuclear nonproliferation agreements as well as treaties to restrict testing of atomic weapons provide security only when such agreements are binding internationally on all nations and are not limited to a few.

The regulation of commerce, once primarily a prerogative of national governments, has also increasingly yielded to international control. The Common Market and efforts to reduce tariff barriers are but two examples of the ways international agreements are used to promote the economic interests of all. Similarly, economic disasters rarely begin and end within a single nation. The devaluation of the British pound and the attack on the American dollar produce global economic vibrations.

Moreover, national governments now perceive that problems affecting one nation may ultimately affect others. What would formerly have been judged to be a national problem is now believed to be an international concern. The alarm felt in the United States over the population explosion in India, China, and nations of Latin America results not only from an interest in the welfare of the people of those nations. In part, this concern stems from a recognition that the contemporary world cannot remain peaceful if people in significant portions of the globe are left to suffer and die from hunger and disease. Similarly, problems of managing and preserving the natural environment are global, not just local, in scope. Ultimately, everyone is threatened by polluted air, impure water, and dwindling natural resources. These hazards are now reaching the point where national solutions no longer suffice; man's health and perhaps even his survival depend upon the ability of nations to take collective measures against the pollution and destruction of the environment.

The old perspectives have outlived their usefulness. This is not to argue that nations will suddenly cease to exist or be important: distinctive national characteristics, separate languages and religions, and unique philosophies and outlooks will no doubt continue to mold the
lives of individuals in different nations. But the relative importance of these national influences will gradually decline, and a worldwide, trans-national culture will come to play an increasingly large role in determining the life patterns of individuals everywhere. Today, as Hans Kohn has said, "mankind' is slowly emerging as a reality."

**Implications for the Teaching of Social Studies**

If it is true as asserted above that there is a conceptual lag in the way world affairs are visualized today, and if it is also true that trans-national as opposed to national transactions are growing in importance, then there are obvious implications for the teaching of social studies. First of all, it is clear that any conceptual lag occurs in social studies classrooms as well as in the general thinking of educators, politicians, and the public at large. It therefore becomes crucial that social studies teachers themselves adopt new points of view more in keeping with the realities of trans-national society. This means, among other things, that many more teachers should be willing and able to have the kind of trans-national experiences now being enjoyed by the political, intellectual, and commercial elites of all countries. Too few teachers today have traveled or taught abroad or participated in seminars and conferences held overseas, yet it is precisely this kind of experience that would enable teachers to acquire new perspectives and attitudes about the relations of peoples and nations.

Furthermore, if the primary objective of social studies instruction is to provide students with the skills and knowledge required to cope with the contemporary world, it is apparent that only valid, up-to-date concepts should be taught in the classroom. Outmoded ideas will not help students; on the contrary, they will cripple or immobilize them.

Since 1945, "teaching for world understanding" has provided the conceptual base for most social studies instruction about world affairs. The term "world understanding" is sufficiently general so that a variety of approaches might have fit under its shelter. In practice, however, "teaching for world understanding" became primarily a process of teaching empathy or even sympathy for people of other nations and cultures. While this may be a worthy goal in itself, the point is that the educational procedures often used to convey "world understanding" may distort reality and provide dysfunctional education. Social
studies instruction that focuses upon beating the piñata as a way of understanding Mexico or fumbling with chopsticks in order to understand Asia may be as irrelevant as instruction about cowboys would be for understanding the United States. Yet with a few exceptions, new formulations or new concepts that might make instruction about world affairs more relevant have not been forthcoming.

There is, of course, no instant remedy for the ills that beset world affairs education. A certain degree of conceptual lag may be unavoidable simply because the human mind requires a certain amount of time before it can “catch up” with reality. But the conceptual lag in teaching about international affairs can be minimized, if not completely eliminated, by seeking out the shortcomings of existing concepts, vigorously searching for newer and better conceptual frameworks—in short, by subjecting the entire discipline to reasoned and unremitting scrutiny. Some of the articles in this Yearbook attempt to do precisely that. The essay by Lee Anderson, for example, suggests that distorted images of the nature of contemporary world affairs are the result of a failure on the part of Western theorists and scholars to look beyond the bounds of Western civilization for examples of different types of human social organization. Articles such as this, which offer a critical overview of the entire field of international affairs, may be the kind of catalyst needed to set in motion a drastic and immediate overhaul of teaching in this area.

None of the articles included here; it should be noted, attempts to prescribe the content or organization of specific courses. The editors of the Yearbook are, frankly, unable to say whether schools should require courses in international affairs, world cultures, comparative politics, etc. Rather, this Yearbook seeks to bring to the attention of social studies teachers some of the concepts scholars are using to analyze the contemporary world. Hopefully, teachers will find that many of these concepts are transferrable to social studies instruction in their own classrooms. However, no one, certainly not the authors of this Yearbook, would claim that the adoption of one or more of the conceptual schemes that follow will end the search for more satisfactory methods to understand the realities of the contemporary world. Reality is in a state of constant flux, and hence the process of refashioning old concepts and searching for new ones is literally a process without end.
This volume, consisting of a series of chapters by a number of educators and social scientists, attempts to convey to the reader some of the excitement and changes in the international studies field in recent years. The implications of developments in this field for social studies education are numerous. Perhaps the most obvious and most important is the need to redefine or reconceptualize international affairs as an area for study in the schools. In a field as fluid, fertile, and ill defined as this, it is impossible to do more than call attention to a few developments, trends, and programs that social studies teachers and other curriculum workers may find fruitful to explore as they seek to improve instruction in this important area.

Each of the four sections of the book deals with a somewhat different but related area of international affairs education. Part I suggests several ways of viewing or organizing materials about the emerging international society and indicates some of the complexities to which educators must be sensitive if they are to help students live intelligently in the framework of this changing world order. Part II offers some reflections about the field of international studies in general and world law and area studies in particular. Part III describes four approaches that are receiving increasing attention in many elementary and secondary school classrooms: simulation, decision-making, case studies, and comparative studies. Part IV provides informa-
tion about a wide variety of materials, resources, and programs available to teachers who seek to improve instruction in international affairs.

In the first section of this Yearbook John Stoessinger points out that the age-old struggle for power and order continues to be carried on within a nation-state system, sometimes by diplomacy, commerce, violence, or threats of military action, sometimes by treaties, aggression, or appeal to international law, and more recently by international organization. Changes are occurring, however. As William Marvel and David Arnold indicate in Chapter 3, there has recently evolved a new form of interstate relations: "educational diplomacy," or the exchange of knowledge, skills, and expertise among nations. This mode of diplomacy has placed new demands upon schools, colleges, and universities and has led them to re-examine their educational role in the international arena. In Chapter 4 one form of educational diplomacy and the impact it has on those who participate in it are discussed by J. Norman Parmer, who reports on some aspects of the Peace Corps. International organization—in particular, the United Nations—is also creating new forms of interaction among nations, and some of these are investigated by Chadwick Alger in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 Lee Anderson points out that the world is rapidly growing much more interdependent and argues that the involvement of increasing numbers of nationals in the affairs of other nations necessitates a drastic rethinking of some traditional assumptions about world affairs education.
Man has always been, and still remains today, both builder and destroyer. In our own times he has descended to unprecedented depths, but he has also soared to greater heights than ever before. He has not only built concentration camps and perfected weapons of mass destruction; he has also learned to control hunger and disease and has created the United Nations. Never before have nations made such intensive preparations to destroy one another. But at no previous time has mankind striven more desperately to avert such destruction. Our generation is involved in the fiercest struggles for power in history. Yet it also has the privilege of participating in the most determined struggle for order ever waged. If, therefore, we have cause for shame and despair, we also have grounds for pride and hope. The struggle toward order in world affairs is as determined as the struggle for power.

These two struggles are at many points closely interwoven. Indeed, the very soil which produces struggles for power also provides the

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1 This article was originally prepared for the Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corporation’s International Relations Film Project. Used with permission.
nourishment for new institutions of order. Thus, World War I brought forth the League of Nations and World War II the United Nations. The Suez crisis of 1956 and the Congo crisis of 1960 led to the creation of unprecedented United Nations peace forces. And the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 made possible agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. Similarly, every struggle for order among nations also involves some kind of power struggle. Witness the United Nations, the most imaginative instrument for order-building thus far devised, yet at the same time the arena for some of the most stubborn vying for power in history. Fundamentally, therefore, these two pervasive struggles must be recognized as two sides of a single coin.

MAN'S STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN WORLD AFFAIRS

What are the main tools man employs in the struggle for power with his fellow men in world affairs?

The Nation-State System

Our world is made up of over a hundred political units called nation-states. There is hardly a place on this planet that is not claimed by a nation-state. Only a century ago the world still abounded with frontiers and lands that remained unpre-empted. But in our time man can no longer escape from the nation-state system—unless he migrates to the frozen polar zones or to the stars. The nation-state has become ubiquitous. And everywhere it is the highest secular authority. It may decree that a man die; and, with no less effort, it may offer him the protection that enables him to live. When no state wants him—when man is naked in his humanity and nothing but a man—he thereby loses the very first precondition for his fellows even to be able to acknowledge his existence. Whether it be to be born, to live, or to die, he cannot do without official recognition: the recognition of a nation-state. Man has endowed the nation-state with a quality that it shares with no other human association, namely, the attribute of sovereignty. It is indeed not coincidence that the theory of sovereignty was first formulated in the sixteenth century, at a time when the nation-state system was in process of emerging from the universalism of the medieval
world. Its first systematic presentation was contained in the writings of the French political thinker Jean Bodin. Bodin's definition of sovereignty as "the state's supreme authority over citizens and subjects," set forth in his De La République in 1576, is still largely valid today. The nation remains the final arbiter over the lives of its citizens, leaving them recourse to no higher law. And while this is true in peacetime, it is even more totally and dramatically the case in times of war. For in the latter eventuality, the sovereign state has the right to send its citizens to their death and, through its sanction, to transform even the most brutal forms of killing into acts of patriotic heroism. It is frequently asserted that the concept of sovereignty is about to become obsolete. There is much to be said for the argument that the first atomic weapon "blew the roof off the sovereign nation-state." It is probably true that in case of atomic war, little sovereignty would remain. But it is equally true that in the absence of violent conflict—especially in regard to what the state continues to be able to demand of its citizens—sovereignty remains very much intact.

The truth is that in our time sovereignty is being both strengthened and weakened. This apparent contradiction is resolved if we survey the different parts of the globe. The Atlantic Community, especially Western Europe, seems to be slowly relaxing the grip of sovereignty. In that part of the world, sovereign states are moving toward larger units of political integration. But if sovereignty is "obsolete" in Western Europe, it is just coming into its own in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. While the Atlantic Community is moving toward cohesion, these other areas are veering toward fragmentation. In fact, more sovereign states have been born in our generation than in the preceding 300-year history of the nation-state system. As a result of the triumph of sovereignty among the nonwhite peoples of the earth, the membership of the United Nations has, since 1945, more than doubled. Hence, we would seem to be living in one of those rare and fascinating transitional periods in history in which mankind is at the same time looking both forward and backward. When we consider the Western world and see sovereignty beginning to be replaced by various new forms of regionalism, we see signs of the future. When we turn to the new nationalism in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, we witness what is in effect a rekindling of the past. Until the world has internationally
evolved somewhat further, therefore, sovereignty is bound to remain an integral part of our lives.

**The Two Great Power Struggles**

The struggle for power and order may be seen as the essence of international relations everywhere and always. The East-West struggle and the struggle over colonialism provide its particular form of expression here and now.

The first great power struggle of our generation has been waged between East and West. Yet today the East-West struggle can no longer be considered exclusively, or perhaps even primarily, in terms of the Soviet Union and the United States. Competition within the two camps has become almost as important as competition between them. China's bid for ideological leadership of the Communist camp has begun to assume the proportions of national power rivalry with the Soviet Union. And the homogeneity of the Western alliance has been seriously challenged by the nationalist policies of President de Gaulle of France in Western Europe and his recognition of Communist China in 1964. Alliances among nation-states are forever shifting.

The second great power struggle of our time is being waged over the liquidation of Western colonialism. A new nationalism in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East has risen to challenge the dominance of the waning European empires. Indeed, at no time since the inception of the nation-state system have so many new states joined the world community during so short a period. Even a partial list dwarfs all previous expressions of nationalism. In Asia, we have seen emerge into sovereign national status the former colonies of four different empires; in the Middle East a number of new states have arisen, many of them profoundly hostile toward one another; and in Africa, finally, the addition of a new member to the family of nations has of late become virtually a monthly event. The most significant characteristic of the international struggle for power in our time lies in the fact that its two principal conflicts—the struggle between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds, and that between the new nationalism of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and the waning empires of Europe—are very closely and inseparably intertwined. At least potentially, every
nation is today to a greater or lesser degree involved in both of these struggles. As the twentieth century completes its seventh decade, the web of interdependence between the two great political struggles has become truly universal. The 1940's saw it expand into Asia; the 1950's saw it move into the Middle East; and in the 1960's it reaches into the remotest corners of Africa. The international struggle for power among nations in our time has indeed become a one-world struggle.

One important difference between the two struggles may suggest something about their ultimate resolution. In the East-West conflict the two sides have fought to a kind of stalemate, while in the North-South struggle the colonial powers have, for the most part, been conciliatory, and the forces of anticolonialism are close to achieving victory. By and large, the issues in the former have turned on the propriety of substantive demands for change, while in the latter they have been concerned with tempo and modality of change. It is quite conceivable that the East-West conflict will still be with us in the next generation, but it is almost certain that the struggle over colonialism will pass before long into the pages of history.

**Violence and War**

What are the chances that power struggles among nations will erupt into open warfare or even nuclear conflict?

Struggles between nations may be of many different types and intensities, ranging from hostile though nonviolent relations, such as those that have characterized the East-West struggle during the post-World War II period of the "cold war," to the total kind of nuclear conflagration that the whole world so fears and is so anxious to prevent.

We may find some encouragement in the fact that though during the past 20 years the world has witnessed a score of outbreaks of violence among nations, all of these conflicts have remained limited and in none have nuclear weapons been used. This fact is remarkable indeed when one considers the actual list of these violent encounters: the Indonesian war, the Chinese civil war, the Malayan war, the Greek guerrilla war, the Kashmir dispute, the Indochina war, the Arab-Israeli war, the Korean war, the Guatemalan revolt, the Argentine re-
volt, the Algerian insurrection, the Israeli Sinai campaign, the Anglo-French attack on Suez, the Muscat and Oman rebellion, the Hungarian revolution, the Lebanon-Jordan clash, the Taiwan Strait hostilities, the two Cuban crises, the dispute over Malaysia, the clash between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Yemen, the hostilities over Cyprus, the violence in the Congo and other parts of Africa, the Vietnamese war, and the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states. To be sure, some of these were civil wars with minor international significance. Others were international conflicts over limited objectives. But at least four of them probably remained limited only because of the deterrent effect of nuclear power: the Korean war, the Hungarian revolution, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the war in Vietnam.

Thus, to some degree at least, the Great Bomb has become both a unique threat and an unprecedented inhibition. It was the latter fact to which Sir Winston Churchill sought to draw attention when he stated that he "look[ed] forward with great confidence to the potentiality of universal destruction." Though Churchill's faith in the dependability of the balance of terror seems somewhat exaggerated, the fact is that for the first time in history mankind is preparing for a war that no one actually wants. Never, indeed, have statesmen sought alternatives to war so desperately. Their anxiousness to avoid not only its realities but even its name may be seen in their designation of the East-West struggle as a matter of "peaceful coexistence" and of the Korean conflict as a "police action." Save for the ever-present possibility of nuclear war through irrationality or inadvertence, as more nations obtain atomic power, wars will in all likelihood follow the pattern of limited conflicts such as have characterized the period since World War II. And though the never-ending fight against the terror of wars of all kinds must continue, there is at least reasonable hope that whatever wars we may become involved in will be of essentially the same type as those we have known in the past.

MAN'S STRUGGLE TOWARD ORDER IN WORLD AFFAIRS

What are the main instruments man has forged for himself in his struggle toward peace and order in world affairs?
International Law

The first of these has been international law. Its contribution to the building of international order has been modest. In the first place, most international disputes simply do not lend themselves to a judicial approach since they are much too deeply involved in questions of power and prestige. Hence international law, unlike domestic law, suffers from a paucity of cases and cannot easily grow into a codified system. A second obstacle is the stubborn fact that the very states that are to be governed by international law are the sovereign masters of that law, rather than its servants. In other words, international law suffers from the lack of a centralized enforcement agency. These truths have raised the question of whether there is such a thing as international law at all. The record shows that the answer is definitely in the affirmative, yet it also shows that the main usefulness of international law is in technical and fairly noncontroversial matters. In these areas, it has crystallized into a respectable body of international rules and regulations which are invaluable aids in the normal day-to-day conduct of international relations.

As a general rule, the "legal approach" to political order-building has been most effective among those nations that are held together by a sense of political community. But law has not been able to produce this community. Rather, since the existence of law has seemed to depend on the prior community—as in the relations between the two super-powers—the "political approach" of diplomacy is likely to yield more fruitful results than the judicial. Indeed, the true relation between diplomacy and international law has not been one in which the latter has displaced the former, but one in which more successful diplomacy has resulted in more ungrudging consent to better laws.

Disarmament and Arms Control

If the objective of the political order-builders is a world without major disputes, the hope of those who would build order through disarmament is a world without weapons. In the view of the latter, arms races cause wars. If, as they see it, arms are permitted to accumulate, they will sooner or later be used. An arms race therefore becomes a relent-
less and self-propelling march to war. Both sides strain furiously to maintain or reclaim the lead. Finally, the tension reaches such a pitch that war is almost welcomed as a liberating explosion. If, on the other hand, nations are deprived of the means to fight, the proponents of disarmament maintain, wars will either cease to exist or, at worst, become relatively harmless.

Here we encounter the first crucial problem. Is it true, as the advocates of disarmament hold, that arms races cause the political tensions that drive nations to war? Or are the political order-builders correct in asserting that though arms races may precipitate war, the real source of international conflict must be sought in the political tensions between nations that lead to arms races in the first place? The former tend to regard the arms race as a basic cause of war, the latter merely as a symptom of political pathology. Both groups are prepared to admit that the problem is really a circular one: arms races breed political tensions; these in turn lead to the development and acquisition of more destructive weapons; and this situation raises temperatures even further, until the violent climax is reached. But the two groups differ as to the most effective point at which to intervene in the vicious circle. Those who see arms races as a basic cause of war assert the primacy of international order-building through disarmament. They maintain that halting the arms race will lead to a reduction in political tensions, which will likely result in an even further scrapping of weapons. On the other hand, a growing number of observers are defending the view that disarmament efforts are bound to fail unless they are preceded by more fundamental political accommodation. The way to disarm, according to this latter view, is not to begin by disarming but to concentrate instead on the settlement of political differences.

The discouraging record of disarmament in the modern world supports the proposition that order is fundamentally not a military problem. Disarmament negotiations per se will not reduce the tensions between the major powers unless such efforts are preceded by at least a minimum of success in the settlement of outstanding political differences. This is really another way of saying that the problem of disarmament is not disarmament at all but is in essence the problem of forging the bonds of political community among nations. We know little about the causes of war. Similarly, we do not know enough about the process of community-building. Why should a pilot under orders
drop a lethal weapon on a defenseless city in "enemy" country, but refuse to drop it on his own? At first glance, this question may seem naive. But when one considers its human implications, it is not. For if we could answer it, the issue of disarmament would have become largely irrelevant. As an order-building strategy disarmament is chiefly concerned with symptoms. The real causes of the disease must be sought at a deeper level.

The frustrations over disarmament have led some thinkers to approach the problem in a somewhat different way: arms control rather than disarmament. Whereas the disarmer is primarily concerned with the actual scrapping of weapons, the arms controller is more interested in stabilizing the climate in which these weapons exist. The emphasis here is less on hardware and more on psychology. The hope is that progress can be made on issues related to disarmament, which might build confidence and ultimately lead to actual disarmament agreements. For example, in 1963, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union and the United States established direct communications—a "hot line" between the White House and Kremlin. In 1967 the "hot line" was used for the first time by the two superpowers during the Arab-Israeli war. Also, by the late 1960's the majority of the world's nations had agreed to a partial nuclear test ban and to the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only.

These indirect approaches to disarmament will probably be employed more and more extensively in the years ahead.

The United Nations

The United Nations is the most ambitious order-building experiment in history. It was designed to attack the problem of war on six principal fronts, each the responsibility of one major organ. A look at the record of each of the member organs shows clearly that in no case have the hopes of the United Nations' founders been realized completely. Each organ has developed a life of its own, often quite different from the original conception, and has made its own unique contribution.

The record of the Security Council is uneven. It has not attained the goal of collective security, but the great powers have often been able to agree on investing the Secretary-General with sweeping re-
responsibilities for keeping the peace. The General Assembly has certainly not become the world's parliament, but has shown a capacity for improvisation far greater than any of the United Nations' founders would have dared to predict. In effect, it has become collective security's second line of defense and has played a major role in the establishment and political direction of United Nations peace-keeping operation. It has also shown a remarkable talent for international law-making, and it continues to be the last remaining global forum in which the two great political struggles are waged in an atmosphere of parliamentarianism. Neither the United Nations Economic and Social Council nor the specialized agencies have realized the original hopes expressed in the Charter, since most economic, social, and cultural work has been too permeated with political significance. But the proliferation of functional agencies under the aegis of the United Nations Economic and Social Council has yielded a multitude of global "good works" of unprecedented magnitude and unquestioned value. While colonial dependencies have not become "sacred trusts of civilization," the Trusteeship System has doubtless contributed to the peaceful liquidation of Western colonialism. But unless new Trusts are added, the Trusteeship Council may disappear from the United Nations family. Much could be gained if the concept of trusteeship were applied to the more explosive of the remaining colonies. The World Court's role has been modest. It has not been able to contribute much to global order-building but has managed to consolidate the gains of international law in the Western world. Of all the United Nations organs, the Office of the Secretary-General has come closest to approximating the conception of the framers of the Charter. It has, indeed, become the repository of an invaluable new treasure—international statesmanship.

In the final analysis, the most striking characteristics of the United Nations have been its elasticity and adaptability. The League of Nations, which did not subscribe to as eclectic an approach to peace as the United Nations, crumbled after the first onslaughts. The United Nations, on the other hand, has developed multiple lines of defense against war. In its short life span it has been tested at least as severely as was the League of Nations. It has managed to respond to a multitude of challenges with amazing resiliency, an unmatched gift for
innovation and improvisation, and a realistic sense of the politically possible. What has not killed the United Nations has made it stronger.

THE NEXT GENERATION

All the evidence of the past suggests that the struggles for power and order will continue in the future with even greater intensity. But the coming generation may play a decisive role in this age-long struggle: it will have a veto power over the existence of man himself as the dominant form of life on this planet. If power prevails over order, there may develop a fateful race between man's temptation to incinerate the earth and his striving to reach and populate another planet. If order prevails over power, man can now, for the first time in history, build a meaningful life without want or fear for all on Spaceship Earth.
The primary objective of any nation-state is the maintenance of national security, a condition in which the territory, institutions, and values of a nation are protected from disruption. The security of a nation is a relative situation: threats or potential threats to stability are always present, arising from events both within and without its boundaries. To maintain the security of the nation, the government develops a set of domestic policies to promote the optimal growth of national life and a set of foreign policies designed, in the first instance, to ensure that other nations are not able to disturb this life.

Throughout human history there have been nations coveting more territory or more influence over other nations. For nearly all countries of the world, therefore, maintaining a durable national security has required constant attention to the actions and aspirations of neighboring countries. The legal jurisdiction of governments extends only to national boundaries, yet states expend large measures of energy in attempts to control events beyond these boundaries and to prevent these events from affecting their national security. For those nations most vulnerable to the demands of others, whether from geographic...
position or conditions of national power, effective foreign policies have often been more critical than domestic policies to the survival of the nation.

During the first 125 years of our national existence, the United States, due to both location and historical circumstance, did not devote much attention to world affairs. Within that period there were foreign concerns, diplomatic maneuvering, and occasional wars. But on the whole this country could with impunity ignore the rest of the world.

This is no longer so. Transformations in world affairs within this century have effectively ended the splendid isolation of the United States. Two world wars, the spread of communism, the dissolution of colonial empires, the rise of nationalism, developments in weapons and space technology—these events have affected all nations. To the United States has come unanticipated and unsolicited leadership in the new order, with responsibility for restraining aggression, maintaining peace, and assisting in the improvement of conditions of life throughout the world. This new role has brought a staggering range of overseas commitments to the nation. From the Marshall Plan and NATO for Europe, to an Alliance for Progress for Latin America, to a Peace Corps for developing nations throughout the world, the United States has become involved in world affairs to an extent that would have been inconceivable at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Much of the new American involvement in the world has followed patterns of interstate relations practiced by other nations for centuries past; yet there are also new procedures very different in purpose and content from past patterns of relations between nations. Throughout much of the history of international relations, there have been four types of activity used by states in attempts to influence the activity of other states: bargaining, through diplomacy and other forms of negotiation; commerce, through the exchange of goods and services; legal agreements, through participation in conventions, treaties, and, more recently, international organizations; and force, or the threat of force, through the manipulation of military strength.

These techniques have served the United States well, even in this new era of world affairs. International conferences, summit meetings, and informal conversations with the world’s diplomats still contribute to the regulation of interstate relations. The volume of international
trade has increased threefold since the end of World War II. Nearly every nation participates in the activities of the United Nations, and there have been more than 10,000 international treaties recorded by the United Nations since 1946. The threat and the use of military force has yet to be renounced or abandoned, although the horror of nuclear weapons would appear to have deterred world-encompassing aggression by even the most powerful nations.

To these four categories of interstate relations, however, the United States, along with other of the more advanced nations, has added a fifth—educational diplomacy. This new pattern is closely related to the more traditional pattern of economic commerce: just as commerce involves the exchange of needed goods and services, so educational diplomacy involves the exchange of knowledge, skills, and expertise. This interchange includes the sharing of ideas with other peoples through international conferences and meetings, books, television, and other media; the exchange of persons with other nations, such as American professors who teach and American students who study overseas; cooperative research projects involving scholars of several nationalities; and development of educational institutions, enlisting the assistance of educators from different nations.

The traditional patterns of interstate relations admittedly have more immediate foreign policy implications than does educational diplomacy. Programs in educational interchange do not directly maintain world peace nor do they directly prevent international conflict. They do, however, assist in establishing basic conditions supportive of peace by encouraging mutual understanding among peoples and by sharing the knowledge of the more experienced countries with the less experienced nations of the world. Bargaining, commerce, legal agreements, and force often produce direct political results; educational diplomacy, when successful, brings humanitarian gains.

The mode of implementation of this new pattern of interstate relations is as novel to world affairs as its philosophy. Customarily, foreign affairs have been carried out almost exclusively within and between national governments. Heads of state and their representatives have met with other heads of state and their representatives. Civilian populations have been used in armies, but were rarely called on to participate in other aspects of international relations.
U.S. educational diplomacy relies heavily on the participation of the American people. For example, although the Department of State administers important segments of the exchange program, the persons exchanged are drawn almost exclusively from outside the government. Similarly, the Agency for International Development mounts programs of educational development overseas, but leans heavily on personnel from the private sector to implement these programs. The Peace Corps does contribute its own staff directly to its overseas operations, but these individuals are less likely to be career personnel than volunteers recruited from the private sector and intending to return to nongovernmental pursuits after completion of their assignments. Crucial to the success of nearly all of these programs is the U.S. university. It is mainly from the university that American educators are sent overseas; it is to the university that foreign students and educators come; and it is through the university that many U.S. programs in educational assistance are implemented.

The attention of the American university to educational diplomacy has closely matched the relatively recent commitment of this country to world affairs. Our institutions of higher education, unlike their European antecedents, have from their very beginnings developed closely in step with the needs and expectations of the society of which they are a part. Seventeenth and eighteenth-century American private universities trained their elite to preach as well as teach; nineteenth-century land-grant universities prepared men for public leadership at all levels. Today, as the United States has assumed a position of international leadership, American universities have offered their facilities and their personnel for overseas service.

The most visible contributions of American universities to educational diplomacy are their technical assistance activities, in which the university accepts responsibility for supporting the efforts of other nations to improve their economic and social conditions. This support takes the form of either consultation, when the university provides advisory services only, or operations, when the university directly participates in assistance activities, or frequently a combination of the two.

Overseas consulting services are often provided directly to foreign educational institutions and, in a few cases, to foreign governments.
Consultations may be of either short or long duration: in the first instance, the university conducts a survey or study of a defined problem, submits its recommendations to the interested organization, and is then relieved of any further responsibility; in the second instance, the university takes responsibility for guiding the implementation of a set of recommendations, remaining overseas and attached to the interested organization for an extended period of time. Direct participation in technical assistance activities has usually occurred in connection with the development of educational resources overseas, both human and institutional. On some occasions, however, universities have also provided direct assistance to the activities of overseas government agencies.

The largest single source of financial support for American university technical assistance activities has been the U.S. Agency for International Development and its predecessor, the International Cooperation Administration. Through contracts with AID, more than 70 universities are engaged in technical cooperation in over 40 countries. At the same time, however, financial support from other sources for American university technical assistance programs overseas has increased substantially over the past decade. These sources include the major private foundations, such as Ford, Rockefeller, and the Carnegie Corporation, and other U.S. government agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, the Army, the Office of Education, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Agriculture. Support has also come from international organizations, such as the OECD and the World Bank, and from private corporations both in the U.S. and overseas. In addition, occasional programs are supported by American universities alone or in collaboration with a foreign institution.

Examples of university programs will help to suggest the variety and range of involvement.

Michigan State University has, since 1960, been assisting in the development of the University of Nigeria, in Nsukka and Enugu. Approximately 30 Michigan State faculty help recruit and train Nigerian faculty, conduct research on problems of Nigerian higher education, organize and teach courses within the University, and develop reciprocal relationships between the University and Nigerian secondary schools, other universities, government agencies, and agri-
cultural and business organizations. An equal number of Nigerian University faculty have received advanced training at the Michigan State home campus.

The University of California has, since 1961, been assisting the University of Chile in the development of a Chilean regional college structure. California faculty are sent to Chile for short and long-term consultation services, and Chilean regional college faculty participate in M.A. degree programs within the University of California system.

Indiana University has, since 1959, been assisting the University of Punjab, in Pakistan, to strengthen programs of teacher education and to develop an Institute of Education and Research. Approximately 15 American professors have been teaching, conducting research, counseling students, and consulting with Pakistani faculty, with a slightly larger number of Pakistani graduate students receiving advanced training on the Indiana University home campus.

Cornell University has been cooperating with the Department of Justice of the Liberian government since 1952 in the preparation of a code of laws, with Cornell faculty assisting Liberian lawyers in the drafting of new legislative law and a revision of already existing law.

Johns Hopkins University has, since 1961, been working with the Ethiopian Ministry of Health to gather basic data on the incidence of diseases and to evaluate the effectiveness of a newly established series of health centers in that country.

These examples illustrate some of the many ways American universities are contributing directly to educational diplomacy through participation in technical assistance activities abroad. A more indirect impact comes through the training of both present and future leadership for careers in international affairs. Graduate institutions such as Columbia's School of International Affairs, Denver's Graduate School of International Studies, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Syracuse's Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, and Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, offer courses and degree programs for those students anticipating public service careers in foreign affairs or careers encompassing both scholarship and operational positions.
These schools and others also contribute to the further training of individuals already engaged in foreign affairs professions. Officials from U.S. government agencies such as the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency often come in mid-career to attend seminars, series of courses, or even degree programs that will better equip them to carry on in their professions. Similar individuals also come from abroad for study, research, or even reflections.

Perhaps the most visible and extensive contributions of American universities to international leadership have come through training programs conducted for future Peace Corps Volunteers and for overseas nationals in this country as part of AID participant programs. By 1967 more than a hundred American universities had taken part in training some 30,000 future Peace Corps Volunteers. This instruction covers the spectrum from language and area studies to procedures of well-drilling or school construction. University involvement in the Peace Corps has another dimension, as well: many American educational institutions now encourage students to offer prior Peace Corps experience toward graduate training in preparation for higher levels of overseas service.

A pilot project undertaken by Michigan State University illustrates what may become a future trend in the American higher education community. MSU is training 35 returned Peace Corps Volunteers, many of whom already have their A.B. and teaching certificate, to teach in Nigeria for a period of two years. If the students wish to obtain their master's degree in teaching after their service in Nigeria, they may return to MSU, which will grant them credit equivalent to three-fourths of the degree program. In another instance, Western Michigan University has initiated a program whereby students may receive their A.B. after two years on campus, two years with the Peace Corps overseas, and a final year back at the university. The program may be extended to the graduate level for students who leave for Peace Corps duty after their junior year.

On another front, AID-sponsored participant training has involved nearly 80 American universities in the preparation of foreign nationals for leadership in development programs in their own countries. Many of these individuals are sent to a university on an ad hoc basis; others are assigned to the home campus of a university responsible for tech-
technical assistance programs in their country of origin. These foreign participants receive training in such fields as engineering, teacher education, public and business administration, economics, and agriculture. The programs of study may vary from degree courses to brief seminars of several weeks; participants may be assigned to universities as individuals or in groups of up to a hundred.

American universities also provide some assistance to the Department of Defense in the training of foreign military personnel. Although most of these personnel are assigned to the various military schools or training programs, some are placed within civilian institutions. A special program for developing key African military personnel as a leadership core has involved assignments to four-year degree courses at a university (combined with Reserve Officer Training Corps participation) and one year at a military school. Oregon State University receives some foreign army personnel in an Orientation and English Language Program; the English Language Program at the University of Hawaii receives several students from the Okinawa military authorities.

Questions for the University

Despite the apparent success of university contributions to U.S. educational diplomacy, there are differing opinions within the American academic community as to the relevance of international service activities to university purposes and goals. The intensity of discussion is understandable: unanimity of opinion on major issues is not the habit of an intellectual community, American or other, and the value of international service activities has been one of the more important issues among American scholars and teachers in the post-World War II years. Many would accept the relevance of consulting activities for the professional development of the individual faculty member but question whether this function is appropriate to the university as an institution. This criticism becomes stronger as university institutional commitments approach the more operational functions of direct technical assistance.

Discussion in this area appears to arise from two types of issues. The more philosophical involves a rather basic question about the role of the university in society: does the university have an obliga-
tion to serve society directly as an institution or indirectly through the contribution of expertise and individuals to be used as society finds appropriate? The second, and more operational issue, is generated by the complexities of relationships between the university and the agency or institution to which it is offering its services: must the university necessarily compromise its professional and academic standards by engaging in overseas technical operations?

Responses to the first issue vary considerably from university to university, depending on the traditions, constituencies, and leadership of that institution. The state universities have, on the whole, been more receptive to the concept and responsibilities of public service; the private universities have been more reluctant to accept institutional service commitments. There are, however, important exceptions to these trends, and several of the major private American universities conduct extensive domestic and overseas service programs.

Responses to the second issue depend principally upon the nature of the technical assistance projects undertaken by the university. Assistance relationships with overseas educational institutions are more readily acceptable to American universities, since certain academic values and traditions are theoretically shared by the two institutions. Assistance relationships with overseas government agencies are not as readily accepted, because the value structures of the two institutions are, in theory, not the same.

Within the American academic community the greatest area of sensitivity regarding technical assistance projects involves the source of financial support. Foundations, other private agencies, and international organizations are viewed with considerably less alarm by American academics than agencies of the U.S. government. Even among the various federal agencies there is a wide spectrum of variation as to the warmth of welcome their funds will find on the campuses.

AID and its predecessor agencies have continued to cause concern in the academic community. Despite recent attempts by AID to meet many of the objections raised by the universities involved in technical assistance contracts, some American educators tend to believe that any form of operating relationship with a U.S. government agency is inimical to their professional principles. They find administrative supervision from the AID field mission difficult to accept; indeed, they
find any suggestion of professional supervision intolerable. They resent
the necessity to refrain from public criticism of U.S. or host govern-
ment policies while serving overseas and are disturbed by obligations
to secure approval from AID officials for any publications arising from
their field experience.

Many universities attempt to meet internal objections to overseas
assistance activities by defining institutional commitment in terms of
response to the U.S. national interest. This is not an explanation
readily accepted by all members of the academic community. Some
point out that questions of national interest are defined by the govern-
ment with little, if any assistance, from those private individuals who
are required to serve this interest; others question whether issues of
national interest, no matter how defined, should take precedence over
issues of academic freedom.

Other universities attempt to develop a consensus on the relevance
of international service to institutional goals by turning overseas tech-
nical assistance contracts to maximum educational advantage on the
home campus. Faculty members are encouraged to relate overseas
service to their ongoing professional life: to continue whatever re-
search activities they may have started while overseas, to introduce
experience and knowledge gained overseas into their courses and semi-
inars, and to assist in supporting a clearer understanding of overseas
cultures and developmental needs among faculty colleagues. Michigan
State University is an example of this type of institution, deeply in-
volved in overseas development assistance and at the same time
greatly concerned about the possibilities of relating overseas expe-
rience to home campus activities and programs.

Questions about the propriety and relevance of all forms of inter-
national activity to the purposes of a university have been and will
probably continue to be answered by each institution in terms of its
own history, needs, and goals. Although the university can and should
seek outside guidance, the final decisions should be internal. The
locus of internal university decision-making is crucial, for without
institution-wide cooperation in the formulation of policy, there will be
little institution-wide cooperation in the implementation of policy.
Leadership by the administration is important, but the judgments of
faculty, the concerns of students, and the opinions of trustees are inte-
gral contributions to the establishment of a philosophy of university participation in international programs.

Trans-National Cooperation

The experience of American universities in international programs within the past 20 years has produced a body of knowledge on, and a cadre of experts familiar with, the problems of educational and cultural relations and of national development. But this is not solely American knowledge, and these are not only American experts. Study programs have transformed students of all nationalities; leadership training programs have contributed direction to many nations; cooperative research programs have produced the beginnings of a trans-national community of scholars; and technical assistance projects have helped produce an array of new institutions of higher learning around the world.

And now, as American leaders rediscover some rather pressing problems within this country, they realize that this body of knowledge and cadre of experts developed through overseas experience can be directly relevant to the needs and goals of the United States as well. The problems of economic development in rural Nigeria resemble the problems of economic development in some of the bypassed geographic areas of this country. Urban conflict in Latin America shares many of the characteristics of urban conflict in this country. And the developmental needs of new universities in Asia may provide insights for the development of rapidly transforming American educational institutions.

This realization could produce revolutionary changes in the concept and operations of American university international programs. American universities with experience in Nigerian economic development may, in addition to continuing their overseas commitments, wish to apply this experience to the developmental needs of Appalachia. Universities hitherto concerned with urban crises in Brazil might direct their attention to the crises of Los Angeles, Detroit, or New York. Universities with expertise in the development of higher education facilities in India might likewise assist the struggling younger institutions in this country. The universities, however, would not simply be
applying their own knowledge, experience, and personnel to these new directions; they would be enlisting the assistance of those to whom they had previously offered aid. Overseas academic colleagues would be invited to this country, as Americans are being invited to theirs, to assist in search for solutions to problems shared by all developing societies.

The beginnings of this transformation are already in evidence. As a result of President Johnson’s proposal to Congress in February 1966, the Department of State has created a Volunteers to America program that brings young people from overseas countries to serve for a two-year period in elementary and secondary public schools across the United States. This “reverse Peace Corps” program has contributed 64 participants from 12 countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to the American public school system during the 1967-68 academic year. A second group of volunteers will arrive in this country in early 1968 to complete a pilot project complement of 100 volunteers.

This new program—one that could soon have its counterpart at the university level—signals an exciting realization in this country that the needs of all peoples transcend national distinction; that the search for knowledge to meet these needs should be a combined effort that transcends national boundaries; and that trans-national cooperation directed towards the improvement of human welfare is not only desirable, but possible.

This realization may well be one of the most significant contributions the American university will have made to the world in this century.
The Peace Corps and the Conduct of United States Foreign Affairs

Chapter 4

J. NORMAN PARMER

In the welter of official statements on Vietnam, NATO, divided Germany, use of outer-space, and a non-proliferation accord, it is sometimes overlooked that the fundamental goal of American foreign policy is the realization of a world composed of politically independent and economically and socially viable nations. This will be a world where the modern concepts of law and reason are practiced and people can shape their own institutions. It is not the intention of the United States that the world be divided into great power blocs or that nations be replicas of one or the other of the super powers. President Johnson has said that "no nation need ever fear that we desire their land or impose our will or to dictate their institutions."

In the conduct of foreign affairs, the United States can make use of several foreign policy instruments. These include military alliances, economic and technical assistance, commercial and cultural agree-

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1 The author was a Peace Corps overseas country director in 1962-63 and a director of a division of the Peace Corps in Washington in 1963-64. The views expressed herein are, however, his own.

ments, and the Peace Corps. The first three of these foreign policy instruments are often employed to gain near or intermediate-term U. S. national objectives which tend to obscure or even work counter to the fundamental goal. This has been justified as having to “deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.”

The fourth instrument of policy, the Peace Corps, has no near-term goals and few that are overtly national. It is the Peace Corps working as a nearly autonomous agency of the State Department which, more than any other agency of the United States government, seeks to achieve the goal of independent and viable states.

How does the Peace Corps work toward this goal? National viability depends on a number of factors which vary from country to country. But in general, strong and viable nations are likely to be those which make effective use of their existing resources. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, use of existing resources is thwarted or encumbered not simply by inadequacy of capital or shortages of professional expertise, but by ignorance and stubborn persistence of habits of mind. Tradition-bound people may for a time make for political stability. But in today’s world such people do not contribute to political viability. A state’s viability will depend at least in part on its success in ridding its people of ignorance and in changing habits of mind.

The goal then is really modernization—not simply of physical things which the usual technical assistance programs deal with—but of attitudes, values, and institutions. If this is so, then it becomes a concern of American foreign policy to encourage the modification of traditional attitudes and the development of modern ones. The Peace Corps is the only significant foreign policy instrument of the United States which is engaged in promoting modernization in the sense of changing attitudes.

That Peace Corps Volunteers are contributing to political independence and economic and social viability by changing attitudes in the countries where they work is not stated in the legislation establishing the Peace Corps. According to the Peace Corps Act, the Peace Corps has three purposes: (a) to help other countries meet their manpower needs; (b) to promote a better understanding of the

American people; and (c) to help Americans obtain some understanding of foreign peoples. These goals are being pursued. But the unstated goal of changing attitudes is in practice the more fundamental work of Volunteers.

The lack of candor in formulating the Peace Corps goals was probably not calculated. Rather more likely, the founding of the Peace Corps should be regarded as a manifestation of American and Western liberal tradition. This is the tradition in which men, because of their belief in the worth of individuals, do deeds and express ideas out of conscience usually without perceiving the ultimate effects. The truth is that not all Volunteers today fully appreciate what it is they are about. Nevertheless, the Peace Corps represents an American striving not merely to preserve but to extend the liberal spirit which has helped to make Western Civilization both unique and great. The Peace Corps struggles against the "closed hearts and dull minds" which Barbara Ward in another context has said will destroy a civilization.

How is this American manifestation of Western liberal spirit received abroad? How do Peace Corps Volunteers change attitudes? What have been their experiences? What kinds of problems have they encountered? To what extent have they been successful?

Teaching

Every Peace Corps Volunteer is engaged in teaching in some way or another. But the majority of the approximately 12,700 Volunteers in 52 countries at the beginning of 1967 were formally teaching. They are found at every level of education—universities, teacher-training institutions, primary and secondary schools, and vocational schools. Africa claims the largest number of teaching volunteers. At the end of January, 1967, more than two-thirds or 2,560 of the 3,525 Volunteers in 19 African countries were teaching.*

The contribution of education to economic development and modernization has been argued repeatedly by scholars and demonstrated historically by the Western countries and Japan. Planners and statesmen generally accept the idea that education is the most im-

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*Statistical information here and below supplied by the Peace Corps, Washington, D. C.
important investment a poor or underdeveloped country can make. An unusually high proportion of total annual expenditures in many of the developing nations is on education. As a result educational opportunity is expanding rapidly, and the need for teachers is acute. Peace Corps Volunteers are helping to meet the need. It is not an exaggeration to say that in several countries certain types of education would have to be carried on much more modestly or not at all if Volunteers were not available.

In view of the rapid expansion of educational facilities and the importance attached to education, Peace Corps Volunteer teachers would appear to have excellent opportunities not only to teach the skills needed for economic modernization but also to promote changes in attitudes. In fact, however, this is not necessarily so. Often the schools in which the Volunteers are teaching were established by the former colonial powers or have been created since independence on the model of the colonial school. Educational opportunity in colonial societies was narrow. The number of students passing from primary to secondary school was severely limited and the number who went from secondary to higher education, usually abroad, was even more restricted. Moreover, the purposes of education were socially and economically static. The primary curriculum was designed to have children—often only males—follow in their fathers’ agrarian footsteps. The secondary institutions aimed to produce clerks and low level technicians. Most of the countries where Volunteers are teaching still cling to colonial models.

Volunteers blame some of the difficulties they encounter on colonial legacies. The emphasis on rote learning, on adhering strictly to a syllabus, and on infrequent but all important examinations clashes with their own educational experience and disturbs most of them. They believe the system does not encourage the students to think critically, and they wonder how their students will develop the judgment needed to be useful citizens. A Volunteer who departed from the syllabus to encourage some independent thinking was politely but pointedly asked by a student, “Sir, is this in the syllabus?” Volunteers have also been discouraged from straying from the syllabus by the practice in many countries of evaluating a teacher’s ability by the number of his students who pass the examinations. Volunteers believe that the poor
motivation and poor discipline they sometimes encounter is due in part to teaching practices and curriculum requirements.

Not only do Volunteers dislike teaching the syllabus; many of them do not believe in it. They are convinced that the subject matter is inappropriate for their students' needs. History, language, and literature rather than chemistry, mathematics, and auto mechanics are the subjects taught. The history and literature is, moreover, still often that of the former colonial power. As one Volunteer in an African country put it, "The geography of Wales and the history of New Zealand are not going to help these kids to be better cotton farmers."

The school syllabus not only contains the wrong subjects, but in the opinion of many Volunteers the schools themselves are inculcating the wrong values. This is especially true of the residential high schools upon which many countries still rely as the principal training ground for future leaders. The language of instruction, diet and dress, social graces observed, the sports played, the manners of the European instructors—large numbers of whom are still employed on contract—all teach values foreign to the local society. Students, say the Volunteers, are alienated from their people, the very ones among whom they must eventually work. Manual labor and agriculture and by association those people who are in such occupations come to be viewed with disdain. The ideal often created in the students' minds is the white-shirted administrator behind his desk. One Volunteer declared, "The very atmosphere in this place tells them their society is inferior," and another, "We are helping to create 'second class Englishmen'!"

Material conditions, primarily in the housing of secondary school teachers, tend to strengthen wrong values and are a handicap to the Volunteers. Teachers, whether Europeans, local persons, or Peace Corps Volunteers, are usually people of status and are well-trained by the governments who employ them. In one African country, for example, most secondary school teachers are provided with comfortable three-bedroom brick houses. These have full bathrooms, fireplaces (for the chilly nights), hot water, and usually electricity as well as other amenities. Such housing is far above the standard enjoyed by the students and their parents. It is in part the result of colonial tradition when European teachers were employed and in part probably aimed at attracting persons into teaching. Nevertheless the houses tend to
strengthen the tradition of teacher aloofness and discourage after-school social contacts.

Many Volunteers who are in situations such as that sketched above are unhappy. They find that they are helping to displace traditional native values with ones which they believe are of limited or no utility. They are engaged in changing attitudes, to be sure, but the changes are not the ones which they have in mind. They feel that the institutional requirements curtail their freedom and limit their effectiveness. Volunteers are told in training that they must adapt, and they usually do. But for some their conscience is troubled to the point where they express their views outside the classroom.

In one country the controversy reached all the way to the prime minister, who heatedly declared that there was not room for both British and American systems of education in his country and that he wanted the British system. The good man, himself a product of the colonial system, somewhat imperfectly stated the issue. It is unlikely that the British would today point to his country's educational institutions with pride or regard them as owing much to contemporary British educational thought. Nor is anyone in the Peace Corps likely to agree that the Volunteers attempt to foist American values and institutions on the country. But the incident dramatizes the fact that the task of changing values in formal teaching situations is often hampered less by student ignorance and habits of mind than by the existence of institutionalized values and practices.

In some countries the residential high schools still have European headmasters. This is not true in the primary schools or in the newly-founded secondary schools where the headmasters are local persons. Problems sometimes arise between these headmasters and Volunteers. The headmaster is usually new at his job. Often he has not sought the responsibility and receives little or no extra compensation for it. He probably has had little contact with “Europeans,” as Volunteers are called, and never has he had one working for him. The Volunteer is probably a university graduate—a rare and prestigious thing in most countries—while the headmaster will probably have had no more than a year or two of normal school beyond his own elementary and perhaps lower secondary school education. The headmaster may not have asked for a Peace Corps Volunteer; the decision to send one to his school may have been made by the Ministry. These and other factors
place tremendous stresses on the relationship between the headmaster and the Volunteer. The Volunteer cannot himself assure good relations, but unless he has tact, understanding, and patience, there is no hope. On occasion impatient Volunteers have become the dominant personality and in effect taken over the running of the schools. More often, however, relations have developed to everyone's benefit.

In spite of the problems and really because of them, most Volunteers in teaching are almost everywhere effective in bringing about changes in attitudes. They are promoting educational modernization. They do this in many ways—in talks with fellow teachers and school inspectors, in the books they bring from home and share, in teaching innovations within the syllabus, in after-school and vacation activities with students and in the communities in which they live, in their informality and friendliness as well as sincere interest they show in their students, and in the rapport they sometimes develop with headmasters who look to them for ideas. Volunteers by word and example have imbued local teachers with a sense of pride, purpose, and responsibility which was sometimes lacking. Most important of all, the lives of thousands of young people have been directly influenced by the Volunteers.

Increasingly, governments of Asian and African countries are coming to realize that the colonial educational systems they inherited are not providing either the social and economic skills—the engineers, doctors, and scientists—or the motivations and values needed in independent and modern states. Education ministries in many countries are plunged into controversy over syllabus reform and indirectly over the purposes and values of education. Defenders of the old order are numerous; but there are also those who advocate change, and some of these are keenly interested in what Peace Corps Volunteers are doing. Many Volunteer teachers have developed their own teaching materials in geography, history, and literature, and have started extra-curricular classes in vocational subjects such as domestic science and animal husbandry. Some of these innovations have been incorporated into new or revised syllabi. Numerous Volunteers upon completion of their Peace Corps service have been employed by local governments and are now engaged in everything from teacher training and textbook writing to programmed learning and educational television.
Community Development

Most volunteers in classroom teaching would agree that they are changing attitudes and furthering modernization, but they probably would quickly add that for them the process is subtle. They regard their compatriots in community development assignments as more directly and openly engaged in promoting change. The English teacher does not appear to be making a revolution; the community development worker, on the other hand, is often gently yet vigorously urging people to take matters into their own hands. Community development Volunteers are found throughout the world, but most are in Latin American countries. Of the 4,067 Volunteers in 19 Latin American nations at the end of January 1967, about half or 2,187 were "CD" workers.

Community development has different meanings. It has been a popular term in many non-Western countries over the years and has sometimes been incorporated as a tool in national social and economic development plans. To the Peace Corps, community development means helping people to become aware of their resources and opportunities and inducing them to organize themselves to use these resources and opportunities to attain specific goals. These are usually limited but tangible. This definition is based on the usually valid assumption that people do have resources and opportunities of which they are unaware or which they have lacked the individual or collective will to use. Creating the will to use existing resources is usually a matter of changing attitudes.

Most community development Volunteers have no preconceived notions about what kinds of projects to engage in. These are for the people to decide, and usually one of the earliest tasks of the Volunteer is to get the people to define their needs in terms of what can be achieved with the resources at hand. The range of Volunteer community development activities is very broad. Volunteers have helped organize the marketing of handicrafts, the development of cooperative societies, the improvement of livestock, the construction of community halls, village markets, and feeder roads, the establishment of school lunch programs, the implementation of health and sanitation projects, and so on.
Volunteers may work alone or in pairs and in both rural and urban situations. Sometimes they work for or in cooperation with an existing agency of the host country's government. On occasion Volunteers work with American organizations—private and governmental—and with American universities who have projects overseas. The private agencies in whose programs Volunteers have worked include CARE, the Credit Union National Association, the National 4-H Club Foundation, Experiment in International Living, and the American Institute of Architects. A number of Volunteers have been employed in AID technical assistance programs.

Whether a community development Volunteer works for an organization or not, he usually lacks the clear-cut institutional status which the Volunteer teacher or nurse has. He is largely on his own and must establish the reason for his presence. He may well be the first "European" in his rural village or urban slum, and his arrival provokes curiosity, amusement, and suspicion.

The Volunteer's lack of status has usually been thought of as making his job more difficult. But this is not necessarily so. Identification with an institution may ease problems of personal adjustment in a new culture and may make for more ready acceptance in the community. But the Volunteer also acquires whatever stigmas, misconceptions, and suspicions the people may have about the institution. Moreover, institutional requirements such as those experienced by teachers may limit and make more difficult a Volunteer's activities. Lack of institutional status on the other hand can be turned to the Volunteer's advantage once he has established rapport and confidence with the people among whom he intends to work.

The Volunteer usually begins to build rapport by moving into the village and taking a house no different from those of the people. He cannot live in a modern house in the city and visit the village each day. He must speak the language of the people. Further, he must be a good listener and have much patience, for whatever he hopes to achieve will take time. He also needs political savvy because he will have to know who in the village possess real power, who are potential leaders, who are likely to support his ideas. He must be able to recognize initiative and be able to nourish it. Rapport will also depend on little personal acts. The Volunteer will be watched and thoroughly
discussed. Whether he is accepted or not will depend on his whole conduct, day-in and day-out.

The Volunteer must also have some knowledge and understanding of the peoples' traditional mores and values. But probably only rarely are Volunteers found in communities that are thoroughly traditional. More common is the community where traditional and modern institutions are in conflict. The traditional institutions probably no longer provide the social security they once did, while the modern institutions may well be working to the detriment of the people. Such modern institutions as the use of money and credit, the introduction of law and courts, and the extension of the vote may have little immediate relevance to existing social and economic conditions. Those few who have acquired some knowledge of modern institutions may be using that knowledge to exploit and subjugate. The community development Volunteer may well interpret his role as that of broadening the peoples' knowledge of modern institutions so that these may be used for the common good. The task of the Volunteer is not necessarily made more easy where change has already begun.

The obstacles which community development Volunteers encounter are often major ones and sometimes they are insurmountable. Religious and cultural traditions and institutions often incline people to a paralyzing fatalism. Barriers of class and race may engender a hopelessness in regard to change. Disease and bad nutrition rob individuals of the vitality needed for enterprise. Sometimes authority—governmental or extralegal—discourages individuals and groups from seeking to improve their lot. As one Volunteer put it, "In a nation and a continent where individualism and initiative have been punished and corrupted for five centuries, the prospect of a community acting to help itself is something less than hopeful."

Like the teachers, community development Volunteers occasionally find themselves in projects which reinforce anachronistic social and political systems. Peace Corps officials responsible for planning programs do their best to avoid these. When it happens, Volunteers can sometimes be assisted out of such situations by the Peace Corps country director and his staff. But if not, the Volunteer has to try to adapt and to work within the limitations. The Peace Corps has always inclined to the opinion that there are few situations in which there is no opportunity for innovation.
A not uncommon experience for the community development Volunteer is that after months of unsuccessful effort and consequent frustration, he gives up trying to get the people to help themselves on a particular project and goes about and does the job himself. This usually represents a failure from a Peace Corps point of view. The physical thing—the village well, the community hall, or the addition to the school house—has been created. But in much the same manner as the usual technical assistance projects, the people have not participated. Without their participation changes in attitudes have probably not occurred. After the Volunteer’s departure the people are not likely to take the initiative and go on to other projects. And, like more costly and ambitious technical assistance projects, when the thing the Volunteer built breaks down it is not likely to get repaired. The Volunteer failed because, in effect, he made the people dependent on him.

While the difficulties in successful community development are many, Peace Corps Volunteers can point to many successes. Community development is appropriate in Latin America because in many parts of that continent conditions are hopeful. The blinders of tradition are being shaken off and attitudes are changing. There are men who want and expect change and who are willing to take the initiative. Often they only need some encouragement and practical help, which the Peace Corps Volunteer can and does provide. Wherever a Volunteer has succeeded in changing attitudes, very probably social revolution has been encouraged.

The community development Volunteer is actually Eugene Black’s “development diplomat,” although working at a lower social and economic level than Black probably intended when he conceived the term. His task is to “illuminate choices” rather than to “impose solutions.” And like Black, the Peace Corps hopes that the Volunteer, by helping the people find their own solutions, will encourage use of reason and discussion and in time the development of democratic institutions.

Clarity of Goal

Whatever Volunteers are doing—teaching, community development, or other projects—much of their success depends on how well they understand the purpose of the Peace Corps. The task of changing attitudes and of modernizing values and social institutions is more likely to be achieved by Volunteers if they fully understand that this is their purpose. But lack of clarity of purpose is fairly common among Volunteers and is a continuing problem for the Peace Corps.

The difficulty often begins when a person volunteers. An individual's reason for seeking to join the Peace Corps may not be the same reason why the Peace Corps wants him. Many applicants probably do not comprehend what is meant by changing attitudes, and if they do, they may not agree that this is a desirable goal. While they are exposed to the idea in training, they are exposed to many other ideas as well. Once abroad and immersed in the practical problems of living and working, the goal of changing attitudes may seem impracticable to many Volunteers. They find it difficult to relate their particular assignment to the broad, general purpose.

In the early years of the Peace Corps, publicity about the Peace Corps and sometimes the remarks of Peace Corps officials did not contribute to the Volunteer's clarity of purpose. Hardship and privation were emphasized. Ability to cope with difficult physical conditions was equated with success as a Volunteer. The stress on physical problems was in keeping with the popular American notion that life outside the United States, especially in "backward" countries, was bad. Stress on physical achievements fitted nicely with the American concept of success as being the creation of material things. These emphases tended to romanticize and glamorize the Peace Corps and may have helped in recruiting. But Peace Corps officials often denied that this image of the Peace Corps was intended. The certain effect of this kind of publicity on many Volunteers once they had gained some experience abroad was to cause them to be more confused about their purpose.

Especially in the first years many persons who joined the Peace Corps undoubtedly conceived their personal challenge as a physical one in spite of repeated assertions to the contrary in training programs.
Some were certainly not disappointed. But even they in varying degrees came to appreciate that the physical test was not the fundamental one.

For those who expected a physical challenge and were disappointed the reaction was different. Many felt cheated when they received teaching assignments and were given relatively plush living accommodations. Unaware or at least unclear as to their true purpose, such persons did not immediately see any challenge. The sense of being cheated was for some quickly followed by a sense of guilt. Teachers in Asia read of the physical exploits of road surveyors in Africa and concluded that as teachers they were not doing their part. They were not "real Peace Corps." To defend themselves, the Volunteers accused Peace Corps officials of propagating a false image.

Today Peace Corps leaders in Washington and overseas stress to the Volunteers the importance of modest or humble living: simple housing, an allowance sufficient to meet costs of food and other necessities, and no vehicles. While Volunteers everywhere do live modestly, in some countries allowances were initially set unduly high and certain types of vehicles were permitted in connection with jobs. Efforts by the Peace Corps to correct or modify these situations have been resisted by some Volunteers. They have argued that the Peace Corps is continuing its earlier alleged image-making efforts. They claim that a "hair-shirt" posture does not make them better, more effective Volunteers.

Such criticisms result mostly from a lack of clear understanding of the fundamental Peace Corps goal and occasionally from weak motivation. The Peace Corps emphasis on modest living is not based on the assumption that it somehow insures success or that there is virtue in austerity. Rather the belief is that most Volunteers, if they are to have some degree of success, must live among and as nearly as possible at the standard of living of the people whose attitudes they seek to change. Experience has shown that this is an entirely valid belief. It is also true that Volunteers who best understand the goal of the Peace Corps are seldom found among the critics and are usually among the ablest Volunteers.

Another problem related to the individual's understanding of purpose and strength of motivation arises when the Volunteer comes to believe that the value system which he intends to change requires
little or no changing. The pressures which bear on the Volunteer to this end are many. One is the difficulty the Volunteer meets in trying to make friendships among the people with whom he works. For a few Volunteers their personal tastes and values are so firmly set or they are so little interested in others that they are unable or unwilling to accommodate themselves to different levels or types of sophistication. One sometimes hears the remark that "we simply do not have anything in common, we have nothing to talk about." Such persons are usually selected out and never go abroad as Volunteers. When this situation occurs abroad, it may be because the Volunteer has not been well-assigned, but more often the difficulty lies with the Volunteer himself.

Although there are many aspects to this problem, the root difficulty is frequently inability to speak well enough in a common language: either the Volunteer is not competent in the local tongue or the local person's English is inadequate. One has only to observe Volunteers able and confident in their use of the local language in conversation with local people to appreciate the importance of language in overcoming the problem of lack of common interests. In fact a rough but valid measure of a Volunteer's success at whatever he is doing is his facility with the local language.

Individuals who have difficulty developing friendships in a different culture, whether or not they are Peace Corps Volunteers, seldom want to take a share of the responsibility on themselves. Too often people have the tendency to defend themselves by deprecating the persons and the culture among whom friendships seemed impossible. Moreover, those who cannot find a basis for friendships locally will usually seek friendships elsewhere.

Volunteers find that the people with whom they can communicate most easily, aside from other Volunteers, are the affluent, the politically important, and the professional people. Such people usually welcome the Volunteers and show them hospitality. The Volunteer nurse finds friendships easier among the English-speaking doctors than among her fellow-nurses. The road surveyor finds it easier to talk with the engineers than with the members of his crew. The community development worker finds the pleasures of life on the great estate of the landlord attractive.
While these “elite” people sometimes favor reform and talk about the importance of change, many if not most are participants in and defenders of the old order which the Volunteer seeks to change. More than one Volunteer has gone abroad assuming that European colonialism was bad only later to remark, “It is just what these people need.” Like some American diplomats, aid technicians, and military men, some Volunteers have found that those with a stake in the status quo are “our kind of people.” If the goal is unclear and the motivation weak, it is personally easier to accept things as they are. To do so is more enjoyable than to bring on oneself the tensions and frictions that inevitably result from trying to change traditional attitudes.

If the goal is to be made clear and the motivation kept strong, there is a need, as in the liberal democracy that spawned the Peace Corps, for constant restatement and clarification of purpose. To do this, the Peace Corps needs men and women of conviction who can inspire by word and deed. Fortunately the Peace Corps has been able to attract many such individuals. Today, some of the best Peace Corps Volunteers are assuming positions of leadership in Washington and overseas. The overseas representatives of the Peace Corps are especially important, for they must help the individual Volunteer maintain his sights above the particular and the immediate and reinforce the best among his motives for volunteering.

The leadership of the Peace Corps is good and the goal of the Volunteers is valid. But like other liberal experiments, the Peace Corps has had some difficult times. Today is such a time. The Peace Corps as one manifestation of American social and political thought cannot be isolated from the strains within American society and politics. The growing dissatisfaction among many young people with what they see as the shortcomings of their own society and the increasing cynicism with which they view the projects of their elders are bound to affect the Peace Corps. The Peace Corps does not deserve to be tarred with the same brush of cynicism.

As an agency of the United States government operating abroad, the Peace Corps cannot be made entirely immune from the pressures upon and challenges to American foreign policy. The demands of foreign policy could still reduce the independence of the Peace Corps and bend it to roles different from the one sketched above. Were the United States to give up its long-term, fundamental goal of a world of
independent nations with diverse social and economic systems, the Peace Corps would have no role to play. At present the Peace Corps helps to keep alive America's claim to moral leadership when, in the opinion of many, that claim is in jeopardy by United States' pursuit of foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia chiefly by military means.

All of the threats to the Peace Corps are essentially domestic ones. Thus there is need for continued independent and vigorous leadership. In the long-run it may not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the future of the Peace Corps may be tied to the future of liberal democracy itself. But whatever the future, nothing should be allowed to obscure the fact that the Peace Corps is a success. This is true whether measured by the goals set forth in the Peace Corps Act or by the goal of changing attitudes.

Few Volunteers go abroad as altruistic or naive idealists. But most believe in some degree that there is a need to assist socially and economically less fortunate peoples. However they may have personally conceived of their purposes before going abroad, most return home with an appreciation that their purpose had been to promote change and modernization. They are usually convinced, too, that this is a task more difficult than they had imagined. While they would readily admit that they did not achieve this goal, most believe they have made some contribution toward it. Many would add that while they believe technical aid programs and other instruments of foreign policy serve useful purposes, they see them dealing mostly in material and tangible things rather than in attitudes, values, and institutions. Most would probably say that the Peace Corps comes closer than any other instrument of foreign policy in bringing about the changes which will produce a world of politically independent and socially and economically viable states. They are almost certainly right.
Many international organizations have been created since World War II, both worldwide and regional, but man is still far from fulfilling his dream of organizing a world free from the threat of war. Nevertheless, experimentation with a great variety of new international organizations is providing opportunities for both practitioners and scholars to develop new insights on problems of international order. This chapter first will describe briefly the growth in international organizations and some of the distinguishing characteristics of these organizations. Then some of the less dramatic, though potentially significant, aspects of human activity within international organizations will be described, particularly in respect to communication between nations and the creation of new international roles for national officials and international secretariats. Finally, it will be demonstrated how developing knowledge in sociology, psychology, anthropology, and political science can help us discern the potential significance of this activity. Particular attention will be devoted to indicating how this knowledge throws new light on problems of collective security and the feasibility and desirability of world government.
GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

It is easier to describe the phenomenal growth in the number of international organizations, their membership, and their programs than it is to assess the effects of these activities. But a description of some of the growth provides a useful framework for discussing actual and potential effects.

In the past ten years the United Nations has increased its membership from 82 to 122. The regular budget of the United Nations has increased from $51,000,000 to $117,000,000 and total expenses of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies has increased from $180,000,000 to $571,000,000. Much of this increase is due to an extension of the functions of the United Nations: "Born as an instrument for multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations has grown into an operational agency of significant dimensions." Over one half of the employees of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies are in field assignments, and over three quarters are engaged in economic and social activity.

But the United Nations family of organizations, and the well-known regional organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Economic Community (EEC), are only a few of the many organizations in which national governments participate. Lesser known are organizations such as the International Bureau of Education, the International Sugar Office, and the International Tin Committee. By 1965, 169 intergovernmental organizations had been formed, over half of them since 1950.

Growth in governmental participation in international organizations has changed dramatically the opportunities that governments have for contact with each other. Figure 1 provides a useful comparison between opportunities for intergovernmental contact through the more traditional embassies in national capitals and through common memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGO). The solid line indicates the number of nations that are linked to other nations by

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FIGURE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF DIPLOMATIC AND IGO LINKAGES (Diplomatic linkages refer to the number of missions a nation sends abroad; IGO linkages refer to the number of different IGO co-members of a nation.)*

Diplomatic missions in national capitals, and the dotted line shows the number of nations linked to other nations through the sharing of one or more common memberships in intergovernmental organizations. The peak in the diplomatic mission curve reveals that 50 nations send diplomats to less than 30 other nations. In sharp contrast, the peak of the IGO linkage curve indicates that 49 nations share IGO membership.

* From Alger, Chadwick F., and Brams, Steven J. "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations." World Politics 19:601; No. 4, July 1967.
ships with 100 or more nations. National capital representation offers only 15 nations opportunity for contact with more than half the nations, whereas IGO memberships provide almost seven times this number of nations (103) contact with over half the nations.

Although this chapter will be devoted primarily to intergovernmental organizations, it is important to take note of the 1,448 international nongovernmental organizations (NGO) which had been founded by 1965, 45 percent of which were formed after 1950. These organizations are concerned with many of the same kinds of issues as private organizations within nations—agriculture, health, education, the arts, religion, commerce, and industry, among others. A few of the better known organizations are the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, the World Veterans Federation, and the World Federation of Trade Unions.

But these 1,617 international organizations (IGO and NGO) do not comprise the total population, since international business organizations are not included. Corporations, such as Shell, Nestle, Coca Cola, and IBM are encountered around the world. Some international business corporations have activities in and officials from so many nations that it is difficult to assign them a single nationality. Some have annual budgets that surpass the total budgets of all intergovernmental and nongovernmental international organizations, and also surpass the budgets of many nations. Some have more influence on international relations than many international organizations (IGO and NGO), as well as more influence than many nations.

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Activity in intergovernmental organizations usually has been characterized as "multilateral" diplomacy in contrast to more traditional
“bilateral” diplomacy. It is described also as “public” diplomacy in contrast to the more “private” traditional diplomacy. But the customary usage of these terms suggests only some aspects of the vast change in diplomatic practice taking place in intergovernmental organizations. Diplomacy in intergovernmental organizations is “multilateral” in the sense that meetings take place in which a number of nations participate. But it is important to note that much bilateral diplomacy also takes place at these diplomatic sites. Likewise, “public” meetings of councils and assemblies are important activities at international organizations. But much of the work done on items on the agenda of these bodies is done in private. And private diplomacy is conducted on many problems that never get on the agenda of councils and assemblies.

Nevertheless, the regular public meetings of multilateral assemblies and councils are a distinguishing characteristic of diplomacy in intergovernmental organizations—often referred to as “parliamentary diplomacy.” This diplomacy is parliamentary not only in the sense that it involves public debates followed by votes on resolutions, but also in that it requires the diplomat to perform supporting parliamentary tasks, such as lobbying for resolutions and keeping in touch with a wide range of delegates in order to know both how his resolutions will be received and what resolutions others are planning to introduce. Attending these meetings and discharging these functions require that the diplomat spend a great deal of time moving around the “parliamentary” chambers, extending and maintaining contacts with other diplomats.

A second distinguishing characteristic of intergovernmental organizations is that each national mission has the responsibility of representing its nation to all other nations in the organization. This is quite a different assignment than that of national capital missions, which represent their nation only to the host government. As a result, the functioning of the diplomatic community in an intergovernmental organization is quite different from national capital diplomatic communities. Dag Hammarskjöld gave the following assessment of the creation of permanent national missions to the United Nations:

A development of special significance is the establishment of permanent delegations at United Nations Headquarters with standing senior
representation there for all members of the Organization. While in one sense reducing the practical importance of the public sessions of the various organs, this development has, basically, tended to give these organs greater real weight in present-day diplomacy. The public debate, and the decisions reached, gain added significance when the attitudes presented in public result from practically uninterrupted informal contacts and negotiations.5

A third distinguishing characteristic is that intergovernmental organizations also have international features not present in national capital diplomacy. International secretariat officials are likely to be more numerous than national officials. Much has been written about the “quiet” diplomacy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but his work provides only one dramatic example of the opportunities afforded thousands of other members of the United Nations Secretariat and secretariats of other intergovernmental organizations in day-to-day activity. Furthermore, the intergovernmental organization not only offers international people, but also international corridors, chairs, tables, and buildings. In a national capital contact takes place either on the territory of the host government or in the embassy of the visiting diplomat. But the intergovernmental organization headquarters is neutral ground. Since there is common membership in the organization and since visits to the “clubhouse” are frequent, the occasions for contact that is unscheduled (although not necessarily unplanned by one or both parties) are greatly increased.

**INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATION IN ORGANIZATIONS**

In intergovernmental organizations some nations have continual access to each other that have very slight opportunity for contact elsewhere. The opportunity for interaction between Paraguay and Nepal in the United Nations would offer a striking example. The consideration of a common agenda by virtually all nations in the international system encourages the creation of new coalitions around certain issues. An

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example would be cooperation in the United Nations between the Latin Americans and the Afro-Asians on economic development questions, particularly in the context of the new United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Of special interest in UNCTAD is the opportunity given to landlocked nations (e.g., Afghanistan, Bolivia, Chad, Hungary, Laos), most of whom do not exchange diplomatic missions, to collaborate in developing international norms for their access to the sea.

In 1960 a diplomat in each national permanent mission at the United Nations was interviewed and asked to compare his job at the United Nations with that in a national capital. Most diplomats found intergovernmental communication at the United Nations to be different from that in a national capital in a number of ways. They responded that at the UN they have more contact with diplomats from other nations, that this contact is less restrained by the rank of the diplomats, that relations are more informal, that it is easier to exchange "off the record" information, that the UN is a more important source of information, and that it is easier to make contact with unfriendly nations at the UN.

A few extracts from the words of the diplomats will make the nature of the differences between diplomacy at the United Nations and that in a national capital more vivid. Speaking of the greater ease with which contact across diplomatic ranks takes place at the UN, a diplomat who had previously served in London remarked:

If an attaché and a minister are both concerned with the same problem here, they will communicate with each other frequently. They will talk almost as equals. This would be unheard of in London. In fact, here very few people even know the ranks of other people with whom they are working. In London, you would definitely know the rank of someone before you communicated with him.7

Speaking of the greater contact between diplomats in the United Nations one diplomat asserted:

In Washington you have few opportunities to meet diplomats from any other country than the U. S. You even meet those from the U. S.  


7 Ibid., p. 125.
infrequently and by appointment. When you do meet someone from another country, such as India, you have nothing in particular to talk about. In Washington, if I were to ask an Indian about some aspect of Indian relations with the State Department, this might be considered improper. Here you can ask an Indian his position on any problem.

Concerning the greater opportunity at the United Nations to exchange “off the record” information, a different diplomat commented:

There is daily exchange of views that goes on at the UN that would be impossible in a national capital. . . . There was just no such common meeting place in Washington as there is in New York. You couldn’t just go down to the State Department and sit around chatting with diplomats from other countries.

Another delegate speaks vividly of the value of the United Nations as a quick source of information on how nations around the world feel about an important development:

When a piece of news like this takes place it is most useful to just wander through the corridors of the UN or to stroll aimlessly through the Delegates’ Lounge. You can talk with a great number of people from a large number of countries to find out how they are reacting. You can’t do something like this in a national capital. There is no building, no meeting place, where all these people would just happen to be. And in very few capitals would there be this many people even present.

Perhaps most significant is the assertion by diplomats that it is easier to make contact with representatives of unfriendly countries at the United Nations than is the case in national capitals. Quotations from the responses of two diplomats illuminate this finding:

Sometimes we vote for a Soviet resolution and sometimes the Soviets vote for one of ours. The negotiations leading to these votes bring about contacts between the two delegations.

I would be far more likely to talk to Hungarians here than I would in a national capital. Many times this actually happens quite acci-

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* Ibid., p. 132.
* Ibid., p. 191.
* Ibid., p. 192.
dentally. You'll be talking with a group of delegates and one will just happen to be a Hungarian.11

INTERNATIONAL ROLES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

It is often said that the United Nations is no more than the sum total of its members, and there is much truth in this statement. Certainly the scope of UN activity and the character of its achievements are determined largely by the policies of individual nations and the resources they are willing to make available to the United Nations. On the other hand, at the United Nations (and other intergovernmental organizations) even national diplomats sometimes act for a group of nations rather than just their own. Some of these international roles are assumed through election, such as chairmen of public bodies, and others are undertaken through more informal designation, such as certain negotiating roles behind the scenes.

The General Assembly of the United Nations offers a useful setting in which to discuss the international roles of national diplomats. Examples of roles filled by election or formal appointment are the elected posts of President of the General Assembly and chairman of the seven main committees of the Assembly. These posts are generally exercised with considerable detachment from national roles by diplomats from all regions of the world. The chairman of a committee, for example, normally satisfies even those from countries unfriendly to his own that he has tried to give a fair hearing to all and has not steered debate in ways advantageous to his own nation. One reason a chairman finds it necessary to do this is that retaliation for unfair treatment could be applied quickly in other bodies where diplomats from other nations have the chair. But it is also the case that unfairness might wreck the proceedings of his own committee by encouraging unnecessary argument and wrangling. This is avoided partly because there is a desire on the part of chairmen to be recognized as good performers. As a result, chairmen usually desire to keep their committees on schedule, have orderly discussions, and have their committees make progress that will reflect favorably on their chairman. Thus, the norms for a

11 Ibid., p. 129.
“good” chairman cause diplomats to behave much differently than they would if sitting at their country’s seat in the body concerned.

National diplomats also are called upon to perform a variety of other international roles when appointed or elected to bodies such as the Committee on Contributions of the General Assembly, which recommends how the expenses of the United Nations should be apportioned among members. When they are performing tasks for the entire Assembly, national diplomats are often under some pressure from their own government, but they tend to behave differently than when acting as national representatives. Furthermore, involvement in such tasks seems to have an effect on the behavior of national delegations when reports are submitted to the parent body. Sometimes participation provides a delegate’s government with new information that affects policy. In addition, there is a tendency for national delegations to support reports and recommendations for which their own diplomats share some responsibility. For example, possibly because of preoccupation with the India-China border dispute, the Indian delegation was not very active in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly in 1962. However, when the Committee on Contributions made its report, the Indian delegation became quite active in efforts to obtain support for the report. This appeared to be related to the fact that the Committee on Contributions’ report was presented by its Indian chairman, a former Indian ambassador to the United Nations.

In addition, national diplomats perform international roles in which selection is more informal, such as (a) those who facilitate the reaching of agreement between conflicting parties, and (b) those who represent a number of nations in negotiations. The performance of these roles facilitates the blending of a host of national policies on an issue into a few major themes and sometimes makes it possible to reach a general consensus.

A United Nations diplomat may facilitate the reaching of agreement by mediating between two conflicting points of view or by helping to find common ground in a body that has such diverse tendencies that it may be unable to take any action at all. Mediation efforts range from casual individual initiative in lounge and corridor to more formal sessions in which certain representatives are asked by representatives from other nations to meet with one or more conflicting parties. An
example of how national and international roles can be played by the same person was provided in the Special Session of the General Assembly on peace-keeping finance in 1963. The major issue was the apportionment of expenses for the Congo and Suez peace-keeping forces among the members. The Soviet bloc and the French objected to any apportionment at all, saying that the expenditures had been incurred in operations that violated the Charter. Most of the remainder of the membership acknowledged their responsibility but split into two groups with differing views on how the expenses should be apportioned. On one side was a small number of developed nations who would be asked to provide most of the money required and on the other side were the less developed nations who controlled well over a majority of the votes. Each group preferred methods of apportionment more favorable to the kind of nation in its group. In order to get the necessary money and also the required number of votes, a compromise between the two groups was necessary. An agreement was negotiated in a ten-nation group made up of two teams, five from the developed nations and five from the less developed nations. A Canadian representative served as a chairman of the negotiation sessions and is given much credit by both sides for helping to mediate points of difference between them. However, he also served as a forceful Canadian spokesman and would at these times tell the group that he was stepping out of his role as chairman. In addition, he was chairman of the developed nation negotiating team.

Delegates may also attempt to facilitate agreement by refusing to take a stand in the early stages of debate, in the belief that it is necessary for some to hold aloof so that they are available for mediation. At the same time they may be working hard privately, encouraging others to introduce resolutions and perhaps even writing resolutions for them to introduce. Willingness to accept public anonymity—even anonymity among some of their own colleagues—may permit delegates to exert considerable influence by selecting the one who will take the public initiative on a given item and perhaps even by writing his speech and resolution. Such strategies may, of course, be used as more effective means of advancing national policy than public debate. For example, the United States may decide that certain proposals it wishes to make will be more likely to get a sympathetic hearing if introduced by a small nation rather than by the United States. On the other
hand, delegates at times deprive themselves of the opportunity to advance the preferred policy of their own nation in the interest of advancing what seems to be the most feasible basis for general agreement.

Diplomats may also represent a number of nations in negotiations with other diplomats. In one instance in a General Assembly committee in 1962, two diplomats from Western nations met with representatives of Afro-Asian nations to attempt to arrange a compromise between a resolution favored by the Afro-Asians and amendments favored by the West. The Western diplomats undertook these negotiations not as representatives of their own nations but as representatives of a group of nations, having the power to commit other Western nations to a compromise within certain specified limits. This successful effort was the conclusion to an intriguing parliamentary drama in which one of the Western negotiators had actually participated in the writing of the Afro-Asian resolution. This was done with the desire to get a moderate Afro-Asian resolution introduced early in the debate that would have sufficient backing to head off possibly more extreme drafts. When other Western nations would not support the resolution, this diplomat then attempted to salvage as much of it as possible through representing the West in negotiations that produced a compromise. In this case the Western diplomat who played so important a role was never associated publicly with either the Afro-Asian resolution, the proposed Western amendments, or with the eventual compromise. He played a very minor role in the public debate, and, therefore, he left no public record of his efforts. In fact, only some of the committee members were aware of his significant part in the eventual compromise solution.

SECRETARIATS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Secretariat roles in intergovernmental organizations have received more attention than the international roles performed by national diplomats. However, interest is usually focused on certain dramatic activities of high secretariat officials, such as the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the Cuban crisis of
1962 and his activities in the Congo crisis that began in 1960. But the functioning of secretariats, like that of national missions, also includes continuous participation in an intergovernmental society by hundreds and sometimes thousands of international civil servants engaged in a multitude of activities. Because the important mediation efforts of the Secretary-General and his close advisers during crises are better known, three other aspects of the work of secretariat officials will be emphasized here: (a) they inform others of past practice and accepted norms of the organization; (b) they provide background information through documents and spoken words; and (c) they serve as international monitors of relations among member nations.

Secretariat officials, along with national diplomats having long terms of service in an international organization, serve as reservoirs of knowledge on past practice and accepted norms in a variety of ways. One example that can be publicly observed in the case of the United Nations is the support provided by the secretariat during public meetings. On the dais of a General Assembly committee, the chairman (a national diplomat) has on one side of him the undersecretary responsible for secretariat activities on the problems being debated and on the other side a committee-secretary provided by the secretariat. Committee chairmen change each year, but there is considerable continuity in the undersecretary and committee-secretary posts. There is also continuity in the staffs that assist these officials and sit behind them on the dais. Even if a chairman has served in the committee on previous occasions, he has not had experience in guiding the work of the committee and must rely a great deal on experienced members of the secretariat when the intricacies of both substance and procedure are faced.

The chairing of a General Assembly committee thus becomes a cooperative project between secretariat and chairman. Particularly crucial is the function of the committee-secretary, who helps the chairman keep an eye on the pace at which the committee is handling its work; maintains a list of delegates having indicated a desire to speak; prods those who have not yet signed up to do so, if they intend to speak; and encourages those intending to propose resolutions to submit them. During meetings the conversations between chairman and committee-secretary are frequent. Their cooperative judgments about committee pace can be important to final outcomes on issues. To push
an item to a vote too soon may stop the private negotiation that takes place simultaneously with public debate in any parliamentary body before it achieves a fruitful consensus. To fail to close debate at the appropriate time may permit an existing consensus to disintegrate during subsequent public argument. Committee-secretaries play a role in these decisions. In the rapid interaction that takes place as a committee reaches the point of decision on an agenda item, the committee chairman sometimes neglects to turn off his microphone before consulting his secretary. On one occasion the meeting room of a General Assembly committee echoed the hurried advice of a committee-secretary to his chairman: “Have them vote now!”

An important part of the role of any secretariat is the gathering of information on substantive issues for the use of the councils and assemblies that it services. This pool of information may be considerable. In the case of the United Nations, the documentary product is often more than participating diplomats can consume. Secretariats thus are common information agencies for participating nations, thereby tending to increase agreement on what the facts are and what the significant problems are. H. G. Nicholas, in The United Nations as a Political Institution asserts:

“The collection, ordering and providing of information at the points where it is most needed and can produce its greatest effect is one of the most important services that U.N. officials discharge. It is much more than an archivist’s or statistician’s function; it is political in the highest degree, calling for qualities of political judgment and forethought no less than of accuracy and integrity.”

The documentary product of the secretariat is particularly important for the small national missions which cannot afford research staffs. Information is not only provided in documents, but also in a continual round of discussion between secretariat and national diplomats, in lounges and corridors, in secretariat offices, and during public meetings. Two United Nations diplomats have written:

Many international civil servants have better technical qualifications for discussing some of the subjects within the jurisdiction of ECOSOC than do the government representatives attending particular meetings.

It is sometimes difficult to avoid feelings of inferiority on the part of delegates, and of superiority on the part of the Secretariat caused by a misunderstanding of the nature of their functions.\textsuperscript{13}

On occasions the secretariat provides international pools of information that displace some of the more extreme information furnished by national governments. An example has been the information supplied by secretariat and national diplomats who have gone to colonial territories on visiting missions. Information provided both by nations administering territories and by nations attacking their colonial administrations has received effective challenge by information collected under United Nations auspices.

There are a variety of ways in which secretariat personnel can act as international monitors of relations between nations represented in an organization. This may simply mean correcting a message garbled in transit between two nations, or making certain that antagonists stay in contact through the good offices of the secretariat. Secretariats cannot always help, do not always seize all opportunities, nor do they act with desired effect in all situations. But the international element they provide in the continuing conversation in an international organization is different from the contribution of any nation. From their international posture they sometimes see undesirable consequences of certain projected actions that more partisan diplomats don’t see in the heat of battle. They are a continuing source of suggestions on how things might be done. Not infrequently there is an available national diplomat willing to take credit for advancing their ideas. On occasions the “suggestions” of the secretariat may consist of texts of resolutions introduced by national representatives and have even included speeches introducing these resolutions.

Like national officials performing international roles, members of secretariats also can occasionally inject information and perspectives gained in their roles into the foreign affairs apparatus of their own nation. While from one viewpoint it may be regretted that the national origins of members of secretariats may inhibit loyalty to an international organization, national affiliations permit secretariats to have lines of communication to resident national diplomats that are at times quite

useful to the international organization. Nevertheless, contact between secretariat officials and diplomats from their nation is often looked upon with suspicion. One occasion received much note in the press when the United Nations Undersecretary for Political Affairs, a Soviet citizen, passed several notes to the Soviet representative during a Security Council meeting. The assumption by the press that the Undersecretary was engaging in improper conduct was never supported by information about the content of his messages. There could be alternative explanations of his behavior. For example, he could have been communicating information consistent with his UN obligations but which the Soviet delegate would not have deemed reliable had it come from a secretariat official of any other nationality. This is a kind of role not peculiar to international politics. Executives in the U.S. government sometimes use their ties to home states as the basis for forging useful links to officials in these states. For example, it might be recalled that Assistant Attorney General Louis F. Oberdorfer, an Alabaman, helped to mediate the Birmingham racial dispute in May 1963.

Discussion of some aspects of the activities of secretariats offers new insight on questions related to the tenure, qualifications, and independence of international civil servants. While members of international secretariats certainly require expertise, most must be able to apply it in combination with a variety of diplomatic and parliamentary skills. Although they cannot serve an international organization without being independent from their government, it is helpful if they are respected and trusted by their own government so that they can communicate with it and sometimes exert influence.

**SOURCES OF NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNITED NATIONS**

These brief descriptions of some of the behavior of national delegates and secretariat have indicated that activity at the United Nations adds up to more than public debate and voting in the organs described in the charter. Practice under the charter has developed a permanent community of national and international officials performing roles that were not always foreseen by those who wrote the charter and that can
be known and understood only through first hand research at the United Nations. Research in various areas of social science raises interesting questions about the potential significance of some of the activity at the United Nations that has been described.

When intergovernmental communication in the United Nations is interpreted in the light of communication research, it begins to appear that patterns of communication in such an organization could be as important as voting procedures. Particularly useful in exploring communication in the UN are concepts such as “channelling of information,” discussed by March and Simon in their summary of the propositions to be found in the literature on organizations. By channelling of information, they mean “limiting the number of organization members to whom any given bit of information is transmitted.” The available data on intergovernmental communication at the United Nations suggests that there is less channelling of information at the United Nations than in national capitals. March and Simon assert, “The greater the channelling of information processing, the greater the differentiation of perceptions within the organization.” Fanelli reports a strikingly similar finding:

... to the extent that the individual is cut off from significant interaction with others he is likely to develop “private” (as opposed to “shared”) frames of reference which effectively limit his grasp of social reality.

Extending this idea to the community situation under consideration here, we suggest that high communicators ... are likely to perceive the community in a different way than do low communicators.

March and Simon find that differing perceptions of reality are one of the causes of conflict. This suggests that the United Nations communication system might tend to diminish conflict that is based on differing perceptions of reality.

The great amount of face-to-face interaction at the United Nations permits the communication of additional information through gesture, facial expression, and tone of voice. It also permits a variety of oppor-

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15 Ibid.
tunities for feedback in parliamentary debate, small negotiation sessions, and impromptu encounters in corridors and lounges. Small group experiments of Leavitt and Mueller offer evidence that both face-to-face contact and feedback resulting from opportunity to ask questions provide a receiver with a better understanding of what a sender is trying to communicate. They also report that when there is opportunity for feedback both “the sender and the receiver can feel, correctly, more confident that they have respectively sent and received accurately.” This suggests that conflict generated by inaccurate communication and also by lack of confidence in communication systems would tend to be diminished at the United Nations.

Related also are Kelley’s findings in the study of communication in hierarchies. He found that “communication serves as a substitute for real upward locomotion in the case of low-status persons who have little or no possibility of real locomotion.” Application of this proposition to international organizations suggests that providing a place for smaller and developing countries to become high communicators could make them better able to endure a low status position which possibly can be altered only over a relatively long period of time.

Thinking about international organizations in this broader perspective extends the list of questions to be asked when facing such issues as that of Chinese representation. Participation of representatives of the Peking government would do more than give them votes in the Security Council, Assembly, and other bodies. It would alter dramatically the information intake and contacts of hundreds of Chinese officials. It would require as many to devote their energies to the presentation of Chinese viewpoints and policies. It would be necessary for some of these officials also to perform a variety of international roles. What difference would this activity make over a decade, both for the United Nations and the relations between China and the rest of the world? Analysis of the evolution of the role of the U.S.S.R. in the UN could offer relevant insights.


"Kelley, H. "Communications in Experimentally Created Hierarchies." Human Relations 4:55; No. 1, 1951."
Overlapping Membership Groups

Using the example of the underdeveloped nations from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it has been indicated already how the United Nations sometimes permits contact and cooperation that cuts across more traditional patterns of interaction and joint activity. Another example would be the development of a world-wide lobby of small nations for disarmament. These nations were largely responsible for keeping the issue on General Assembly agendas in the past decade. The development of new interest groups that cut across older interest groups and regional groupings is of particular significance when examined in the light of the work in sociology and anthropology on overlapping membership groups. Max Gluckman, an anthropologist, has found that even a relatively small population cannot form a cohesive unit without what he calls “cross-cutting memberships”:

Thus a thousand people on an island in the South Seas, or a couple of thousand in a Plains Red Indian tribe harried by constant attack, seemed unable to hold together as a political unit unless they were involved in cross-cutting systems of alliance, so that a man’s opponents in one system were his friends in another.19

Gluckman considers “cross-cutting memberships” to be so crucial to “political institutions” that he asserts that “all the various ties of friendship linking one small group with another have political functions and are political institutions.”20 Two other anthropologists, M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, write about societies in which “the stabilizing factor is not a super-ordinate juridical or military organization, but is simply a sum total of intersegment relations.”21

Sociologists have also been concerned with this phenomenon. Lewis Coser, in The Functions of Social Conflict,22 draws our attention to the work of Edward A. Ross and Robin Williams. Writing in 1920, Ross provides a classic description:

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20 Ibid., p. 68.
Every species of social conflict interferes with every other species in society... save only when lines of cleavage coincide; in which case they reinforce one another. ... A society, therefore, which is ridden by a dozen oppositions along lines running in every direction may actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or falling to pieces than one split just along one line. For each cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts, so that one might say that society is sewn together by its inner conflicts.23

Robin Williams, in his study American Society, uses similar terminology when he writes that “American society is simply riddled with cleavages. The remarkable phenomenon is the extent to which the various differences ‘cancel out’—are noncumulative in their incidence.”24

The cross-cutting memberships (also referred to as multiple group affiliations) stimulated by involvement in United Nations politics have not, to my knowledge, been deliberately planned, nor their potential contribution to the integration of international society widely understood. Representatives do express concern, however, when certain delegates from other nations do not vote with them on some issues, whereas they do on most others. There is also wide-spread concern about the increasing number of items on the agenda of the General Assembly. The literature on cross-cutting memberships puts a new perspective on these concerns by indicating that the United Nations is likely to be more effective in handling conflicts as the number of nations with which each nation occasionally votes increases. A new agenda item may add cement to the intergovernmental society at the United Nations as it adds not only a new conflict cleavage, but perhaps also a new cooperative coalition.

Multiple group affiliations also help us to think about the role that regional organizations can play in international relations. It is often asked whether regional integration aids or hinders the integration of the entire system or the likelihood of world peace. The literature on multiple group affiliation suggests that the greater the overlapping memberships in regional groups, the more they will contribute to the

lessening of violence. Rensis Likert has discovered the importance of “the overlapping group form of organization” to effective performance of business organizations. He uses the term linking pin to refer to those who link together separate units through multiple membership.25 In the international system, a nation, such as Iran, could serve as a linking pin because of its membership in the Western security system while at the same time sharing the economic development aspirations of other Asian nations. Thomas Hovet, Jr. points out that the Commonwealth Group in the United Nations “plays a harmonizing role because its members belong to other groups.”26

Collective Security

Research in other fields is enabling us to gain new insight on problems of collective security. The collective security system created by the United Nations Charter placed special responsibility on the major powers, through the Security Council, for the establishment of armies to stop aggression. But conflict among the major powers prevented such military forces from being established, and instead the small powers manned small police forces designed to prevent local conflicts, in such places as the Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle East, from escalating into big power conflicts. Some think that the failure to implement fully the collective security provisions in the Charter is due to the lack of will of certain nations and specific leaders, while others believe that failure is due to lack of appreciation of the conditions necessary for creating such forces. Some still think that the UN should have large armies, while others believe that the failure to create such a force is a result of false assumptions about the potential value of armies in peace-keeping.

In thinking about these problems, some international relations scholars have recently turned their attention to politics in primitive societies. Like international systems, primitive societies lack the elaborate governmental organizations of most nations. This makes them, in some respects, more comparable to international systems than

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national governments, which are used often as bases for comparison. In his study of the *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*, Isaac Schapera finds that the organization of cooperative enterprises precedes the organized exercise of coercive authority, which does not emerge until there is a "wider range of activity and complexity of governmental organization." This suggests that there could be a close relationship between the development of international cooperative enterprises (e.g., in the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations) and the capacity to develop international military forces.

Insights gained from the development of central institutions in primitive societies tend to be in agreement with findings of Karl Deutsch and a team of historians who studied ten cases of attempted political integration between and within nations in the North Atlantic area during the past five centuries. Noting that writers on both federalism and international organizations tend to emphasize the importance of courts and central military forces to the integration of nation states, these scholars find such institutions to be of minor importance in the early stages of national integration in the cases they studied. On the other hand, they found cases where "excessive military commitments" tended to destroy already integrated political units.

Thus failure to develop the collective security system enshrined in the United Nations Charter is not surprising in the light of some research on the development of integrated communities in primitive societies as well as within nations. Centralized military force appears to be one of the attributes of government that appear late, with cooperative enterprises being feasible much earlier.

**World Government?**

When people think about the desirability of peace, they tend to base their thinking on analogies from experience in their own nations. If they live in a reasonably peaceful nation with a strong central government, such as the United States, they tend to believe that it is

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the government that is responsible for peace. Therefore they believe that we cannot have world peace without world government, and they also tend to believe that this government ought to look something like their own government. But this line of reasoning overlooks the possibility that national governments are as much a result of already existing peaceful conditions as a cause of such conditions. It also fails to take into account the likelihood that world government would develop out of the melding of a variety of governmental patterns and international conditions rather than follow the customs of any one nation. Furthermore, the assumption that a world government is necessary for world peace neglects the fact that many nations have had peaceful relations, in the present as well as in the past, without international governmental institutions.

Whatever governmental institutions might be deemed necessary to achieve a desired kind of international community, there are indications that researchers and prophets alike should be paying more attention to international nongovernmental and business organizations. Recent research on developing nations has tended to emphasize the importance of social organization outside of central governmental institutions to the viability of these institutions. For example, in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Almond and Coleman stress the importance of the development of nongovernmental groups through which the disparate interests in a society can be "articulated" and through which various interests can be "aggregated" into meaningful pressures on governmental institutions. Without such organization, often through pressure groups and political parties, a political process does not develop linking individual wants to governmental decision-making. In the absence of such a political process, in which nongovernmental groups are crucial, even the most perfect governmental institutions may not be able to perform a vital role in a society.

It is reasonable to think of nongovernmental international organizations as having the potential for fulfilling the same function in the

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*For further discussion of the usefulness of research on the politics of developing nations to the study of international relations, see Alger, C. F. "The Comparison of Intranational and International Politics." *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics.* (Edited by Barry R. Farrell.) Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. pp. 301-328.
international system. Indeed Haas has drawn attention to the way in which trade associations and trade unions in Europe have organized across national lines in order to lobby for their interests in the European Economic Community. For example, the steel producers throughout the Community have organized in order to lobby in the EEC institutions against some of the pleas of a similar organization developed by steel workers. In this way controversy over certain economic issues is transformed from conflict between nations to conflict between international groups. The EEC institutions become more vital as they become the arena in which such disputes are waged and sometimes resolved.

From this discussion three conclusions can be drawn related to thinking about the role of international organizations in a future world order. First, some of the traditional discussions and arguments about collective security and world government may have outlived their usefulness. It appears that we are, through experiment and practice, evolving toward a complex system of international organizations: universal and regional; governmental and nongovernmental; and business. Each of these, in addition to more traditional forms of diplomacy, will play a role in world order. Second, plans for international military forces cannot be successfully implemented except in combination with international cooperative programs in the economic and social fields. Third, it is not only law and political science that have something to offer to the study of world order, but anthropology, sociology, and psychology as well. In fact, virtually all fields of knowledge related to human behavior can contribute to our thinking about international organization for world peace.

The argument to be developed in this essay involves a somewhat new and, to many people, a somewhat unorthodox conception of the nature of the contemporary world. Briefly stated, the argument involves two propositions about world affairs as a subject of education and as an object of social scientific research: first, that there is emerging today a global or planetary society—that is, a world social system; and second, that the emergence of this society or system constitutes a profound innovation in the condition of the human species that has far-reaching, although still ill-understood, implications for education and the social sciences—two cultural enterprises sharing a common objective of expanding man's consciousness of who and what he is.

The notion of globally united man is an ancient vision of humanity's historic destiny. The impact of modern science and technology on the social and cultural fabric of the modern world has transformed a vision into a rapidly emerging, if not already existing, social reality. Just as the flow of the planet's contemporary history has cast up dozens of new, nationally organized societies, so it has also given birth
to a single, worldwide social system, a single, albeit loosely integrated, society.

Is one justified in talking about the world’s more than three billion human beings as members of a single society? Or is this kind of talk simply evidence of sloppy semantics, sentimental thinking, or naive perception? How one answers this question depends on two things. The first is one’s conception of the characteristics that define a “society,” and hence distinguish “societies” from “nonsocieties.” The second is one’s perception of how well the world as a whole fits into one’s concept of society.

Image a child whose knowledge of fruit is confined to experience with apples and oranges. Out of this experience the child develops the concept of fruit, but the concept will be limited because his experience with fruit is limited. Exposed for the first time to bananas or pineapples, he is likely to judge them as outside that conceptual class of things he calls fruit. The limited historic experiences from which western man has learned his conventional, operating concept of “society” resemble somewhat the case of the child. In large measure this concept of society, as well as of relations between and among societies, has been shaped by the experience of that fraction of the species that has lived on the western edge of the Eurasian land-mass since the emergence of the territorial state system in the 17th century. Out of this bit of history has emerged a conception of the world in terms of two ideal types. “At the one extreme is the political order characteristic of the nation-state; at the other, the anarchic system of inter-state relations.” In short, the concept of society has come to be equated with the concept of nation-state, while relations among states are seen as lying outside the province of that “something” called society.

Contemporary thought is as handicapped in understanding different or new societal forms as is the child in dealing with an unfamiliar variety of fruit. The concept of society prevalent today has been formed from observations of only those societies that are the most accessible, geographically, historically, or culturally—namely, a few Western nation-states, which are characterized, among other things,

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by elaborate legal systems, centralized governments, and comparatively little internal political violence. Similarly, current notions about the nature of interstate relations have been shaped by a restricted and partial knowledge of the total human experience: three centuries of increasingly violent and deadly conflict between Western nations.

The trouble is not only that this is a very limited sample of mankind's experience with social forms, but that, even more importantly, it is a biased sample. In many respects this procedure is comparable to taking, from a heterogeneous classroom, the five most intelligent girls and the five least intelligent boys, and from this concluding that girls are always smarter than boys.

The matter of violence offers a case in point. Everyday thinking tends to associate the absence of political violence with the presence of society and the presence of political violence with the absence of society. This makes sense as long as the area under consideration is confined to the northwestern region of the planet during the last two or three centuries. Undoubtedly more human beings living in this region during this time have been killed in wars between national groups than have died from political violence internal to these groups. Expanding the sample of human experience to be observed, however, produces a somewhat different picture. One would hardly judge the Congo or Nigeria, or Indonesia, or China to be islands of domestic order located in a sea of international anarchy. Or take the case of Latin America since the Europeanization of this region: in contrast to Europe and the English-speaking world, undoubtedly more human beings have met their end from violence internal to the Latin American countries than have fallen victims of conflict between these countries.

Consider another example: the matter of the existence of a centralized government, a state. In current thinking the existence of a society and the presence of a centralized government have become so closely bound together that a centralized government is often assumed to be the prerequisite for a society. Furthermore, so this line of reasoning continues, since the international system is stateless, clearly the world as a whole cannot be called a society. Here is another example of social theory influenced by a limited and culturally biased sample. The Western nation-states are clearly societies with centralized governmental institutions, but it does not logically follow that all human
societies must also be states any more than it follows that since some fruit is round in shape, all fruit must be round. Many of the human groups that are conventionally labeled primitive societies are stateless societies, that is, societies without centralized political institutions. But one need not go to exotic lands for examples. For a great many purposes one can think of America's sprawling metropolitan areas as sub-societies within American national society, for clearly they are a more significant kind of social unit than are most of the states. Societies like those of metropolitan New York or Chicago are stateless systems. Politically, they are comprised of a large number of legally sovereign governmental units (cities, special districts, counties, unincorporated areas, etc.), whose interrelations are a matter of diplomacy, negotiation, and bargaining, not unlike what may be observed in the international arena.  

The discussion could be continued, but perhaps enough has been said to illustrate the point that today's popular conceptions of what a society is and is not are largely the product of a traditional preoccupation with the so-called Western world during the last three centuries. With an expanded awareness of global variations in mankind's social life comes a realization of the need to give to the term society a more complex and open meaning.

If social theory can escape from the conceptual limitations imposed by traditional language and usage, it can then go on to ask if there is any kind of empirical basis for thinking of the planet as a whole as a society, a piece of real estate supporting a single global social system. An examination of the world as a whole at any point in time reveals two contrary forces of change at work: on the one hand, forces of integration, and on the other, forces of disintegration. Those who are psychologically or philosophically predisposed toward the latter view may well conclude that there is little evidence to warrant thinking of the world as a society. Those, on the other hand, who tend to see only unifying themes in the tapestry of human affairs are likely to be led beyond the modest claim that mankind has become a species united in a single society to the more expanded notion of mankind as a single

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1 For an excellent discussion of the comparative analysis of international and intranational systems, from which the essential ideas in this discussion have come, see Alger, Chadwick. "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics." American Political Science Review 57:406-19; June 1963.
family. Of course, neither of these perspectives is adequate. The point is not that there exists side by side evidence of unity and disunity—this has been true of all history. The interesting and also critical question concerns the ratio existing between forces of integration and of disunity. A bit of history in which there is one element of unity for every nine elements of disunity is quite different from a bit of history in which the ratio is four to ten.

The contemporary observer regarding the modern world in this way and looking backward over the long sweep of man's development might reasonably conclude that the forces that divide the human species have neither appreciably increased or decreased in the modern era. On the other hand there is reason to believe that integrative forces have expanded in number and scale. "For the first time in man's history," Peter Drucker has observed, "the whole world is united and unified." As Drucker goes on to say, "This may seem a strange statement in view of . . . the conflicts and threats of suicidal war that scream at us from every headline," but there is much to be seen in the contemporary human condition that warrants conceptualizing the world as a single system, a single world-wide society.

What are these? At a minimum, they include the following:

I. A RAPIDLY EMERGING WORLDWIDE SYSTEM OF HUMAN INTERACTION.

As Robert Harper observes, "throughout most of history, mankind did exist in separate, almost isolated, cultural islands . . . now most of humanity is part of a single world-wide system." Raymond Platig describes part of what this means in this way:

Civil disturbances in the Congo and in South Vietnam have their repercussions in New York, Moscow, and Peking; crop failure in India calls forth a response from the American midwest; nuclear explosive power unites men around the world in the fear of holocaust and the dread of environmental contamination; physical changes on the surfaces of the sun affect man's ability to communicate with his fellow men; complex sensors located in artificial earth satellites reveal guarded secrets concerning the capabilities of another group; a desert

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2 Ibid.
war east of Suez threatens to bring the industrial machinery of Europe to a grinding halt; new ideological notes struck on the taut strings of Balkan societies set up entirely new patterns of harmony and dis-harmony in world affairs.  

2. GROWING GLOBALIZATION OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERDEPENDENCE. Two decades of acute self-consciousness of world economic development have made it abundantly clear that the poor and the rich regions of the planet are linked in chains of mutual dependence. While change in local institutions and in local cultures would seem a necessary condition of development throughout much of the world, it is not a sufficient condition. Whether the economic and social welfare available to three-fifths of humanity increases or declines is intimately linked to decisions made by the political and economic elites who rule the planet's more affluent neighborhoods. The dependence of the latter upon what happens within the earth's slum areas is less visible and more complex, but certainly no less real, than the dependence of poor nations on rich ones.

Man's ageless problem of procuring security from violent death at the hands of his neighbors has also been internationalized by the advent of modern military technology. Nations continue to talk of national security, but this concept has lost much of its traditional meaning; indeed it survives as a kind of linguistic hangover from a not-very-distant past when a reasonable degree of safety was a human value that could be secured within the boundaries of national systems.

3. AN EXPANDING NETWORK OF CROSS-NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS. In our time the globe has been encircled by an expanding grid of organizations and groups cutting across the boundaries of national systems. Among these are hundreds of organizations that link national governments to national governments, as well as hundreds of

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nongovernmental organizations and groups reflecting religious, fraternal, scientific, business, artistic, and humanitarian interests that cannot be bounded by the geography of the nation-state system. Just how important some of these cross-cutting institutions are in the social fabric of global society can be sensed by looking at large international business enterprises, many of which have budgets far in excess of the budgets of most of the world's nation-states.

4. INCREASING SIMILARITY IN MANKIND'S SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. The range of diversity in mankind's social institutions, particularly in the arenas of politics and economics, appears to be narrowing. This would seem to be particularly true within the economically and politically developed regions of the planet. Modern technology harnessed to large and complex social structures seems to carry its own organizational imperatives, which are partially immune to the influence of ideology. Thus, advanced, large-scale, mass societies, such as the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and most European countries, while continuing to reflect the influence of their own peculiar histories and ideologies, are beginning to have increasingly similar social systems.

5. AN EXPANDING HOMOGENEITY OF CULTURE. The human species has always possessed a core of cultural similarity surrounded by a much larger area of cultural diversity. Today globalized communication and transportation are in the process of gradually and unevenly erasing many culturally defined differences, and in so doing gradually expanding the core of human culture. Perhaps a more accurate way of putting this is to say that these forces are creating, at a global level, a pool of values and world-views from which all people can draw. Global commonalities in the subculture of the world's teenagers is one example that will come to the mind of the educator. This, of course, is but an illustration, an example of a larger phenomenon.

To date, this global pool of cultural forms has been fed mostly by Western ideas, largely for the simple reason that Europeans dominated the planet at the same point in time that modern science and technology emerged as significant elements in the life of mankind.

But before the century is over, it may well become clear that cultural diffusion is a two-way street, bringing Eastern culture to the West as much as Western culture is currently penetrating the East. For example, while many Americans find the sources of life's meaning in the middle class status they occupy in an affluent society, there is good reason to believe that an increasing number of young people in the West are seriously beginning to seek answers to the question, "Beyond affluence, what?" In an age of global communication there is no reason to assume that these young people will confine their search for answers to within the boundaries of Western civilization.

Expanding interaction at the global level, increasing economic and military interdependence, expanding numbers and varieties of cross-national social structures, a gradually receding heterogeneity of social institutions, and gradually increasing cultural homogeneity—these are among the important indicators warranting the claim that one can legitimately think of the world as a single society. Barbara Ward summarizes the general argument that has been so briefly outlined in the past several paragraphs:

*In short, we have become a single human community. Most of the energies of our society tend toward unity—the energy of science and technological change, the energy of curiosity and research, of self-interest and economics, the energy—in many ways the most violent of them all—the energy of potential aggression and destruction. We have become neighbors in terms of inescapable physical proximity and instant communication. We are neighbors in economic interest and technological direction. We are neighbors in facets of our industrialization and in the pattern of our urbanization. Above all, we are neighbors in the risk of total destruction.*

From the point of view of education, the general implications of the argument developed in the past several pages are clear. Historically the schools have been agents of a community, but the definition of the scope and character of the community to which the schools are responsible has varied through time. In American society schools are perhaps most commonly conceived of as instruments for forging a national consciousness, and to a somewhat lesser degree as instru-
ments for developing an awareness of membership in the community normally termed Western Civilization. But if one pause to realize that the children and young people now in school will spend most of their adult lives in the twenty-first century and indeed may well become, as Lewis Paul Todd puts it, "the first settlers to colonize the lunar wastes," then—if the argument here being proposed is a sound one—it becomes clear that the schools must come to view themselves as an agent of global society as well as an instrument of one national community within that society. The implications of this new self-definition are at once profound and subtle. It means a substantially expanded emphasis in social studies instruction upon man qua man. No one is asking the schools to abandon totally their traditional mission of developing within young people an awareness of the history of their own peculiar group or an appreciation of the cultural creation of the West, but clearly the schools now have a responsibility for cultivating within subsequent generations of human beings considerably more of what Robert Hanvey aptly terms a species-wide view of human affairs. This has both diffuse and specific implications for what and how the schools teach. Generally it means a consideration of the historically particular within the context of the larger, more general human phenomena of which any particular historical event is but a part. It means the presentation of human affairs in terms of a language and conceptual structure that is species-wide in its potential applicability.

More specifically, it means explicit instruction about that social reality here termed global or planetary society. Robert Harper has noted the implications of this for geographical education, but his observations are equally relevant to education about economics, politics, sociology, or any of the other social studies as well.

... the whole world is more important than its parts. It is understanding of the worldwide system of humanity living on the earth that we want the student to grasp, not just an understanding of the parts—the regions that have been the center of the geographer's attention.

The region is no longer primarily important in itself. The important thing is to see how it fits into the larger world system.

This calls for a whole new approach in geography. No longer can we study the United States just in terms of learning its own characteristics and of comparing those characteristics with those of other parts of the world with the aim of seeing similarities and differences. We must now see the United States as part of the worldwide system of ideas, goods, and people.

Of course, to understand the world as a whole we must scrutinize the parts, but the aim is always to see the part in the context of the bigger whole.12

If an acceptance of this line of reasoning has implications for education, implications that are still to be fully understood, much the same can also be said for the social sciences. In the first place the concept of a global society calls for the development of international studies research and theory proceeding out of a "societal" orientation to world affairs, an orientation which has been relatively neglected in American social science with a few notable exceptions.13 Minimally, this means inquiry based on a conception of the world as a social system analytically comparable to man’s social systems at the subglobal level. For example, students of international politics who have adopted this perspective have found it instructive explicitly to compare world politics with the political systems found in primitive societies and in traditional societies now caught up in the process of modernization.14

The argument has another implication. Given the existence of a global society or a world social system, individuals then may be thought of as actors in that system, and their actions within the world system may in turn be considered the international behaviors of individuals. If it is the case that the global social system is assuming increased significance in the creation and allocation of human values, the study of international behavior of individuals becomes increasingly salient to the social scientist.

12 Harper, op. cit., p
14 See Alger, op. cit.
There are a number of conceptual and research problems in the study of the international behavior of individuals relevant to the educator's concerns and responsibilities. Perhaps the most significant class of problems centers on the matter of educating human beings for competence in what Byron Massialas and others term "world citizenship." Taken as a problem in conceptualization and research, the question of competence in world citizenship has a number of aspects. Two of these will be considered here: first, the problem of defining the nature of competence in world citizenship; and second, the difficulties to be faced in developing this competence.

What constitutes competent world citizenship? How can one go about the task of developing reasoned responses to this question? One way of approaching this task might be by asking the questions, How do individuals relate to the global social system? What kinds of abilities does this relationship presuppose? The answers to these questions may in turn help furnish a model or profile of the "psychological ingredients" of competence in world citizenship.

Nearly everyone is, at one time or another, actively involved in a relationship with global society simply by virtue of being an actor in some cross-national system. Obvious examples include that of the soldier; the student studying abroad; the international tourist; the businessman involved in international trade, finance, or investment; the church leader or professional man involved in international activities of their respective organizations; housewives boycotting (or not boycotting) Polish hams in the local supermarket.

The individual can also relate to world society on an intellectual plane. At least four major kinds of "intellectual" roles can be distinguished: the individual as an observer of the current history of planetary society; as analyst of international social phenomena; as evaluator of international phenomena; and as critic or judge of the actions (policies) pursued by the organized groups that comprise the world system. While most people perform these roles to one degree or another, each individual does so with varying degrees of competence. The proficiency and insight an individual brings to bear on his observations and analyses depends upon the degree to which he possesses an interrelated set of motivations, values, cognitive skills, and knowledge or information.
As observers, individuals function largely as selectors, organizers, and evaluators of messages about international phenomena that come to them via a complex network of elite, mass, and interpersonal communication. An individual listening to a conversation about Vietnam, reading a news account of the day’s events at the United Nations, watching a television special about Africa, or listening to a foreign policy address by the President is functioning as an observer of world affairs.

As social analysts, individuals articulate and judge the correctness of empirical claims about international phenomena. To assert that alliances are a cause of war; to believe a rich world will be a peaceful world; or to reject the belief that American investment in Latin America is a cause of political instability is to carry out social analysis or inquiry.

As social evaluators, individuals articulate and judge the acceptability of normative beliefs about international phenomena. Attitudes are one very important form of evaluation. To hold the attitude that the government of one nation ought not interfere in the domestic affairs of another nation, or to believe that the rich nations have (or have not) a moral obligation to aid poor nations is to engage in social evaluation.

As policy critics, individuals are involved in a complex blending of empirical analysis, evaluation, and judgment. To conclude that it would be unwise for the United States substantially to escalate the war in Vietnam because of a high probability of Chinese intervention, or to assert that it is a political mistake for a particular business firm to invest heavily in South Africa is to function as a judge or critic of policy.

What are the ingredients of citizenship competency in world affairs? Educators and social scientists, as well as their colleagues in such fields as philosophy and theology, are a long way from being able to unveil a detailed portrait of the competent world citizen. Nevertheless, some of the component elements of a model of competence are clear. Take the matter of empathy—a quality of behavior whose cultivation is one of the frequently mentioned objectives of international education programs. There would seem to be little question that a capacity for empathy is one of the defining elements of competent evaluation. The
reasons are not hard to detect. No behavior or institution stands by itself. It is always part of a larger system, and to pass judgment on it intelligently, the individual must look at it in relation to the larger system of which it is a part. Moreover, to understand that system, the individual must transform the strange into the familiar, which he does by "stepping into another's shoes," and in so doing acquires an awareness of the commonality of human experience.

The "new social studies" are also producing a rich fund of resources readily useable by the educator and social scientist seeking to construct a model of world affairs competence. While one might wish to quarrel with certain details of the inventory of "inquiry skills" constructed by Edwin Fenton and his colleagues, most educators would agree that his typology points to a set of cognitive abilities constituting important ingredients of a capacity needed to analyze international phenomena competently. 16

The line of reasoning followed here suggests a kind of "needs model" of citizenship competence. What do individuals need to possess in the way of cognitive abilities, values, motivations, and information in order to function competently as observers, analysts, evaluators, and judges or critics of events, decisions, trends, or developments occurring in the international dimension of their social environment? The answers given to this question would constitute a gross but operating model of the competent world citizen.

While any model of competence now in existence suffers from incompleteness, enough of the component elements have become visible to justify the conclusion that competence in world citizenship is not something distinct from competence in national and local citizenship. In other words, models of the competent citizen would resemble each other in many important respects, whether they are designed to represent an individual functioning at the local, national, or global level of human social organization. When one considers the matter of developing the abilities specified by these models, however, the picture changes somewhat: the task of generating citizenship competence at the global level seems to be more complex and difficult than comparable tasks at local or national levels. The reasons for this are to be found in the social structure of planetary society and hence in the

ways individuals existentially experience the international dimensions of their social environment. This can be illustrated by looking at two examples, that point up the magnitude of the problem confronting educators who seek substantially to expand the world affairs competence of the American public (or for that matter any other population of human beings).

The first illustration deals with the matter of information or knowledge. Clearly the possession of some minimal level of knowledge or information about the structure and functioning of the international system is a requisite for competent analysis, evaluation, and policy judgment. In the absence of this, one cannot expect competence any more than one would expect a high quality performance on the part of a football player suffering from a serious dietary deficiency.

Virtually everything now known about the public's awareness of world affairs suggests the existence of a kind of massive, large-scale deprivation in respect to knowledge and information. The following passage, in which John Robinson briefly summarizes some of the relevant research, illustrates this.

**Awareness of Troubled Areas:** In answer to the question, 'Have you heard anything about the war in Viet Nam?', 25 percent of a cross-section sample in the spring of 1964 (before the Presidential election in the fall of that year, but after over two years of combat involving American troops) claimed they had not. In a separate study made at the same time in the Detroit area, 37 percent of the respondents claimed they had not heard about any activity in Viet Nam and Laos. In the late autumn of 1961 23 percent of a national sample were unaware of any trouble either in Berlin or in the Congo.

**Knowledge of the Characteristics of Foreign Countries:** In a 1964 study, 28 percent of the population sampled were unaware of the existence of a Communist government in China, and an additional 29 percent did not know of the existence of the alternative Chinese government on Formosa. In a January, 1964, Detroit Area Study, 29 percent were unable to answer the question of Chinese governments correctly. In the same study, only 64 percent correctly said that India did not have a Communist government and only 60 percent knew that France had developed and tested its own atomic weapons.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE LOCATION OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES: In the Detroit study 34 and 51 percent, respectively, correctly answered that Afghanistan and Mongolia were not in Africa. In June, 1955, about 90 percent of the national population could not accurately place the country of Bulgaria on the map of Europe.  

These “test-like” questions of factual information are of only minor interest in themselves, but when taken collectively they provide useful indicators of the general level of the public’s knowledge and consciousness of the current history of our planet.

What accounts for the general public’s low level of enlightenment? In many societies one might look to an undeveloped communication system or to widespread illiteracy for an explanation, but American society is rich in information resources; virtually every American is surrounded by a massive sea of information constantly being fed anew by the mass and scholarly media. Nor can one simply blame the society’s school system. Most of the knowledge and information requisite to citizenship competence concerns historically emerging phenomena about which the schools can never supply much information. An explanation of the public’s state of enlightenment must be more complex. Since the shape of planetary society (like that of most national and local societies) is constantly and in many ways rapidly changing, individuals, in order to maintain even a minimal level of information and knowledge about world affairs, must continuously consume and process new information. To be able to do this, individuals must possess certain motivations and cognitive skills. A large portion of the public is deficient in respect to these necessary conditions of information-seeking behavior. Such individuals lack the interest to consume world affairs information, and in many instances the cognitive abilities to process such information.

Why should this be the case? For an explanation one must look to the structure of planetary society and to the way it is existentially experienced by a vast majority of human beings, including Americans. The structure of the contemporary global social system is such that it fails to supply most human beings with the motivations requisite to taking an active interest in the continuous flow of world history. The

social landscape visible to most people looking out upon planetary society is not unlike the landscape that a village peasant must have seen as he looked out upon (let us say) the Persian Empire in which he was a subject. For in many important social-psychological aspects, planetary society today is like the society of the archaic empires. Like the local villager, people today are vaguely conscious of being part of a larger whole, but that whole is experienced as an undifferentiated, unstructured, and generally mysterious environment that seems to be very remote from the everyday existence of ordinary citizens, except when political elites mobilize their lives and energies for war. James Rosenau has summarized important elements of this in the following passage, which contrasts the way many people experience themselves in relation to their national and extra-national environments.

[World affairs] concern . . . remote and obscure matters that, if they are kept under control, seem too distant from daily needs and wants to most citizens to arouse concern. 'There are enough things to worry about in one's immediate surroundings,' many say, 'without fretting over the arrangements whereby other people abroad conduct their lives.' For most citizens the external environment is simply an 'out there,' an undifferentiated mass that can be threatening but rarely is. It is only when rapid changes occur in the environment that this mass acquires structure for most citizens and thereby appears to be linked to their own welfare in potentially damaging ways.

What we are trying to stress is that one's interests are linked to a variety of interaction sequences that recur among individuals and groups, but that most of these sequences are perceived to unfold within the boundaries of one's own system. Thus, for example, it becomes possible for many Americans to be concerned about racial strife in Mississippi even as they ignore similar strife in South Africa. Events in Jackson are part of their lives, but those in Johannesburg are not. The former become intimate in the sense that they are perceived to unleash a chain of events into which every American may eventually be drawn, whereas the latter remain remote because their repercussions seem far away. For the same reasons, to use a more mundane and thus even more pertinent example, Americans can become concerned about the contests and outcomes of proposals to provide medical assistance to aged Americans even as they remain totally unin-
volved in the question of whether the British system of socialized medicine should be extended. The arrangements of the former potentially encompass them, whereas those of the latter do not. It follows that the ordinary citizen has few convictions about how things should be arranged abroad and many about the arrangements at home. The arrangements abroad are the business of others, but those at home are his...¹

If a great many people do not possess the motivations necessary for taking an active interest in world affairs, another large number (many of whom are also included in the first group) lack the cognitive skills necessary to process information about world affairs. For most people the world of world affairs is a verbal creation. It is a world of words and occasionally pictures. The most direct link to events and developments in Moscow, Paris, Nairobi, Saigon, Buenos Aires, etc., is, for a majority of individuals, through the mass media. Through these flows a massive volume of words that seek to describe and explain the shifting landscape of global politics, economics, social life and culture. A very large number of people, even if attentive, find little but “noise” coming through the international communication system, for they lack the necessary vocabulary and conceptual understandings for making sense of the words that bombard them. For those who find analogies helpful, the relations of most people to global society might be thought of as suffering from a kind of cultural deprivation, not unlike the cultural deprivation experienced by a great number of urban residents in respect to their relation to middle-class American society. There is little in the positions most people occupy in the social structure of world society or in the cultural milieu that surrounds them that can supply the motivations and cognitive skills requisite to involvement.

Is it possible for the schools to compensate, at least in part, for what the larger social environment fails to provide? Can the elementary and secondary schools supply the motivations and skills necessary before individuals can take an active informed interest in the public affairs of mankind? Or are such expectations comparable to asking an unemployment agency to convert their clients into millionaires? The evidence at hand is mixed and very incomplete. The only rational posture to assume at this point is one of hope. Why this? For the simple

reason that currently available evidence suggests that, for a large share of Americans, experience in the years of childhood and adolescence is a critical predictor of their subsequent interest in world affairs. For example, John Robinson, after reviewing some of the highlights of two decades of political socialization research, observes:

"... Individuals during the formative years are exposed to a number of influences which can affect their orientations toward political and world issues. However, unless influenced directly or indirectly and rewarded for accumulating information and developing an understanding of world affairs during these years, it is unlikely that any of the future agencies of society will generate such an interest in them. While it is of course possible that later conditions (such as occupational or social position) can foster such an interest, a feeling of interest and concern would seem to be a necessary aspect of early development."

In short, unless the motivations and skills necessary for world affairs competence are acquired during the school years, it is unlikely that they will ever be acquired by most individuals.

There is one other problem that should not be overlooked in considering how to develop competent world citizens: namely, the problem of developing individuals who are psychologically free to make rational evaluations of international phenomena. Since most evaluations assume the form of attitudes toward social objects, rationality may be conceived of as a property of an individual's attitude structure, and individuals can be imagined as varying along a continuum ranging from those with highly rational attitude structures to those with highly nonrational structures. William Scott has defined rationality in this way:

"A rational attitude structure can be said to exist to the extent that values or goals are explicit (verbalizable) and mutually consistent and objects or events are perceived and cathected according to their relation to these values."

Within any attitude structure both rational and nonrational forces are operative, and hence rationality is always a fragile and difficult..."
quality to develop in any social context. But because of the nature of planetary society, there is good reason to believe that the development of rational international attitudes is a particularly difficult and complex problem. This is the case because nonrational forces such as personality needs can be expected to assume greater influence in the shaping of international attitudes (evaluations) than they do in respect to attitudes toward more familiar social objects. Scott has suggested four major reasons why this should be true: (a) Events are not completely or accurately comprehended; (b) Unless verbal justification for a position is forced upon the individual, events as perceived are not systematically related to values; (c) In the rare case of forced justification, the individual will transfer a set of values from a closer area of his life to apply to his analysis; and (d) The energy sources behind international attitudes come from the personality and social system of the individual, and not from the cognitive structure.20

If this be the case, then one should be able to observe relationships between the attitudes individuals hold toward international phenomena and characteristics of their personality systems. There is a massive accumulation of research literature bearing on this matter. It suggests, among other things, the following kinds of links between the personality of an individual and the kinds of evaluations that he makes of international phenomena. There appears to be a positive relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentric, xenophobic, isolationistic, and nationalistic evaluations.21 Other studies document a positive relationship between “hard line” foreign policy positions and misanthropy, anality, status concern, and anti-intellectualism.22 Her-

20 Ibid.
H. McClosky, in an extensive analysis of the psychological base of isolationistic attitudes, finds that such personality states as misanthropy, psychological inflexibility, manifest anxiety, and low self-esteem positively correlate with isolationism.23

The findings cited here are merely representative of a large number of investigations which appear to document the general proposition that human beings are normally less free psychologically to make rational evaluations of international phenomena than is true with respect to many other classes of social phenomena. Again, the cause of this may be found in the nature of the world social system as that system is experienced by individuals.

Summary

The thesis developed in this essay may be briefly summarized as follows. First, it was argued that there is emerging a social reality which can be usefully thought of as a global or planetary society or worldwide social system. Second, it was argued that this represents a profound innovation in human affairs, which has far-reaching implications for the work of both educators and social scientists. Three of these were noted: (a) the need to forge rapidly ahead with developing a species-oriented program in social studies education; (b) the need to make the emergent world social system an explicitly defined object or focus of social education for the generation of children now entering school—a generation for whom planetary society will be of even more significance than it is for adults today; (c) the need to expand basic knowledge of the international behavior of individuals, particularly of the ingredients of competent world citizenship and the peculiar kinds of problems which the schools and other agents of international education confront in educating human beings for global citizenship, an adventure unique in the history of our species.

23 McClosky, Herbert. "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation." Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 51-110.
SOCIAL STUDIES TEACHERS and curriculum specialists select from the social sciences the information, methods, and insights that they believe to be most useful in educating their students. In a field characterized by a great variety of intellectual approaches, research strategies, and substantive emphases, this is a most difficult task. The chapters in this section are all designed to assist the teacher in the job of selecting and evaluating new areas of study in international affairs.

In Chapter 7 Fred Sondermann provides an overall review of the rapidly changing field of international relations. Chapter 8, by Seymour Fersh, emphasizes the importance of introducing students to cultural contexts other than their own.

The promise and the scope of area studies are discussed by John Thompson in Chapter 9. In Chapter 10 Saul Mendlovitz and Betty Reardon examine the field of international order and world law, and offer some of the reasons why they believe that this area of inquiry deserves greater consideration in the academic community.
Changes in the Study of International Relations

Chapter 7

Fred A. Sondermann

Introduction

That international relations are the most important aspect of human relations in our time; that their scope has expanded in many directions since the Second World War; and that on their future course the survival of the human race depends, is hardly open to dispute.¹

The study of international relations deserves a place of prime importance at all levels of education, from the primary grades through adult classes. No single set of problems confronting modern man is at once as complex and as potentially dangerous as those problems commonly included under the title "international relations." If the potential dangers could be converted into opportunities for peace and progress, all mankind would benefit. If we are unable to cope with those dangers, mankind faces the risk of destruction which is the fruit of an advanced technology in a retarded social pattern.

The challenge to constructive action is great. But all action must be preceded by understanding, which can only be attained by study. It is to this task that the present essay attempts to make a modest contribution, by dealing with the past history and some aspects of the present stage of the study of international relations.

Of the many questions which confront the student of this field, one deserves to be singled out for initial consideration. It relates to the definition and the scope of international relations as a subject of inquiry. There seem to be as many definitions as there are writers on the subject. For purposes of this essay, we will adopt a definition advanced by Charles McClelland, to the effect that "international relations is . . . the study of all the exchanges, transactions, contacts, flows of information and meaning, and the attending and resulting behavioral responses between and among separated organized societies, including their components . . . ."

The study of international relations, within the framework of such a definition, usually deals with actors (states, governments, leaders, diplomats, peoples) striving to attain certain ends (objectives, goals, purposes), using means (such as diplomacy, coercion, persuasion) which are related to their power or capability. Two points should be added: First, the relationships take place within an international milieu, which lacks to a substantial degree both the consensual and the institutional ingredients predisposing to peace and order within a domestic environment; and second, in pursuing their goals, actors come into contact—and frequently into conflict—with other actors engaged in similar processes. Not all of the approximately 120 national states of the world are constantly engaged in the same pursuits, to be sure; but more than one state, more than one government, more than one set of leaders or one public is involved in almost any given activity. Whenever a national act deals, or attempts to deal, with men, groups, governments, etc. beyond the borders of its own state, we are in the presence of an international relationship. This is the subject of study of the specialist in the field.

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So vast is the subject that, even in the present rather early stage of inquiry, a considerable degree of specialization has already taken place. Thus, alongside the generalist student of international relations, we find specialists dealing with political, economic, military, psychological aspects of such relationships; those dealing with comparative governments and foreign policies of various nations; and those dealing with key relationships in specific geographically limited areas of the world. All of them pursue the same end—that of understanding, and hopefully eventually predicting, events in the international realm.

**General Observations About Academic Disciplines and Their Development**

The student of either intellectual history in general, or the history of a particular discipline, is almost always confronted by two facts. The first of these is that the development in any field of study is closely linked to developments in other fields. While one line of inquiry may temporarily forge ahead faster than others, a kind of intellectual fallout occurs. The result is that in a given period in history, a number of disciplines will change in approximately the same general direction—not quite simultaneously, to be sure, but still within a limited time span. The second fact is that areas of inquiry do not always progress at steady rates. Rather, there are periods of rapid advancement, of interesting and exciting new work; and there are other periods when plateaus of intellectual achievement seem to have been reached, when the members of a discipline are engaged more in consolidating advances previously made than they are in reaching for new data, new concepts, new theories in their field.

Applying these two general rules to the study of international relations as it has taken place in the United States, we find that this field of inquiry has always been greatly influenced by its surrounding climate, both intellectual and political. We also find that the last twenty years have been a period of exciting change and innovation, making it necessary for those who are professionally engaged in this study to "re-tool" more than once, to bring their thinking and practice up to date if they do not wish to be hopelessly left behind by a rapidly advancing intellectual enterprise.
This essay will deal with only some aspects of the development of the study of international relations in this country. It will seek to introduce some of the newer ideas and approaches which inform that study. Many of these are dealt with in more detail in other parts of this work. We will also try to raise some of the questions which concern the student of international relations and suggest some tentative answers to those questions.

The Study of International Relations in the United States Before World War II

The relations between powerful groups—cities, duchies, kingdoms, secular and religious authorities, etc.—have always been of interest to historians, who, throughout the centuries, have recorded the events of a particular period. Hence, today's student of past international relationships has a wealth of historical information at his disposal. In this sense, then, some phases of international relations have been studied and taught as long as history has been a subject of scholarly inquiry and communication.

It was not until the late years of the nineteenth century, however, that courses which were specifically identified with international relations became part of the curriculum of a few American universities. Courses in diplomatic history and international law generally monopolized this branch of inquiry. We see in the emphasis on international law a reflection of the general optimism of the nineteenth century, when people were persuaded that human progress, in peace, was the rule of life. We see also, perhaps more immediately, a reflection of such events as international arbitrations and the Hague Conferences, which sought to avoid and prevent war by emphasizing peaceful settlement of disputes and limitation of armaments.

The intellectual assumptions which undergirded these approaches to the study of international reality came crashing to the ground with the outbreak of World War I. Much of the study of international relations in this country during the interwar period was a reflection of the breakdown of nineteenth century assumptions. But interestingly

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enough, the conclusion which was drawn was not that the previous approaches had been wrong, but rather that it was necessary to try harder—an early instance, perhaps, of the "Avis" syndrome! The tragedy of World War I persuaded American intellectuals of the interwar period that their efforts had to be devoted to the prevention of a recurrence of such massive disaster. Hence, during the 1920's and much of the 1930's, the study of international relations in this country progressed along three major paths.

The first of these was a careful study of current events, accompanied by some early attempts to fit these into some type of general pattern. While it is not easy to reconstruct underlying intellectual assumptions 30 or 40 years after the fact, one may speculate that it was assumed that international misunderstandings and conflicts could "creep up" on people almost unnoticed unless events were subjected to the most careful scrutiny. According to Grayson Kirk's report in *The Study of International Relations*, the New York Times tended to be the "Bible" of most international relations classrooms. Kenneth Thompson has commented on this phenomenon in the following terms:

*The task of the professor was to read and comment on the latest dispatch or discourse on the findings of his favorite diplomatic columnist. Viewing the international picture from this angle of vision, the professor produced an air of contemporary relevance within the classroom. Students were able to relate what they learned within "the academy" to what they heard about in the outside world. This approach made for lively debate and spirited conversation, but it did little to carry international studies beyond comment and impressions of the day's news. There was little if any progress in moving the subject in the direction of cumulative knowledge or in the building of an organized body of ideas and principles.*

A second mode of approach in the interwar period was the study of international organization. The intellectual foundation of this kind of study obviously lay in the assumption that an international legal order, with an organizational base provided by the League of Nations, could channel and resolve conflict. The orientation was openly and admittedly reformist.


*Thompson, "The Study of International Politics," *op. cit.*
A third strand of analysis of international affairs in the interwar period concerned itself primarily with the role of international economics. Basing itself on a simplified version of Marxist-Leninist thought, this school of analysis produced interpretations of past international conflicts and wars which relied heavily on economic factors. In the United States, for example, this trend was reflected in the Nye Committee investigations of the 1930's, conducted with the viewpoint, widely current at that time, that American business, industrial, and investor interests had propelled this nation into World War I. This resulted in the various pieces of ill-advised neutrality legislation, designed to keep the United States out of future European conflicts.

In describing these intellectual trends of the interwar period, it is easy to adopt a condescending tone. How could our intellectual forebears have been so naive as to think that law and organization could channel the explosive stuff of international politics? How could they have thought that the mere study of current events would suffice to create a conceptual framework sufficient for the full understanding of such dynamic processes? How could they have elevated economic considerations above political ones? These questions are easy to raise, but they are less than fair. Any field of study goes through various stages. Some of these prove to be more productive than others. The individual engaged in trying out a particular approach takes the chance that the intellectual pay-off may not live up to his expectations. Those of us who today adopt different frameworks for our inquiries might do well to reflect how our current approaches will look to another generation 30 years hence.

Furthermore, it must be added that in the 1930's some more sophisticated approaches began to appear. Frederick Schuman published the first edition of his innovative work *International Politics* in 1933, with succeeding editions in 1937 and 1941 (and several more in the post-war period). While it contained much in the way of current events, historical, legal, and institutional data (as, by the way, current texts still do), this work is recognizably contemporary in its emphasis on such factors as power. Other works in the same vein began to appear in the later years of the decade and the early 1940's. The new ap-

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proaches were undoubtedly stimulated by the rise to power of the dic-
tators and their behavior in international affairs, which, to put it
mildly, led to a diminution of faith in the role of rational, legal, or-
ganizational processes. Books such as those we have mentioned were
clearly the precursors of the “newer” approaches to international rela-
tions which emerged in the post-World War II period.

The Study of International Relations in the Postwar Period

The point of departure for any study of international relations since
the end of World War II must be the work of Hans J. Morgenthau of
the University of Chicago. The first edition of his Politics Among
Nations was published in 1947. Discarding many of the assumptions
of most previous writers—such as the assumption of automatic har-
mONY between varying interests, the efficacy of law and organization,
or the peaceful influence of public opinion—Professor Morgenthau
vigorously advanced the proposition that power was the central focus
for the study of international relations, as it was for its practice. It
will help to understand his position to quote from the first chapter of
his work:

International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. What-
ever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the
immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom,
security, prosperity, or power itself. They may define their goals in
terms of a religious, philosophic, economic, or social ideal. They may
hope that this ideal will materialize through its own inner force,
through divine intervention, or through the natural development of
human affairs. But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means
of international politics, they do so by striving for power. . .

Professor Morgenthau defined power as “man’s control over the
minds and actions of other men.” He proposed further that the objec-
tives of states in international politics could be subsumed under the
general category of “national interest,” which had to be distinguished
from “sub-national,” “other-national,” and “supra-national” interests.
In what came to be known as the “realist” approach to the study of


\[\text{Ibid., p. 13.}\]
international relations, Professor Morgenthau and a growing group of scholars adopting the same general stance held that before real advance in our understanding of international politics could be made, it was essential to discard much of the intellectual baggage of the pre-World War II period.

The publication of Professor Morgenthau's text coincided with the huge increases in university enrollments under the stimulus of the G. I. Bill of Rights, and great increases in interest in international studies engendered by wartime experiences. Considering the obvious inadequacy of many of the previous attempts to explain international processes, the clarity of Professor Morgenthau's writings, and the rapidity with which his views were espoused by a number of other writers, it seems fair to say that his views affected the approach of a whole academic generation of international relations scholars. In assessing his work, no one can deny that in clearing away some cobwebs which badly needed to be cleared away, he made room for a more lucid approach to the study of the processes which are the subject of our inquiries.

Needless to say, all of this did not take place without an intellectual battle which left a number of casualties on both sides—a battle which proceeded under the somewhat oversimplified rubric of "the realists" v. "the idealists." The counterattack of the latter group upon the Morgenthau position was that it glorified power and neglected moral considerations; that it seemed close to the position that "might makes right," and that it therefore left no room for moral judgments. A further charge was that men are driven by many motivations, of which the desire to wield power is merely one, and not always the guiding one. Finally, consistent realism, as Professor E. H. Carr had pointed out in his book The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-193911 (which generally follows the realist rather than the idealist tradition), has no emotional appeal and in its deterministic approach provides no ground for meaningful action.

This particular intellectual encounter raged for some years, at a rather high pitch of involvement and excitement. Whatever one's views on the merits of the debate may be, the discussion took place on Professor Morgenthau's grounds, and he therefore affected the disci-

pline profoundly. Most of today's international relations scholars feel that they have gone beyond his initial formulations—as indeed he himself has done also—and that they have found weaknesses in his emphasis on "power" and "national interest" which render these concepts less useful than they had earlier been thought to be. But few would deny that the agenda of international studies was changed greatly by him and others who wrote in the same tradition.

By the mid-1950's, then, the study of international relations had departed considerably from the study of diplomatic history, current events, international law, international organization, and international economics which had been its main foundations in previous periods. Scholars now were primarily concerned with political processes and with the behavior of states and their leaders in pursuing their objectives.

Some final comments about this period seem appropriate: (a) It was a period of greatly enlarged interest in international studies, revealed by the creation of new programs in colleges and universities, enrolling rapidly rising numbers of students. The production of Ph.D.'s with international relations specialization increased measurably. The study of international relations is now the largest single branch of the discipline of political science. (b) The academic study of international relations received a great boost by the establishment of the journal *World Politics* in 1948 as the first publication exclusively devoted to international relations as a field for scholarly inquiry. Now in its twentieth year of publication, it remains the outstanding journal in the field, though it has since been joined by such other publications as the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *International Studies Quarterly* (formerly *Background*). An organization of international relations scholars, the International Studies Association, was formed in the late 1950's and has expanded to become national in scope, with regional subsidiaries throughout the country.

**Some Recent Trends in International Relations Studies**

Approaching the present, then, we find new and more programs, new and more personnel, new and more media of communication. All these

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resulted in, and reflected, the rapid proliferation of international studies which has been the hallmark of the last ten to fifteen years. George Liska has referred to the period 1955-1965 as "the heroic decade" of international studies. It may be debated whether it was indeed heroic; it cannot be denied that it was, and is, exciting. Only a few highlights of some of the new approaches can be dealt with here. The list is not all-inclusive, and the various approaches are not discussed in detail. All that is intended is to provide a partial inventory and to indicate something of the variety of interests and approaches which presently permeates the field. Some of the new departures are, in any event, covered in more detail in other portions of this book. The many new ideas, suggestions, and proposals have made the recent study of international relations an exciting, and at the same time a difficult and often frustrating, experience.

An early entry into the list of new approaches was the suggestion, made by Professor Richard Snyder and others, to study international relations by studying the decision-making process. In the original work, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, Snyder and his colleagues deplored the chaotic state of the field of international studies and insisted on the necessity for a central focus. Their suggested focus takes into account new work that is currently taking place in such related fields as communications, social psychology, management, and organization studies. The scheme they proposed was enormously complex, which probably accounts for the fact that so little follow-up work has been done on it. It raised many questions. One of these was whether one can, in fact, grasp the totality of international relations by looking at them from the vantage point of national decision-making processes alone. The present writer once put this, rather inelegantly, by asking whether at any given time the field of international relations is only the product of the actions of states and statesmen, or whether perhaps the actions of states and


statesmen are affected by the field of international relations. The question is from what point of view or what level the reality of life which we call “international relations” can best be understood.

Another emphasis which gained ground in the 1950’s was the so-called area-studies approach. This approach concentrates on a single country or area and studies it in depth, not only in terms of its domestic and international politics, but also in terms of its geography, social structure, economy, culture, and language. Area study programs have proliferated at American universities. Exciting new concepts for the study of foreign societies have been developed by anthropologists and social psychologists, among others. Understandably enough, particular emphasis is placed on areas which previously tended to be terra incognita for American students—that is to say, the newly emerged countries, most of which are politically and economically underdeveloped. Thus, African and Asian area study programs receive a great deal of effort and attention.

Third in this partial inventory of recent developments in international relations is the movement which is frequently referred to as “behavioralism.” This is a catch-all term, relating the study of international relations to movements that have occurred simultaneously in a number of other disciplines. Its meaning is not totally clear. It refers to at least two, and possibly more, fairly distinct trends. The first of these is the attempt to relate findings from psychology, sociology, social psychology, and even psychiatry to the study of relevant aspects of international relations. Examples of this trend are works such as Alexander and Juliette George’s Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House or Lewis J. Edinger’s more recent Kurt Schumacher. These books, and others like them, explicitly borrow concepts and categories from psychology and psychiatry to explain the behavior patterns of important political actors.


A second meaning of "behavioralism," which is probably more widely accepted than the first, involves the attempt to make the study of international relations "scientific" in the sense of using clear and replicable research procedures and studying issues capable of precise measurement. What is involved in "behavioralism," however, is surely more than methodology, however important new methods may be: it is, in essence, a receptivity to new ideas, concepts, findings from other disciplines. David Singer has put this as strongly as anyone: "A treasure chest of ideas ... lies ready at hand in the behavioral science literature." He argues, and the international relations specialist can profit by developing the skills and awareness that will enable him to integrate these ideas with his own work.

As with other trends in the study of international relations, this one has given rise to lively controversies. On the one hand, proponents of "behavioralism" argue that unless the international relations scholar develops precise measurements, sophisticated research designs, and replicable studies, he simply cannot be confident of the validity of the points he is trying to establish. The other side claims that in reducing a topic with as many variables and complexities as international relations to simple research designs, the researcher departs from reality to such a degree that he cannot help but reduce the validity of his findings.

Three other examples of some new approaches, and of the controversies to which they have given rise, are (a) the application of game theory, (b) the use of simulation techniques, and (c) the use of content analysis in international studies.

In the first instance, a form of analysis taken over from mathematics and economics is applied to the study of decision-making situations. In the second example, attempts are made to reproduce significant segments of international reality in a laboratory situation in order to extract possible meaningful patterns from the behavior of participants in the experiments. (It should be added that simulation techniques are often employed not to add to international relations theory, but simply as a pedagogical tool to convey some of the realities of politics to participants in a way which no lecture, discussion, or book can ever do.) Those who defend the application of simulations argue that despite

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the admitted variations between games or simulations and international reality, there are enough underlying similarities to justify the use of a simplified approach for learning about reality. Those who question these techniques caution against too great a reliance on such methods and procedures, and maintain that international reality is too complex to permit this type of experimental simplification.19

Content analysis focuses on the close examination of political messages, not so much in terms of their content as in terms of their frequency and of the use of key words or phrases which are used as indicators of levels of tension or cooperation in a given international situation. The approach has been used primarily in the study of conflict and crisis situations and has yielded some findings which evidence considerable regularities in the behavior of important actors in such situations.20

Finally, a theoretical framework which has commended itself to an increasing number of international relations students (and within which any of the foregoing methods, along with others, can be employed) is that generally referred to as “systems theory.” It is not easy to outline its basic properties and implications in a limited space. Basically, a “system” presupposes that all actions in a given realm are functionally related to one another; that they can be understood only in terms of their relationship to the whole, broader system of which they form a part. Any system has to behave in particular ways and perform particular tasks in order to exist in its specific environment. One of the simpler definitions of a system is that of Professor Rosenau: “A system is considered to exist in an environment and to be composed of parts which, through interaction, are in relation to each other.”21

A given system has boundaries, beyond which exist other systems with which the system is in contact. It also has “inputs” in the form of demands (for goods, services, the regulation of behavior, participation, etc.) and supports (in the form of taxes, obedience, service, participation, and deference to symbols of authority). These inputs feed into a central mechanism which converts them into policies. The

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21 Rosenau, op. cit., p. 77.
policies emerge as "outputs," in the form of allocations and distributions of goods and services, regulations of behavior, and the like. Finally, a system has a feedback mechanism, by which the results of policies are fed back into the decision-making process.22

This is a very simplified version of the intellectual scheme. Whether or not it is possible to think of the international realm as a "system" is debatable, though the present writer believes that one can do so. It is quite clear, however, that in the analysis of the national units which compose that international sphere, this approach has direct relevance in that it draws attention to certain aspects of the decision-making process, to certain relationships, to the steps which precede and follow decisions, and to the interrelations among many relevant factors which, until the advent of systems theory, were only dimly perceived. Some students of international relations believe, in fact, that systems theory bids well to become the unifying focus in the study of all human phenomena, including those which fall in the realm of international relationships. Systems theory seems to be developing in a number of the social and natural sciences, and some predict that the coming convergence of these fields will result in a broad conceptual framework from which a new world view of man will emerge.

Some Continuing Problems in the Study of International Relations

The foregoing is a brief and admittedly sketchy view of some of the ongoing activities in the field of international relations. If it serves no other purpose, it may still have been worthwhile if it has managed to convey something of the sense of excitement which pervades the field, and some feeling of the vigorous efforts being made by international relations scholars to deepen their understanding of the immensely difficult and complex patterns with which they deal. The main point to be made is that international relations is an open field of study. Little is settled, less is universally agreed upon. All is in flux, and all is being challenged. This makes an uncomfortable situation for anyone rash enough to try to sum up an intellectual movement in ferment.

22 For a particularly valuable essay relating the systems approach to international relations, see Almond, Gabriel A. "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems." World Politics 17:183-214; No. 2, January 1965.
This concluding section will deal with a few of the unsettled questions which presently concern those engaged in the study of international relations. One such question is whether the study of international relations is becoming a separate discipline or whether it remains as a sub-branch of one (or more) of the major disciplines. Its disciplinary (and in most cases its administrative) home is, of course, political science. It owes much to its parent discipline. Since changes and controversies very similar to those described in these pages also characterize the field of political science, the student of international relations does not find his continuing link with political science burdensome. In fact, one would guess that most scholars in the field consider themselves political scientists first, and students of international relations second.

Yet the study of international relations is in some important respects different from the study of political relations within the political entity which we know best—namely the relatively well-ordered, relatively democratic, relatively peaceful society. Many international relationships take place in a milieu lacking both the common background which makes government and domestic peace possible and the common institutions which help establish and maintain law and order within a society. The international environment tends toward decentralization of power and authority, and this fact imposes a different set of considerations upon those who make decisions within this environment. Foreign policy is not, as is sometimes thought, merely "domestic policy writ large." Instead, it deals with projects, subjects, and objects which are beyond the span of jurisdiction of the governments whose authority in domestic affairs usually goes unchallenged.23 In a seminal article in the first issue of World Politics, Frederick Sherwood Dunn contended that "the technical knowledge of International Relations is not merely the extension to a wider geographical scale of knowledge of social relations inside the national community, but has unique elements of its own."24

It does not pay to be too dogmatic on this point, however. Chadwick Alger has recently reminded us that, just as there are both

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22 Dunn, Frederick S. "The Scope of International Relations." World Politics 1:142-146; No. 1, October 1948.
domestic systems which are relatively well-ordered and those which are relatively disorderly, the same can be said about international relationships. For example, while a country such as Great Britain can rely on sufficient domestic harmony and consensus to make civil war an unlikely occurrence, a country such as the Congo can hardly make similar assumptions. Similarly, relations between two countries such as Canada and the United States, in spite of frictions, do proceed on the assumption of continued peace, while no such assumptions can as easily be made of the relations between, say, the United States and the People's Republic of China.

What this amounts to is the consideration that students of the political process have much to learn from one another, whether their particular point of departure happens to be politics in the domestic or in the international setting. In fact, it increasingly seems to some scholars that the real division is not between those who study politics within societies and those who study them between societies, but rather between those who study politics within stable and orderly, as opposed to unstable and disorderly, milieus.

The links with political science, then, have always been strong and remain so today. But the study of international relations is also linked closely to other disciplines. The list of the other fields whose work is of concern to the international relations scholar is very long indeed. One writer has gone so far as to suggest facetiously that the best definition of a student of international relations is "a person who regrets that he does not better understand psychology, economics, diplomatic history, law, jurisprudence, sociology, geography, perhaps languages, comparative constitutional organization, and so on down a long list." This may sound a bit funny, but those working in the field, who know how true it is, seldom smile about it. Quincy Wright, in his monumental work The Study of International Relations, specifically covers geography, demography, technology, sociology, psychology, and ethics, and refers to history and general philosophy as

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well. The continuing need to base our formulations on sound historical evidence is emphasized by such works as Adda B. Bozeman's *Politics and Culture in International History*, in which we are reminded that European or North Atlantic history is not the be-all and end-all of our quest for historical evidence, and that we must learn much more than we now know of the histories of Asia and Africa as well.

Obviously, no single person can hope to be expert in all, or even many, of these fields. Modern renaissance men are hard to find. Nor is this essential. The important thing in all scholarly enterprise is to reflect on the underlying unity of the effort and to draw appropriate conclusions from that reflection. Our ultimate goal is to understand the human being in all his varied and complex relationships—with himself, with his natural environment, and with his human environment. The latter includes his activities and behavior within, and as part of, the set of relations embraced by the term “international relations.”

A second important question, asked with increasing frequency, relates to the policy orientation and the policy participation of international relations experts. We live in a period and in a society where the scholar is increasingly called on for advice and judgment—in short, for the contribution of his scholarly competence to the policy-making process of his society.

The question no longer seems to be whether he has a contribution to make. Rightly or wrongly, it is taken for granted that he does. More and more professionals, including students of international relations, are engaged in research, advice, and consultation on problems of national security, economic development, and foreign policy. Research organizations are established to perform such functions almost exclusively, and are awarded government contracts for consultation services. Likewise, some major academic departments rely heavily on research grants from government agencies. Increasing numbers of scholars commute between their campuses and Washington or spend time abroad as consultants in various programs of foreign aid. Men of thought and men of action are becoming closely linked.

Many welcome this development. In the study of international relations, as in the other social sciences, there has always been a strong reformist trend: the scholar hopes that his work, in one way or another, will leave the world a little better off than he has found it. Here are new and often exciting chances to contribute to that goal. The question of responsibility also enters: can a citizen legitimately refuse to put his talents at the disposal of those who are charged with the protection and advancement of national purposes?

The trend is unmistakably in the direction of increasing involvement of scholars in the governing process. Yet, there are also voices which caution against too ready an acceptance of this new and demanding role. Some question whether, given the present stage of our inquiries, we know enough to give meaningful advice. The answer to such a question is probably that we do not, but that what we know may be more than what others know, so that some net gain may still be involved in feeding our knowledge to the decision maker. A more troublesome question is whether by actively participating in the formulation of policies, we lose that sense of detachment and independence of mind which must always be the hallmark of the scholar; whether, by becoming involved, we are sacrificing a different contribution which we could make if we resisted the temptation of instant relevance—the contribution, for example, of questioning a given period’s conventional wisdom or of criticizing a given society’s conventional behavior. Undoubtedly it was thought along these lines which prompted one prominent member of the profession, William T. R. Fox, to say that “if a first-class international relations scholar tries too hard to be immediately useful, he may only succeed in becoming a fourth-class journalist”, to which Stanley Hoffman added, “Policy-scientism is one form of impatience.”

Whatever the scholars response to this troubling question may be, the fact of greater involvement is undeniable. The present writer raised the issues involved in the following terms in an article some time ago:

Changes in the Study of International Relations

... (the) larger issue (is) that of the appropriate relationship between the academy, the society in which it operates, and the government which makes decisions for that society. So much has been said on this issue that one hesitates to add to the volume, but the problem is important and has been so since the time of Socrates. It is becoming more central at a time when men of knowledge increasingly have the option of becoming men of power—a temptation which it is not always wise, and never easy, to resist.

I can only enter a personal judgment here, unsupported by the usual scholarly apparatus of facts and figures gained through empirical research. It is that the easy transition to power and influence should be rejected—not by all, of course, but by some; that some scholars can make their best contribution indirectly rather than through direct involvement and participation in decision-making. I think of such activities as research, study, reflection, and the kind of effective teaching whose results may not be visible for a generation. Above all, it would seem to me that at least some persons in the academy must make their contribution by rigorously critical examination of the assumptions, values, and policies of their society and government, by raising issues which majorities would prefer not to see raised, by opening difficult and embarrassing questions to public discussion. This of course, is not the only function of the college or university and its faculty, but it is one which no other part of society can perform as well. It is neglected at the peril of both the institution and the society of which it is a part. And it cannot be performed adequately if there is a customer or client relationship between the government and the institution.31

A third and final issue to be broached here relates to what might be called the “agenda” for international relations research. Two points of view may be distinguished. One school of thought believes that the greatest need at this stage in the development of the field is for more and better data. According to this view, international relations has a sufficiency of conceptual frameworks within which such data can be placed, and as well as the tools and techniques for gathering, organizing, storing, retrieving, and processing such data. In this respect, of

course, the new developments in computer science are just beginning to exert a powerful influence on the study of all social science fields.

In contrast, some students believe that the theoretical formulations in international relations are still so poorly developed that the infusion of massive amounts of unrelated data would simply swamp the field and overwhelm the scholar. They feel that what is needed first is the construction of better theoretical frameworks within which the new data—which, according to advocates of the first point of view, is available and just waiting to be gathered—can be fitted.

Almost no one is very confident that international relations is on the verge of a great breakthrough in theory construction or that it will soon emerge with a single overarching theory of the behavior of men and groups, including governments, in international relations. What we are looking for are smaller, shorter-range formulations, sometimes referred to as “middle-range theory.”

The present writer, who at one time held the second point of view (“The study of international relations, in its present stage, needs the integration of existing evidence from various fields, not random accumulation of more and more facts”) has changed his mind. With the development of systems theory, the decision-making approach, and other new foci in the study of international relations, one can now subscribe to the view that we do have conceptual frameworks into which data can be fitted, or with which data can be compared. No doubt these frameworks are inadequate. Comparing them with “real life” in the form of hard facts will reveal such inadequacies and can, in time, yield better formulations than we now have.

Having said this, however, one must go on to express some doubt whether the discipline is growing in a way which ultimately promises to yield best results. Some feel that it is; that whatever our various interests and preoccupations may be, we are all “touching the same elephant,” and may legitimately hope, in time, to get a clearer picture of the whole beast. Others worry whether this is in fact the case, or whether in our pursuit of a large variety of interests, and in our reluctance to engage in replication studies, we are not being driven

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further apart, without the kind of unifying apparatus and principles which could give some order and meaning to the total enterprise.

What emerges from all of this is a field of study in flux. A great many persons are pursuing many different lines of inquiry, all of which attempt to add to our understanding of the behavior of men in the massive and complex relations between powerful groups, organized into political units, separated by real and by psychological boundary lines. No more exciting challenge has ever confronted the teacher or the student. Our failures are, and will continue to be, many. Our successes in gaining understanding are intermittent, and each increment of insight only reveals vast new intellectual territories that must yet be conquered. The frontier of all politics, as William T. R. Fox has put it, is endless. It is there, and like other frontiers, it will slowly yield to exploration.

Before 1945 the pattern of foreign area studies in American high schools and colleges was clear. In a course inappropriately titled "World History," students were taught that man's most significant development occurred in Europe and later in the United States. Invariably, the course was textbook-centered and followed a chronological arrangement. The emphasis was on political history—dates and men, wars and governments. Little attention was given to other considerations such as how people lived, what they created, how they viewed themselves and others.

The study of areas beyond Europe entered this version of world history only peripherally, mainly when these areas were "discovered" by Europeans and later by Americans during periods of overseas exploration and colonization. In one major textbook published in the 1940's, fifty important dates in world history were listed and the only one which referred to Asia was the notation of Japan having been "opened" by Commodore Perry. In American schools the study of the world has not really been global; it has been principally a study of the American people and their origins—from the Tigris-Euphrates valley westward.
In the early 1950's the traditional world history course began to change when more textbook pages included mention of Asia and Africa. At first, however, the additional coverage was merely an extension of the usual approach with its emphasis on political developments. A few years later, however, a more significant trend began; anthropology rather than history was used in one major high school textbook as a way of studying the world's people. The globe was divided into eight major culture regions, and the "way of life" in each region, including its history, was examined. By the early 1960's other textbooks were departing from a strict historical-chronological treatment of world history. Paperback series began to appear in which separate culture regions were featured.¹

Today most textbooks and most teachers of world history still give Europe their main attention and still favor using an historical approach to their subject matter. This condition, however, represents "pedagogical lag" rather than a strong feeling of what should be done. Agreement is becoming more widespread that world history courses should be broadened to include better global coverage and that a cultural rather than an historical viewpoint should be used. Classroom changes in this direction depend, however, on the speed and skill with which teachers can be educated about the previously neglected regions of the world and about the ways in which a culture is studied.

Opportunities for study are now available for teachers under the National Defense Education Act, which helps to sponsor summer and year-round institutes. In Pennsylvania a state law requires each high school student to take a course on world cultures. In New York the State Education Department's Office of Foreign Area Studies is creating materials and study programs for teachers. Moreover, in a special message delivered to Congress on February 2, 1966, President Johnson recommended a broad program for projects in the fields of international education and health. The International Education Act was subsequently passed, and its implementation should have world-wide effects.

Almost to the same degree that Americans have become involved in the real world beyond our own shores, the representation of that world has moved into the American curriculum. Professor Richard M. Morris asks a relevant question (which he thinks should be rhetorical):

*If there are serious questions in the air about the American educational establishment itself, our primary concern should not be merely with non-Western studies and the options of tacking them on, infusing them, or integrating them at school and college levels. Insofar as we are defining purposes and not procedures, we are really asking: Is this the proper moment for the rest of the world to become visible to us?*

**Motivation Affects Purpose**

While there is now an almost universal agreement among American educators that other cultures *should* be studied, there is little agreement about why they should be studied. And the *why* certainly affects the *how*. Howard Mehlinger is right when he says, "More often than not, the objectives underlying the inclusion of a unit or course ... on a Non-Western area are stated in terms of national interest rather than of the values for the child. Therefore, units or courses on communism and the USSR became popular because 'we must learn to get along with the Russians' or more often, 'the USSR is our enemy and we must learn how to cope with it'.

Because the major motivation for studying other cultures is related to current events and narrowly conceived national self-interests, the treatment reflects this limited concern. Consider, for example, a six-week unit on Asia which is being studied in one large American city. Of the eleven study-guide questions, eight mention the United States by name; the other three deal with New Zealand and Australia. The

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questions follow this pattern: "Why is Southeast Asia important to the United States? What is the nature of the Communist Chinese threat to the United States? What are some of the 'trouble spots' in the Far East and how do they affect the United States?" These questions might be appropriate for a study unit about Asia in an American history course, but they are certainly not a substitute for learning about the ways and wishes of the people who live in Asia. Incidentally, notice that terms such as "trouble spots," "powder kegs," and "points of conflict" are often used to describe situations and conditions outside the United States—terms which carry the connotation that the rest of the world has become a "burdensome" and "troublesome" place which creates a continuous series of problems for Americans.

One professor of Asian studies wisely warns that the pragmatic motive of using fear in promoting non-Western studies "may be realistic and necessary in trying to persuade federal and state legislatures or private donors to make available the needed financial support. . . However, if limited to this motive, students are apt to view other peoples and countries as pawns in a power game and to think of them as actual or potential allies and enemies." Professor William Theodore de Bary makes a similar assessment:

There are many persons today who explain the need for Asian studies in terms of the rising importance of Asian peoples in the world today. . . There is no question but that such considerations are vital in the political, diplomatic, and military arena today, but there is a very real question whether they have anything to do with liberal education. The peoples and civilizations of Asia are important to undergraduate education, not because they represent factors in the cold war, as means to some immediate practical end, but because their experience in living together, what they have learned about life, and what they have come to understand about the universe we all live in is now part of the common human heritage. Nor are these peoples to be studied like problem children needing our help. They are to be studied, rather, as peoples who can teach us much about ourselves,

whose past can give us a new perspective on our own, and whose way of looking at things can challenge us to a re-examination of our own.\(^5\)

Moreover, the attempt to reduce complex issues to brief, simple terms easily results in "mis-education"—the illusion that one is well-informed when, in fact, he has a worse understanding than no understanding at all. The following summary was prepared "in easy English for adults" so that they could be knowledgeable about the world in which they live. As a result, will they know more or less about the "real world"?

There is a new war in Asia. India and Pakistan are fighting again. The people of these two countries first fought in 1947. At that time they all lived in one country, India. They disagreed over religion. They divided India into three parts. The large part was India. Another part was East Pakistan. The third part was West Pakistan. Then India and Pakistan fought again. They each wanted a small country. It is Kashmir. The United Nations stopped them. They did not like this. They began fighting again this summer.

India has more soldiers. Pakistan has more guns.

The U.S. sends money to both countries. It is to feed the hungry. Pakistan used some money to buy guns. The Indians didn't like this. The U.S. wants the truth. They sent men to find out the truth.\(^6\)

What kinds of educational benefits are likely to result from an over-concern about political events, especially when the maturity level of the student is not suited to the question? "I, for one, am just a little skeptical," said Dean Rusk, "that in the elementary or perhaps even in the high school classes there is a good opportunity to solve the Kashmir question. And I don't think our young people get much bene-


\(^6\) Consider the observation by Felix C. Robb: "As Pogo once said, 'We have met the enemy—and he is us.' We Americans do so much that is fine and good both here and abroad that we tend to think we have no flaws, when in truth our Achilles heel in international relations is our tendency to be basically proud, provincial, and unprepared for cultural shock. We do not really appreciate fully our own subcultures, let alone understand the rest of the world and its awesome problems. To a degree we are still insular, as if that were necessary to our mental health." From "International Education: The Prospect." Address delivered at the White House Conference on International Cooperation, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1965. (Cited in Brademas Report, op. cit., p. 503.)
fit from problem solving where the problems are taxing the capacity of the mind of man itself."

**Frame of Reference Affects Perspective**

The unconscious preoccupation with self—the tendency to see one's own culture as the center of human life—is also a barrier to the potential enrichment offered by cultural studies. In the United States, the currently popular way of dividing the world is the terms, "Western" and "non-Western." In the so-called non-Western parts of the globe are peoples as different from each other as Chinese, Indians, Nigerians, Egyptians, and Iranians, but these differences are minimized or, more often, ignored and overlooked. In a similar way, all of the peoples who were living in the Americas when Columbus arrived were identified by the Europeans as "Indians." The so-called Indians never thought of themselves as being "one people"—some of them considered themselves (more correctly!) as Iroquois, Hopi, Aztecs, Incas, etc.

The Chinese, for example, in their own language represent their country by two symbols which mean "middle kingdom" or "center of the universe." The English (with the man-made prime meridian passing through their country) have helped to popularize the terms "Far East," "Middle East," and "Lands Down Under." These terms are, of course, appropriate from an English viewpoint, but are not acceptable to people who live, for example, in Turkey or India or Japan and who do not think of themselves as living "near" or "far" from anywhere. In the United States we consider it natural to use a map which shows this country as the center of the world. And it is this view of our relationship to other countries which Americans tend to internalize both figuratively and psychologically.

"Nothing can distort the true picture of conditions and events in this world more," writes Emery Rees, "than to regard one's own country as the center of the universe, and to view all things solely in their relationship to this fixed point. It is inevitable that such a method of observation should create an entirely false perspective. Yet this is the

only method admitted and used by the seventy or eighty national
governments of our world, by our legislators and diplomats, by our

Consider, too, the invidious words which are used consistently to
characterize the peoples and cultures of "non-Western" countries—
words such as "backward," "underdeveloped," or "emerging.\footnote{For an examination of the semantical implications in studying other cultures,
see Fersh, Seymour H. "Words Under a Mask." \textit{The UNESCO Courier}; February 1965; and "Semantics and the Study of Culture." \textit{Social Education} 27; No. 5,
May 1963.} To refer to contemporary India as "emerging" is especially ironic when we
recall that it was India and the "Far East" which Columbus was
eagerly seeking when he discovered the "New World" (which, of
course, was "new" only from the European viewpoint. This designa-
tion, however, encouraged the explorers to claim lands as if they were
uninhabited and really new).

Words such as "backward" and "underdeveloped" are often used
without much reflection. Was Nazi Germany a "developed and for-
ward" nation because of its high literacy rate and superior techno-
logical achievements? Does industrial leadership mean that a country
is likewise a leader in other fields of human development: art,
philosophy, religion, social and political systems? "Why is it assumed,"
asked Senator William Fulbright, "that the proof of superiority is
force—that when a nation shows that it has the stronger army it is also
proving that it has better people, better institutions, better principles—
in general, a better civilization?\footnote{Fulbright, J. William. "The University and American Foreign Policy." \textit{Center
Diary} 12: May-June, 1966. (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions.) Hyman Rickover was quoted in the \textit{New York Times}
(January 17, 1957) as saying that citizens in a democracy have a duty to become
educated, especially so that they may support social action against harmful tech-
nology. "Society ceases to be free if a pattern of life develops where technology,
not man, becomes central to its purpose. We must not permit this to happen lest
the human liberties for which mankind has fought, at so great a cost of effort and
sacrifice, be extinguished."}

Is it possible, after all, for some cultures to be "affluent-stricken"
while others are "poverty-stricken"? Consider, for example, the follow-
ing description by a \textit{New York Times} reporter of "The Underdevel-
oped U.S.A."

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not man, becomes central to its purpose. We must not permit this to happen lest
the human liberties for which mankind has fought, at so great a cost of effort and
sacrifice, be extinguished."
The nation has the wealth, the science, the technology, the energy
to do virtually anything it has to do. The apparatus so quickly put
together to place a man on the moon almost surpasses belief.
Yet, it has sickening racial problems, an antique rail system, horrible
slums, shocking poverty, inadequate schools, overloaded hospitals,
water unfit to drink and air so foul its largest cities may literally choke.
It is simply not organized to do what its resources and energies make
possible, and it shows no particular will to reorganize itself or even to
recognize the need. That can only mean an underdeveloped society,
whether in Togo, Chad or the U.S.A.11

Each culture has its own kinds of achievements and problems. No
educated Indian, for example, would deny that his country is “back-
ward” with reference to the number of its automobiles, amounts of
electrical energy, and supplies of food and medical services but he
would resent (and rightfully) the conclusion, by inference, that the
value system of his culture is necessarily equally “backward.” Why,
for instance, should a photograph in an American textbook which
shows an Indian woman and her children have a caption which reads,
“Even in mud huts, Indian parents love their children”? In the preface
to their recent book, Jon and Rumer Godden write:
Children in India are greatly loved and indulged. . . . Book after
book is written about India now, emphasizing her appalling problems
and over-population, starvation, disease, her struggle to survive; all
this is sadly true and anyone who loves India must grieve deeply over
these things and feel apprehensive about the future—but they are not
the whole truth. There are millions of beggars in India, thousands of
disproportionately rich men, millions of refugees, but many, many,
many millions of people live in the middle way, living, as in any coun-
try, a middling way of life, dignified, honorable, content in their
standards; even among the poor there is laughter, small pleasure in
life, simply because it is life.12

10 Wicker, Tom. “News of the Week” section, New York Times, December 4,
11 Godden, Jon, and Godden, Rumer. Two Under the Indian Sun. New York:
Knopf and Viking Press, 1966. In an editorial, “On Understanding Asia” (July 1,
1966), Time magazine makes the following relevant observation: “The Easterner
seems heartlessly unconcerned about the misery of those to whom he is not related
by some tie. But to his family and friends, the Asian commits himself in a way
that makes the American appear heartless. The thought of packing one’s parent
off to some old-age home or retirement colony is shocking to him.”
Moreover, it is also a mistake to assume that the world is becoming “Americanized” because of the increased international use of “Made in the United States” goods. A person may acknowledge the superiority of a steel blade over an iron one and still not admire the culture which produces the particular item. For example, Richard Hughes has observed:

*Certainly modernization is coming from the West—although Japan is increasingly getting into the act—but the great changes basically owe nothing to, and reflect nothing of, nationality, racism, or ideology. . . . American contribution to modernized life, from Coca Cola to computing machines and from supermarkets to washing machines, appeal because of their merit and quality, not because of their origin—sometimes, in spite of their origin. Their acceptance, and imitation does not impose American philosophical, political, social, or cultural values, good or bad. . . .*

Furthermore, the facts which one culture puts forth to win admiration and respect may, instead, bring envy and suspicion. What “image” does the United States carry in a world where its people (who number six percent) have half the world’s wealth and where the per capita annual spending of almost $90 for liquor and tobacco is more than the average total annual income of more than half the world’s people? How do others see us in a world where most people have less than enough to eat and where obesity was recently designated as the major U.S. health problem? Nor is it really likely that the “gap” between the world’s rich and poor people will be narrowed if conditions continue as they have. In the last 15 years, for example, the United States has doubled its manufacturing capacity. The American economy not only far exceeds all others, but the lead is widening. While other nations are having “population explosions,” the United States is having a “goods and services” explosion.

And should the peoples of so-called backward areas be impressed with the so-called developed nations which, in recent years, have spent more money on defense than on health and education—a total defense expenditure which if divided among the world’s population would amount to more than $40 for every man, woman and child? It has

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been estimated that the elimination of military expenditures could double income for the 1.2 billion people who make less than $100 annually as well as release 15 million soldiers and 75 million workers for constructive work.

As people increasingly learn about cultures other than their own, it should become clear that choices between cultural patterns need not be rigidly restricted between a "spiritual East" and a materialistic West." In the United States, many are beginning to learn that man does not live by Gross National Product alone. While in countries such as India, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the relatively low standard of material living. How a person feels about the facts of his culture is being less determined by the culture itself; as people learn about other ways of life they are applying a variety of measurements in assessing their own culture. Their expectations are changing more quickly than their experiences. The result is that waves of "spiritualism" and "materialism" are flowing around the world, mixing ingredients from one culture into another. It is no longer rare to see an Arab camel driver listening to a transistor radio or to see American college students listening to lectures on Hinduism.

But for the overwhelming majority of the world's people, their own culture is still the one against which all others are measured. And there is still the strong disposition to accept one's own culture as "superior." The new is for alertness to assumptions. What is a teacher implying when, in her introductory remark to students, she says, "Although the people of Asia and Africa are backward, there is no reason for us to feel superior"? What we need to avoid is what Professor Neil Postman calls "thinking by definition" and he tells this story to illustrate his point:

A man was sent to a psychiatrist because he believed he was dead. "Do dead men bleed?" asked the psychiatrist. "Of course not," replied the man. The psychiatrist then jabbed him in the arm with a sharp needle. For a moment, as he watched the blood ooze from his arm, the man seemed puzzled, even disappointed. Then his face brightened, he regained his composure and said, "Well, imagine that. Dead men do bleed!"

Awareness Must Precede Judgments

The major purpose of studying other cultures is to discover the ways in which other groups of human beings have organized their lives to answer the perennial questions of survival and fulfillment. Confucius said, “The nature of men is always the same; it is their habits which separate them.” And their habits are an essential part of their culture, that man-made environment of customs and costumes, of outlook and “in-look.”

From the moment of birth, the infant in all cultures is encouraged to be ethnocentric— to believe that his homeland, his people, his language, his everything is not only different but is superior to those of other people. The elders (by demonstration and remonstration) teach that the ways in which we do things are the “natural ways,” “the proper ways,” and “the moral ways.” In other places, they—“barbarians,” “infidels,” “foreigners”—follow a “strange” and “immoral” way of life. “Ours is the culture; theirs is a culture.”

And in many ways, the ethnocentric view of life is “right”; the pattern of responses which evolved in a particular culture may make relatively good sense—for that particular people and place. In studying other cultures, the objective is not to discover a “universal culture” which is suitable for all people, in all places, and for all time. Rather, the objective is to learn the lesson which Aldous Huxley described in Jesting Pilate following his first around-the-world trip in 1926:

So the journey is over and I am back again... richer by much experience and poorer by many exploded convictions, many perished certainties. For convictions and certainties are too often the concomitants of ignorance. ... I set out on my travels knowing, or thinking I knew, how men should live, how be governed, how educated, what they should believe... I had my views on every activity of life.

This generalization is less true for most people today because of the rapid and widespread effects of technological innovations. In the past, however, explains Professor Elling E. Morison, “For generations—for centuries—men did their work with the natural resources and energies lying ready at hand—the earth, the beast of burden, the wind and falling water. These materials and sources of power remained on the whole constant and stable, therefore the conditioned reflexes, habits of mind, customary emotional responses—in short, the culture—built up around these agencies remained on the whole relatively constant and stable.” On Teaching History,” Ventures: Magazine of the Yale Graduate School 8, Number 2, 1966.
Now, on my return, I find myself without any of these pleasing certainties. . . The better you understand the significance of any question, the more difficult it becomes to answer it. Those who attach a high importance to their own opinions should stay at home. When one is travelling, convictions are mislaid as easily as spectacles, but unlike spectacles, they are not easily replaced.

A person's awareness of his own ethnocentricity does not mean that he therefore must consider all cultures as equally acceptable to himself. Awareness can, however, help an observer to realize that what he "sees" is largely already "behind his eyes." Marshall McLuhan says, "Our need today is, culturally, the same as the scientist's who seeks to become aware of the bias of the instruments of research in order to correct that bias." ¹⁸ A similar warning comes from Teilhard de Chardin when he writes, "When researchers reach the end of their analysis they cannot tell with any certainty whether the structure they have made is the essence of the matter they are studying, or the reflection of their own thoughts." ¹⁷

It is not necessary nor possible for a person to cease being, in large measure, ethnocentric. The places, people, and experiences which one associates with his induction into a culture will probably always command a strong loyalty and preference. A person will usually feel most at home in a culture which he understands as an "insider." But an

¹⁸ McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenburg Galaxy. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1962. p. 31. "We can now live, not just amphibiously in divided and distinguished worlds, but pluralistically in many worlds and cultures simultaneously. We are no more committed to one culture—to a single ratio among the human senses—any more than to one book or to one language or to one technology. . . . Compartmentalizing of human potential by single cultures will soon be as absurd as specialization in subject or discipline has become. It is not likely that our age is more obsession than any other, but it has become sensitively aware of the condition and fact of obsession beyond any other age." Ibid. See also McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw Hill, 1964.

¹⁷ Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. The Phenomenon of Man. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. Or, as James Thurber suggested, "Let us not look back in anger or forward in fear but around us in awareness." For (as is asserted in a report entitled "The College and World Affairs"), "Awareness need never remain superficial in an educated man, whereas any unawareness is certain to be ignorance, probably compounded by arrogance." (Cited in Brademas Report, op cit., p. 115).
awareness of the ways in which one's opinions are formed can help to provide an essential element of humility. John W. Gardner analyzes the condition in this way:

...every judgment is no more than an approximation of the truth, subject to revision. ... If we recognize our judgments as subject to revision, we shall be less inclined to force them down other people's throats, or to back them with bullets. ... The mind has an enormous capacity for error, self-deception, illogic, sloppiness, confusion and silliness. All of these tendencies may be diminished by training, and that, of course, is the function of education. 18

Factual Perception Depends on Cultural Context

When the learner has become alert to his cultural conditioning, he is then ready to continue his study of other peoples. The next concern is one of "cultural contexts." New information and experiences are likely to be perceived within the framework of one's own culture rather than in the one which is being studied. Contexts are, after all, invisible. How can the "outsider" possibly hope to create for himself the same cultural contexts which the "insider" carries effortlessly and unconsciously in his head? Here again, the need is for empathy, humility, and strong motivation.

Until recently, for most people of the world, it really did not matter if empathy stopped at national boundaries, if indeed it stretched that far. Now, however, when eighty minutes have replaced eighty days as the earth-circling wager, it is hazardous to base actions solely on one's own viewpoint. Moreover, ignorance about others perpetuates ignorance about one's self because it is only by comparisons that one can discover personal differences and similarities. The "glass" through which other cultures are viewed serves not only as a window; it serves also as a mirror in which each can see a reflection of his own way of life. 19

19 For a selected, annotated list of 21 books (many of them written by Asians) which can help provide the reader with an "inside" view of life in Asia, see Fersh, Seymour H. "Asia: Through the Cultural Looking Glass." Intercom 9; No. 1, January-February 1987.
The achievement and maintenance of a "double vision" is not, however, easily accomplished because, as Ralph K. White explains, "Empathy normally has the disturbing effect of requiring us to 'see double'—to hold in suspension two interpretations of the same facts, the other fellow's interpretation and our own. Complexity and uncertainty are introduced. The human mind, seeking simplicity and certainty, rebels. And empathy is choked off."  

For example, most of the reporting in American newspapers about "cow worship" in India has been factually correct but contextually false. Few Americans understand the practical importance of cows in non-industrial countries such as India. A cow gives milk but also provides dung—a valuable and dependable source of fuel. And let's do recall that American pioneers used a similar commodity—"buffalo chips"—but that in American history textbooks this usage is often explained as another example of pioneering ingenuity. The cow also delivers other cows or bulls. And bulls when castrated become bullocks (oxen) which are the main work animals in rural India. In death, too, the cow, bull and bullock provide skins for leather and bones for buttons. The cow may have become "sacred," as Gandhi suggests, because she has been one of the most useful and docile creatures on earth.

This consideration of the cow’s utility within the traditional Indian context does not mean to suggest that the cow will or should continue to hold a "sacred" position. In every culture, there are reasons why certain things are done in certain ways. When the reasons are no longer relevant, changes may be introduced without serious damage to the cultural pattern. Many times, however, the relevance of traditional customs is not understood by innovating experts. Induced changes under these conditions are harmful. Moreover, is it always defensible to use utility (a favorite American yardstick) as the measure of cultural "rights" and "wrongs"?

In the United States, for example, the automobile holds a "special" (some would say "sacred") position even though it helps to kill 50,000 people yearly.

White, Ralph K. "Misperception and the Vietnam War. Journal of Social Issues 22; No. 3, July 1966. White further states, "With no illusions as to the possibility of fully achieving such a synthesis, we can aim at empathy without gullibility, without shirking our responsibility to make an independent appraisal of the facts, and without weakness in action even when action has to be based on much less than a perfect case."
annually, to wound hundreds of thousands, to eat up the countryside, to pollute the air, and to upset dating and marriage patterns. In 1966 the number of traffic deaths increased by 8 percent, there were nearly 1.7 million disabling injuries and the economic loss was $8.6 billion.

If a "non-Western" consultant were to study "the problem of the automobile in the United States," he might consider the car basically as a means of transportation. After all, this is how Henry Ford viewed it when he produced all of his earliest cars in one color and changed the model only when technological innovations were made. It is not unlikely that one recommendation from the consultant would be the curtailment of automobile production: birth control of vehicles. In making this recommendation, however, the non-American consultant would have revealed that he had not learned a central cultural fact of American life—that the American economy currently depends overwhelmingly on the widespread use of auto transportation and that the car is an essential part of an American's "pursuit of happiness."

Likewise, the foreign consultant might have difficulty understanding the "special position" of cigarettes in the American culture. Even though the National Advisory Cancer Council blames cigarette smoking for producing an "enormous man-made epidemic" of lung cancer which kills 50,000 annually, no serious attempt has been made to curtail the manufacture and distribution of this lethal leaf. During 1966, twelve new cigarette styles appeared and sales increased 2.9 percent to a record annual consumption of 526 billion cigarettes.

Another example of how cultural contexts affect intercultural understanding is the way in which the system of arranged marriages is often presented in American textbooks. How should the following statement be evaluated: "Indian children are rushed into marriage at an early age by anxious parents who pay an exorbitant dowry"? In many cultures, it is believed that marriage should take place when the bride and groom are biologically ready to have children. Few Americans realize, for example, that this belief was shared in colonial times and in the early decades of the nineteenth century when the fertility of women in the United States approached the physiological upper limit of about 55 births per 1,000 population (compared to a low of 17 per 1,000 during the early 1930's).

In India, the married couple in rural areas will most likely live with the family of the groom in what is appropriately called a "joint family"
system. Their adjustment to and acceptance by the groom's family and village is an essential part of a successful Indian marriage. In the United States marriages, of course, are not arranged but attempts are certainly made by "anxious parents" to arrange dating so that when "love comes," it arrives within the acceptable arena of preferred religious, racial, and educational backgrounds of bride and groom.

It is interesting to note that in the United States there has been a rise in "computer arranged" marriages. The Director of The Scientific Marriage Foundation was quoted as having said, "We have reached the point in our society where we must put a scientific foundation under romance." In our culture "scientific" is a sacred word but the items which the computer considers are not dramatically different from those which illiterate village matchmakers evaluate: emotional control, self-acceptance, monetary values, intellectual training, family background, etc.

As a final reminder of the importance of cultural context, Americans might also reconsider their own history. After all, why should Americans be surprised and patronizing about certain kinds of events which are occurring in nations which have recently ceased being European colonies? Which "emerging nation" followed a policy of neutrality for over 150 years, had as its first president a general who presided over a cabinet consisting of opposing political leaders, had border disputes with all of its neighbors, suffered a civil war, protected "infant industries," and pronounced to the world its mission of "manifest destiny"? Shouldn't our own history provide us with some helpful empathetic insights?

**Cultural Studies Are Essential to a Liberal Education**

The study of other cultures should not contribute merely to a more specialized knowledge of some foreign area. It must be an integral part of the kind of humanistic education which Professor de Bary characterizes as "education for a world community":

*I put it this way because "education for world affairs" suggests the same preoccupation with the current world scene which we have grown wary of. Research and reporting on the international situation is indeed essential in government, in business and in our democracy, for all educated persons participating in it. But the first essential is to*
have educated persons. They must be educated to live, to be truly themselves, in a world community. They must undergo the kind of intellectual chastening that is prerequisite to the exercise of any power or influence in the world. They must know themselves better than they know world affairs, so that the responsibilities they assume are commensurate with their capabilities and not swollen with self-conceit—personal, national, racial, religious, social, political and so on.21

Moreover, an awareness of international cultural differences can alert us to cultural differences within a country. National boundaries may encompass geographic areas but they do not necessarily convert all of the people within a country to the same cultural value system. In the United States, for example, there is still a heritage of ethnic variations which resulted from differences among our immigrants. To speak of “culturally disadvantaged” groups within the United States is to commit the same error whereby cultures outside the United States are likewise considered to be “disadvantaged.”

Few members of the so-called culturally disadvantaged groups in this country would deny that they receive lower wages or have less educational opportunities, but does this condition also mean that their cultural values are inferior? Should we be surprised that people who are labeled as “culturally disadvantaged” may develop a low self-image which itself interferes with civic and government attempts to provide assistance?

Professor Oscar Lewis believes that a proper distinction has not been made between poverty and what he calls “the culture of poverty.” There are, in his opinion, many poor people in the world but not all of them live in a culture of poverty. The significant distinction, according to Lewis, is the degree to which a person or a group feels included or excluded from the rest of the larger community in which he lives. “Most primitive people,” he says, “have achieved a higher degree of socio-cultural organization than contemporary urban slum-dwellers.” For example, Lewis makes the further observation: “In India, the destitute lower-caste peoples—such as the Chamars, the

leather workers, and the Bhangis, the sweepers—remain integrated in the larger society and have their own Panchayat institutions of self-government. Their Panchayats and their extended unilateral kinship systems, or clans, cut across village lines, giving them a strong sense of identity and continuity. In my studies of these peoples I found no culture of poverty to go with their poverty.22

In a similar way an awareness of cultural differences can be applied not only to those who inhabit “foreign areas,” but also to those living in “foreign times.” In the United States, technology changes living conditions so rapidly that each generation lives in ways dramatically different from those of its predecessors. American parents and their children have been learning the difficulties of communicating to each other not only because of age differences but cultural differences as well. American teen-agers have many characteristics of a separate culture—their own special language, dress, music, folkways, and mores.

An additional benefit of cultural studies for the individual is the enrichment of his life by extending his sensory experiences. What would life in the United States be like if we had no knowledge of what had been created in Europe—its art, music, literature, languages, foods, architecture? Wouldn’t we be a “culturally deprived” people if we had never heard an Italian opera or seen a play by Shakespeare or eaten French-style cooking? Isn’t it equally possible that we are culturally deprived if we know nothing of what has been created by the world’s people who live in Africa and Asia?

Anyone whose life is restricted to knowledge only of his own culture does not share in his birthright as a member of the world community. For Americans, however, the loss is more than a personal one. It can be a loss for people in all parts of the globe because Americans, through their government, have chosen to involve themselves in the affairs of others. What we don’t know about foreign peoples and cultures can result in American mistakes which defeat benevolent objectives. Because our help is offered in a humanitarian spirit, we often find it difficult to understand why the recipient does not show an appreciation—even if the assistance is not helpful.

The claim of good intentions is not, however, an acceptable excuse for ill-informed actions. If Americans are to help others, we must first...
help ourselves by understanding the nature of cultural assumptions. Albert Camus warns that, "The evil that is in the world always comes from ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding. On the whole men are more good than bad; that, however, isn’t the real point. But they are more or less ignorant, and it is this that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of an ignorance which fancies it knows everything."23

Implications for Educational Changes

The addition of courses and subject matter about the peoples and cultures beyond Europe should have a much more significant effect on the curriculum than merely to broaden it. When we talk about "the central pedagogical implication of non-Western studies," according to Professor Morse:

We are no longer asking how best to smuggle these studies into standard curricula now that we are convinced of their use and respectability. We are instead saying that the only conceivable justification for smuggling them in is that they serve as a Trojan horse for educational reform. . . . It matters little that non-Western course content be taught. As Paul Goodman has said, we are presumably to teach young people, not subject matter.

Morse continues:

Our non-Western specialists are important to us not because they penetrate Oriental mysteries or predict Caribbean surprises but because they angle into subject matter freshly. . . . The real use of non-Western studies is in the emotional shock they give. If this shock were now being provided by American studies—that is, if our students were experiencing their own culture as foreign—the situation would be propitious ipso facto for non-Western studies to find their proper curricular nest without elaborate strategies and apologies. To put it the other way, only when American culture is so experienced will we know that non-Western studies have found their nest.24

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24 Cited in Brademas Report, op. cit.
The student in high school and undergraduate studies should not be trained as an area specialist or a political analyst; rather, a major function of his education should simply be to help him recognize his membership in the human race. This kind of education would attempt, in Senator Fulbright’s words, to “humanize international relations”:

*Educational exchange can turn nations into people, contributing as no other form of communication can to the humanizing of international relations. Man’s capacity for decent behavior seems to vary directly with his perception of others as individual humans with human motives and feelings, whereas his capacity for barbarism seems related to his perception of an adversary in abstract terms, as the embodiment, that is, of some evil design or ideology. China and the United States, for example, seem to think of each other as abstractions: to the Chinese, America is not a society of individual people but the embodiment of an evil idea, the idea of “imperialist capitalism”; and to many Americans, China represents not a people who have suffered greatly at the hands of the West and who are now going through an extremely difficult period of revolution but rather appears as an evil and frightening idea, the idea of “aggressive communism.”*

The existing world history courses should be strengthened by including more of the world than the United States and Western Europe, and their approaches should be broadened to include cultural rather than merely political-chronological considerations. There should be at least one major culture region which is studied sufficiently to give the student the feeling of having “experienced” it rather than having had only an exposure. The suggestion by Professor Yu-Kuang Chu is an excellent one:

*A first component is for the student to learn a general technique in studying all foreign cultures even though he may be studying only one. The civilization courses in general education at Columbia College focus the study on three basic questions about any people, namely, (1) How do the people make a living (the material foundations of life)? (2) How do they live together (their social organizations and processes)? and (3) How do they think of themselves and of other people in the world and the universe (their images as reflected in religion, ...

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By learning a general technique of how to study one particular culture, it is hoped that the student can internalize the method and can use it in understanding other cultures—within and outside his own system—in a way similar to that used in educating anthropologists. An intensive in-depth study should help the student to develop the skill of empathy and the style of humility. Although the learner is introduced to other value systems, the result need not necessarily be a minimized view of his own country; it will surely result, however, in a different view not only of others, but of himself as well.

A proper balance is suggested by Gandhi, who said, "I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house, as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any." The advice given to technical specialists planning to work in foreign countries also indicates ways in which students should learn about other cultures:

It should include the willingness to understand the cultures of recipient peoples, to look for the good in these cultures, to search for the reasons for traditional ways, to restrain excessive missionary zeal which leads to inability to see alternatives, and to take the time and trouble to prepare oneself, technically and emotionally, to work in a foreign society. . . . The ethic of helping people change their culture.

"The Liberal Values of Non-Western Studies," op. cit. For a general introduction to materials especially suitable for elementary and high school, see the series of "World Affairs Guides" prepared by Leonard S. Kenworthy and issued by the Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University. For information about a series of guides identifying outstanding materials (books, records, maps, films, etc.) for teaching about Asia, send a request to The Asia Society, 112 East 64 St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

"It is always difficult for us to see a civilization whole, all by itself. We do not even begin to understand ourselves and our own society, though we spend a lifetime at it, until we come into contact with others; and then suddenly the significance of things we have been immersed in, surrounded with, breaks in upon us. Students experience this same feeling repeatedly as, in their minds, they "live" with one civilization for a time and then move on to encounter another." de Bary, Brademas Report, op. cit., p. 158.
begins with a readiness to understand that culture, to recognize the good in it, and to know the reasons why it is what it is.28

But we must also be aware that a willingness to understand others does not necessarily mean that we will be able to do so. It is, for example, often said that we live in a shrinking world—a world which has become a neighborhood. And this is true when distance is measured by the time it takes to transport a person or to transmit a message. There is, however, another kind of distance—the “space” which separate the minds of men. And measured in this way, Americans are farther away than ever from their world neighbors.

Despite rapid urbanization since 1900, more than half the world’s people live in villages without electricity and running water. Increasingly, Americans live in cultural contexts which have widened the distances between themselves and others—especially those who live in Asia and Africa. The greatest educational need for Americans then is not merely to increase the intake of facts but to become alert to their own cultural context. Other people need to do the same. The problem, as stated by Barbara Ward Jackson, is one for mankind:

Most of the world’s political education still lies in teaching students how to grasp their own nation’s interests and policies and how, at best to “understand” other people and to know why they are different.

This is not really the education chiefly needed in a human society where there are no final contrasts between “ins” and “outs” because, in fact, everyone is “in.” Over a wide range of critical issues—atomic survival, a world trade, lending or liquidity—the interests of each community can only be fully understood and realized in a framework that includes the others. An educational process which begins by saying, “here are our needs, our interests, our policies; now let us see how other interests can be fitted in,” is already slightly out of focus. It would make more sense to say: “Here is a world problem—say, escape from potential incineration. What impact does it have on national

28 Foster, George. Traditional Cultures: And the Impact of Technological Change. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. p. 260. He also notes: “It is not so easy for a technician to accept the fact that an understanding of his attitude, values, and motivations is just as important in successfully bringing about change. It is painful to realize that one implicitly accepts assumptions that have little validity beyond tradition and that one’s professional outlook has been acquired uncritically.” p. 250.
particularities that cannot be easily reconciled with a working solution?

But the empathetic study of other cultures does not need to wait until others agree to try to understand our viewpoint. It is an area in which there can be a kind of "unilateral cultural disarmament" because the better one understands others, the better one understands himself. Nothing is lost by knowing more about others; nothing is gained by limiting one's own view.

Americans can and should help others—and be helped in return. But the conditions of exchange must be based on respect and appreciation of differences, not on contempt. Otherwise, we will succeed only in turning "windows on the world" into "magic mirrors" which only tell us that we, among all cultures, are fairest of them all. This ethnocentric approach to the study of other people will not only be a disservice to those whom we seek to assist, but it will deprive us of the most essential ingredient for self-correction—the ability to see ourselves as others do.

In Chinese, the word "crisis" is written by combining the symbols for "danger" and "opportunity." The major motivation for studying other cultures may have come from a sense of danger, but the crisis—properly conceived—is one full with opportunity. The question is no longer whether we should learn about other cultures; the real questions are what and how should we learn about other peoples and for what purposes? Looking outward is now "in." And we should make the most of our benevolent crisis.

"A Stevenson Memorial." Saturday Review; July 9, 1966. © 1966 by Saturday Review, Inc. Reprinted by permission. On the same point, Reyes (op. cit., p. 29) writes: "Our political and social conceptions are Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copernican.... There is not the slightest hope that we can possibly solve any of the vital problems of our generation until we rise above dogmatic nation-centered conceptions and realize that, in order to understand the political, economic and social problems of this highly integrated and industrialized world, we have to shift our standpoint and see all the nations and national matters in motion, in their interrelated functions, rotating according to the same laws without any fixed points created by our own imagination for our own convenience."
John M. Thompson

The Nature and Objectives of Area Studies

One of the most significant developments in American education since World War II has been the rapid growth and spreading influence of area studies—the study through various disciplines, such as geography, history, literature, economics, and political science, of a specific area of the world. In most cases the area under study includes several nations or other political units, e.g., Latin America, the Middle East; but in a few cases, such as China, the Soviet Union, or India, attention is focused on one large state and society. Although greatest emphasis has been placed on the so-called “non-Western” societies, that is, those areas lying outside of Western Europe and North America, in recent years more attention and support has been accorded European studies, and there has been some revival of an older interest in American studies—multidisciplinary study of the United States. At the graduate level, area study has generally been accompanied by intensive study of the major language or languages of the area of concern.
The basic rationale for area studies is that one can better understand another society by viewing it as a whole; one needs to know various facets of it and to perceive how they relate to and fit with each other. The expectation is that the whole will be greater than the sum of the parts, and that a broader and more thorough understanding will emerge from area study than can be obtained by studying another culture and system through only one discipline or angle of vision. At the same time the area specialist is not to be a dilettante with a smattering of random information about various aspects of the civilization under study; he is expected instead to have deep and full professional competence in one discipline related to the area, combined with multidisciplinary knowledge about it.

Proponents of area study also hope that its integrated approach to understanding a whole society may help to break down the restrictive compartmentalization of disciplines that now characterizes much university teaching and research, and that this will promote greater universality of knowledge. Similarly, it is believed that theories and principles in the social sciences and humanities, now based largely on observation of Western experience, will be modified, broadened, and made more valid and generally applicable to the human situation when they are tested and reworked in the light of data from non-Western societies. Other objectives of area studies are to broaden the horizons of students through having them examine significant portions of the total human experience that American education has largely ignored in the past, and to provide perspective into one's own culture through the study of other cultures.

Between 1951 and 1964 the number of graduate area programs in American universities grew from roughly 30 to over 150, a five-fold increase. At the same time area studies began gradually to have a greater impact on undergraduate and secondary education. After 1960 both the philanthropic foundations and the federal government encouraged experimental college programs in non-Western studies. Although a number of individuals had been at work for some time on

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projects to develop a greater awareness of world affairs in the secondary schools, the post-Sputnik atmosphere contributed to a broadened interest in area studies. A number of states, including Pennsylvania, New York, Wisconsin, and Indiana, now recommend or require courses or units in non-Western studies at various levels from grades seven to ten. Both the federal government and private foundations have funded institutes for teachers to provide training in non-Western studies. Courses on the non-West appear more frequently in the curriculum, and many more books and other materials have become available to both teachers and students.

In the last few years, however, area studies in higher education have faced novel or renewed challenges and problems, particularly in regard to their function in liberal education, their relationship to the established disciplines, and their position and role in the total international commitment of universities. The present period is one of change and adjustment, and it is difficult to predict how area studies will fit into American scholarship and education in the next decade, although it is already clear that their role will be substantially different from that of the past 20 years.

The purpose of this brief essay is not to describe in detail these complicated and far-reaching developments, but rather to sketch the evolution, organization, purpose, and problems of area studies in higher education and then to suggest ways in which that experience may have relevance for elementary and secondary school social studies. There is no pretense of providing a formula for the successful adoption of area studies to the particular challenges of school programs, which are often very different in kind and degree. Nevertheless, these remarks are based on an assumption and belief that the approach of area studies has unusual pertinence and special opportunities for the social studies, which itself is multidisciplinary and which should perhaps be seeking certain objectives similar to those postulated for area studies.

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History and Achievements of Area Studies

The concept of multidisciplinary area study is not as new or as revolutionary as it is sometimes assumed to be. Education in the classics, based on a venerable tradition, also involved multi-faceted study of a whole society. Students of the civilizations of Greece and Rome are not only expected to have a grasp of the language and philology, the literature and mythology of these cultures, but are also required to be well versed in their history, institutions, economies, and social structure. An important difference, it is true, is that classical education is concerned with societies that no longer exist, while area studies as they have developed in the last few decades have focused on recent or contemporary societies still in a dynamic process of development and change—often very rapid change.

Although experimental programs in American civilization and in the study of foreign cultures in their entirety date back to the 1920's and 1930's, World War II provided the major impetus for the remarkable growth of area studies in the United States. Deficiencies in our knowledge of many areas of the world, and the lack of Americans who knew these areas well, were starkly revealed under the pressure of global conflict and of the increasing international commitments of the United States. After the war, government officials, scholars, university administrators, and foundation planners cooperated in efforts to remedy this situation, and a number of graduate area study programs were initiated. These programs have now been in existence for two decades and have made an excellent record of achievement.

The main functions of the programs have been to train area specialists, primarily for academic life and government service and to a lesser extent for journalism, business, law, and other careers connected with overseas activity, and to promote scholarly research concerning the non-Western societies. On both counts area study programs have been highly successful. Upwards of ten thousand young Americans have been prepared with basic competence in a discipline, multidisciplinary study of an area or society as a whole, and command of one or more of the languages of the area. They have embarked on successful careers in teaching and research, in public service, and in a variety of other positions. The pool of skilled men and women in the
United States knowledgeable about various parts of the world is now a considerable one. Similarly, our knowledge of non-Western societies and civilizations is vastly greater than it was 20 years ago, thanks to much group and individual research which has been made available in articles, monographs, books, and audiovisual materials. On the other hand, it should be noted that relatively little of this specialized training and research has permeated to the general public. In fact, several foreign observers have commented on the wide disparity in American life between the high level of specialized understanding and awareness of other societies that exists among an intellectual elite, and the relative ignorance of the rest of the world on the part of the average student and citizen. The problem of how to close this gap remains a serious challenge in area studies.

In the first postwar decade the greatest emphasis was placed on study of Russia and of Asia (primarily China, Japan, and India). At the end of the 1950’s and in the early 1960’s, there was a spurt of interest in Africa, followed by growing concern with Latin America. Recently, new attention has been directed to East European studies. Study of the Near and Middle East has evolved slowly, while Southeast Asia has remained a relatively neglected field of study. There has been considerable interest in contemporary China, but research and training in this area has been hampered by the difficulties of the language and of acquiring materials and by the lack of access to mainland China for American students and scholars.

For the first ten years the costs of graduate area programs were borne primarily by universities and foundations. Since the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the federal government has contributed increasing amounts in the form of fellowships and of grants to “language and area centers” in the universities. Although difficult to estimate, it is probable that total support to area studies from the foundations (primarily the Ford Foundation) and from the government has been around $150 million, while the universities’ contribution is easily four or five times that amount. In other words, these have been very expensive programs, and at this writing their

future sources of support are not clear. The universities will undoubtedly have to carry even more of the burden since the foundations are unlikely to continue substantial underwriting of area studies. If Congress provides funds to implement the International Education Act of 1966, this will, of course, provide major assistance and open up new opportunities for experimentation and development.

As noted earlier, in the last six or seven years the growing interest in non-Western studies in American undergraduate education has received some encouragement and help from the foundations and from the government. Again much depends on the fate of the funding for the International Education Act, which specifies support for undergraduate as well as graduate area study (but little for elementary or secondary education). Nevertheless, in the long run the colleges themselves will have to provide the main resources for giving undergraduates a greater awareness of the rest of the world.

Most of the graduate programs and many of the undergraduate ones have focused on the study of an area from the vantage point of several disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, as well as language study. In the 1940's and 1950's some academic specialists argued that area study provided an alternative to, or even an improvement on, disciplinary study. Defenders of the established disciplines never accepted this line of reasoning, and most area specialists have acknowledged the fundamental importance of a disciplinary skill for both training and research in area studies. A few programs attempted to grant Ph.D.'s in area studies, but these degrees were never widely accepted in academic circles and their holders found it difficult to find jobs in regular college and university departments. As a result, almost all area programs have today abandoned this practice and now require a master's or doctor's degree in a discipline, combined with study of an area in several (usually up to four) other disciplines and, of course, language competence. Completion of the area study program is usually recognized by the awarding of a certificate, in addition to the disciplinary degree.

Originally established to meet what was seen as an urgent national need for trained personnel and new knowledge, graduate area programs have been justified by academic and intellectual arguments as well. While the utilitarian rationale still remains, in the form of the need for information and people to cope with America's ever growing
international responsibilities and to assist our colleges and schools to
give students greater acquaintance with the non-Western world, it is
also maintained that area studies still provide an effective way to break
down disciplinary barriers and to encourage integration of knowledge.
The student and specialist, it is argued, can understand another civiliza-
tion more fully if he acquires, through several disciplines, knowledge
of a number of its facets and how they interact with each other. More-
over, it is expected that his specialized study of the society in depth
in one discipline will be enriched and broadened by his ability to
apply to it insights and information from other disciplines. Whether
this integrative process can take place only in the mind of the student
and scholar, or whether formal interdisciplinary mechanisms can
assist it, is a problem that has plagued area studies.

Perhaps an even more significant rationale for area studies is that
since the theories, models, and methods of most of the social sciences
and some of the humanities are based primarily on observation and
data from Western society, our knowledge and tools of analysis con-
cerning man and society are limited and parochial at best, and dis-
torted or erroneous at worst. What is needed is the addition of in-
formation and experience from non-Western societies to provide a
sufficient basis to develop universally applicable principles, systems,
and techniques. Partly linked to this argument is the question of the
relationship of area studies to comparative studies: does not knowl-
edge of the various past and present societies in the world furnish the
necessary building blocks by which comparisons can be made, thereby
both giving greater insight into any given society and permitting more
accurate generalizations about man and society as a whole? To un-
derstand economic activity do we not need to know the village and
the market as well as the factory and the stock exchange? To un-
derstand man’s aspirations do we not need to know the Koran and the
Ramayana as well as the Bible and Ulysses? To understand political
behavior do we not need to know about the village elder as well as the
congressman?

**Difficult Issues in Area Studies**

From their inception area studies have faced a number of challenges
and problems. The high cost of area studies has been alluded to
earlier and need not concern us further here. Difficulties in organizing and administering area programs usually reflect either the problems and incoherencies of the administration of higher education in general or the question of how area study programs relate academically and intellectually to disciplines and departments, so they will not be dealt with per se. The early battle, referred to previously, over whether area study in itself constitutes a new or distinct discipline has generally been resolved in the negative and need not detain us. A number of important questions remain, however.

The language problem in area study is still a serious one. This problem seems to have three aspects. First, what level of proficiency in language is required? Obviously, the standard is different for the area specialist and for the student interested simply in a general acquaintance with the area, but in neither case is there full agreement on what should be demanded. Although they constitute a minority, some academicians maintain that even for the specialist the language of the area is simply a tool and that it need be studied only up to the level of competence necessary to do basic research, primarily a reading skill for working with written materials. Others insist that while it is indeed a tool, the language is much more than that, providing a special insight into the values, mental processes, and outlook of a whole civilization which can be acquired in no other way. Moreover, to achieve this kind of mastery, ability to speak and understand, if not write, the language is essential, in addition to reading skill. Most graduate area programs attempt to require full fluency in reading, speaking, and understanding, but this is not always achieved and, in any case, there is considerable disagreement on exactly where to set these levels of fluency and how to measure them. For the generalist, most observers agree, language study is not essential, but there is a determined minority that insists that at least rudimentary acquaintance with the language is useful, if for nothing else than learning how to pronounce and spell names.

Second, there is the problem of how to achieve the desired level of competence, wherever that is set. Despite the considerable expansion of language study which has recently taken place in American schools and colleges, many students enter graduate area study either ignorant of or woefully prepared in the language of their chosen area. Most area studies do not depend on one of the commonly taught languages
(French, German, Spanish, and to some extent Russian). In most cases, therefore, students must acquire the language they need, investing a huge amount of time and energy in language study in the first two years of their graduate training. The question arises whether language training should be done intensively, either full-time or half-time plus summers, or more gradually so that the student can begin to use the language as he acquires it in order that he does not lose interest in the substance of his area study because of total immersion in the language. Some suggest that the best solution lies in having the "exotic" languages taught more widely in the colleges and even in the secondary schools. Variations on these and related questions are debated in abundance, with no solutions in sight.

The third aspect of the problem is the dilemma of how many and which languages to require. This is true for all area studies, but is particularly acute for the study of Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, where there is no lingua franca for the entire region and where a number of separate languages or dialects must be learned if one is to encompass all the countries in the area. Even where one major language exists, as in Russian or Chinese studies, the problem remains of what related or what European languages should be studied.

Another set of issues revolves around the importance and timing of study in the area. At the level of the specialist, the question is related in part to that of language. Should the student go to the area at an early stage of his training in order to develop genuine fluency on the spot, or should he wait and go when he is ready to do research, even though his language may not yet be under perfect control? Another disagreement exists over whether field research in the area is essential in the training process. Almost everyone concedes that it is highly desirable, but there are some who maintain that adequate area training and research at the graduate level can be accomplished without direct experience in the field, although later in his career the specialist will certainly need to spend some time in the area. This point of view is buttressed by the record in Soviet studies, in which for ten years, from 1946 to 1955, when the Soviet Union was closed to foreigners, competent students were trained in this field of knowledge. A similar situation exists currently for students of Communist China, who cannot visit the object of their study. Moreover, the costs of sending to an
area everyone desiring to acquire competence in it would be prohibitive.

For the generalist—for the undergraduate and the social studies teacher, let us say—the argument centers on the relative merits of introductory study of the area while residing in it, given the usually high cost of this, as compared with academic study of the area in the United States. But even where the expense can be substantially reduced, as in Mexico or Western Europe, the question remains of the effectiveness and quality of study-abroad programs. How can a kind of academic tourism be avoided? How can Americans studying abroad be successfully integrated into the local culture and society? How can "little Americas" in small towns and localities be avoided? Moreover, what level of language skill should be a prerequisite to study abroad? If local faculty or institutions are used, how can the academic quality of the program be ensured? Despite the proliferation of graduate and undergraduate programs abroad sponsored by American colleges and universities, and despite the existence of a few centers for teacher training overseas sponsored either by the federal government or by universities, many of these questions remain unanswered.

A more central issue is the relationship of area study to the established disciplines. As suggested earlier, much of the justification for area programs lies in their claimed ability to bring together and integrate various disciplines in the task of understanding a single society. The difficulty is to discover just what this means and how it is achieved. Almost all programs provide for multidisciplinary study, but it is not so clear that this always results in cross-disciplinary or interdisciplinary benefits. Some have argued that such effects occur only in the mind of the individual student, after he is exposed to the approaches and data of several disciplines, added to training in his own special field. Others have maintained that the most effective interdisciplinary device is the common cafeteria, lunchroom, or coffee hour, where students and specialists from various disciplines can exchange points of view and can discuss their work, approaches, and findings. Still others insist that an interdepartmental seminar in which

students and faculty from several disciplines work together on a common general topic, with resulting clarification and enrichment of each individual's own investigation, is the best approach. A few programs have encouraged group research projects, with varying results. In short, achievement of genuine interdisciplinary effects remains almost as great a puzzle as when the postwar area programs were founded.

More serious at the present time are the increasing pressures on programs, and on the whole area study concept, from the individual disciplines. To some extent scholars in certain fields of study have always contended that area study in depth was unnecessary and irrelevant. Armed with the proper theory and technique, so the argument runs, the student or scholar can pursue effective and enlightening research on almost any set of data, wherever located, and without much or any acquaintance with the language or general multidisciplinary shape of the society in question. Thus, an anthropologist can work equally well on an Indian or a Brazilian village, an economist on the Indian or Brazilian economy. For the psychologist or the sociologist, the most important task is developing or refining principles and approaches on the basis of empirical data which is most easily obtained and verified in American society. Even in political science, on which at one time area studies made a strong impact, many scholars are now insisting that the key research target is the model or system, which can be analyzed and applied in a variety of settings.

While this situation is not a new one, it has become broadened and exacerbated in recent years as the degree of specialization and the theoretical level of the disciplines have been heightened. Graduate students are now required to do more and more in their disciplines, to acquire additional skills, to meet new levels of competence. As a result, they have less and less time to devote to the additional taxing demands of area study programs. And since the entree to teaching and research and even to a considerable extent to government employment is the doctorate, not the certificate awarded for completion of area studies, more and more students fail to see any practical or intellectual advantage in area study programs, and consequently bypass or never complete them. This trend of the last few years is being reinforced by those scholars and departmental chairmen who insist on the intellectual and academic pre-eminence of the discipline and who, in any case, resent the division of authority, dilution of interest, and diver-
sion of funds represented by separately constituted area "institutes" or "centers," which, they feel, draw off the attention and energy of students and faculty from the main disciplinary task.

In this development, the opposite side of the coin is the conviction of some scholars and administrators that area studies have outlived their usefulness and should, like Marx's state, now wither away. Having performed a significant and useful service to American education, area programs, by their very success, have now become unnecessary. In a few instances, perhaps, this feeling stems from a prejudice that area programs were primarily ways of attracting interest, both student and faculty, and a device for garnering money, both foundation and federal, which are now not so effective. But in most cases it is based on the conviction that to a considerable degree the objectives of area studies have been achieved—the advantages of insights and data from other disciplines are increasingly recognized in each discipline and, most importantly, the parochialism of American education in all disciplines has been broken down. In other words, non-Western studies have infiltrated most departments and fields. Whereas 20 years ago it was a rarity to find an area specialist on the roster of a major department of a university, now most have two or three, and it is accepted that they should be there and that students should be exposed to study of non-Western materials as part of their regular training. Moreover, data and research results developed from the area programs are now frequently fed into the disciplines and into the formulation of their theoretical constructs. Thus, it is argued, the formal structure of area programs is no longer required now that the rest of the world has come within the ken of American scholarship. While many feel that this is a premature and optimistic assessment, all would agree that area study has made a major impact on American universities and that new approaches and roles should now be experimented with.

Despite these misgivings, area studies are continuing to make a useful impact in many areas of higher education. One significant development is the growing link between area studies and the total international concern of universities. More and more it is being recognized that the various service activities of the university—in teacher education, in public programs, in overseas contracts with government agencies such as the Agency for International Development, or with
private foundations such as Ford, and in sister relationships with universities and institutions abroad—should both reinforce and be buttressed by the basic training and research functions of area studies programs. Similarly, the various research or teaching interests of the university that cut across disciplinary lines and have an international focus, such as development, use of human resources, international business, or international education, are developing the kinds of ties with area study programs which can and should be mutually beneficial. Thus, in a growing number of universities an attempt is being made to link area programs with research and service under some sort of a coordinating committee, center, or institute. The hope is that each of these functions of the university in the international field can draw support from the others, and that the total impact will be to strengthen and make more effective each of them, as well as the overall activity of the university abroad. There are many problems in such relationships, but it is already clear that this sort of tie and mutual dependence, however organized or implemented, will become a part of the role of area studies in universities in the future.

Finally, area studies will obviously perform an ever more significant function in broadening and extending undergraduate liberal education. Most university area programs have had until now relatively little impact on the liberal arts curriculum in general, but this must change. As it becomes widely acknowledged that study of Western experience alone is insufficient to produce a liberally educated person or an individual equipped to live in the world of the next 50 years, area programs will bear an increasing responsibility not only to provide trained personnel to the colleges—which they have been doing to a considerable extent in the last two decades—but also to devise imaginative ways to integrate knowledge of other societies into the intellectual experience of American students, without sacrificing the grasp of their own culture which these students ought to have. A number of interesting and apparently successful approaches are already being tried, from the development of small-scale area study “majors” through courses or programs based on comparative study to the exposure of all or most students to an introduction to one civilization and culture.6

Further experimentation and innovation is required, but it is clear that many American undergraduates should and will have an education much more broadly oriented than that their parents received.

What then is the relationship of area studies in higher education to the social studies in elementary and secondary schools? First, it is apparent that given the existing resources of the schools, the present curricular pattern in social studies, and the number of teachers with any significant training in area studies it is not possible, or even necessarily desirable, to have miniature area studies programs introduced in the schools. Even where feasible, such programs would reach only a small percentage of the able students. Moreover, it is not likely in the foreseeable future that combined language and area study can be developed in other than a few unusual schools.

Nevertheless, in two ways area studies have a special opportunity to influence and infiltrate the social studies. And this can be done in such a fashion as to achieve two important goals of education: the utilitarian objective of helping the student to understand the complicated world in which he must live and, as a citizen, act, and the intellectual goal of assisting the student to know himself, his heritage, and other cultures as a basis for his future development and growth as a person.

In the first place, the multidisciplinary and integrated approach of area studies peculiarly lends itself to adoption in the social studies, if the latter is to become the study of man and society from the viewpoint of the various social sciences. If the area studies approach can be introduced into world history or as units in other courses, this should help develop the ability of the student to see societies as a whole, to understand the interaction among the psychological, historical, political, social, and economic forces at work in any culture. Moreover, if the student can acquire the skill to analyze one system in this way, this may help him to understand other civilizations and cultures.

Second, the contribution of area studies to comparative studies and the growing integration of data on other cultures into the basic theory and content of the social sciences provide a particular opportunity to develop in the social studies a more comparative approach.
tive material from non-Western societies can be used to help students understand general principles and concepts. At the same time this should erode the provincialism of the student, broaden his outlook, and assist him to understand better both his own civilization and its relationship to other societies.

Obviously, these are rather abstract and vague suggestions; their realization will require not only cooperation between area and social studies specialists but considerable flexibility in both fields. But they are important enough and promise enough potential benefit to make them worth striving for. Helpful in this process is the fact that many excellent materials on non-Western areas for both teachers and students now exist. Also valuable are the growing opportunities in both pre-service and in-service education for teachers to learn about other areas of the world. At the same time it is clear that much more needs to be done to prepare teachers in non-Western studies if they are to be able to use effectively in social studies teaching the integrated and comparative approaches suggested by area studies. The two key steps, however, remain the realization both among area specialists and social studies specialists that fruitful interaction and transfer between the two fields is possible, followed by cooperative action to adapt the potentialities of the two fields to each other. The result could produce a very different and much better education for students of social studies during the next few decades.
World Law and Models of
WORLD ORDER*

Chapter 10

BETTY REARDON and SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ

Since World War II scholars and statesmen have projected a number of models or images of the international system that they believe are most likely to provide the greatest degree of order in the world community between now and the year 2000. In the three decades remaining in this century, the search for a viable system of world order will assume greater urgency than ever before. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons, the number of nations actually or potentially possessing them, and the dangerous tensions arising from the disparity of wealth and resources in today’s world combine to create hazards unprecedented in human history. If man is to master his own military technology and at the same time deal with the problems of world economic welfare, he will have to make a sustained and vigorous effort—not to ensure “peace,” if peace is understood to mean a kind of universal harmony—but to build an enforceable system for drastically minimizing the likelihood of international violence.

* The reader who is interested in learning about world order as a disciplinary framework for studying international relations and world affairs should consult a forthcoming article by Professor Mendlovitz that will appear in Falk, Richard, and Black, Cyril. Future of International Order. Princeton University Press.
This essay is written in the hope of encouraging responsible academic inquiry into the problems of world order and world law. The essay begins by describing and evaluating five of the most widely discussed contemporary models of world order, each of which purports to depict the future evolution of the international system. This is followed by a discussion of two additional models of world order, one of which, in the view of the authors, comes much closer than any of the others to satisfying the conditions of a true system of world order.

Projected models of international stability; it should be noted, have been made in two ways. Scholars have said, "This is the way, in fact, the world will be"—a prognostication; or, "This is the way the world ought to be"—a preferential statement. The following questions should therefore be asked in reviewing models of world order: How would I like the world to be in the year 2000? How do I think the world really will be in the year 2000? And most significantly, how can the gap be spanned between the way I would like the world to be and the way it is likely to be?

The five images or models of world order that are currently used quite widely either for prognostication or preferential purposes are the following:

1. The United Nations Model is based on the notion that the five big states that emerged victorious from World War II and became permanent members of the Security Council have the primary responsibility for maintaining the peace and security of the international community. They are organized into a formal authority structure in such a fashion that the big five must agree unanimously in determining whether there is a threat to peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. And if they agree that such an event has taken place, then with the vote of any other two nonpermanent members, these seven states can invoke a whole set of sanctioning processes or even call upon the rest of the international community to use force.

   This particular model of world order, it is well to remember, is quite an advance over the League of Nations model, in which initiating collective security processes required the unanimity of all member states. Placing the primary responsibility upon five member states plus two auxiliary nations represents a high mark of supranational authority. The development of world community policing in cases of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression implies a re-
jection of the notion that any one state should be allowed to circum-
scribe world community action and acceptance of the idea that only a
few states should have the power to prevent—or initiate—collective
security actions. The United Nations model, incidentally, is of more
than historical importance. The arguments that are now taking place
on the east side of New York in the various committees dealing with
peace-keeping operations are in fact arguments concerning the extent
to which the Security Council should once again re-emerge as the
voice of the world community and the viable unit of world community
review and control of the use of force in international society.

2. “PROTRACTED CONFLICT” is a second model of world order, which
emerged chronologically about 16 to 18 months after the establish-
ment of the United Nations. It is frequently referred to as the “cold war.”
In this model there are two major superpowers dominating the world
community. These major superpowers—the United States and the
Soviet Union—actually control the destiny of mankind because they
have enormous military and economic capacity and can between them
determine the course of world events. Furthermore, these two super-
powers are locked in deadly ideological struggle in which one side
must win and the other side must lose. What keeps peace and pre-
vents war in this system is described as “stable deterrence” or “mutual
deterrence.” According to this notion, there now exists such a high
level of technology in thermonuclear weapons and delivery system
capacities that both sides now have the ability to annihilate one
another, even after a first strike. Peace is therefore maintained in the
system by mutual deterrence, or the fear of mutual suicide.

This system has a low threshold for violence; that is, while it may be
suited for preventing large-scale nuclear war, it is not well adapted for
averting local civil wars throughout the world or small-scale wars in
which big powers are not directly involved. The model suggests that
if the big powers are directly involved, there will be a series of tacit
understandings or mutual agreements of a formal or an informal sort
that will keep the stakes from escalating to a point where thermo-
nuclear and atomic weapons will be used. It is asserted that over the
long run—a hundred or two hundred years—one side or the other will
be debilitated, lose its moral fibre, or experience a failure of leader-
ship, and at that point the opposing state will win, leading to the emer-
gence of a system of world order. In the meantime a kind of rudi-
mentary world order is maintained by a system in which the two big powers determine the basic constitutional rules.

3. A THIRD SIGNIFICANT MODEL IS “REGIONALISM.” The theoreticians of this model contend that it has now become increasingly apparent that no nation-state is capable of handling by itself the two major dimensions of international relations: security (territorial integrity and political independence) and economic development. No state that wants to achieve the necessary level of political and military security and economic development can depend solely upon its own resources.

The people who support this argument say that the next step in the development of world community is the coalescing of a set of supranational units. In their view, there will probably emerge in the world from five to fifteen regional supranational units that will handle the issues of political and military security and economic development. Thus, for example, the Common Market will become a United Europe; the Organization of African Unity will form a continental state; Latin America will merge into a supranational unit; and India, China, and other large states will become actors in the new international system. Peace will be maintained in this system, it is alleged, by continuous conferences either in the U.N. or in some new forum. In addition, the threat of mutual annihilation will act as an added stimulus to keeping the peace: for it is believed that each of the supranational units will have thermonuclear capacity and delivery systems, and, therefore, the system of mutual deterrence that has arisen under the bipolar or protracted conflict model will also be in effect in the regional system.

This regional model parallels the balance of power system extant in Europe during the period from 1814 to 1915. The system comprised a number of European states that had reached a fundamental agreement on the rules of the power game. These rules assumed that while nations competed with one another for power, wealth, and aggrandizement, each state had a vested interest in the system insofar as it had limited ambitions for territorial expansion, or, conversely, insofar as it opposed the expansion of other states. If any state, either by an alliance or by individual military decisions, threatened to overstep the bounds of the system, a new alliance would emerge and would bring into effect a new balance of power to prevent any single state from dominating the system. The new regionalism postulates that the supranational units or actors will evolve a similar system for main-
taining the peace: a balance of power with mutual deterrence through fear of thermonuclear weapons.

4. "POLYCENTRISM" IS A FOURTH MODEL, which is sometimes labeled "nationalism rampant." Nationalism as a major force is comparatively new in the history of man and is likely to see its apotheosis over the next 150 years. Well over 65 new states have been created since 1945, and the process of creating states is not yet completed. For the next century or even the next two centuries, people's lives, their personal identities, their personality development, their sense of loyalty, and their sense of kinship with secondary groupings will probably be shaped by the nation-state. According to this model, mankind is less likely to find himself involved in a series of supranational regional units than to be living in an international system comprising 140 to 200 sovereign states.

Peace will be maintained in this system by a very complex balance of power. Given the fact that instantaneous, worldwide communication networks are rapidly becoming a reality, and granting the possibility of fast-movement of men, arms, and equipment, it is most likely that by the year 1990 men and equipment will be able to be dispatched anywhere in the world within two hours. A system of this kind will produce very rapid shifting of alliances in order to meet what may look like a threat to the peace or a threat to the security, political independence, or territorial integrity of any one state.

5. THE FIFTH MODEL, "CONDOMINIUM," is in fact a reversal of protracted conflict. The theory contends that the United States and the Soviet Union have finally come to realize that they have a common interest in preserving world order. It is to their mutual advantage first, that they do not destroy each other, and second, that they maintain their respective control of various parts of the world.

This kind of common interest is evolving slowly, but it must be pursued through tacit understanding: not too much progress can be made in a formal way because there are large groups in each society that resist any kind of formal agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States—in fact, that perceive such action as anathema. Nevertheless, given the fact that these two powers have so many common interests, a system is likely to emerge over the next 20 years by which the two states will control the destiny of earth, in regard to political and military security as well as economic development.
Furthermore, so the argument goes, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. enjoy such a high level of industrial, technological, and military development that even if all the other nations of the world were to combine their military power and pool their economic resources, they could never catch up with the superpowers. The two big states will recognize that their advantage lies in maintaining this technological superiority and will guard against any risks, military or otherwise, that might jeopardize their position. Under such a system of condominium the big two will keep the peace by policing the rest of the world.

It is quite clear that each of these five models corresponds with reality to some extent, and in a few cases the "reality quotient" is extremely high. In fact, present world politics can be analyzed to illustrate that virtually any one of these models is the operative system and has already been attained. All five, moreover, have some mechanism for maintaining peace, at least in the sense of averting nuclear calamity if not in the sense of bringing about a cessation of all kinds of international violence. On the other hand, none of them embodies any positive values beyond the minimal one of human survival. All of them are implicitly based on the dangerous assumption that it is impossible to achieve world consensus about world authority structures, much less the principles or values to be comprehended in such a supranational system. None of them—not even the United Nations model—deals competently with the issues of economic development and social justice, which, in their own way, are potentially just as "explosive" as nuclear armaments themselves.

But what is perhaps the most serious shortcoming of all, none of the five models discussed above takes into account the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons, breakthroughs in military technology, or additional deterioration of world political stability. None of them, in other words, provides adequately for the specific eventualities most likely to threaten the peace of the next three decades. If, for example, there should be, as seems quite possible, an accelerated proliferation of atomic weapons, models like protracted conflict, regionalism, condominium, and particularly polycentrism will immediately become dangerously anachronistic. For if a number of states eventually come to possess their own nuclear arsenals, the world will
probably revert to an "autarchic" system, in which each state plays "univeto" over the life and death of mankind.

It is remarkable, in a way, that men have refrained from using atomic or thermonuclear weapons since 1945. There are five states that now have such weapons; and it must be admitted that the elites of these nations, no matter what their other failings may be, have not only exercised remarkable restraint with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, but have also shown little tendency to spread these weapons to other nations by sharing information or selling armaments. But how long will that situation continue? How long will the elites of the world demonstrate that kind of responsibility? It would take only one or two politically unstable leaders in positions of responsibility to upset the precarious balance of world peace. One need only visualize a second Hitler—this time armed with nuclear weapons—to realize the shocking inadequacies of the present system of voluntary restraint.

Furthermore, if there is a technological breakthrough that goes beyond atomic or thermonuclear weapons, making possible first strike destruction of defense systems—and making impossible any retaliation against the assailant—then a new competitive military race will be virtually certain to occur. In such a situation, states must constantly engage in costly research and development in military technology simply in order to keep up with other nations. In an arms race, moreover, the weapons themselves become an independent variable with little relationship to a war-prevention system; indeed, their very existence constitutes a threat to the system. In addition, there is little reason to believe that over the long run political stability will prevail among the world's nations or within any supranational system that may come into existence.

Given the obvious imperfections of the present structure of international relations, as well as the shortcomings of all of the five models of world order discussed above, it becomes clear that alternative systems for the control of international violence need to be developed and implemented. The search for an adequate model of world order involves a two-fold procedure: first, the projection of a carefully described system of international relations (or a model of world order) that seems capable of preventing organized international violence, together with an analysis of the present system of international relations, insofar as it relates to this problem; and second, a description,
in as great detail as possible, of the transition: that is, how the present system is likely to and/or can best be metamorphosed into the projected image or model. These two steps—the projection of a model of world order and the statement of transition from the present system to that model—may be termed the use of relevant utopias.

Two such utopias, with varying degrees of relevance, will be presented here. The first, to be mentioned only briefly, might be labeled “protracted conflict II.” This model, which comes mainly from the rhetoric of the Chinese Communist, Lin Piao, divides the world into the industrial states of the northern hemisphere and the rural-agrarian states of the southern hemisphere and Asia. The conflict between these two giant divisions will ultimately, by an inevitable historical process, be resolved in favor of the rural-agrarian states and former colonies, which are already in the process of casting off the yoke of colonialism state by state. China is the prototype of such a revolution, which, when completed, will see the union of these rural-agrarian states into a common front united against the industrial states, forcing upon them a world order of fraternity and socialism. If violence becomes necessary to realize this vision, it is a regrettable but nonetheless useful tool for achieving the desired goal of world order.

Although this model might be said to have the merit of identifying a powerful schismatic force in the modern world—the tension between the industrial and nonindustrial nations—any potential usefulness it might possess is negated by a few readily detectable flaws. Aside from the fact that the mode of transition appears extremely perilous, an imposed system would doubtless bear the seeds of its own destruction. Nor are all nations likely to accept a single interpretation of “fraternity and socialism.”

There is, however, a second projected international system that merits more serious consideration. The proponents of this model do not contend that its implementation is imminent, but they do believe that it constitutes a relevant utopia—a model, in other words, that squarely confronts the conditions most likely to threaten peace in the next 30 years. The ultimate goal of this model is the creation and preservation of world order, that is, an international system so revised as to prohibit nation-states from employing organized violence against each other, either in the pursuit of national goals or in the redress of national harms. Such a system requires the establishment
of a world authority equipped with legislative bodies for making laws against international violence and, in addition, agencies to enforce these laws, keep the peace, and resolve conflicts. “World law” is a shorthand term describing such an authority and related institutions; and hence this model of world order is termed the “world law model.”

Before proceeding further, it might be worthwhile to point out that international violence has not been entirely devoid of beneficial functions in past history, a fact of which even advocates of world law ought to be aware. It cannot be denied, for example, that a great deal has been done to better the human condition through the use of organized violence: tyrannies have been overthrown, slaves freed, and economic and political rights won by wars and violent revolutions. The world law model does not—indeed, could not—direct itself toward the total elimination of all forms of violence. In a nuclear age, however, violence that goes beyond certain circumscribed boundaries is potentially the trigger for a nuclear catastrophe. If the next century is to be free of the threat of annihilation, therefore, exploration of alternatives to violence must be undertaken without further hesitation.

The world law model proceeds from the following basic assumption: no person, much less a society, is likely to give up his own sense of helping himself with regard to questions of security in the absence of some substitute for self-help. Or to put it another way, no political elite would be advised to engage in any kind of disarmament, be it unilateral or complete and general, unless there were some assurance of another security system to protect its political independence and its territorial integrity.

World law thus ties together two very important notions: disarmament and a collective security system. It argues that the present system of international relations as well as the other models discussed above are based on unilateral decision-making sanctioned by armaments, and maintains that this situation results in a spiraling arms race that may very well set off a cataclysmic war. The world law model therefore posits the need for complete and general disarmament of all the states in the world down to the level of police forces, and proposes the establishment of a trans-national police force that can maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of each state.
The world law model further asserts that if war is to be prevented, then there must be some place where states can bring their grievances for adjudication, settlement, or third-party review. Within any national society it would be unthinkable for conflicts arising over property damage, broken contracts, or physical assaults to be settled only by self-help. Yet this is in many ways the international system that is in effect today, and it almost inevitably leads to the use of violence as a means of redressing legitimate grievances. The world law model suggests, therefore, that a warless system of international relations requires an institution with compulsory jurisdiction over grievances and claims of states.

Furthermore, if there is to be a war-prevention system based on complete and general disarmament, a trans-national police force, and third-party settlement, there must also be a set of rules by which disarmament is imposed and the police force invoked. A world legislative authority is therefore needed to determine how those rules will be set up and executed.

There is one final element in a world law model that seems most crucial for the achievement of economic welfare and social justice—a world development authority based on the desirability of a more equitable system of distribution of the earth's material goods. If an international system permits two-thirds of the world to live in conditions that Americans or citizens of any other affluent nation would find intolerable, it is unreasonable to expect two-thirds of the world to display any enthusiasm for or commitment to the system. The nations of the world are presently spending between $135 and $165 billion a year on arms. Just one-third of that invested in a world development authority would over a period of several years, save $100 billion now being channeled into resources that can be used for nothing but the destruction of other human beings, their institutions, and property.

In the view of the authors, this scheme or something like it offers the best hope for a viable and reasonably just system of world order. The world law model is admittedly utopian. But is it any less utopian than hoping to achieve world order through a series of evolutionary, small-term, incremental kinds of agreements, one-step advances, or accommodations when in the meanwhile man is likely to blow himself up along the way? The crucial question is: How can such a utopia be translated into reality?
It is here that scholars and educators have a real contribution to make; for it is up to the academic community to refine the tools of science and education and develop them into an integrated methodology for approaching the problem of world order. Responsible research can help enlarge the relevance of the world law model or other models of world order, making certain that they meet and satisfy the conditions imposed by reality. Most important, scholarly research can help identify the processes by which the present system of international relations can be transformed to the projected model. It is doubtful that even the most successful and coordinated efforts will bring about that universal brotherhood known as "peace." But the effort to create a workable system of world order may help achieve a more immediate and pressing goal: assuring the survival of human society. In this critical endeavor world law may come to be seen less as a utopia than as a necessity.
Part III

Selected Approaches

Recent years have seen a mushrooming growth of new approaches to the study of international affairs at all levels of education. This phenomenon is due, at least in part, to the realization that methods of teaching must be appropriate to the substantive content of the material being presented. Both curriculum developers and social scientists are now emphasizing the methodology as well as the factual information of academic disciplines. Part III treats four innovative approaches in the social studies, each of which is receiving increased attention in the classrooms of schools and colleges across the nation.

The attempt to convert the classroom into a meeting of active participants in the educational process underlies many recent experimental programs. Among the numerous devices being used to achieve this goal are simulations and games. Cleo Cherryholmes describes some experiences with this approach in Chapter 11. In Chapter 12 James Robinson and Richard Snyder deal with a second device frequently used to involve students in the educational process—decision-making. A third method, involving the use of case studies, is examined by James Shaver and A. Guy Larkins in Chapter 13. The case study method, once used primarily in graduate schools of law and business, has now begun to find its way into a growing number of social studies classrooms. Finally, William Siffin treats comparative studies in Chapter 14.
Key decision-makers and advisors were hurriedly assembling as Bingo's Head of State called the National Council to session. A crisis had just arisen in a meeting of the International Organization. Bingo's ambassador along with those from Delton and Alphanesia had introduced a proposal aimed at controlling nuclear proliferation. Bingo and Betaslavia were the only nations in possession of nuclear weapons, but some of the other six nations in the world were on the verge of producing or obtaining them. Bingo supported this proposal aimed at reducing the probabilities of nuclear war by mistake. Betaslavia had never expressed enthusiasm for this move because of suspicions about Bingo's motives. What had occurred took both Bingo and Betaslavia by surprise. The non-nuclear nations would only support limits on nuclear proliferation as part of a general agreement on nuclear disarmament. Whereas Bingo was in favor of supporting the current balance of power through an agreement limiting nuclear proliferation, she was not willing to support a change in the status quo through a nuclear disarmament pact. The present meeting was called to develop further a rationale for this position and to plan the next move.
This incident occurred recently in a classroom simulation of international relations. Simulated environments, situations, and games are being used with increasing frequency in social studies classes. Educational simulations put students in the role of decision-makers, contending with environmental, situational, and organizational problems built into the simulation. Bingo's national council meeting was an example of one of many types of activities that occur in a simulation of international politics.

A social simulation is an operating model of social processes. All simulation models are basically alike, whether they are used for research or for education and training. A simulation is a small operational model representing significant features of the process or structure under study. The manner of representation may be physical, such as in wind tunnel experiments, or symbolic, such as a computer plotting the path of a satellite, or a combination of physical-symbolic elements, as in the Inter-Nation Simulation where participants actually make decisions about an international system represented in symbolic terms.

Simulations in social studies classes generally deal with international relations, legislative and business activities, and mechanics of interest group influence. Most of these, as well as the Inter-Nation Simulation, belong to a class of models referred to as man-computer simulations. These simulations for turning over their exploration and development to long traditions in both education and the social sciences. Educational antecedents include moot courts, mock legislatures, model United Nations exercise, role playing, and dramatic play. These activities have been pursued for a number of reasons. It has been assumed that student motivation is increased by the chance to act out roles, and that increased realism would lead to greater empathy by the students for the decision-makers and social actors depicted. Generally it was expected that students would derive insights into various processes, situations, and roles from interactions in these contrived situations.

The social science background of all-man and man-computer educational simulations may be traced to a convergence of social-psychological small group experiments on the one hand, and business and military games on the other. Laboratory experiments involving a variety of political and social games have mainly a post-World War II
Simulating Inter-Nation Relations

history in the United States. Guetzkow at Northwestern, and Bloomfield and Padelford at MIT were among the first to utilize the simulation of political problems in research and teaching. Subsequent contact between university and elementary and secondary school teachers led to the development of a number of simulations for the social studies.

A simulation is a model of a situation or process, whereas role-playing is a description of an activity. A simulation is more highly structured than is a role-playing activity. From one viewpoint, social action may be viewed as a series of cumulative decisions: each succeeding decision is based on the outcome of the previous decision. Many simulations being used in the classroom incorporate this view of social behavior. In the Inter-Nation Simulation, for example, the results of one decision period, or simulated year of activity, provide the context for the following decision session. Role-playing activities, because they are less structured, are rarely able to extend beyond one set of decisions. Thus students have fewer alternatives from which to choose in role-playing than in simulation because the verbal introduction and description tends to produce a more "closed-ended" activity than does the greater explicitness of a simulation.

The pioneering work on the Inter-Nation Simulation was completed under the direction of Harold Guetzkow at Northwestern University in the late 1950's. Since that time a number of adaptations have been made from the original model to facilitate use in classroom situations. Among the more useful are those produced by the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute (1966); Donald D. Skinner and Robert N. Wells, Jr. (1964); and Duane N. Strinden and William F. Butler (1965). A simulation related to foreign policy decision making—not, however, based on the Inter-Nation Simulation—has been produced by Abt Associates, Inc. for the Foreign Policy Association (1967). Guetzkow and Cherryholmes (1966) have developed the only version of Inter-Nation Simulation commercially available. All of the Inter-Nation Simulation models share many basic and fundamental similarities. It will, however, be useful to refer to specific characteristics of Inter-Nation Simulation that might vary in detail from one model to another. References to a specific version of Inter-Nation Simulation will, because of the availability of the materials, be made to Guetzkow and Cherryholmes' Inter-Nation Simulation Kit, henceforth referred
to as INSK. When more generic features of the Inter-Nation Simulation are discussed, the reference will be to INS. This chapter will discuss: (1) similarities among social processes, games and INS, (2) how INS is organized, run, and analyzed in the classroom, and (3) what educational research has determined about learning in INS.

Social Situation, Games, and Inter-Nation Simulation

Games, as well as simulations, may be used to describe social behavior. In *Games People Play*, Eric Berne demonstrates that interpersonal interactions can be usefully and effectively described in game terms. Anatol Rapoport in *Prisoner’s Dilemma* uses a simple game to explore a specific type of social choice behavior. A game becomes a simulation when it attempts to model a referent system. In this sense, INS may be thought of not only as a simulation—i.e., an operating model of international politics—but also as a game that represents features of the international system. All games, however, are not simulations. It is difficult to imagine what theory is being represented or simulated when the St. Louis Cardinals play the Los Angeles Dodgers. Nor are all simulations games. For example, a wind tunnel experiment simulating the performance of a racing car design does not constitute a game, as we normally think of it. Within limits, however, social processes, games, and simulations are characterized by elements that may have a high degree of correspondence.

A commonly agreed upon goal in the social sciences is the construction of explanatory and predictive theories about social action. A social simulation contains explicit social science theory in that an operating model represents a theory or set of theories about what is being simulated. A game designed to represent given social processes also represents theories about those processes, as shown in Table 1. INS has been designed to embody much political theory about international relations. As long as this is kept in mind, it matters little whether INS is referred to as a game or simulation. Widespread familiarity with games in a variety of contexts, furthermore, makes it convenient to use the similarities between games and simulations in discussing the nature of INS.
TABLE 1.—SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, GAMES, AND INTER-NATION SIMULATION KIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL BEHAVIOR</th>
<th>GAMES</th>
<th>INTER-NATION SIMULATION KIT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation</td>
<td>Rules*</td>
<td>Each nation is characterized by a set of proto-type political, economic, and military variables related to each other by mathematical formulae.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Social and Physical)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Players</td>
<td>Positions include, Head of State, Foreign Policy Advisor, Chief Diplomat, Official Domestic Advisor, Domestic Opposition Leader, Staff of World Newspaper, and Staff of International Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Nations are differentiated in terms of population, basic resources, type of political regime, units of basic capability, units of capital, units of force capability, and other critical variables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts</td>
<td>Moves</td>
<td>Nations decide how their resources are to be allocated and what actions they will take vis-a-vis other nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payoffs</td>
<td>Winner and Loser</td>
<td>Each set of decision-makers seeks to maximize its national goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rules of a game perform three distinct functions in the present context. They specify the distribution of resources among players as the game begins; they state relationships among the several elements of a game, including players, resources, moves, and winning or losing; and they describe the mode and sequence of play.

Table 1 illustrates both the ease and difficulty involved in designing a simulation. The basic elements of a social simulation may be quite simply put: a person and/or a group acting to commit its resources in a physical and social situation in order to achieve a set of goals. The difficulty lies in the fact that the social scientist does not always have at hand general or special theories that permit the construction of such simulations.
INS Situation or Rules

INS represents characteristics of nations and national interactions in two ways. Approximately 30 political, economic, and military variables describe each nation; the relationships among the variables are determined by simple mathematical formulae. The relationships stated by the formulae represent the dependence of national foreign policy decision-making upon the characteristics of the nation. INSK nations, for example, are limited by varying levels of resources, levels of industrialization, population, and many other characteristics. National production must be allocated among five categories: developing or replacing capital and consumer goods, building military weapons, pursuing research and development projects, and maintaining internal order. The formulae relating the variables are generally uncomplicated: for example, if military strength is developed, consumer goods and heavy industry must suffer relatively.

A second set of rules relates simulation time to communication processes. Time is compressed in INSK; each session of forty minutes to two hours may represent lengths of “real” time varying from six weeks to one year. Formulae concerned with population growth, capital depreciation and obsolescence, economic growth, and other internal characteristics of nations are based on changes that occur in nations during a twelve-month period. Rules dealing with conferences and written messages are also based on one-year periods. Table 2 summarizes these INS rules.

INS rules represent current hypotheses about international politics. These hypotheses are tentative and subject to change as knowledge accumulates. Some propositions built into INS will obviously be rejected as research continues; others will acquire more precision and be reformulated. Revisions of INS are, therefore, to be expected as the body of knowledge about international politics continues to grow.

INSK Actors and Players

INSK decision-makers represent officials for a hypothetical set of nations. The correspondence between these INSK roles and their policy-making counterparts is shown in Table 3.
### Table 2.—National Decisions, International Relations and Inter-Nation Simulation Kit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF RULE</th>
<th>SCOPE OF DECISION</th>
<th>ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS</th>
<th>INTER-NATION SIMULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables and their relationships</td>
<td>Intra-Nation</td>
<td>For example, military and industrial production depend on levels of productive resources.</td>
<td>The political, economic, and military variables are related to each other to represent selected processes within nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and Commitments</td>
<td>Inter-Nation</td>
<td>For example, direct face-to-face meetings among diplomats are supplemented with extensive exchanges of written messages.</td>
<td>Aside from limits on inter-nation communication imposed to force delegation of duties and maintain a balance of verbal and written messages, nations are free to determine their inter-nation policies and actions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These positions represent a decision-making hierarchy typical of how nations are organized to conduct foreign affairs. The responsibilities attached to each position differentiate foreign policy-making tasks. Nations tend to assign priorities to a set of goals, gather and process relevant information from the domestic and international scene, and pursue appropriate policies. INSK roles are designed to facilitate these operations along the same general organizational lines as a state department or a foreign office.

One needs only to recall accounts of the Cuban missile crisis to appreciate the special skills used in making foreign policy. President Kennedy made the final decision using information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and the advice of those around him. In that instance, of course, the domestic opposition rallied to the support of his decision.
Table 3.—National Officials

and Inter-Nation Simulation Kit Decision-Makers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROLE TYPE</th>
<th>NATIONAL OFFICIALS</th>
<th>INSK ROLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>President, Premier, etc.</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory</td>
<td>Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Council, Foreign Minister, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Advisor, Chief Diplomat, Official Domestic Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>Opposition parties, revolutionary groups, etc.</td>
<td>Domestic Opposition Leader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INSK Capabilities or Resources

Because nations are not equal in terms of wealth, status, or power, indicators that seem important in distinguishing the power of one nation from another constitute a necessary part of the INSK model. Three sets of variables are of central concern: those related to politics, economics, and the military. The political power of a nation in international affairs may be related to its type of political system. For example, an authoritarian regime may be able to plan and carry out a preemptive attack that would be impossible for a non-authoritarian polity, or respond to a surprise attack in a shorter period of time.

The economic production of a nation may be the most crucial factor in determining its international power. Production of goods and services determine its levels of domestic consumption, the amount of aid that it can extend to foreign nations, and its military capability. Basic elements that contribute to production are programmed into the INSK. For example, capital is depicted by Units of Capital, labor by size of Population, and land or raw materials by a Basic Resources Index. The decision-makers are given a profile of their nation's resources before they spell out their “Goals and Strategies” or begin making allocations and international commitments. In general, each nation seeks to increase or maximize its internal and external well-being in terms of the given distribution of power and resources among the simulated nations.
INS Acts or Moves

The moves or plays are suggested by the rules outlined in Table 2 and the roles stated in Table 3. One set of decisions concerns how nations allocate their resources. These decisions are made in accordance with rules relating the economic, political, and military variables to each other. At the beginning of a simulation session, each team of decision-makers allocates the economic resources of the nation. These allocations should be related to statements of national goals. A nation may choose to raise the standard of living, build up the armed forces, increase economic growth, or select from among other possible objectives. INS decision-makers continually seek to enhance their international position in the context of the domestic realities facing their nations.

A second set of decisions involves foreign policy questions. After decisions have been made concerning the distribution of national production, participants turn their attention to inter-nation affairs. There are very few formal constraints on officials as they make international policy decisions. Leaders may choose to pursue an isolationist policy or give strong support to an international organization; they may disarm or compete in an arms race; they may uphold their treaty commitments or break them; or they may follow other strategies. The inter-nation situation changes from session to session as a result of decisions and events of the preceding period.

INS Payoffs or Winning

Nations receive payoffs when they attain their goals, much as the player of a game wins after having reached some objective. Many parlor games, such as chess, checkers, Monopoly, and others, are essentially “zero-sum games,” i.e., what one player wins the other players lose. In a zero-sum game such as Monopoly, the limited resources eventually gravitate to one of the players, and his winning is defined by the financial loss of the other players.

INS represents a more complex situation. It is conceivable that all nations may be considered winners or losers in any international situation or simulation. INS belongs to a class of games known as “non-zero-sum games.” From certain points of view, international politics
may be considered a zero-sum game in which some resources of the system gravitate to one or a few nations. Aspects of nationalism seem to express this view of the international system. Usually, however, international politics resembles a non-zero-sum game in which cooperation among nations may produce a number of winners. If all nations were to secure a stable arms agreement, for example, they would be able to reduce military expenditures and allocate an increased amount of resources to domestic research and development projects, internal consumption, industrial growth, and social overhead projects such as better hospitals, schools, and roads.

Students invariably try to determine the winner in international politics. Unfortunately it is not always easy to determine who wins, even on a given settlement. France may have considered herself a winner when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, but this judgment may have been reversed as World War II was fought to change the status quo created at Versailles. The complexities of stating and achieving national goals are represented in INS. When students raise questions of winning or losing, complicated aspects of international politics are brought to their attention. No longer is Nation A the winner and Nation B the loser; now Nation A and B may both be winners or losers. In a world in which the major nations are powerful enough to destroy society as we know it, the possibility that all nations may lose if international politics is played in terms of a zero-sum game is an important idea to teach future generations.

Inter-Nation Simulation in Class

The general format of the Inter-Nation Simulation not only resembles a game but, in many respects, must be handled as a game in the classroom. An instructional unit organized around INS is divided into three distinct parts, each equally crucial to the success of the project: (a) orientation and organization, (b) play, and (c) analysis.

Orientation and Organization. Simulations are not commonly found in social studies programs. It is essential, therefore, that a teacher introduce INS thoughtfully and carefully to his class. Inbar concluded that "... a careful handling of the players before the session starts might be all that is needed to induce those predispositions
which seem to produce desired results in the playing session.\footnote{Inbar, Michael. "The Differential Impact of a Game Simulating a Community Disaster." \textit{American Behavioral Scientist} 10 (1966). p. 26.} Students should be aware that INS is a serious learning exercise, because the structural similarity between Inter-Nation Simulation and international relations is not necessarily obvious to junior and senior high school students.

It is essential that sufficient class time be allotted to organizing INS and assigning students to nations and specific positions within each nation. Able students should be selected for key roles because INS sessions generate a great deal of complex activity that may overwhelm inattentive participants.

In explaining decision-making roles, teachers have many opportunities to discuss the organization of a foreign office or state department. Class discussion about the secretary of state or the ambassador to the United Nations is usually conducted at a rather abstract level. As students realize, however, that soon they will be performing duties corresponding to those they read about in texts and newspapers, new immediacy will be added to the discussion.

Play. Inter-Nation Simulation is designed to compress the long time spans in which nations conduct their affairs into periods short enough to be manageable in a classroom or laboratory situation. The number of INS periods can be varied to fit either a unit or a course on international politics. Teachers who have structured a six-week unit around INS have typically devoted only about eight to ten classroom sessions to simulation itself. Lectures, discussions, preparation of student reports, and other assignments related to the simulation or to a factual study of international relations occupied the remaining periods.

The instructor may vary at will the scenario on which the simulation is based. In world history courses, INS has been used to recreate European conditions prior to the outbreak of World War I; American history and American government courses have used INS in constructing an inter-nation system corresponding to contemporary affairs. Other simulations have studied issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons. INS is a flexible teaching approach whether the
teacher is concerned with scheduling classroom time or with focusing on a specific international problem or situation.

During the INS session each team of national decision-makers is obliged by the nature of the model to perform duties corresponding to yearly national planning activities. Nations make year-to-year decisions within the context of long-range national goals. Before the simulation begins, each nation develops its long-range plans in a "Statement of Goals and Strategies." This original formulation remains in force until the decision-makers modify it to reflect changing conditions. A nation, for example, is likely to change long-range goals following a major conflict, as Germany did after World War II.

Advisors (see Table 2) complete advisory forms at the start of each simulation period. These reports assess recent events from the perspective of the immediate and long-range goals of their nation. The Head of State keeps informed about the course of events through reports such as these from his advisors; the reports also provide a record of INS history.

A second means by which the Head of State keeps informed is through national conferences held near the beginning and at the close of each simulation session. At these conferences the advisors report recent negotiations, and communications and exchanges are discussed in planning future moves. Decisions arising from these conferences are implemented intra-nationally in the form of budget or allocations or inter-nationally through negotiations and other interactions. Each set of decisions and actions produces consequences that the nation must respond to in future sessions. It is this cumulative aspect of INS decisions that helps set it apart from model UN exercises.

The "Main Decision Form" is the instrument of national sovereignty in INS. Any treaty commitments are unfulfilled unless indicated on the "Main Decision Form." Treaties and trade agreements are implemented or broken in this manner. The design of the INSK "Main Decision Form" forces national officials to abide by a systematic pattern of decision-making in each session. The first section summarizes the current status of the nation in terms of the proto-type political, economic and military variables that describe it; the second records decisions made during the period; and the third is an adjustment of the status of the nation as a result of the actions taken during the period. The "Main Decision Form" states the condition of a nation at the
start of a simulation period, lists the decisions and actions taken, and delineates the state of the nation at the end of the session. Participants go through these steps in every simulation period.

Decision-makers soon appreciate that failure to make a decision is a decision itself. Population changes, and industrial equipment depreciates and becomes obsolete. Decisions about increased consumer production or the replacement of worn out capital goods cannot be avoided. As in international affairs, the pressure of time on INS decision-makers is relentless. Participants may become able to empathize with the office of the President because they are making similar kinds of decisions under pressures of limited time.

Other forms are used to record international agreements, trade and aid exchanges, and to provide for the declaration and conduct of war. Because INS symbolically represents an international system, the forms are necessary to record decisions and to keep an up-to-date description of the simulated world.

ANALYSIS. The correspondence of the structure and activity of the Inter-Nation Simulation to the world of international affairs is clear to thoughtful, observant teachers. Students participating in INS, however, need to have parallels between their inter-nation system and international politics pointed out and discussed. This is necessary for at least two reasons: (a) their INS experiences are too immediate for them to obtain overall perspective, and (b) their knowledge of international affairs is too limited for them to draw proper analogies. The teacher’s job is to provide the bridge between the student’s world in INS and the world of international affairs they read about in newspapers and books and hear reported on television and radio.

Inter-Nation Simulation is a model of world politics. Activity is generated as students act in the context of a hypothetical international system. INS nations may represent specific countries, while the setting represents a historical, international alignment. In INS analysis sessions and supplementary activities, the teacher must be concerned with imparting knowledge about: (a) structural and dynamic parallels between INS and international politics, and (b) factual information about the international system. Problems arising in a simulation when national sovereignty inhibits disarmament agreements can be instructive in discussing current issues concerning the control of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, a discussion of international organizations in
the simulation may have relevance for understanding the eclipse of
the League of Nations and problems facing the United Nations. But
it is important to note that such a discussion includes (a) the general
problems of international organizations, and (b) specific factual in-
Complex problems such as these all have a factual as well as a struc-
tural dimension. INS should therefore be viewed as a supplementary
approach that focuses on the structure and dynamics of international
politics, leaving to the teacher the job of imparting and interpreting
factual data.

Educational Research On Inter-Nation Simulation

It is surprising that educational simulations, as new as they are to the
social studies classroom, have produced the quantity of educational
research they have. (The 1966 September and October issues of the
American Behavioral Scientist were devoted entirely to reporting re-
search on educational simulations.) Inter-Nation Simulation has been
investigated in a number of settings with high school, undergraduate,
and graduate students. Initial impressions of INS observers led them
to hypothesize that in comparison to students in conventional pro-
grams, INS participants were (a) more highly motivated, (b) more
likely to learn facts and principles and retain them longer, (c) more
likely to acquire critical thinking skills, and (d) more likely to become
political realists through attitude change (Cherryholmes, 1966). These
four propositions seem to depend on the first—higher student motiva-
tion accompanies INS than is found in a more traditional classroom.
Assuming higher motivation, more learning, attitude change, and
greater retention were hypothesized to follow. Critical thinking was
hypothesized to derive from the fact that INS is an extensive decision-
making exercise for the participants.

At this writing the current state of our evaluation of INS consists of
four studies (Anderson, 1964; Robinson, et al., 1966; Cherryholmes,
1963; and Seiler, 1966). Each investigation reported high
student int

"NS: (a) high school students reported more in-
terest in IN

in other social studies work (Cherryholmes, 1963
and Garvey and Seiler, 1966) and (b) college students reported or
exhibited at least as much interest in INS as in case studies and lee-
Simulating Inter-Nation Relations

None of the studies found that INS participants learned more facts or principles. Garvey and Seiler did not find that students acquired critical thinking skills nor that retention was increased by INS. With respect to attitude change, Cherryholmes reported changes away from simplistic views of politics, but his study did not use a control group. Garvey and Seiler used a modified version of the same attitude instrument with a control group and did not find that a pattern of attitude change distinguished the experimental simulation group from the control group. Research to date indicates that while high school students are highly motivated by INS, INS participants do not demonstrate significant gains in learning facts and principles, critical thinking skills, retention of information learned, or attitude changes.

Educational research on INS is incomplete. Some of the propositions, such as the one related to critical thinking, have not been sufficiently investigated. (Garvey and Seiler, 1966, have been the only ones to evaluate it.) In other cases, studies carried out with different methods have yielded divergent or contradictory results, such as the two investigations on attitude change mentioned above. By placing these four studies in a larger evaluation framework, however, it may be possible to suggest where research may profitably proceed.

To begin with, evaluation goals should be divided into two areas: cognitive learning and affective changes. With regard to international relations, two types of cognitive learning seem plausible for evaluation: (a) facts and principles related to international politics described in terms of a static model, as found in textbooks, and (b) facts and principles related to the systemic elements of international relations, as found in an operational model of a dynamic system such as INS. By a static, non-operational model is meant factual descriptions encountered in discussions of national character, power, and other concepts, as well as factual information about contemporary nations, alliance patterns, and international bodies. These considerations have dominated the testing of cognitive learning in the studies surveyed, and the results have indicated no significant difference between the simulation and control groups. By the systemic elements of international politics is meant the behavioral, dynamic aspects of politics such as communication flows, elements of integration, trade and aid exchanges, and characteristics of international negotiations. Evaluation
of learning related to the behavioral patterns of nations has received only peripheral attention in these studies. Since INS is an operational model of international politics, it can be reasonably hypothesized to be most effective in teaching participants about the dynamic, operational features of an international system. INS participants might also be expected to learn something about general social processes, such as how one approaches an adversary with a compromise. More attention needs to be given to these problems if INS is to be evaluated properly.

INS may also be hypothesized to produce affective changes. It is possible that students' outlook on politics may be changed because INS participation may be their first experience in explicitly analyzing their own behavior in a political context. INS brings politics into the classroom or laboratory by demanding participants to act politically. The study of politics in public schools, unfortunately, is usually an abstract study of government in an institutional-legal sense. Such elements of politics as communication and negotiation are often excluded. It may be hypothesized, therefore, that by introducing students to politics in INS they will become more tolerant of conflict, adopt a less rigid ideological stance, apply stereotypes less frequently in analyzing political issues, and favor compromise more frequently than dictated solutions to social and political problems. The proposition becomes: if INS teaches participants about politics, then students will tend to be more tolerant of political conflict, less rigid, and more willing to seek compromise solutions. The proposition may seem tautological: if students learn about politics, then they will accept political and social realities. We know, however, of many instances in which acquisition of information does not result in attitude change. That INS contributes to tolerance of political conflict seems plausible, but the proposition is untested.

Summary

The Inter-Nation Simulation is an operating model of international relations designed for use in a classroom or laboratory. It is similar in many respects to an educational game that portrays specific aspects of the political world. For the teacher using INS, it is important to properly orient and organize the students, supervise the play, and
analyze the action in terms of international politics. Students learn as many facts and principles from a simulation as from traditional instruction and are much more highly motivated. It may be hypothesized that students participating in INS learn more about general social and political processes characteristic of the international system than do students who read textbooks and listen to lectures. It may also be hypothesized that students will become more tolerant of political conflict and appreciative of compromise solutions. INS represents an early attempt to simulate political processes in the classroom and the laboratory. It seems to be a promising addition to more traditional materials and methods of teaching international relations, but more research and classroom experience are needed before its contribution can be reliably assessed and its future can be accurately predicted.

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JAMES A. ROBINSON and RICHARD C. SNYDER

If one dates the beginning of the international political system of nation-states from the Treaty of Westphalia, something called international political activity or behavior has existed for more than three hundred years. During this period as many "decisions" must have been made as there are stars in the heavens. Yet these rich and abundant data have been analyzed little. Often they have not even been accurately observed; they have less often been recorded reliably. In spite of the appearance of new theories of decision in several academic disciplines, the number of theoretically oriented, empirically executed studies of international decisions remains small. To discuss decision-making in international politics, therefore, is to engage in a "prescientific" exercise. What follows reviews concepts and propositions relevant to understanding international decision-making. This review is arranged according to a generalized conception of the way in which organizations make decisions.  


Decisions refer to choices between or among alternative courses of action by a decisional unit. Narrowly conceived, decision theory refers only to choice of alternatives, but we prefer to include the search for alternatives, and even decisions about what problems will be dealt with, as well as choice and execution. Although some problems are thrust upon a decision unit, as when Britain withdrew support of Greece and Turkey in 1947 and the United States intervened, not all problems are given to decision-makers. Selections must be made. Even when decision-makers are forced to deal with problems (as they could not avoid some response to the Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950), problems must be interpreted, categorized, and defined. For example, United States policy-makers could have interpreted the invasion as Russian-inspired and could have read the intentions of the Peking government in several ways. Similarly, alternatives often are not given but must be formulated.

International decision-making thus embraces the ways in which national and international actors select problems to be considered for choices of alternative courses of action and make these choices. Strictly speaking, international decision-making should be designated as international policy-making, in that the international system lacks sanctions for enforcing compliance with its policies. The international system cannot make decisions authoritatively for all nations and bind subunits to comply. In this sense, the globe is analogous to a large metropolitan area of interacting municipalities, each of which can speak—that is, decide—for itself, but no one of which can decide for the area as a whole, which may consist of as many as 1,400 governments. Thus, global policy consists of the collection, accumulation, and intersection of decisions taken by subunits.

We conceive of three major factors in explaining a decisional outcome: the occasion for decision; the individual decision-maker; and the organizational context in which he decides. This three-fold conception of decision-making combines psychological and sociological levels of analysis. Moreover, it incorporates both "intellectual" and "organizational" factors.

THE CONCEPT OF OCCASION FOR DECISION

The origins of every decision are, strictly speaking, different, and decision-makers' interpretations of each decisional situation may vary
considerably. However, comparison and generalization require a search for basic and recurring categories or characteristics of decisions. Decision-makers classify cases as more or less like previous ones; whether observers can develop discriminating categories is one of the current challenges to decision theory. As an elementary set of criteria for categorizing or comparing cases, the following three characteristics are proposed: the extent of anticipation and prior programming of the decision; the ratio of time available for making a decision to demands of the task; and the scope and domain of values at stake.

**Anticipated or Unanticipated Situations**

Occasions for decision may be distinguished as follows: either they came as a surprise to the decision-makers, or some prior planning identified the possibility of their occurrence. The North Korean invasion of South Korea apparently was unanticipated by the decision unit that responded to the attack. Although a policy-planning paper predicting a Soviet probe somewhere on the perimeter of the United States sphere of influence was circulating through lower echelons of the American government early in 1950, it had not reached the President and his most intimate advisers. Likewise, the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 seems to have been unanticipated by American foreign policy-makers; several previous allegations of a Soviet build-up, accurate or inaccurate, were not confirmed by reconnaissance; and the American decision-makers did not develop policies until after confirmation was obtained.

Even if a situation is anticipated or regarded as possible, programmed actions may not be developed. Whether a situation of surprise differs from a situation of anticipation without prepared response has not been studied yet, although it seems reasonable to expect differences in reaction, in use of decision time, and perhaps in decision outcomes also.

**Decision Time and Task Demands**

A second characteristic of any decision occasion is the time available for response. Time affects the number of alternatives that may be considered. Although the relation between time and number of alternatives is not necessarily linear, still, in the absence of programmed de-
cisions, short decision time reduces the opportunities to search for different courses of action. The Korean decision was one in which the United States committed land and air forces in a matter of days, and the Cuban missile situation of 1962 involved a similar amount of decision time. The Cuban invasion of 1961 required important decisions within a matter of hours, and reaction time was hardly longer at certain stages of the U-2 episode of 1960. As is well known, many have worried about the few moments of decision time given a President in the event of apparent nuclear attack; President Eisenhower ordered an atomic alert before entering four hours of anesthesia; and the United States nuclear defenses were alerted within minutes after the assassination of President Kennedy.

Decision time does not necessarily correspond to chronological time for those involved in the decision-making process. Time means different things to different decision-makers; one requires five minutes for a task for which another needs an hour. Our way of dealing with this problem is by proposing that decision theory include individual psychological variables such as intelligence, mental agility, and creativity; propositions may eventually be formulated and tested in which such individual capacities are related to time and their interactions are related to decision outcome.

A more difficult problem arises from combining time with task complexity. Even when clock time seems extended, the decision situation may be so complicated that many tasks must be performed in reaching a policy. The series of British decisions to join the Common Market from 1960 through 1962 bore some characteristics of long time mixed with numerous and complex tasks.

In terms of sheer length of time, the United Kingdom had approximately two and a half years from the spring of 1960 until late 1962 to make and implement the decisions to negotiate and to join. When one considers the detailed and technical negotiations required to facilitate membership, and the delicate political consultations required to obtain the consent of the parties affected by Britain's decision, two years is not a long period of decision. Moreover, to these considerations must be added a third: Britain was simultaneously concerned with a number of other critical foreign policy decisions. In the summer of 1960 there took place a Summit Conference that ended without ever really beginning. Throughout 1961 and 1962 Britain was recon-
considering her defense policy, including her use of independent nuclear weapons, and also was trying to find some solution to her last remaining colonial problem, that in Central Africa. These difficult and time-consuming occasions for decision also crowded the agenda of an already busy and preoccupied Cabinet and set of ministries.

In addition to the fact that the intricacies of the subject matter modified the usual advantages of two years of decision time, there was another source of complexity: the large number of parties to the decision. These were not necessarily participants in the decision in the sense of having a constitutional function. Some were "advisory" rather than "representational" parties or participants. Although they did not have a veto or even a vote, their advice was sought; and they were regularly informed of the stages of the decision. Those who did not have a direct vote included the countries in the Commonwealth, the nations in the European Free Trade Association, and the United States. Domestic interest groups did not have a vote, but the long-standing traditions of British politics whereby interests have a close consultative part in decisions affecting them were respected. Periodically during the negotiations preparing for the decision to join, the Lord F. ivy Seal met with these groups and briefed them on the progress of his talks with the European Economic Community and the representatives of the Six. At one time, the London Times reported that "for every six hours Mr. [Edward] Heath spends in negotiations with the European Economic Community, he later spends eight hours consulting the Commonwealth and the EFTA representatives in Brussels and with the High Commissioners in London." (February 20, 1962)

In short, while the time for decision was long in months, it was relatively crowded by demands upon it. Intricate and detailed technical work was involved; extensive consultations with domestic and foreign parties were expected or necessary; and the Government's foreign policy agenda was crowded. Decision time, then, is not to be regarded as absolute; it is relative to the intricacies of the decision itself and to the number of parties to the decision. Finding operational measures that fit a time-to-task ratio of decision time remains a foremost task on the agenda of decision theory.

Scope and Domain of Values of Stake

The scope and domain of values affected obviously varies from decision to decision, and high-level policy-makers are ordinarily confronted with only the most vital ones. Contemporary international decisions of the greatest value consequence are those involving the choice of violent or nonviolent alternatives, the development of economic and political institutions in new states, and the construction of rules and procedures for the conduct of international relations. These three are intimately related to almost all basic human values—well-being, wealth, power, respect, etc.

The Concept of Crisis. Decisions that arise without prior planning, allow short time for response, and have high value consequences, we have designated as "most crisis-like" decisions. At the other end of the continuum of decisional situations are those in which the problem is anticipated by the unit of decision, some advance contingency plan has been adopted, considerable time for deciding is available, and relatively slight consequences are likely to result. The Korean decision and the Monroney Resolution, in which the Senate prodded the Eisenhower Administration to support an International Development Association, are stark contrasts.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF DECISION-MAKERS

The influence of personality on decision outcome is largely unexplored. Students of clinical "political psychology" have dwelt more on recruitment of different "types" of personalities or persons with varying personal characteristics into different roles, such as political, bureaucratic, or agitational, than on the impact of personality types on decision outcomes. When the clinical or case method was followed by survey methods, the trend continued, as in the studies by McConaughy of legislators and by Hennessy of political activists. This approach has received renewed emphasis by Rogow and Lasswell, who refine

and extend earlier theories of the effects of psychological deprivation on role recruitment. However, role occupants, even when they share similar characteristics accounting for their selection, may differ in their decision-making behavior. Lasswell and Almond conducted a pioneering field experiment which demonstrated that welfare agents differed in their claim-granting according to differences in their personality characteristics as these interacted with characteristics of their clients. The relevance of personality is illustrated also by Scodel, Ratoosh, and Minas, who conducted experiments on the relation of personal characteristics to risk-taking. They found that a group of military personnel selected more high-payoff-low-probability bets than a control group of college students. Within the college group, those who selected high-payoff alternatives were higher on the theoretical and aesthetic values and lower on the economic and political values of the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey Study of Values than the low-payoff group. The low-payoff group was higher on need achievement than the high-payoff group. Intelligence was not significantly related to degree of risk-taking, but was inversely related to consistency or variability in risk-taking.

Individual attributes of decision-makers include personality characteristics, social backgrounds and experiences, and personal values. Referring to individual characteristics of decision-makers does not mean considering only personality characteristics of the idiosyncratic type. Nor does it necessarily involve only the ways in which a particular individual who happened to be placed in a decision-making position and his particular needs and complexes affect decisions. We are referring also to such factors as social backgrounds, previous experience, and personal values that may characterize the elites from which decision-makers are recruited. Looking at individual characteristics does not imply looking exclusively at the personal idiosyncrasies of decision-makers.

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Personality Characteristics

Personality includes a wide range of factors related to decisional performance. Variables such as propensity to assume high risks, tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, intelligence, creativity, self-esteem, dominance, submissiveness, need for power, need for achievement, and need for affiliation appear to bear on decision-making styles and outcomes. The need for power has long interested political scientists. Lasswell's hypotheses of the 1930's have been applied clinically to the cases of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House. George and George explain certain of Wilson's decisions that had consequences for United States foreign policy and international relations of Europe in terms of his childhood deprivation of affection and esteem for which he compensated through a craving for power and dominance over others. Rogers's personality-oriented biography of the late James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, places the individual in the context of the organizational and situational demands of high-level foreign policymaking.

Charles and Margaret Hermann "matched" personality characteristics of leading figures in European diplomacy on the eve of World War I, as revealed by the Stanford Conflict Studies' extensive reconstruction of that history, with participants in two simulated "reruns" of the six weeks prior to the outbreak of that war. Their ingenious effort to find simulation participants who possessed some of the same personal characteristics as those of the Kaiser, Lord Grey, and others comprised several steps. First, speeches and autobiographical materials were content-analyzed for traits listed in standard psychological inventories. Second, the California Psychological Inventory and a semantic differential instrument consisting of thirteen concepts were administered to candidate-subjects, from whom participants matching

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profiles of the historical figures were finally chosen. Particular attention was given to dominance, self-acceptance, and self-control. In neither run did war occur, although in at least one of the runs war appeared imminent during the final decision period. Certain actions of simulation participants seemed similar to 1914 personalities, such as the dominance of particular leaders over others and the calling of conferences in vain efforts to resolve conflicts.

Margaret Hermann content-analyzed legislative speeches for personality characteristics related to the legislator’s nationalism or internationalism as revealed both in speeches and in roll-call votes. She reported significant relationships between sense of security or insecurity, tolerance or intolerance of ambiguity, and positive or negative people-orientation, on the one hand, and the congressman’s voting record on nationalism or internationalism on the other. The following propositions were supported:

1.a. The greater a congressman’s sense of insecurity, the more nationalistic his voting record.

1.b. The greater a congressman’s sense of security, the more internationalistic his voting record.

2.a. The greater a congressman’s intolerance of ambiguity, the more nationalistic his voting record.

2.b. The greater a congressman’s tolerance of ambiguity, the more internationalistic his voting record.

3.a. The more negative a congressman’s orientation to or value of people, the more nationalistic his voting record.

3.b. The more positive a congressman’s orientation to or value of people, the more internationalistic his voting record.

Social Backgrounds and Experiences

Past experience, including education, travel, religion, occupation, and profession, has long been thought to affect future performance, including political behavior. Matthews has reviewed the classical theories and tested hypotheses relating constituency, status, and prior political...

experience to senatorial influence. In the legislator’s observance of certain Senate folkways; senators from safe states, who have had prior political experience and who come to the Senate at an early age, are more likely to observe the folkways and hence, are more likely to be influential. Pool, Keller, and Bauer have shown that foreign travel alters the bases and rationale of businessmen’s views of foreign trade policy, although it may not alter the substance of their attitudes.池, Keller, and Bauer have shown that foreign travel alters the bases and rationale of businessmen’s views of foreign trade policy, although it may not alter the substance of their attitudes.池, Keller, and Bauer have shown that foreign travel alters the bases and rationale of businessmen’s views of foreign trade policy, although it may not alter the substance of their attitudes.

Acheson, in an artful historical lesson, admonishes Presidents to consider the status and public reputation of candidates for Secretary of State in addition to the usual qualifications of competence and to avoid appointing one whose political or other background characteristics make it difficult for him to be subordinate to the President.

Robinson identified some of the special and rare conditions under which a legislator’s constituency-values will be unambiguously related to his committee decisions, as when the issue has low salience within the House of Representatives. Robinson identified some of the special and rare conditions under which a legislator’s constituency-values will be unambiguously related to his committee decisions, as when the issue has low salience within the House of Representatives. Robinson identified some of the special and rare conditions under which a legislator’s constituency-values will be unambiguously related to his committee decisions, as when the issue has low salience within the House of Representatives.

Froman connects constituency differences to variations in congressional voting (including voting on foreign policy and on reciprocal trade agreement legislation initiated by the President) while holding party and incumbency variables constant. Froman connects constituency differences to variations in congressional voting (including voting on foreign policy and on reciprocal trade agreement legislation initiated by the President) while holding party and incumbency variables constant. Froman connects constituency differences to variations in congressional voting (including voting on foreign policy and on reciprocal trade agreement legislation initiated by the President) while holding party and incumbency variables constant.

Rieselbach investigated the relations between congressmen’s “isolationism” or “internationalism” and their party affiliation, ethnicity, religion, education, urbanism, occupation, margin of election, prior political experience, and other variables. He found that between 1939 and 1958 party affiliation became less predictive of the foreign policy votes of congressmen, while constituency characteristics in-
creased in their predictive strength. Alger described some of the effects of experiences in the General Assembly on temporary delegates to the United Nations. Temporary delegates to the United Nations acquire new information, perspectives, and orientations that are likely to enter into their contribution to international decisions when they resume their national roles at home.

Much research on social backgrounds and career patterns has been conducted for theoretical reasons other than decision-making. Hence, it is often difficult to relate differences in background and experience to variations in decisional performance. For students of decision theory, an extension of the work summarized above to a number of foreign offices and international organizations would be appropriate. Key questions include the following: What policy positions, if any, are systematically favored or disadvantaged by variations in recruitment and socialization? What kinds of experience are associated with what kinds of styles of decisional performance?

Values of Decision-Makers

We conceive of values, ideology, or philosophy as relatively enduring orientations toward goals of a social system or sub-system as distinguished from relatively transitory postures, such as attitudes or opinions. We are interested in the ways in which these are related to, or mediated in their relation to, decisions or policy outcomes.

Policy-makers need to distinguish basic value orientations from ephemeral shifting attitudes. During the 1930's, profound public and congressional opposition to Bolshevism abounded in the United States, and this contributed to the delay in United States recognition of the U.S.S.R. In spite of opposition to communism, the various publics were, contrary to the Roosevelt Administration's expectations, able to distinguish between their values opposing communism and their attitudes or opinions toward aid to Russia in 1941. While remaining opposed to communism, the public changed from negative attitudes toward including Russia in the lend-lease program to positive approval of such aid as a tactical device. Similarly, in 1937 half a million

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American college students swore not to fight in any war. But when the Selective Service Act was adopted three and a half years later, fewer than 100 men refused to register, and by 1943 only 1,400 had gone to prison for ideological or ethical defiance of the draft.

Among elites there may be a similar slippage between values and attitudes and between attitudes and behavior. Charles de Gaulle’s “shift” of French policy toward Algeria might not have been predicted from his earlier values about overseas territories. Harold Macmillan’s leading the British retreat from Suez might not have been expected, given his apparent early advocacy of intervention. The “moderate” leadership of several Southern governors to accept some of the implications of the federal courts’ decisions on school integration might not have been obvious from their prior statement of attitudes. But situations such as these, in which one set of values conflicts with another (loss of Algeria vs. domestic political stability and continental leadership; or retreat vs. national bankruptcy; or some desegregation vs. violence and constitutional disorder), reveal the perils of one-dimensional value analysis.

Robinson found correlation between congressmen’s foreign policy attitudes, as revealed in interviews, and their roll-call votes. Miller and Stokes also found a correlation between foreign policy attitudes and votes on a sample drawn from the same universe. Both studies, however, found that the relationship of values and attitudes to behavior is far from perfect. Knowledge of the ways in which situational factors and organizational processes intervene to mediate this relationship is, therefore, high on the agenda of the needs of decision theory. We have already identified a number of characteristics of decision situations that seem important. Now we must ask what kinds of organizational rules, constraints, and procedures might be expected to mediate the effects of personal values in international decision-making. Such questions point to organizational context as a third important cluster of variables in decision processes.

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ORGANIZATION OF DECISION-MAKERS

Characteristics of Foreign Organizations

The foreign policy organization within the typical national government of a complex society consists of a relatively large number of agencies and individuals linked by a network of lines of authority and channels of communication. A rather elaborate division of labor—allocation of power and responsibility—results from the sheer magnitude of size and the many complex tasks to be performed. Differentiation of roles and functions creates diverse subunits whose activities have mutual impact. Some degree of articulation and coordination is necessary. Regardless of how centralized the total governmental system is, delegation of authority to act, plus informal bases of power or influence, will produce semi-autonomous subunits and, often, blurred jurisdictional boundaries. The formal allocation of power and responsibility may or may not coincide with operating realities. There will be a set of explicit or implicit, written and unwritten rules and expectations that guide role performance, rewards and punishments, and the supply of resources needed by the organization for the fulfillment of its mission. Agencies within the organization will compete for scarce resources, and the foreign policy organization itself will usually have to compete with other governmental functions. The rate of personnel turnover will vary, as will the mode of recruitment; but the organization retains its structure regardless of what happens to individual members; and some members will be permanently assigned to the organization. Changes in specific assignments may be frequent even for career officials. The conduct of individual members in their prescribed roles may be guided by more than a single motive, and it cannot be presumed that the national interest or a specific assignment is the predominant motive. However, there is a sense in which the organization qua organization is more of a “constant” than the other factors that enter into foreign policy formation. If this thumb-nail sketch is brief and abstract, its elements are familiar enough.

What are some of the more obvious implications of the organizational context? Conflict is pervasive and arises from the different values, experiences, viewpoints, and objectives associated with differ-
ent agencies, roles, and functions. It is rare that one fails to find in the daily paper evidence of strains and tensions between units of power and responsibility, of concern for positional influence and prestige of individuals and agencies, of vested interests in particular programs for their own sake, and of two or more opposed interpretations of a major problem confronting the nation. Less publicized, but of equal potential importance, are differences of perspectives between officers "back home" in various bureaus and divisions and diplomats "in the field" who are closer to events, between staff and line officers, between area experts and substantive experts, between political appointees and career officers, and so on. Often, choices of great portent must be made between alternative intelligence estimates of critical situations. Jurisdictional conflicts arise because the delegation of authority is ambiguous or because problems do not fit neatly the division of labor.

It is not that these conflicts are "bad." The discussion immediately above is intended to be descriptive, not evaluative. Whatever the merits of certain kinds of conflict, or their "dysfunctional" consequences by some standard, the point is that they must be (and usually are) resolved. Resolution may be achieved by persuasion, by "clearance" procedures, by voting, by bargaining, and by high authority. These modes of liquidating disagreement or obtaining agreement are operative within as well as between agencies. Politics and diplomacy accurately describe many of the processes through which consensus is reached and influences are brought to bear on outcomes. It is not uncommon for lawyers to represent two intra-organizational units in a negotiation.

Side by side with conflict are, of course, coordination and cooperation. Division of labor means that specialized roles and task forces make different contributions to foreign policy and have different locations in the total web of external contacts and relations. Depending on the substance and complexity of various problems, some degree of mobilization of skills, time, resources, and power to act is required. The many facets of foreign policy must be fitted into a mosaic before authoritative, coherent action is possible. Leadership, communication, assignment of specific responsibilities, and evaluation of information all enter into the activation of relevant organizational components and the formation of strategies. Mobilization and problem-solving activ-
Decision-Making in International Politics

...ities imply subdecisions—what shall be decided when and by whom? Availability of resources and personnel, as well as money and equipment in the broadest sense, necessitate further choices and planning.

Foreign policy-making, then, transpires in an organizational context having its own political forces, its own rules of the game, and even its own sets of subgoals. Decision-makers must work for each other, with each other, and sometimes against each other. The very processes of conflict resolution, consensus building, and mobilization for action will affect what can be done and how long it will take.

Organizational Differences between National and International Policy-Making

In the absence of more research on dimensions of organization, we may think of two more or less typical patterns of international decision-making. Foreign office decision-making is predominately hierarchical, whether in the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, or Norway. Variations exist within this pattern, with Great Britain probably more centralized and hierarchical than the United States, but intranational policies are, on the whole, close to the familiar bureaucratic model. International policy-making, on the other hand, is based on decentralized interaction among a number of relatively independent hierarchies of leaders. Leaders control leaders through bargaining. The United Nations and various regional organizations have formalized in a permanent way what traditionally occurred only occasionally and temporarily in multilateral conferences and congresses. The organizations function more in the decentralized fashion of legislatures than in the hierarchical manner of bureaucracies; votes are taken under a majority or a unanimity rule; minorities may sometimes defeat a near unanimous vote by casting a veto, or they may avoid a vote by threat of a veto; and enforcement of decisions depends on bargaining and "remuneration" rather than on expected observance backed by coercion.

Foreign policy-making in Great Britain is probably more hierarchical than in the United States, although one should also emphasize the multiplicity of interests involved in British decisions. Extensive consultation and bargaining with opposition, party, constituency, and organized interests also occur in Britain. This characteristic of British...
foreign policy-making is illustrated by such diverse events as the British decision to join Israel and France in a war against Egypt in 1956 and Britain's decision to seek membership in the Common Market in 1961 and 1967.

Studies of American foreign policy-making are considerably more numerous than for any other country. This reflects the greater amount of social science activity in America and the culture-bias of American social scientists. Excluding the extensive work in diplomatic history, studies of United States foreign policy fall into two main categories, those that describe and analyze the organizations and institutions contributing to policy, and those that present detailed cases of particular decisions or policies.

Among organizational studies, general surveys of the total policy-making structure are to be found in numerous textbooks and in the report of the Brookings Institution to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The Brookings study combines description (based on more than 150 interviews with high-level policy-makers) and recommendations. The series of studies undertaken by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1959-60 were primarily "content" or "issue" studies, with the exception of the study done by the Brookings Institution. However, the 1960 hearings and recommendations of the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operation were directed at the policy-making process. Its hearings were dominated by former government officials rather than by professional observers and analysts of policy-making. Although the Subcommittee's staff canvassed a wide body of thought, no research was undertaken into the way in which the process of making national security policy was functioning. Many of the Committee's recommendations showed signs of the influence of Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power* and were especially critical of committees as a policy-making instrument. Several of its recommendations, notably the abolition of a number of committees and the bypassing of the National Security Council and the Cabinet, were adopted by the new Adminis-

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tration in 1961. However, most of the abolished committees had not been meeting for months or years and were, thus, merely taken off the books; there was little behavioral change. Moreover, the Cuban and Soviet difficulties in the spring of 1961 led to an apparently increased use of the National Security Council and the Cabinet as coordinating if not decision-making bodies.

Numerous case studies illustrating the interaction of the major institutions are available. Dawson retraced the decision to extend aid to Russia in 1941, with emphasis on the influence of public opinion; Price and Jones reviewed the development of the Marshall Plan and focused primarily on executive agencies; Haviland followed the 1957 foreign aid bill through the basic steps from drafting to adoption and highlighted the bargaining between Congress and the executive; Cohen detailed the making of the treaty with Japan with special reference to the Senate, informal advisers, interest groups, public opinion, and the press; and Paige reconstructed the decision to resist aggression in Korea with emphasis on the ad hoc group formed to respond to the crisis.

The major institutions in foreign policy-making are clearly within the executive branch—the Office of the President, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Neustadt's book, the most recent major study of the Presidency, is based to a considerable extent on his personal experience in the Truman Administration and is illustrated by three case studies: the recall of MacArthur, the seizure of the steel industries, and the intervention of troops in Little Rock. It should be supplemented by Sorensen's insightful formulation of his personal experience as a close adviser to and observer of President

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Kennedy's28 and by Neustadt's subsequent comparison of F. D. Roosevelt's and Kennedy's organizational styles.29 The Pentagon, that complex of military and civilian planners and makers of defense policy, has taken on a role virtually co-equal to that of the State Department in influencing foreign policy. Hammond and Huntington have analyzed and evaluated the Pentagon's performance in the post-World War II years.30 Policy-making studies now cover a spectrum that includes operations research, management, simulation, procurement, process, and the like.

The role of the legislature in foreign policy is primarily that of legitimator or amender of executive action. To the extent that Congress (or Parliament) takes initiative, its role is on issues of marginal importance, having little influence on basic values. When the occasion for decision is crisis-like or involves any matter of perceived importance to the executive, the executive will take the initiative. Legislative influence will be confined to vetoing or modifying executive action. There are legal and constitutional explanations for this distribution of legislative-executive participation in foreign policy, but other factors operate also. The Constitution has not changed with respect to the executive role, yet in the twentieth century executives everywhere have gained power (participation in decisions) at the expense of legislatures. The increasing need to process large amounts of information about the foreign environment, a need which bureaucracies are more able to meet than legislatures, may explain part of the enhanced position of the executive.31

The influence of public opinion on foreign policy is a controversial and unsettled issue. According to Walter Lippman's description, executive governments are subject to the will of electorates that are

31 Robinson, op. cit.
represented by parliaments. We have already indicated our conception of the role of legislatures as one of minimal influence on foreign policy. If parliamentary bodies are not the nexus between opinion and executive policy, what is the connection?

If a link exists, it does so as a consequence of executive policymakers’ anticipations of future opinion about not-as-yet salient issues. Almond and Key, as well as a wealth of survey and other data, document low information and low involvement among “the publics” on foreign affairs. Cohen finds this true of the publics’ interest in newspaper reporting of international relations. To the extent to which opinion affects policy, it does so through the policymakers’ prediction of what public opinion would be if it were aroused. However, politicians vary in the accuracy of their predictions.

Still another mechanism for the impact of public opinion is through specialized foreign policy publics. Almond identified “attentive publics,” and Rosenau has documented how one of them was discovered and/or created in behalf of foreign aid in 1958. One can think of a list of several foreign issues on which specialized publics have emerged: China, the United Nations, the test ban, and German unification. Those who actively participate in one policy issue are not necessarily those who follow and contribute to debate on other issues.

Elite opinion groups are frequently “co-opted” by the executive for ad hoc temporary service. The creation of special study groups, commissions, and similar bodies is a means of providing the executive with new perspectives, as well as of legitimating other viewpoints. Evidence of the presence of this “external bureaucracy” is particularly

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35 Almond, op. cit.
visible at the transition from one presidential administration to another.

Generally speaking, the impact of public opinion in the decision process depends on the nature of the problem, especially the amount of decision time available, and the previous discussion of it; the decision-makers' need to have the affiliation and support of others (Wilson's intransigence and Truman's decisiveness are examples of minimal concern for opinion); and the way in which the policy-making structure is designed to report (accurately or not) public sentiment. Variations in these three major factors in the decision process will affect the influence of public opinion.

International Policy-Making. Regional and international organizations are more typical of decentralized and bargaining-like organizations. The numerous new organizations in Western Europe, those that constitute the movement toward European integration, operate on a pattern of decision-making different from that of the polar types of national foreign policy-making or United Nations policy-making. The European Economic Community, the Coal and Steel Community, and related agencies have acquired decision-making structures of their own. In the rigorous meaning of decision, they make some choices for which they invoke sanctions to bind compliance. They are more than actors, roles, and institutions participating with other units in a bargaining situation from which a policy will emerge. The European Economic Commission and the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community have a jurisdiction in which they take decisions that are not dependent on the unanimity of the member states. Judicial organs to which appeals may be taken are available, but parliamentary organs to which the "technocracies" are responsible have yet to be developed.

Depending on the occasion for decision, the European communities employ different organizational processes. Some decisions are taken after consideration of the member governments' interests, but not necessarily with the unanimous agreement of those governments. Others are taken on the basis of agreement among member countries. Hence, both the foreign policy-making and the international policy-making characteristics are present. These new decision-making units are of interest, therefore, for the variations on certain organizational dimensions that occur within them.
CONCLUSIONS: WHOLE IMAGES COUNT, UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS?

The main purpose of decision-making analysis is to determine whether and how decision process affects the content of decision outcome. Does the process of making a decision make any difference for the substance of the decision? Do different kinds of processes reach different results? Do different combinations of situations, individuals, and organizations produce different policies? Or is decision-making as simple as one of C. P. Snow's characters twice asserts: "...whatever rules one has, sensible men usually reach a sensible conclusion"?

Whose images count depends, first, on the occasion for decision. Power-holders vary from issue to issue. Those who involve themselves in policies concerning West Germany are not necessarily the same as those who participate in decisions about nuclear testing. Various studies of influence—in communities, in legislatures, and in other settings—agree that power varies with the issue. Lyndon Johnson typified the contrary view when in 1960 he rationalized his decision to forego immense senatorial influence for the alleged obscurity of the Vice Presidency: "Power is where power goes." These two opposing points of view are reflected in the controversies associated with "the power elite" and "the establishment."

Influence varies not only with the value at issue in a decision situation, but with the level of crisis as well. The Korean crisis of 1950 brought together an unusual, virtually unique ad hoc decision unit, one that was drawn partly from official role occupants and partly from officials who were available in Washington. Elements of innovation were evident in the selection of participants in the Kennedy Administration's handling of its two Cuban crises. Decision-making personnel in these crises differed from that in more routine decisions.

The situation not only determines, in part, who will participate in a decision, and, thus, whose images count, but also affects the selection and formation of images. If decision-makers in one country perceive themselves threatened by decision-makers in another, the probability is high that those who think they are threatened will respond with a threat. This response confirms to the original threatening group that its hostility was justified, and it then responds with further threats.

Thus originates the spiral effect of perception, threat, response by threat, confirmation, further threat, and so on.

Crisis also affects the number and the breadth of alternative images that may be available in decision. Current simulations of crisis decision-making reveal that in a crisis, as contrasted with a non-crisis, the perception of only one or two available courses of action is more likely than of more numerous alternatives. Moreover, in a crisis, as contrasted with a non-crisis, there will be less search for alternative courses of action. These hypotheses suggest that aspirations regarding a "good" solution to a problem are reduced in a crisis, particularly if organizational consideration of alternatives is sequential rather than simultaneous, as is typical. In other words, a nation's decision-makers are more willing to accept, in a crisis as compared to a non-crisis situation, one of the first alternatives that occurs to them.

The truth of the proposition that influence varies with the personality of decision-makers seems obvious, but hard evidence has not been collected. Among hypotheses for which data are available is the one that social backgrounds of decision-makers are increasingly "democratic." In urban politics, in Congress, in Parliament, and in foreign offices, class counts for less than it did a generation ago. The consequence is that more varied images and perspectives are being considered in foreign and international policy-making.

Whose images count further depends on the organizational arena in which decisions are taken. The placing of many items on the United Nations agenda or before new multilateral organizations involves different participants with different values than would be the case if the decision unit were bilateral.

Within the American foreign policy process, the major base of influence is the executive branch. In this branch lies the initiative for innovation—not in Congress, or in the press, or anywhere else. Legislatures, mass media, and other participating roles may check, limit, thwart, constrain, veto, or delay executive action, but usually they cannot initiate, except at the pleasure of the executive. This is true in the United Kingdom as well as in the United States. It appears to be so in the Soviet Union, in France, and in other world powers.

Furthermore, within the executive agencies of governments, different situations may evoke or activate different organizational patterns or processes. When decision time is short, as it was during the Berlin
airlift, the Korean invasion, and the Suez invasion, fewer agencies and fewer factors are likely to be involved than when there is a long time for decision. In the cases just mentioned, decision time ranged from several hours to several weeks. In other decisions, when perhaps four to sixteen months may be available, time allows for more agencies to participate and more factors to be considered. For example, annual foreign aid bills, the original Marshall Plan, the formation of NATO, the creation of the United Nations, and the periodic renewal of Reciprocal Trade Legislation have involved many executive agencies and the legislative process also.

These hypotheses illustrate unevenly some of the mechanisms and processes by which images enter into decision-making. Fuller and more exact knowledge about the influence of various images on international policies depends on the growth and development of research on the interactions of situations, on individual decision-makers, and on organizational settings in international arenas.

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The Case Method
and the Study
of International Affairs

Chapter 13

JAMES P. SHAVER and A. GUY LARKINS

There are, among the many domestic problems facing our society, issues of great complexity. Factual and ethical complications are compounded by strong feelings on the part of disputants. The position of minorities, especially Negroes, and the right of the society to force men to serve in wars in which they do not as individuals believe are but two vexing areas of concern. Resolution of the stresses generated by such issues will require enlightened leadership and an intelligent citizenry if the potentially disruptive effects on society are to be avoided.

Yet, given the exacting nature of our domestic quandaries, the issues we face on the international scene are both more immense and intense in their dimensions. The clash of differing value systems as major powers strive to attain and maintain what they believe to be their rightful world positions, the pressures of time as new nations seek their proper political and economic statuses, the difficulties of predicting the consequences of actions involving complex intercultural interactions, particularly when information is inadequate due to national communication barriers—all of these combine with the destructive
potential of any decision in this age of possible mass destruction to make governmental decision-making in the international area a herculean task. What more pressing area of concern for the social studies curriculum? And, many ask, what better way to have students evaluate the validity and reflect on the extreme difficulty of decisions in international affairs than through the use of the case method? The latter question is the focus of this chapter.

WHAT IS THE CASE METHOD?

It is difficult to define the "case method" precisely or to specify the assumptions which underlie its various uses. There is little question, though, about the basic dependence of case method teaching upon student involvement in discussions. Francis Bacon is said to have suggested that although reading makes a full man and writing an exact man, it is conference that makes a ready man. His analysis suggests one common thread running through case method usage: that is, the assumption that experience in discussion is crucial if the student is to be ready to apply his "fullness" and his "exactness" in his encounters outside the classroom.

Case method teaching can be interspersed with other methods. However, the basic philosophy underlying it is not compatible with a total emphasis on the lecture or even on recitation if students are asked only to recall specific information. Advocates of case method teaching reject the notion that general education should concentrate on the survey and general accumulation of "important" facts. Little value is placed on facile memory. The basic thrust is toward impelling the student to use data as the basis for thought. The anticipated end product of instruction is not profound truth provided for the students by the teacher. Learning is seen instead as the result of complex inter-

actions among the ideas of teacher and students as positions are proposed, opposed, and defended. This assumption, that active involvement in discussion will promote better learning than will listening to the instructor, is no stranger to philosophy of education. John Dewey has been perhaps the best known opponent of instructional practices that make the student a “theoretical spectator,” a person “engaged not in having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly.”

In short, then, two presumptions about the effects of involving students in the discussion of meaningful problems underlie case method teaching: (a) Better skills of thinking will be attained; and (b) students will be better able to apply what has been learned to situations outside the classroom.

But what instructional practices constitute case method teaching? For the purposes of this chapter, we consider any use of case material as a vehicle for involving students in class discussion to be case method teaching. This definition, which may seem circular, serves as the basis for the discussion that follows.

Cases

There are two elements to case method teaching—the case and the method of discussion used. Obviously, the two are not completely independent, but they can fruitfully be discussed separately. A case used in the study of foreign affairs may take any one of several different forms. It may be a record of actual events, or it may be a fictionalized account of actual happenings. For some cases the situation itself may be fictitious, invented for the purposes of instruction to pose a situation which has not actually occurred. The case may be brief and scanty or rather complete and lengthy. In fact the distinction between a “case” and a “historical” description of an event is not clear-cut. Usually a case will be short enough to allow the completion of

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The *case method* should be distinguished from what has been called the *case study method*. In the latter method, the emphasis is on having students prepare case studies to obtain in-depth familiarity with a topic or area of study. This type of student activity may well be an effective means of attaining some objectives, but the focus of this chapter is on the discussion, not the preparation, of cases.
discussion in one or two class periods, although this is, of course, not an ironclad rule. Moreover, duration of discussion is more likely to be contingent on the issues posed by the case than on its length.

At least two broad categories can be used to classify cases in order to focus attention on their possible use in the study of international affairs. These categories are not inflexible. Cases are, after all, like other instructional materials, and the objectives the teacher has in mind in using them should determine their form and content, not some notion of what a case "really is."

DECISION CASES. One major classification of cases includes those used to involve the student in decision-making. Cases of this sort are used to pose issues to be debated, if not resolved. In the study of international affairs, there are at least two subclasses of decision cases: (a) cases that focus on incidents involving nationals of different nations, and (b) cases that focus on government foreign policy decisions. An example fitting the first subclass would be a case describing the situation faced by a banana company executive who must secure an adequate labor supply from a native population whose members believe in working only until sufficient money is obtained to buy a few days' provisions. A case illustrating the latter category might center on the question of whether the United States government should put pressure on the government of a Latin American country to guarantee that a business based in the United States will not be nationalized.

Decision cases may inform the students what decisions were made by the characters and give their reasoning, or such cases may stop at the point where a major decision is to be made. The choice is the teacher's. How the case is written or what type of case is selected will hinge on considerations such as whether the purpose is to have the student learn to evaluate the decisions of others, perhaps as a basis for a decision of his own, or to have him formulate and defend his own decision without the contaminating knowledge of what others did under the circumstances presented in the case.

EMOTIONAL-ImpACT CASES. A second major category of cases for use in the study of international affairs includes those intended to build understanding and empathy. Just as the use of cases for class

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discussion provides a means for achieving cognitive objectives such as the attainment of knowledge and the development of "skills of critical thinking," it also affords a means for attaining attitudinal objectives.

A basic problem which must be faced by any curriculum centered on international affairs is the restricting effect of culture. People are commonly culture-bound. That is, in the inevitable process of learning, we take on the values and beliefs of our culture, and our views and interpretations of other societies and the people in them are shaped by this frame of reference. Given the limited experience that most people have with other cultures, it is little wonder that "ugly American" incidents occur, reflecting lack of understanding and empathy. Cases provide one means, albeit a less than perfect substitute for actual person-to-person encounters, for building intercultural perspective. This is a prerequisite to the thoughtful and balanced consideration of decisions involving people of other nations.

Findings reported by Oliver and Baker indicate that the discussion of cases is an effective technique for changing attitudes, and that attitudinal changes are likely to occur regardless of the teacher's desires. Cases can be written specifically to teach understanding and empathy, even sympathy. The discussion of cases documenting the daily events in the lives of children in underdeveloped countries could have a powerful impact on students. Such cases would be particularly appropriate as a prelude to the discussion of what our national policy should be in regard to newly formed nations in Africa, or in regard to economic reform in Latin America.

It should be evident that the "emotional-impact" case will often play a subsidiary role to the "decision" type of case. Also, some cases will be appropriate for both types of objectives. The use of such cases will help to ensure that students will consider possible courses of action in

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*Instances of cultural misunderstanding are too numerous to be recounted in detail here. Galbraith, for example, relates the story of the dairy inspector in India who was upset with Americans who tried to instruct local retailers not to water their milk. Since India's large population required more milk than was available, watering seemed essential. The real accomplishment had been to get the producers to use sterile water instead of water from the gutters. Galbraith, John Kenneth. "The Polipolutionists." The Atlantic 219:52, January 1967.

a context that gives adequate allowance to the beliefs and feelings of the people of other nations. Intercultural understanding is a legitimate goal in its own right, but it also plays a crucial supporting role in the adequate discussion of decisions in international relations.

“Non-decision” cases can also be used to launch a new unit of work. It often is difficult to stimulate students to do the background reading deemed necessary before discussion of decision cases is initiated. Cases that pose the various conflicts and problems which will be studied can be used to good advantage for this purpose. For example, discussion of a case presenting the plight of a peasant family in Vietnam as a battle between Viet Cong and American troops engulfs the family farm might provide an emotional context for pursuing questions about U. S. involvement in Vietnam. Of course, once students are involved in debate over policies, they will likely see further reading as relevant and necessary.

Method

In the previous paragraphs, it has been suggested that cases can be used in various ways and that the case method may be used in conjunction with other methods, such as lecture. However, what is the case method? Just as there are many types of cases that might be used as a basis for discussion, there are a variety of types of discussion, each demanding different teacher behavior, and, in that sense, different methods. In the use of cases in law and business schools, the instructor typically plays an active leadership role. Although the emphasis is on having the student state and defend decisions, the teacher initiates and directs the discussion. He decides when one individual has been grappling with the problem long enough and when the class needs a lecture to provide needed concepts or background. He also guides the drawing of conclusions, summarizes, and so on. This method is teacher-oriented in that the teacher is the leader, but student-centered in that responsibility for thinking is put upon the student.

The alternative methods available to teachers for conducting discussions are practically unlimited. However, a review of several text-

*Several chapters in McNair, op. cit., discuss this type of instructional role.
books for social studies methods courses indicated that the case method as such was rarely treated, although the specific questions teachers might ask in guiding discussions was a fairly common topic. In the books reviewed, little consideration was given to different types of discussions.

Glatthorn, in his brief consideration of small group instruction, has succinctly described three types of discussions that might be used with cases in international affairs. One of these is the "discursive" discussion, the "free and uninhibited discussion by students of a topic. . . ." This type of discussion is roughly equivalent to a "bull-session" in which the teacher is primarily an observer and the students carry the brunt of the discourse. The bull-session can easily be overused; however, if our intent is to prepare adults who can make decisions without the guidance of an authoritative figure, it may well be important to provide students with early experience in discussing international issues with their peers. Perhaps it goes without saying that analyzing tape recordings of these "teacherless" discussions of cases can be extremely fruitful—both as a means for the teacher to assess student competencies and as a means of alerting the students to the strengths and weaknesses in their approaches to decision-making.

Glatthorn also comments on "heuristic" groups. With this discussion type "emphasis is on inquiry and discovery" with the teacher a "responsive environment" whose function is to provide guidance in the process of inquiry. The teacher's role is to guide students in learning to ask questions in fruitful paths of inquiry as they try to come up with defensible positions on international affairs. Learning processes

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* Ibid., p. 9.

* Ibid., p. 11.

*See, for example, Suchman, Richard J. "Inquiry Training: Building Skills for Autonomous Discovery." *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 7; 1961; and (by the same author) "Inquiry Training in the Elementary School." *Science Teacher* 27:42-47; No. 7, 1960.
of inquiry cannot be the exclusive goal of discussion, but the development of the student's ability to initiate his own inquiries should be stressed.

The "maieutic" or "Socratic" discussions sketched by Glatthorn might also be used with cases in international affairs. Here the teacher initially challenges and probes, plays the devil's advocate, and often deliberately introduces confusion by upsetting the student's previously unexamined views. As the discussion moves along, the teacher shifts from an adversarial role to the role of mutual-seeker-after-truth. The principal advantage of Socratic discussions would seem to be the involvement of the student in the discussion of international affairs in the same context in which he is likely to confront them as an adult—that is, in an argumentative dialogue.

**COMMENTS ON A CASE**

Brief consideration of a specific case may be the best way to elucidate some of the foregoing points on case method teaching. The following case is intended to illustrate the type of material for discussion that can be prepared relatively easily by a teacher, given the limited time usually available for such preparation and the resources commonly available in the school or community library. There is no pretense that the case is a complete, scholarly document such as is often turned out by university professors or by interested groups with funds and personnel. If the teacher had to rely on cases from such sources, however, case method teaching would not be a viable alternative in international affairs. The case materials available are simply not adequate in terms of numbers or correspondence with teachers' objectives. By the same token, if teachers were expected to prepare scholarly, complete records of decisions in international affairs, case preparation at the local level would be impossible.

This short case, built around a fictional aide to the U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, deals with the decision of the United States to send troops into the Dominican Republic in 1965.

*Glatthorn, op. cit., pp. 12-13.*
A SAMPLE CASE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN CRISIS?

Wesley Anderson found himself in a position common to embassy political officers. He had been asked to advise the Ambassador on an important matter involving local political developments. By three o'clock, he was to be ready with a recommendation as to whether the President should be advised to send American marines and soldiers into the Dominican Republic. It was now 10 minutes to three, and Anderson doubted that the remaining few minutes would bring him any nearer to a clear-cut recommendation. But a decision had to be made. The rebels were gaining more strength by the hour. If the United States did not decide soon whether or not to send in troops, there might be no decision to make—it could be too late to do anything.

As Anderson listened to the sound of gunfire in the streets outside of the Embassy, he thought about the events of the past few days. "It seems incredible. Just four days ago a mere handful of men, apparently with few active backers, captured the radio station in Santo Domingo. Today their forces have grown large enough to resist the Dominican Army effectively. The United States now faces the distasteful choice of sending in troops and being accused of interfering in the affairs of another nation or standing by and risking that another Latin American country will be taken over by the Communists."

Wesley prided himself on his reputation for cool, clear-headed thinking, for his ability to wade through emotion and get at the facts. "But," he thought, "here I am in the midst of turmoil, and I am supposed calmly to help make a decision that could well affect our relations with Latin America for years to come."

He thought over the seemingly reliable information available to him. "The rebels claim that they are not Communists, and for most of them this seems to be true. They do have the support of many people in the country who were outraged when military leaders deposed Juan Bosch, the first democratically elected president in Dominican Republic history. How can people be blamed for fearing that the military junta might become another dictatorship? The country suffered much during the many years Trujillo was in power."

"This case is based on reports in the New York Times from April 29 to May 2, 1965."
"On the other hand," he reflected, "there certainly are Communists among the rebels. No one knows how many, or whether they are in control. Can we afford to wait and see how powerful they are? Communists have a well-deserved reputation for gaining control in times of crisis."

He then began to mull over some of the decisions that the United States government could make. "We could simply stay out of the whole mess, and let the Dominicans settle their own affair. Those rebels who are devoted to democracy might be able to establish a government. But what of the rather quick change in Castro from an outwardly liberal reformer to a Communist? Might not such changes happen in the Dominican Republic as well as in Cuba? Besides, we know that some of the rebels are not Dominicans. Many have been trained by Communists in other countries to take advantage of situations such as this. Doesn't the presence of these men amount to outside interference?"

"As an alternative," his thoughts went on, "we could appeal to the Organization of American States. Any action taken with OAS approval would have the weight of international law. We would probably get support from Paraguay; and Argentina and Brazil would likely back us. However, Venezuela, Panama, Chile, and Peru might be hard to convince. Even Mexico might hesitate to support intervention. Moreover, taking the situation to the OAS would take several days—and by then it might be too late even if action were approved."

"One other alternative is for the United States to act on its own and send in troops to restore peace. This action might ruin years of effort to overcome the image of the North American bully with the 'big stick.'"

At that point, there was a knock on the door. Anderson's secretary poked her head into the room. "It's three o'clock, and the Ambassador is waiting to discuss your recommendation before he telephones the President."

This case is relevant to several points made previously. In the first place it illustrates one of the variety of materials that can be used as the basis for discussion, depending on the teacher's goals. At the same time, this one case could be used for a variety of purposes. While the emphasis is on personalization of a foreign policy decision, the case might be used, for instance, to introduce a unit of study on U.S.-Latin
American relations, to involve students in the consideration of the issues faced in a decision to intervene in another country, to illustrate numerous applications of critical thinking concepts to such decisions, to raise questions about the "facts" surrounding U.S. involvement in the Dominican Republic, or even to initiate discussion of the role of junior embassy officials. None of these uses, of course, excludes the others.

It should be fairly obvious that this case is intended to be used as a foreign policy decision case, not as an emotional-impact case. Also, the case has been written as a basis for involving students in decision-making, not to illustrate or explicate the process of decision-making followed by ambassadors or the President in such situations. Of course, the decision-making process used by the main character might be one discussion focus for the case.

This case does not dictate use of any one type of discussion. It could be used in a recitation-type situation in which students would be asked to think of and weigh the various factors that Anderson should consider in formulating a recommendation. Or it might be used as the basis for a Socratic discussion in which individual students would be asked to take and defend a stand on the recommendation Anderson should make. Various foci are possible for the latter type of discussion. For example, the conflict between our nation's commitment to help preserve "freedom" as opposed to our commitment to follow established "legal" procedures might be stressed. The teacher might be prepared to counter student arguments with instances of our own resistance to intervention on the part of other nations, or with illustrations of our commitment, domestically, to the use of established procedures in order to protect individuals against arbitrary, unjustified action. If the student argues against intervention, the teacher might stress the importance of defending our "national interests" and protecting the future freedom of the Dominicans.

However used, the case is obviously brief and intended to generate discussion and further inquiry rather than to convey complete cov-

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average of specific details. Discussion could, for example, include consideration of the practical context within which the President himself must finally make such a decision, as well as examination of the factual assumptions made by Anderson.

In some instances, then, the case might serve as a springboard to the acquisition of further information about U.S. involvement in Latin America. Discussion of issues presented by the case could proceed, however, with little information beyond that available from the case and the students' general knowledge. Undoubtedly many social studies discussions are superficial because the students lack background; but it also is true that the amount of background needed to discuss a case intelligently is often overestimated. Facts can often be temporarily assumed or posited so that confrontation with issues will not be avoided in the name of inadequate information. To illustrate: A student may say that because the class does not know much about the feelings of Latin Americans toward our country, discussion of Anderson's dilemma would be fruitless. To this the teacher might reply, first, by asking what relevance Latin American feelings have to Anderson's decision and, second, by positing a situation ("Let's say that the Latin Americans are very bitter toward the United States.") and pursuing the discussion in the light of the assumed circumstances.

The variety of uses for cases is not limited to the high school. Cases such as Intervention in the Dominican Crisis? can be used from elementary school through college. Experienced teachers in in-service courses will become as involved as junior high school students in the issues posed by similarly written cases. At whatever level the case is used, one caution must be kept in mind: cases and discussions cannot be perfect replicas of reality. In the use of emotional-impact cases, reading about a situation can only suggest the impact of living the actual experience. In the use of decision-cases, making a decision in class is not actually followed by action in which the individual assumes responsibility for the outcome.

For an excellent discussion of restricting factors, see Sorenson, Theodore C. Decision-Making in the White House. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. For example, Lawrence Senesh's Our Working World series (Chicago: Science Research Associates) includes materials that can be used as cases with elementary students. Sorenson, op. cit., emphasizes, for example, that the President ultimately has sole responsibility to live with his decisions.
PERSPECTIVE ON THE CASE METHOD

Unfortunately, instructional practices are often adopted without due appreciation of the state of research on the subject or the demands which will be made on teachers. Such naivete is sometimes responsible not only for over-enthusiastic claims, but for early disenchantment with sound, if not spectacular, practices. The discussion that follows is intended to present a necessarily brief, but realistic picture of the research concerning case method discussions and the special demands made on the teacher by the case method, including problems of assessing learning.

Research

There are, as we have already noted, two aspects of case method teaching—the case and the discussion of it. There is, in fact, little research on the effect of using various forms of written documents or other information sources as the basis for discussion. Research on discussion as a teaching method is somewhat more plentiful, even if it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from it. For example, despite the great emphasis in recent years on "discovery," "heuristic" teaching, and the intuitive appeal which such methods have, there is little evidence bearing on the effectiveness of this approach to case discussions. Another type of discussion style often discussed is the "maieutic," probing type of dialogue supposedly similar to that used by Socrates. How does the effectiveness of "Socratic" discussions measure up to methods more traditional to American schools?

Socratic case discussions were one of the teaching styles investigated by the Harvard Social Studies Project.21 The cases discussed presented the background to controversial domestic issues imbedded in general problem areas such as school desegregation, the growth of labor unions, or the growth of big business. One case, for example, presented the background to the decision by the white citizens of Front Royal, Virginia to close their public schools rather than have them racially integrated. The question posed for discussion was whether this decision was right, given the white parents' opinions about what

seemed best for their children and a societal commitment to equal education for all citizens. Equivalent dilemmas are readily discernible in international affairs and could serve as the basis for cases. Should the United States, for example, withhold grain supplies to another nation in which a large proportion of the population is threatened with starvation in order to force that nation’s government to take policy stands more favorable to our security?  

In the Socratic discussions, the Harvard Project teachers encouraged individual students to take personal positions on the issues presented in the case and then forced them to defend these decisions. In particular, inconsistencies among the student’s various values, and between his factual beliefs and his values, were emphasized. As discussions progressed the students were assisted in applying concepts of critical thinking to arrive at defensible positions.

The effectiveness of the Socratic technique was compared with that of discussions led by teachers using a “recitation” style, but based on the same cases. With this discussion style, students were not forced to take a personal stand, but rather were asked a series of questions to bring out the factors to be considered in handling the problem presented in the case. Students were asked, for example, what policy stands might be taken in regard to the issue in the case, what data might be relevant to making a reasoned position, what words might need to be clarified, what value conflicts would need to be confronted.

A research design was set up and an extensive statistical analysis was carried out to determine whether one discussion technique or the other was more effective in teaching students to apply analytic concepts to the consideration of public issues. On the several measures of learning used by the project, no significant differences were found between the students taught by the two methods. These findings were not surprising in the light of the number of past investigations which have produced similar results.

However, Oliver and Shaver classified students not only according to the type of case discussion to which they had been exposed, but also according to whether they fell into the bottom, middle, or top one-
third of the distribution on each of a number of personality measures. Analysis revealed several dramatic differences in learning for students who had been taught by the same method but fell into different thirds of a personality distribution. In other words, Socratic and recitation discussions evidenced marked differences in effectiveness depending on the personality characteristics of the students.24

While findings such as these are provocative, there has in fact been little research investigating the effectiveness of different case methods of teaching. As a result there is little systematic knowledge about the effect of different types of cases or of different types of discussion techniques.25 There is also little knowledge about the effectiveness of discussion versus other techniques, such as the lecture. It has not been conclusively established that discussion is more effective than lecture either in terms of mastery and retention of facts, or problem solving and the application of knowledge,26 even though some findings suggest that lecture may well be more effective in teaching "facts" and discussion more effective for other types of objectives.27

What are the implications for the classroom teacher interested in using the discussion of cases as a technique for teaching about international relations? In the first place, there is an obvious dearth of conclusive research findings. In making decisions about the use of the case method, the teacher will have to rely primarily upon his own judgments and those of his respected colleagues at the elementary, secondary, or college level, rather than upon research findings. He must, however, be careful about concluding too easily that discussion will be more effective than lecture or some other method in attaining his goals. He must also be cautious about assuming that one type of discussion will be better than another; here research evidence is espe-

24 Ibid., Section 5 of the Appendix.
25 For example, should teachers be democratic or autocratic? Richard C. Anderson has suggested that our research does not provide a clear cut answer. See his "Learning in Discussions: A Resume of the Authoritarian-Democratic Studies." Harvard Educational Review 29:201-15, 1959.
27 McKeachie, Ibid., p. 1127.
cially inconclusive and lacking. And he should be hesitant to conclude that any one method will have the same impact on all students. In fact, whenever possible, he will probably want to group his students according to the kind of discussion to which they seem to react well and teach the different groups accordingly. Of course, the last suggestion is most feasible in a team teaching setting.

**Demands on the Teacher**

The suggestions made in the preceding paragraph demand a great deal of the teacher, for while the usual uses of the case method call upon the teacher to be a discussion leader, we can tell him little about what specific leadership behaviors will be best. However, some suggestions can be made.

**ATTITUDES TOWARD STUDENTS AND CONTENT.** To begin with, the teacher who is going to use case methods, but has been accustomed to the traditional use of lecture and recitation based on textbook assignments, must abandon his role as purveyor of knowledge. His attitudes toward students will also be important. There must be basic respect for the students' views; students must be viewed as rational beings who have the intelligence and the right to grapple with significant problems. The teacher must be willing to engage in a free interchange of ideas, accepting student contributions as valuable and worthwhile, not as responses to be forced into a predetermined mold based on the teacher's judgments.

Aside from these attitudes the teacher must, in order to engage in a free-wheeling discussion, have an open, inquiring mind not addicted to thinking in categorical terms. In addition he must be able to tolerate conflict and the heat engendered by full and frank discussion.28

**PREPARATION.** The demands on the teacher as discussion leader go beyond the toleration of noise, disputation, and hostility. Discussions in which students are seriously involved in pursuing questions in international affairs do not happen by chance. The teacher must work to develop a general climate that allows the student to participate

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freely. In many schools the role of coparticipant will be a strange one to students. It will take time and effort to convince these students that their responses are wanted and that the desired behavior is not the parroting of the teacher's expressed point of view.

The student will also need help in learning the proper attitudes toward the discussion of cases: toleration of ambiguity as the discussants wrestle with the problem of determining the most appropriate routes to a reasonable decision; suspension of judgment in the face of inadequate evidence; acceptance of contrary decisions arrived at by acceptable processes of inquiry. These attitudes can be evidenced by the teacher in his own discussion behavior, and they can be discussed with the students as part of the general problem of maintaining open channels of communication so that the discussion will utilize the opinions, background, and knowledge of all participants.

Skills of Thinking. Processes of communication are not the only concern. Students must also be taught specific skills of analytic thinking. It is unlikely that students will learn to think critically as an incidental outcome of reading the works of great thinkers or of participating in discussions. The concepts and operations that the teacher wants students to learn and use must be identified and taught.

Schemes of critical thinking are available in the literature. Traditionally the emphasis has been on the answering of factual questions.

Should every child participate in a discussion? There is little systematic evidence on this point, despite the constant reminders of methods textbooks that all children should talk. Some unreported research by one of the authors of this paper indicates that extent of participation in discussions is not in itself a powerful predictor of learning. Perhaps social studies teachers have undersold the impact of vicarious experience—a mistake a teacher of literature would not likely make. Perhaps important vicarious experiences can be gained from hearing a vigorous lecturer debate with himself or challenge the student to answer silently—arguing inwardly against the lecturer’s position.


While there has been some attention to propaganda analysis, the problems of clarifying language have been neglected. Of particular concern to an adequate scheme for use in analyzing decision cases in international affairs is a rarely treated aspect of critical thinking: the making of ethical decisions. For at the root of each decision lies the question: How do I justify the particular course of action I am proposing? The concept of relevance is also important if discussions are to be fruitful. Almost any discussion among adults will provide ample evidence of the dissipating effects of the inability to determine which data or what arguments are relevant. It may be an instructional error to use cases that have been carefully written to exclude irrelevant matter, since they fail to challenge students to make the judgment of germaneness.

Cases. All in all, the various demands on the discussion leader require much out-of-class preparation. While it is common to visualize the lecturer spending hours carefully developing his notes, too often the discussion leader is envisioned as walking to class with no previous preparation to lead a discussion that will be delineated only by his students' whims. For the conscientious teacher this picture is obviously false, except perhaps in the case of the "discursive" or "bull-session" discussion. The initial task of finding or preparing cases is not an easy one. Appropriate cases will often not be available, and the teacher will have to prepare his own or abandon his instructional objective. Excellent source material for cases is available in news magazines and books. The problem, of course, is time. For the typical, already overburdened teacher, it will be difficult to find time for case research and writing. It may be so commonly said as to be trite, but the most serious need of American education is time for teachers to examine what they want to do and are doing, to inspect available materials, and to develop their own materials as necessary.

Although there will be little alleviation of the time problem as long as teaching loads remain at present levels, the teacher may obtain valuable assistance in case development from students. Students can search periodicals for information, and in many instances they can do a highly acceptable job of writing cases. The teacher will need to provide direction and guidance by delineating the subject matter of the cases to fit his teaching objectives, by checking on the adequacy of the sources used and the data included in the cases, and by editing the
writing. Beyond the production of cases, the result is likely to be valuable experience for the student in locating sources, organizing data and thoughts, and expressing himself in writing.

QUESTIONS AND STRATEGY. Once a case appropriate to the teacher's objectives is available, much preparation still remains. The teacher must ask himself how he is going to initiate discussion and what sorts of problems may be encountered during the discussion. What questions, for example, are left unanswered by the case that may need to be answered in order to continue a fruitful dialogue? If the teacher is going to conduct a "Socratic" discussion, he must ask himself a number of questions: What types of policies are students likely to propose to meet the problem posed by the case? What types of reasons and justifications will they have for their decisions? What responses should the teacher make in order to challenge them to an adequate consideration of deficiencies in and alternatives to their positions? Experience in the Harvard Project has indicated that being aware of the various issues underlying a problem and preparing an adequate array of counterarguments for student positions is a most demanding job. Fortunately, with experience teachers become more adept at thinking in Socratic terms.

The conscientious teacher faces a task of equal magnitude in preparing for a recitation discussion. He must have a comprehensive grasp of the subtleties of the case in order to program questions that will expose the students to an adequate cross-section of the problems to be met in reaching a reasonably well-grounded decision. He must also, of course, be ready to react to any of a number of different tacks which students might take in the discussion. As with Socratic teaching, he must be ready to suggest to the students other readings and courses of investigation to broaden their understanding and strengthen the basis for their decisions.

As with all teaching, the case method should be a means, a springboard, to student involvement outside the classroom. If the students' concern with the problem in the case ends as they leave the classroom, if the discussion stimulates no further reading, investigation, or discourse, then the discussion can rarely be judged a success.

THE COMPLEXITY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Among the most perplexing demands on the teacher who would conduct discussions on international affairs are the difficulties and complexities of the issues
themselves. To begin with, the consideration of international affairs involves students in the discussion of matters that are more abstract, in the sense of being less directly familiar, than is the case with domestic affairs. Most students have not had first hand experiences with other cultures, and it is more difficult for them to comprehend and appreciate the frames of reference of other nationals. We have already alluded to the limits which cultural perspective places on our ability to examine the reasonableness of a position from another cultural point of view.

The question of whether students should be encouraged to an empathetic view, or at what age they should be exposed to this sort of thinking, raises the specter of the relativity of values. As a result of projecting himself into another cultural frame of reference, the student may become less certain that his own value system is the right one. Such a suggestion is enough to shake the equanimity of many teachers, particularly if their school districts have active right wing groups protecting the virtues of American society. Nevertheless, intercultural understanding is crucial to the adequate comprehension of the behavior of other nationals and nations.

A related complication is the impinging of a number of value systems in the discussion of cases involving more than one nation. Our own value framework, with its conflicts between even the most basic of democratic values, is not easily applied to the analysis of decisions; but the problem is compounded when the disputants in a case come from cultures with different normative frames.

In addition, the workings of international affairs are not so clear-cut or predictable as the internal workings of the United States government. Even including informal factors, such as pressure groups, the procedures followed in making national decisions are fairly evident and the flow of governmental action fairly dependable. The usual procedures for a bill to become a law (including, for example, the work of lobbyists and the effects of the Congressional committee system) are commonly known, but what is the predictable course for development of a treaty? Once a law is passed in this country, there is some certainty about its enforcement or the process followed to have

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For example, demonstrations against U.S. involvement in Vietnam can be supported in the name of freedom of speech and opposed in the name of national security. Both are values of this society.
it rescinded or declared unconstitutional. How much certainty is there that a treaty will be followed or enforced? How much do we know about the actions by which it may be abandoned? The teacher who ventures unprepared into the discussion of cases in international affairs will not be able to fall back on his everyday, working knowledge of government as he can with domestic issues.

**Evaluation.** The evaluation of students also makes special demands upon the teacher who uses the case method. Two evaluation problems are somewhat peculiar to case method teaching. First, there is an inherent contradiction between the teacher's desire to obtain free and open student participation in discussions and his need to assess student performance in order to provide report card evaluation. Not only is the process of rating ongoing student performance likely to interfere with the teacher's own participation, but the knowledge that assessment is going on is likely to affect student performance. The second, and not unrelated problem, is the difficulty of establishing criteria by which to judge student learning with the case method. Surely knowledge as conventionally tested is not adequate as a sole criterion of learning. Furthermore, the common paper-and-pencil testing format can hardly be judged adequate for assessing how well one has learned to formulate and defend a decision in a discussion setting.

The systematic analysis of the content of discussions may provide at least a partial answer to both problems. Students soon grow accustomed to tape recorders, and recordings can serve as an excellent basis for the analysis of discussions, because verbal behavior is of primary interest. If recordings are occasionally played back for group or individual student analysis to increase discussion and analytic skills, and those for assessment picked from recordings used for instructional purposes, the effect of knowing that evaluation is taking place will be mitigated. Moreover, the analysis of the content of actual discussions provides a testing situation more in line with the objectives usually espoused for the case method.

Again the task is a demanding one. Categories must be developed and priorities assigned to types of comments. Recordings must be listened to, discussion broken down into scorable units (e.g., the simple sentence), and units scored in categories. Of necessity, the use of such a technique must be limited, but the invalidity of present tests
has long been decried. Means must be found for more valid testing, and the systematic analysis of discussion content is a promising technique.\textsuperscript{35}

CONCLUSION

In short, the case method provides no panacea for education in international affairs; nor does adoption of the case method dictate ready answers to instructional questions. Cases can be used for an almost limitless number of purposes and in an endless variety of ways. The social studies teacher’s goals in international education, hopefully based on careful consideration of the role of social studies in general education, should provide the criteria for selecting the subject matter and orientation of cases. Discussion techniques and methods of evaluation should be matched against the same criteria. If the rationale underlying the teacher’s instructional decisions includes a commitment to involving students in the active consideration of situations and issues in order to develop understandings or decision-making competencies, then the discussion of cases provides one means to the accomplishment of objectives in the teaching of international affairs.

ON THE NATURE OF COMPARISON

Cogito ergo sum—I think; therefore I am. The well known aphorism of Descartes states the fundamental feature that distinguishes homo sapiens, the thinking primate, from all other forms of life. It is only one short step from cogito ergo sum to cogito ergo comparo—I think; therefore I compare.

The act of comparison is an intrinsic feature of human intellectual activity. As one writer states, "... when we come across something new, we do not necessarily respond to it at once in a particular manner. We think it over. We can imagine making one of a number of possible responses, and imagine it so clearly that we can see whether it would be, if we made it, a mistake, without having to commit ourselves to action. We can make our errors in a thought and reject them in another thought, leaving no trace of error in us." Being able to perceive, to remember, and to imagine, we can judge and then act on the basis of judgment. In judging, we make choices from among things compared.

International Dimensions in the Social Studies

The Aims of Comparison

Whenever comparison occurs three questions are answered. What shall be compared? How shall the comparison be made? And for what purpose shall it be made? The choice of objects depends largely upon intended aims. The range of particular purposes that can be served by comparison knows no limits, but several types of aims are easily identified. One is the determination of preferences. This involves the comparison of the relation of a set of items to some standard.

Nearly everyone knows that old and elemental model of economics: the model of “economic man,” who assesses the alternatives and acts to maximize his gain. This is an idealized model of rational behavior based upon comparative analysis. No one believes there actually is an “economic man,” nor was it ever necessary to do so. But the model provides a standard for judging economic behavior and stipulating “proper” or rational economic preferences.

A traditional concern of economics has been to determine the “best” ways of using material wealth. Being analytical, economics was and is intrinsically comparative. Probably as a result, consciously-labeled comparative studies did not emerge as an important discrete element of the discipline during its formation as a social science.

The determination of preferences is only one possible objective of comparison. Another is the classification of phenomena in order to describe them. In essence classification is a relatively simple kind of operation, involving the matching of a set of items-to-be-classified with a set of “type-definitions.” In practice classification is a many-splendored thing, and any extended discussion must immediately face up to the question: What is the basis for classifying? The manner in which this question is answered will determine the meaningfulness and utility of the activity. Descriptive comparison has been an important feature of most of the social science disciplines and is commonplace in the humanities.

This, of course is a rather simple set of statements about a complex and many-sided discipline. Much descriptive subject matter has also existed within the discipline of economics, along with various kinds of comparison apart from that briefly noted here. For example, one finds the comparison of economic systems as part of the discipline, and this is different from the theory of the firm and marginal utility analysis.
The ubiquitousness of this kind of comparison results from a simple, inescapable fact: without comparing we cannot describe. Not much can be said about anything that is truly and totally unique. We can only comprehend "the unique" as something compared with other things by a classification process. Thus in this elemental and limited sense all studies are comparative. Whenever general concepts are used in considering particular items, descriptive comparisons are being made even if the classification of objects under categorical concepts is only implicit and unconscious.

More important, without comparing we cannot explain. One vital objective of comparison is to look for patterns of regularities—and variations from these—in phenomena of practically all kinds. This activity may be called comparative analysis. The aim of comparative analysis is to classify and study data in a way that will make it possible to perceive dynamic relations among them, as distinguished from static comparisons. This is the most complex type of comparison. In addition to a classification scheme, comparative analysis requires rules and procedures for finding and examining the patterns that may exist among the items compared.

**How to Compare: The Comparative Method**

The aims of comparison and the methods of comparison are only partially separable aspects of "the same thing." Description can be called an aim and classification a method. The distinction is largely a matter of perspective. The same can be said of explanation as an end and the search for regularities as a means. Yet the distinction between aim and method remains a matter of profound importance.

Available methods limit the kinds of purposes that can effectively be pursued. For most of human history comparative studies have been guided by two kinds of method. In Genesis it is recorded that Adam made his choice, and the comparison of good and evil has been among mankind's concerns ever since. Thus one comparative approach makes no sharp distinction between what is and what ought to be. Over the centuries many comparative studies have mingled "is" and "ought," the "better," and the "worse." From a positivistic perspective it is, of course, impossible to say that there is anything wrong with this.
But such approaches cannot directly lead to laws and theories about what "is."

Other comparative studies have sought to describe and explain what is and why it is, using intuition and deduction as the primary method. The basic problem of deduction is that "the broadest statement is made at the beginning." One can apply the grand axiom to various cases and interpret or explain them as manifestations of it. But deduction alone cannot enlarge explanatory capabilities.

A combination of subjective artistry and deductive analysis has been used in a wide variety of comparative studies over the years. Even today many exciting and germane questions can only be handled in this way. But for a long time empirical questions could not be systematically handled otherwise.

That relatively recent development, the emergence of the modern social sciences, has been essentially the rise of new methods of comparing and analyzing aspects of human behavior. A key feature of these methods is an underlying inductive approach. Inherent in it is a limited but not inconsequential ability to derive explanations of how and perhaps why things happen, by going from the data to the finding.

In principle there are no inherent limits in the ability to "grow new knowledge" through the use of social science methods (provided the basic assumption about order in the universe applies). In practice there are numerous limits. But they continue to be pushed back. The analytic, explanatory power of the modern social sciences is the key to their value. This power is a function of a methodology which is inherently comparative. Part of the appeal and much of the utility of many contemporary studies stems from the fact that they are based upon the inductive methodology of the social sciences.

**Pre-Social-Science Approaches to Comparison**

Twenty-three hundred years ago Aristotle set out to examine the state. His aims were to describe and to prescribe. His method was comparative analysis. His efforts have met the test of relevance: the *Politics* is still in print.
Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life. We must therefore examine constitutions, both such as actually exist in well-governed states, and any theoretical forms which are held in esteem; that which is good and useful may be brought to light.\(^1\)

Aristotle studied constitutions and states to find out how they worked and to measure their workings against his own ideals. Aristotle was no positivist; he wanted to consider “what government is best.” But he was also a realist, noting that “excellent ideas are often impractical,” that “the best is often unattainable,” and therefore that the student and statesman needed to know “what kind of government is adapted to particular states.”

Aristotle pursued his comparative studies of political systems to the point of making some inductive “if this . . . then that” statements. He perceived certain relationships between types of constitutions and the organizational and legal forms of governments. He noted that the efficacy of a given type of constitution appeared to depend upon certain kinds of governmental organizational and legal arrangements and vice versa.

The general objectives of systematic comparative studies are not radically different from Aristotle: to discover patterns or regularities and variations, to explain them, and thus perhaps to impose a degree of purposive order and control upon existence. But the Politics is not unalloyed social science. As a scholar, Aristotle was an artist—a systematic, disciplined, logical, imaginative, prescient scholar, and nonetheless an artist. The scientific and normative and the inductive and deductive were thoroughly blended in his work.

Later in our intellectual history came other scholars, more emphatically artistic than Aristotle, who produced impressive comparative studies in their essentially impressionistic-deductive efforts to explain the grand design of human existence. Arnold Toynbee’s monumental A Study of History is a vivid illustration. Toynbee set out to answer the question, Why do civilizations grow, stagnate, and decay? He wanted to discover the underlying factors that explain the rise and fall of great civilizations. To his own satisfaction Toynbee answered

his question through his comparative study of societies; the rise of a high civilization is inescapably linked with the presence of a creative minority and an environment that is stimulating but not too demanding upon society.

Toynbee's work is that of a brilliant and diligent artist, whose talent is matched only by his boldness. His work is artistic in the fundamental sense of being uniquely Toynbee. No one else could do what Toynbee did and reach identical conclusions in the selfsame manner. People can and will contend over his judgments and interpretations; these are intrinsic features of the work, as much embedded in it as Aristotle's judgments about the proper nature of state and society were incorporated in his Politics.

In aim if not in method Toynbee is linked with others who have probed the great riddles of human existence. Karl Marx was such a scholar. He sought to discover and explain the fundamental forces that pattern the course of human history. He based his grand theorem upon his own comparative studies and sought to explain the rhythm of social progress as he perceived it in the light of economic determinism and the labor theory of value.

Marxism today sustains the legitimacy of certain governments in the world and serves as the dogmatic basis for attacks on non-Communist regimes. Marx's influence—on efforts to shape as well as to study the world—cannot be denied. His own work was artistic. (That of some of his followers has been artful.) As a basis for comparative studies Marxist theory imposes a perspective which is inconsistent with the canons of inductive social science scholarship that have evolved in the West. It is not "theory" in the social science sense of the term. Rather, it is one of the great works of social philosophy.

Other artists are found among the antecedents to systematic comparative studies. Notable among them are the evolutionists—the early sociologists and anthropologists who studied social and cultural change and sought to explain it in terms of a determinate thesis about progress. These scholars were concerned with "stages of civilization." They compared societies and cultures and tried to relate their studies to an overarching theory of human development. This group included Comte and Spencer, who were among the forerunners of modern sociologists.
A "theory of social or cultural evolution" is a tantalizing thing. But it poses more problems than it solves. Like all meaningful comparative studies, such a theory presupposes the existence of patterns of order in the events of the world. But there are patterns and there are patterns, and there is a stark and elemental difference between the idea of empirically perceivable regularities on the one hand, and of definitions of "progress" or development on the other.

The evolutionists were as deterministic in their way as Marx. Some were as prescriptive as Aristotle. To talk of human progress, they had to put forth a standard for judging degrees of civilization or advancement. In making assumptions about "evolution," they asserted or implied an order and regularity in the grand pattern of human affairs that no evidence has as yet sustained. The evolutionists were essentially artists, bringing their own unique visions of reality into their studies of society.

THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SYSTEMATIC COMPARATIVE STUDIES

A variety of factors have combined to bring about modern comparative studies—social science studies marked by rigor of method, theoretical foundations, and the aim of contributing to comprehensive theories of human organization and behavior—that are a distinctive feature of contemporary Western scholarship.

Systematic comparative analysis in the social sciences is based upon the assumption that there is "order" or regularity in the world. (Not in everything, necessarily, but in many things.) In functional terms, the social scientist assumes that every empirical event has a cause. His highest task, then, is to isolate and identify the causal factors involved in the regularities perceived. By classifying phenomena in ways that focus upon the relationships between sets of events, it should therefore be possible to discover the dynamic relations that exist among them—in other words, to find orderly patterns of related actions. These relationships may be expressed in statements, sometimes called "laws," that take the form: "If A happens, then B will happen." (or: If A happens, then the probability that B will happen is .")
The discovery of patterns of regularities in the occurrences of events may lead to more general explanations of what causes things to happen. In other words, comparative analysis may inspire theories that explain classes of events by means of deductively related laws or regularities. The validity and reliability of such theories can be tested in application. For this reason these theories are different from the grand “theories” of scholars like Marx, Toynbee, Comte, and Spencer.

A theory is more comprehensive than a statement about some particular observed regularity. A useful theory does several things. First, it states or explains some dynamic relationship between a whole class of phenomena—it covers more ground than do particular “laws.” Second, it explains why the regular or orderly relationship exists, and it does this in terms of some underlying principle or process that is common to the whole class of phenomena.

The value of a theory lies in its broad explanatory power. This is what has made “theory-building” a passionate pursuit of scholars through the ages. But the emergence of the social sciences has greatly enlarged and sharpened this theory-making capability.

In the social sciences the word “science” is taken seriously and is perceived as the effort “to explore, to describe, to explain, and to predict the occurrences in the world we live in,” through the systematic marshaling and examination of empirical evidence. This kind of science seeks to be free from unyielding a priori stipulations about causation. It does not accept grand notions about evolution or other thematic forces that purport to explain the course of human events. Likewise, this science strives to be “value-free.” Unlike Aristotle, its practitioners are not, in their roles as social scientists, concerned with what is good or bad, but only with what is, or appears to be.

To trace the rise of modern social science is beyond the scope of this chapter. The roots go back a long way. Here we need offer only

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2 Ibid., p. 1.

Comparative Studies

Beginning with the Physiocrats in France and with Adam Smith in Britain, economics attains the status of an empirical science.7 With Durkheim about the end of the nineteenth century sociology began to become a generalizing social science. Some of the basic perspectives for a modern science of political behavior were stated by Arthur F. Bentley in 1908, in his seminal The Process of Government—a book that proved to be almost 40 years ahead of its time (along with the work of Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, published in the same year.) Social anthropology began to emerge in modern form with the work of Sir Henry Maine (Ancient Law) in 1861 and Edward B. Tylor (Primitive Culture) in 1871 (although neither was really a modern social scientist). The basic principles of the discipline of psychology emerged between 1880 and 1920, and psychology became a systematic science as its methods of inquiry developed after World War I.

If psychology straddles the line between “social science” and “natural science,” then history stands on the other end of the spectrum, belonging partly to the social sciences and partly to the humanities. Yet all the social sciences have their important historical aspect—we are all historians in a sense—and history, too, is distinguished by its scientific aspect. Beginning with the German historian Leopold von Ranke, early in the nineteenth century historiography began to blossom as an intrinsic element of the discipline. History became more mingled with the concerns of other social sciences in the latter nineteenth century, as historians turned to social, cultural, and economic subjects. And in contemporary times history has become a major source of refined materials for a variety of social science scholars.8

Finally, there is geography. It also has mixed affinities, claiming a degree of identity with the social sciences on the grounds that it contributes to the understanding of man in society. For a long time many geographers like Ellsworth Huntington were concerned with the pre-

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7 Ibid., p. 138.
sumably determining effect of natural conditions upon human behavior. Modern geography is less presumptuous and less ingenuous. Avressing a concern with "the study of the human occupancy of regions," geography focuses upon the spatial aspects of culture and social organization, and mingles with other social science disciplines under such rubrics as economic geography, political geography, and historical, cultural, and urban geography. Geographers who associate closely with the other social sciences are always in danger of losing their own disciplinary identity: the primary questions and many of the concepts that concern them derive from disciplines identified by the adjectives they attach to "geography." But these efforts have been rewarding. Urban geography, for example, is an increasingly important source of data and perspectives for studying some of the most challenging problems of contemporary civilization.

These modern social sciences are "systematically problem-oriented fields of inquiry.” This, however, does not mean that their chief immediate concerns are the discovery, definition, dissection, and disposition of the practical problems that wrack and threaten human existence.

There is a reformistic element in the social sciences, and much impetus to inquiry within them is a response to practical problems (including those problems whose investigation is generously funded by government and private foundations). And quite properly, the acceptance and support of the social sciences in modern society is linked with assumptions about the general relevance and utility of these disciplines to worldly needs and concerns. But social science is not merely social engineering; and the "problems" that concern social scientists are not just those that people in general see as vexing and threatening. They are rather "problems" of explanation—the myriad problems of trying to explain regularities and variations in human behavior through the study of empirical phenomena. In principle, and quite often in practice, social scientists are committed to the cumulative development of knowledge, and not to finding a functional equivalent of alchemy. Inherent in this commitment is an abiding concern with comparative studies, for systematic comparison is the basic method of the social sciences.
The Comparative Method and Comparative Studies

In recent years a concatenation of events has stimulated a great expansion of social science-oriented comparative studies. There was the emergence of the social sciences themselves. This was quickly followed, and partly paralleled, by unprecedented changes in the world. New problems and new kinds of commitments have spurred the quest for comprehension and control. The social sciences have blossomed as the world has erupted.

Until World War II most of the world simply was not relevant terrain for most of the social sciences. (The chief exception is probably anthropology. Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Bronislaw Malinowski, and others were laying the foundations of systematic study in social anthropology long before World War II, and doing it by studies in places that most other social scientists had never heard of.) Before the war "many economists, sociologists, political scientists and psychologists . . . cultivated an Olympian complacency about the universality of their disciplines, and did not feel the need to go beyond the familiar experience of Europe and the United States for illustration and proof of their universal principles."9

Then came the dissolution of colonial empires, the emergence of a host of new nations, attempts to promote modernization and development in these nations, and the interplay of the "free world," communist imperialism, and "third forces." One might also add the development of thermonuclear weapons and the simmering threat inherent in rapid population growth. These events produced and constituted new sets of socio-political phenomena and problems, to put the matter mildly. Quick on the heels of such clamorous events has come the cumulative impact of urbanization and technology here at home, producing social changes of unique magnitude and speed and challenging the established order of myths and structures in our own society.

In short, rapid, drastic changes in the viability of initial assumptions concerning a wide-range of behavior has stimulated a tumultuous

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growth in the social sciences. In view of the nature of the events, it would be unseemly to speak of a "happy combination of affairs" in the parallel growth of the world's problems and the social sciences. But the relationship appears evident. And the response of the social sciences to the circumstances of our time has been dual: to expand the scope of their terrain, and to refine and develop their methodology.

The logic of method—the combination of principles and practices governing systematic inquiry—may not seem very compelling as one contemplates starvation in India, urban blight in the United States, nation-building in the Congo, and pressure for social reform in Latin America. Yet the development of more powerful and perceptive means and modes of inquiry is a primary characteristic of the social sciences, and the key to the ability to define and examine problems and issues that only recently were beyond their competence. This expanded capability for engaging in systematic comparative analysis has had much effect upon the character of contemporary comparative studies.

COMPARATIVE STUDIES, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS

It is difficult to characterize the consequences of these developments but they seem to include at least five important trends in comparative studies.

THE TERRAIN. The subject matter treated under the rubric of comparative studies has expanded vastly. Governments and societies that only a few years ago were exotic and unfamiliar, and economic phenomena that hardly existed, are now among the popular objects of study in our colleges and universities. The field of comparative government, for example, was once largely bounded by the limits of North America and Western Europe. Now it covers more territory than the membership of the United Nations. There has been a proliferation of courses and programs.

DEPTH. Greater breadth has been matched by greater depth. Concepts and perspectives of social science have been brought into play in describing and analyzing an ever-enlarging range of phenomena. The social sciences have enhanced our descriptive and explanatory
Comparative Studies

power by enabling us to look at more aspects of the objects of inquiry and to say more about how they work.

To cite an example: Not many years ago "comparative government" focused on the parallel study of a limited number of governments. It looked at their legal characteristics, their historical development, and various governmental problems usually treated in a thoroughly subjective and prescriptive fashion. Twenty-three hundred years after Aristotle the best of these efforts sometimes achieved a perspicacity reminiscent of his own.

Today the prevalent quality of the comparative study of politics is quite different. Things are really compared, not merely examined in parallel, through the use of models and constructs that permit the examination of similarities and differences in groups of political structures and patterns. The comparison is not limited to describing static structures and their formal procedures. A focus once limited to government has extended to politics. Politics is viewed in more ways than one, but the dominant motif is that of a "political system," with many parts and also with a functional dimension. Comparative description and analysis treats such items as "representation" and "rule-making" as processes rather than merely examining legislatures as formal structures. "Social integration," "leadership," and "authority," to mention only a few, are indicative of the categories of analysis used in the comparative study of political systems.

New comparative approaches such as these pose their problems. They also have significant consequences for the organization of academic enterprises. The problems are substantial, and none is greater than that of meeting the requirements of competence:

Consider what the contemporary practitioner of comparative politics is supposed to know in order to be au courant with all the main streams of his field. He is supposed to be at once a political scientist, a logician, and a methodologist. He is supposed to know a good deal of sociological, anthropological, social-psychological, and general systems theory. His knowledge must (ideally) extend not merely to a specific country, nor even to a particular region or type of government, but over the whole universe of political phenomena. He must not only know contemporary politics, but be something of a universal historian as well. ... Certainly, the study of public law, in which
scholars of the past made rich and busy careers, has become a mere fraction of the things he is supposed to study...

METHODOLOGY. Professor Eckstein’s statement is evidence of a third trend in both comparative studies and the social sciences generally: a growing coherence within the social sciences, marked by an expanding body of common methodology. As a result the customary disciplinary delineations have been losing discreteness. Political scientists study the social system, the civic culture, and economic policy. A breed of anthropologists and sociologists makes “political” a prefix to their generic identifying labels. (Some day we may have political economists!)

No one knows the degree to which political scientists, sociologists, social anthropologists, social psychologists, non-physical geographers, and historians have come to share in a common scholarly culture. This culture, characterized by a common code governing principles and standards of inquiry, and a shared bag of systematic research methods, is at best inchoate; but it is producing a growing coherence within the social sciences (or at least sets of coherences that link across disciplinary boundaries within sectors of the social sciences). New patterns of academic specialization are forming, and are to some extent being integrated by the intellectual culture common to many social scientists.

ACADEMIC ORGANIZATION. As one would expect, all these developments must have their effect upon academic organization. Rather than producing a major restructuring of established academic disciplines, they have added a dimension of academic organization. Within universities it takes the form of institutes, centers, committees, programs, and groups composed of members from different disciplines with common interests. At Indiana University, for example, one finds multidisciplinary graduate area studies programs with substantial and diverse social science participation that makes them comparative as well as areal. Separate but not apart from these is a Political and Administrative Development Program focusing upon the comparative study of social change in the political sector of developing nations.

An International Development Research Center and a Human Resources Development Committee encourage and support research on a variety of developmental problems, generally stressing a comparative, multidisciplinary approach.

A brief sketch of the "new layer" of organization that has developed in many American universities, in response to the expansion of the social sciences and the concomitant rise of modern comparative studies, would require several pages. The general pattern, however, is quite common: multidisciplinary integrative mechanisms for comparative studies, set off from but drawing participants from individual academic departments, typically concerned with either teaching or research, with strong social science orientations.

In passing it should be noted that these comparative studies are not necessarily cross-cultural, nor does it make sense to think of them only in this way. For example, comparative urban studies may be cross-cultural, but they may equally well focus upon a terrain limited to a single culture. The same is true of other comparative studies. Cross-cultural comparisons involve special problems. For some people and institutions they have a special appeal, but the essence of comparative studies in the modern sense is not in their being cross-cultural: it consists of systematic comparative analysis. The only comparative studies that are inherently cross-cultural are comparative studies of cultures.

A second trend in the organizational response to the rise of comparative studies within the social sciences has been the formation of professional committees that bring together members from several disciplines and perhaps many academic institutions. Examples include the influential and productive Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, and the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration.

A recent development of potentially great significance has been the creation of an Institute for Comparative Sociology, with representatives from eight Midwestern universities plus participants from Columbia University and the University of California at Berkeley. This organization marks a new phase of interest in explicitly comparative analysis in the discipline whose concepts and methods are already the foundation for much multidisciplinary comparative study. The prime aim of
the Institute is to attack fundamental methodological problems, some of which have emerged from efforts at cross-cultural applications of sociological concepts and theories.\textsuperscript{11}

Comparative studies have entered the field of professional education in the form of the Comparative Education Society. This organization and its journal, \textit{Comparative Education Review}, represent in the field of professional education the kind of development that has taken place in the comparative studies generally. Comparative education traces back to nineteenth century educators whose immediate aims were quite pragmatic—improving educational systems. The growth of the field more or less paralleled developments in such areas as comparative government. The initial focus was historical and concerned with national systems of education. Today, however, one finds comparative education a perspective of study shared by a variety of scholars, both inside and outside professional schools of education, including sociologists, economists, political scientists, and others with strong social science identifications. The society and its publication are an example of the interinstitutional, interdisciplinary development that is a feature of comparative studies today.

THE SCHOOLS. The burgeoning of comparative studies and the rise of the modern social sciences generally are having a great impact upon prime consumers of its product—the elementary and secondary schools, especially the latter. Bernard Berelson has noted that making up the social science curriculum in a school already resembles the bargaining efforts of an international organization.\textsuperscript{12} Things are not likely to get any simpler in the near future. The burden of expectations unloaded on the social studies (and apparently accepted with enthusiasm by many people in the field) is stupendous. It is equalled only by the problem of shaping strategies to carry it in the absence of compelling guidance on how to do this and in the presence, one suspects, of

\textsuperscript{11} For a fuller description of this development see Useem, John, and Grishaw, Allen D. "Comparative Sociology." \textit{Items}, Social Science Research Council. December, 1966.

occasional institutional rigidities reminiscent of the Sabertooth Curriculum.

The social studies are expected to "socialize." The social sciences, fecund sources of knowledge and interpretation, throw increasing light on socialization as a phenomenon. But they can never provide goals and specify strategies for socializing. Meanwhile, some of the central strategic premises of the social studies have been eroded, partly by changes in society, and partly by the (social scientific) analysis of the strategies themselves.

The integrative mechanisms within the social sciences are conceptual and methodological. Yet granting the existence of the "social science culture" mentioned above, one must note two other factors that restrict the extent to which the social sciences are integrated: the limited extent to which this common culture effectively integrates the social sciences, and the problem of competence stated, with appropriate poignancy, by Professor Eckstein. If changes in the social sciences are helping "unglue" the old integrative mechanisms—such as there were—within the social studies, to what extent, and in what fashion, might developments in the social sciences provide new and better means for advancing relevance and coherence within the social studies? The social sciences are invariably better at posing than answering questions, and some questions, such as this one, are beyond the bounds of social science competence.

Man cannot live by social science alone, and some of the substantive concerns of the social studies are at least partly beyond the capability of the social sciences. For example, it is in many contexts difficult to make systematic descriptive and predictive statements about the phenomena people have in mind when they use the word "power." Yet we must live with "power," use it, watch out for it, perceive institutions in terms of it, and try to understand many things that can aptly be labeled with this term.

Some very fruitful insights into power, including comparative studies of power in communities, polities, economics, and societies, are found in studies that are essentially impressionistic. Even here, however, the conceptual orientation of the social sciences has had its influence. An important part of the "power" of the social sciences lies in their ability
to help shape perspectives of analysis, even when the analysis itself is not "pure" social science.

If man cannot live by social science alone, neither will mystique and unquestioned tradition suffice for survival and mastery of the world's problems. More than ever there is danger in descriptions, interpretations, and prescriptions based upon hoary wisdom and prophetic vision. On this premise rests the most potent argument for the assimilation into the social studies of all that can be taken from the social sciences. But this, unfortunately, will not solve the problems of the social studies as a disciplinary area.

In short, and in conclusion: (a) The compelling relevance of the social sciences for the social studies lies largely in the incremental capability of understanding and control that social science knowledge has to offer. (b) Taking advantage of this relevance complicates the already complicated problems of the social studies. The integrative mechanisms that have been emerging within the social sciences may be of some help in integrating the social studies. But such developments as the rise of modern comparative studies pose problems more than they proffer solutions. The flux and the ferment that mark the social sciences will continue to spread within the social studies, to produce more conflict and confusion—and, one hopes, the compensations of creativity, comprehension, and new and better forms of coherence.
Resources
and Programs

Part IV reports on some of the programs, resources, and opportunities available for strengthening the international dimension of the social studies. Chapter 15, by Martin Cramer, lists a number of educational programs sponsored by agencies of the federal government. In Chapter 16, Jerry Moore describes a few of the better known foundation-supported programs. In Chapter 17, Gerald Marker evaluates the efforts of state departments of education in the field of international affairs. World affairs councils as a source of aid to educators are discussed by William Rogers in Chapter 18. And Chapter 19, by Frank Klassen, deals with the attempts made by schools of education to internationalize their curriculum.
Federal Government Programs

Chapter 15

The teacher of international affairs knows all too well the information explosion he faces, but might not, paradoxically, know much about the opportunity explosion resulting from a wide range of federal government programs, designed to help him better understand international relations and other areas of the world. This situation results from lack of adequate publicity in some cases, but more often, perhaps, arises from the fact that these programs are currently administered by a variety of offices in a number of federal agencies, notably in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of State.

This chapter is an attempt to list some of the opportunities now available from federal agencies to teachers of world affairs and related subjects. Although it is not a complete list, it may offer some help in clarifying the range of government programs and services of which teachers may now avail themselves.
CLASSROOM RESOURCES

Federal assistance to teachers of international affairs takes many shapes and originates in many separate sources in the government. In its simplest and most direct form, however, federal aid consists in providing teachers with educational materials—publications and audiovisual tools—and making available speakers to give informative lectures or help in improving world affairs programs in the schools.

Educational Materials

Materials describing and explaining the formation and operation of current American foreign policy are produced principally by two governmental agencies or departments. The first, the Agency for International Development, is in charge of administering most United States technical assistance and development programs abroad. AID prepares a variety of educational materials, mainly films and pamphlets, designed to convey the nature and scope of its work in underdeveloped nations. One film, for example, is entitled A Simple Cup of Tea, and depicts agricultural work in a rural section of East Pakistan. Another film, Quiet Battle, shows aspects of U.S. foreign aid in several countries. AID materials on Vietnam focus on the pacification program, and include a number of pamphlets as well as a film entitled The Other Viet-Nam. Requests for information about AID materials should be addressed to the Public Information Staff, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C. 20523.

The Department of State, as the leading initiator and executor of foreign policy, is naturally the most prolific producer of materials that describe the background of foreign policy decisions and analyze the process by which they are reached. Among the wide variety of State Department publications are Background Notes (brief statements on individual countries), Geographic Bulletins, descriptions of how a Foreign Service mission (the "Country Team") operates, accounts of chief-of-state conferences in Asia and Latin America, discussion of changes in the Communist world, and analyses of U.S. policy in Vietnam. It should perhaps be noted that materials published by AID and the Department of State, particularly ones that deal with controversial policy issues, can be expected to expound the "official" point of
view on the subjects they discuss. Teachers and students can none-theless find valuable insights into the aims of current American policies from these materials, even those that touch upon such complicated problems as Vietnam.

Providing information on past—as well as present—foreign policy decisions is another service performed by the Department of State. Its Historical Office issues two principal publications: the comprehensive *Foreign Relations Series* and *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*. Both of these series contain original materials that can be used to show students how historians approach their tasks. Teachers and students can choose whichever publication is most appropriate to the period they are studying: the *Foreign Relations Series* (through 1945), *Current Documents* (through 1964), or, for the most current “history,” the weekly Department of State *Bulletin* or the bi-weekly *Foreign Policy Briefs*.

These written materials are supplemented by a number of audio-visual aids. Films, with accompanying discussion guides, are available on such subjects as United States foreign policy objectives, American representation abroad, and U.S. relations with Western Europe. Soon to be made available, in addition, are a film discussing the factors that enter into foreign policy decisions and one on the U.S. mission at the United Nations. A filmstrip on a variety of topics prepared by the Department of State, “The United States and the World: An Introduction to Our Foreign Relations,” can be used by teachers from elementary school to high school.

Tape recordings, made by senior Department of State officials, include discussions of the Foreign Service, the Country Team, foreign aid, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. These audiotapes, like many of the Department of State films, are accompanied by discussion guides. Upon request, officers of the Department of State, who are on speaking tours, will also prepare videotapes for school systems, colleges, or educational television stations.

The procedure for obtaining Department of State materials varies widely. Initial inquiries about both publications and audiovisual materials should be addressed to the Distribution Services Staff, Office of Media Services, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Speakers and Briefings

The Department of State provides one further means for teachers and schools to improve their world affairs programs. Through its Office of Public Services, it arranges speeches, college visits, and briefing sessions in which officers of the Foreign Service offer the professional diplomat's point of view on international relations. These lectures may be arranged for various kinds of audiences: schools, colleges, community organizations, teachers meetings, and television and radio broadcasts. The Foreign Service officers who participate in this program include Senior Fellows at universities throughout the country or political advisors to major military commands. Teams of four officers hold panel discussions in Community Meeting tours throughout the country. Tours of individual officers often feature day-long College Visits, during which the officer meets with college administrators, faculty, and students in a wide variety of formal and informal forums. Upon request, Department of State officers deliver "telelectures," from the Department building.

Teachers who take their students on a trip to Washington may also arrange for a foreign affairs specialist to give the class a briefing session at Department of State headquarters. Teachers without their students often attend briefing sessions as well, and are also invited to attend the symposia held 10 times a year on geographical and political regions of the world.

Finally, the Department of State operates a program of national and regional conferences aimed, at least in part, at teachers of world affairs. National conferences for educators in 1966 and 1967 included many social studies teachers among the invited guests. Regional conferences, generally arranged at the request of local sponsors, include Youth Conferences, in which high school students, accompanied by their teachers, discuss foreign policy issues with senior Department of State officials. Special regional conferences for educators have been held in Minnesota, California, and Florida. The Department of State will also hold a special briefing session for teachers planning to attend the November 1968 meeting of the National Council for the Social Studies.

Inquiries on and requests for any of these services may be directed to the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, U. S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Teacher Training in International Affairs

In addition to the programs mentioned above, which furnish direct assistance to teachers and schools in the form of materials or speakers, there are several programs of indirect federal assistance in the field of international affairs. Through these programs funds are made available to colleges and universities for organizing and operating summer institutes and seminars in a number of social studies fields and topics including many in the area of international affairs. These programs are administered by the U.S. Office of Education, although all individual applications must be made to the particular colleges or universities at which the seminars or institutes are held.

NDEA Institutes for Advanced Study are authorized by Title XI of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. The first Institutes were held in 1959, and social studies subjects were added to the list of approved fields in 1964. NDEA Institutes now exist in five social studies areas: history, geography, civics, economics, and, beginning in 1968, international affairs. Institute programs are designed for both elementary and secondary school teachers, although the majority of programs in the area of international affairs are limited to teachers on the secondary level. Certain of the Institutes, in addition, are tailored to the special needs of supervisors, teacher trainers, and teachers of disadvantaged youth.

Although 1968 will be the first year for Institutes specifically designated as international affairs, there have been in past years a number of seminars that actually treated topics in international relations. These Institutes were generally organized under related rubrics such as history, geography, and civics. Secondary school teachers who attended Institutes in 1967, for example, had a wide variety of programs from which to choose in the international affairs field. In particular, NDEA Institutes in history included some 30 programs classified under the subheading of “World History and Foreign Areas,” ranging from area studies (e.g., Latin America, East and South Asia) to special topics (e.g., European Cultural History, History of Islamic Civilization and the Middle East) to political or social problems (e.g., Minorities in the Modern World). In addition, 1967 Institutes in civics included several studies relating to international affairs, such as Developing Nations, Comparative Communist Studies, and Southeast
Asia. Geography, too, included some Institutes that treated foreign areas.

In the summer of 1968 nine NDEA Institutes are being held in international affairs, some of them to be located overseas. As in previous years, a number of Institutes dealing with topics in international affairs are included under other social studies headings. Teachers may obtain a listing of NDEA social studies Institutes by writing to the Division of Program Administration, Bureau of Educational Personnel Development, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C. 20202. Prospective applicants may then receive further information from the particular college or university sponsoring the Institute to which they wish to apply.

Another type of seminar program in the field of international affairs operates under certain provisions of Section 102 (b) (6) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays). The seminars are conducted by United States colleges and universities which receive financial support for the programs from the Division of Foreign Studies. The summer seminars are open to teachers of secondary school social studies, college instructors and assistant professors. In contrast to the NDEA Institutes for Advanced Study, which are generally (though not entirely) held in the United States, the seminars in this program are held exclusively abroad. Each seminar is conducted by an American college or university which makes the overseas arrangements for operation of the seminar. Most seminars are designed to include about six weeks of academic study, followed by two weeks of travel in the foreign area. Although knowledge of the relevant foreign language is not a prerequisite for participation in the seminars, it is considered "a definite asset." Seminars are intended to give participants insight into the culture, economics, political system, or geography of the individual country in which they are held, or, in some cases, of the entire area in which that country is located. Teachers who wish information on the seminars for a particular summer may obtain a list of those programs in February of the year of the seminar by contacting the Overseas Projects Section, Division of Foreign Studies, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C. 20202. Individual applications, however, are received by the sponsoring institutions, not by the Division of Foreign Studies.
Teaching Abroad

The federal government sponsors or operates a variety of programs that enable elementary and secondary school teachers to teach and live abroad for periods of a year or more. These programs, although primarily aimed at benefiting teachers and students overseas, also provide valuable experiences and insights for the participating American teacher. Some overseas teaching positions are available to teachers as part of the United States educational exchange program, while other assignments are offered through agencies operating abroad, such as the Agency for International Development, the Department of Defense, or the Peace Corps. Considering all the overseas teaching opportunities currently available, the enterprising teacher might, according to his needs and interests, find himself in any one of dozens of countries, ranging from developing nations in Africa or Asia to sophisticated countries of Western Europe.

One of the major overseas teaching programs is that established by the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 and administered by the U.S. Office of Education under an interdepartmental agreement with the Department of State. The attractiveness of this program lies in the fact that it benefits not only the teacher, who gains the experience of teaching in a foreign school, but also the foreign school, its students, and teacher's home school in the United States, which can, under certain conditions, receive a foreign teacher in exchange for the American teacher abroad. Not all overseas teaching assignments in this program, on the other hand, are operated on a direct interchange basis; in some cases the American or foreign teacher assumes a position on a one-way basis.

During the 1967-68 academic year, overseas teaching positions of both the interchange and the one-way variety were available in 35 countries. The majority of openings were in elementary and secondary schools, although some college and university positions were listed. In most countries the subject in greatest demand was English as a foreign language, but in English-speaking countries any subject might be included. Specific positions as well as the countries involved in this program can be expected to vary from year to year. Information about and applications for teaching overseas can be obtained from the Teacher Exchange and Training Branch, Bureau of Elementary and
American teachers can also find opportunities abroad in schools operated by the Department of Defense for the children of military personnel abroad. Teaching experience in these schools is not, of course, likely to differ radically from teaching in schools in the United States, since the aim of Department of Defense schools is to match the quality, standards, and techniques of American schools insofar as possible. On the other hand, DOD schools have the advantage of combining an American curriculum and milieu with residence in a foreign country. Teachers who find this an appealing combination may secure further information and applications from the Chief, Placement Branch, Department of Defense, Overseas Dependent Schools, Old Post Office Building, 12th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20305.

The civilian counterparts of Department of Defense schools are the independent American-sponsored schools that serve American, local, and third-country students. These schools were established to fill the educational needs of the large communities of American diplomats, government employees, and businessmen residing abroad. In addition, they are designed to further mutual understanding by serving as demonstration centers abroad of American educational services and practices. Hiring of teachers for these schools is done by the individual schools with assistance from The International Schools Services, 392 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York. Teachers interested in exploring such assignments should write to The International Schools Services.

Two further federal programs offer opportunities for teaching abroad as part of U.S. technical assistance or development projects: The Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development. The Peace Corps is the larger of the two operations in terms of the number of openings available for elementary and secondary school teachers. In 1967 the Peace Corps had projects in over 50 countries in South and Central America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and over 14,000 Peace Corps Volunteers were involved in teaching in these countries. The long-range plans of the Peace Corps over the next 10 years call for the recruitment of about 50,000 Volunteer teachers for overseas projects. Naturally, the supply of experienced teachers will never be great enough to meet this demand. Hence, the Peace Corps
has adopted a policy of accepting liberal arts college graduates for teaching positions, even though they lack prior experience or special training in pedagogy. (This is not to say, of course, that experienced teachers are not welcomed by the Peace Corps.) Teachers of mathematics and science are in greatest demand by developing nations, but a recent list of subjects being taught by Volunteers overseas includes a number of social studies fields, particularly geography and history. Teachers interested in further information about the Peace Corps should write to the Director of Recruitment, Peace Corps, Washington, D.C. 20525.

Some teaching positions abroad are also made available by the Agency for International Development, which has contracted with the National Education Association to recruit American teachers and supervisors to conduct workshops overseas for local teachers in certain subject fields. Sometimes the workshops may involve the social sciences. Teachers interested in these opportunities should write to International Relations Committee, National Education Association, 1201 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Opportunities for Study Abroad

Teachers who wish to undertake graduate study or research abroad are often eligible for assistance from the federal government. Under the Fulbright-Hays Act, opportunities are available to qualified persons, including teachers, for studying at the graduate level and for conducting advanced research abroad. Assignments on a world-wide basis are generally for one academic year. Grants are awarded to candidates selected in an annual nation-wide open competition in over 150 fields of specialization. Additional information on opportunities for graduate study may be obtained from the Institute of International Education, 809 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017. For information about advanced research abroad, write to the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20418.

Opportunities are also provided for teachers to study or do research abroad for the purpose of strengthening curriculum and improving their competence in modern foreign language and area studies. Section 102 (b) (6) of the Fulbright-Hays Act makes provisions under the Faculty Research and Study Program for teachers, specialists and
faculty members employed by American colleges and universities, state departments of education, school districts and other educational agencies to do further study and research abroad. Educational agencies and institutions are invited to submit projects in such activities as preparing curriculum materials, studying methods or procedures of teaching, or organizing courses, seminars, or resource units, and to nominate an individual to carry out such projects. The Division of Foreign Studies with the advice of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and a panel of eminent scholars will review applications and award grants to the nominated individuals. Further information on this program is available from the Overseas Projects Section, Division of Foreign Studies, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C. 20202.

**Curriculum Specialists**

Mention should also be made of a program that enables schools and school systems in the United States to obtain the consultant services of a foreign curriculum specialist. The Foreign Curriculum Specialist Program, administered by the U.S. Office of Education under authorization of Section 102 (b) (6) of the Fulbright-Hays Act, is designed to strengthen teaching and courses of study in modern foreign languages and area studies. Through this program, foreign specialists in language and/or area studies are made available to state departments of education, large city or county school systems or colleges and universities that wish to strengthen their offerings in those fields. The curriculum specialist receives a 10-month grant permitting him to work with the host institution in such projects as improving existing curriculum materials or creating new ones, assisting in teacher training, conducting workshops and giving special lectures for teachers, and speaking occasionally to students. The host institutions must submit an application for a specialist to the Division of Foreign Studies; the specialist is then recruited by the Division of Foreign Studies in cooperation with American Embassies and Binational Educational Commissions and Foundations abroad. The final selection of the specialist is made by the host institution, subject to the approval of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. Further information concerning application procedures may be obtained by contacting the Overseas Projects Section, Division of Foreign Studies, U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C. 20202.
Conclusion

It is undeniably a sign of governmental vitality that such a multitude of federal programs have been created in the field of international education. The task of keeping track of current programs and services devolves upon the individuals and groups involved in international education; and one of these groups, the International Education Association of the United States, has compiled a brief mimeographed pamphlet containing a concise list of federal opportunities now available in this area. The pamphlet, which is entitled “International Education and Government,” should be of help to teachers interested in taking advantage of federal programs in international affairs. It may be purchased for 15 cents from the IEA, Suite 305, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

It is unlikely, of course, that any listing of federal programs will remain accurate for very long. Modifications are to be expected in any kind of federally administered programs, given the changing moods of Congress and the American people, the variable demands of the world situation, and, of course, the unavoidable problems involved in appropriating funds for any project, no matter how worthwhile. Sometimes advances and setbacks occur, with regard to federal support to international education, almost simultaneously, as was the case with the International Education Act of 1966, whose provisions for strengthening international education have thus far been nullified by Congressional failure to appropriate funds for the program.

In spite of such temporary adversities, however, the trend is unmistakable: improved international education, for a nation irrevocably involved in world affairs, is an absolute necessity, and will, in one form or another, be increasingly fostered and encouraged by the federal government. Secondary school teachers now have unparalleled opportunities to strengthen their own resources and backgrounds in international affairs, and thereby to improve the education of their students. Nothing need stand in the way of teachers who want to take advantage of federal programs, except perhaps the slightly bewildering governmental terrain in which they are located. It is hoped that this chapter will provide a rudimentary roadmap in what may have been unfamiliar territory.
What secondary schools should teach in social studies is the subject of endless controversy. In an already crowded social studies curriculum, increasing the content in international affairs or any other social study area forces educators to decide what traditional content should be displaced or reorganized into new structures. Long-standing traditions of academic disciplines and customary usages in secondary education frequently present severe obstacles to internal reform. Consequently, the impetus for major changes in the social studies has often been provided by influences outside the educational establishment. The last decade, for example, bears witness to the effect that external pressures have had upon the teaching of economics in secondary and elementary schools.

Individuals, groups, and organizations interested in the social studies curriculum but lying outside educational institutions have not always been credited for their role in stimulating innovation and change. Because many individuals and groups react negatively to change and oppose the inclusion of controversial issues in social studies, school personnel have not always been aware of the positive ways in which
private groups contribute to educational programs. Even more striking is the fact that secondary school personnel have not freely exploited the resources private organizations make available.

The purpose of this discussion is to identify some of the roles private organizations perform in promoting international studies and producing school services in support of that objective. It is difficult to categorize private organizations in the international studies context since most associations interested in the social studies exhibit at least some concern for world affairs. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the term international affairs organization has been limited to those private groups having the promotion of some aspect of international or intercultural studies as their primary objective. The category has been further reduced to those organizations sponsoring programs specifically designed for secondary education. For the most part, these organizations are non-profit, non-governmental associations usually independent of educational institutions.

Generally speaking, international affairs organizations play much the same role in educational society as do pressure groups in political society. Acting as special interest groups, they encourage secondary schools to adopt different approaches to international studies, to emphasize specific topics within the international dimension, and/or to develop programs strengthening particular student attitudes. However, world affairs groups differ markedly in the focus of their interest. Some programs are designed to promote the study of specialized issues or topics in world studies. The Asia Society, for example, is primarily interested in furthering Asian studies, just as the United Nation's Association promotes studies of the United Nations. Other organizations, such as the North Central Association Foreign Relations Project, and the Foreign Policy Association, are more broadly concerned with world affairs education. They encourage secondary schools to develop world studies while urging social studies teachers to consider a range of alternative topics in constructing a course of study.

Many aspects of international affairs organizations might be examined. Subsequent comments, however, have been confined to two basic questions: What contributions do private organizations make to the study of world affairs? What services do such organizations provide social studies educators?
Contributions of Private Groups

The ultimate objective of international affairs organizations is to bring about change in the behavior and attitudes of high school students. The primary objectives of a given organization may emphasize attitudinal changes, such as instilling patriotism or promoting international understanding, or they may stress comprehension of a body of knowledge or acquisition of skills essential to the investigation of social problems. To accomplish their objectives, these special interest groups act to influence both the structural composition of secondary social studies and the instructional processes employed by the social studies teacher. The intermediate objective of private groups is therefore to create a climate for curriculum change in the schools.

In this regard, world affairs groups are closely analogous to political pressure groups. Political interest groups act to generate an opinion favorable to their interests. To accomplish this task, pressure groups collect, research, and circulate information in support of their position. Despite the fact that this material is designed to persuade legislators or attract supporters, it does constitute a useful source of public information about important issues.

International affairs organizations, like political interest groups, provide informational services for the social studies educator. These private interest groups constantly remind school officials of the importance of including a variety of concepts, issues, and problems in international studies. Because world affairs is such a broad field, a private organization may choose to stress the study of a single structure (i.e. international relations); a cultural or geographical area (i.e. Africa); a special topic or issue (i.e. disarmament); or it may encourage schools to select relevant topics from a variety of international studies.

By competing with each other and with other social studies groups for time and content space in the curriculum, world affairs organizations contribute to the debate on what the schools should teach in social studies. The pressures of private organizations do not lessen the difficulty educators face in making curriculum decisions; indeed, they make the process more complex. However, the presence of many and varied pressures for reform does, by providing numerous options, in-
crease the likelihood that instructional and curriculum practices will carry out an intelligent screening of alternative choices.

Representing cross-sections of a concerned public, private groups collectively focus attention on a breadth of issues, social problems, structures of knowledge, and teaching strategies that might otherwise be ignored. Generally free from the restraints that characterize secondary education, the programs of world affairs organizations reflect both past and current moods and interests of the larger society. To some degree, these outside pressures help the school to become less insulated from the community it serves.

World affairs groups keep abreast of scholarship in their field of concern and accelerate the flow of new research to the school. Keeping up-to-date on new resources available in world affairs—and in other social studies as well—has become a major problem for the classroom teacher. By channeling new ideas and information into the school environment, private groups encourage a continuous process of curriculum change.

All organizations interested in international affairs disseminate relevant information to educators and the lay public. Even those groups that do not have or seek direct liaison with secondary schools assist social studies educators by sensitizing the lay public to the need for international studies. A favorable community attitude enhances the teacher's opportunity to make intelligent choices concerning what should be taught in world affairs.

The programs of most private organizations reflect the realization that the social studies teacher is the most significant agent for change in world affairs education. A majority of the organizational activities clearly make attempts to alter teacher attitudes and to secure a commitment for instructional change. A striking weakness in the educational establishment is the fact that social studies teachers seldom share ideas with comrades in other schools and rarely interact with scholars. Essentially a bureaucrat in a system that does not reward change, the social studies teacher lacks the incentive to consult formally or informally with professional colleagues.

Acting in their own best interests, world affairs groups sponsor a variety of in-service activities to bridge this gap. Short seminars or conferences during the school year and summer institutes are the
The most common types of in-service programs. Generally held in cooperation with educational institutions, in-service programs permit teachers and social scientists to interact in discussions centering upon problems in teaching about international topics. Seminars and institutes provide for the transfer of both academic and professional knowledge. During the in-service activity, the participants consider varied approaches to the study of a particular issue or subject, discuss teaching strategies, and review instructional materials. Perhaps the most important outcome of seminar or conference programs is the extent to which the participants become committed to instructional reform. Ideas and experiences shared by teachers and scholars are further disseminated when the participant instigates a reevaluation of social studies offerings in his school. Teacher exchange programs, travel-study grants, and research grants are related activities sponsored by private groups; and, they too often serve to stimulate curriculum change.

The manner in which world affairs groups most directly relate to secondary social studies is through the production of instructional materials and associated services. Many topics in the international sphere require teaching materials that cut across social science disciplines. Cultural studies, for example, require materials that bring together knowledge from the humanities, social sciences, and physical sciences.

In the early 1950's, when a number of world affairs groups became interested in secondary education, few publications for international studies were available through commercial markets. Furthermore, few social studies teachers had studied international topics during their pre-service education. Consequently, teachers were reluctant to introduce into existing social studies programs world affairs units that lacked the support of teacher and student materials.

Realizing that instructional materials were essential for curriculum change, world affairs groups have produced or have sponsored the production of materials to meet classroom needs. In some cases private groups have directed their resources into the production of materials for the high school student, thus stimulating commercial publishers to increase their output of secondary school materials in the world affairs area. In other instances, private organizations have produced courses of study, unit outlines, and basic readings for the
Private Organizations in International Affairs

Most world affairs groups serve as clearing houses on information related to their field of interest. They compile and disseminate to secondary schools bibliographies of research studies, curriculum experimentation, instructional materials, and teacher aids that are available from a variety of sources. At regular intervals, the clearing house releases information on new publications and activities in the field, usually through a newsletter to the schools.

Determining the needs and goals for curriculum reform is often difficult for persons functioning as a part of the system to be reformed. In the interest of promoting change, world affairs groups research information on the character and quality of social studies instruction. Privately conducted surveys of social studies offerings and teaching patterns of social studies teachers benefit secondary schools as well as the sponsoring agent. The data compiled helps both private groups and school systems identify weaknesses in social studies programs. In addition, it encourages discussions and helps educators formulate policies to effect changes.

Experimental programs developed outside the secondary school environment, particularly those requiring innovative teaching strategies, often fail to consider institutional features that restrict instructional patterns. Furthermore, widespread acceptance of innovative techniques and materials in social studies depends largely upon demonstrations under practical conditions. Curriculum study projects sponsored by world affairs organizations and conducted in secondary schools have sometimes aided in lowering resistance to change. Experimental materials that are developed and tested by classroom teachers can be easily replicated by other schools. Another major advantage of such cooperative projects is that non-participating schools may be motivated to establish their own study projects.

Case Studies

The organizations to be described in this section were chosen because they represent a cross-section of the school programs sponsored by world affairs groups. The first two organizations discussed are repre-
sentative of those private groups exhibiting broad interest in international studies. While they frequently publish materials on specialized topics, their activities are not confined to promoting a particular type of world study.

The Foreign Relations Project was initiated in 1956 by the Committee on Experimental Units of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. The project committee, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, launched an educational program designed to promote the study of foreign policy issues in secondary social studies. To accomplish this goal, the Project developed a series of self-contained units for high school students on the study of foreign relations. Entitled the Foreign Relations Series, 12 booklets have been published, each focusing upon a single country, world area, or foreign policy issue. Individual study units contain background reading on historical, cultural, economic, and political data contributing to a particular international issue, and conclude with a consideration of alternatives open in the formulation of American foreign policy. Written by scholars representing different social sciences, the materials were developed and evaluated in cooperation with public and parochial high schools.

In coordination with the development of study units, the Foreign Relations Project has conducted over 300 short seminars, conferences, and workshops where teachers and specialists have discussed problems associated with the teaching of international relations. In the earliest phase, these in-service programs were utilized to interest teachers in international studies and to acquaint teachers with the varied resources available for world studies. More recently, a series of short, statewide, residential seminars have focused on in-depth study of a particular topic in world affairs. The variety of seminar topics—“Asia,” “Africa,” “Cultural Relations,” “Peace Through World Law,” and “Democracy and Totalitarianism”—indicates the breadth of interests the Project has in world affairs education.

Sponsored in cooperation with other world affairs groups and educational institutions, such as state departments of education, universities and colleges, and social studies councils, in-service seminars help teachers to identify local resources that contribute to curriculum development. Teachers become aware of individuals and educational centers that provide consultant services. Reports of the conference
discussions are widely disseminated in an attempt to reinforce the participants' efforts to produce educational change.

The Project publishes numerous other materials of interest to the social studies teachers. Select bibliographies are compiled and distributed through mailings and seminar activities. Essays on teaching strategies, inquiry and study modes in international relations, and curriculum evaluation have been issued in pamphlet form. In 1963 the Project conducted and circulated the results of a survey of social studies offerings in North Central Association high schools.

The Foreign Policy Association is a non-partisan organization primarily interested in keeping the public informed on foreign policy issues. Since 1917, FPA has produced, sponsored, and disseminated materials and programs to encourage citizen interest in world affairs.

In 1966 FPA created a school services division to develop programs and materials for elementary and secondary schools. School Services operates as a central clearing house on world affairs programs, activities, and materials that are available to social studies educators. A broad interest in world affairs, combined with the vast network of organizations and information sources to which FPA has access, enable these clearing house services to be quite extensive. Intercom, published six times each year, complements the clearing house service by summarizing new ideas, programs, publications, and services in world affairs. Each issue of Intercom focuses on a single topic, country, or world area, and includes a bibliography associated with the theme. FPA also operates a world affairs book center.

Beginning in 1967 the school services program was expanded by the establishment of five regional offices. Regional staff members serve as curriculum consultants and conduct in-service programs in secondary schools.

In addition to Intercom, FPA produces two other publications that are of particular importance to secondary social studies. Great Decisions, an annual publication highlighting eight major foreign policy problems, was originally published for adult discussion groups. More recently the program has been increasingly utilized by secondary schools. The Great Decisions booklet contains a series of articles that provide background data, present pro and con arguments, and analyze foreign policy alternatives for each of the problems presented. The Headline Series provides supplementary readings in international
studies. Published bi-monthly, each issue of the series is devoted to a single foreign policy issue or problem area of the world. A typical pamphlet contains historical and contemporary data related to the topic along with an analysis of foreign policy alternatives.

Interested in innovative techniques, FPA has produced a simulation exercise in international relations. Designed to introduce high school students to the dynamics of foreign policy formation, the game places students in decision-making roles and involves them in a simulated world crisis.

Under a grant from the U.S. Office of Education, FPA has undertaken the task of surveying the needs, priorities, and objectives of world affairs education in elementary and secondary schools. The study includes both a survey of existing courses of study and recommendations for the development of model programs.

Several organizations promote the study of a particular cultural or geographical area of the world, such as Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East. The Asia Society is representative of this type of association. To promote better understanding of Asian peoples, the Asia Society conducts programs for the general public, specialists in Asian studies, and elementary and secondary schools. The society's journal, Asia, contains articles on contemporary Asia that are valuable to both Asian scholars and social studies teachers.

The Asia Society serves as a clearing house on printed materials, instructional aids, cultural programs, and other activities relating to Asian studies. In cooperation with the Japan Society, the central office compiles and disseminates reference and resource materials for schools. The educational services include reprints of journal articles, background facts on Asian countries, maps, and bibliographic guides to Asian films, books, and art, and directories of organizations interested in Asian studies.

In cooperation with other private organizations, the Asia Society has conducted seminars and institutes on various aspects of Asian studies. Regularly scheduled lecture programs, exhibits of Asian art, and library collections are among the services provided at the Society's central location, Asia House.

Some private associations manifest primary interest in a particular issue or topic in world affairs, such as the United Nations, population, food and hunger, or nuclear strategy. Two closely associated organiza-
tions, the World Law Fund and Leadership and World Society (LAWS), are examples of this type of organization.

The World Law Fund was created in 1961 to encourage the study of world order and the contribution of law to the control of international violence. Following an inventory of social studies instruction, the Fund discovered that high schools taught little that was relevant to world order problems. The initial thrust of their program, therefore, was to sponsor seminars and institutes that would interest teachers in the development of world law studies.

Realizing that few materials were available to provide a foundation for world law studies in high schools, the World Law Fund has produced and distributed reprints of journal articles, books, and bibliographies. Three feature films—Dr. Strangelove, Lord of The Flies, and High Noon—have been edited for school use. Guides have been produced that suggest ways in which the films may be used to stress concepts about world society.

Leadership and World Society (LAWS), in cooperation with the World Law Fund, annually awards grants to high schools interested in developing experimental programs on world affairs. Grants are awarded to applicants seeking to develop study units and student programs involving such topics as disarmament, peacekeeping, the United Nations, international organizations, and world law.

**Summary**

The private interests of world affairs organizations also serve the public interest in secondary education. In the promotion of international studies, private groups serve as catalysts for innovation and change in the social studies. Clamoring for a place in secondary social studies, these special interest groups alert teachers to the need for careful selection of content. Furthermore, the activities of private groups in calling attention to the social studies help prevent further erosion of instructional time to other academic areas.

Obviously secondary schools cannot employ all of the course models, experimental techniques, and materials proposed by private groups; nor should they do so. Nevertheless, teachers and administrators have the responsibility to become acquainted with resources produced by private groups. Because private organizations have varied purposes
and programs, the school must evaluate the services each group produces. Their programs should be judged on the standard criteria of scholarship, relevance, and objectivity. But commercial publishers are also private concerns, and their products need to be judged by the same criteria.

What to teach in the social studies and how to go about teaching it—these are decisions facing school systems and individual teachers. The services of private organizations help provide schools and teachers with a greater range of alternatives in this difficult selection process.
The Role of the States
in Improving the Teaching
of International Affairs

Chapter 17

GERALD W. MARKER

WHAT THE STATES ARE DOING

Despite America's undeniably vast involvement in the international arena, the field of international affairs is slighted or even virtually ignored by a number of school systems in the United States. In fact, the organizations that set minimum educational standards in the nation's public schools—the state departments of education—are, by their own admission, doing very little to improve the teaching of international affairs. There are a few exceptions, but generally the states have given priority to areas other than international education. Indeed, until the recent infusion of federal funds, many state departments of education had no one whose primary responsibility was the area of social studies in general or international affairs in particular. Although a number of states do seem to be in the very early stages of developing some rather ambitious programs, the present situation gives few indications of monumental leadership on the part of the states.

These disquieting conclusions, as well as the discussion of state programs that follows, are based primarily on the results of a 1966 survey of the chief state school officers in the 50 states and of state social
studies supervisors in the 39 states where such positions existed at that time. A total of 42 states are represented, either by letters from the chief state school officer, or the social studies supervisor, or both. The questionnaire was not designed to obtain data for a quantitative analysis. Replies ranged from simple "yes" and "no" answers written on a copy of the original survey letter to packages of state department leaflets and letters describing programs.

Of all the states that responded to the survey, only one—New York State—was found to have taken major and significant action in the field of international affairs. More has probably been done in that state to widen the international dimensions of the social studies curriculum than in all other states combined. While it is tempting to refer to the New York State program as an ideal to which all other states should aspire, many states would justifiably resent this comparison with the Empire State. Certainly that state has a number of unique advantages, including a cosmopolitan population, high per capita income, a rapidly developing state university system, the presence of the United Nations, and a business and banking center. Therefore New York State has not been used in the following discussion as the yardstick against which all state efforts are measured, but rather as an example of the many and varied options available to states wishing to exert leadership in improving the international dimension of social studies education.

Who Is Doing What?

The range of possibilities for improving international affairs education is, of course, practically unlimited—in theory. In reality, the resources available to states, as well as the extent of their commitment in this field, are subject to very great limitations indeed. For state department officials the problem is less one of finding enough worthwhile programs than one of making some specific decisions concerning where and how to apply their limited resources most efficiently. The following discussion examines the results of such decisions by state departments. As the various aspects of state programs are examined, mention will be made of selected programs that indicate what can be and is being done. No attempt has been made at a comprehensive listing of state programs and activities.
State-Mandated Courses

One of the most powerful and influential actions that a state can take to affect the teaching of international affairs is to mandate a course or courses that must be taught in all schools. While one might argue that mandated courses seldom "improve" the teaching of anything, such an alternative does exist and has been used in some states. None of the states responding to the survey had state-mandated courses on international affairs or international relations, although many indicated that these courses were offered as electives. This does not mean that some states have not required courses of an equally specific nature in other fields. Florida, for example, requires that every high school offer a course entitled "Americanism vs. Communism." The course must follow a state study guide and last no fewer than six weeks. In practice the course is often expanded to a semester in length and includes the study of contemporary world affairs. In Georgia a Senate Resolution patterned after the Florida law requires 30 hours of teaching about communism. In Hawaii, study about communism is mandated by action of the Board of Education. Louisiana requires the teaching of Americanism and communism in high schools and provides for a State Supervisor for Americanism in the Department of Education. Mississippi requires six weeks of intensive study at the high school level of the nature and threat of communism. Other states have considered legislation along similar lines. In 1961 the Massachusetts legislature considered mandating a course about communism, with the result that the Department of Education conducted a survey to determine the extent to which schools were already teaching about communism. The survey was conducted and analyzed, but no legislation was passed.

1 In 1963 11 percent of the public schools offered a separate course in current events or affairs, contemporary events, or foreign or world affairs in grades 7-12. This was a 3 percent increase over 1968. Independent schools offered such courses in 20 percent of the cases. Some 76 percent of the public schools and 54 percent of the independent schools dealt with such topics in a combination course. From Anderson, Scarvia B., and others. Social Studies in Secondary Schools: A Survey of Courses and Practices. Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service, February, 1964. p. 12.

In 1962 it was proposed that the Indiana legislature mandate a course entitled "Americanism vs. Communism." The proposed legislation would have even prescribed the content to be emphasized in the course; it stated, for example, that the course shall "emphasize the free enterprise competitive economy of the United States as one which produces higher wages, higher standards of living, greater personal freedom and liberty than any other system of economics on earth" and "shall lay particular emphasis upon the dangers of Communism, the ways to fight Communism, the evils of Communism, the fallacies of Communism, and the false doctrines of Communism." Although this bill was not passed by the Indiana legislature, it does serve as an example of the extent to which state-mandated courses might prescribe specific course content, including courses in international affairs.

In some instances states that have no mandated course or unit on communism have instead provided study guides or resource units for their teachers. In a 1964 survey 32 state departments reported that they published guides, syllabi, and/or reading lists to assist school districts in teaching about communism. Other states have chosen not to issue a special guide on the subject but rather have included the topic in their regular curriculum guides.

More numerous are the states that require courses in world history, government, and modern problems. Dunlap found that of 48 states (Louisiana and South Carolina not included), 13 required government, and 7 required some type of problems course. It is common for such courses to contain units that deal with foreign policy, developing nations, comparative political or economic systems, international law, or disarmament. In Alaska, for example, the state curriculum guidelines suggest such themes as world interdependence, population dynamics, and international posture. In Utah a sixth grade course entitled "The United States in Relation to Other Parts of the World" contains a unit on international relations, while in the tenth grade World History course emphasis is given to the non-Western world. Pennsylvania has a mandated one-semester World Cultures course and recommends a full-year course on the subject. New York requires a

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*Ibid., pp. 1-2.*
ninth and tenth grade sequence forming a unified course in World History and Cultures. In Minnesota a twelfth grade course, Concepts and Problems of American Democracy, includes the study of communism and international relations. Indiana's newly adopted seventh grade course focuses on area studies of the non-West.

While state-mandated courses do indicate the kind of action that states might take in the field of international affairs, they serve as a very poor basis for generalizing about the extent to which international affairs is actually being treated in the schools. Many states that do not require a specific course at a particular grade do "strongly recommend" that certain courses, and topics or units within courses, be taught. A case in point is Oregon, where, with the exception of a few schools that offer an elective program to a select group of students, Modern Problems is required of all twelfth graders. Two units of this widely taught problems course are "Patterns of Modern International Relations" and "Comparative Philosophies and Ideologies of Modern Government," which includes a section entitled "Analysis of the History and Development of Communism." While this course does not fall within the category of a mandated course, it is taught to most students in Oregon. Further complicating the picture is the fact that state requirements serve only as minimum standards. Many schools go beyond what are sometimes modest requirements with additional requirements of their own. Masia, in a study conducted in 1962, found that among the schools of the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 81.8 percent of those surveyed required two years of social studies, 40.3 percent required three years, and 6.5 percent required four years. A similar situation prevails in the country as a whole. His study indicated that American history was required in over 99 percent of the schools surveyed; government (Senior Civics) in approximately 45 percent of the schools; World History (a one-year course) in 35 percent of the schools; and Problems of Democracy in only less than 30 percent of the schools.


† Ibid.
International relations fares somewhat better when one examines the electives offered by schools. The number of California secondary schools offering an elective course entitled "International Relations" increased from 73 schools in 1961 to 138 schools in 1963.8 Masia found that 16 percent of the N.C.A. schools offered International Relations as an elective, while in the schools offering a Problems of Democracy course, some 62 percent dealt with the topic of international relations.9 In 1964-65 Georgia schools taught 4 sections of international affairs, increasing to 22 in 1965-66. Not all school systems are increasing their offerings in international affairs, however. In a survey limited to one county in Michigan, it was found that of the 17 different social studies courses offered in grades 7 to 12, only 3 could be considered to have a world focus (Geography, World History, and International Relations).10

In summary, international affairs, for good or ill, has not reached the status of a state-mandated course, although one aspect of international affairs, namely, the study of communism, is required in some states. In addition, a number of states do require courses such as World History, World Geography, Government, or Problems of Democracy, many of which have content relating to international affairs. If one takes electives into account, the number of courses dealing directly with international affairs again increases.

State Curriculum Committees

As previously noted, states have considerable power over the school curriculum. Because power and interest often go hand in hand, it is not surprising to find that over 50 percent of the states which replied to the survey had some type of state curriculum committee. In California the Statewide Social Sciences Study Committee is developing a new state curriculum framework which should be completed in 1968.11

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9 *Masia, op. cit., p. 10.*


11 Missouri has a similar specialized body, i.e., the Statewide Social Studies Curriculum Committee, which reviews research, makes studies, and writes curricular guides.
New York State has both a Department Curriculum Council and a Regents Standing Committee, which reviews and recommends curricular changes. In Utah the State Course of Study Committee appoints a State Social Studies Curriculum Committee, whose responsibilities include reviewing textbooks submitted for adoption. Illinois has a committee on Comparative Political Systems, which prepared the manual *Teaching About Totalitarian Communism, 1965*.

Most states, however, have a curriculum committee with a general interest in all subject areas rather than a committee solely concerned with the social studies area. When specialized committees are formed in the social studies, they often function only until their specific task is accomplished, at which time they are thrown on the administrative "junk heap." Such was the case in Indiana, where a special social studies revision committee labored for three years to produce a new, recommended state course of study and faded out of existence once the job was finished. A similar curriculum review is currently under way in Idaho, where ad hoc committees are formed to work in the specific subject areas.²

In some states the state social studies council may influence curriculum decisions. In Washington State the Director of Secondary Education indicated that the "Washington State Council for the Social Studies Committee would be influential in curricular change in the area of international affairs."³ In Wyoming the state Social Studies Council was one of three organizations that developed *Framework for the Social Studies Grades K-12* during the summer of 1964.

In short, it is apparent that while many states have chosen to operate curriculum committees, the composition and function of these committees vary greatly. Some are standing committees dealing with all types of curriculum problems, while others are temporary and focus upon only social studies.

³”Alaska uses somewhat the same arrangement whereby special groups are brought together for special curriculum problems.

²Quoted from a letter to this writer by Alfred T. McCallum, Director of Secondary Education, Department of Public Instruction, Olympia, Washington, October 27, 1966.
Resource Units, Bibliographies, etc.

One of the most common activities of all state departments of education is the publication and distribution of courses of study, resource units, or bibliographies. A committee of teachers, curriculum specialists, state department personnel, and sometimes representatives of the social science disciplines generally produces these materials, often by borrowing heavily from similar materials published by other states or local school corporations. Both courses of study and resource units typically include a list of objectives (including understandings, skills and attitudes), a content outline, suggested activities, and a bibliography. Predictably, these publications vary considerably in both scope and detail. Wisconsin, for example, publishes a booklet\textsuperscript{14} that takes 307 pages (mimeographed) to describe the social studies programs for grade 7 through grade 12. New Hampshire furnishes its teachers with \textit{New Viewpoints in the Social Studies for New Hampshire Schools K-12},\textsuperscript{15} which gives considerable space to listing the concepts contributed by each of the social science disciplines. At the other extreme, \textit{Social Studies Program for Idaho Public Schools}\textsuperscript{16} deals with the entire 12 grades in only 15 pages by listing a major theme and some points of emphasis for each grade level. Of the many and varied state curriculum guides received for examination during the course of the survey, the series of bulletins published by the State of New York seemed to be not only the most professionally written, but also potentially the most useful.

Bibliographies are another of the more common state department of education publications. As previously indicated, such listings are often a part of courses of study or resource units. From the information and materials provided by the states surveyed, the State of New York once again sets the pace in this service activity. The New York bibliog-

\textsuperscript{14} Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. \textit{A Scope and Sequence Plan for the Social Studies in Wisconsin Schools} (Grades 7-12. Madison: The Department, 1964. 307 pp. (Mimeo.)


\textsuperscript{16} Idaho Department of Education. \textit{Social Studies Program for Idaho Public Schools}. Boise: The Department, 1983. 15 pp. (Mimeo.)
rical bibliographies are extensive, although often not annotated. The Hawaii State Department of Education publishes numerous annotated resource lists which include, among other things, a form for teachers to use in requesting guest speakers from the University of Hawaii. In some states bibliographies are keyed to specific courses and in others to geographic areas or specific subjects.

As various local, state, and national agencies expand their efforts to improve the teaching of international relations, it becomes increasingly difficult for the classroom teacher to keep abreast of the opportunities available to him. Some states are attempting to remedy this situation by publishing newsletters of various kinds. California, for example, publishes Social Science Notes only once a year, while the New Jersey State Department of Education Newsletter is published monthly and is broader in scope than simply social studies. In Ohio the social studies newsletter is published in conjunction with the Ohio Council for the Social Studies. To the state department considering the publication of a newsletter, it may appear that one of the things the overburdened classroom teacher does not need is another newsletter cluttering up his already full mailbox. It must be remembered, however, that in terms of the amount of information crossing his desk, the teacher still faces a significant information gap.

Teacher Certification

Another way states can improve instruction in international affairs is by upgrading certification requirements in order to strengthen the academic background of teachers. Typically, certification requirements require a certain number of hours in each of the social sciences and history but allow the individual institutions of higher education to designate the specific courses needed to meet this requirement. Because of such an arrangement, it is most difficult to assess the degree to which teachers are required to take courses related to international affairs. While certification requirements can be used to strengthen the preparation of teachers of social studies in general and of international

For example, Checklist of Paperbound Books on Russia compiled by Sherman D. Spector (1964) and Checklist of Paperbound Books on Africa compiled by Paul Rosenblum (1965), both from the University of the State of New York, State Education Department, Albany, New York.
relations in particular, it seems to be a course of action seldom chosen. Of the states responding to the survey, only one, New Mexico, makes any specific requirements of teachers in the field of international affairs: teachers in that state are required to complete five semester hours in international affairs before being certified to teach the subject. The relationship between certification requirements and "encouraged graduate study" is very similar to the relationship between mandated and "encouraged" or "recommended" courses in international affairs. In both cases states have generally chosen the more permissive alternative.

Fellowships and Loans

Some states provide fellowships and/or loans to prospective and experienced teachers of social studies who wish to continue their studies. California provides scholarships, as do Florida and Wyoming. New York State provides loans to any college student who meets certain minimum qualifications, and in 1961 began a tuition grant program which encourages social studies teachers to take part in summer institutes and academic year courses on foreign areas. In addition, New York State floods the public schools with announcements concerning various college- and government-fellowship programs. Georgia provides grants-in-aid for both fifth- and sixth-year work in any academic area.

State social studies consultants report that they make every effort to publicize public and private fellowship and loan programs, even though their state does not have programs of its own. Such a policy has encouraged many teachers to capitalize on the opportunities available for graduate study. New Jersey, for example, had 40 teachers studying at non-West centers in 1965. Some states give preferential treatment to teachers who wish to continue their education. Hawaii grants special leaves-of-absence to teachers who qualify, and Alaska provides sabbatical leaves at half pay without specifying the courses which must be taken for "professional advancement." The states providing financial aid or leaves-of-absence are, however, exceptions to the rule. Most states have seen fit to stand aside and let foundations, banks, and the federal government provide the lion's share of fellow-
ships and loans for teachers desiring to further their education in the international affairs area.

The State as a Coordinating Agency

There was a time in our history when all but the seaboard states could easily forget the world “out there.” Those teachers who wanted their students to have the experience of meeting people with a different cultural frame of reference were hard pressed to find a Russian, Chinese, or even a Mexican near at hand. Such is no longer the case. Most universities, even the smaller ones, have many foreign students; and the number of public schools that participate in student exchange programs continues to grow. It is an unusual community that does not have a businessman, school teacher, Peace Corpsman, or other individual who has lived or traveled abroad and who can be used as a resource person. From the point of view of those who have had first-hand experience with other cultures, the situation has gone from famine to somewhere just this side of feast.

The classroom teacher is now faced with the problem of knowing what is available in his region or state. This situation provides an opportunity for the state department of education to serve a very useful coordinating function. Who are the foreign students and where are they? Where are the visiting foreign professors? Will they speak to school groups and on what topics? What overseas programs are available for students or teachers? What are the state’s library resources on foreign affairs topics? There is no lack of people and programs to be coordinated. Resources are so great that New York State has established a special office to deal with professional visitors and educational exchange. This service is being developed under a Title V grant of The Elementary and Secondary Education Act. In Hawaii the State Department of Education and the University of Hawaii cooperate to bring speakers to student and teachers groups. The Vermont Social Studies Consultant cooperates very closely with the Vermont Council for World Affairs in providing such a clearinghouse service. Maine and Kansas also perform such a coordinating function. Most of the states replying to the survey, however, have made no provisions to assist the teacher in locating speakers and resource people from foreign countries.
Six of the states replying to the letters of inquiry indicated that they engaged in some type of teacher or student exchange program. In Oregon the Social Studies Consultant is President of the Oregon Partners of the Alliance, a program that arranges for bilateral teacher and student exchanges between Costa Rica and Oregon. Texas participates in the International Cultural Exchange Program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Through this arrangement Texas teachers exchange positions with teachers of other nations. For the past 10 years the Missouri State Department of Education has co-sponsored with the U.S. Office of Education a similar exchange program.

**State Administered Federal Programs**

It is still too early to assess the impact of programs established under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the National Defense Education Act, or The International Education Act. Some state social studies supervisors reported that they have actively encouraged colleges and universities in their states to sponsor Title XI NDEA Institutes for teachers as one means of improving the teaching of world affairs. In California funds are being used from Title V of the ESEA to carry on a comprehensive survey of the social studies program in the California public schools from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. In New Hampshire, ESEA Title V funds have been used to establish the position of a consultant in social studies. In 1965 the New Jersey Department of Education assisted in the preparation of 94 proposals under the various education acts. Many states reported using federal money to assist in offsetting the costs of in-service meetings for social studies teachers. In the long run the greatest contribution of federal funds may be the general strengthening of state departments of education, which in turn will then be in a position to devise programs tailored to state needs.

**Regional Programs**

States can sometimes do in concert what they often seem unable to do alone. One of the most ambitious programs of a regional nature is the

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18 In 1966 38 states employed at least one consultant or supervisor in the area of social studies.
The Role of the States

Educational Agencies Project, International Education. This program is headed by Dr. W. R. Goodson of the Texas Education Agency and involves, in addition to Texas (the contracting state), Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and North Carolina. The project is funded under Title V of the National Defense Education Act and has as its main objective to improve the state departments of education by injecting international affairs into their work. Each state will hire a full-time coordinator to work with the state department of education, the overseas schools section in the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Office of Education, and schools and colleges in the state. Three of the most significant goals of the program are to develop the potential inherent in educational exchange for increasing international understanding, to relate educational planning in each state to various international activities, and to coordinate within the state the educational activities of the Peace Corps, U.S. Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other groups charged with developing international programs.19

A second example of regional programs is the Northeastern States Youth Citizenship Project, involving Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The Project was created in 1960, growing out of Northeastern States Commission of Education that was formed in 1950. The Lincoln Filene Center at Tufts University was designated as the service arm to carry out the objectives of the commissioners of the Project.

The Project conducts workshops and conferences for both teachers and students and has published resource units for teacher use.20 In addition, the Project has developed a roster of resource people able to provide consultant service, and is planning a materials clearinghouse service for member states. It is noteworthy that many of the states participating in the Citizenship Project are the very ones frequently mentioned in the preceding pages as being already actively engaged in providing educational leadership.

WHAT CAN THE STATES DO?

By this time it should be quite apparent that while the states viewed as a whole are engaged in many varied programs to improve the teaching of international affairs, when viewed separately many states are doing very little. This is not surprising, since many states have only in the last year hired someone whose primary responsibility is social studies in general, much less international affairs in particular. It is quite natural that such persons should concentrate their efforts, at least initially, on improving the teaching of such traditional subjects as history, government, or economics.

To concede that the unimpressive record of the states is natural or understandable, however, is not to say that the states should be satisfied with their present efforts in international education. On the contrary, the fact that a few states—notably New York—have produced many exemplary programs in international affairs stands as a reminder that most states can and should devote more attention to this field. Of course, the majority of states could not duplicate New York’s programs even if they wanted to. International affairs understandably receives more attention in states where such matters are also important concerns outside educational institutions. One need not be a geographer to realize that talent, wealth, and population are not equally distributed in this nation. But all this in a way begs the question. The point is that all states, some more than others, can expand their services in the area of international affairs. The question is, given the very limited resources of most states, how?

The problem of resource allocation is a complicated one. How can a state with only one or two people in the whole area of social studies best serve the teachers in that state? The question is not one of identifying all the ways a state can serve its teachers, but rather one of deciding how very limited resources can best be employed and toward what end. The acid test of any effort to improve the teaching of international relations, or any other subject for that matter, comes inside the classroom. Despite what state curriculum bulletins and school handbooks say, it is behind classroom doors where the curriculum really comes to life. State department programs, like all others, must finally be judged by the extent to which they bring about change at this level.
Difficult as it is to conceive of such a situation in the mid-twentieth century, some states still refuse to recognize the value of teaching about international relations in the public schools. Where this is the case, state departments of education must convince school administrators that this is an area of valid concern. One way of going about this might be through a series of regional meetings sponsored jointly by the state department, colleges and universities, principals and superintendents associations, and organizations such as the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Groups such as these carry an air of respectability with school administrators and might convince them that like modern math, international affairs is a valuable enterprise. Participants at such conferences could be asked to endorse recommendations in the area of international affairs; and these recommendations could be incorporated in reports which are then circulated widely throughout the state. The North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools Foreign Relations Project has already had considerable experience with such seminars, which it has conducted on topics such as Asia and teaching about democracy and totalitarianism.

The social studies supervisor might also encourage the state's chief school officer to support increased attention to international affairs and to urge the state legislature to manifest its support as well. States should do for schools those things which the schools cannot do as well or better for themselves, and leadership in the area of policy formation is one of these functions. School administrators are very sensitive to the pronouncements of state school people, and until state personnel make "legitimate" the matter of international affairs, the majority of schools will be reluctant to forge ahead in this area. In a study of the New York State educational system, Henry Brickell concluded that "State endorsement has been at least as important as State financing in clearing the way for local schools to respond to public demands."21 He also found a pattern which he termed "increasing affirmativeness"; that is, the lower echelon departmental representatives, who also have the greatest contact with local school people, are also the least likely to support educational innovation. His findings imply that state de-

partments will bring about educational change in the secondary schools only to the extent that they foster receptivity toward change among their own personnel at all levels.

Once school administrators have been convinced that education in international affairs is both valuable and necessary, a real need will arise for state services in this area. Unless states are careful, however, the deployment of their very limited manpower and resources will make little or no difference at the classroom level. One simple but important guideline for getting the most out of existing resources is not to attempt to do what other agencies are already doing or can do better. Specifically, state departments of education should not invest time and money in producing materials for classroom teachers, but should rather concentrate their limited resources on creating a liaison between teachers and existing opportunities. Where desired services are not already available somewhere in the state, the department of education personnel can serve as agents for change by getting other institutions and organizations to provide those services, with the state serving the function of initiator, coordinator, and consultant rather than the role of producer.

There are several reasons why materials produced by the states often represent an unwise investment of time and effort. Many states publish curriculum guides, resource units, or bibliographies, for example. But while these materials may give the state supervisors a sense of accomplishment, serious questions can be raised about their usefulness and effectiveness. In the first place, some of these items are of questionable value when measured by the impact that they have at the classroom level. Curriculum guides, resource units, and other similar teaching materials must be designed to meet such varying needs that they often attempt to be all things to all people, a virtual “grab bag” of classroom tricks and bits of information. Even those materials that are carefully designed around both an explicit philosophy of social studies and a learning theory suffer from the same disadvantage as their less consistent counterparts: few classroom teachers know or care about them. If any 20 teachers are asked how they decided what to include in a course and how to teach that course, it is likely that not one of them will mention a state course of study unless it has been mandated by the legislature. Thus the first argument against investing much state time and money in producing curriculum materials
The Role of the States

is that they are often of very poor quality and are seldom used—although the latter is not necessarily caused by the former.

State involvement in writing courses of study or resource units can be questioned on other grounds as well; namely, that state departments of education are not the best qualified agency to develop such materials. At present there are some 50 social studies curriculum projects underway in the nation. Most have substantial sums of federal and foundation backing as well as the combined talents of scholars, educational psychologists, curriculum and measurement specialists, and classroom teachers. Unlike the typical curriculum guides and resource units, the materials being produced by these projects are directly useful in the classroom and are based upon a consistent set of theories about social studies education and learning. (This consistency, it should be pointed out, is intraproject rather than interproject, although a number of projects certainly share many common characteristics.) In short, the development of curriculum materials in the area of international affairs, or any other area, is a function that state departments can best leave to others whose organization and personnel are better suited to the task.

Bibliographies present a somewhat different problem for the state supervisor of social studies or others in a similar role. Where the state department of education chooses to maintain a curriculum center in which all the latest materials are on display and available for examination, the compiling of a descriptive bibliography is not particularly difficult. However, when various colleges and universities in the state maintain curriculum materials centers, it is doubtful that a state department should duplicate such efforts. Teachers may be better served if state resources are used to encourage educational institutions to develop bibliographies, which may then be distributed by the state department of education.

In the light of the general point made above—namely, that state departments of education should avoid duplicating services which are already available or which can better be performed by others—the following five spheres of activity are suggested as worthy of investment of the typical state’s limited resources. Each can generally im-

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prove the teaching of social studies, and can hence improve the teaching of international affairs.

State, Regional, and Local Organizations

Few states can boast of a really strong state social studies organization, much less a viable network of regional and local organizations. The state department of education representative who sets out to build such a network of organizations will rarely stumble over others working at a similar task. School systems feel no obligation to free someone to work on such a project, at least not outside the local community. Similarly, colleges and universities, with a few exceptions, have not viewed this as a legitimate concern for their full-time faculty members. What efforts are expended on such organizations by teachers and professors are usually of the after-school and weekend variety. With no travel budget or secretarial help, such labors require an unusual degree of professional commitment. Yet as those who have served such organizations know, their continued existence and growth requires constant attention. In that sense at least, the organization is never “weaned.” Until social studies organizations can afford full-time executive secretaries, their future will remain clouded and their effectiveness limited.

The state department of education is in a unique position to provide leadership in this activity. Its representatives are free to travel throughout the state. Through the use of “seed money” the state department can encourage such organizations by jointly sponsoring meetings with them. Department representatives can invest the necessary time in the all-important personnel relations, the glue that holds such organizations together.

For the state department wishing to improve the teaching of international affairs, state, regional, and local social studies organizations are worthy of a heavy investment in time and money. They provide the state department with a ready-made channel of communication to

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*Indiana University (Bloomington, Indiana) currently has four School Coordinators who hold joint appointments in the School of Education and the College of Arts and Sciences and who have as their full-time responsibility liaison between the public schools in the state and the university. Each works in a specific subject area, i.e., science, foreign language, English, or social studies.*
the classroom. Such organizations can serve as organizing agencies for in-service training programs, fellowship and exchange programs, dissemination of new materials and ideas, or curriculum and legislative reform. They have the additional advantage of being directly responsive to regional and local needs. Furthermore, they can provide the means of identifying and training emerging professional leadership—the kind of leadership that is necessary if state programs are ever to reach the classroom. In other words, a well-developed and continually maintained system of state, regional, and local social studies organizations can greatly multiply the leadership and service potential of the state educational agency in a fashion reminiscent of the "each one teach one" philosophy. Without such an organizational framework, it is difficult indeed for state programs in any curriculum area to filter down into the classroom.

The State as Coordinator

The state department of education is uniquely fitted to serve a second function—that of coordinator. State department representatives are in a good position for staying in touch with projects and people all over the state. This is especially true if they are active in the kind of social studies organizations proposed above. The state department of education can become the place to go for teachers or administrators who want to know what is going on in the state. The teacher who wishes to know where a one-semester elective of Asian history is being offered, or the administrator who would like to talk with people who have had experience with a teacher exchange program, should be able to call on the social studies representative in the state department of education, who in turn ought to be able to put them in touch with appropriate persons or programs. A state social studies newsletter, directory of foreign visitors, or listing of institutes and fellowships are useful services which state departments can provide with no fear of duplicating the services of others.24 As programs multiply and oppor-

24A number of national announcement media (e.g., Social Education or the American Historical Association Newsletter) do list the institutes, fellowships, or other programs of interest to social studies teachers, but teachers in many schools do not regularly see these publications. A state social studies newsletter would help make programs more visible at the local level.
tunities for study and travel increase, the state's coordinating activity becomes an increasingly indispensable service.

The State as Consultant

What has just been said regarding the multiplication of programs is particularly applicable to the area of federal programs. Most social studies teachers and some school administrators are unsure what opportunities are available through federal statutes such as the Higher Education Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the National Defense Education Act, or the International Education Act. Again, the state department is in a position to provide special and much needed services. School systems often welcome assistance in preparing proposals under these acts. Teachers and administrators with a general notion of a program they would like to propose should very early in their planning feel free to seek help from the state department of education. When such proposals involve social studies in general or international affairs in particular, the social studies supervisor should be in a position to offer his services.

Strengthening Teacher Training

It has already been indicated that few states have any specific certification requirements concerning a teacher's preparation to teach in the international affairs area. Since international affairs is not one of the well-defined traditional subjects such as economics or history, this is understandable. The fact that many colleges also lack any type of coordinated program in international affairs further helps explain this situation. The social studies supervisor in the state department of education, through his contacts with those who determine certification requirements, can make changes that will pay long-range dividends in improving the teaching of international affairs.

States generally have an abundance of teachers certified to teach social studies and yet have very low minimum requirements for social studies certification. Therefore it should be possible to raise the

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For example, in South Dakota one needs only 15 semester hours in social science courses to be certified to teach social studies; in Kansas only 24 semester hours; and in Idaho, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Wyoming (examples, not
standards for social studies certification without contributing to a critical shortage of social studies teachers. Although there are a number of ways that standards could be raised, only three are proposed here. One method is to change certification from the all-inclusive field of social studies to specific subject areas, such as civics, geography, U.S. history, or international affairs. Such a move can be accompanied by increasing the credit hours needed to be certified in each subject. It should be pointed out, however, that in the view of those who see social studies as the interdisciplinary application of the social science research disciplines, this kind of innovation would not help improve certification standards.

A second alternative is to certify teachers in the broad area of social studies while increasing the amount of training necessary for such certification. Given the surplus of social studies teachers, it may be realistic to require 70 or 80 semester hours of history and the social sciences before such comprehensive certification is given. An increased requirement like this would, in most cases, exclude any teaching minors such as English or physical education. While the initial impact of abolishing the teaching minors of social studies teachers would make it difficult for small schools to secure properly certified teachers, a change such as this would have several long-run advantages, namely, strengthening the teaching of those subjects that social studies teachers formerly taught as minors, and putting further pressure on the very small schools to consolidate into larger units. Increased requirements would also prepare many more teachers qualified to teach international affairs.

A third means of raising certification standards involves the fifth year or graduate program. It is often contended that one cannot pre-

a complete listing) one needs only 30 semester hours for certification. In most of these states history takes up almost half of the required hours, leaving the other five or six courses to be distributed among the five social sciences. The result is that many economics, geography, and sociology classrooms are presided over by a teacher with only 3 to 6 hours of training in that discipline. In contrast, New York State requires 36 hours of social science course work for a provisional certificate with another 15 hours required within five years. Indiana requires 40 hours for provisional certification and an additional 8 hours within three years after certification. Indiana further requires that teachers show a minimum of 32 semester hours in a specific subject (e.g., economics, U.S. history, world history, etc.) before being certified to teach that subject; in other words, the license is not a comprehensive "social studies" type.
pare a qualified social studies teacher in four years. This is especially true when an international dimension is added to those subjects in which the teacher should have some competence. The competence of social studies teachers might be substantially improved if teachers were required to obtain a master's degree within a few years after beginning teaching, with at least a portion of their graduate credit hours required in the certified area.

Whichever proposal a state might choose to adopt, international affairs could be expected to benefit. If undergraduate credit hours needed for certification were increased, certain courses helpful in strengthening the teacher's preparation in international affairs could be required, for example, comparative political and economic systems, cultural anthropology, or non-Western history and geography. If certification were by specific subjects, international relations could be added to the list along with certain general requirements for certification. States wishing to reduce the ethnocentric views of social studies teachers could even require specific graduate courses designed to foster a relativistic view of cultures.

Through its control of certification the state department of education can greatly influence the qualifications of social studies teachers. The point is not that certification requirements are a magic formula for insuring that teachers are internationally minded, but simply that a teacher's formal training does influence his teaching. This is another case in which the state not only does not duplicate the work of others, but can make a unique contribution to improving the quality of international education.

In-Service Training

In-service training activities offer state department of education personnel two different opportunities to serve social studies teachers. First, the state supervisor can be an instructor in an in-service setting. It is here that he can acquaint teachers with the many services and programs available in the state. In-service meetings provide the natural setting for such liaison activities. Second, the state department person can serve as the initiator and observer of in-service conferences or seminars. Whether the primary purpose of an in-service meeting is to improve the teacher's competence in a particular subject or in
pedagogical methods, he can play the role of program planner, advance publicity director, and sometimes payer of bills.

State curriculum committees might also be regarded as a form of in-service training for those who participate. Admittedly, the materials produced by these committees are of dubious value unless directly related to state-mandated courses. On the other hand, the process of producing curriculum bulletins can in itself be very educational, and in a sense can be considered a real form of in-service training. To the extent that the emphasis can be shifted from product to process, such committees will be even more useful as a training device, though one can still question the efficiency of allocating limited resources to such activities.

In summary, most state departments do not have the financial resources to engage in the extensive design, evaluation, and development of curriculum materials and teaching strategies. For the time being, at least, such states must necessarily concentrate upon assisting local schools in the process of adapting curriculum innovations, be they new textbooks or curriculum packages developed by national curriculum projects. Each of the five areas discussed above has a role to play in making the state department a more efficient coordinator of resources and instigator of change.

The future will see an increasing number of states join the few already in a position to do curriculum design and development work. Once a state department becomes this sophisticated, the proposals made above for allocating very limited resources will have to be reconsidered. The fact remains, however, that most states are still far from this goal.

WILL STATES BE WILLING AND ABLE TO DO MORE?

Thus far we have discussed two questions: What are the states doing to improve the teaching of international affairs, and what might they be doing, given their very limited resources? A third question remains:

*For a detailed plan for this advanced level of state directed educational change, see Brickell, op. cit. A discussion of factors influencing educational change can be found in Carlson, Richard O. *Adoption of Education Innovations*. Eugene: University of Oregon, The Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1965. 84 pp.
Are the states willing and able to do more? The states are at the crossroads and they must very soon make some extremely difficult decisions concerning their involvement in education. As Ward Morehouse has so aptly put it, "... if the states are to retain their central role in public education, they must cast aside their characteristic provincialism and respond far more readily than they have to the challenge of our revolutionary world to American schools. ..." 27

If the federal government's role and power in the field of education expands, the states will find it increasingly difficult to preserve their role in educational decision-making. If federal programs continue to develop, it is quite possible that local school systems may find themselves dealing with Washington directly rather than through the states. If states are to avoid this situation, they will have to demonstrate that they are capable of educational leadership. One writer gave this summary of the problem:

Present weaknesses of all but one SED (state education department) dictate that most state departments will have to revise their structures, their activities, and their relationships with both Washington and local districts (particularly with cities, whom they have traditionally ignored), or they may revert to a ceremonial, anachronistic role, as county superintendents in most states did many years ago. 28

If states are to have a meaningful influence in education, they must begin to employ their limited resources in such a way that they "make a difference." State departments can no longer afford the luxury of duplicating the efforts of other agencies. Their services and programs must be of such a quality and nature that they would be missed if they were to be suddenly stopped. Many of their present efforts would not be.

To their credit, many states have seen the need to strengthen their role in education. Perhaps they were prodded into action by the increasingly dire warnings of state and national leaders. In the words of Dr. James E. Allen, Jr., Commissioner of Education for the State of New York, "Unused powers atrophy. If the states stand by while edu-

cation is changed without their participation, if they do not accommodate to new needs, states will be increasingly by-passed and new agencies will be created to do their jobs. Certainly the President served a polite but no less direct notice to the states in his Message on Education on January 12, 1965, when he said to Congress, "State leadership becomes increasingly important as we seek to improve the quality of elementary and secondary education. We should assist the states by strengthening state departments of education."20

The states are victims of a changing role: their earlier task of collecting and disseminating data gave way to the job of inspecting in order to maintain minimum standards, and finally to the potential role of educational leaders. The transition from inspector to trusted adviser will be a difficult one at best and may require many individuals who accept the old "policeman image" to step aside. The time has come for more states to rethink their educational efforts much as New York has done as one result of Brickell's study.31 The choice may be one of a quick but painful review or a slow and more painless death by irrelevance.

State departments of education face an uncertain future. In the past, few have been noted for their leadership abilities. Unless they can rise to the new demands being made upon them, they will be bypassed. Funds to do the long-neglected jobs are now becoming available. The nature of the educational task is changing as rapidly as the world context in which it exists. International affairs is only a part of the more comprehensive social studies program, but a part that is assuming increased significance. Leadership is needed, and leadership will be provided. The question remains, by whom? Certainly a decision not to change its educational role may be the last significant one a particular state department of education ever makes.


21 Ibid.

31 Brickell, op. cit.
World affairs councils and the schools have a symbiotic relationship. These voluntary associations of adult citizens usually devote some part of their programs specifically to teachers and students. While helpful to the schools, such activities also give the adult group a gratifying sense of service to the coming generation.

There are now over two score world affairs councils scattered about the United States from coast to coast, usually in the larger cities. Among the oldest and best known are those in Cleveland, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Minneapolis-St. Paul, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The first two mentioned were founded shortly after World War I, while most of the rest originated after World War II. Their purpose is basically to educate adult citizens in order to develop an informed public opinion which will support wise U.S. foreign policies.

The councils are typically membership organizations whose core clientele includes individuals with a deep and abiding interest in foreign policy. The average world affairs council member is likely to be in an upper income group, well educated, well traveled, and well
How World Affairs Councils Serve

read. A substantial proportion of the membership will be included in any list of local community leaders. In the larger cities the councils have from three to ten thousand individual members. They may also have corporate business memberships which provide some of the needed financial support.

Council programs include bringing prominent speakers to the community for banquets and luncheons and sponsoring special programs for certain segments of their membership, such as young adults, business groups, and teachers. Sometimes they will sponsor day-long or even several-day-long conferences and seminars for community leadership groups. Councils also have regular continuing services for non-member groups and individuals interested in world affairs. These often include speaker services for clubs and associations, correlative services on programming, pamphlet shops, and in some instances book and film libraries.

In communities where world affairs councils are highly developed, they serve as the center of local activities in the field of world affairs. Most large events are sponsored by the council or have had some connection with it between the conception and birth of the activity. The council is a clearing house, back-stopper, and catalytic agent for community world affairs activities.

From the viewpoint of the schools, one of the most important functions of the world affairs council is giving the subject of international relations a sanction of respectability and credibility in the community. This function can be of extreme importance for a school system. After all, foreign affairs contain elements of controversy; and there are always those in the community and in the schools who want to avoid differences of opinion. There are also those who want to suppress political opinions different from their own. In some communities these forces, singly or combined, have been so strong that the schools have been unwilling or unable to deal forthrightly with fundamental international relations subject matter or issues.

Because the board of directors of an active council looks like a page from "who's who in our town," political zealots are generally wary about attacking council-backed school programs. The "Establishment" as represented in a world affairs council can defend the schools against both the crackpots and those who are frightened by them.
The council should also concentrate, however, on the more positive role of encouraging the schools to give more attention to world affairs teaching. The rank and file membership of the world affairs council includes the type of people who are most active in PTA leadership and school board decisions, and there is indeed a significant overlap in membership. The voice of the council is usually heard loud and clear in the schools.

Most of the school-related work of world affairs councils is day-to-day unpublicized assistance to teachers and supervisors rather than the more dramatic activity described above. Much of the content of the school world affairs curriculum is contemporary in nature. Textbooks go out of date almost as soon as they are printed, and teachers need stepping stones between the textbook and the daily news. Pamphlets help meet this need. Pamphlet collections are common and useful services of the world affairs council. A pamphlet is more current than a textbook although less so than the daily paper. Many librarians do not like to handle pamphlets because they are ephemeral in nature and difficult to catalogue and shelve. Bookstores seldom stock a great variety of them, and so the council’s collection can close a real gap.

Pamphlets are often unexcelled for up-to-date treatment of a single issue or area such as Vietnam, the China question, or the population problem. Some councils have pamphlet shops containing up to a hundred current titles available free or at a small price. Not only the teacher, but entire classes will use the pamphlet shop. For example, as a service to California’s social studies teachers and librarians, the World Affairs Council of Northern California published a Pamphlet Review Service which collected and described useful materials which could be ordered from the Council’s pamphlet shop. Each fall, the Cincinnati Council sends kits of materials to social studies teachers in its area on major current problems.

The world affairs council is a repository of information and know-how about the wide range of world affairs resources for teaching which exist both within the community and beyond it. Its staff can answer such questions as “Who knows the most about Russia in our town?” “Is there anybody who recently returned from a trip to Africa who could speak to our school assembly?” “Does anyone have some slides on Japan they would be willing to show or lend to my class?” or “Do
you know if there are any foreign students from Asia who would be willing to show my children artifacts and their native dress?"

Most councils have active speakers bureaus serving community groups, including the schools. The International Center at the University of Louisville, for example, provided the following school or school-related groups with speakers during one academic year: Carmichael School; Charlestown High School, Charlestown, Indiana; Cooper Methodist Church; Dixie-West End Hi-12 Club; Emma J. Woerner Junior High School; Pleasure Ridge High School; The Rotary "Youth for International Service" Program; Seneca Junior High School; The Thomas Jefferson High School Parent-Teacher Association; W. E. Wilson School; and the Wilkerson School.

If it is doing its job properly, the world affairs council usually knows who knows what about what in world affairs. This fund of resources will be used by teachers who want to enrich their classroom experience or make extra-curricular activities a little more interesting to students. If the local world affairs council does not have the information demanded by teachers, it will go outside of the community for help. It may get in touch with other councils around the country, with one or more of the many national associations interested in world affairs, or with government agencies. It is not unusual, for instance, for a world affairs council to obtain speakers from the State Department or the United Nations for high school groups.

For many teachers, the local council is a natural part of a full intellectual life. He or she is often a dues-paying member and regularly attends its late afternoon and evening adult programs. Such participation may well serve as a kind of in-service training. However, the teacher, as an influential citizen in a peer group learning about a subject that is of very special interest to him, needs no further justification. Teachers often constitute as much as 25 percent of the audience of some of the more high-level, intensive seminars sponsored by world affairs councils. It might be added that many teachers prefer to learn in the company of the stimulating lay membership of the world affairs council rather than by attending "for teachers only" sessions. In the broader group they find increasing recognition of the fact that teachers are more and more becoming a part of the community leadership structure.
Many councils do have special programs, however, which may be of special interest to teachers. The Minnesota World Affairs Center’s 1966 Foreign Policy Conference for Educators attracted several hundred teachers from kindergarten through graduate school. A recent special teachers program sponsored by the Philadelphia Council was attended by 450 teachers. The topic was “U.S. Foreign Policy in Troubled Areas of the World.” Like the Minnesota Conference, the meeting was held in cooperation with the United States Department of State.

The Cincinnati Council’s major vehicle for providing professional services to teachers has been the three-year cycle Asian Studies Enrichment project, conducted for 37 school systems in the southwestern Ohio area. An elaborate structure has been built by the school administrators to supervise the project. The council has secured a wide range of outside speakers, consulting services, and materials to add to the resources brought to bear on the project by the school systems themselves.

Usually the emphasis of special teachers conferences is on content rather than on teaching process and methods, because the strength of world affairs councils lies in their access to the subject matter of world affairs. Such conferences also provide opportunity for teachers to discuss methods among themselves and to engage in professional shop talk. Sometimes, however, a council does make a methodological contribution, such as Philadelphia’s “Teachers’ Manual for Use in Simulation Techniques in the Classroom.”

As has been indicated, councils have numerous substantive programs aimed directly at students. Some sponsor junior world affairs councils in the schools. Others supply programs and speakers to existing international relations clubs which often draw heavily on the councils for help. Unfortunately, little is done at the elementary level, but for secondary school students, councils frequently sponsor programs inside and outside of school hours. These range from programs of several days duration, such as Minnesota’s high school residential American Assemblies, to Saturday morning or evening programs, to special weekday class activities.

The Dayton Council on World Affairs describes its junior council program as “aimed at developing an international perspective in the largest possible number of students.” This is accomplished through junior council clubs, which in 1966 involved 38 high schools covering
a four-county area with over 2,500 students. Over 160 junior council officers and advisers attended an all-day workshop to help develop program ideas for the year’s theme, which was Africa. At the fifteenth annual high school institute, 350 students heard the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs speak. A Model General Assembly with 600 students, a study tour to Washington and New York, and a recognition dinner attended by 550 students helped round out the Dayton program.

In Philadelphia 400 students from 40 Philadelphia area junior high schools have attended monthly meetings focusing on the cultural aspect of life in six countries. The Philadelphia Council in 1965-66 presented 85 programs for students of more than 200 schools in this region. A Saturday morning forum had attendance of over 400 students from more than 80 schools. The students chose the topics and helped lead the discussion. Student leaders attended special briefing sessions before each forum. Distinguished experts on foreign affairs from the United States and abroad spoke to these groups. The Council also sponsors conferences in Washington and at the United Nations for students.

The Cleveland Council, with one of the oldest junior council programs, embraces 54 schools. It sponsors annual institutes, provides speakers, arranges a New York-Washington trip, and distributes Foreign Policy Association “Great Decisions” kits. It also publishes a monthly newsletter and draws together 1,000 students for a model UN program which “is the oldest event of its kind in the nation.”

For school systems of the region, the Cincinnati Council maintains central services for junior councils on world affairs, prepares the Annual Seminar on Foreign Policy, performs the program services for the Annual World Affairs Institute, provides kits of informative materials, and serves in a consulting role to school systems on educational problems in the world affairs field. Approximately a thousand students in 25 high schools of the area belong to the Cincinnati Junior Councils on World Affairs. Regular meetings are held with faculty advisers and with the student Steering Committee in order to exchange ideas. Pamphlet and other reading materials and suggestions for speakers are provided for the Councils, which are responsible for formulating and carrying out their own individual programs and structures. Highlight of the year for the students is the Annual Seminar on Foreign Policy.
A recent seminar was devoted to "The New Nations of Africa and United States Relations with Them." The student registrants were sent kits of materials in advance of the Seminar, including a discussion outline, which they utilized at their own round table groups during the latter part of the Seminar. Faculty advisers and leading students of the Cincinnati Junior Councils attend the Annual Conference of the Council.

World affairs councils sometimes have a special tie with the mass media which can be related to the schools for mutual benefit. Such programs show the public what the schools can do in the world affairs field and indicate citizen support for this activity. (They may also show adults how far they are behind young people in their knowledge.) A number of world affairs councils have regular youth programs on television or radio. The Philadelphia Council, for example, had a diplomatic simulation project on television using high school students. It also has an active radio program, and student newspaper editors have interviewed top ABC network news correspondents. The Minnesota Center's director serves as director of the Program of Information on World Affairs of the Minneapolis Star. This 22-year-old Program, consisting of background articles and tests, has been used by a thousand high schools in the Upper Midwest. An annual awards banquet is the highlight of the year.

It is unwise to look at community-wide world affairs educational activities in a series of separate compartments. Most teachers know that students who are highly interested in world affairs tend to come from homes where the parents have wide civic interests. Many students, teachers, and parents have a common interest in world affairs which will be brought together through the local world affairs council in a variety of ways. The Minnesota Center, in cooperation with its opposite number at the University of Wisconsin, did a study some years ago showing that the "hard core" of their audiences attributed their interest in world affairs to their parents. Respondents in the survey reported that schools acted more as reinforcing agents than as originators of this interest. It is not unusual for parents, teachers, and students to appear at the same world affairs council programs and to have other contacts with one another at such internationally oriented school events as American Field Service activities. Parents, teachers, and students can and do reinforce and stimulate one another's interest in international relations.
Another function of the world affairs council is in helping to bring school discussions and programs out of the ivory tower. The urban-based citizens organization can give some corrective to an "other worldly" atmosphere which is found not only in colleges but increasingly in schools. Students who attend council foreign policy meetings (at special rates) often return to the classroom ready to challenge textbooks and teachers after having heard the latest interpretations from the horse's mouth (or rather from the mouths of journalists, professors, and official spokesmen)!

Council officers with their specialized knowledge can also help teachers correctly identify major current problem areas. There is no reason why mock UN programs in the schools need to deal with outdated problems, as they too often do. It is the council's business to know where the developing crises are, and to know what local and national resources are available for their objective treatment.

Looking across the country, one sees an amazing variety of council programs of interest to the schools. Grand Rapids, Michigan, has a program for sending high school students to Europe in the summer. Minnesota collaborates with World Pen Pals, one of the largest pen pal services in the United States. Some world affairs councils take students to visit the UN. Some, like the Cleveland Council, are centers for foreign students, who are often popular as speakers in schools.

Others act as agents for international exchanges. The Louisville center brought 57 French students to its area in 1965 and found full-time jobs for them. Needless to say, these students had many contacts with Kentucky students. Louisville was also host to a selected group of 40 high school seniors from different parts of Kentucky, who attended a summer institute on international relations.

Obviously, UN week is an important activity for most world affairs councils. They and the schools plan major projects together during this period. The Vermont Council on World Affairs entertains and hosts foreign visitors, some of whom are excellent "audiovisual resources" for local schools.

A number of councils sponsor the Great Decisions programs of the Foreign Policy Association in the local schools. They furnish background reading materials for teachers and otherwise help enrich the FPA materials.

For a number of years the Foreign Policy Association of Minnesota has sponsored seminars for high school students. A number of public
and private schools work together with the Association in planning these day-long programs. It might be noted that the Minnesota FPA had a president who was a leading secondary school social studies teacher, illustrating the very close relationship which can exist between school and community, as well as the community leadership role more and more teachers are assuming.

Some councils sponsor the UNICEF Halloween project, which is one of the few world affairs activities that reach into the elementary schools. Others cooperate with the 4-H Clubs, which are sponsoring an increasing number of world affairs projects. (Here is a complicated example of a community group working with an extracurricular school project sponsored by a non-school organization.)

The New Hampshire Council on World Affairs has a two-day tour and briefing at the UN in New York for high school students. A number of councils cooperate with the United Nations Association of the United States in sponsoring high school essay contests.

The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations has a project called Teenagers Abroad that is an inexpensive tour to Europe where students "stay in friendly medium sized towns, . . . to meet with European high school students, to see Europe through the eyes of a European and, last but not least, to establish lasting international friendships."

Some councils work with and sponsor individuals from groups like the American Field Service and the Experiment in International Living that are interested in direct, personal contact with nationals of other countries. Others work on projects through Leadership and World Society (LAWS) that funds a great variety of stimulating experimental school programs across the nation.

What goes on in the schools is frequently mirrored by what goes on in the community and vice versa. As indicated above, certain types of people are interested in world affairs; and their children are more likely than others to become involved in studies in this field. The fact that the world affairs council deals with a subject of special interest to selected adults makes it possible for teachers to get special help for their classes. Further, these additional resources enable teachers to provide additional materials and programs for superior students.
World affairs are extremely complicated, and many current educational programs may be beyond the interest and understanding of students with modest intellectual endowment or those from homes where public affairs are seldom discussed. In a democracy as complicated as ours there must be some specialization of interests. Everyone cannot be a specialist in every branch of public (or private) affairs. If this is recognized in the community, it is easier to do so in the schools. If such a statement smacks of an elite philosophy, let it be said that the groups interested in world affairs are self-selected. Membership is not hereditary and is open to all who wish to join.

World affairs councils can furnish a corrective to schools showing an unwillingness to deal with force and violence as an aspect of international relations. Some schools try to emphasize the UN and what they call “international understanding,” avoiding the unpleasant realities of world politics. Consciously or unconsciously teachers may try to shield their young charges from the facts of international life. The council, on the other hand, must deal realistically with the world or risk losing its sophisticated adult clientele.

The interrelationship between world affairs councils and the schools is on the whole salutary, but it can, strangely enough, become too close for the welfare of either or both. It is fairly easy to raise funds “to help the leaders of tomorrow,” while councils are always forced to scratch for their funds. The council, lured by easy funds, may find its program distorted from its important basic mission of adult education by too heavy an involvement in school activities. It can also become one more group pushing its special educational wares into the schools. After all, schools have to deal with mundane matters like teaching mathematics and music even at the possible risk of neglecting tomorrow’s diplomats. In most cases, however, world affairs councils usually do a great deal of good by helping to improve the quantity and quality of world affairs education in the schools by backing up and supporting teachers and administrators, and by providing them and their students with a multitude of ideas and resources. They, in turn, benefit in many ways by working with the schools. In the important business of preparing citizens for life in a democracy where world affairs increasingly are the only affairs in which mistakes are irretrievable, the community world affairs council and the schools have a job to do together.
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Teacher Education: The World Dimension

Chapter 19

FRANK H. KLASSEN

School and Society—The Role of the Teacher

The advent of the International Education Act of 1966 was widely and justifiably heralded as a significant shift from traditional educational perspectives toward a world view. It was a shift prompted by many factors: the pressure of events that had in recent decades produced a sizeable commitment to international studies in America's schools, colleges, and universities; a dramatic expenditure of the nation's human capital in foreign educational programs; and a reasoned analysis on the part of government, the educational community, and the public that isolationist, parochial, and chauvinistic tendencies in American education would ill equip future citizens to cope with the emerging demands of global responsibility. It is suggested in this chapter that the preparation of teachers to accomplish the objectives underlying the International Education Act is a focal point on which major efforts must be concentrated so that the new perspectives can be introduced into the structure and content of American education.

That the teacher plays a significant role in American society—or in any society—is accepted without question. This fact has been stated
with persuasiveness and persistence and needs little further elaboration. But because of the prominent place of the teacher in perpetuating society's heritage and in energizing human resources toward social progress, criticism of the teacher and his adequacy is voiced no less often than admiration and respect for the teacher's role. It is not without reason that the debate over American education has focused with considerable intensity on teachers and teacher education. For if it is accepted that the teacher is a central element in the formal education of American youth, and that the level of education cannot rise far above the quality of the teacher in the classroom, then the selection, preparation, and performance of these teachers is likely to be a constant source of social concern and criticism. The net effect of this criticism, whatever its merits may be, has often been to make teacher education a kind of "whipping boy"—a fact that, in the eyes of some foreign educators, reveals an apparent disparity between our domestic views concerning teacher education and the impact of teacher education abroad. Writes one such foreign observer, who now plays a leading role in American international studies:

In some parts of this country . . . it has become customary to write teachers and teacher education off. Indeed the words "teachers college" seem to be classified as an un-American activity in semantics. You Americans have a great capacity for self-flagellation. You seem to take an especially lustful delight in the area of teacher education, where your destructive efforts have been occasionally almost sadistic. You are so busily preoccupied with self-criticism that you often fail to note that the rest of the world is faithfully copying, while steadily criticizing, many of the educational trends and practices you have pioneered . . . In spite of your dismal deprecations, I maintain that American teachers are still the best educated in the world.

Whatever the merits of the case—and no normative or empirical standards have yet been devised to bring contrasting views into equilibrium in this matter—the teacher in the classroom, for good or ill, is a product of his social and educational environment. That is to say, in large measure teachers reflect their preparatory training and the in-

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intellectual and behavioral climate in which it takes place. They are no less a product of societal values and practices than the future citizens whom they educate. They tend to express in the school's activities the same attention (or lack thereof) to human rights, for example, that is characteristic of their training institution. This means that the teacher, like any other individual, can be subject to feelings of alienation, chauvinism, or a sense of powerlessness to deal with global problems—attitudes that he transmits to the classroom.

Herein lies the dilemma and, simultaneously, a course for future action. It is a dilemma the schools alone cannot be expected to solve, for the bearer of educational authority is in the last analysis that amorphous and yet distinct entity—society.²

The potential role of education as a medium for change derives largely from the assumption that the school is an institution established by society for the purpose of preparing the young to participate in that society. The school's philosophy and objectives are therefore usually framed with reference to the ideals, the aspirations, and the needs imbedded in the culture of that society. In essence, the structure and guiding principles of a nation's educational enterprise are inevitably molded by the society that it serves.

Society, on the other hand, cannot, without peril to its continued existence, ignore its educative function. In pursuing this function, society must take cognizance of the goals and norms that education is designed to serve. For to educate is to act, and to act involves preferences and consequences. Those preferences and consequences that society deems desirable are passed on to the recipients of education through teachers, texts, and a host of other instructional materials and processes. The recipients in turn become citizens who subsequently help to mold the social, economic, and political aspirations of society. The definition of the aims and processes of education thus becomes a moral, intellectual, social, and political problem.

This relationship between society and formal education tends to ensure the continuity of society. More important, it identifies the arena within which change affecting education takes place. It also highlights the intellectual, moral, and political forces that must be in-

fluenced or responded to so that change can flourish. Both the bearer of educational authority—society—and the transmitter of society's values, knowledge, and skills—the teacher—are inextricably involved in this process.

Social Change—Education's Response

Societies do change. In fact, societies “have unleashed the technology that has built a loom of truly global dimensions—one on which new and sturdy threads are weaving together formerly independent social tapestries, penetrating, disrupting and overlapping old social patterns, and transmitting the shocks of social change throughout the global fabric.” This interrelationship, an interdependence of man to man that ignores geopolitical borders, is intensified when considered in the context of a “shrinking world” brought about by new modes of transportation and communication. As the authors of a recent Education and World Affairs study point out:

The world is shrinking only in the physical sense—in those aspects that can be gauged by time and distance. The other “world,” the world of human relationships in which men and nations actually live in the fullest sense, is not contracting at all, but expanding widely and rapidly. For better or worse, every man, every family, every people shares in the daily interaction of a world which—because it is more compact—forces all of us to be more broadly involved with our neighbors.

The related concepts of a shrinking world and expanded human relationships necessitate a reconsideration of what type of “society” will be the future arbiter of the role that education and the teacher play. America is inextricably involved in the newly emerging global patterns, and Americans, as participants in this process, will inevitably be led to change their conception of education in general and the preparation of teachers in particular. “The behavior of people everywhere will

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depend crucially upon the ways in which they are taught to perceive and interpret the universe, the earth and its envelope, the world community, their own respective nations, themselves and their families, and their roles, statuses, and functions in these various, more or less overlapping or nesting organizations, milieu, contexts or systems. 5

Several studies have been undertaken in recent years to probe and gauge the response now being made by American teacher-preparing institutions to the global challenge outlined above. In 1965 Education and World Affairs assigned a Task Force to assess the role of professional schools of education and suggest future courses of action in this field. 6 In 1966 the Foreign Policy Association began a study of the objectives, needs, and priorities in international studies at the elementary and secondary levels as well as in the realm of teacher education. The study is bridging the "discipline-professional gap" by bringing together classroom teachers, teacher educators, social scientists, historians, geographers, and others in an effort to develop a broad consensus on major priorities in the field of international education. And in November 1966 the American Association of State Colleges and Universities reported on a study of approximately 200 member institutions regarding the emphasis placed on international education on the respective campuses.

The most recent study in this field has been completed by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education under the direction of Dr. Harold Taylor. During the course of the project, which was entitled "The Preparation of American Teachers in the Field of World Affairs," Dr. Taylor visited over 50 AACTE member colleges and universities specializing in teacher education to analyze the content and quality of their curriculum in world affairs. Two publications report the findings of this survey, which provides a conceptual framework for internationalizing America's future teachers and suggests needed areas of research. 7

These and related studies represent a major advance in the thinking of that segment of the American educational community concerned

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6 Sanders, op. cit.
with the advancement of international studies in higher education. Previous studies recognized the need for the development of a citizenry sensitive to and knowledgeable about the interlocking network of global relations. But they paid scant attention to the role of teacher education in this process. The newer studies, however, are coming to realize the potential contributions of one of the pivotal professions, teacher education, whose programs link American higher education with the American public.

Equally significant is the role of teacher education in the area of educational assistance abroad. Through some 75 governmental and nongovernmental programs involved directly in the improvement of foreign teachers, the teaching profession is forging new links between the American public and the peoples of the world. Teacher education is thus itself becoming an avenue for developing global loyalties and a widespread understanding of the larger "world society."

On the broader educational scene there is no doubt that American higher education has, through language and area studies and new curricula, accepted considerable responsibility for breaching the parochialism of the American people. One indication of the growing internationalism of higher education is the proliferation of phrases and cliches that grace the speeches of university administrators, college professors whose sabbaticals have taken them abroad, serious students of international affairs, and coordinators of international programs, to name a few. How familiar have the phrases become: "the world as a laboratory," "the international dimension of education," "the experiment in international living," and "the open door to foreign students."

Considering the ubiquity of these cliches, in addition to the numerous overseas sojourns of students in their "Junior Year Abroad" or of "jet professors" on their "Faculty Seminars Abroad," there is considerable evidence, albeit somewhat superficial, that the American university is belatedly responding to the challenges of the second half of the twentieth century. The evidence portends, moreover, what may

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well be the beginning of a fundamental shift in the substantive character of intellectual endeavor in American higher education and teacher education: a shift toward a reasoned analysis of the totality of human endeavor in the context of varied and complex sets of human relationships that comprise the world community.

This compelling interest in the nation outside our borders is not without historical antecedents. Students of history will recall that in the 1830's and 40's Horace Mann and Henry Barnard made studies of foreign systems of education in an early attempt to learn from the roots of our intellectual heritage. Nevertheless, at no time in our history have the aims and priorities of higher education been so imbued with the concept that the world is of vital concern to and a legitimate area for study in American colleges, universities, secondary, and elementary schools.

Equally impressive is the involvement of youth in the teaching process overseas. Of the 14,000 Peace Corps Volunteers in service today, some 40 percent serve as teachers. A majority of the rest are functionally involved in the teaching process, whether in rural development, community service, or public health. In addition, of some 17,800 Volunteers who served at least two years before terminating their Peace Corps assignments, over 8,000 were teachers. The impact of this experience on the career choices of returning Volunteers has been noteworthy. Over 1,300 are now teaching. The fact that Peace Corps training and experience is gaining recognition by state certification boards and colleges of education is also encouraging. At least 10 states currently grant waivers of the student teaching requirement to returning Peace Corps teachers. Eighty colleges grant academic credit for Peace Corps training and 10 for Peace Corps service.

A number of other programs involve Americans in overseas teaching. Columbia University Teachers College, for example, in its Teachers for East Africa Project, provided some 500 teachers for East African secondary schools from 1961 to 1967. The National Education Association Teach Corps Project annually sends qualified teacher volunteers for summer seminars to developing countries. And the Department of Defense and American-sponsored schools overseas employ numerous teachers annually. Taken together, all these programs represent a large quantitative impact of the American teaching profession on the world.
Another important contribution to the improvement of teacher education overseas is the sponsorship, by American educational institutions, of projects designed to improve foreign educators. A study of current AID-supported teacher education programs under contract to American colleges and universities reveals that some 60 are currently operative. In addition, the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education has during the past decade initiated a series of programs within its current 774 member institutions designed to: (a) establish lines of communication and cooperation between American and foreign colleges under its Inter-Institutional Affiliation Program; (b) provide foreign study and experience for educational administrators, presidents, and deans of member institutions, whose policymaking role in the development of new programs is often crucial; and (c) improve administrative skills of key officials in foreign colleges and universities through its Administrative Internship program. Under this program principals, rectors, and deans come to this country from Africa, Asia, and Latin America and spend periods ranging from five to nine months working with college presidents and deans on American campuses to become acquainted with modern administrative techniques.

The impact of these approaches to international education on the host campuses has been considerable. They have been able to develop new curricula and improve faculty competencies in the international field through the development of college consortia, such as the 11 Pilot Projects in Education for International Understanding. They have also provided assistance to American-sponsored schools through a linkage between universities and American schools overseas.

Role of Federal Government

Focusing for the moment on the federal government's programs overseas, it is probably safe to say that the past decade has witnessed an increased awareness by the federal government and its agencies of the educational task to be undertaken overseas. This awareness, coupled

*Space limitations present further elaboration of institutional efforts in international education. Some indication of the magnitude of current college and university programs may be gained from The International Programs of American Universities. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1955 and 1966.
with an increasing reliance upon university personnel to accomplish these educational tasks, has brought about the creation of a new constellation comprised of the government and American institutions of higher education.

The relationship between government and education in spheres of activity outside of international education is, as is well known, not of recent origin. Indeed, on March 2, 1967, the U.S. Office of Education celebrated its first century of operation. During this period the Office of Education has far exceeded its original information clearinghouse function and has received legislative mandate to support land-grant colleges, vocational education, grants to Federally impacted areas, and cooperative research. Furthermore, as Congresswoman Edith Green reported in her 1963 study of the Federal Government and Education, “all told, 42 departments, agencies and bureaus of the government are involved in education to some degree.”

No relationship comparable to the one found on the domestic scene had been firmly established in the government’s international programs, however, until 1958, when, with the passage of the National Defense Education Act, the role of the university in the arena of international affairs was clearly recognized, the twentieth anniversary of the Fulbright program notwithstanding.

The National Defense Education Act was designed to “strengthen the national defense and to assist in the expansion and improvement of educational programs to meet critical needs . . .” The Act placed, for the first time, modern language training on a federally supported pedestal alongside mathematics and natural sciences. Whether this emphasis has in fact reduced America’s “language gap” to meet critical nations’ needs or whether it has produced a nation of polyglots who speak many languages and have nothing to say in any of them, is difficult to say. What is noteworthy is the reliance on higher education to perform a task closely identified with success in international affairs.

Three years later, in 1961, President Kennedy launched the Peace Corps as a part of his overall program that committed the United States to a “positive interest in helping less developed nations secure decent living standards for their people and achieve sufficient strength, self-respect, and independence to become self reliant members of the community of nations.”

It should be noted that the conception of

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national goals had expanded in this three-year period to embrace not only the security of our nation but also the well-being and self-reliance of all nations.

The Peace Corps represented one of the many tools designed to achieve President Kennedy's international goals. From the beginning, America's institutions of higher learning were regarded as vital sources of expertise in the education of Peace Corps manpower. In his first report on the Peace Corps, Sargent Shriver wrote, "As a high educational venture, its proper carriers are our traditional institutions of higher education." Shriver was by no means content, however, with a mere parasitic relationship. He added, "It is time for American universities to become truly world universities. They need to expand their horizons—their research and curriculum—to the whole world. The Peace Corps will help them with this transformation." It was clear that a symbiotic relationship was envisioned between the Peace Corps and the university, and that higher education was being called upon to bear major responsibility for providing the expertise in education and research for the conduct of international affairs. The universities were being asked to provide an education not only to preserve our borders, but, through the Peace Corps, an education designed to banish the concept of borders, both within the university and in the world at large.\textsuperscript{10}

The most recent stage in this somewhat deliberate dash through the decade of internationalism in education was reached on October 29, 1966. On a visit to Chulalongkorn University in Thailand during his Asian tour, President Johnson signed into law the International Education Act of 1966. This Act brought to fruition the intentions of the President in his Smithsonian Institute address on September 16, 1965. This "new and noble adventure," to quote the President, still awaits its first bold adventurer-in-residence, however, since Congress failed to appropriate any funds to implement the Act.

Despite the funding crisis, it is important to recognize the essential meaning of the passage of the International Education Act. The new

legislation was without a doubt the most significant federal move ever made in the field of international education. First, it assigned major responsibility to the educational community for defining and implementing the Act. While the government could stimulate and provide large-scale financing, the ideas and activities that made up international education were clearly in the province of the schools, colleges, and universities. That several provisions of the Act clearly identified the universities as fully equal partners with the government in the planning process was a major step forward. It was an invitation to institutions of higher learning to perform national service and to assume responsibilities far beyond the needs of the communities that supported them. In addition, as clearly indicated by the House Report, there was to be commensurate national investment to be dictated not so much by the foreign policy requirements of the nation or by cost-effectiveness analyses of American governmental activities overseas as by the purposes and priorities of the educational institutions involved. In short, the Act was intended to strengthen the universities and not to make them instruments of American foreign policy.

Current Problems

The significant strides made in recent years in universities, schools, and federal agencies have not been accomplished without growing pains. New terminology, new configurations of educational and political forces, a re-examination of the relationship between professional preparation and disciplinary relevancy, and renewed awareness of the role of the teacher have been among the products washed up on the shores by the current tides of internationalism. A brief analysis of some of these products and their implications for teacher preparation is in order.

As the language of international educators begins its history of etymological metamorphosis, it is interesting to note the subtle pressure that accepted terms are beginning to exert on educational processes and operations themselves. In the area of international exchange, for example, this pressure is reflected in the terms most popularly associated with international education, such as “overseas study,” “overseas experience,” and “travel abroad.” To some extent these terms
have created, in the minds of students and faculty members, a “salt water syndrome” that militates against a creative use of international experience in Canada, Mexico, South and Central America, or among the Eskimos in the Northwest Territories—unless Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, and the Rio Grande can be brought under the rubric of “overseas” travel.

Related to this transoceanic approach to international experience is the use of distance criteria in the award of in-service growth credit for teachers who participate in international study tours. In a recent study of 166 selected school districts in 29 states, the major criteria employed to assess travel was the minimum time length of the trip. In addition, 18 percent of the districts reported that the distance travelled was a major factor in considering the award of credit. In some cases this criteria specifically excluded close-to-home travel from the credit system. It is obvious that a teacher from Bangor, Maine, who travels some 200 miles to Quebec City to observe the bilingual and bicultural educational system of French Canada is at a decided disadvantage under these criteria when compared to the teacher from San Francisco who travels to Bangkok, Thailand. Whether the knowledge and insight gained from the two trips reflects the same differential is by no means certain.

A further possible dimension for international experience in our hemispheric back yard lies in the potential involvement of prospective teachers in the problems of the variegated social structure of American society. It may well be that the process of making the world a teaching laboratory for future teachers should begin in our immediate environment and should treat international education as an extension of intercultural experiences within American society. “Let us start with the sub-cultures of our own great cities,” states Harold Enarson. The point is simply that international study and experience for teachers should create new learning opportunities for students in American classrooms. Immersion in another culture is a highly significant precondition for understanding one’s own, and it may be that

12 Henderson, Earl E. “A Survey Concerning the Award of In-Service Growth Credit for Travel.” Washington, D.C.: Division of Educational Travel, National Education Association, 1967. (Mimeo.)
experiences of this type can "be obtained in a geographically distant culture or within a few miles of home."

Further difficulties that hinder the acculturation of the teaching profession to global world problems stem from the activities of America's intellectual and professional community in international programs. For example, university technical assistance abroad has been carried on largely by three professional schools, agriculture, engineering, and education. Basic research, on the other hand, has been fostered by the social sciences and the humanities. Rarely has there been an inter-penetration of concern that united the efforts of the professional schools of education and the social science researcher. Seldom, for example, do the five-year educational or agricultural development plans of a developing country manifest an awareness of the cultural milieu within which these plans are to be implemented and for which abundant research materials exist. On the other hand, the emerging nations themselves are beginning to ask of the sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists who appear like genies on African trails, Amazonian tributaries, and in Indian villages, "What relevance, what utility for our nation-building program does your research have?"

To some degree the polarization of professional versus basic studies and research can be traced to the atomistic nature of activity and concern on the part of the professional schools and the major disciplines on the American campus. The problem, of course, is a circular one; much of this mutual isolation results from the nature of federal programs overseas. It is encouraging to note that the Agency for International Development is adding research clauses to future technical assistance contracts that will, to some extent, bring together professional and disciplinary skills in the field of operations.

It is unnecessary to elaborate unduly on the lines of demarcation that exist in the attitudes of professional educators and liberal arts and science professors toward each other. Recent studies indicate that common social concerns are in fact bringing all disciplines and professional preparatory programs into a mutually beneficial relationship. But in order to develop a teaching profession that can assume leadership in the world affairs programs of our schools, universities

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14 Ibid.
15 Sanders, op. cit., p. 23ff.
should seriously and systematically promote collaboration between schools of education and the traditional disciplines whose focus in research and teaching involves world affairs.¹⁶

Teacher Education—International Dimensions

Having superficially explored the potentialities and problems inherent in the current surge of international education, some attention should be given to the preparation of teachers who, armed with the necessary cognitive and affective tools, can create an environment for their students that will lead to an understanding and appreciation of other cultures. Where to start is a major question. In the midst of a wealth of opportunities for international and intercultural study by students and teachers, the choice of a right beginning becomes paramount.

The events leading up to the signing of the International Education Act of 1966 provided adequate evidence that the teacher and his preparation were to occupy a central role in the diffusion of international understanding and enlightenment. In his Smithsonian address of September 1965, President Johnson emphasized that “The conduct of our foreign policy will advance no faster than the curriculum of our classrooms...” The failure to fund the Act was, therefore, an event of no minor proportions. In fact, when one becomes aware that the dependence of some universities on federal funds has reached the point where two or three professors will not even gather together without a preplanning grant, the crisis in funding begins to sound like a death-knell to further planning for international education on the university level. Further, this crisis in funding brings home the point that the expansion of teacher education into the international sphere must stem from justifications other than the existence of outside funding support. Instead, it must stem from a reasoned conviction first, that the continued parochialism of American education jeopardizes its own future improvement, and second, that this parochialism can be alleviated by devising teacher education programs that enable the prospective and certified teacher to become immersed in the “world beyond the one[to] which his cultural origins are bound to confine him.”¹⁷

¹⁶Ibid., p. 66.
Whatever the conceptual models for the preparation of teachers may be at any point in time, one of the features common to all of them is the role of experiential involvement in the process of the teaching act, whether through student teaching or clinical sessions of one type or another. It is this experiential core that at once provides the focus for the teacher's role as a mediating agent between the content of instruction and the learning growth of the child, and simultaneously provides a context of interlocking social and intellectual relationships enabling the student-teacher to validate in his own personality and cognitive processes all the factual information, abstractions, generalizations, and methodological suggestions found in his academic and professional courses. That the experiential component has not been given its adequate place in the preparation of teachers may be ascertained from the loud complaints by students and critics of education concerning the irrelevancy of much of what is taught in professional education courses. The vaunted irrelevancy is due in part to the structure of much of teacher education, in which immersion in a student-teaching experience follows rather than precedes or accompanies the intellectual discourse on the psychological, social, historical, philosophical, and methodological foundations of education. If it is true, as Herbert La Grone asserts in the AACTE study on teacher education, that teaching requires the making of choices among alternatives, then the power to make a choice and to express it must be forged in an interrelated situation in which content, the teacher, the student, and the environment create the opportunity to explore alternatives, to assess their effectiveness, and then to make new choices. This is not to say that education courses or academic studies do not contribute to the awareness of alternatives and the development of a conceptual scheme to assess and order a behavioral situation. They are indeed vital to any educational program. It is that the sterility of many of the courses is a function of their isolation from and lack of relationship to the student-teacher's own grappling with the complexities of the classroom. In sum, the preparation of the teacher cannot stand apart from direct teaching experience; rather it should radiate from and be related to a process of experience—experience that makes concept-formation and

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decision-making possible and relevant. Without this interfacing of cognitive discourse and experiential entanglement, the preparation of tomorrow's "international teacher" will suffer from the same deficiencies.

Finally, reform in the area of teacher education, whether devoted to domestic or international objectives, must receive its impetus and its insights from the living situation of the society in which the educational enterprise is nurtured. It is within this context that overseas study and activity makes its contributions to the preparation of teachers competent to assist in shifting the center of education's gravity from the domestic scene to the wider world.

What, then, are some of the essential components of experience in a program designed to internationalize future American teachers? The experience should be first, one that enables the prospective teacher to enter the lives of others at a level deep enough to make mutual understanding possible. Second, this experience should be accompanied by structured discourse, whether through courses of study, a summer seminar, or one of the many other mechanisms currently available to students overseas. Third, the discourse and experience should be undertaken by the student teacher not only as a consumer but also as a producer, one who will be faced with the obligation to transmit the results of his experience to the students in the classroom. For them, the teacher will represent in many cases their only contact with a foreign culture.

With respect to the role of institutions of higher learning, including schools of education, several factors might be considered. First, the necessary resources, intellectual and financial, that are required to mount effective international and intercultural programs far outstrip the resources of any one professional school, department, or institution. While larger universities do indeed possess resources that permit them to carry out effective programs, this is not the case with the majority of American centers for higher learning. Intrainsitutional and interinstitutional activity is called for. It is interesting to note that under Title II of the International Education Act it was made clear that the Act was directed toward the support of a total institution or group of institutions rather than individual scholars or small research groups.19

19 For further elaboration of this concept see speech by Paul Miller in Taylor, op. cit., pp. 26-28.
Second, institutions would be well advised to make a careful analysis of their own resources and initiate campus-wide discussions regarding their aim in international education before embarking on ambitious programs. It is difficult to achieve a total institutional commitment when a program of teacher preparation in this field is undertaken merely as a peripheral activity prompted by academic fashion, external pressure, or the potential availability of outside financing.

Third, the clarification of total institutional aims with respect to international education must incorporate an increasing rapprochement, intellectual and operational, of the various departments of an institution, wherein it is made possible for the different disciplines and the professional schools to work jointly. Much of the uncoordinated, fragmented, and episodic nature of internationally oriented programs can be traced to lack of coordinated institutional effort.

Fourth, the continued success of any international program on the campus will be determined by the competence of its faculty and the quality of its instruction and research. Many avenues are open for the improvement of faculty competence in the international sphere: faculty seminars of an interdisciplinary nature that stimulate interest in and knowledge about cultures and that give scholars an opportunity to exercise the knowledge of their own disciplines in new contexts; hiring policies that give some preference to those whose prior training and experience combine professional and disciplinary competence with foreign study, research, or service; close campus-community cooperation to permit faculty and students to take advantage of the learning potential latent in the cultural and linguistic diversity existing in the ghettos of our cities; and administrative policies that provide for staff mobility to pursue their specialization on an intercultural plane, to name but a few.

In the final analysis the success of an international emphasis in America's colleges and universities will depend on the creation of a new educational environment able to foster a more enlightened and perceptive outlook on the part of all who participate in it: the teacher, the undergraduate, the graduate student, the college professor, and the plain but new-fashioned American citizen, a citizen with a world view.
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