Presented in this document is a discussion of faculty participation in academic governance. Within this context, the discussion is broken into categories concerning oligarchy and anarchy, professionalism and unionization, academic policy and purpose, leadership and authority, and constitution and structure. It is felt that much of the present agitation over faculty rights in academic government is misplaced. Furthermore, it is part of a deplorable drift toward unionization in the profession of college teaching. The dominance of the labor-management model is tending to fragmentize the collegiate system into bailiwicks, presided over by interest groups. It is felt that such a system will be less purposive, more susceptible to sectarian pressures, and more responsive to private interests. (HS)
Power and Purpose in Collegiate Government

The Role of the Faculty in Academic Planning

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Power and Purpose in Collegiate Government

One way of viewing a college or university is to approach it as an enterprise which needs to be managed for the optimization of productivity. That perspective is admittedly a limited one; yet it is an important one for a conscientious interpretation of any system of education. The simple reminder that a college or university is, among other things, a producing organization is occasionally in place in a time when the exuberance of would-be reformers distorts the vision of the earnest.

It is important for observers of the system of higher education to study the colleges as organizations. And, indeed, a considerable interest in the analysis of collegiate governance has developed of late. Unfortunately, much of the current discussion is diversionary, being based on a theory of organization which is inappropriate for the institutions to which it is applied.

To be specific, the problem of the role of the faculty in academic decision-making is typically cast in the light of assumptions like the following: 1) First, it is assumed that the college is constituted of different groups, e.g. students, faculty, and administration, each having basically divergent interests and distinct powers. The problem then is to create an organization in which the power of each group counterbalances that of the others. Government, according to the classic American model, proceeds by a balance of powers and the exercise of veto. Similarly, the structure of academic government is generally conceived in America in terms of a restraint on the exercise of individual or group power.

2) It is assumed, secondly, that democracy in any form of government means a proportional recognition of private interests. An egalitarian form of social organization is one in which extant interests are proportionally represented, and an open society is one in which both majority and minority
interests are allowed to influence the final decision. In an educational institution, then, the problem is to create an organization in which particular interest groups within the academic community are appropriately represented in the planning process. Academic government, too, is conceived under the representative model.

3) A third assumption is that the effectiveness of organized activity, especially where there is a high degree of division of labor, requires a structure through which lines of authority are clearly established. The problem of educational organization is therefore to define appropriate ranges and levels of authority. A constitution which specifies the functions to be performed by various individuals and an organizational flow chart which clarifies the hierarchical structure become the objective towards which organizational planning moves. Discussion focuses, accordingly, on the merits of alternative organizational forms, and proposals for reorganization appear as constitutional revisions.

4) Finally, it is assumed that institutional change of any magnitude can probably be effected only through the application of force or the exercise of sanctions. It is only persons who live outside the groves of academe who believe that decisions are there made on the basis of sweet reasonableness. Academicians know the limits of rationality, and they have learned that in debates on academic policy, especially those touching a strong personal interest, the cosmopolitanism of universal science easily gives way to partisanship and provincialism, and men begin to depend not on the power of reason but on the power of rationalization. Whether that expectation is cynical or realistic, it remains typical for men who, in scientific pursuits, demand of both themselves and their colleagues nothing less than that prejudice and subjectivity shall be restrained by objectivity and proof. To the surprise of many laymen, the problem of educational organization is usually cast in the form of a search for suitable sanctions and forms of force. The faculty, too, assume that the only way they will obtain the recognition of their interests
in institutional planning is by exercising or threatening the sanctions and the forms of force available to them—within the limits of a fluid professional ethics.

None of these assumptions is appropriate for viewing the problem of academic organization. They are drawn from a theory of government which is incompatible with the nature of education and has no application in an educational institution. Discussions of the problem of the faculty's role in educational decision-making, when conducted under the control of such assumptions, can only be received as diversionary by those who understand the process of education.

Much of the current discussion of faculty participation in academic government is a digression, diverting the attention of reformers away from the real and fundamental issues and focusing on pseudo-problems and superficial issues. The discussion concentrates on the problem of who will exercise leadership in educational planning, when the real problem is how leadership should be exercised. It concentrates on the problem of how to maintain conditions of academic freedom, when the real problem is how to maximize educational effectiveness. It concentrates on the problem of representative academic government, when the real problem is how to release creative educational leadership. It concentrates on the problem of creating mechanisms for improving the relationships among the students, the faculty, and the administration as groups, when the real problem is that of enlarging the opportunity for the exercise of imagination by individuals. It concentrates on the problem of creating a system through which faculty perspectives and interests may be brought to bear on institutional planning, when the real problem is that of helping both faculty and administration to become clear about the nature and purposes of education. It concentrates on the identification of bailiwicks, controlled by individuals or groups assigned to special functions, when the real problem is that of uniting the entire staff under a common sense of mission. Accordingly after the dust of the present battle for collegiate reform has cleared, the colleges will be as far as ever from a solution of their real organizational problems.
A number of ambitious studies of academic government are in process. All of them are revealing a condition of disease and malfunction. The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at the University of California, Berkeley, for example, has been investigating campus governance at nineteen “typical” institutions. The study has disclosed that in the face of an unprecedented complexity in collegiate operations, academic government has been reduced to negotiated exchanges among many internal and external factions. College and university presidents are found retaining accountability, but with a declining ability to control. Their formal authority is far greater than their informal influence. They find themselves in the position of having to defend decisions which they have never made. The faculty, on the other hand, are found to be suspicious of administrators as a group, and especially hostile to presidents, deans of students, and state education departments. Most faculty members believe that financial officers make the really effective decisions in institutional planning; but even faculty decision-making is dominated not by regard for the institution and its educational purposes, but by self-interest. The study discloses a deep conservatism and protectionism in faculty planning; academics are found to be reluctant to accept fundamental change, explaining that innovative practices found successful in other institutions are inapplicable in their own. Friction over the budget and the distribution of information regarding it, resentment over inadequate presidential delegation of authority, and low morale resulting from poor methods of announcing unpleasant news add to the picture of organizational malfunction. The story could be recounted in institution after institution — colleges and universities, private and public institutions, liberal arts and community colleges. Everywhere there is a condition which alternates between oligarchy and anarchy.

Despite honest intentions on all sides, it is a rare college that has actually succeeded in mobilizing all its personnel resources, both faculty and administrative, for collective planning. The isolation of the bulk of the faculty from planning
processes is decried by both the academic bureaucrats, harassed by intolerable pressures, and the scholars, eager for a piece of the action. Yet nothing changes. The weakness of faculty loyalty to their institutions, as contrasted with the depth of their concern about their “disciplines,” is much lamented by concerned educational statesmen. Yet the defect is probably not one of will; it is a defect of perspective, arising out of the professionalization of advanced learning, and a defect of opportunity, arising out of the ineptness of collegiate government.

The issue of faculty involvement aside, institutional planning is not in a healthy state in the colleges. In most instances the colleges operate without any sense of direction. There are colleges, of course, where unity of purpose and of policy has been effected by autocratic rule; but in most institutions any detectable direction of development has probably been established not by deliberate choice of the participants but by sociological processes beyond their control. Max Wise reports that even in the smaller liberal arts colleges (which might be expected to be more purposive) malaise, drift, and procrastination are the dominant characteristics of planning. “Most decisions,” Wise says on the basis of his extensive experience, “are made on an ad hoc basis and are often contradictory to each other.” (C. Max Wise, *The Politics of the Private College*, published by the Hazen Foundation, p. 15.)

In the absence of any clear sense of mission around which the staff can unite, it is natural for individuals to resort to acting out of regard for their own particular interests. The faculty and students plan to protect their autonomy and freedom, while administrators plan to keep the empire-builders in check. The political climate of the institution comes to be dominated not by the idea of a community working towards common objectives, but by the idea of an aggregation of individuals and groups bent on pursuing their special interests. In this situation the cause of low morale in the staff is not the incoherence of the institution — the disparity of institutional sub-cultures is accepted as a matter of course — but
arbitrary action by remote administrators and state planners which threatens the professional status and performance of the staff.

The problem is aggravated by the inadequacy of communications on most campuses. Departments are too hard-pressed in the discharge of their specialized functions to lay systematic plans for interdepartmental contracts. Lacking a communications network, individuals and groups are without the information which they require for collective decision-making. And the information gap readily becomes a credibility gap. Suspicion and mistrust develop to make communications even more difficult.

The causes of the fragmentation of collegiate government go far beyond the personal characteristics of the individuals involved. They are rooted in institutional and sociological processes of long standing. The following might be cited: 1) The role of the college teacher has reached a state of unprecedented complexity in the past half century. His functions run the gambit from teaching, to research, to advising, to planning and programming, to consulting, to recruiting, etc. Not only does the task require extraordinary versatility, but it is bound to create uncertainty regarding the priorities of responsibility. Nor is it clear what is the mode in which all these functions are to be coordinated with institutional processes. The diversity of faculty responsibility, in short, complicates their participation in institutional decision-making.

2) A second cause of the breakdown of total-campus planning is the character of the advanced training through which college and university teachers are prepared. Graduate study is aimed at preparing individuals not for the specific function of college teaching but for the general function of scholarship. The program of formal study is discipline-oriented, not career-oriented. Accordingly, there is scarcely any provision for the formal study of the processes of education in the graduate programs out of which college teachers emerge. There is no systematic investigation of the teaching-learning process, of the collegiate structure, of the history of education, of the relation between education and society. Of course, every scholar picks up some insights and opinions on
these matters in the course of his own education, but for the most part these arise fortuitously. Most graduates are quite unprepared for the broad range of planning responsibility which confronts the college teacher, and neither the graduate schools nor the colleges as employers have marshalled an effective program to correct the deficiency. The result is that faculty are obliged to resort to makeshift and trial-and-error planning endeavors, which leave neither them nor their colleges satisfied. The inadequacy of the perspective from which faculty members tend to view problems of institutional planning is exhibited in their tendency to treat these as problems of words — to be met by “taking a stand” on some issue or by working up a petition or by participating in a public demonstration. Naivete can hardly fail to result from the level of understanding of the social processes affecting education which can be observed especially among younger scholars.

3) A third difficulty is posed by the dual position of the faculty member in relation to his institution, viz. as professional and as employee. Unlike some other professional groups, the teacher must combine these two statuses. He is not self-employed, as are many of the professionals whose life-styles he takes as paradigms, and his access to clients is dependent on his accepting employee status in some institution. The accommodation is inevitably distasteful to the self-respecting professional; at the same time the relation of dependence makes it impossible for him to avoid the typical employee syndrome. The combination cannot help but produce conflict and tension. Most of the problems in faculty-administration relationships grow out of this double status of the instructional staff.

4) It cannot be denied that emotionality also plays a part in disturbing the peace of academia. Divisive prejudice and judgmental depreciation are not unknown even in organizations of scientists. Both faculty and administration develop stereotype images of their opposite numbers, which make mutual respect and understanding more difficult. And the generation gap creates schisms between young Turks and the old guard, which obscure a larger measure of agreement on educational philosophy then either group dares to acknowl-
edge. When normally critical people are confused by grossly inaccurate preconceptions and "ideal types," the conclusion can only be drawn that psychologically or sociologically conditioned feelings are intruding to prevent a rational approach to problems.

5) In some institutions, of course, serious crises are precipitated by the ineptitude or high-handedness of administrators, who short-sightedly exercise their formal authority without regard for their informal relationships with the staff. Such occurrences seem especially common among the newer community colleges and the state colleges which have emerged out of normal school and teachers' college backgrounds. In these institutions an authoritarian approach to secondary administration may be carried over into collegiate administration, with dreadful consequences, and a rapid rate of growth increases the likelihood of error in administrative judgment. An administrator will probably be forgiven many sins, as long as his actions do not jeopardize faculty interests. But administrative arbitrariness which violates the will of the faculty is a capital crime. And the repercussions of such acts often extend far beyond the limits of the institutions in which they were committed.

6) Finally, the sheer magnitude of an educational enterprise today produces a degree of complexity which makes organizational integration difficult. In seeking to cope with the unprecedented complexity of academic planning, the colleges have begun to make institutional planning more and more a specialized function. The advancement of technology has permitted the processing of more data, but it has also centralized the utilization of data in a planning office, isolated from the persons most directly affected by the decisions reached. The centralization of institutional planning has seemed mandatory in order to cope with the problems of management, at both the local and state levels. But the numerical growth of the academic profession has continued apace, to leave an increasing number of staff members separated from the planning centers whose decisions they feel most keenly.
One might describe the difficulty as what results from the combination of the "academic revolution" and the "organizational revolution." The academic revolution has brought the faculty to power and affluence. The organizational revolution, achieved with the aid of the new technology, has given individuals a greater command of information, through which they can control larger and larger numbers of people. Both revolutions have effected vast improvements in their own spheres, but their interaction is posing serious conflicts in the colleges. For years the isolation of economic planning from academic planning, and the prescriptions of extra-college agencies, like churches and state coordinating agencies, have been a source of irritation to faculty. We face the prospect of the intensification of this kind of alienation, as the centralization of planning continues to progress.

These causes of organizational disunity are not primarily defects of character or of personality. They are institutional and sociological factors which incidentally, are more difficult to control. Indeed, some of the causes of organizational disintegration are only what results from efforts to improve education in some other respect. The problems are too deep-seated to respond to the superficial solutions which are emerging from the current clamor.

The basic task, of course, is to find ways to restore an authentic collectivism to educational planning. And this means, particularly, involving the faculty more fully in the process. We must, as the AAHE-NEA Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations puts it, find ways to move from a condition of "administrative dominance" or "administrative primacy" to a condition of "shared authority." (Faculty Participation in Academic Governance, American Association for Higher Education, 1967.) But the concept of "shared authority," devoutly recommended as the corrective for the present disarray of educational administration, is no solution at all. It is nothing but a shorthand way of referring to the problem; it does nothing but identify the task at hand, namely to achieve integrated institutional planning. The difficulty, of course, is that having stated the problem few people know how to proceed.
The involvement of the academic staff in educational decision-making is the task. Perhaps recognizing that fact is the first step to wholeness. It is sometimes said (as Eric Hoffer has observed in his Ordeal of Change) that power corrupts. But it is equally important, Hoffer advises, to recognize that weakness, too, corrupts. Any institution which keeps its faculty isolated from the main currents of institutional decision-making will be able to provide its own demonstration of the principle. We may take it as established that the faculty must be systematically involved in total institutional planning. How to do it remains a problem.

Professionalism and Unionization

Some discussions of the faculty’s role in academic planning are dominated by a vocabulary which reflects an apparent trend towards unionization in higher education. The key terms in these discussions are “rights,” “representation,” “pressure,” “power,” “negotiation,” “bargaining,” “arbitration,” “appeal.” The key problem, as seen in these discussions, is that of protecting faculty autonomy and interests against administrators and trustees whose arbitrary actions might jeopardize faculty status and performance. The concern is primarily with the “economic status of the profession,” secondarily with working conditions and load. The fiction of collegiality is politely maintained, and there are gestures to traditional concepts of professionalism; but, practically speaking, faculty-administration relationships are viewed in labor-management terms.

For many years the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers have sought to recruit members from higher education, with minimal success. The current blossoming of new organizing efforts, however, may signal a significant change in the professional life of the college teacher. No doubt the membership solicitations of such groups will at first be most successful among community colleges and education faculties, but it remains to be seen whether they will establish a larger clientele. These organi-
zations are, of course, avowedly professional in nature, but immediately the threat of strikes and other sanctions is posed. At that point the game is changed.

Nor is the document on *Faculty Participation in Academic Governance*, commissioned and published (though not explicitly endorsed) by the American Association for Higher Education, free from the dominance of the labor-management model. Repeatedly the report of the AAHE Task Force defends the use of political, educational, and economic sanctions as a basic faculty right in the struggle against administrative intransigence and adamancy. (It is significant that the document attributes these qualities to administrators.) The strike is recommended only as a last resort, of course, but no responsible union official would recommend a strike except "as a last resort." The view consistently maintained throughout the report is that "if all other approaches to decision-making have failed — including fact-finding and recommendations by mutual third parties — there are no compelling reasons why faculty members should be denied the strike sanction. Moreover, as indicated previously, strikes may be preferable to alternative methods of pressuring the administration that inevitably will be utilized if the right to strike is denied." (*Faculty Participation in Academic Governance*, American Association for Higher Education, 1967, p. 66.)

A new strategy is thus introduced into faculty participation in academic governance, and the AAHE Task Force proceeds to analyze the tactics which might be required. The circumstances under which a strike is likely to be efficient must be analyzed. The risks of employing educational sanctions, like a revocation of accreditation, must be calculated. The sorts of assistance that can be requested from external organizations like the AAUP must be reported. The conditions under which direct political action is likely to be effective must be studied. The tactics of organizing the profession and the law concerning exclusive bargaining rights must be pointed out. An organization of college teachers thus acquires all the essential earmarks of a labor union.

The character of these recommendations probably caused no surprise to those who determined the makeup of the Task
Force, which is dominated by lawyers and students of industrial relations. But it is shocking to those whose ivory-tower existence has kept them aloof from the processes which have been affecting personnel administration in higher education. The findings and recommendations of the AAHE Task Force are indeed, only a dramatic out-cropping of an interpretation of college administration which has reached the ascendancy in this generation.

The unionization of the professors stems from the conviction that educational decision-making is dominated by a power elite, to use C. Wright Mills’ term. Unionization is a predictable act of self-defense on the part of an academician who has come to regard the administration in the way in which the working man regards management, i.e. as his Enemy. Like the working man, the professor is certain that there is a power elite which makes the important decisions. That there must be such an elite he infers from the fact that decisions are handed down, not having been made, at least, by him. He begins to sense that he is being managed, used as a means; he begins to feel that he is being taken for granted, that his importance as the Producer is not being adequately recognized. He begins to act to protect his interests, and, knowing his own weakness as an individual, he seeks to strengthen his position by organizing his fellow producers against the power elite.

The development may be regarded as perfectly natural by those whose view of institutional life is basically Machiavellian — and many such people make their living in education. In the real world, so this interpretation goes, the action of any dominant group is based on self-interest, and the action of any minority group is calculated to gain a position of dominance or at least to win concessions from the dominant group. It is a principle which holds not only in industry and politics but also in education and religion.

Indeed, there is a growing accumulation of evidence to show that individuals in colleges and universities are in fact, primarily concerned about their own self-interests. A recent national survey of the importance which various groups attach to various problematic situations has shown that for stu-
Dents the most important issue is the teaching ability of their instructors, while for faculty the most important issues are class size, class schedule, and teaching load. The same study surveyed the importance which campus groups attach to various kinds of college resources, and found that students place the highest priority on student parking and on space and equipment for individual study, while faculty give highest priority to faculty office space and provision for sabbatical leave. (The latter ranked fourteenth and last for students.) Space for administrative offices ranked thirteenth and eleventh respectively (out of fourteen possible choices) for students and faculty, and fourth for administrators. (Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley, Research Reports, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1968.) Such findings quickly destroy any predilections about the idealism of the system of higher education and become a new rationalization for adopting a self-seeking strategy if you have to live in the system.

One of the confusing things about higher education to anyone who observes the system from outside is the difficulty of finding out who holds the power. On the one hand, the students and the professors report that, although they sense the effects of momentous decisions made somewhere, they have not made them. On the other hand, those whose positions should place them at the center of power profess (credibly and sincerely) their impotence. College presidents have almost unlimited formal authority, but their informal relationships with sub-systems in the enterprise deprive them of the opportunity to exercise their authority. On the other hand, individuals and groups with little formal authority are not aware of the informal influence which they exert on others through the inter-relationships of the sub-systems. The result is a picture of a decision-making process which is utterly confusing. In any event, most students and faculty feel left out of it. They are sure that it is not superior ability or intelligence but superior power which gives authority to others. So they resort to the tactics of power in order to defend themselves as best they can.
The forms of force are legion, of course. Some are more acceptable to academicians than others. Blatant self-seeking, the scramble for position, and love of lucre are supposed to be disguised under a cloak of gentility. The academician is supposed to prefer the condition in which judgment is based on logic, not on interest. Still there are forms of coercion or intimidation which are fully condoned in the world of education. The present search is for new forms of power which may prove acceptable to the profession. Perhaps even the strike will become respectable. It used to be that an unlimited exercise of the power of dismissal by administrators was generally suffered by academicians. The recent establishment of the faculty member's right in his institution has seriously eroded that power, and in its place has arisen a new form of power, wielded now by the formerly exploited, viz. the power of discontent. The forms of force may come and go, but the game is the same — viz. the power struggle.

Once the game is defined in these terms, the possibility of authentic institution-wide planning is ended. The working man, indeed, is suspicious of any talk about the integration of labor and management in institutional planning. The separation of the two spheres is a condition he can understand and in which he can function. He suspects, however, that the doctrine of the unity of labor and management can too easily become a new instrument for subjugating the worker to the requirements of management. The new educational unionists harbor a similar suspicion. In any case, the alteration of the terms under which a unionized faculty wishes to negotiate with the administration makes an integration of the decision-making system practically unattainable.

There are faculty who, sensing the duality of their status as employees and as professionals, wish to choose the respects in which they are to be treated as one or the other. When negotiating salaries and working conditions they wish to be treated as employees. When it comes to questions of educational policy and production, they wish to be treated as professionals. The combination would provide the best of both worlds, but it is, of course, impossible. The threat of sanctions will always lurk in the background in any situation where
the faculty works with the administration, and the threat cannot help but change the relationship. The AAHE Task Force, indeed, recognizes that if the tactics of force and collective bargaining are once introduced as a strategy for dealing with economic and personnel issues, it is entirely possible (rather, probable) that in time the same tactics will be brought to bear in dealing with other kinds of issues previously regarded as professional. The resort to collective bargaining inevitably means the end of professionalism in college teaching.

There is only one way to avoid that result, viz. to retreat from the present interpretation of college government as a power struggle. The metaphors of force imply a theory of educational administration which eventually leads to unionization. The only alternative is an understanding of academic government based not on power, but on purpose.

**Policy and Purpose**

It is only under a theory of academic government derived from a concept of purpose that there is any hope of integrated college-wide decision-making. This is true for two reasons. First, the principle is dictated by the very nature of education. Secondly, the tactics of power, though likely to be successful in achieving certain limited and tangible objectives, cannot bring the faculty into the center of institutional planning.

All education is a purposive act. There is a contemporary "realism" which has become contemptuous of that view, but like other nihilisms this anti-teleological "pragmatism" will be shown by history to be no part of the "perennial philosophy" through which human culture evolves. Every act of education is based on a concept of goal, and all educational policies and programs must be designed as means for the achievement of an intended result. One may, of course, unintentionally be an occasion for the *learning* of someone else without being aware of what one is doing, but no one ever *teaches* another without intentionality being present. The concept of purpose is the central one in both the theory of
instruction and the theory of educational administration. No educator of integrity can deal with the organization of learning on any other basis.

But there is also a pragmatic reason for making purpose central in the attempt to establish the faculty's role in academic government. It is the only way to give the academician a meaningful voice in the basic decision-making process. Most of the crucial battles in the struggle for culture cannot be won if you resort to the tactics of your enemy. If there is a power elite which controls the processes of government, a resort to force will probably not unseat the elite group. The use of power may win some identifiable concessions from the power elite, but it will not basically change the order of things. Indeed, the resort to the tactics of force may only play into the hands of an oligarchy skilled in the application of the principle, "divide and rule," and of what Lasswell labelled the law of "restriction by partial incorporation."

Furthermore, from the standpoint of the individual, a representative government only creates a new oligarchy in which he is again not directly involved. Elected representatives, too, may seem to the individual to be using him as a means and taking him for granted. And from the point of view of the minority, a condition of a balance of forces is not one of equality, but of imbalance.

History ought to have taught us by this time that the condition of the exploited is not greatly changed by violent revolution and that force is never a means for achieving justice. To act as though interest were sovereign and equilibrium the rule of politics is to assign to force too great a control of destiny. In point of fact, history is determined largely by drift, and there is no reason to believe that destiny is less responsive to purposive action based on clear principle than to the manipulation of force. The meaning of culture in any event, consists in the direction of life by rationality. The abandonment of reason in any human enterprise makes that enterprise profane. For education, therefore, there can be no substitute for the guidance of activities by the light of rational criticism and investigation.
It is elementary in the theory of organizations that the basis of rational control is clarity of purpose. The planning of operations can be guided by the canons of intelligence only in terms of the calculation of the relation between means and ends. That calculation is possible only if the concept of the end aimed at is sufficiently concrete and specific to be capable of being correlated with operations as means. "Where there are shared operational goals, differences about the course of conduct are more likely to be resolved by rational, analytic processes. Where the shared goals are not operational (or where the operational sub-goals are not shared), differences are more likely to be adjusted through a qualitatively different process, that of bargaining." (Daniel Katz and Robert C. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966, p. 269, citing March and Simon's book, Organizations.)

Max Wise has contended, accurately, that the real root of organizational malfunctioning in the smaller liberal arts colleges is their own lack of clarity regarding their essential mission. The achievement of clarity in this regard, however, is perhaps the most difficult thing in education. There are many obstacles which purposive planning must first overcome. One is the professional specialization of faculty training and concern. "Most college faculties," Wise observes, "are clearer about the profession of scholar than of teacher and are almost totally unprepared to participate in thoughtful consideration of educational and institutional purposes." (The Politics of the Private College, op. cit. p. 49.) The appeal to self-promulgated definitions of professional standards is, indeed, one of the favorite ploys through which academicians justify their parochialisms and promote their interests. In most colleges and universities, administrators have given up trying to get the faculty to agree on the common purposes of the institution as a whole, and have resorted instead to attempting to make the goals of the organization, as defined by the inner core of officialdom, coincide at points with the personal goals of the faculty so that the faculty will be motivated to make some contribution to the organizational goals.
What makes the clarification of institutional goals so difficult is the complexity of modern education. One source of complexity is size; another is diversity. As the system of higher education has developed, it has become increasingly difficult to specify central objectives. Even within sub-systems it is difficult to set goals in operational terms, but a systematic formulation of the operational goals of a whole university or an entire state system of higher education presents a staggering challenge to comprehensive thought. Most institutions settle for trying to meet needs as they arise, responding to situations as they develop, creating academic programs piecemeal.

Decentralization is generally thought to be the only way to keep a complex organization moving in all its parts, but the resulting departmentalized bureaucracy is unable to function in system-wide planning. With complexity and decentralization comes the need for a new kind of centralized control, separated from departmental operations but nevertheless restricting them, usually through the budget. Fiscal planning becomes the function of another department of the organization, rather than a collective decision reached by all participants together.

Bureaucracies, of course, tend to follow certain developmental patterns. Bureaucracies tend towards rigidity, as Weber emphasized. The bureaucratic routine becomes a guide to policy-makers rather than the other way around. The bureaucracy becomes self-perpetuating, and the ease or convenience of the bureaucratic official becomes an important consideration in decision-making. The result of the attempt to maintain a high level of departmental productivity in a complex organization like a university is thus a power structure, which determines the operational goals of the organization at least as much as concepts of purpose determine the organizational structure.

Nor do attempts to define institutional purposes ordinarily start from scratch. Each attempt to delineate operational goals begins not only with a received tradition which may serve only to obfuscate, but also with a pattern of established routines which determine how individuals view their
tasks. The eggs, as someone has put it, are already scrambled before you try to separate the yolks. Designing an educational program is much more like finding one’s way through a maze than like creating a new idea. Indeed, educational programs which are too rigidly tied to statements of purpose postulated on the basis of philosophical abstractions may quickly prove irrelevant and unsupportable in a rapidly changing culture. A productive organization must adapt to the community it serves in order to survive. So the choice confronting education seems to many people to be between being doctrinaire (though purposive) and being opportunistic (though adaptable). The necessity of surviving makes that no real choice.

Statements of objectives for educational institutions tend to be vapid, platitudinous, and sterile. In most instances they are what Katz and Kahn call them— “teleological fictions” propounded by organizational spokesmen, promoters, and salesmen. In some colleges and universities considerable professional time has been spent on philosophical reflection about educational aims, but the case is reminiscent of boys’ clubs engaged in perennial debates over constitutional revision. Nothing fundamental is achieved in the way of operational impact.

What is required for rationalizing the processes of collegiate decision-making is a study of ends in relation to the operational means through which they can be achieved. Goals must always be coordinated with plans. Accordingly, there will be as many levels of goals as levels of planning. There will be mediate as well as ultimate goals, short-term as well as long-term goals, departmental as well as institutional goals. All statements of goals must be equally determinate and operational, but they need not be equally general. In some instances individuals will find themselves engaging in planning and activities the immediate goal of which is the maintenance of the organization for its larger productivity. In some cases the maintenance requirement will be of such magnitude that the entire staff must be concerned about it and care for it. It is always helpful, however, to view the problems of organizational maintenance in the context of the func-
tioning of the institution as a whole. It is edifying for an administrator, for example, to remind himself repeatedly that the sole justification of his existence, in the long run, is that he facilitates the productivity of the faculty in teaching and scholarship.

The ideal for social organization may therefore be expressed in the following proposition: "A formal, rationally organized social structure involves clearly defined patterns of activity in which, ideally, every series of actions is functionally related to the purposes of the organization." (Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1957, p. 195.) The best talent and the full resources of the organization must be directed to the task of achieving a rationally ordered system of programs, policies, and structures as functionally related to aims.

It is a serious mistake to think of academic organization in terms of a division of labor which consigns to one group (e.g. the faculty) responsibility for defining ends and to another (e.g. the administration) responsibility for creating means. Both ends and means must be studied coordinately by persons who understand the purposes and processes of education. The clarification of goals is not separable from planning. Both are political acts. Making explicit the aims of education eventually means designing a curriculum. Teaching must be conceived as a form of programming, and the establishment of an institutional value-system must be conceived as setting policy. Nor are programming and policy formation separable from budgeting. The philosophy and economics of education mutually condition one another; organizational coherence requires that the consideration of the two must be systematically combined.

What emerges, then, is the image of a college or university in which the finest talent available to the organization is devoted to the implementation of planning and decision-making — which includes the clarification of operational goals, viewed in terms of productive output; the calculation of inputs, viewed in terms of the material with which the institution has to work; and the design of operations, viewed in
terms of the policies and programs by which the organization will achieve its productive goals. It remains to be seen whether this image can be made a part of the real world.

Leadership and Authority

Leadership, of course, is indispensable for the implementation of planning for organized activity. No modern organization can tolerate a condition in which "each man does what is right in his own eyes." A society comprised entirely of philosopher-kings will still be in a state of anarchy until some center of initiative is created for the coordination of activities. Leadership is inherent in the function of education, not only etymologically but also practically. The problem, however, is to identify forms of leadership or of initiative which are suited to the educational situation.

The analysis of the form of initiative which is appropriate for educational organization requires a clear distinction between leadership and authority. Leadership is the generic concept, authority the specific. The quality of leadership which characterizes academic government must be compatible with freedom, the indispensable condition of all education. Authority, though an appropriate form of initiative for a military organization, is inimical to freedom and hence to education. The concept of authority plays no essential role in the theory of educational administration, contrary to the appearance created by its conspicuousness in the literature of education.

There is abundant evidence that it is not possible, at least in the long run, for authority to be exercised over the processes of education. The American college and university president, to take the case where the lesson can be spelled out "in capital letters," has almost absolute authority. Yet most presidents are immobilized by the complex of relationships which their position requires them to maintain. The president's authority cannot be exercised until the supporting relationships allow it. The same principle applies to the lower-order instances of formal authority in the educational system. It is only in short-run or superficial contexts that
authority is ever exercised in an educational organization. Ignorance of this fact is behind many misconceptions (among both student activists and legislative reactionaries) concerning institutional responses to recent campus demonstrations.

The problem for educational administration is not to allocate authority and establish channels, but to legitimize acts of initiative. The problem concerns the moral basis of leadership. Max Wise, in his customary perceptiveness, correctly identifies the issue (using the instance of presidential leadership): "The problem is to convert this latent influence into effective leadership by using it carefully and wherever possible to clothe its use in a 'quality of rightness.' That is, his actions as president must be placed in a context of a set of persistent, integrated principles which express a doctrine or ideology acceptable to all or most interested parties." (The Politics of the Private College, p. 38.)

Viewing the problem of educational organization as that of the delegation of authority puts us back in the theory of government as a balance of powers. The possession of authority by one individual or group must then be balanced by the assignment of authority in another respect to some other individual or group. But if there is anything which the American political experiment has demonstrated it is that the only movement which occurs in a condition of the balance of power is a vector — i.e. either no movement at all or a compromise. The system of higher education now affords a parallel illustration of the same pattern. The dominant political situation in the colleges has reached the point where, as Wise puts it, the power to veto outweighs the power to initiate change.

There are a number of different bases for the exercise of leadership in organizations. The one which figures most conspicuously in popular discussions is position. It is true, of course, that to some extent an individual's position in an organization enables him to exercise leadership in it or prevents him from doing so. But the importance of this factor has been greatly exaggerated. It would be nearer the truth to say that an individual finds it possible to exercise leadership when he is placed in a position which enables him to reward success.
(as he views it) or punish failure. The power to hire, fire, promote, or pay is, indeed, an important basis of leadership in many organizations. It would be naive to deny the role it plays in educational systems.

Yet the theory of academic government cannot make position the primary basis of leadership. It is, in the last analysis, the personal qualities of the leader — his personal attractiveness, his expertness, his ability to synthesize a complex of sub-systems and to produce a unified result — which is the basis of educational leadership. Lacking these qualities, many persons in high office in educational systems fail to be leaders. Conversely, the activity of leadership is often affected by gifted persons in subordinate positions in the organizational hierarchy. What should be made primary in the study of academic government is not the structure of the academic hierarchy, but the personal qualities and interpersonal relationships which are the foundation of effective leadership. The basic problem, that is, concerns not organizational management, but institutional leadership.

Like any large and complex organization, a college or university is a system of relationships among a variety of sub-systems. It in turn is a sub-system in a more inclusive social complex. All these systemic relationships are decisive determinants of the organization's functioning. Both internal and external relationships must be recognized and controlled in any attempt to set goals and establish programs. Leadership in the process of decision-making is, in the last resort, based on the “system-perspective” of an individual — his capacity to identify and manipulate the important organizational relationships. Educational leadership requires the ability to view purposes in relation to operations, the imagination to reconcile diverse objectives and interests of departmental sub-systems, and the awareness of broad social processes as they affect education. Autonomy, sensitivity, imagination, patience, skill in mediation, and the power of concentration — such are the ingredients of leadership.

An example of an analysis of organizational leadership in these terms is Philip Selznick's modest but important book, *Leadership in Administration, A Sociological Interpretation*
(Evanston, Illinois, Row, Peterson and Co., 1957). Selznick views the task of institutional leadership as that of converting an organization into an institution — i.e. welding individuals and sub-groups into an authentic unity. The task, as he puts it, is to accomplish the “dynamic adaptation of the total organization to its own internal strivings and to its external pressures.” He likes to think of the resulting institutional unity as an organism, even as a sort of person (these are not more than metaphors), possessing a “distinctive character” — as a “subject” capable of having purposes, rights, and responsibilities. Institutional leadership, as Selznick views it, is based on the capacity to effect institutional unification, to achieve the “institutional embodiment of purpose.”

That account may sound like a mythology, but Selznick offers it as a practical proposal. Indeed, he avers that myths, in the form of ideologically consistent formulations of intent, are indispensable for institution-building. Unreal as it may sound to the organizational opportunist, the ideal described by Selznick is the foundation of institutional effectiveness and harmony. (Cf. Talcott Parsons, “A Sociological Approach to the Theory of Formal Organizations,” in Structure and Process in Modern Societies, New York, Free Press, 1960.)

Leadership, in a sense more akin to statesmanship, is needed in all the areas of educational planning — in policy formation (origination of structure), policy interpretation (interpretation of structure or improvisation), and policy application (use of structure or administration). The point to be emphasized, now, is that in an educational organization the greatest potential for such leadership lies in the talents of the academic staff. Every organizational leader is, above all, an educator. Any act of leadership, especially in an educational institution is an act of teaching. It is in the college’s resources for teaching that the greatest — and presently largely untapped — resource for organizational optimization lies. Educational leadership is primarily a function of scholars.

The structure of most educational organizations is poorly suited to the exploitation of this resource. But a more serious problem is the prevalence of a theory of academic
government which prevents the bulk of the academic staff from accepting responsibility for developing a foundation for leadership in the sense indicated. The first step towards collegiate reorganization, therefore, is not a constitutional revolution which brings the faculty to power, but a redirection of the application of faculty interests and intelligence to the determination of goals, policies, and programs in an environmental context.

In most institutions some moves by the administration will be required before the redirection of faculty effort will become possible. First, the eradication of a radical misunderstanding of the function of administration, among both faculty and administration, is called for. Then, steps will have to be taken to create a climate in which faculty creativity and initiative can be realistically exercised. Obviously, access to information about college operations and about the various systems to which these operations relate is indispensable. Furthermore, the inefficiency and malfunctioning of organizational mechanisms, which create distracting irritation and frustration, must be at least reduced to tolerable proportions.

The functions of educational administration should be viewed primarily in terms of releasing the potential for institutional leadership which exists in the academic staff. The primary functions of administration are the following: 1) To create a climate of internal security, through organizational engineering, which will encourage productive imagination; 2) To assemble the information required for collective planning and to make that information available to the staff; 3) To create conditions which allow the realization of collective purpose — i.e. to make possible in the future what is not possible today. In short, the task of the administrator is well summarized in the adversative of one of the wisest of them: "Never be a bottleneck."

Whether institutional leadership emerges from administrative or faculty sources is relatively a matter of indifference. And the formal constitution of the leadership hierarchy is far less important than the creation of informal conditions which permit institutional leadership to emerge. Recent research
has indicated that the outcomes of faculty and administrative leadership, when exercised on an institutional basis, are much more congruent than is widely supposed. Faculty and administration assign largely the same significance to educational goals and operations. What differences can be detected are largely attributable to perspectives arising from their respective collegiate and departmental preoccupations. (Cf. Edward Gross and Paul V. Grambsch, *University Goals and Academic Power*, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1968, pp. 99-105.) Most administrators, after all, have not ceased to be influenced by their personal involvement in scholarship and teaching.

It is a horrendous mistake to think of the administrator as the head of an educational institution or to think of administration in terms of control. Administration is nothing more than coordination aimed at achieving the productive aims established through collective decision. In the apostolic model of ecclesiastical organization, for example (Cf. 1 Corinthians 12), the office of administration, though recognized, is carefully distinguished from the office of headship (which belongs to no man). All gifts, including the gift of administration, are given through the same Spirit and for the common good. The administrator is, (as the etymology of the Apostle's word indicates) nothing but a helmsman for the vessel. He is one among many in a functioning organization, but he does not occupy the hierarchical apex. A similar model applies in higher education.

**Constitution and Structure**

The basic ingredient in a dynamic organization is leadership. It cannot be denied, however, that organizational structure has an important, although secondary, bearing on organizational effectiveness. Most discussions of the faculty's role in academic government exaggerate the importance of structure and exhibit a formalistic bias which reduces the relevance of proposals for reform. But on the other hand, the question of structure cannot be ignored.
The drift of the preceding discussion has been towards recommending a structure which releases the organization’s latent potential for personal leadership. We have assumed that the talent for leadership is not confined to the managerial sector. The task, then, is to conceive and install a structural form which will succeed in identifying and exploiting the leadership qualities of individuals wherever they are found — and of members of the academic staff in particular.

There is no one structure of academic government suited to the maximization of purpose in academic planning. But we may distinguish certain general requirements which must be satisfied by any structural form. The structure must be characterized in the first place, by flexibility. In all organizations the tendency for bureaucracies to rigidify, to seek their own convenience, and to perpetuate themselves poses one of the most serious obstacles to maximum productivity. The problem is especially critical during periods of rapid institutional change. Adapting the organizational form to the demands of the moment is one of the most important functions of institutional leadership. An institution characterized by effective and dynamic leadership will be one, as Katz and Kahn put it, which avoids unvarying use of structure and tends towards origination of structure. To quote at some length from their perceptive analysis.

No organizational chart and no book of policies and procedures can specify every act and prescribe for every contingency encountered in a complex organization. To attempt such a specification merely produces an array of instructions so ponderous that they are ignored for the sake of transacting the business of the organization. Moreover, even if such specifications are provided, they would soon be out of date. Organizations are open systems and exist in ever-changing environments. Each change in the environment implies a demand for change within the organization. To some extent the demands are foreseeable and the appropriate responses can be programmed; to some extent they require leadership beyond such responses. Additional factors
which mitigate against organizational stability and create a continuing need for leadership are the uneven development and different dynamics of the several organizational sub-systems, and the sequential nature of human membership in organizations. (Daniel Katz and Robert C. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966, pp. 334-335.)

A second requirement of a purpose-oriented organizational structure is parsimony. A cumbersome and complex structure makes it difficult for professional leadership to express itself. The academic staff of a college or university must give priority to its productive activity. Involving the staff in academic leadership will require structures which economize on the use of professional time. Simplicity in faculty organization is an important device for restricting faculty involvement to matters of prime relevance and urgency. The depth of this problem will be attested by that vast corps of conscientious scholars who suffer under the harassment of pointless faculty business meetings and a redundant committee structure. Too few educational organizations have succeeded in pursuing the patently sound principle that structure should be oriented to production. The mere requirement of simplicity would force the organizers to establish priorities for governing the use of professional time in planning.

A third requirement in a structure designed to facilitate the exercise of leadership is openness. An assortment of forms of closure are the stock-in-trade of organizational manipulators bent on restricting the exercise of initiative and disenfranchising the many. Monopolies over information, restrictions on debate, appeals to tradition or to stereotypes, intimidation based on the exercise of authority — these are the ploys through which an elite maintain control over the machinery of government. But a structure aimed at releasing talent and leadership, wherever they are to be found, for participation in decision-making will reduce the availability of such devices. Perhaps the most important consideration in the design of a structure of educational organization is the
creation of provisions for open access to information and the free flow of communications. Scarcely anything in collegiate organization is more important—or more difficult.

Finally, an effective organization must be *systemically coherent*. The basis of organizational leadership is "systemic perspective." The utility of an organizational structure in releasing effective leadership depends on its utility in enabling individuals to perceive the inter-relations among the various organizational sub-systems. A committee composition involving a mix of representatives from the main sub-systems of the organization is one means (though not the only, nor an infallible means) for relating the structure of planning to the sociology of the organization. The purpose of this arrangement, however, should not be to guarantee to each group represented its share of power, but to introduce into the planning process a perspective based on recognition of the operations of the organization in all its parts.

The aim of a structure of collegiate organization should be to increase the likelihood that policy, program, and budgetary decisions will be made on the basis of understanding of the principles and purposes governing educational processes. The result of requiring policy to emerge from clear understanding of essential aims and a well-laid structure of procedures may, however, be to make an educational organization appear conservative and unresponsive to pressure for change. The desire to avoid this appearance in recent times has created a new form of organizational malfunction. Educational planning is often dominated not by a clear concept of institutional mission but by a new form of contextualism, which finds educators preoccupied with modes of response to internal and external pressures, while agitators devise new tactics for causing the establishment to react. The institutional response is aimed not at achieving some essential goal which defines the institution’s reason for being, but at relieving the crisis which threatens its security. If a collegiate system refuses, on account of clear understanding of its essential mission, to react to the provocations of the interest groups, it may well appear to the impatient to be conservative or reactionary. But its unresponsiveness is its virtue. Indeed,
it may well be that, especially in view of the present nervousness and conscientiousness of educators, an important structural arrangement for maintaining the purposiveness of educational planning would be some kind of waiting period, to delay the installation of innovations until a time when a condition of balanced reflection is more likely to exist.

The elemental functions of government — legislative, executive, and judicial — are clear. It is by no means necessary, however, (contrary to the American predilection) for each function to be respectively consigned to a single element in a formal structure of government. Indeed, our contention in these pages has been that all these functions of government involve the exercise of institutional leadership and that there is no organizational sub-group which has a corner on leadership potential. Furthermore, it has been our contention that in a system of collegiate government the prime source of institutional leadership is the training, experience, and productivity of the academic personnel, whose involvement in the processes of government at all levels must, accordingly, be structured. Thus it is a mistake for anyone to restrict faculty participation to the policy-making and program-designing function, while the administration is assigned the task of adapting or enforcing policies and implementing the programs in detail. Such a separation of functions is unrealistic and sterile. Our plea has been for a genuinely collective involvement of all the gifted in all the processes of academic government.

The structure of academic government should therefore be designed to eliminate the schism between faculty and administration in institutional planning. The point is not that the differences in functioning between the two staff groups are insignificant, but that these differences do not prevent the integration of both in collective decision-making. A number of structures may be deemed appropriate — for example, there might be greater use of joint board/faculty committees, assignment of administrative officers as executive secretaries (not chairmen) of faculty committees, appointment of faculty members to the key committee on budgetary planning and control — to enhance joint planning.
An organizational structure for total-campus planning is required both to develop and to exploit the potential for institutional leadership which exists within the academic staff. Such a structure must make specific and functional provision for the following: 1) A provision for effective communication and information-sharing; 2) A provision for program and budget planning in the light of a clear understanding of operational objectives and the best available cost/benefit analysis (i.e. a Program Planning Budget System or its equivalent); 3) A provision for open discussion aimed at achieving the broadest possible institutional consensus; 4) A provision for encouraging imagination, creativity, and originality. Unfortunately, nothing more than a bare outline of the task can be presented here. The crucial problems are the opening up of the lines of communication, the channeling of data into the planning process, and eradication of the traditional separation of academic and fiscal planning.

A word should be added about the form of faculty organization. Most of the failings which faculty groups bewail in the over-all collegiate organization they have succeeded in perpetuating in their own. The theory of the open academic community is, in both contexts, finer than its practice. Faculty organizations, too, often disenfranchise the young and inexperienced, and the ineptness of intra-faculty communications only affords another example of organizational provincialism. The organization of a faculty for a unified collective attack on the problems of planning is too rare an accomplishment to leave anyone sanguine about the prospect of successful faculty involvement in the larger processes of government.

It goes without saying, perhaps, that some organization of the faculty as a whole is called for, in the form of either a faculty assembly or a representative senate. Yet there are colleges which have not yet achieved even the form of such an organization, and in most others it remains to be made effective. The jurisdiction of the faculty organization is often imprecise, and the participation of individual members is typically undependable.
The independence of the faculty organization is paramount, but, conversely, its responsibility is imperative. One structural provision for enhancing the autonomy of the organization would be for the faculty to elect its own chairmen. It would likely be most efficient if the faculty chose the chief academic officer for this role, as long as he is closely identified with the faculty; it would undoubtedly be best if the president were not the chairman of the faculty.

The structure of standing faculty committees should be simple. No doubt, the following are indispensable, even in a small college: a committee on instruction, a committee on student personnel services, and a committee on administrative services (primarily concerned with faculty benefits). Where other committees are required for effective planning and study, they should be organized as sub-committees of the major standing committees. Ad hoc committees should be avoided whenever possible. The continuing organization of the faculty should be kept sufficiently adaptable to serve the planning needs of the faculty. The number of sub-committees should be kept to a minimum. Whenever a committee is unproductive or fails to conduct its business, the question should be faced whether the breakdown is due to the inadequacy of personnel or to the irrelevance of the structure.

The business of the faculty assembly or senate should emerge from committee planning. The committees should, in their turn, establish effective liaison with other faculty groupings, departmental and otherwise. Coherence in the structure will be expressed in the smooth flow of planning towards the faculty assembly (senate) and beyond to the board of control.

Student participation in educational planning has always been essential, but recent campus developments have broadened the recognition of the necessity. It is easier, however, to create formal arrangements for permitting student participation in faculty and administrative committees than it is to make that participation effective from the standpoint of the exercise of institutional leadership. The task of broadening student involvement is, indeed, complicated by the character of recent student agitation for academic reform. The difficulty is posed not by the threat of backlash, but by the lack of
generality and institutional perspective in the protests themselves. Student dissatisfaction tends to be specific and student involvement in academic planning tends to be discontinuous. The problems on which their dissatisfaction really rests, however, are general, and the strategies required to attack these problems are ongoing. The problem is to transfer student concern about matters which relate most directly to their satisfaction and status — their desire to reform archaic parietal rules or arbitrary restrictions on political action — to the academic program as a whole.

One device of the student activists requires astute faculty control in the interests of purposive institutional decision-making. Frequently the strategy of student demonstrators has been to create an incident which will throw the collegiate establishment, and particularly the administration, into the sort of consternation which will precipitate irresponsible reactions. The support of the faculty is often required for this strategy to be successful. However, an alliance of students and faculty against the administration is debilitating in the long run, as long as it is nothing but the application of the tactics of force in academic politics. The strategy of the youthful reformers frequently involves the abandonment of the concept of organized planning in favor of the application of divisive pressure. Faculty influence should be exerted in the opposite direction, viz. in the direction of helping all parties to retain their composure and helping students to discover alternate means of relating organized student opinion to the structure of decision-making.

Conclusion

The propositions which have emerged from the preceding analysis are unavoidably theoretical and general. To some readers they will appear naive. Unfortunately, however, there are no pat solutions to the problem of collegiate government. There are, at best, only some general guidelines for action which may emerge from a clear understanding of theory.

Most discussions of faculty participation in academic government place an inordinate emphasis on structure. Questions of constitutional form cannot be ignored, of course, but
the primary issue concerns the development of the capacity for institutional leadership. The basic problem concerns the creation of a climate out of which institutional leadership may emerge.

Much of the present agitation over faculty rights in academic government is misplaced. Furthermore, it is part of a deplorable drift towards unionization in the profession of college teaching. The dominance of the labor-management model is tending to fragmentize the collegiate system into bailiwicks, presided over by interest groups. Such a system will be less purposive, more susceptible to sectarian pressures, more responsive to private interests. The end of the collegiate ideal is the final upshot. The rejoinder that the colleges are even now pluralized and divided is no reassurance to those who are drawn to a more unified ideal.

The abandonment of purpose by a faculty bent on the exercise of power in academic government means the end of ideology. The preservation of the collegiate ideals of reasonableness, self-control, social concern, and order depends, conversely, on the action of the professors. It is the faculty who will demonstrate, in both precept and life-style, whether or not such ideals are viable. The real crisis in collegiate government concerns not the equitable distribution of power, but the relevance of the intellectual tradition of purposiveness. It is that tradition which is now threatened by both the friends and the enemies of the intellectuals.

Eric Hoffer has warned, of course, reverting to his constitutional contempt for all forms of aristocracy, against ever giving power to intellectuals. Intellectuals should be kept out of government, he says, not only for the sake of good government but also for the sake of creative production itself. Creativity, he holds, never flourishes amid comfort and ease. "The most gifted members of the human species are at their creative best when they cannot have their way, and must compensate for what they miss by realizing and cultivating their capacities and talents." (The Ordeal of Change, New York, Perennial Library (Harper), 1967, p. 47.) That explanation is one of those half-truths which makes Hoffer one of the most provocative writers of our time. It cannot be
made the basis of the theory of collegiate government. Nothing in the experience of the universities confirms Hoffer's hypothesis when applied in the justification of an autocratic organizational structure. What is confirmed by that experience is, rather, the hypothesis that participation is increased and productivity is enhanced by a structure for decision-making which maximizes the number of individuals whose initiative and leadership are allowed to play.