David Armor's "The Evidence on Busing" presented a distorted and incomplete review of this politically charged topic. We respect Armor's right to publish his views against "mandatory busing." But we challenge his claim that these views are supported by scientific evidence. A full discussion of our reading of the relevant research would be too lengthy and technical for the non-specialist. We must limit ourselves to outlining and discussing briefly our principal disagreements with Armor, which center on four major points. First, his article begins by establishing unrealistically high standards by which to judge the success of school desegregation. Second, the article presents selected findings from selected studies as "the evidence on busing." The bias is twofold. The few studies mentioned constitute an incomplete list and are selectively negative in results. Only cursory descriptions are provided of the few investigations that are reviewed. Third, the paper's anti-busing conclusions rest primarily on the findings from one short-term study conducted by Armor himself: an evaluation of a voluntary busing program in metropolitan Boston. This study is probably the weakest reported in the paper. Fourth, objections must be raised to the basic assumptions about racial change that undergird the entire article. The whole national context of individual and institutional racism is conveniently ignored. [For David Armor's reply, see UD 013 499.]
Busing: a Review of “The Evidence”

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW, ELIZABETH L. USEEM, CLARENCE NORMAND & MARSHALL S. SMITH

DAVID ARMOR’s “The Evidence on Busing,” (The Public Interest, No. 25, Summer 1972) presented a distorted and incomplete review of this politically charged topic. We respect Armor’s right to publish his views against “mandatory busing.” But we challenge his claim that these views are supported by scientific evidence. A full discussion of our reading of the relevant research would be too lengthy and technical for the non-specialist. We must limit ourselves here to outlining and discussing briefly our principal disagreements with Armor, which center on four major points.

First, his article begins by establishing unrealistically high standards by which to judge the success of school desegregation. “Busing,” he claims, works only if it leads—in one school year—to increased achievement, aspirations, self-esteem, interracial tolerance, and life opportunities for black children. And “busing” must meet these standards in all types of interracial schools; no distinction is made between merely desegregated and genuinely integrated schools.

This “integration policy model,” as it is labeled, is not what social scientists who specialize in race relations have been writing about over the past generation. Indeed, Armor’s criteria must surely be among the most rigid ever employed for the evaluation of a change program in the history of public education in the United States.

Second, the article presents selected findings from selected studies as “the evidence on busing.” The bias here is twofold. On the one hand, the few studies mentioned constitute an incomplete list and are selectively negative in results. Unmentioned are at least seven investigations—from busing programs throughout the nation—that meet the methodological criteria for inclusion and report positive achievement results for black students. These seven studies are widely known.

On the other hand, only cursory descriptions are provided of the few investigations that are reviewed. Mitigating circumstances surrounding black responses to desegregation are not discussed. For example, we are not told that educational services for the transported black pupils were actually reduced with the onset of desegregation in three of the cited cities. In addition, negative findings consistent with
the paper's anti-busing thesis are emphasized, while positive findings from these same cities are either obscured or simply ignored. Newer studies from three of the cited cities showing more positive results are not discussed.

Positive findings are also obscured by the utilization of an unduly severe standard. The achievement gains of black students in desegregated schools are often compared with white gains, rather than with the achievement of black students in black schools. But such a standard ignores the possibility that both racial groups can make more meaningful educational advances in interracial schools. Indeed, this possibility actually occurs in three of the cities mentioned by Armor. Yet he does not inform us of this apparent dual success of desegregation; instead, "busing" is simply rated a failure because the black children did not far outgain the improving white children.

Third, the paper's anti-busing conclusions rest primarily on the findings from one short-term study conducted by Armor himself. This investigation focused on a voluntary busing program in metropolitan Boston called METCO. Yet this study is probably the weakest reported in the paper. Our reexamination of its data finds that it has extremely serious methodological problems.

Two major problems concern deficiencies of the control group. To test the effects of "busing" and school desegregation, a control group should obviously consist exclusively of children who neither are "bused" nor attend desegregated schools. But our check of this critical point reveals that this is not the case. Among the 82 control students used to test the achievement effects of METCO at all 10 grade levels, we obtained records on 55. Only 21 of these 55 actually attended segregated schools in the tested year of 1968-69. Many of the 34 (62 per cent) desegregated children by necessity utilized buses and other forms of transportation to get to school.

Incredible as it sounds, then, Armor compared a group of children who were bused to desegregated schools with another group of children which included many who also were bused to desegregated schools. Not surprisingly, then, he found few differences between them. But this complete lack of adequate controls renders his METCO research of no scientific interest in the study of "busing" and school desegregation. Since this METCO investigation furnished the chief "evidence" against "busing," Armor's conclusions are severely challenged by this point alone.

Serious, too, is an enormous non-response rate in the second test administration, a problem alluded to by Armor only in a footnote. For the elementary students, only 51 per cent of the eligible METCO students and 28 per cent of the eligible "control" students took part in both of the achievement test sessions. The achievement results for junior and senior high students are also rendered virtually meaningless by the participation of only 44 per cent of the eligible METCO students and 20 per cent of the eligible "control" students. Compare these percentages to the survey standard of 70 to 80 per cent, and one can appreciate the magnitude of the possible selection bias intro-
duced into the METCO results by the widespread lack of student participation. Efforts to compensate for these high non-response rates through the use of cross-sectional samples that also suffer from extensive non-response are insufficient.

There are other problems in the METCO study. Some children were included who initially performed as well as the test scoring allowed and therefore could not possibly demonstrate "improvement"; in fact, these pupils comprise one sixth of all the junior high pupils tested for achievement gains in reading. Moreover, the conditions for the third administration of the attitude tests were different for the METCO students and the "controls": The former took the tests at school and the latter took them at home with their parents as proctors. Even apart from the severe control group problems, then, the faulty research design makes any conclusion about differences in racial attitudes between the two groups hazardous.

The inadequate discussion of the METCO study in Armor's article makes it virtually impossible for even the discerning reader to evaluate it properly. We uncovered its many errors only from unpublished earlier materials and from reanalyzing the data ourselves. The METCO discussion is inadequate in other ways. Differential statistical standards are employed, with less rigorous standards applied to findings congruent with the article's anti-busing thesis; attitude differences among METCO schools are not shown; and misleading claims of consistency with other research findings are made.

From this assortment of "evidence," Armor concludes authoritatively that "busing" fails on four out of five counts. It does not lead, he argues, to improved achievement, grades, aspirations, and racial attitudes for black children; yet, despite these failures, he admits that desegregated schools do seem somehow to lead more often to college enrollment for black students.

The picture is considerably more positive, as well as more complex, than Armor paints it. For example, when specified school conditions are attained, research has repeatedly indicated that desegregated schools improve the academic performance of black pupils. Other research has demonstrated that rigidly high and unrealistic aspirations actually deter learning; thus, a slight lowering of such aspirations by school desegregation can lead to better achievement and cannot be regarded as a failure of "busing." Moreover, "militancy" and "black consciousness and solidarity" are not negative characteristics, as Armor's article asserts, and their alleged development in desegregated schools could well be regarded as a further success, not a failure, of "busing." Finally, the evidence that desegregated education sharply expands the life opportunities of black children is more extensive than he has indicated.

Consequently, Armor's sweeping policy conclusion against "mandatory busing" is neither substantiated nor warranted. Not only does it rely upon impaired and incomplete "evidence," but in a real sense his paper is not about "busing" at all, much less "mandatory busing." Three of the cities discussed—among them Boston, the subject of Armor's own research—had voluntary, not "mandatory busing."
"Busing" was never cited as an independent variable, and many of the desegregation studies discussed involved some children who were not bused to reach their interracial schools. Indeed, in Armor's own investigation of METCO, some of the METCO children were not bused while many of the controls were.

Fourth, objections must be raised to the basic assumptions about racial change that undergird the entire article. Public school desegregation is regarded as largely a technical matter, a matter for social scientists more than for the courts. Emphasis is placed solely on the adaptive abilities of black children rather than on their constitutional rights. Moreover, the whole national context of individual and institutional racism is conveniently ignored, and interracial contact under any conditions is assumed to be "integration."

Now we wish to pursue these basic points in more detail.

I

Unrealistic standards for judging the effects of "busing." The article advances an "integration policy model" which it claims grew out of social science and guided "the integration movement." The model allegedly maintained that all school desegregation would result in improved black achievement, aspirations, self-esteem, racial attitudes, and educational and occupational opportunities (Armor, p. 96). This interpretation of "the integration policy model" is at sharp variance with what specialists in this field have been writing over the past generation. The fundamental premise of social scientists over these years was that racial segregation as it is typically imposed in the United States leads directly to a multitude of negative effects not only for black America but for the nation at large. (The evidence for this premise is extensive, and Armor does not contest the premise.) But social scientists have not made the error of contending that because enforced racial segregation has negative effects, all racial desegregation will have positive effects. It requires little imagination to think of hostile conditions of school desegregation that would limit its benefits for both races.

At the heart of this misconception is a persistent misreading of Gordon Allport's (1954) theory of intergroup contact. Armor cites a quotation from Allport delineating the crucial conditions that he held to be essential before positive effects could be expected from intergroup contact: equal status, common goals, institutional supports, and a non-competitive atmosphere that is likely to lead to "the perception of common interests and common humanity." Yet Armor summarizes this quotation by stating: "The clear key to breaking the vicious circle, then, was contact." This is not what Allport wrote; the key, Allport argued, is contact under particular conditions.

Later in his article Armor adds a brief discussion of one of these conditions—equal status between the two groups. Allport and other contact theorists have maintained that this condition is met by equal status, dignity, and access to resources within the contact situation.
itself (e.g., Pettigrew, 1971). Armor reinterprets this condition so that it is met only if the two groups bring equal societal status to the situation, a rigorous test indeed in a society where racial discrimination has long been endemic. We know of no relevant contact research that supports this reinterpretation of the theory, and vague references to conflict in Northern Ireland and the Middle East hardly suffice as evidence. But armed with his own reinterpretation, Armor (p. 111) writes: “Therefore, we have to question whether integration programs for black and white children can ever fulfill the equal status condition as long as socio-economic and academic inequalities are not eliminated.” Here the misreading of Allport’s contact theory is fashioned into not only an explanation of presumed “negative” results from interracial schools but a not-so-subtle rationale for at best gradualism and at worst a return to racially segregated education throughout the nation.

The basic weakness, then, in this description of an “integration policy model” is that it assumes positive results for all interracial schools rather than for just those meeting the conditions for optimal contact. This erroneous assumption is best illustrated by reference to the chief policy document relied upon by Armor: Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, issued by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1967). The quotation Armor cites from this report emphasizes the harmful effects of racially isolated schooling, and it does not specify all of the five hypotheses which he somehow deduces from it. That the Commission clearly understood that interracial schools in and of themselves are not necessarily effective schools is demonstrated by the following passage which was not quoted:

Whether school desegregation is effective depends on a number of factors. These include the leadership given by State and local officials; the application of the plan to all schools in the community; the measures taken to minimize the possibility of racial friction in the newly desegregated schools; the maintenance or improvement of educational standards; the desegregation of classes within the schools as well as the schools themselves, and the availability of supportive services for individual students who lag in achievement.

The Commission Report discusses these factors in detail for over eight pages, factors neither mentioned nor measured by Armor. “The integration policy model,” then, sets up unrealistic standards for judging the effects of “busing” by ignoring the conditions specified by the two principal sources cited. Its five criteria for success constitute a “straw man,” far exceeding the standards applied for the evaluation of other educational programs.

The critical distinction between desegregation and integration is ignored. The racial desegregation of schools is not a static but a complex, dynamic process. To evaluate it fairly, the critical conditions under which it takes place must be assessed. For this purpose, it is important to distinguish between desegregation and integration. Desegregation is achieved by simply ending segregation and bring-
ing blacks and whites together; it implies nothing about the quality of the interracial interaction. Integration involves Allport's four conditions for positive intergroup contact, cross-racial acceptance, and equal dignity and access to resources for both racial groups.

The neglect of this distinction besets not only Armor's theoretical contentions but his empirical ones as well. No effort is made to look inside of the schools at the process of desegregation. The cursory descriptions of the "busing" investigations tell virtually nothing about the conditions of interracial contact that prevailed. (Indeed, a few of the initial reports of these studies failed to describe contact conditions.) For example, we should have been informed by Armor that transported black children in some Riverside schools arrive and leave earlier than the untransported white children and that they have separate reading classes—hardly practices likely to generate interracial contact and lead to integration (Singer, 1972). And we might have been told that minority students in Riverside who were most likely to be in interracial classrooms (high-ability students) performed far better after desegregation than before (Purl, 1971).

In fact, in his Detroit deposition for school segregation, Armor admitted that he had no measures or knowledge in his own study of the METCO schools of such crucial factors as teacher expectations and preparation, the racial composition of the faculties, ability tracking practices, and curriculum changes. A review of "the evidence on busing" is misleading at best without consideration of these indicators of the desegregation versus integration distinction.

II

A biased and incomplete selection of studies. Armor's article makes no attempt to review all of the available evidence on "busing," as its title implies. Instead, the reader is told about only a small number of studies, selected with an apparent bias toward those reporting few positive effects. One hint of this selection is found in Armor's footnote 1, where we learn that he arbitrarily excludes the entire southern United States from his purview, though this severe restriction is not indicated either in his title or his conclusions against "mandatory busing." This unexplained exclusion seems unwarranted, for the bulk of court-ordered "mandatory busing" has occurred in the South.

Armor omits at least seven key desegregation investigations—only one of which is from the South—that reach conclusions in conflict with those of his paper. All seven of these desegregation programs involved "busing," and all seven of the studies meet the paper's two stated criteria for inclusion—longitudinal data and an adequate control group. Table 1 summarizes these neglected research reports. Though five of them spanned only one school year, all seven reach positive conclusions concerning the effects of school desegregation upon the academic performance of black children. Moreover, none of them found that the process lowered white academic performance. No matter how Armor might wish to view these studies in
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>AUTHOR(S)</th>
<th>GRADE LEVEL</th>
<th>TYPE OF COMPARISON</th>
<th>CONTROL VARIABLES</th>
<th>TIME OF DESEGREGATION</th>
<th>ACHIEVEMENT RESULTS</th>
<th>FOR BLACK CHILDREN (IF TESTED)</th>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHERN DESEGREGATION</td>
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<td>Goldsboro,</td>
<td>King &amp; Mayer (1971)1</td>
<td>7-11</td>
<td>White students and trend</td>
<td>Convergence curves for regression</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>Statistically significant gains in reading closing part</td>
<td>Both reading and math gains</td>
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<td>N.C.</td>
<td>McCullough (1972)</td>
<td>cohort</td>
<td>during segregation</td>
<td>to mean effects and pre-desegregation trends</td>
<td></td>
<td>of black/white differential; gains in math scores do not close racial gap; gains greatest for initially high achievers</td>
<td>greatest for high achievers</td>
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<td>SUBURBAN BUSING PROGRAMS</td>
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<td>Newark-Verona,</td>
<td>Zdep &amp; Joyce</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
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<td>1 year</td>
<td>Statistically significantly greater total achievement</td>
<td>No negative effects</td>
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<td>N.J.</td>
<td>(1967)</td>
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<td>gains for desegregated in both grades</td>
<td>(only difference favors the desegregated)</td>
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<td>Rochester-West Irondequoit,</td>
<td>Rock et al.</td>
<td>K-2</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
<td>Teachers' ratings of ability</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>Statistically significantly greater verbal, reading, and math achievement gains on 13 of 27 comparisons for desegregated; no significant differences on remaining 14 comparisons</td>
<td>No negative effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>N.Y.</td>
<td>(1968)</td>
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<td>(only differences favor the desegregated)</td>
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### Table 1. Continued

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>Type of Comparison</th>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Time of Desegregation</th>
<th>For Black Children</th>
<th>For White Children (if tested)</th>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHERN CENTRAL CITY DESEGREGATION</td>
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<td>Buffalo, N.Y.</td>
<td>Banks &amp; DiPasquale (1969)</td>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
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<td>1 year</td>
<td>2½ months greater achievement gain for the desegregated</td>
<td>No negative effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, N.Y.</td>
<td>Slone (1968)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Statistically significantly greater math achievement gains, and somewhat greater reading gains (p&lt;.10), for desegregated</td>
<td>No negative effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pa.</td>
<td>Laird &amp; Weeks (1966)</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
<td>I.Q., grade and sex</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Statistically significantly greater reading, and somewhat greater math, achievement gains for desegregated in fourth and fifth grades</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento, Cal.</td>
<td>Morrison &amp; Stivers (1971)</td>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>Comparable non-transfers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>Statistically significantly greater gains on three of ten comparisons (5 classes on 2 tests) and greater gains on 6 more, for desegregated</td>
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1. Similar results for a cohort of second through fifth grade students have also been obtained in Goldsboro. After two years of desegregated education the standardized verbal and mathematical computation achievement scores of both the black and white students had risen. The verbal gains, though not the mathematical computation gains, closed the racial differential slightly. Robert R. Mayer, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, personal communication.
retrospect, there was no reason for their omission in a paper that claimed to present "the evidence on busing."

Space limitations prevent a discussion here of these neglected investigations, but five points should be made about them. First, a number of them share methodological problems with the studies that Armor did choose to discuss. Indeed, reviewers of this research literature have uniformly found it methodologically weak (Matthai, 1966; O'Reilly, 1970; St. John, 1970; Weinberg, 1968). Second, these seven by no means exhaust the relevant research literature that meets the paper's dual criteria for inclusion. There are studies on desegregation without busing that reveal positive achievement effects (e.g., Anderson, 1966; Fortenberry, 1959; Frary and Goolsby, 1970). There are a few others that were also left out that found no significant achievement gains associated with desegregation (e.g., Fox, 1966, 1967, 1968). From the perspective of the desegregation versus integration distinction, this mixed picture is precisely what one would expect. Third, these seven studies are not obscure reports; all but the more recent Goldsboro and Sacramento studies are cited in one or more of the standard reviews available on the topic (Matthai, 1966; O'Reilly, 1970; St. John, 1970; Weinberg, 1968).

Fourth, the positive achievement effects revealed by these studies are often not just statistically significant (Armor's criterion) but, more important, are educationally significant as well. The study from Buffalo by Banks and DiPasquale (1969), for example, found a 2.5 month achievement advantage for the desegregated children. Over a 12-year school career, were such an advantage to be replicated each year, this would constitute 2.5 extra years of achievement—a critical addition that could mean the difference between functional illiteracy and marketable skills. Finally, these seven studies do not measure the "pure" effects of desegregation any more than those cited by Armor. Probably there are no instances of school desegregation that are not confounded with curriculum changes, school quality, and other educational alterations. But our point is made: The few studies mentioned in Armor's article constitute an incomplete list and are selectively negative in results.

**Biased and incomplete descriptions are provided of the few studies discussed.** The cursory reviews of the few studies that Armor did select for attention allow only biased and incomplete descriptions. Since his article never probes the process going on inside the schools, it repeatedly omits mitigating circumstances surrounding black responses to desegregation. For example, no mention is made of the fact that educational services for the transported black students in Ann Arbor, Riverside, and Berkeley were actually reduced with the onset of desegregation (Carrigan, 1969; Frelow, 1971; and Purl, 1971). Nor is there any indication that Riverside initially placed many of its bused minority children in the same classrooms, and often with low-achieving white children (Henrick, 1969). No "integration model," not even the new one devised by Armor, is fairly tested under such conditions.
Moreover, the positive findings that favor desegregation in these studies are often obscured or simply ignored by Armor. In the case of Hartford, for instance, only Wechsler I.Q. data are cited, while extensive results from the Primary Mental Abilities Test and measures of school achievement go undiscussed. When all three types of tests are considered together, a clear pattern of larger gains for the transported children emerges for all four grades from kindergarten through the third grade (Mahan, 1969). Likewise, black pupils in Ann Arbor attained a substantially higher mean I.Q. after one year of desegregation, but this fact is lost from sight by the use of a white comparison. A range of interesting results from Riverside is also omitted. Purl (1970) found that: (a) Bused students who were more dispersed in the classes of their receiving schools outperformed those who—through ability grouping or other means—were clustered in near-segregation style. (b) While the mean achievement of minority pupils with low initial ability scores declined relative to grade level, the achievement of minority pupils with high initial ability scores rose in the desegregated schools. (c) Minority children transported to schools characterized by higher achievement of the receiving white students gain significantly more than comparable minority children transported to schools characterized by low achievement, an effect not linked to the social class levels of the receiving students. (d) The one group of bused minority students who began their schooling in interracial schools achieved better than those who had first experienced segregated education.

The incomplete descriptions also fail to reveal major methodological weaknesses in these cited studies. The Berkeley (1971a) investigation, as a case in point, utilized different tests for comparison over time, precisely the same defect for which an investigation in Rochester (1971) showing a number of positive results is rejected without discussion. The White Plains (1967) investigation employs inadequate control groups drawn from earlier time periods, a faulty procedure that confounds the effects of events over time with those of desegregation. Indeed, the negative conclusions of a follow-up study in Ann Arbor are given without recording the fact that it failed to meet either of the criteria purportedly used for inclusion, for it had no control group whatsoever nor did it gather longitudinal data on the same test (Aberdeen, 1969; Carrigan, 1948).

Finally, several newer reports on these same cities that present results favorable to desegregation are not utilized. Mahan and Mahan (1971), for example, provide more refined analyses on the Hartford achievement data. Pooling the first, third, and fifth grades, they show that the desegregated children in Project Concern do significantly better after two years than their comparable segregated controls on the Wechsler I.Q. and on both the verbal and quantitative scores of the Primary Mental Abilities Test.

Though he cited a Master's thesis on New Haven desegregation, Armor failed to cite a better-known doctoral dissertation on the same city. Samuels (1971) studied 138 black students who had all attended inner-city kindergartens in 1969 and then were assigned
randomly to one of three conditions: bused into suburban schools, received intensive compensatory education in New Haven schools, or attended regular New Haven schools. After two years, Samuels found that the bused children possessed significantly higher reading scores than the two control groups as well as higher word knowledge scores that approach statistical significance \((p<.07)\). Their self-image scores were slightly higher, but not significantly different. Comparisons on word analysis and mathematics yielded no significant differences.

In Berkeley, Frelow (1971) studied the third and fourth grade achievement of poor children, most of them black, over a six-year period that witnessed rapid changes in the city's schools. Though this design, like that used in White Plains, lacks contemporaneous controls, he found that achievement scores rose significantly after the introduction of compensatory programs and went slightly higher still after desegregation despite a reduction in services. Frelow concludes that “when gains are measured against level of instructional services, desegregation produces the most prominent achievement results.”

The use of white control groups is inadequate and often misleading. The contention that black children will learn more in integrated than in segregated schools is not tested when black data are compared with those of white control groups. Moreover, the use of a desegregated white control group ignores the possibility that both whites and blacks could benefit significantly from integration without “the racial gap” in achievement closing at all. As a matter of fact, precisely this possibility occurs in Riverside, Berkeley, and Ann Arbor—though this is not mentioned by Armor and is allowed to mask black gains in desegregated schools.

For Riverside, Armor reports that even for the fourth-grade group that had been desegregated since kindergarten “the minority/white gap had not diminished...” But actually the white test scores being used for a comparison had improved after desegregation relative to national norms (Purl, 1971). Thus, the fact that the minority students held the “gap” constant represents improvement; this is indicated, too, by these minority students’ relative gains in grade equivalents.

For Berkeley, Armor reports in a footnote that “black achievement is as far behind (or further behind) white achievement after two years of integration as before integration.” But both white and black grade equivalents in grades one, two, and three went up across age cohorts after two years of desegregation; yet since they rose in virtually equal amounts, the “black/white gap” was narrowed (Berkeley, 1971a, 1971b). The measure here is grade equivalents, not percentiles. Thus, keeping “the racial gap” from expanding is an accomplishment in itself for desegregation, since the typical result of segregated schools is an ever-widening “racial gap” in grade equivalents (Coleman et al., 1966; Mosteller and Moynihan, 1972).
The misleading use of white control groups, however, was not unique to Armor (Carrigan, 1969). Here the bused black students were a "multi-problem group" with a greater incidence of "general health problems" and behavioral "problems requiring special professional help." Yet they gained an average of 3.86 I.Q. points during their first year of desegregation. They were compared with generally high-status white children, many of whom came from academic families, who gained an average of 4.28 I.Q. points. "Busing" failed, in Armor's terms, because "the racial gap" did not close. But can a program which utilizes fewer services with a multi-problem group of youngsters, and yet is associated with a nearly four-point average increase in I.Q. during one school year, be unquestionably ruled a failure? We think not, even if these "bused" pupils did not gain more than high-achieving white youngsters from a university community.

This point represents a crucial difference between our perspective and Armor's. We believe it to be unrealistic to expect any type of educational innovation to close most of the racial differential in achievement while gross racial disparities, especially economic ones, remain in American society. Furthermore, we know of no social scientists who ever claimed school desegregation alone could close most of the differential. We are pleased to note the many instances where effective desegregation has apparently benefited the achievement of both black and white children, and where over a period of years it appears to close approximately a fourth of the differential.

But to insist that "mandatory busing" must close most of the achievement differential by itself in a short time or be abolished is, to understate the case, an extreme position. Indeed, Armor himself has wavered on this point. In The Public Interest he wrote: "The ideal control group, of course would consist of black students who are identical to the integrated students in every way except for the integrated experience" (Armor, p. 97), though white students in the same school constituted an "adequate" control. Later, however, while testifying in support of anti-busing legislation before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, he used white pupils as the critical comparison. This stern criterion leads to some strange conclusions. A desegregation program that dramatically raises the achievement levels of both racial groups is judged a failure when it does not close most of the racial disparity, but another desegregation program that entirely closes the gap by raising the blacks' scores and lowering the whites' scores would have to be deemed a success!

Serious weaknesses in the METCO research. Armor's article relies most heavily upon his own research on Boston's suburban program known as METCO. Far greater space—including a dozen graphs—is devoted to the METCO research than to all of the other research combined, and the METCO work is the only investigation that is
relayed upon for support of all five of the conclusions concerning the effects of “busing.” Yet a careful reanalysis of these METCO data reveals a host of serious weaknesses that center on five concerns: (a) the unrepresentativeness of the METCO program, and problems regarding (b) the control group, (c) the sample, (d) test administration, and (e) the analysis.

a. Unrepresentativeness of METCO program. Not only is “busing” not “mandatory” in METCO, but the program is highly atypical of desegregation efforts with “busing” around the nation. METCO is a voluntary program, and it has disproportionately attracted middle-class black students. This class bias may help explain why METCO children in the first year of the program attained a higher average I.Q. than the white national average (Archibald, 1967) and why in Figures 1 and 2 of Armor’s article all 10 grade levels show relatively high achievement scores. Moreover, METCO children comprise only a minute fraction of their student bodies, with less than four per cent in any one school in 1969. Black faculty are rare in virtually all of the METCO schools. Indeed, some METCO schools have had all-white staffs, and until recently even all of the bus drivers were white. Thus, given METCO’s “tokenism” in students and staff, as well as its social class bias, direct generalizations from this program to “busing” throughout the United States appear dubious at best.

b. Control group problems. The most serious weakness of the METCO research involves the students who were employed as “controls.” The study’s design obviously requires that none of these control students were either desegregated or “bused.” But a careful review of the available records reveals that this essential condition is not met. Among the 41 “control” youngsters at the elementary level, we obtained records on 17. Only seven of these 17 pupils were actually attending segregated schools during 1968-69, while 10 (59 per cent) were attending desegregated schools. Similarly, among the 38 (out of a total of 41) “controls” at the junior and senior high levels whose records we obtained, only 14 were in segregated schools during the tested year, while 24 (63 per cent) were attending desegregated schools.

All told, then, of the 55 students whose records were secured, 34 (62 per cent) actually went to desegregated schools and many of them used buses and other means of transportation. Even if we assume that all 27 students whose records were unavailable went to segregated schools (an unlikely possibility), these data still mean that at least 41 per cent (34/82) of the “control” students were in fact experiencing a racially desegregated education. Indeed, these desegregated “controls” were generally in schools with a greater interracial mixture than those attended by the METCO children.

This failure of the METCO study to have an adequate control group cannot be overemphasized. It means that all of the METCO comparisons between the METCO and “control” children in Armor's article are not valid indications of any differences attributable to “busing” or school desegregation. For such comparisons may also
Busing: A Review of "The Evidence"

Detect the different effects of suburban versus inner-city desegregation and token versus substantial desegregation. In short, we believe this weakness alone eliminates the METCO study from being relevant to "the evidence on busing," and makes our further criticisms of the study almost superfluous.

Other problems involve the use of siblings of METCO students as "controls." "This design feature by no means guarantees the equating of the groups," wrote Herbert Walberg (1969) in the initial write-up of this investigation, "since there may be bias in the family's choice of the child to be bused. . . ." Indeed, there is potential bias in the selection by families, but the direction is not clear. The academically superior child might be chosen more often by his parents; or, as METCO officials suspect, the child having difficulties in Boston's schools might be chosen more often. Moreover, the use of siblings for controls tends to confound sex, grade level, and age with family climate and social class.

c. Sample problems. The METCO research suffers, too, from both small numbers and a severe loss of eligible subjects. Limited sample size makes finding statistically significant differences in achievement between the experimental and "control" groups less likely; or, put differently, small sample sizes aid in supporting the anti-desegregation thesis of the article. The extent of this problem is shown in Table 2, which provides the sample sizes by grade level. The question arises as to how large the METCO group dif-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Level</th>
<th>METCO1 &quot;Control&quot;</th>
<th>Segregated</th>
<th>Desegregated</th>
<th>Unavailable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd &amp; 4th</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th &amp; 6th</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary School Totals</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High School Totals</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
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<td>10th</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High School Totals</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 These data are taken from our reconstructed data tapes. Armor lists 123 junior high METCO students in his Figure 2, but he inadvertently dropped two cases.
ferences in achievement would have had to be before the sample sizes employed could have detected a statistically significant difference even at the .05 level of confidence? By our calculation, the answer at the junior high level, for example, is that the METCO students would have had to gain at least 0.4 of a grade more in average achievement on the test norms than the "control" group. This is an unrealistic expectation over a duration of only seven months, especially for comparisons among children who are close to grade level. An educationally meaningful average gain difference over such a short period would have been 0.2 of a grade more for the METCO students. But this would have required sample sizes of roughly 200 in each group to have reached statistical significance for a two-tailed test. Instead, only 125 METCO and 27 "control" junior high students were tested. The same point can be made about the other grade levels. We conclude, therefore, that the criterion of statistical significance was inappropriate for evaluating the METCO program when the sample sizes were so small.

The loss of subjects occurred in two stages. Among the elementary students, in the first test administration in October 1968, there was a 23 per cent loss of eligible METCO students and a 35 per cent loss of eligible "control" students. In the second test administration in May 1969, 34 per cent of the METCO and 56 per cent of the "control" students who had taken the tests seven months earlier did not re-take them. Combined, then, the achievement results on these students included only 51 per cent of the eligible METCO and 25 per cent of the eligible "control" participants. The situation was even worse for the junior and senior high students, whose achievement results were based on only 44 per cent of the eligible METCO and only 20 per cent of the eligible "control" participants. Furthermore, only eight per cent of the "controls" took part in all three test administrations.

Contrast these percentages with Usen's (1971, 1972) response rate of 57 per cent in her study of white students in METCO schools. Compare them, too, with the accepted survey research standard of at least a 70 to 80 per cent response rate, and one can appreciate the high level of potential bias introduced by this loss of subjects from Armor's study. An attempt to compensate for these impaired data by utilizing cross-sectional results is not an adequate remedy for many reasons, some of which are provided by Armor himself when he condemns cross-sectional investigations. Besides, there was a considerable loss of eligible subjects, and thus potential bias, in the cross-sectional data as well.

d. Test administration problems. "The control group," Armor argued in his Detroit deposition for school segregation, "has to be measured in the same way that the treated group is." He further maintained that "we must measure them before the treatment, and put one through the treatment and one not, to assess the effect of a program." We agree, but his METCO research failed on both counts.

The third testing in May 1970, which involved attitudes but not achievement, took place under markedly contrasting conditions for
the experimental and control groups. While the METCO children answered the questions in school, the control children answered them at home through a mailed questionnaire that explicitly requested the parents to serve as proctors. This procedure risks two related sources of bias. A wealth of research has demonstrated how different situations can lead to sharply different responses; and the home administration of the controls' testing opens the possibility for family members to influence the answers directly.

Armor expresses amazement that the METCO children revealed as a group more militant and ideological responses than the "control" children, but the differential testing administrations provide a possible explanation. Repeated surveys indicate that young black peers at school are far more likely to be militant and ideological than older parents at home (Campbell and Schuman, 1968; Goldman, 1970); and research in social psychology has shown that such different situational influences can have a sharp effect on group-linked attitudes (Charters and Newcomb, 1952).

On the second point, measuring the groups before the treatment, the METCO research also fails. The METCO pupils were measured initially in October 1968, after all of them had begun for a month or more their year in the METCO school. Moreover, 45 per cent of the METCO children were not beginning "the treatment" of suburban education, for they had already been in the program for either one or two years.

Finally, studies utilizing achievement tests require well-motivated students who are trying to do their best. We learn from those in attendance at both the first and second test administrations, however, that motivation was apparently not high. And no wonder. The students, METCO and control, had no special incentive for taking the lengthy tests on a holiday in a Boston technical school described by Walberg (1969) as "an old, run-down, ill-cared-for building." This low level of motivation probably accounts for the small turnout for the second test.

e. Analysis problems. Even if there were no serious control group and sample problems, numerous data errors place Armor's analysis of the METCO results in serious question. One child was included who apparently did not take the verbal test initially at all; his post-test scores were then treated as a total gain from a base of zero. A sixth (25 of 151) of the junior high students initially scored virtually as high as the achievement test scoring allowed. Thus, this "ceiling effect" made it impossible for their post-test scores to advance, and their performance was treated as showing "no gain." Such problems, together with clerical errors, help explain why such talented children are shown to make such slight achievement gains in Armor's Figures 1 and 2. But given the irreparable control group and sampling problems, no purpose is served by a reanalysis of these data that corrects for these errors of analysis and data handling.

Inadequate discussion of the METCO research. The reader is not told enough in Armor's article to evaluate the METCO research fully.
Most of our critical comments are based on information gleaned from a reanalysis of the raw data, the examination of unpublished papers on the research (Archibald, 1967; Walberg, 1969; and Armor and Genova, 1970), and a review of Armor's court testimony concerning the research. The discussion of the METCO work is also inadequate in other ways: (a) Differential statistical standards are employed; (b) attitude differences between METCO schools are not shown; and (c) misleading claims of consistency with other research findings are advanced.

a. **Differential statistical standards.** Rigid standards of statistical significance are uniformly applied to findings that favor school desegregation. Findings of positive effects in other studies that approach statistical significance are summarily dismissed as "not significant." But these standards are relaxed considerably when findings interpreted as negative to school desegregation are discussed. For instance, Figure 3 is provided to show how the grades of METCO's junior and senior high school pupils declined slightly, and this finding is emphasized in the conclusions (Armor, p. 109). Yet there is no significant difference between the METCO and the control groups on changes in grades. Similarly, a slightly greater increase among METCO students in wanting a school with no more than half-white student bodies is emphasized (Armor, pp. 102-103). Though "... the differential change is not statistically significant," Figure 7 is devoted to it. And later in the conclusions, this finding is utilized without qualification as part of the evidence that "bused" black students have become more supportive of "black separatism."

b. **Attitude differences between METCO schools are not shown.** Armor's article assumes that the METCO program consisted of the same "treatment" for all of the children participating in it. Consequently, attitude differences across METCO schools were not shown; nor, as noted earlier, were any variables utilized to take into account what type of educational programs were actually occurring inside the various METCO schools.

Actually, of course, there are as many different METCO programs under way as there are separate METCO schools. But consider the contrasting policy implications of providing only the total results as opposed to school-by-school results. Suppose a particular school program aimed at improving racial attitudes were attempted in eight schools, and that the overall effect was minimal. The policy implication would be to regard the program a disappointment and to consider abandoning it. Suppose further that a meaningful effect had in fact been registered in all but two schools, but that attitudes in these two were so unfavorable that they virtually obscured the favorable attitudes of the other six in the total data. Now the policy implication from the same data would be to regard the program as encouraging and to find out how to change the deviant two to make them more like the successful six schools. In short, the variability across schools is a critical consideration in judging a program.

Our Figure 1, from Uscem (1971), shows that a situation similar to this existed for the METCO program in 1969. Note that schools F and
A review of the evidence.

A evident ly far the most anti-METCO sentiment among both white and black pupils. Note, too, that black attitudes toward METCO are consistently more favorable than those of whites, though there is a positive relationship across schools in the attitudes of the two groups. With such wide differences between METCO schools, how can a simple judgment of success or failure be passed upon the entire program?

3. Misleading claims of consistency with other research findings are advanced. Two studies are cited as providing supporting evidence for the METCO results; but their descriptions are so incomplete as to be highly misleading. Useem's (1971, 1972) METCO investigation is given as evidence for how interracial contact in METCO schools leads to worse race relations. Her complete findings, however, point to a different conclusion, and we shall return to these findings shortly. The other citation refers to Armor's earlier reanalysis of the Coleman report data:

An extensive reanalysis of the Coleman data showed that even without controlling for social class factors, "naturally" integrated (i.e., non-bused) black sixth-grade groups were still one and one-half standard deviations behind white groups in the same schools, compared to a national gap of two standard deviations. This means that, assuming the Coleman data to be correct, the best that integration could do would be to move the average black group from the 2nd percentile to
Such a statement is extremely misleading, and it requires clarification. It appears to assert that there is some upper limit on the possible achievement gains through “busing” of blacks relative to whites. No such assertion is possible. Moreover, the evidence that this claim is based on data from groups of children who are in general not bused and for whom there are only Coleman’s cross-sectional data. The statement, then, implies a causal relation from cross-sectional data, a practice correctly condemned earlier by Armon. The statement further implies that there is some intrinsic, if unspecified, connection between the gains possible from “busing” and the inferred gains estimated from cross-sectional data.

More misleading still is the use of group percentiles. Technically, it may be correct that the average black group mean in desegregated sixth grades is only at the 7th percentile when compared with the means of white groups. But the obvious misinterpretation that can easily arise is that the average individual black student in a desegregated school is only at the 7th percentile compared with the individual white student norms. Such an interpretation is patently wrong. Though Armor can argue that his statement is technically accurate, we feel that he has an obligation to inform the lay reader fully so that such a misinterpretation could not occur.

The misleading statement utilizes standard deviations based on group means rather than on individual scores. Group standard deviations are invariably smaller than standard deviations based on the individuals within the groups. Instead of the average black group in desegregated sixth grades being at the 7th percentile of white group norms, then, we estimate that the average black individual in desegregated sixth grades ranks between the 25th and 30th percentiles of white individual norms. Indeed, Figure 2 of Armor’s article shows that the black senior high students in the METCO research average between the 25th and 43rd percentiles in individual reading achievement.

The achievement effects of “busing” are more complex and positive than reported. Armor concludes that “busing” fails on four of the five standards he alone sets for it. One of these alleged failures concerns the academic achievement of black students. From the selected findings of selected studies, Armor concludes that desegregation research throughout the nation has typically found no statistically significant enhancement of black achievement. Furthermore, he claims that the METCO results support this conclusion. But we have noted how this conclusion was reached through the omission of at least seven busing investigations with positive black achievement results and through serious weaknesses in the METCO research.

This is not the place for a complete review of the relevant research literature. But our evaluation of the available evidence points to a more encouraging, if more tentative and complex set of conclusions.
First, the academic achievement of both white and black children is not lowered by the types of racial desegregation so far studied. Second, the achievement of white and especially of black children in desegregated schools is generally higher when some of the following critical conditions are met: equal racial access to the school's resources; classroom—not just school—desegregation (McPartland, 1968); the initiation of desegregation in the early grades; interracial staffs; substantial rather than token student desegregation (Jencks and Brown, 1972); the maintenance of or increase in school services and remedial training; and the avoidance of strict ability grouping.

Grading changes before and after desegregation are meaningless if differential grading practices are not considered. "Busing" also fails, according to Armor, because the grade average of the METCO students in junior and senior high schools declined. The average METCO grade decline is slight (−0.12 on a four-point scale), although he described it as "considerable" (Armor, p. 109). Nor is the difference in grade changes between the METCO and control groups statistically significant. Moreover, the greater drop in METCO grades than in control grades may be an artifact of the enormous non-response rate discussed earlier, for the full cross-sectional data show the controls' grades falling as much as those of the METCO children (−0.14 to −0.13).

Black grades also fell after desegregation in Evanston, we are informed in Armor's footnote 4. But we are not informed that the same study shows that white grades also fell and that there were no significant differences "in the frequencies of earned grades within each group" (Hsia, 1971). By contrast, when black pupils left a segregated junior high school in Sacramento in 1964, they soon received higher grades in the desegregated schools and maintained this improvement throughout their junior high years (Morrison and Stivers, 1971). However, none of these results are convincing, since differential grading practices are not controlled.

Shifts in aspirations and "academic self-image" during desegregation are positive in meaning. Armor further contends that "busing" fails because it lowers both the aspirations and academic self-concept of black children. Several qualifications are briefly discussed initially (Armor, pp. 101-102), but when the conclusions are drawn, this METCO "finding" has become unqualifiedly one of the four failures of "busing" (Armor, p. 109).

Actually, the METCO data on the subject are by no means clear. Two of Armor's three relevant Figures (5 and 6), those concerned with occupational aspirations and with "feeling more intelligent than classmates," show no significant change differences between the METCO and "control" groups. And the non-response bias may account for the one significant change difference—in regard to the desire to obtain a bachelor's degree (Figure 4)—since the full cross-sectional samples reveal a similar decline for both groups (−11 per cent to −12 per cent).
Two careful desegregation investigations from Pittsburgh and Evanston, however, have found lower black aspirations combined with better academic performance. Black ninth graders in Pittsburgh had significantly higher arithmetic achievement and lower educational aspirations in desegregated schools (St. John and Smith, 1969). Similarly, both black and white pupils in Evanston's third, fourth, and fifth grade who had previously been in predominantly black schools reported somewhat lower academic self-concept scores after two years in predominantly white schools (Weber, Cook, and Campbell, 1971; Hsia, 1971). And we have noted that Evanston's black and white children made achievement gains during desegregation, though they were not statistically significant (Hsia, 1971). Since this effect occurred for both racial groups, these investigators inferred that this "social comparison effect" reflected adaptation to new norms and more realistic conceptions of academic performance.

The key to understanding the apparent paradox of reduced aspirations combined with increased achievement is the well-known psychological principle that achievement motivation and aspiration level are by no means identical. Researchers have repeatedly found that moderate motivational levels are best for learning and achievement (Atkinson, 1964). Some of this motivational research directly concerns black children. Katz (1967), for example, has demonstrated experimentally how unduly high aspirations can doom black students to serious learning difficulties. In his view, desegregation benefits learning among black children by lowering their aspirations to more effective and realistic levels. Veroff and Peele (1969) supported Katz's position in a study of desegregation in a small Michigan city. They found that achievement motivation, as measured by the choice of moderately difficult tasks, significantly increased for black boys after one year in a desegregated elementary school; black girls, however, did not evince the change.

If METCO had drastically curtailed black ambitions to low levels, this would have been a negative result. But METCO reduced these ambitions only slightly, for they remained as high or higher than the ambitions of white students in METCO schools. In short, when desegregation lowers rigidly high aspirations of black students to moderate, effective levels, it should be considered a positive, not a negative effect.

Shifts in racial attitudes during desegregation are exaggerated and interpreted too narrowly. "Busing" fails again, in Armor's view, because he regards his METCO data as indicating that desegregation leads to negative effects for race relations. Once again, these METCO data are tenuous at best. Though much is made of it, the increase among METCO children in their desire to attend schools with at least half-black student bodies proves not to be significantly different from a similar increase among the "control" students (Figure 7). No control data are shown for black students' relations with white students (Figure 10), even though data without control comparisons are otherwise condemned by Armor and a large segment of the "control"
group also attended interracial schools and had contact with white students. And as already noted, the differential administration of the third attitude questionnaire in 1970 is a critical factor which probably explains at least part of the difference between the two groups.

But if these supporting data are suspect, Armor's interpretations of them are even more suspect. "Militancy" and heightened "black consciousness and solidarity" are viewed as indicating "bad" race relations, though Armor adds, "It would be a mistake, of course, to view the increased racial solidarity of black students as a completely negative finding" (Armor, p. 113, italics added). Similarly, support for black power and a preference for a school with a student body that is evenly divided between the races are believed necessarily to involve black separatism. Even sympathy for the Black Panthers is regarded as indicative of "anti-integration sentiments"; this despite the fact that the Panthers do not support racial segregation and removed their leader because of his insistence on racial separatism.

These interpretations involve a logical contradiction in Armor's argument. He begins his article with the famous "hearts and minds" quotation of the 1954 Supreme Court ruling against de jure racial segregation of the public schools; and he employs it as evidence of the powerful influence of social science upon "the integration policy model." Yet the Supreme Court was maintaining that segregation led to black self-hate. Now when he interprets his data as showing that METCO "busing" leads to racial pride, militancy, and a desire to be among blacks as well as whites, Armor concludes that "the integration policy model" is proven wrong and that "busing" causes bad race relations.

The article admits that the METCO children are still supportive of the program, but emphasizes the trend toward "militancy." No consideration is given to the effects of the differential administration of the third-wave questionnaires; nor is any given to the possible effects of the study's having begun just after the 1968 assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a tragic event with wide repercussions for black/white interaction. Finally, the attitude results, like the achievement results, must be reinterpreted in the light of our discovery that much of the "control" group attends substantially desegregated schools. It could be, then, that the extreme tokenism of the METCO programs influenced these attitude results. They cannot be related to "busing" and desegregation, given the composition of the "control" group.

Nonetheless, Armor views these findings as a challenge to contact theory. To buttress this contention, he selectively cites a lone finding out of context from Useem's (1971, 1972) 1969 study of white racial attitudes in METCO schools.

Nonetheless, although the evidence is not complete, what we have indicates that the white students themselves were negatively affected by the contact. . . . [T]hose students who had direct classroom contact with bused black students showed less support for the busing program than
those without direct contact. In fact, the kind of students who were generally the most supportive—the middle-class, high-achieving students—showed the largest decline in support as a result of contact with bused black students. This finding is based on cross-sectional data and does not indicate a change over time, but it is suggestive of the possibility that a general polarization has occurred for both racial groups. (Armor, pp. 103-104)

When drawing conclusions, however, he forgets his own caution against drawing causal inferences and flatly states that "white student attitudes in the receiving schools also tended to become less favorable to black students . . ." (Armor, p. 112, italics added).

The simple correlation between increased classroom contact and more negative feelings toward METCO among white students is statistically significant; but Armor fails to report that the relationship is no longer significant once such variables as sex, socio-economic status, and academic standing are taken into account. Moreover, this effect is limited to upper-status students of high ability who remain favorable to the program but who have their initially unrealistic expectations of blacks modified.

There is also a failure to report other relevant findings from Useem's work. For example, she found a statistically significant positive relationship between favorable white attitudes toward METCO and earlier equal status interracial contact in elementary school, summer camp, etc.; and this strong relationship remained significant after full controls were applied. Useem also found a relationship (p<.05) between support for METCO and interracial contact in extracurricular activities. Moreover, she found that having a METCO friend is strongly linked to support for METCO, and is best predicted by equal status contact with blacks as a child and with METCO students in class and school activities.12

The evidence that school desegregation "channels" blacks into greater future opportunities is stronger than presented. The one "success" of "busing," Armor admits, is that METCO appears to "channel" its students into colleges at higher rates than control students presumably from the same families. But this finding is couched with many qualifications that are conspicuously absent from his negative conclusions. Furthermore, his article actually understates METCO's success in this regard and fails to cite recent research that indicates that it may well be an important effect of interracial education in general.

Armor's article shows in its Figure 11 that 75 per cent of the METCO graduating class of 1970 entered four-year colleges, compared to only 44 per cent of the controls. By the fall of 1971, the percentages were 66 per cent and 44 per cent; and by the spring of 1971, 56 per cent and 38 per cent. (For universities, the spring 1971 figures were even more impressive, with 43 per cent of the METCO graduates and only 12 per cent of the controls enrolled.) Similarly, positive results are cited from another special program (Perry, 1972).
But the article also implies that the METCO drop-out rate from college is excessively high, suggesting that the program pushes into college students who do not belong there. This point is answered as soon as one compares the METCO figures with other data on college attendance. For 1969 and 1970, the percentages of the total graduating classes of the METCO high schools going on to four-year colleges were 61 per cent and 62 per cent—all well below the 1969 and 1970 METCO figures of 77 per cent and 78 per cent (Uschem, 1971). Moreover, the 84 per cent college retention rate of the 1970 METCO graduates who entered the second year of the four-year colleges is not abnormally low. In fact, it is slightly above the 78 per cent national retention rate for white students in four-year colleges (Astin, 1972).

Nor was the 1970 METCO graduating class unusual. Robert Hayden, the director of METCO, kindly supplied us with data on the 32 METCO graduates of 1969. Twenty-eight (88 per cent) entered college in the fall of 1969, while four began full-time employment. Three years later, attempts were made to contact the entire group, and 22 of the 28 college-attenders were reached. One was in the Army, and five had left college. Sixteen (73 per cent), however, were still enrolled in college.

Yet Armor belittles such concrete results. He emphasizes that such findings are tentative, based on small samples, and may indicate that the future benefits of biracial schooling are limited to the college-bound. The importance of all three of these cautions is reduced, however, by a major research effort that goes unmentioned. Robert Crain (1970), using a 1966 survey of 1,624 adult blacks in the urban North, focused upon the occupational and income outcomes of desegregated education for high school graduates. Crain concludes:

American Negroes who attend integrated public schools have better jobs and higher incomes throughout at least the next three decades of their life. The differences in income cannot be accounted for by the higher educational attainment of alumni of integrated schools, or by the higher differences in social background. The most significant effect of integrated schools is probably not "educational." It is probably more important that Negroes who attend integrated schools will have more contact with whites as adults, and tend to have more trust in whites than do Negroes from segregated schools. This in turn partially overcomes a crucial barrier to equal opportunity—the fact that information about employment opportunities is spread through types of informal social contacts to which few Negroes have access.

The firm policy conclusion against "mandatory busing" is not substantiated by the evidence presented. For the many reasons discussed above, the evidence does not justify Armor's unqualified conclusion: "The available evidence on busing, then, seems to lead to two clear policy conclusions. One is that mandatory busing for purposes of improving student achievement and interracial harmony is not effective and should not be adopted at this time" (Armor, p. 116). Inter-
THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Interestingly, this conclusion was added to the final version after considerable publicity concerning Armor's paper had been generated by its repeated leaks to the mass media. An earlier draft had concluded only that "the data may fail to support mandatory busing as it is currently justified."

Armor also concludes that "voluntary busing" should continue for those who still believe in it and for the sake of social science research. Yet he never demonstrated, nor do we detect it when reviewing the evidence, that "mandatory" and "voluntary" desegregation lead to different effects. "Mandatory busing" is condemned out of hand even though his article rests most heavily on a voluntary program's effects, and rests entirely, except for Berkeley, upon token programs with small numbers and percentages of black children, while most "mandatory" programs involve larger numbers and percentages of black children in Southern cities excluded from consideration.

In a real sense, Armor's article does not concern itself with "busing" at all, save for its title and its conclusions. It does not provide us with direct evidence on the "busing" of school children for racial desegregation, for it never treats "busing" as an independent variable. Rather, his article is an attack upon the racial desegregation of public schools that often, but not always, involves "busing." Large numbers of the children in the few studies cited by Armor attend desegregated schools without "busing." And we have noted that in his own METCO study many of his so-called "controls," who were supposed to be "unbused" and segregated, were in fact "bused" and desegregated. Furthermore, a check on his METCO sample finds that a substantial number were not bused. Armor was apparently aware of these problems, for he admitted in his court testimony for segregation in Detroit that "a more accurate title would be The Effects of Induced School Integration."

To our knowledge, there is actually no evidence whatsoever that "busing" for desegregation harms children. This is fortunate, since over 40 per cent of all school children in the United States are "bused" daily (though only three per cent are "bused" for purposes of achieving racial desegregation: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1972). Only one of the investigations mentioned in Armor's article actually utilized "busing" as an independent variable. It found, though this was also omitted, that black pupils in Evanston who were bused to desegregated schools attained significantly higher test score gains than those who either remained in or walked to desegregated schools (Hsia, 1971). This result may be an artifact of selection, but it at least indicates that "busing" per se did not impair achievement.

IV

The article's basic assumptions about racial change are unjustified. To this point, our critique has answered Armor's argument within the narrow confines of his view of the process of racial desegregation of the public schools. But here we wish to break out of these confines and to challenge the basic assumptions about racial change that under-
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Gird his entire article. Armor's thesis is predicated on viewing school desegregation as a technical matter, an inconvenient intervention whose merit must be judged solely by how well black children manage to adapt to it. Blacks are once again the "object" whose reactions should determine "what is good for them." The conditions faced by black children go unmeasured and ignored, and the whole context of American race relations is conveniently forgotten. All interracial contact is assumed to constitute "integration." No mention whatsoever is made of white racism, individual and institutional, which the Kerner Commission maintained was at the root of the problem (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968). Nor is there any discussion of the strong argument that genuine integration is necessary primarily for its potential effects on white Americans and their racial attitudes.

Instead, the whole issue is portrayed as the creation of "liberal educators" who are "so intent on selling integration to reluctant white communities that they risk the danger of ignoring the opinion of the black community" (Armor, p. 113). Forgotten is the fact that the issue was the creation of black America, from Charles Hamilton Houston to Roy Wilkins, and that it has been continuously opposed by white America with every conceivable means.

Data from the limited METCO sample are generalized to the whole black community (Armor, p. 113). The anti-busing resolution of the National Black Political Convention held in Gary, Indiana, in March 1972 is emphasized, but the paradoxical fact that the same Convention also passed a strong "pro-busing" resolution is not cited. While it is acknowledged that "many black leaders favor school integration..." and that "the majority of blacks may still endorse the concept of integration..." (Armor, pp. 112, 115, italics added), the full range of support for school integration (not merely desegregation) in the black community is never revealed. "Would you like to see the children in your family go to school with white children or not?" When asked this question at the time of the METCO research in 1969, 78 per cent of a national sample of black Americans (up from 70 per cent three years before) chose "go with whites," as opposed to 9 per cent "not with whites" and 14 per cent "unsure" (Goldman, 1970). Thus not just a majority but an overwhelming portion of black America still opts for school integration. If any further evidence were needed, the immediate and hostile public reactions of many blacks to the initial newspaper stories concerning Armor's paper should have supplied it. This is not to deny that there are strong doubts among blacks, especially the young, as to whether white America will ever allow genuine integration to become the national norm, doubts that are only reinforced by the assumptions upon which Armor's article is based.

Armor asserts that the burden must fall upon those who support school integration to prove that it works. Given America's unhappy racial history, we believe that the burden of proof rests with those who wish to maintain racial segregation. But actually such contentions miss the point. The courts' interpretation of the 14th Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, and not social scientists' opinions about black responses, ultimately governs the racial desegregation of the public schools and court-ordered transportation which may be needed to achieve it. This fundamental fact was dramatically demonstrated by the judicial reaction to Armor's deposition in the Detroit school case, a deposition based on an earlier draft of "The Evidence on Busing." On June 12, 1972, U.S. District Court Judge Stephen H. Roth ruled the deposition inadmissible as evidence on the grounds of irrelevancy. The deposition, in Judge Roth's view, represented "a new rationale for a return to the discredited 'separate but equal' policy ...".

FOOTNOTES

1 This is true from the early statements on the desegregation process by Clark (1953), Williams and Ryan (1954), Johnson (1954), and others (summarized in Coleman, 1960) to more recent statements by Katz (1964) and Pettigrew (1969, 1971).

2 Matthai (1968) describes the White Plains (1967) research as follows: "The small numbers of Negro students tested (33 desegregated students, 36 from previous years); the lack of explicitness about comparability of the groups under study and the rationale of sample selection; the occasionally contradictory figures and tables; the lack of significance tests; the selection of only one grade level for study (plus a truncated comparison of another grade level); and the almost impenetrable prose of the research report make this study utterly equivocal."

3 Grades two and four were excluded because of problems of sample drop-out. Earlier work showed somewhat greater gains for the desegregated youngsters in the second grade and for the segregated youngsters in the fourth grade (Mahan, 1968), so the omission of these two grades should not bias the results of this new analysis (Thomas Mahan, personal communication).

4 More recently, a study has been released by the Center for Urban Education concerning 25 black first, second, and third graders bused under Project Concern from Bridgeport to Westport, Connecticut. Though the sample size renders its findings tentative, it found marked academic improvement for the "bused" children during one-and-a-half years when compared with similar unbused children remaining in the segregated sending school in Bridgeport. The study also found no ill effects among the desegregated white children (Holler et al., 1972).

5 We wish to thank Robert Hayden of METCO, the Boston School System, and the families of the children contacted for their helpful cooperation in securing these data.

6 We are following the standard practice of defining a segregated school as one with a predominantly black student body. Had we employed a majority-white definition for a desegregated school, the "control" percentage attending desegregated would be 53 per cent (29/55) instead of 62 per cent (34/55). Small numbers of Chinese-American and Spanish-speaking students in a few of the schools explain the minor difference.

7 Our projected sample sizes conservatively assume a standard deviation of the junior high gain scores of one grade level.

8 Unfortunately for the discerning reader, Armor failed to mention these losses of elementary subjects in the one footnote he devotes to the subject. We obtained them from Walberg (1969).

9 Using the Coleman report data, the standard deviation for groups of white students in desegregated schools in the Metropolitan North is only about 40 per cent as large as the standard deviation of the white individual scores; or, on Coleman's verbal test, roughly four points where the standard deviation of the individual whites is 10 points (Coleman et al., 1966). Since Armor finds that the mean for white groups in desegregated schools is roughly one-and-a-half group mean standard deviations larger than that for black groups in desegregated schools, we estimate that the average black child is roughly six points (1.5 x 4..."
points) behind the average white child. Translating this into individual percentiles and assuming that the average white in desegregated schools is at the 50th percentile, we arrive at our estimate that the average black pupil in desegregated schools is between the 25th and 30th percentiles.

8 Bailey (1970) has also shown that high school “disruptions” and racial tensions are far less likely to occur when the black staff percentage is equal to or greater than the black student percentage.

1 Useem (1971) studied white tenth graders’ aspirations and attitudes in eight out of the nine secondary schools participating in the METCO program during 1968-69. She found white aspirations just equal to or below those reported for blacks in the same schools. Thus, 74 per cent of the white students wanted to be above the middle of the class academically compared to about 80 per cent of the black students; and 26 per cent of the whites aspired to a professional or graduate school compared to 35 per cent of the blacks.

12 In his Detroit segregation testimony, Armor stated that he omitted these positive findings of contact because they were voluntary and therefore could have been caused by self-selection. But classrooms at the high school level often involve selection too. Besides, 72 per cent of Useem’s white students who had contact with METCO students in school activities had it in athletics. Armor’s argument requires us to believe that tolerant white students would go out for football primarily to have contact with the few black players on the team.

13 Data from one METCO high school was unobtainable for 1970, but the similarity of the percentages for the two years suggests that this does not introduce a serious bias.

14 From these same data, Crain (1971) also finds that those who attended integrated schools are more likely to have graduated from high school, are more likely to have attended college, and score higher on a verbal test than those who attended northern segregated schools. It seems likely that the higher achievement of Negroes in integrated schools can be attributed partly to differences in the character of their classmates, irrespective of race. In addition, however, there is evidence that attending integrated schools has an important impact in establishing social and psychological preconditions for achievement.

15 Armor’s data on black attitudes toward “busing” in his footnote 11 are outdated. By March 1972, blacks favored “busing” for integration by 54 per cent to 34 per cent (Harris, 1972).

REFERENCES


