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Final Report

Project No. 1-C-024
Grant No. OEG-3-71-0087

Kenneth R. Beittel
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania 16802

A Case Methodology for the Study of
the Drawing Process and the Drawing Series

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U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare

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A CASE METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRAWING PROCESS AND THE DRAWING SERIES

ABSTRACT

This study asks: What methodologies permit one to describe and analyze the drawing process and series of an artist in a manner cognitively adequate and close to the artist's imaginative consciousness? It assumes that: (1) arting is an ultimate realm of man's experience; (2) it includes artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization; (3) it is a unitless psychic phenomenon of the artist's stream of consciousness; (4) the researcher must be close to the creating stream of consciousness; and (5) this demands a special participant observer role.

The data are based on collections of artists' extended drawing series. Knowledge of their construction comes from shared histories stimulated by time-lapse records of drawing processes. The synthesized information is the basis for exploration of modes of description and analysis.

The emphasis is on qualitative description of the case as an idiographic history, not as a type. The world view and method is contextualism. The study explores (1) presentational modes close to the artist's stream of consciousness and (2) historical and interpretive modes twice removed from the creating stream of consciousness. It ends with a summary and critique of the delineated modes.
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Chapter I

Assumptions about Arting and Setting for the Study

Art an Ultimate

I assume that among man's many varieties of experience, that of making and responding to art constitutes an autonomous and irreducible realm. Religion and science are said to comprise like realms. Though boundaries can never be tightly drawn, at their core these can be known as distinctly different.

If we think in terms of what Buber calls essential living relationships, those in which man transcends himself over against things, others, and the mysteries, we come up with art, love, and religion. Science then recedes into the background. Perhaps I will leave it there, with history, as among the problematic ways we can refer to experience in order to apprehend and comprehend it. On the level of passional, experiential realities which constitute the primitive terms behind which we cannot go, I am quite content with art, love and religion, relegating to history and science the role of formulating descriptions of these. I need not then refer to natural science or history, but can dwell upon humanistic science and history. Better still, I can speak of conceptual (scientific) and qualitative (historical, contextual) description, and reveal to the reader that my topic is the making of art (or "arting as I will call it") and to some extent love (at least insofar as full human interaction brings one closer to another's arting) as known through qualitative description. Those uninterested in this subject and my perspective upon it can save themselves time by stopping here.

Emergence of the Present Perspective

The approach I will take has been clarified and purified over the last two years -- since, that is, I submitted the original proposal (June 3, 1970). Some of the plans originally laid in that proposal have thus been superceded by developing insights and methods. The ethic of inquiry demands, in my view, that the researcher proceed where he feels he must. I assume that the term "grant" carries this connotation. The "contract" is with the topic and its elucidation.

The Dialogue-like Nature of Experiential Phenomena

Experiencing is something I can conceptualize thus: as foremost qualitative, of a distinctive form and duration, pregnant with meaning, but a meaning which I cannot grasp cognitively in any direct sense. By means of symbols I can represent its various facets in a kind of inexhaustible exploration.
As a layman, I think of phenomenology as a dialogue between consciousness and phenomenal experience, proceeding by a kind of method. This reflexivity of consciousness upon the events in the stream of experience I see as an inescapable part of human life and as symbolic of the dialogue-like rhythm pervading acting, loving, worshiping (or whatever verb one wishes to use for religious experience).

A game of strategy has been defined as one in which one's act is countered by the act of another. "Intention" and "plan" thus take on initiatory and provisional connotations, for the picture projected is constantly changing. Arting, it could be said, is a game whose rules are made up as the game is in progress, where the exact meaning of words or images is known only in the context of each new statement or articulation. Further, it is an appetitive function, but one proceeding not through need but through desire. If intention seems to come from the self, significance seems to come from "the other." Hence we are transcended, in dialogue.

The Conditions of Arting

Lacking terms to refer to what I feel are the basic conditions for making art, I have coined three. This threesome should not be unduly hypostatized. Starting at a very early age (certainly pre-school, more likely as early infants), wherever art is made I see evidence of artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization. "Artistic causality" underscores the proactive, as opposed to reactive, nature of our intentional acts. The agency of the artist is affirmed. He is an "origin," not a "pawn." It means an active helmsman plotting his course according to his interpretation of in-process feedback.

"Idiosyncratic meaning" refers to what is largely private and covert, to that affective, image-bound, situational meaning which impels and guides our artistic processes. I conceive of even the collective and the technical as entering into the artist's mind and acts idiosyncratically.

At its simplest, "intentional symbolization" refers to the artist's desire to work over into materials some equivalent of his idiosyncratic meaning. I believe this operates through the artist's effort to treat properties of medium in-process as an "ad hoc set of signs" which he can analogically lead back toward the base in feeling or imagery which is his impetus. I use the verb "lead back" advisedly, for the artist moves away from the collective properties and conventions of medium and symbols, or at the least submits these to the test of personal relevance. The medium and any symbols must be used in an ad hoc way to synthesize the situational aspects of each art process with artistic causality and idiosyncratic meaning.
The Intrapsychic Myths: Parallels between the Artistic Serial and the Construction of a Self-System

I have borrowed the concept of "serial" from Henry A. Murray. Through it he refers to those internally stimulated actions which continue earlier actions and project into future actions, often of a goal-directed nature, such as skill-learning activities, the practice of a sport, a hobby, an art, or an enduring friendship or love-affair. All of these tend to be proactive, initiated spontaneously from within, rather than reactive. They do not aim at homeostasis; they are superstatic, for they add something new to a previous condition. Murray feels that serials play a major role in the ego system.

The making of art can be seen as a serial. Proactive, superstatic, initiated spontaneously from within, expressive situations stretch potentially from birth to death.

The material upon which I draw in this study is in the form of individual drawing serials -- a string of drawings stretching at the least over a ten week period. The conditions under which these series are done (to be described shortly) lead the artist to a clear sense of his own drawing history and to the problem of its meaning and its future. Regardless of their level of training, it appears that the artists we observe develop conceptualizations about their art which are quite abstract. These are, in fact, often close to idiosyncratic or individual artistic myths. They emerge slowly, at least insofar as they can be articulated at all, and they have great lasting power.

I take a transactional and genetic viewpoint of the idiosyncratic artistic myths. Whatever the artist's existing cognitive "structures" about arting may be, they constitute the raw material which interacts with the on-going artistic serial. All that is in the mind cannot be linked to the drawing, but what is in the mind becomes the base for decisions which have to do with the symbolic transformation of feedback from the specific drawing itself and from its position in the series of which it is the tangible, present link.

Because the drawing serial has form, directionality and a life of its own, it conjures up the myth of self-identity and the notion that the self-system of the artist is itself under construction simultaneously. Making art leads, I feel, to the emergence of the creative and the artistic in the on-going experience of the artist. He is transcended; his self feels enlarged concurrent with his artistic conquests, no matter how small these may seem from some external view. This happens, that is, as long as artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning and intentional symbolization are present.

The myth of self-construction and identity, the inverse, as it were, of events in the world bearing the stamp of our expressive actions, can and does arise where art is concerned even in our science.
oriented Western world. Western man prides himself ordinarily on being "beyond" or "above" myths, relegating these to erroneous and naive attempts to account for forces and causes better subsumed under natural law. To be sure, this belief is in itself a "science myth." Beyond that, however, exist those shadowed areas within the mind and private life which somehow are not to be ascribed to laws and causes as these are preferred by science. Science, in fact, does not admit to the existence of these fantastic night spaces of the mind. Somehow, thus, the intrapsychic myths survive, though in a formless and often unshareable manner. Here, again, art, love, and religion take up their abode. It is my contention that serials in any of these three raise questions about man and life which become an integral part of the self-system. Serials bearing upon art and love do this service for our time more than religion, wherein the mythic force of images and rituals has been vitiated.

Note that I do not say that the artistic serial causes the construction, enlargement, and integration of a viable self-system. Rather its inner dynamics parallels and symbolizes the latter task.

The Expressive Situation

The making of art occurs much as does a dream: it possesses an overpowering sense of reality while it is ongoing, and it has symbolic overtones crying for interpretation but singularly resistant to advances with that in mind. While there may be "latent" thematic or structural similarities between expressive situations, each is experienced as unique by the artist. At bottom, to be sure, even repetitious acts have this quality, but how much more so in making art, where one is opened to the new, the other. The very criteria for a game of strategy or a dialogue ask for transcendence, for that which exceeds prediction.

Major Operational Assumptions

The expressive situation, arting, the making of art -- these all refer to an experiential reality alive to the artist, as the dream is to the dreamer, as the act is to the person acting. Where, then, I take the making of art as my focus, the actual events and their context exist within the ongoing experience of the artist. Arting, thus, is to be seen as a unitless psychic phenomenon centered in the artist's stream of consciousness in the unique expressive situation. To arrive at qualitative, historical, contextual description of expressive situations, the researcher must step within the artistic serial of which the situation is a part, and move as closely as possible to the creating stream of consciousness. He must have, that is, indirect access to the artist's creating experience. This requires a special participant observer role.
Setting and Data Collection Ritual

Conceivably, one could study the making of drawings without the environment and procedures I am about to describe. A process focus, however, makes certain situational controls almost unavoidable. The question we are trying to find answers to is not a new one. Way back in 1914 Tsanoff asked: "What went on in the poet's imaginative consciousness while he was writing this poem?" His approach was much like ours, given the different art form. He dealt with the tangible record of construction, the process traces of decisions, by means of collected first drafts. Our method is more complex, more precise, and more sophisticated, for we are concerned with in-process records, stimulated recall, and a series perspective. How this is done is described below.

The Drawing Laboratory

The physical description of where the drawings of this study were done is very simple. Within a large room devoted to research only, a smaller room was constructed of wooden frame and wallboard painted white (to provide a neutral background that is light reflective and upon which drawings can be pinned). A drawing table with a tilt-top drawing board is situated centrally and attached to one wall in a fixed position. Above it and out of reach is mounted a large front-surface mirror on a 45° angle. Parallel with this is a small window in the wall, through which a camera records by means of time-lapse photography the evolution of each drawing. The camera is thus outside the drawing "studio" area.

The artist works typically on a 12" x 18" white drawing pad. The paper is neither completely smooth nor rough. It is heavy enough to take ink washes or acrylic paints, and it responds well to charcoal, carbon pencil, and the like. Thus far all artists have been restricted to black and white media. Any black and white media or mixed media are acceptable. The drawing lab is set up as a nurturant environment which, within its fixed boundaries and procedures, will respond to the artist's special needs and requests. If the artist wishes to use larger or smaller paper, or scratchboard, or rougher paper, for example, we supply it. Sometimes special stimulus or still-life materials are requested, and occasionally the artist wants someone to pose. In all such cases we try to respond to the request once it is initiated by the artist.

Since drawing is assumed to be a special game of strategy or a dialogue between the artist and his evolving work, and since the artist is seen as an open system directing itself through self-regulative transformations of feedback (the subjective dimensions of these structuralist or cybernetic terms are "intention" and "significance"), it has always seemed to me inappropriate to interfere with, intervene, or interrupt on-going drawings. This constitutes, thus, an additional operational assumption.
The Shared History or Feedback Inquiry

When the artist first comes to the lab he is told that he can work any way he likes; that he will not be instructed; that we will not evaluate, criticize or pass judgment on his work; that we will record the history of each drawing by time-lapse photography; and that we wish to be able to ask him questions about how he made his drawings. The participating artists know all of this, in fact, before they volunteer for the study, for they are self-selected on the basis of an advertisement placed on the bulletin board of the Student Union Building or in various living centers. They are also told that if they attend for ten weekly sessions (one college term) they will receive a $25 honorarium in recognition of their time and cooperation. The honorarium provides social justification for their involvement to their peers. The note advertising for participants asks for non-art majors at any skill level.

To the time of this writing, 26 man-Term equivalents (a man-Term being construed as an artist working for ten consecutive weeks) have been recorded. Of these, all but two were non-art undergraduate college students with little or no art training. One was an art education undergraduate major, and the other was a professor of art known for his drawings.

When the artist returns for his second week, the feedback and inquiry session precedes his next drawings. During the inquiry, the room is darkened and the time-lapse negatives are projected larger than life size on the wall. At this time the history of each drawing is shared through the stimulated recall provided by the replay of the drawing processes from the week before. Questions are asked by the researcher and his assistants at this time. Their purpose is to encourage the artist's recollection and to make contact, indirectly, with the creating stream of consciousness.

The Special Participant Observer Role

The researcher and his assistants, in this responsive and nurturant environment, stand within the artistic serial of the artist they are studying. They "study the future as history," as it were, by attempting to relive the expressive situation through stimulated process recall in an effort to move close to the creating stream of consciousness. Many writers warn against the artist's statements about what he has done or complain at his flowery talk and naive psychologizing, but few indeed have tried to make contact with the artist's mind through his own in-process traces. Stimulated by these, the artist is undeniably in a privileged position. His first-person-singular statements have undeniable validity and meaning -- even in the case where historical inaccuracy is verifiable. Further, each feedback inquiry is positioned within an artistic serial and reflective of a formative individual artistic myth. We focus on the reality
of the unique expressive situation and on the reality of the inquiry which indirectly explores in the other case the "specious present," as Pepper\textsuperscript{12} calls it, indirectly. It spreads forward and backward, connected with inferences and references once it is part of the artistic serial, and in some tangible form, and available for later qualitative description and analysis.

To expect an artist to share not only in a way non-threatening to him but in a way helpful and potentially useful to him takes, I feel, a special participant observer. The Rogerian criteria proposed for nondirective counseling are a start: unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence.\textsuperscript{13} But the inquiry and the drawing serial are not akin to a therapy session nor a therapeutic history. The artist's dialogue is with his drawing first, and his concern is with the intrapsychic and artistic myths that echo about his immersion in a drawing serial. The special participant observer steps within this on-going stream of experience and is himself immersed in the potentialities of the artist's existential projects. The fuller the human dialogue during inquiry can be, the more the artist's creating stream of consciousness seems to be revealed. We are within an existential psychology whose data are of a special order. As we elicit information through exploration during stimulated process recall, we affect the artist's consciousness in not only its past and present but also its subsequent engagements in arting. Unless this interaction is entered into fully and humanly, it is apt to impede or direct the artistic serial.

In my own case, I have come to let the artist's perceptions and cognitions be my surest guide. By this I mean that I take my cues from his readiness to go further or to remain silent, to be concrete and factual or abstract and speculative. I try to get as much "yield" as possible in each inquiry, but this is not to be measured by the number of words, and the worth of what is said is evaluated between us, not on my side only.

Kinds of Data Utilized

In the contextual, historical or qualitative descriptions which are the concern of this study, all of the data comes from events and their direct and indirect traces within the drawing lab itself. The forms of data are relatively simple and constant from one artist to the next and from one time to another. These include:

1. The drawings themselves, as coded by date, by drawing number within that date, and by drawing number within the series. Outside drawings that are brought to the lab are recorded with a different code and likewise dated and ordered.
2. The time-lapse negatives on each drawing's evolution, coded as are the drawings, and placed in negative folders (for each drawing's negatives.)

3. The lab notes made by each researcher or research assistant, coded by week number and date. These attempt to reconstruct the inquiry and drawing session as recalled and sensed by each participant observer. These are recalled, similar to anthropological field notes.

4. Direct observational descriptions, such as by the camera operator off the front-surface mirror, or by an observer who watches (from behind) the artist as he is working. This also includes direct observations (not recalled) while the inquiry is in session.

5. Transcriptions of inquiry sessions (from tape recordings). These are fully taped.

6. Transcriptions of any verbalizations taped while drawing. (This is used only for artists who are inclined to talk a great deal or to interact with the participant observers while drawing. Most artists fall relatively silent while drawing.)

7. Faithful 4" x 6" negatives of each completed drawing, coded in separate envelopes for each drawing. These allow the researcher to physically locate a drawing quickly. If made into contact prints or larger glossies, they permit easy scrutiny of a series in a small space and visual field, making comparisons and other manipulations easily possible.

8. Prints of process negatives. These are made where description must refer to the time-lapse records to show changes and the like.

The Goals of Qualitative Description

One might well ask for what ends the kinds of knowledge sought in this study? Given the assumptions about arting presented above, it is proper to say that one cannot know directly or exhaustively the expressive situation. One can move closer to it and speak with both clarity and insight concerning what likely took place in the artist's imaginative consciousness while he was making a given drawing. The psychic events, however, which are the object of our inquiry, cannot yield to any confident verificationism. To me, it is enough to extensionalize perspectives on unique expressive situations, pursuing them in and out of the textures in which they are embedded. Because of the nature of symbolization of experience, of states of consciousness, it is never more than a facet of these experiential realities that we reveal. Hence a criterion of incompleteness is appropriate.
Further, there is what can be called a Roshomon effect peculiar to passional truths -- differing accounts of identical phenomena can be valid. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that the phenomena do differ experientially to the one describing them. I accept this condition as organic to the qualitative description of arting.

The ends of knowledge need not be prediction and control. The kind of knowledge we are here concerned with leads more directly toward understanding, appreciating, and enjoying. Whatever reinforces our grasp of the qualitative uniqueness of a given art process enlarges our world's potential for meaning.

Inquiry itself is reflexive. The link between knower and known is such that one side of the relationship is revealed no more than the other, so that the knower comes to know himself as well as his object. He persists as if knowledge of his object is possible (even when this object is the creating stream of consciousness and only indirectly accessible). If the researcher were completely introspective, he would doubtlessly turn philosopher, admitting that, at bottom, only the mind of the knower can be known.

The nature of art making is such that the researcher must take responsibility for his impact upon it through his study of it. I have come to see that the ideal of leaving the phenomena untouched is not honest in passional, artistic affairs. The researcher must enhance the likelihood of the creative and the artistic by his very influence, or else, I believe, he cancels out their potential in the world. This is the ethic I sense for inquiring into cultural, psychic entities. There is a willing suspension of disbelief on the researcher's part, so that he participates in the artist's effort, as Jung put it, to "dream the myth onward."

One of the practical outcomes of such inquiry is that of contributing to meaningful dialogue on art education. Responsible speculation and grounded theory not afraid to deal with core concerns of the field are stimulated, if my own experience is any guide, by studies like this.

**Statement of the Problem**

What methodology or methodologies permit one to describe and analyze the drawing process and the drawing series of a particular artist in a manner both cognitively adequate and close to the artist's imaginative consciousness? My approach perforce must deal with the setting, procedures, and the kinds of data described above; but I consider it sound to say that the modes of qualitative description which will follow have wider application than to conditions directly paralleling those of this work. Other researchers may not make the same explicit assumptions about arting that I do. I like to think the modes will still apply -- it would merely be a different Roshomon effect.
Notes for Chapter I


Chapter II

World View and General Method

In speaking, as I have in Chapter I, of the ends of the kind of knowledge about arting I seek and of the assumptions about the realm of experience demarcated for study, I have doubtlessly raised the question whether I deal with science at all, or at least with "empirical science" as this term is usually construed. Varying answers can be given to this question. At the least I will claim that I deal with "philosophical anthropology" which has its empirical origins. If I apply Kockelman's criteria for empirical science -- thematization, formalization, functionalization, and quantification, "which as forms of reduction lead to reductive models objectively describing certain aspects of man's life" then I am not now engaged in empirical science, for quantification, at least, has no necessary part in what I am. (The word "objective" has problematic associations as well. I propose to use "cognitively adequate" in its place.)

I propose that it is possible to gain knowledge of man as artist, and that in so doing we must try to see man in his totality, for in his art making he is so revealed. This proposal is admittedly an ideal, but so is the natural scientist's choice to act as though pure objectivity were possible, or the artist's goal of pure imagination. In this effort, quantifiable aspects are not excluded, but the claim that one must limit inquiry to quantifiable aspects is rejected. In this I proceed no differently from earlier anthropologists. Malinowski, for example, speaks of kinds or levels of knowledge which he refers to as "bones" (the statistical evidence, kinship networks and the like), the "flesh" (what he calls the "imponderabilia of daily life," characterized by a participant observation role, immersing himself in the experience and noting the behavioral acts around him), and "spirit" (by which I understand him to mean analysis of living language, myths, and the like). Such a perspective aims at a grasp of the totality of a culture.

A certain reduction is unavoidable. There is a way in which thematization and formalization are required in all inquiry and a part of all methods. One of the differences I note, however, is that the approach here used does not depend on a thoroughgoing theory and conceptual system before the descriptive task begins. Here, again, I prefer a term of Malinowski's. The researcher comes to his work with "imponderable problems," which sharpen his eye, and with conscious experiences; but he revises these willingly and necessarily in the context itself. The meaningful categories are not then completely separate from their content, and their functional form appears after, not before, immersion in the descriptive task.
In Chapter I, I have referred to my method with three descriptors: qualitative, historical, and contextual. It is these terms with which I will abide. The case I make is by no means original with me. Langer sums up the matter thus:

It is even conceivable that the study of mental and social phenomena will never be "natural sciences" in the familiar sense at all, but will always be more akin to history, which is a highly developed discipline, but not an abstractly codified one. There may be a slowly accruing core of scientific fact which is relevant to understanding mind, and which will ultimately anchor psychology quite firmly in biology without ever making its advanced problems laboratory affairs. Sociology might be destined to develop to a high technical degree, but more in the manner of jurisprudence than in that of chemistry or physics. Were that, perchance, the case, then the commitment to "scientific method" could be seriously inimical to any advance of knowledge in such important but essentially humanistic pursuits.

Sartre attempts to delineate a phenomenological psychoanalysis, as opposed to an empirical (Freudian) one:

It is a method destined to bring to light, in a strictly objective form, the subjective voice by which each living person makes himself a person; that is, makes known to himself what he is. Since what this method seeks is a choice of being at the same time as a being, it must reduce particular behavior patterns to fundamental relations -- not of sexuality or of the will to power, of being -- which are expressed in this behavior. The results thus achieved -- that is, the ultimate ends of the individual -- can then become the object of a classification, and it is by the comparison of these results that we will be able to establish general considerations about human reality as an empirical choice of its own ends.

I wish also to quote Strasser to round out background material before proceeding:

As soon as we reflect on the situation of encounter or on dialog as the fundamental situation of research about man as man, important characteristics reveal themselves and make it clear that the way in which empirical science refers back to itself is wholly different from a reflection in the sense in which this term is used in speculative philosophy. These distinguishing characteristics may be briefly indicated in the following way.
1. Man asks himself a question, but he does not ask himself as total existence. He interrogates himself in a certain respect, e.g., the historical, sociological or psychological respect.

2. Man asks himself a question, but he does not ask himself as he is but as he was. For, by raising the scientific question, man's existence has entered a new phase. All his preceding phases have now become past phases.

3. Man questions himself not as an acosmic, unhistorical, non-social spirit. The question, "Why was I who I was?" implies other persons, things, conditions and social relationships.

   Accordingly, the questioning man is not simply identical with the questioned man. There is a certain distance between the two, a certain standing-opposite-to, limited though it be, and this distance suffices to give rise to the fundamental situation of a genuine encounter or an authentic dialog. In this way all the safeguards required by the "second objectivity" are present.

The above three rather lengthy quotations give a point of view to which my own is closely related. With Langer, I move toward history, a discipline which is not "abstractly codified." With Sartre, I attempt to study "the subjective choice" by which the artist makes himself a person, and to seek out "fundamental relations" expressed in "particular behavior-patterns." (Unlike Sartre, I am humble about generalizations possible at our present state of knowledge, being content with a valid perspective on the making of art in a particular drawing or series of drawings.) With Strasser I admit to "distance" as an inevitable part of the "questioner's stance."

The writings of various phenomenological philosophers are pertinent to many of the issues raised by this kind of inquiry, but it is beyond the scope of this work and beyond my philosophical prowess to discuss the views of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Strasser, and others, as they potentially bear upon present concerns. Historically, and as an American, it is perhaps more truthful to say that I have been influenced by a lineage from Kant to James to Gestalt psychologists to Dewey and to Pepper. The latter, as we shall see, best summarizes the contextualist "world hypothesis" under which I am most comfortable. A blend of pragmatism, historicism and empiricism seems to occur most naturally under this perspective.
Contextualism

The historic event, as Pepper says, is the root metaphor of contextualism; and the theory to which it commits one is synthetic and not analytical. By "historic event," Pepper explains, the contextualist does not mean primarily a past event, one that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed. He means the event alive in its present. The real historic event, the event in its actuality, is when it is going on now, the dynamic dramatic active event. We may call it an 'act,' if we like, and if we take care of our use of the term. But it is not an act conceived as alone or cut off that we mean; it is an act in and with its setting, an act in its context.

Pepper goes on to say that we should use only verbs in talking of the contextualist view of the world: doing, making, creating, laughing, and the like. Such acts or events are extremely complex, with patterns that are continuously changing. Further, disorder is "a categorial feature of contextualism, and so radically so that it must not even exclude order." And in focusing on the "total given event" in all its concreteness, richness and complexity, an uncommon degree of arbitrariness exists in why one feature is selected rather than another. (Hence what I called the "Rashomon effect" in Chapter 1.) Concreteness, uniqueness and wholeness have been set out as singularly appropriate concepts upon which to concentrate in the description of expressive acts. Perhaps academic psychology has made too much of "permanent structures" in nature and in behavior, on the one hand, whereas art has made too much of change and novelty on the other. I have veered more toward the latter, in keeping with my contextualist stance closer to the phenomena my special view allows me to reconstruct and, hopefully, revitalize, as regards the expressive act itself.

The structure of a given expressive act, then, is seen as peculiar though inexhaustible, in its very concreteness. I have lately been fond of saying that we can never know the expressive act, but that we can indeed study it, if only indirectly, and through a concern with its context and structure we can do two things: arrive at an understanding, appreciation, and enjoyment of it, and reflect upon it from some more abstract and theoretical vantage point. These two aims, though interrelated, are distinct and different. They drive us towards considerations of context and of structure. At this point in my own intellectual life, I am closer to the context side, but I acknowledge considerations of structure. The very fact that I study not just one expressive act but a series by a given artist inclines me to a view wherein the "form" of the series incorporates the individual processes or expressive acts as their "content." The series
still remains a lived history contextually explored, but it raises at least synthetically, the kinds of "speculations I refer to later dealing with "the particular theorizing mode: the type concept." It does not, however, plunge me willy-nilly into the transcendental world of essences, as Husserlian phenomenology would have it. I skirt "thin atomism" in the reductive, behavioristic, mecanistic, positivistic methods (to which the modes herein are an alternative) on the one side, and a "fat gestaltism," or an excessively narrow phenomenology, Platonist in flavor, on the other.

Therefore, as I later play at descriptive and analytical modes I only budge so far: they are deflections from a basically empirical and contextualist base predicated on the two massive procedural assumptions of this work.

To return to our contextualist view, it may be said that the structures of concern have been those alive in the series or the process under view. Continuity outside the context has not been assumed, except in the weakest and most inescapable manner. Certainly any "case" I have studied impresses me with its uniqueness and its lawfulness simultaneously. Whether the particular lawfulness resonates with that of another series is a matter for exploration and for elucidation as to what level of abstraction and what method is involved.

Whatever the reader thinks of my arbitrary focus on a given expressive act, he can hardly deny that I deal with its real structure as a historic event. The concern is with behavior: observed, shared, inferred, and experienced. It is a catholic and open perspective.

Pepper affirms that change and novelty are "the ineradicable contextualist categories." Change and novelty occur, he says, as details within quality and texture. The latter may be said to be the working categories of contextualism. Under quality appear subheadings concerned with how an event (1) spreads, (2) changes, and (3) fuses (to some degree). Under texture we refer to a texture's (1) strands, (2) context, and (3) references. And under references it is noted that they may be (a) linear, (b) convergent, (c) blocked, and (d) instrumental. Says Pepper: "This system of concepts may be regarded as a set of working categories for handling the events of our epoch."10

Pepper states that quality and texture, the basic working categories, cannot be explained because of their categorial nature. They can only be shown or pointed to.

...the quality of a given event is its intuited wholeness or total character; the texture is the details and relations which make up that character or quality.11
Qualities are central to our focus but do not constitute the focus of analysis. We proceed through analysis of the texture -- the elements, features, details, and the like -- but not at the expense of wholeness (quality). Thus quality and texture are not separable.12

There is not space to pursue further here Pepper's exposition of contextualism nor to criticise its method or its criteria of truth. I did not seriously review Pepper's theory until the research here presented was well under way. Yet I find that I have unknowingly, and perhaps unclearly, utilized many of his working categories. In particular, the reader will see that reconstruction of expressive acts has paid attention to the detailing of "references" within the "strands" of "textures." Linear, convergent, blocked, and especially instrumental references have been discussed, but not called such. As will later be shown, in the historical mode, for example, my intuitive emphasis (and arbitrary one, in that many other basic sets could be taken) on "concepts about art and arting held by the artist in the context of his drawing series" initiated a linear reference giving both direction and satisfaction to my search through the case material. A convergent reference was indicated by the similarity, again for example, of various concepts about arting found throughout the series. Also, concepts held by the artist about art and about making art interacted and converged (two different initiations for a linear reference eventuated in a common satisfaction, in Pepper's terminology). What Pepper calls blocking of a reference occurred, for example, when two different strands (concepts about making art in this case) crossed.

In further detailing of the textures within a given event, we come to what Pepper calls "instrumental references." These bear closely upon blocking, referred to above. Much of what I observe and am given to share in the drawing lab comes under instrumental references. An original aim or movement of the artist is blocked and an instrumental episode, coherent in its own right, takes its position within the larger aim or movement.

The result is often a texture of very complicated and integrated integration. What holds it together is a linear reference that persists from lack of satisfaction. This is the positive dynamic factor in the integration. The negative factor is the blocking in the form of an intrusive novelty.13

By "intrusive novelty" Pepper means one for which one can account by attending to the past histories of crossing strands.14

What I am saying is that most of the novelties seen in my case studies of drawing are unpredictable but historically traceable occurrences related to blocking of operations (transformations) and to the interaction of dissonant conceptions about making art. Further, blocking in itself is of interest usually only to the degree that

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instrumental actions are undertaken as subordinant acts within larger episodes. It is at this level that most change occurs, as I perceive it, although from time to time more severe shifts appear which are not only unpredictable but hard to trace as the result of blocked strands.

In passing, I want to note that Pepper suggests how conquests of blocked references became part and parcel of larger directionality, as in the drawing series.

...instrumental reference tends gradually to turn into articulated linear reference. Contextualists often make a great deal of this fact...pointing out the dangers of conceiving the distinction of means and ends as absolute. An instrumental activity enters right into the texture of a terminal activity, and the structure of any complicated terminal activity is largely instrumental. ...At the early stages of an instrumental act, when the obstacle is vividly felt, the instrumental activities are qualitatively taken as rather separate events, but as they become integrated with the terminal texture they fuse into the quality of one total texture.15

Textures can become extended -- into chapters and books, into a drawing series, into the "serial" as we have used the term -- and thus reach beyond the contextualist present. These can still be called textures, says Pepper,16 but it is useful to call them "individual textures" to signify how they extend beyond more narrowly confined present events.

In coming upon individual textures we are thus stepping out of the immediacy of present events into the evidence for a widely extended universe in which myriads of given events are interlocked and march forward arm in arm into the future with great strides.17

Individual textures, of which I identify the drawing serial as an excellent example, accrue from the concatenation of instrumental references. As a later example shows, one artist's concepts about arting, spanning two and one half years, give the conceptual fruits of instrumental references occurring in his extended series of drawings, providing a complex and dynamic individual texture. We are thus carried out into larger textures, into the public as well as the private world, because "the context of a private texture is already some other texture, and the two textures are thus mutually conjoined and interpenetrating."18
Expansion of the Root Metaphor

Contextualism, with its open attention to the unique event, is unending but pragmatic analysis, provides the requisite shelter and dignity for our work. Further, it remains neutral as to contents, not closing down because of methodological dogma before inquiry ever begins. Into this neutrality, the lore and rich, qualitative complexity of art-making, and the equally complex unity of the self-system as represented in continuous artistic production, can enter in as contents. Phenomenological description and reflective introspection can join together in providing the richest possible basis for analysis according to contextualist categories. The stones that earlier builders rejected can indeed become the cornerstones of this new mental edifice. Titchener for example, in 1912 expressed his opinion that

"...no form of phenomenology...can be truly scientific, for the reason that the implied attitude to experience is multiply motivated and fluctuating, while the minimum requirement of science is a fixed and constant point of view."

Indeed the attitude to experience we have been arguing is just what he says: multiply motivated and fluctuating. From the qualitative side that is its very nature. Just as in a certain view of science one acts as though objectivity were possible, so in our view of inquiry we act as though a grasp of what is multiply motivated and fluctuating were possible. The one moves by way of exclusion, the other by inclusion; one sets conceptual systems between knower and object, the other begins by stepping within the experiential stream. Neither, we hold, is in error. Both are part of the world of knowledge.

Twenty-four years after his book World Hypotheses, Pepper faced this potential conflict within the world of inquiry by showing that both conceptual and qualitative analysis belong within contextualism. They complement one another, but they cannot be merged or reduced one to the other. He also revises the root metaphor for contextualism. In the earlier book, as we have indicated, it was the historic event; in the later one, it is the purposive act, or the appetitive structure. This shift is significant, for while purposive acts can be observed objectively, they assuredly conjure up the image of the human agent. All of this is implicit in the concept of the historic event, where there is a necessity to use action verbs -- making, enjoying, solving, exploring, and the like; but direct reference to the purposive act makes this explicit.

Pepper shows that appetition (within which we can explore Levinas' distinction between desire as opposed to need) can be analyzed in either a qualitative or conceptual manner. (By the latter he apparently means something akin to behavioristic social science, but this is not the place to get drawn into that debate.) It is Pepper's belief that both kinds of descriptions are true and necessary for full comprehension of our world:
Though closely parallel, they are not exactly the same concepts. For the qualitative list does not automatically gear in with the conceptual system of the natural sciences, while the conceptual list does. It will be maintained that both of these lists are fully descriptive, in their own ways, of a purposive act...We shall take each list seriously as a veridical description so far as observation has gone. If there have been errors, they are open to correction. A refinement of the concepts will always be possible...At this point in the description of a purposive action, almost alone in the whole expanse of nature, we have both a highly articulated qualitative description and a highly articulated conceptual description which refer to exactly the same actual process. The bifurcation of nature into conceptual system and qualitative experience meet here at this point. Here is where the crotch of the fork is from which the bifurcation extends.

My thesis will be that there is nothing wrong in this bifurcation. It was inevitable if our knowledge of the world was to increase. Once we understand it, and can trace it from its point of bifurcation to the tips of the prongs at the other end, we shall find it to be, not a source of division in our knowledge, but the very instrument for its comprehensive unification.22

Pepper's metaphor helps to clarify the general method of this study. Our approach to the "actual qualitative event" is primarily through "description in phenomenal language." Pepper describes its method as "the introspective verbal description of Q by a man experiencing Q" (where Q is the "actual qualitative event").23 On our outline of "kinds of data utilized" in Chapter I, however, only two of the eight classes listed could by any stretch of the imagination be called "introspective." It is my own view, here approaching history as a model, that much more than introspection is involved in qualitative description. The virtue of Pepper's Contextualist World Hypothesis is that it affords us a unified home and perspective, freed of a confusing eclecticism and of the need to do battle with the other prong of the fork, conceptual description, with its reliance on "physical description." Contextualism, moreover, as we have outlined above, provides us with a set of categories. These must be put to the test to see how well they function in the qualitative description of an artist making art. As Pepper tells us: "The adequacy of a set of categories can be judged only in terms of their capacity to interpret whatever goes on in the world."24
The Problem of History

Again, I cannot within the scope of this work present more than a few superficial aspects of the concept of history as it applies to our general method.

Counelis\textsuperscript{25} in a recent article has attempted a typology of general research designs which attracted me because it makes useful distinctions I have not found in other typologies. A major dimension of his typology deals with the researcher's time/space assumptions. He says there are two of these: the kairotic time/space manifold, which derives from a Greek word for time which "refers to the unique moments in a temporal process that emphasize the qualitative, the experientia and the singular;" and the chronotic, also of Greek origin, which "refers to the quantitative, calculable, and repetitive elements in the temporal process."\textsuperscript{26} (The reader will note, in passing, the similarity between these terms and Pepper's qualitative and conceptual description.) The second dimension of Counelis' typology is akin to Plato's distinction between the one and the many, or the unit object and the object class. Below is the typology constructed of these two dimensions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scientist's Assumptions About Time and Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kairotic Manifold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Typology of Generic Research Designs\textsuperscript{27}

Counelis\textsuperscript{28} offers the following descriptions:

History and biography are concerned with the one, the unique object/event with a particular time/space locus.

Though surveys are built upon frequencies of the unit, it is with the class of the unique...that the survey is concerned primarily.
Case study is always a study of the singular, be it a person, an institution, a social group, or some other social system. The case is understood, usually, as a generalized microcosm; or better, the case is understood as a Hegelian concrete general.

The epistemic rule in experimental design is to control all sources of variance and uniqueness explicitly.

The above typology clarifies that the emphasis of this study is on the kairotic time/space manifold and the unit object. It is, in fact, history, with all of its problems. Whether I speak of a single artist or a group of artists, this is my perspective. It is obvious that I use the word "case" differently from Counelis. Only when I later refer to the case under the "type concept" does it take on some of the connotation of a "Hegelian concrete general," and that only weakly.

Collingwood has argued that history means to preserve the individual quality of events without degrading them to science, to the status of particulars illustrative of general laws deriving from theory a priori. To Collingwood, as to Pepper, science presupposes history, as the first level of description close to "actual qualitative events." I can hardly claim to be dealing with history as "a highly developed discipline, but not an abstractly codified one" (as Langer put it in our earlier reference in this Chapter), for such studies as this are in their infancy. Here, none the less, we have an ideal to pursue.

In keeping with a humble position toward my stage of development, I will refer to "speculations" or "grounded speculations" rather than to "generalizations" or "valid interpretations." As efforts at qualitative historical, contextual descriptions of the making of art proliferate, generalizations, interpretations, and theories will grow apace. At times in what follows I will move toward a primitive kind of hermeneutics, by which I simply mean that I will try to make explicit the rules according to which I attempt weak interpretations of the given data.

Organization of the Remainder of This Report

Chapter 3 will consider the modes of description of the making of a drawing or a series of drawings close to the artist's stream of consciousness. These will range from more expressive (literary) accounts to rudimentary historical ones (with minimal interpretation), all largely keyed to the artist's "subjective perspective," as revealed, inferred and imagined.
Chapter 4 will present modes of description and analysis twice removed from the artist's stream of consciousness. Discussion will encompass historical modes, "types" (exemplary cases), "containers" (pooled cases), and modes where some interaction and intervention is implied ("formative hermeneutic modes").

Chapter 5 will give a summary and critique of the research, along with tentative conclusions and recommendations for further research.
Notes for Chapter II


Notes for Chapter 1 cont'd.


24. Pepper, Stephen C. Ibid., p. 32.


27. Counelis, James Steve. Ibid., p. 10.


Chapter...

Presentational Modes Close to the Artist's Stream of Consciousness

Concurrent with my two major assumptions (the need for access to the artist's active stream of consciousness while acting, by means of a special participant observer relationship, through the indirect means of a stimulated process recall within a nurturing setting, modes discussed in this chapter will seem to many readers closer to literature than to science. For this reason I have called them "presentational modes.

While I will try to make distinctions between the various modes as follows, it should be obvious that the lines drawn between them are arbitrary and tentative. At most, such distinctions as are drawn are to sensitize us to subtle nuances between modes, and to unique images possible within each...

The understanding resulting from these modes is closer to appreciation, as we associate this term with the experience of art, than to a knowledge which has a stronger discursive and cognitive component. We seem to grasp through immersion in experiences of a literary work both the existential unique aesthetic or appreciative encounter and some residue which, in a strange sense, "generalizes" in our mind about "life," "man," "love," "art" and the like. We acknowledge to ourselves that we cannot place any defensible logical or discursive structure upon the latter residue, yet we persist in our belief that we have achieved a kind of insight, or a kind of intuitive knowledge. Thus, for the person utilizing the modes of this chapter, he is laboring like the artist more; and for the person responding, he is more like the appreciator. The difference between these modes and literature is largely that the events beneath the modes occurred within a real and not an imagined time and place. The situation, therefore, is more akin to biography than to fiction; although it is apparent that biographies themselves move, on the one hand, closer to fiction, and on the other, closer to the historical documentary.

When we aspire to indirect access to the creating artist's stream of consciousness, and when we acknowledge the human dialogue which makes this access honest and possible, we become immersed in psychic reality-potential and shared insights which we more or less construct and present, rather than merely categorize and describe. To this degree, work in most of the modes of this chapter is expressive, literary. I have preferred to call them "presentational" to subtly connote that the experience of the events, psychic, overt, and dialogic, is as direct and as related to time and context as possible.
What we have, then, is a special kind of literature, or a special kind of biography.

I trust that it is not necessary to this point to justify these modes nor to persuade anew the reader that they are important. Reasons why I believe them to be have been presented in the first chapter. To the extent that such approaches succeed, they will enhance our appreciation of art through their presentation of the uniqueness of each expressive act and context. Further, since we deal with the artistic serial, they will also enhance our appreciation of the unique path emergent from connected expressive acts over time, and of the mytho-genetic quality of such a path. We also appreciate that to grasp all of this we must be a part of it, and take responsibility for our indirect influence on its future. And finally, as in a novel, we may be left with a residue which encourages us to generalize tentatively about art and life. We would not expect to generate hypotheses from these modes, however, which would be subject to verification in some hypothetico-deductive system. In fact, some of the modes in this entire report has the previously mentioned end in view, for that end is inconsistent with the major assumptions set forward herein. It is true that modes presented later permit progressive abstraction to the point where hypotheses may be generated for verification, but at that point we no longer deal with the reality of art in its experiential and contextual uniqueness, but with extra-art abstractable properties. I have no reason to denigrate such efforts, only to counter them with alternatives closer to my conception of a vital psychology of art. The abstractions I feel drawn toward do not permit hypothetico-deductive experiments.

The organization of the modes which follow owes much to the thought of Steele, who worked with me for three years in the drawing laboratory. He developed a number of "pattern types" which are the basis for my own efforts at elucidating presentational modes. (He should not be held accountable for the way I describe and evaluate these modes.)

**Modes of Mute Evidence**

Artists properly distrust verbalization about art, especially when it makes any pretensions toward explaining art or speaking abstractly about it. What is implied here is the belief that art speaks for itself, in its own presentational mode, in its own medium and project of articulation, and that no translation into some other medium or mode, as in discursive thought, is possible without completely changing its existential and presentational meaning.

**Iconic Representations of the Expressive Situation**

The expressive act and the behavior stream and context surrounding it can be represented in varying degrees of iconicity. A videotape or motion picture film can record the setting and the observable
Overt acts of the artist, as the work in question evolves, the film and T.V. have their own peculiar qualities as medium, as is well acknowledged by practitioners. There is, for example, the subtle affect of camera angle and distance, of light, of movement at the camera, of lenses, of speed, and the like. In the case of film, multiple views of the same event can be "matted" into any number of variations. With a full T.V. studio's potential, the "mixing" of multiple views is possible. In any event, these media, in either simple or complex form, can represent the observable acts and the setting with a high degree of fidelity. Sounds occurring in the environment recorded to accompany the visual record can also be utilized.

Such representations may in themselves constitute interesting "documentaries," or they may be so done within their medium that they are themselves an art form. If an artistic serial is involved, as is the case in the drawings I am studying, the records become voluminous and repetitive, taking as much time to re-experience the events as when they transpired. Their utility for detailed study of overt acts and events, however, is unquestionable.

Process Representations of the Evolving Art Work

As indicated earlier, we have been sampling time-lapse still-photographs of drawings from a front-surfaced mirror mounted on a forty-five degree angle over the drawing table. Such records, sampled either methodically or via an intuitive judgment of "significant noticeable change," faithfully reconstruct the metamorphoses or stages of development of a given drawing. Context and the overt acts of the artist are largely ignored, except as these appear through a focus on the drawing itself. These records, when spread before one, constitute another kind of mute evidence of the expressive act. Unlike film and T.V., they reconstruct the art process in a more abstract way, by way of time sampling and by way of excluding events outside the drawing.

Since, again, I have been concerned with the artistic serial, it is possible to represent a given series of drawings by the placement side by side of the different time lapse drawing processes. More typically, the finished drawings themselves are taken to represent the series, and each of these is in turn backed up by the in-process samples. There is, of course, a medium effect in still photography also, but it seems less intrusive than in film or T.V.

The examples above, termed "mute evidence," are in reality evidence only as they are used for some other purposes. In themselves, they are not really presentational modes related to the major assumptions of this book, for they do not contend with indirect access to the artist's stream of consciousness through a Special Participant observer. Mute evidence modes are assuredly useful within this special perspective, however, as indicated by the preferred and productive approach to the artist's privileged experience through stimulated
process recall via works and time-lapse process records. The utility of process records for descriptions of commonalities across drawings in the earlier study of drawing strategies is obvious and undeniable, but that usage moves away from this report's focus on the unique expressive act and the unique artistic serial and the way our inquiry becomes a part of that.

T--Data Modes

As in the case of iconic representational modes, the verbal descriptions and transcriptions subsumed under this heading are meant to stand for the events they represent as direct a fashion as possible. Because the term "T-tu" is borrowed from Barker, the reader is referred to his work for a fuller sense of how he uses it.

In essence, the observer, participant observer, or special participant observer, uses himself as far as possible as a neutral sensing and recording instrument. One should not stress "neutral" too much, however, for the use of oneself as an instrument assumes that the bias in one's own perception is unavoidable and, perhaps, even useful. We do not observe other people, especially in the expressive situation, as though they are mindless automatons in the grip of purely external stimulus conditions. Rather they appear to us as intentional, purposeful, and planful beings with a history and with a future. Further, as observers, we appear to ourselves, though obliquely, in the same manner.

And when we concern ourselves with the artistic serial, we soon learn how much of the expressive situation is covert and dependent, if we are to describe it upon a history of shared insights and intuitions. Nevertheless, we can and do describe the "highlights" of our impressions of what transpires before us. The anthropologist writes his "field notes," or talks into a recorder for later transcription.

My assistant and I have over the past four years attempted to keep up diary entries or lab notes on each session in which an artist visits the drawing lab. Below are excerpts from one session occurring at Week 9 of one undergraduate's work in the drawing lab. Frank, as I'll call him, is untrained in art. He is a pre-medical student. By Week 9 (next to the last week of the usual Term's work), the observers refer to the history in the lab as well as to what is right before them. They also risk interpretations and reveal their interests just by what they consider significant to record. Three examples follow. The first is my own. The second is that of a psychologist friend who observed Frank over a number of consecutive weeks in the lab. The third is by the graduate research assistant working with me. Figure 1 in the appendix shows the drawings which Frank made during W-4, W-8 and W-9, which are referred to in the last notes.
Example 1, Frank, W-9, November 26, 1969; KRB.

John had put a lamp and a tree in his rain picture, but it didn’t work out -- didn’t stay back in space, so he erased them.

He had intended to put in more people but just couldn’t place them. He wanted the smaller figure to be further back in space than it turned out. He also had in mind a night scene, with street light, big yellow reflections. The puddles were added last to capture the rain idea. Not satisfied with these, hands he can’t do (or faces), so these were left out.

He made the association with the shark drawing (W-4), insofar as the spatial problem exists, but he didn’t think of this at first. He was not pleased with the umbrella’s position. It should have been angled more to suggest going into the wind.

He stopped us after last week’s session and asked if we could identify the forms on steps and pavement, which I did, stating that they were puddles. "Correct," he said.

After viewing the sequence on the screen, he said that it was connected in his mind to a prior discussion or "flatness" that he had with Charles. This occurred to him after he left last time, but he did not think of it consciously, he felt, when drawing; yet he felt it influenced him while drawing. The idea was to outline arm, boots, etc. and more or less disengage them from the rest of the forms, abstractly or flatly, to show the idea through significant parts.

Today he started to draw a vase, but it changed to an owl. He is studying and measuring it out studiously, using a paper towel as a measuring and line-up device.

Example 2, Frank, W-9, November 26, 1969; psychologist.

Frank reviewed his last week’s production, a man climbing steps, leaning into a rain storm. Again Frank expressed dissatisfaction; he was not able to produce what he intended. Placed one smaller figure in the background, but had intended to place several other figures in the background. Tried a tree, converted it
to a lamp post. Neglected face and hand. Says the
boots, umbrella, and leaning into the wind are the
essential elements of the idea.

Talked about a form of depictive art which is
essentially flat or two dimensional. Trying de-
liberately to suggest the whole by drawing a part.
This idea spontaneously occurred in this drawing
session and he thinks this idea may have been
occurring subconsciously last week, when he made
the drawing.

This will be a short session, as the viewing
and discussion took some 30 minutes. Frank talked
more about his work this time than at any previous
session.

Again is working from imagery. "I was going to
draw a vase, but now I think it will be an owl."
"Now, I don't know what it will be."

The production comes slowly, with much reflection.
Figure only partially outlined, but spending a great
deal of time on the outline and the little detail

Example 3, Frank _____, W-9, November 26, 1969; CSS.

Some weeks I am silent. Other weeks the words
just pour out. This week I pushed Frank (in the
inquiry) harder than most times. I run the risk
of forcing him into corners, and even worse my
corner. He had idea to draw a windy day. It was
that way last week. Drew a stick figure first and
then filled in. Didn't look right. Put in the
steps (reminded him of library steps). Drew lamp
post and tree to fill in, but didn't like them and
erased both. Second figure on the right just a
fill-in, like shark figure earlier.

He would have filled in the background if he
had a model. Not well pleased with position of
umbrella. Would have preferred it lower to em-
phasize the idea.

I asked if he meant feeling compared with form.
"Form?" "Shapes. Yes, I understand." (Didn't
seem to think of this separation of idea and form.)
I mentioned the skull (W-5) as more concerned with form?
He knew the hands weren't complete, but they weren't needed in this drawing. He just can't do them, either -- maybe if he had a model, he said.

Started to draw a vase. Stopped, turned to us and told us it was an owl.

I pushed this week but John is now in our groove. Seemed interested and attentive to all I said. Wanted to help us, and now maybe himself. Now maybe himself -- happened once or twice last week, but NM himself was impossible in the first month, I think.

Several things make the notes presented above different from straight T-data. To begin with, some of the events we record are transmitted to us via Frank's first-person-singular statements concerning how he made his drawing, as these are stimulated by the process recall and our questions. Secondly, we inquire about past events in the context of the present drawing. Third, to varying degrees we intrude our evaluations and insights as interested persons, as well as neutral observers (see especially Example 3 above). The notes, in a sense, represent our own effort as scribes and historians to record, recall and connect what is memorable, and to put it in a form befitting our perceptions.

Even so, the notes are an abstraction and selection out of highlights from the inquiry under stimulated process recall, plus observations in the context of the lab of the drawings being formed, and from comments made by the artist drawing and after current drawings. In contrast to the lab notes, the inquiry sessions themselves are taped and transcribed verbatim. These give as faithful an indication of what transpired as words alone can do, for here there are no selections or deletions or recastings into different words or our memory of them. In one sense, such transcriptions are primary evidence of what I have called an indirect representation of the artist's stream of consciousness as mediated by stimulated process recall and special participant observers. Here is an example from a session with Larry, which occurs during his second term in the drawing lab, separated by one year and one term from his first term as a participant. Figure 2 in the appendix, shows the three drawings to which he refers in the transcribed inquiry session. The entire session's inquiry is given verbatim.

Larry______, Winter 1970, W-3
1/28/70

B. Got into a bit of texture, Larry? Did you have the whole idea of the landscape in mind?
L. No, just the movement of the trees—the lacey quality. The other things I put in because I thought they were kind of funny—next to a sewer and a motel sign. The kind of things you see along the side of a road. ...I did the trunks first, with the...paint is it? ...like you said, it has a little texture in it. I didn't want it that heavy. I didn't know how it was going to work. But, that kind of look is what I wanted to do.

B. It was pretty much what you were after? You say it got a little heavier than you wanted it to up there?

L. Yeah. I wanted it to be a little thinner.

B. Did you do those more quickly than the other lines?

L. Yeah, I guess I did. I knew I wanted to get a certain look, a certain openness. It would have been a lot better if those lines had been thinner. I thought I could get it with quick brush strokes but I guess I was applying too much pressure on the brush.

B. The pressure went along with the thickness.

L. Yeah.

B. The quickness—did it have to do with the feeling of growing too?

L. Mmm—I was...I figured that I just wanted to get a kind of lacey effect, the kind of thing on the trees when it's cold and they just—I just didn't care too much about placing them very carefully.

B. It was the effect you wanted, not the details.

L. Yeah. I thought I could do it that way...there it's just more fleshed out. I don't know that I was doing anything new there.

B. Did you have in mind their going back along the road?

L. It was kind of like up over a bank. Against the gray sky with the black trees—it's kind of an interesting thing when you're driving along.

B. As far as your original idea, did it seem to need anything more at this point? (before sewer, sign, etc.)

L. No, I don't think so.
B. It was at this point that you decided to add more?

L. Yeah. I decided to put something in with it. I put in the top of a sewer—a drainage ditch, an outlet or something. It's the kind of thing you see along the road, kind of strange.

B. Strange juxtaposition.

L. Yeah. I just put it there in kind of a fun way. I just kind of liked it—but I didn't think it was that important. Then I put in that sign, and the road. The road wasn't anything. The sign was just another funny kind of thing you see along...the motel sign...the line along the side of the road—I used some gray. It kind of had a nice feel to put it on like that.

B. A very direct way.

L. Yeah. I don't really like the rest of the stuff I put on.

B. Some more shading?

L. Right.

B. How do you feel about the first one you did?

L. It's o.k. I kind of chuckle.

C. Is it the first time you've used that (paint)?

L. The acryllic—yeah. I like using it. It's a lot nicer to work with.

B. You prefer that to the ink and charcoal, etc?

L. Yeah. It makes kind of a feel...Oh, these are the boxes.

B. This is the one you did in one of your notebook sketches.

L. Right there is where I ran into trouble...the three (boxes). It was grounded right away. It ran off the page in kind of a bad way. Not like the other one I did. That was like the foundation—it had a strong foundation. Anything I put on to it didn't seem to shake it—it didn't make it.
B. The relationship wasn't right for you?

L. Once I did that I couldn't...

B. Did you know what was wrong there?

L. If I...had started up in the left hand corner more, I maybe could have worked it down, kind of a straggling kind of effect...kind of built them down, instead of having them look like it was setting there...I wanted to have them look like they were tumbling or something.

B. It became too solid.

L. It was like I put a foundation on it and from there it could take anything I put onto it, at least in my eyes anyway.

B. The idea you had before showed it kind of like tumbling?

L. Kind of...kind of, you know, weak...the way they were set, they didn't look good. They looked like kind of a ramshackle house...it didn't look like a ramshackle house, but as kind of opposed to a solid brick house...like an old wooden shack that was half crushed in...kind of bent out of shape.

B. These got too solid?

L. Yeah.

C. When did that happen, do you know?

L. I think it was up in the left there. There when I put in that third block (at this time the negatives are being rerun.) I think if I had started those other two up in the left further and worked it down somehow. Like...go on to the next one; I think it'll show it. I got that one up in the corner, the top one, the highest one...if you look at those three, from those on anything I put in was...you see those three were so solid that all the other things I put on just hung on to them.

B. You tried to treat these next ones a little more loosely you said.

L. Yeah. I tried to get them to shake it up a bit.

C. It looks like they don't belong, the others are so solid.
L. The other ones are...you know, abominated.

B. It looks like you got some granite in with your cardboard so to speak.

L. Yeah. Too much structural steel in the darn things. They'll never crumble.

C. How do you feel about those other three--not the first three, but the other three.

L. They're kind of interesting. They aren't exactly what I was trying to do. I was trying to get an effect with more strongly shaped boxes. Those are kind of a different way of getting at it.

C. They're looser, but in another sense they're not boxes either. They're contorted and twisted.

L. Trying to make the angles in there, they're not really rectangular.

C. The first three are solid, but the problem is that they had a foundation. The others have less of a foundation, but then they don't become solid.

L. Yeah, they're broken up, and I tried when I started out to use more solid figures, but do so just by their positioning, by their relationship to each other they'd be looser.

L. (new picture) that's the Ebervale Post Office. That's what it is.

B. Is that an actual place.

L. Yeah. Last summer, I worked outside Ebervale, surveying. We went in there a couple of times for a soda after work.

B. A little store in there?

L. Yeah, a little store, and the door covered about as much of the front space as I've showed it there, and the grays are what I tried to get because it's kind of a gray. It's attached to a bigger building at the left which turned out to be a bar, to the left, the Valiant Bar, to the left--a bigger more strong building. This is kind of tacked on. It's old. The inside is really interesting. It's got a scale that hangs--a spring scale with a big brass bucket, that they put the tomatoes or cold meat in. And behind it an old type of glass front candy counter.
C. Where is this?

L. Outside of Hazleton. To the right as you go in they have the Post Office part—very little, with a little window, all the wanted posters on a little clip board, and all these wooden pigeon holes where people come for their mail. And there's an old guy that seems as though he was built along with the place. And it seems as though they'll both probably die at the same time.

C. He was sleeping over in the corner of the general store and one day they built a post office around him.

L. Yeah. And there's an old Coke machine on the right side. It's an ice box—no refrigeration. It's rusty, square, dumpy. It's a nice place.

C. But you wouldn't want to live there.

L. No. There's one wire going into it. No refrigeration, just enough power for a light. ...As you look at it, I guess it's on the lower side of the road, on the bank, you look at it and get the perspective that I'm looking at it. And of course there are all coal banks behind it in the distance...strip mining, and the shale and stuff on top; but in the distance you can see that behind it...all black hills, mountainous things deposited by big steam shovels.

B. And they have some really big ones too.

L. Some of the world's biggest—two of the biggest. The road runs from Hazleton to Freeland. Hazleton's pretty small and Freeland's smaller yet. Ebervale's about, maybe, 20 houses. I don't even know if there are that many. Along the left side of the road—behind Ebervale—there's a vein of coal, back about a quarter mile. There's an old company town, put up by the old coal barons. Kind of an interesting thing. The standard of living's... you're kind of well off if you've got this new asbestos siding on your house, over the old wood. This is old wood. Of course it's painted. It's gray. It's old and dirty and stuff, but at least it's covered. A lot of the others aren't. I'm kind of the Chamber of Commerce of Ebervale. ...That (on the slide) is the edge of the next building (the bar). Maybe it used to be a hotel, two stories high.

B. This is the part of the country you come from?
L. Yeah. I live in Hazleton. (on slide) I'm putting some more of the black on there. I didn't bring it down to the roof. I don't know why. I just thought it looked better that way.

B. Just left a space there?

L. Yeah. I thought it gave it distance there.

B. You didn't plan originally to bring it down?

L. No. I started up high and I just didn't bring it down. I just kind of outlined the roof, but I kept it about an inch or so out. It looked pretty good like that to me.

B. It brought more emphasis to the house, like?

L. Yeah. I think if I'd have brought it right down it would have closed in on the building...Like I didn't try to get too much dimension. It was kind of like a flatter type of thing.

B. You wanted it flat?

L. Yeah.

B. Did that flatness have anything to do with the grayness? Simplicity...and all that.

C. One-dimensional thinking...

L. I don't know. I think the first thing I did in the picture...yeah, I remember now...I put the window up on the top there. I don't know why. Maybe I wasn't quite sure I was going to do that picture. I just kind of (makes "one, two, three" noise and gesture). And everything kind of went around it from there. ...Anyway, I kind of like the looks of it. It has all the things I really ever wanted to show about the Ebervale Post Office. I didn't think about bringing the eaves out, or trying to make the door look like it has a step...and the mountain there...

B. It all goes with the feeling of the Ebervale Post Office.

L. I'm not exactly sure. I don't know if it's all that way, or just kind of the feeling I got that day...kind of the image in my mind. I'm kind of satisfied.
B. Does this one work more for you than the first one?

L. They're like two different things.

B. Not comparable?

L. No. I was concerned with a different kind of thing, kind of an image of a feeling. Over there, with the trees, it was more of a visual thing. The branches, in the winter, are so stark, it's such a powerful, striking thing. I just wanted to try to get that. And after I did that I just added things like you might see...scrap...

B. On the negatives, the trees seemed almost complete in themselves, but you wanted to show the contrast—the way you experience these things. These are a part of the environment too—the way you come upon it.

B. The third one is more a problem in characterization, was it?

L. Yeah, that was something more that just stuck upon me. Like I said, the mood way...I was doodling and all of a sudden there was something there.

B. The image wasn't there at the start.

L. No.

C. Actually, you started out with a square, almost like the second one. It might have had a relationship to the squares, but you didn't want to follow it?

L. I don't know. I remember now, when I first did that, no. 2, maybe I was just doing flat stuff.

B. That interests you, the idea of showing something flat like that?

L. Yeah. If I did more of them, I might get some idea of what I was doing and why.

B. Do you think these coal mountains had any relationship to making it flat.

L. I put those in that way to keep them back. They weren't supposed to have any dimension. Kind of a flat behind flat.

B. That's what I meant.
The above transcription shows some of the subtle interactions between the special participant observers and the artist. It is not my intent to discuss these here. Rather, I have wished to give an example of verbal material, indirect and direct, but the one not completely separable from the other, which acknowledges three things: the need for the artist's first-person-singular statements concerning his work as stimulated toward recall of process; the need for special participant observers whose role is toward appreciation and understanding; and the admission that as special participant observers we are a part of the artist's drawing series, even if in an indirect way (that is, in a way claiming no causal relationship between our reflections with the artist and what he subsequently does). It is important that our entry into the artistic serial in no way usurp artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization on the artist's part.

First-Person Singular Narrative

None of the examples presented under the various alternative modes discussed in this report is purely fictional. Each is based on sources of evidence and information like those listed above under mute evidence, interview, and transcriptions of inquiry sessions. In this section we will explore the kind of insight possible through the imaginative effort to rewrite the available information on a drawing's evolution as through the artist were thinking to himself as he works.

Of course, just what that thinking is like neither the artist nor our accumulated information can tell us with certitude. Hence I refer to this effort as one of imaginative reconstruction in the subjective or stream-of-consciousness mode.

Several years ago, my research assistant, a visiting psychologist, and I each tried, one at a time with no one else present, to verbalize as naturally as possible as we drew. We concluded that the process was unnatural, interfering with the on-going drawing. Even so, my curiosity impelled me to go back and listen to the tape I had made while drawing. I was working on a tree series motif. It seemed to me that verbalizing strongly affected what I did. The associational chain of words seemed to make my drawings string out, usually unfinished, from one exploration to another. Purely aesthetic considerations (whatever they might be), as less verbalizable aspects of drawing, yielded to verbalizable goals or criteria suitable for evolution under the guidance of my feelings of emerging qualities of the works. Here is an excerpt about half way through the tape:

"Working wet on wet is not completely the way I want it...Better now. Can't be too wet...Hmm. Having trouble here with the ink. Something I'll have to play with more. What I'm after here is some way to suggest the feeling I got when I saw the pattern on the road...of tree branches in the moonlight. That
pattern is relatively vague...and random. But vague and random in a curious way. Again, I guess I'm thinking of a possible pottery decoration, but don't need to... Scrubbing around a bit helps there. In this case it's just the opposite from the lacy patterns. Probably how to get a feeling of definiteness without being definite...and a clear pattern without having a clear pattern visible. I find it hard to verbalize. In this case it shouldn't be recognizable to any great extent. (Inaudible statement). ...I seem to be working more on effects of being definite...and a clear pattern without having a clear pattern visible. I find it hard to verbalize. In this case it shouldn't be recognizable to any great extent. (Inaudible statement). I'm working on to that pattern, but being quite elusive, simultaneously...Its structure is almost root-like in its tangles. (Inaudible statement). And I felt it...out of nature...out of a walk. The running water has something in common with it, because it flows... and the light flows...Well...for what that's worth. I'm not completely succeeding. It still helps to objectify it, anyway. Medium is appropriate in a way. It might be in the case of the (inaudible) tree shapes...the brush might do better in establishing the general flow. I'll try just a few branches...I goofed a bit...I think it does work... a little heavy handed...but there's something in the general feel I like..."

Perhaps this just indicates that I'm quite verbal, at least under a first attempt at talking aloud while working. The dots in the transcription indicate pauses. Maybe if I did this more, the pauses would be longer, because I would not feel the need to speak all the time. The inaudible areas of this short transcription suggest that some of the speaking is close to "inner speech" and not articulated clearly enough even for a sensitive microphone.

I present this material first, because it gives one slant on the unanswerable question concerning what form first-person narrative reconstructions should take. The direct "authorship" of acts and the indirect authorship imaginatively reconstructing the authorship of acts are different affairs. We draw a drawing, possibly accompanying it with rudiments of inner speech. We do not talk a drawing, accompanying it with only rudiments of drawing. It is what might be called inner drawing, actual drawing, inner speech and transformational, analogical, and evaluative thinking linked with drawing that are our concern. It has been assumed that purely external perspectives on drawing desensitize us, making us forget that each drawing is a unique series of acts taking place within one person's drawing serial, in a definite time and place. We can attempt to "come near" to its reality as a psychic
event by moving as close to the "authorship consciousness" as possible, via our role as special participant observers.

Let us look at an example of reconstruction in the first-person singular mode. The example given is that of a college undergraduate young man who has returned to the drawing lab for a third term (ten weeks). He had first come in Fall 1968, then returned in Winter 1969, and in this example has just begun the Spring 1970 term. The formulation upon which this reconstruction is built is a transcription of a feedback inquiry, but in this instance the stimulated recall is immediately after the drawing was made and is via a videotape replay of the entire drawing. I have chosen this instance in the belief that more of the authorship feeling might arise in this setting than where the recall is delayed and where it is stimulated by time-lapse photographs only. (Interestingly, this student discusses his preference for delayed recall via the time-lapse photographs on the same transcription from which I draw my information. In his view, the delayed recall is more helpful: "I like the idea of painting and going away from it, not saying too much. Turn the engine off and let it spin...The only thing I'm concerned about is that the T.V. doesn't hinder a kind of thoughtful, emotional reflection after doing it...a kind of soul-searching 'how did it work'? 'How could I have done it otherwise'?...This way might be recall only. I don't say anything on my own. The other way, maybe things just kind of jell...It's easier this way. I can come out with some fresh things about when I was working." The last statement suggests the appropriateness of the immediate recall via videotape for the present purpose.) Figure 3, in the appendix, reproduces the drawing which the example below attempts to relive from subjective angle.

"Let's see...I'd like to try to get that bad downtown Baltimore feeling. I can see it. How to begin? Like I'm right in the middle, everything stronger than me. But how to get it on the page? What lines to hang it on? They need to fan out like. Guess I'll just jump in. Stronger, bolder strokes. There...

Better watch how I mix the black and white paints. I'll lose that grunginess of outdoors against that black, black inside feeling--the bar, the strip show. The black's gotta count...

Those bars are darker than anything I've ever seen. Evil...terrifying! Maybe with some sticky white paint here...thick. Laid on. But what's a white sidewalk doing in Baltimore? Dirty it up a bit.

Now what to do? The angle's not quite right. Seems I'm up above it, damn it. I just can't handle the technical stuff. Let's get what it'll do anyway. That paint mixing
is helping. Maybe if I used different brushes for each
different color and changed them. Three different shades...
black, white, grays. I'll give it a little touch of white.
Maybe if I draw this outside doorway here, just to high-
light it with a little bit of white...not so's it's notice-
able, but it just kind of works on the eye in an unconscious
way.

Let's take a look. Geez, that looks impressionistic
almost. Didn't mean it to. Really want to be more literal.

That bar door really struck me. Don't want to pin
it down but it's gotta be there, is for real. How to
get the right strokes and the feeling. They gotta catch
the shapes. Well, it's better than when I started painting...

trying to paint it gets you more aware. Like that dumb-ass
feeling about the grass on the HUB this morning--really
green, and the shapes in it. Baltimore's just the opposite.
Those forms were too much for me. Only broken down whores
and bums that drink. What were they drinking? Adrura port,
or something like that. Broken down people. Broken down
town. That's all you see...

There...a billboard beside the bar. Don't have to
see it too clear. "Naked show." And another black door.
It wasn't really. But everything you walked into was
black...Surrounded by darkness.

Now, these grays...Wait, they don't go with the rest
of the picture. Break it up a bit.

Take another look. What should go up there in the
left? I don't know what would bring it together.

Just some building above the bar. First floor,
second floor--I don't know what's up above. But...from
the ground up it's dingy. Not too much definition. Just
surrounding walls. The blackness, the dinginess...That's
the whole thing. Smog in the sky. Don't even have to
look up, it's there. It's on you.

This sure sharpens you up. You have to get right
to it...face to face with a visual problem. Can't just
be some vague, undefined thoughts. Don't know what I'm
really doing when I'm drawing, but I've gotta be more
aware of my feelings, perceptions.

There, a window...kind of. Don't know what I had
in mind. A big, old window. Kind of interesting like
that on the second floor. All over the place and all
different. Maybe it'll tie things together some.
Here below...the eye-catching stuff. Then those other vaguer things on top.

Now, some marks on this section. Those dash marks...works somehow. Don't know what it suggests. Kind of impressionistic. Need some different shape in there. Maybe like an old brownstone. The buildings are all different. Different, but no clean detail. There, with the bigger brush. Hey, I can lay these different brushes on each other. White window shade with this, some jabs of black here, mixes right on the page. Beats one brush, like before.

Woops, too runny there on that door. I'll wipe it off with some towel. There. That scrap paper helps keep it not too runny, not too heavy.

Better study it now. Want it to be consistent. Not too literal.

That white paper there's disturbing. Some white and gray on it. Now, touch it up a bit. Geez, it looks too impressionistic. Still, it'll be too broken up if I get too definite. Let it flow a little vague. Those empty spaces still bother me. And a little more black on the window...that blackness underneath the shades. Just like in the bar. Hmm...white paper changes with even white paint on it. Works better.

The blackness inside is the controlling type thing. Hard with just three colors. Maybe with more I could concentrate on using the blacks here and here and here...make them stand out more.

There. There's a lot I can't do like I want. But it is Baltimore mood."

In rereading my example, and even comparing it with my own earlier effort at verbalizing when drawing, it occurs to me that the narrative could be tied more closely to drawing acts than I made it. To give the reader a different flavor, therefore, I am including another example. This one is concerning a drawing by the same young man, this time from his first term in the drawing laboratory. The reconstruction was done by Steele. Figure 4, in the appendix, reproduces the drawing in question.

"Let's see, maybe I'll try that old shoe...that's it -- down to here. No, a little longer. O.K. Now it looks like the toe part. Hmm, let's see--I wonder how you are supposed to show leather. Hell, I can
see right away I'm having trouble. I don't know how to master the technique for the shadow in the leather. I can see right -- I can't make the smooth that, oh -- it's so flat. Well, that's feeble! Maybe like the ball -- like this -- it would have been a lot better if those lines were thinner. Guess it was too much pressure with the hand. Putting in a second figure here for the shadow -- that seems reasonable. That's not as stubby -- guess some more.

How would you indicate light -- how do they want to indicate light with black pen lines? Here in the sense from this angle, maybe don't see a distinct line. Here again I can't produce what's out there. Maybe I should have tried the chair. It has simpler lines -- try with less ink to modify this line a little bit to indicate a small mound. That's not what I wanted. There again I wish I knew the technique to that high spot on the paper. Maybe just a broken line along here -- that's more what I wanted.

I wish I could capture some of that old shoe look."

One of the problems I sense in first-person narrative reconstructions is a kind of reductionism unavoidable even here. Perhaps repeated efforts would make me more sensitive. In trying to relive a drawing, from inside as it were, the serial perspective is broken, and we may end up with what is directly action related and what is easily verbalizable or sharable. For example, I cannot transmit any of the sense of wonder and mystery that made that tree branch tangle pattern in the moonlight on the dirt road so memorable to me that I wanted to try for it again and again -- in a pottery decoration with a sensitive brush held on the end of a three foot pole, or in the wet on wet ink exploration of the transcription. In like manner, the artist's feeling about downtown Baltimore, when he went there for a physical examination prior to induction into the army, and how all of this fit into his life problems and projections, is not communicated by too close a hold on one drawing process. Such efforts as these can conceal as well as reveal. "Tell all," someone has said, "but not the song the Sirens sing;" lest, I suppose, one would not believe it himself. Seen only as a mode, that is, apart from some larger purpose, such verbalizations, too, can be reductive.

I had to choose, however, between the possibility of distortion and reduction on the one hand, and giving no examples on the other. I have chosen to risk examples, though so doing renders me vulnerable. It is my hope that, poor as they may be, they will offer a less pale, more human shadow than current circumlocutions in our literature. The probable solution to this problem lies in the more full-blown artistic serial history, where this mode is only one of a number of presentational and interpretative devices, and where the problem of what the knowledge is for becomes a conscious issue.
The Multiple Consciousness Narrative

In the sketchy examples above, it is obvious that we are not really limited to the artist's stream-of-consciousness but rather deal with some representation of it at further remove from it. Even when I mumbled aloud into a microphone as I drew, this was so, for I responded to my own verbal feedback, and one of the difficulties I encountered was how to counteract the string of verbal associations occurring above my drawing, as it were, and not in it. So even in this case multiple viewpoints were engaged.

Here, however, we wish to explore briefly the possible advantages of consciously extending viewpoints. In the information I draw upon for my reconstructions, I, my assistant, the drawing studio, and the like, are all ingredients, in addition to the artist's direct drawing processes and those same processes as we can indirectly approach them. We have, in short, multiple consciousnesses at work and in interaction already. We only need to tease them out and intertwine them freely for the richest reconstruction possible.

An interesting side issue appears. Were I a real literary artist at it, perhaps I would do as well, or better, unhampered by the search for a tangible base of information upon which to erect my reconstruction. My spontaneous insights, my imaginative immersion in the artist's active person, and the like, might carry more conviction and feeling of truth as a literary projection, than the more passive historical desire to probe, amass evidence, and reconstruct. This I must admit, and with it the likelihood that my low ability in the modes discussed so far is a function of my combined desire to understand and appreciate on the one hand, and to ameliorate the condition of that which I study, in addition to achieving a kind of knowledge (or nonabstract theory), on the other. In short, dear reader, I cannot give you good literature. I aspire more to give you good psychology and good art education. (And, of course, even in the latter two cases, I would have to add "of a particular kind.")

The example which follows, however, is a simple descriptive narrative, utilizing material from various points of view. It is presented largely from my point of view (at least that is what the "I" implies). I have changed the names of the artist, the visiting psychologist, and my assistant. The three drawings mentioned in the example are shown, in chronological order, in Figure 5, in the appendix.

Dr. Hamlin from Psychology came to the drawing lab for the first time today to watch Frank drawing. I was a little uneasy, not knowing how Frank might react to a new observer, and may have projected that. Bill, my assistant, was out. I fumbled about trying to get the negatives in the filmstrip projector the right way.
Finally, the image was on the wall of the darkened room. Bill came in just after the series of negatives started. He greeted Dr. Hamlin. They had a little chitchat while we got resettled, and I went to my preferred place, on the bench, between Frank (on the drawing stool) and the white celotex wall where we projected the negatives. Bill took over the projector.

Last week Frank had brought in an oak leaf to draw. The idea to do so was suggested to him by what an art major friend had to do for a class project, he told us. His friend had started with pine needles, but she went back to a leaf too.

When I took the time-lapse photos last week I observed the stages of Frank's drawing through the little window behind which the camera is mounted out of sight. (The photographs are taken from a front-surface mirror mounted over Frank's drawing board on a forty-five degree angle.) I was frankly surprised by Frank's skills in rendering the oak leaf. His first drawings (the first two weeks) were quite primitive, compared to the realism of the leaf. He was able to modulate the light and shade, show variations in contour and contour shading -- the shadow of the leaf on a flat surface. I noticed he put in the fine veins first, but they became almost indiscernible after the first shading. Frank had said that this was what he was after -- a 3-D look. He was able to concentrate on the goal of depth. Two weeks ago his mind had wondered as he tried to draw the squirrel in an oak tree, from memory.

Today with the negatives projected in order on the wall, Frank wasn't saying much. He verified again that the ribs went in first, then the outline lightly, then the details of the outline, the finer veination, some shading, and finally more shading with a softer pencil. It was hard to follow the negatives at first, because the pencil lines were so light. Frank said he didn't prefigure how he'd do the leaf, or that he'd add the shadow. I learned that the sharpest detail and veination was mostly where the light hit the leaf.

"Putting shading in on the side of the fine veination, you lose some of the detail, is that right"? I asked. Frank said it didn't concern him that the veins were mostly lost with the shading.
"How does it look after a week's lay off?"
Bill asked Frank.

"O.K. I don't know," he replied.

"What's up for today?" Bill continued.

"You got me!" answered Frank.

"I didn't mean to get you," Bill said, trying to ease what might have seemed like pressure on Frank to produce.

Bill and I went to work, busying ourselves with chores related to the room. Dr. Hamlin seated himself, with notepad in hand, to Frank's left, in the rear. Bill and I fell into conversation about articles we were reading.

Dr. Hamlin took careful notes of what followed:

Student thinks approximately 10 minutes. Thrice turned pad horizontally: marked, erased. Began to draw. Curving line -- outline. Worked within outline, erased portion of outline and retraced. Began to elaborate on outline at "top." (Took first picture after 5 minutes.)

Still working on "top" of outline. (picture, 2 minutes)

Studying the sketch. (picture, 2 minutes)

More detail "inside" outline. (picture, 2 minutes)

Studying sketch -- more fine detail, on lower edge -- shading.

Studying sketch -- working at right side -- working at left side -- emphasizing small detail, shading work.

Ponders quite a bit -- pencil work is little by little. Chin on hands. Jiggling knees on stool. Picture seems to be evolving bit by bit -- out of thin air.

Working on shading bottom edge.

No clear idea of what he wishes to draw? Evolving from his behavior itself?
Head on arm; much squirming.

Pencil tapping. Shading. (E's continue to talk in background.)

Pencil work at bottom of sheet.

Thinking, pondering. Not looking at sheet?

Shading behavior.

Left upper half -- new outline appears.

Heavily shading this new figure.

New outline "sketched" -- rather hesitantly.
UL of page, line continues to right and back toward left.
(appears to be a fish.)

Erasure.

Studying drawing. Long period of 2-3 minutes.
More shading in figure at UL.

Vigorous shading.

Tapping cheek. Squirming. Erasure (pencil eraser is almost even to metal ferrule). Great deal of erasure -- more than a minute. (No pencil sharpening yet.) Uses brush to clean drawing.

Shading at right. Erasure in same area. Much erasure -- UL and UR. (55 minutes since session began.) Erasure continues. Studying the page.

Erasing? or Smudging? Seems intentional smudging.
Told it's 3:20 but he can work as long as he likes.

Frank decided to stop work. He was about finished anyway.

"It's a shark picture," he volunteered before leaving. "I've been dissecting a shark in anatomy class this week." After a brief pause; "I couldn't remember how many gills there were. It made me really mad at myself."

We learned that Frank had not intended to draw the other three sharks. They just came in -- perhaps, he mused, because the tail of the front big shark ran off the page at the right, he brought in the tail of another on the left. Then followed other sharks, in planes of space. He got the image of them then in a murky ocean setting. "They look like ghosts in the background," he said.
He had used the blunted eraser end to smudge out the original sharp outlines. The sequence was as Dr. Hamlin recorded it, but now we had the intention behind it: outline, detail, shading, spill-over shading (to suggest distance and water), smudging and blurring. Frank even blurred out the rock, flower and seaweed details, and the large foreground fish to a degree, to show the water medium. He was disturbed about the open water areas, not knowing how to represent the water itself when not on an object. "I'm sure an artist would have a way to handle it." Then, too, the picture lacked a clear demarcation between ground and water (even though a rock and flower were shown).

"I really don't know if I'm any use to you, nor what I should do -- what I could do to help from your point of view," he said apologetically. We tried again to assure him we had no expectations about what he was to do and that from our point of view he was doing fine.

After Frank left, the three of us discussed Frank's method of doing an object in detail and then transforming it by some other operation -- for example, the leaf veins, then shading and losing them; and the fish detail, then smudging and rubbing it out. Dr. Hamlin thought this might come from Frank's biology background. This seemed plausible enough, but later evidence failed to support this hypothesis. I found a kind of structure and charm in the thinking processes Frank seemed to be using. It reminded me of Lowenfeld's haptic blind sculptors who made the eye socket, entered in the eyeball, then put the lid over it. Even though later transformations hide much of the earlier preparatory work, a kind of honest structure is there, underneath.

Literary Psychology

Under the general heading of presentational modes we have moved from mute evidence and direct T-data to reconstructions close to the artist's subjective angle, then to many angles or many consciousnesses as they surround a unique time-space artistic process. The "otherness" that creeps in as we leave the subjective angle is intensified within the series of modes that follows it, and this will continue by and large in those taken up in the next chapter. Even, however, in the first-person singular presentation, the hand of the writer is present. This is just as true if we try to reconstruct our own stream-of-consciousness. There is a reflectiveness and reflexiveness necessarily attendant upon our effort, which may not so much be a flaw as an enrichment in the effect. At the most we can strive by our literary skill to render the reflective quality transparent, if that is our aim.

One of the questions unanswered in my mind has to do with how much reflective quality an artist must possess to make methods like the ones here described fruitful. I do not know, for example, to what degree they would be useful with preadolescents. I am inclined to feel that the methods might work but that the artist's ability to profit from verbal self-guidance as a result of reflective inquiry would be lesser.
This, then, might result in a reduced motivation to participate in such sharing modes as described. I feel optimistic that other outcomes profitable to a child's art would appear, but this hunch must await study.

In a way, the name of the mode to be described in this section is misleading. It is a literary psychological vantage point, but it is applied to a kind of "nonabstract" theory making, the aim of which is still to give us a grasp of a particular artist's expressive event couching that within the artistic serial of which it is a part. The appearance of "psychology," however, as a term consciously used, moves us away from the novelist's spontaneity and toward the historian's reconstruction and interpretation under the guidance of role and question. Since our concern is art, the problem is complicated, for we contend not only with views about how the mind operates, but also with those concerning the nature of art experience. My own dual identification, to the degree I am conscious of it, is what I will call a depth-cognitive psychology of the individual and an existential-expressive theory of art. (The last book of Langer's, Mind, is as close as I can come to a comfortable available model.)

Steele discusses what he means by literary psychology:

Another type of writing may be more psychologically oriented... Both the novelistic and psychological styles take on a slightly different feeling than the first-person singular style because there is an obvious "othering." There is also a slightly different feeling between presenting the "othering" view as a novel or as psychology, sociology, anthropology and history, for the latter are an attempt to begin to theorize in a nonabstract particular way.

The above quotation introduces a difference in emphasis and purpose in this last presentational mode. It is, in fact, a transitional mode, belonging equally with those to be introduced in the next chapter.

Rather than say, as Steele does above, that this mode is attempting "to theorize in a nonabstract particular way," one might say that the person working in this way is inclined to approach the phenomena he aims to present under the guidance of some psychological theory, the general principles of which will influence his perception and representation of the individual case. Thus a Freudian or neo-Freudian will be sensitized toward one kind of perception and interpretation, a cognitive theorist toward another. The writings of Arnheim and Ehrenzweig are examples from within the literature of art and art education, except that these writers, interestingly enough, rarely, if indeed ever present a case, either with a detailed description of one of that individual's particular artistic processes or of his artistic serial of which it is a part. Lowenfeld, especially in his first book, occasionally represents the detailed history of a child's drawing or series of drawings. In his descriptions his own role in
stimulation, setting of topic, and the like, is explicitly included, for it is through the impact of this external influence that meaning arises. Typically, the child's schema or basic, uninfluenced manner of representation is first established, then deflections under some influence or experience are analyzed and interpreted, as, for example, being attributable to "proportions of value," "autoplastic sensations," and "self-identification" through inclusion of the self in the drawing.

Schaeffer-Simmern does not quite belong under the mode here discussed, in that his approach is based on a theory of art drawn from the thought of Gustav Britsch, as extrapolated into a developmental theory. But, in another way, he represents this view well, for he is more inclined to present an individual case in some longitudinal depth, and his explanatory concepts (which also become pedagogical forces) are at least quasi-psychological.

I find myself, now locked in on the integrity and continuity of individual process and serial, hard pressed to set to the task of representing a case under the guidance of some explicit psychological theory. Some of the philosophical and psychological concepts which have influenced me and which I am conscious of are evident in the assumptions and purposes of this report. (For an indication of the history of these influences and for an example of attempted analysis and synthesis of pertinent literature, the reader is referred to the book preceding this report, Mind and Context in the Art of Drawing.) My procedure, in actual practice, has been that of coining new terms and labels to aid my perception and description of the individual case, arriving at these neologisms as inductively as possible. Since, however, I use the new terms for more than one case, they function somewhat like principles from psychological theory. In truth, they function more usefully when I discuss the problem of representing individual cases in the abstract, or in general. When I actually speak of a given individual, the terms do not occur as readily. In this report, for example, I have spoken of "artistic causality," "idiosyncratic meaning," and "intentional symbolization." Elsewhere I speak of "inner drawing," "forbidden techniques," "counter-intervention," "myth of self-identity" and the like. These terms are first efforts to describe how I conduct myself in the drawing lab, what I perceive, and what I expect.

Sometimes I utilize broad, abstract concepts which I feel give promise of far-reaching interpretations and insights. Let me give an example of this. It has been my impression that, in addition to their technical, representational, and transformational skills in media, artists guide themselves by semi-conscious artistic concepts and attitudes. In the case of an artist with limited training and drawing skills, it is somewhat easier to see how given concepts and attitudes function to transform or transcend impoverished skills toward new and desired ends.
One of the borrowed concepts I find useful is what has been called the "third-order-concept". This term, in a therapeutic or interpersonal example, indicates the following level of complexity or abstractness: "Here's how I see you seeing me seeing you." The authors from whom I have borrowed this idea feel that emphasis on such thinking, on the conscious level, is the major task in psychotherapy, and that actual change or "improvement" occurs on a "fourth level" beyond the mind's conscious comprehension, a kind of transcendence which is none the less prepared for by the third level "work."\(^{15}\) In a given case, too much credit may be given to this conscious work of the mind, or so the depth psychologies would suggest. In the latter view, the conscious work is often set off by less conscious influences or symbols, as from dreams, free-associations, expressive symbols, and the like. In the drawing serial, both forces, it would seem, are operating. Newness arrives by multiple routes, in the drawing and in the mind, so that a constant interaction occurs and the path of the serial is projected onward.

Let me present a case of "sudden transformation" from this point of view. A recent instance has just occurred in the drawing lab, wherein the artist has suddenly dropped his typical themes and problems and produced, in rapid succession, eighteen drawings in little over an hour's time. This example is too recent to reflect on adequately, however, and at this writing we do not yet have the stimulated process recall follow-up whereby we can indirectly share the artist's stream of consciousness on that productive occasion. Nor do I have the subsequent sessions behind me, wherein I can read the utilization of this change in the continuing serial. The artist has already said that he has "just gotten into the fun of it all," after eight weeks in the drawing lab, and he has projected his desire to draw outside the lab, on his own, and to begin a "visual diary."

I mention the above example, because such startling changes are certainly prepared for, and the person representing them feels constrained to interpret and reflect upon them. Such instances are not rare, though they differ endlessly in form, suddenness and magnitude.

For our purposes here, I am choosing an earlier example. This one concerns Larry, in his first term in the drawing lab, and it centers on a transformation which took place in his drawings between the sixth and seventh sessions. Figure 6, in the appendix, presents key drawings which are referred to in the example to follow.

In his first weeks in the lab, Larry had demonstrated that he could take liberties in his drawings, as, for example, in selecting items from a still-life, where, in Week 1, he changed sizes (diminished size of screen to fit it into his drawing), showed the line of a drawer not visible to him, consciously adjusted forms to the page format, and selected elements that were simple and flat. He appeared, at the
start, to be a slow and careful worker, "getting used to pen and ink."

He mentioned a philosophy teacher he had at one of the branch campuses, who got him interested in the philosophy of art. He had read Dewey's *Art as Experience* and Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*.

From the start, Larry had trouble with texture -- "they weren't just straight lines. A face might have the same problem." We learned that he was consciously trying to "translate" visual impressions into pen marks -- "pen figures," as he called them. In his second drawing session, he tried to work out ways to represent form and light, practicing first on a spherical pot, then on an old shoe from the still life. During this session, we later learned, he discovered how to control different weights of pen lines and felt these had some relation to form, light-shade, and "perspective."

In drawing the old shoe, Larry worked on the problem of texture ("what the material is") and shadow and light, which is more or less superimposed on the form and texture. He knows the relationship between these two problems is a fluid one. Light and shade, and texture are both translated into pen-and-ink language -- what he calls "pen figures." He discovered that the figure for texture had to be different from that for light and shade. He also learned that how to have these interact in actual practice was a problem, causing some visual confusion.

During the third session Larry worked further on his shading-light-form-texture pen-and-ink problem. He utilized a white sphere, a spherical light shade, a cube and a cylinder which were in the room (from a perception experiment). He discovered the "elliptical shadow" cast by a sphere on a plane in perspective. He transferred this discovery to the representation of a tree with spherical leaf-mass, but had trouble finding the proper elliptical shadow to stay on the plane. Here, we learned, he made an unintentional discovery which was like a minor-break through for him. In drawing the rough tree trunk, while working on the problem of light and shadow (interestingly, he represents the place light strikes a sphere with black pen lines, not in the classical art-school sphere-shading method), he unconsciously varied both weight of pen line and closeness of strokes. He then realized he was representing both texture and light-and-shade (form) at one time. This insight so excited him that he drew another trunk beside the first one, to reinforce his discovery and share it with us.
We learned that Larry's objective was to arrive at "life-likeness" first, and "feeling" thereafter ("as in a face"). "Now," he said, "I'm like a person learning to use a hammer and saw so he can build something."

Though Larry had set himself a kind of discipline leading toward representational mastery, and though he had made some important discoveries on his own toward his goals, he seemed to be getting progressively unhappy with his work. At this same time (week 3 and 4), he saw an art exhibition of faculty work. He also drew in a sketch book away from the lab -- a copy of a high contrast Beatles photograph, a section of "Guernica," and his own pipe. He liked the spatial, in-out quality of the Beatles photograph, and responded to the freer feeling in the "Guernica" detail. He had studied the latter in art history -- "it really blew my mind."

In the lab he made three drawings from a large photograph of a girl's face and shoulders (which we had hidden, but he asked for it), in Conté, charcoal, and ink (he had not used the first two media before; they happened to be on the drawing table because another artist had used them just before Larry came in). Larry had admitted that it might be possible to work on his realism-mastery, technical control objective and his more distant goal of "feeling" or expression somewhat simultaneously -- not wait until he had mastered "technique" and then go on to "feeling."

When Larry did the photographic portrait in pen and ink, he continued his explorations and conquests from before. He began with the hair, but with no outline at the forehead; and he varied the light-shade, or value texture of the hair by direct pen strokes (not "by going over"). This is a departure. Lines are now very loose and open. He says he now visualizes the whole first. In this face, he put all of the hair in with some indication of ears and neck before the features. He treated all the features but the lips with his open, no-outline strategy. He recognized that this made the lips look out of context. He mentioned that he still has problems with the projection and rounding of a form. He drew a cube in perspective in a miniature below the portrait, indicating how he wanted the face to thrust forward. He described a pastel face done by an art major friend. "He puts on a few strokes and smudges them in while he's putting his shirt on, and there it is. Just like I'd want it."
At this point, Larry draws W____, a visiting Art Education student, from real life, in the laboratory. He was proceeding freely and liked the drawing until he added the features at the end, when he got the plane of hair and neck out of gear with the features. He was conscious of his difficulty in foreshortening (a term he did not use, however), and indicated the problem by constructing a plane of touched thumbs and extended forefingers and tilting it at different angles. After this partial failure he did a page of quicker sketches, some from life, some schematic. Among them appear two which solve the angle of foreshortening appropriate to a head tilted downward. This was corroborated by Larry later:

Larry: If you get the lines of the forehead andchin, it's successful.

B: What does this have to do with the features?

Larry: The features still have to be placed correctly, but the right angle of the face gives a reference point.

B: (Referring to the second drawing with the quick sketches -- a new technique for Larry) You didn't get hung up on details here. Was this manipulation helpful to you in any way?

Larry: I was conscious of it.

B: It's amazing how much you "read" without the features -- nice quality.

W: (Who had been posing) Yes, it still catches a lot -- has a nice feeling about it. Are there any particular lines to start with that make you feel right?

Larry: Yes, forehead and chin.

B: Do you feel that what you have learned about doing it will permit you to manipulate angles without the subject being there?"

Larry: Yes.
B: Are you saying that in a sense what you have to learn is not to depend on what is there?

Larry: Yes. More on not so much learning to copy exactly.

At this point, several other influences have some impact on Larry. He saw two quite dissimilar, rather avant guarde art shows. The one was that of a painting professor from the Art Department which incorporated actual projections from the canvas (as in one-half of a head, from a doll or mannequin) with more traditional painted representations. The other was a show of Flavin's utilizing only fluorescent light tubes in an otherwise darkened room. Both of these exhibitions caused him to extend still further his concept of art.

Then, during the sixth week in the lab, Larry did no drawing at all. Instead he and W____, the Art Education major who had posed for him before, entered into extended discussion on a great many topics concerning (as far as I can recapture it, since I and my assistant left the two alone) W____'s feeling about the importance of "confidence in his own thing" -- whatever it seemed like. Then the talk got more abstract. Larry's ideas on literature (his major) as art are pretty clear. The talk between Larry and W____ was quite meaningful to both.

Prior to the discussion between the two (who are essentially peers), Larry had told us of his concept of "expression," which "is the main thing in a face" and how this is different from realism. He had also experimented, on the page with quick sketches of heads, on more abstract, schematic representations. Among these was an abstract nose which Larry had consciously "flattened and formed," which still read as form and nose. He had written the word "visual" beside this, apparently to tell us of some insight, but he could not recapture that later.

The transformation in Larry's series occurred the session (Week 7) after the all-talk session with W____ (Week 6). When Larry came into the lab (for Week 7), he was greeted but pretty well ignored -- a kind of tacit understanding that he'd draw because the session before was all talk.

Larry didn't know what he was going to draw. He focused on the broken screen of the still-life, the moiré effect of its double fold, and the shape of the whole as an
abstract form. He worked out pen units to signify the light and dark pattern (using two symbols $\equiv$ and $\neq$). He placed these units carefully on the page. First he put in all the light units, then all the dark ones. He varied the marks in both darkness and density. He deliberately gave no setting which would identify the drawing as "screen" or "landscape" or whatever. He connected his desire to leave it open to the feeling he got at the Flavin (light) exhibition and the Montenegro (3-D and painted) exhibition. When questioned at the close of the session, Larry saw virtue in this ambiguity. It led to "interest." He also saw his approach now as under a different attitude, not bringing to bear as many rules and technical requirements before the process, and relaxing his "first the tools then the building" theory. In an interview the following week (with my research assistant, C, during my absence), further corroboration of a changed attitude occurred.

C: Was this drawing a conscious effort?

L: I did it after seeing those two displays.

C: The Montenegro and the light show?

L: It's different. Before what I was building for was so I could get realistic -- make a face or something; show a mood or something like that.

C: You're implying two things: the technique and the feeling.

L: The reasoning behind it. This is different in that there's no attempt to be realistic.

Then there followed a discussion comparing literature and visual art, in which it came out that, to Larry, there could be more freedom in visual art than in literature. Larry concluded:

In this picture (of Week 7) we have two distinctions. First, not being concerned so much with realism. Then we have it as a visual experience, something different.

Further corroboration of a changed view comes from an interview at the end of the term, where all of Larry's drawings are put on the wall for review. He feels a "divide" happened during week 7. Before that he was "attempting realism all the time, and...mainly trying to get perspective and control the pen." He was also getting progressively frustrated.
"trying to present things realistically." The two exhibitions and his discussion with W kept rolling around his mind. "I guess I loosened up a bit...I really was tight. It was getting really depressing."

Larry further supported the interpretation that his works became more symbolic to him. He put it: "It's more of an effect. A feeling rather than just a representation." And he acknowledged he didn't really have to know what it meant.

Subsequently, in the remaining sessions of the term (following Week 7), Larry explored media much more freely, using brushes of all sizes, inventing new strokes, varying pressure, amount of water, and the like. He also developed some free "doodles;" freely rearranged parts of the still life, depicting them with rapid strokes of a large brush; did more "abstracts" in the vein of the screen of Week 7; and terminated the series with a very spontaneously rendered depiction, with a one-inch brush, of an image of a standing sculptural form (a Glicormetti "man" he had seen in the Philadelphia Museum).

Thus, in Larry's development, we see him moving from a tighter, more ego-controlled, regime of self-instruction oriented toward realistic representational skills, in which he could barely conceive of himself as interested in "feeling" or "expression," toward a relaxation of control and goal, a freer exploration of media and ideas, and a willingness to let the freedom he felt in visual art speak in its own cryptic, partly ambiguous way. There is a fuller acceptance of his limited skills (preceded by depression, even when he knew he was improving his representational ability) and a recognition of his own feeling and expressive needs. A tension develops, one might say, between the pleasure and the reality principle, but it is a healthy one, with which Larry feels he can cope through exploration and daring.

The exhibitions, and the conversations with nurturant and interested others which Larry experiences, plus the reflection that stimulated process recall allows him on his own drawing methods and intentions, combine in his consciousness to produce new concepts and attitudes about art. Third-order concepts about Larry's drawing series arise from our side and his. He sees as it were, how we see him drawing and reflecting on his drawings. And all of this is related to Larry's drawing serial. It is a part of emergent ideas, images, and methods; and he is now capable of transcending and synthesizing the cognized elements. He plays more, but he also becomes more serious.
He lives more within the expressive situation itself, becoming more open to its history as unique potential for particular meaning.

I see now, that I have tried to present the story of Larry's change, that I am not capable of representing a single mode. At most, there is a deflection brought in by the "literary psychology" label. A rereading of the effort suggests it is neither literature nor psychology, nor an organic blend of the two. To begin with, the "facts" of the case must be established, more in T-data and mute evidence form than any other. Then, unlike the effort to apply general principles to the individual case, I am inclined to attempt a truly individualizing psychology. The outcome is more that of a psychological history of one person's drawing serial than it is that of literary psychology. I let the mode stand as it is, however, for others may be able to master what I cannot, or have no desire to. My task seems rather to reconstruct the psychic lawfulness of an individual's drawing serial from its more or less superficial empirical parts (observable, shared, and otherwise inferred). Perhaps this is what Steele really means when he speaks of "theorizing in a nonabstract particular way." I want to reveal, through what Schopenhauer calls the "empirical" (experienced or observed) character, the "intelligible" (partially born, partially potential, partially unrealizable) character of a unique being's artistic path, as this is seen as an aspect of his total intelligible character.16 With the best of evidence at hand, this is perforce an imaginative representation, the end of which is an appreciation and understanding of an individuating force through the forms through which it unfolds. This is why any play with modes is at best didactic, and at worst deceptive.

Still, the modes presented in this chapter do cohere in their presentational emphasis and in their paucity of interpretation. Their expressive or literary quality must be a function of the mind and hand forming them. I invite the admittedly needed improved versions which these scant examples call forth.
Notes for Chapter III


13. Ibid., see especially Chapters 6 and 7.

Chapter IV

Historical and Interpretive Modes Twice Removed from the Artist's Stream of Consciousness

Further Philosophical Considerations Relating to Modes of Inquiry into Expressive Acts

What I wish for is not alternatives in a neutral world, where one method is as good as another; nor is it a cluster of alternatives I can put in a balancing scale or huckster as superior. The Roshomon effect I alluded to earlier does have the positive aim of extensionalizing points of view concerning the expressive situation, but it also indicates that all points of view miss the point of expression. The hope was that we would come to the inexhaustible, infinite notion of expression by converging on the presence of the expressive transaction itself, on its very I-thou character which transcends viewpoints. At best, the clustering of finite and dead alternative extensionalizations would prepare the conceptual grounds for the illimitable, transcendent nature of each expressive movement.

For this effort not to go astray, I have maintained that we need the indirect witness of the artist who lived that expressive movement. We need, that is, closeness to the stream of consciousness that was immersed in expressing. But this is impossible, for reflecting and expressing are opposed movements. We have therefore proposed a means by which the history of events can be recalled meaningfully to the artist. Stimulated recall via process samples, however, is essentially a technique. We have added to that a relationship role, that of a special participant observer. This observer does not just gain rapport. He responds to the very otherness of the other, not only as artist, but as a thou confronting an I. The reality of expression in art as a cognition beyond comprehension is engendered by one in the other within the human dialogue. The latter, as Levinas\(^1\) contends in his conceptualization of the "face to face," is expression, transcendent, impossible of containment in encompassing thought or as a part or function of some totality. Thus we have one dialogue ostensibly taking another as its subject. In the human "face to face" we accept and resurrect, that is, that other presence, the face to face which is the act of expressing in art.

Perhaps the "face" which the artist confronts in the artistic dialogue is actually his own. But this is not meant as a mirror reflection, which grimaces when he grimaces or smiles when he smiles. That would be no dialogue. This is no face-to-face. This is not "expression," again as Levinas\(^2\) means it, coming from "the other" toward "the same." The thrust of intention from the artist is overcome by the swell of meaning rolling back from the project of expression itself.
Nor am I happy with Yeats' concept of the mask,3 according to which the artist plays at a self, an artistic self, "an other" than the ordinary self and one which changes in each act of expression. The mask conjures up too dead an image. The "face" concept is far more potent—a living physiognomy, implicit with and overflowing meaning. It is, again to lean on Levinas4 who at this point speaks most clearly toward a philosophy befitting an art education dynamically and humanly conceived, this very "exteriority," this "otherness," toward which we move from our essential and necessary base in subjectivism and separateness. This otherness is the source of both the ethical and the expressive. I do not express myself. I come to a transaction, an encounter, a dialogue, in which I am overcome, transcended, in the face-to-face where expression occurs. (Levinas, it should be confessed, speaks in a timely and detailed way much as Buber did for me almost two decades ago.) Further, expression then is no satisfaction or fulfillment of my need. It is not taking "the other" and assimilating it to "the same." It is the movement out from a desire that exceeds all need and that is insatiable.5

Dewey6 speaks of the subtlety and fragility of expression in art, wherein the artist must take from what is common and shared and "work" it toward what is personal and subjective (a construction similar to Piaget's7 synthesis of "the expression of ego" and "submission to reality" in the art of the developing child). But the balance is somewhat destroyed in these formulations, although they do conjure up the image of the "hero" who moves out into a courageous encounter. I believe the concepts discussed from Yeats, Dewey, Piaget and others merely reaffirm the idiosyncratic, subjective base, the nearly absolute separation of the self, the I, the same, out of which proceeds the transcendent, the insatiable desire for the other.

The mystical dimension which eludes my own efforts in such discussions resides in the fact that the "self," taken in a depth psychological view, contains "the other," at least in the infinitude of potential expansions we dimly sense in our own internal life. I will term this mystical dimension more akin to Levinas's insatiable desire for the other (which by extension is that for life itself). What I have called the myth of self-identity, a myth which artistic experience promotes, but which in the fashion of true myths never solves or satisfies itself, is a symbol for the infinity of transcendences which is signified implicitly in the depth view of the self. My "works" are dead, but when a fellow human being faces me and we together consider these works, they signify a path, a series of events almost freed from historical time; they signify, if I may be allowed an earlier expression, my soul's thirst—an insatiable one for meaning and for enlargement of the self through genuine dialogue with the non-self, for an ethic of relationship and a life without fear. This is indeed what we want from all otherness. It is a relationship beyond instrumentality and will, what Levinas8 aptly calls a nonallergic relation to the other.
This leads to a distinction between idiographic lawfulness, or between the principles proper to a study of intrapsychic relationships, and the "account" of an individual's artistic serial. The former perspective leads one in the direction of an historical determinism within the single personality. Traditionally this view is opposed to the nomothetic approach, where one discusses principles wherein all (or some) men are alike. But this is not the oppositional continuum upon which I would like this study to be judged. The historical-deterministic approach, whether idiographically or nomothetically oriented, should be opposed to an approach which is non-deterministic and largely ahistorical. I have qualified the latter to a degree because there is a special kind of historical flavor to the artistic serial and to the expressive act itself. But in treating art and expression as ultimate or primitive terms they are no longer converted into objects to be explained or analyzed from the view of a system which assigns them a subordinate place in terms of its own totality. My position is closer to Allport's, which is that events, considered in terms of the individual, and, I would add, within an existential or experiential frame of reference, are ahistorical, cutting across patterns of a lineal time stream. The artistic serial, seen as proactive (not reactive), as superstatic (not homeostatic), as a movement of desire (and not a reduction of need), concatenates a crazy path, evokes a dream-like vision which we can interpret, if at all, only in humility and with trembling, and I have argued, only face to face with the artist in a relationship wherein he can invoke his own peculiarly ahistorical memory of his stream of consciousness in the expressive act. Perhaps it is more to the point to say that a special kind of historical problem exists when we describe the artistic serial.

Yet, I am caught in a contradiction, for I make something of "history," but it is of an existential, projective history. It is, as I have said, seeing the future of the artistic serial as a shared history--one, moreover, which in the sharing is not explained away, is not totalized, is not accounted for, but curiously is rendered indeterministic, pluralized through extension and open reflection, and even mythologized. The final contradiction is that I also must talk about the "cases" I know from some point of view. Hence these elucidations. I must be criticized from the points of view I am developing. All criticisms placed elsewhere are irrelevant. I would like to pluralize, open up, give art back to the artist, meet the artist as my peer and as a significant other upon whom I have no designs. Without criticisms of other efforts, including my own earlier ones, this is the only ethical stance toward inquiry into the making of art I can now take.

The "twist," then, I give cases should be read against this philosophic setting. I agree with Allport when he says that the researcher sooner or later is bound to put his stamp of interpretation on the case, and that he will be able to clarify the interpretation and meaning essential to his inquiry through deliberate selection of those things he deems essential. In this book I have argued for alternative world views and modes of inquiry which, hopefully, will usher in a needed pluralism,
where now we have largely an underdimensionalized science of man based on a reductive model borrowed from the natural sciences which disintegrates the concept and the meaning of artistic experience and the expressive act.

Earlier I cited Collingwood's concept of artistic expression as it relates to the problem of history. The artist, he says, cannot formulate his problem beforehand, because formulation can only be read as synonymous with expression in artistic creation.

This indeed seems to be the special character of art and its peculiar importance in the life of thought. It is the phase of that life in which the conversion from unreflective to reflective thought actually comes about. There is therefore no history of artistic problems, as there is a history of scientific or philosophical problems. There is only the history of artistic achievements.13 (Italics mine.)

It would seem, then, that when in what follows I use that ambiguous term "history," I will be doing so in different ways. First, as concerns a single artist, I can talk of the history of his artistic achievements; but I must qualify even this, because "achievements" is a word usually concealing some external frame of reference, and I have argued that what is achieved is ambiguous and most closely related to the artist's own thought, close to the expressive act where the conversion from unreflective to reflective thought comes about. This is why all inquiries traditionally made into the making of art seem nonsensical to the individual artist. Even in the occasion where he is made an individual case he cannot be generalized within the confines of any conceptual system. At least not as long as he lives and as long as we relate to him. (And even when he is dead, we can still proliferate "interpretations" from the same base of "facts," or find others "shedding new light.") But let us face some of these problems as we introduce the various modes of this chapter.

**Historical Mode**

In Chapter 3 we presented modes once removed from the artist's stream of consciousness. In so doing, the role played by the observer's own feelings was quite important, but these feelings were not made explicit. The special participant observer, through empathy and interest, and by utilizing lab notes, transcriptions of inquiry sessions and pictorial evidence, tried to reconstruct as faithfully as possible what the artist did and made known through shared reflection. In other words, meaning was assumed to be implicit, first within the artist's own recollections as stimulated by process recall, and secondly, by the participant observer's shared feelings within that situation of recollection. Conceptualizations that are reported within the modes of Chapter 3 are those which arise during the inquiry.
dialogue itself. As such, these have the role of guiding the series within which they are situated. In this chapter, however, the special participant observer is asked to remove himself once again to a still more abstract position, that is, one which is twice removed from the artist's stream of consciousness and to develop conceptualizations on top of the materials presented in Chapter 3. This is by no means easy because now the ongoing dialogue and its referent, the creative act, are no longer immediately present for this special participant observer. He now becomes more of an analyst, a person who is reflecting and interpreting what took place in the past. It is for this reason that the modes in this chapter, by and large, come under the term historical.

What is the aim of this special kind of history? First of all, my aim is not to imprison the artist within the confines of a tight conceptual system. Twice removed I risk interpretations, but these are tentative. There is a way in which the task that is upon me is similar to the task which was upon the artist within the inquiry sessions in the drawing lab—that is, I am asked now to reflect upon the experience which I had in the drawing lab with the artist and his ongoing series, just as the artist was asked to reflect upon his own ongoing processes of expression. My effort, thus, is a humble one, just as was the artist's. I will try through reflection to stimulate my own thinking and action forward. I will not solve problems once and for all nor come up with grandiose theories that will be a sure guide for others or for myself. Nevertheless, the effort is to share in a reasonable form reflections and abstractions pertinent to a description of expressive acts. These expressive acts are chained together in the series of one concrete, specific individual, and they occur within a definite context and time line.

At this point it may be worthwhile to digress and borrow some ideas from Gendlin. His focus is on experiencing and how meaning arises therefrom. The meanings which occur in experiencing are preconceptual or implicit. Perhaps an analogy to art would help at this point. The images present within our experiencing seem to be implicit with meaning although we cannot easily or directly attach symbols to them to represent their meaning. We cannot refer to our experiencing of an image without symbols and every symbol which we apply will overlay a different meaning upon the preconceptual order. The mere fact of referring to images in consciousness is, as Gendlin points out, a symbolic act. He calls this method of symbolizing one of direct reference, because it merely points to the feeling or the meaning implicit without conceptualizing it. At this level experiencing could not be shared (although there may be some communicative power in the very tone or expression of reference). Conceptualization, however, does not just refer to what is symbolized but represents it. We must symbolize experiencing for it to be known but it need not be conceptualized.
The special participant observer has the difficult task of not only conceptualizing the artist but at each point experiencing him. At the level of historical interpretation, this special observer must deal with past and present conceptual contents which represent the artist experiencing, but now at several removes. As historian, further, his own present experiencing and conceptualizations are upon him and he has the pressing burden of realizing that each set of symbols which he applies gives a different set of meanings to the events which he is conceptualizing. What results is "not whatever meaning we wish but only just this meaning, which results from the application of this set of symbols to this aspect of experiencing."16

Therefore, to operate in the historical mode I must formulate conceptualizations which represent my experiencing of an individual artist's drawing processes and drawing series as they occurred in a given time and place. Another person could not do this in the same way because he would not be guided by the implicit meanings already present in the preconceptual matrix of my own experiencing of the given series. The conceptualizations and interpretations offered should not exhaust the meanings present in the preconceptual matrix of experiencing, but at the same time they are not arbitrary for they do symbolize that base. It would be possible for a third party to utilize the data or given material from the drawing lab without the base in experiencing, but what would eventuate would be a different kind of order. From the standpoint of the alternatives discussed thus far in this book, this other kind of order would not be acceptable because I have based my presentation on the necessity for closeness to the artist's stream of consciousness and for a special participant observer. Therefore, it is as a special historian I come to these events. I was present at the second order, or once removed, and the third order, or twice removed. As one of my research assistants has put it, my task is that of "describing a description," for the artist's work is already a (symbolic) description of his experiencing. A third party dealing with these data would be operating at the fourth level or thrice removed, and the links between the other levels would be sundered or would have to be imaginatively constructed. His history would not be wrong or false but it would surely be a different history and it would not meet the presuppositions upon which I have based the modes herein presented. Yet there can be no doubt that patterns at this more abstract level can be teased out and may be helpful for varying types of theories and interpretations. They are not, however, the present concern.

How does one proceed at this third level or twice removed? First of all, I would imagine that one would review the case so that all of the material is brought back into consciousness. I would add other procedural "hints" I have found useful: it helps to pick up a case that is not too recent, and it helps to be engaged in a present case (that is, in ongoing research but with a new artist). The data base includes all of the levels discussed within Chapter 3, the levels of mute evidence, the reconstructions of the artist's stream of consciousness,
and the various narratives of multiple viewpoints. The reader will note that this material is in itself uneven in that sometimes it represents mere references to the experiencing whereas at other times it presents various conceptualizations of that experiencing. After reviewing all of the case material, which would be akin to a type of more or less neutral description (although I realize there are difficulties with the word "neutral"), one would then proceed to a new order of conceptualizations. The questions to be directed to any given individual case need have nothing in common with questions to be directed toward other cases. What seems essential, however, is that definite questions be asked or that key concepts or rules for interpretation be advanced. At this point, then, what might be called general principles exist which will give form to what follows. The process is to penetrate to the descriptive base of events by intuition, by recall of thoughts of the artist, by evidence sifting, in short, by any means available to the historian. The historical "work" which follows the elucidation of principles or questions is akin to the work of analysis in behavioral research and would proceed therefrom toward interpretations, conclusions and critique.

I have described the artist as existentially free. By this I mean that he is capable of entering into each new act of expression as though it is an honest dialogue which will transcend his expectations and his plans. One of my concerns, and one which has been supported by selective reading of philosophers and psychologists, is directed toward the kinds of conceptualizations about "arting" which the artist himself constructs and shares in the inquiry sessions. What is the nature of these reflective conceptualizations of a given artist? How does he modify and extend them from one time to another? How do these conceptualizations relate to the feelings he expresses during the inquiry sessions? What changes in processes of drawing seem to occur thereafter? Such are the abstract questions which concern me at this level. I have indicated, however, that, being general, they may not be the right questions for a given case. To put this to a trial let us consider anew one or more of the passages already referred to in Chapter 3.

Please note that the conceptualizations or art concepts of which I speak are not abstract concepts to be thought of apart from the individual case context and history to which they refer. They may indeed have some meaning in a more abstract, generalizable form if they appear from time to time in a number of cases, but that is left at this point for another inquiry. The test of work in this mode is not whether the interpretations are of use to the artist but whether they do in fact add to our insight into and our appreciation of the inexhaustable meanings implicit within art experiencing.

Perhaps I can explain further what I mean by using a personal example. As a Master's paper a student17 has recently done a biographical sketch of my own work in pottery. As she accumulated the material,
transcribed interviews with me and with those who had worked with me, or known me or taught me, and proceeded to analysis and interpretation, she did in fact present for my own consumption points of view and abstractions which I would not have come to on my own. These, however, seem to have little if any impact on my present thinking and work as I come to new pottery experiences. The latter aim, we would have to say, was not the purpose of the biographical sketch and analysis.

I will use as a base for this discussion some of the materials already presented on the case of Larry which appear in Chapter 3. The reader is referred to the following passages given in chronological order: (1) October 2, 1968, pp. 43-44 (2) September 25, to December 8, 1968, pp. 52-59 (3) January 28, 1970, pp. 31-38 (4) April 15, 1970, pp. 41-43 If other data are referred to they will be given in this section; otherwise the reader will be referred to the passages outlined above. This approach will permit me to refrain from giving extensive new material.

**Larry's Conceptualizations about Arting**

Larry tries to invent "pen figures" which are equivalent to discriminations he perceives in nature. He wonders how to show light with black pen lines. He seems to conclude: "I can invent medium-tool devices tentatively equivalent to my visual impressions."

Concept: The artist can be master of the world out there which he is trying to represent. He can change sizes, tilt objects, leave items out, etc.

Concept: "Pen figures" can represent simultaneously more than one visual impression—e.g., "If I use wriggly lines which vary in weight and density I can represent both the texture of a tree trunk and the degree of light and shadow present at the same time."

Concept: Technical mastery, basic discipline, as in a craft, precedes satisfactory representation, which in turn is the basis for "expression." "If I can use the hammer and saw I can build something I want to."

Concept: Just as texture and light can be merged into one problem, so technical control and expressive qualities can be seen as interdependent, not separate problems. "I can work at both feeling and technique together."

Concept: The right texture and form can be represented by direct pen strokes if one visualizes the whole first. Forms in nature need not be represented by a bounded outline. "I can organize a lot of complexity if I remain open and keep my eye on the whole I am after. Techniques within a given drawing must be consistent. I can't draw the lips with a tight outline if nothing else is so drawn."
Concept: The projection of a solid like a head in a drawing requires spatial strategies. Related concept: A clear failure in representation can pinpoint a difficulty and bring it to consciousness. "I made the angle of the features different from the angle of the head as a whole, but the proper angle of the face is a reference point that should lead to a correction of that."

Spatial representation requires conceptual mastery not just trying to copy what's out there.

Quick sketches and incomplete drawings can move one more fully toward solutions of representational problems. "I guess I loosened up a bit. I really was tight."

Concept: The world of art is much broader, much more exciting than the problems of representational mastery. "Guernica blew my mind. I saw two vastly different exhibitions (Flavin, Montenegro). The idea of art cannot be restricted. Yet all of these experiences were pleasant."

Concept: Confidence and feeling on the artist's part are an essential part of art expression. "That part which is mine alone, which I have strong feelings about, is important in art, just as it is in the art of others I enjoy."

Concept: There are modes of drawing which are more abstract which communicate visually as well as or better than representational ones. "I have done something not so much concerned with realism--a visual experience, something different."

Concept: Once one becomes liberated from realism only, interested in free exploration of media, in visual experiences which are different, in responding to the full range of art appreciatively, and in allowing a drawing to have levels of meaning which need not be pinned down, the world of expression and feeling opens up for him. "It is more of an effect, a visual experience, rather than just a representation."

Concept: Visual impressions and the feelings they arouse can be captured through explorations with media and tools in the act of expression. "I think I could get the lacy effect of trees against the gray sky with quick, thin brush strokes without applying too much pressure."

Concept: Reflection on the analogical, metaphorical quality of visual impressions aids one's efforts of expression. "I wanted to have them look like they are tumbling. It didn't look like a ramshackle house but as kind of opposed to a solid brick house...like an old wooden shack that was half crushed in...kind of bent out of shape."
Concept: The mood pervading a place can be captured in a drawing of it (the Ebervale post office). Guided by feeling, one learns what to represent and how to do it. "I didn't bring the black coal dumps down to the roof. I just thought it looked better that way. It was kind of like a flatter type of thing. Kind of a flat behind a flat. Here it is not just a visual thing but kind of an image of a feeling."

Concept: Ideas will come without forcing them and will come while working. "It was the mood way. I was doodling and all of a sudden there was something there. Everything kind of went around it from there."

(February 4, 1970. This is new material not available from sections of Chapter 3) Concept: Exploration of media, tools, and the textures and spaces on a page are interesting in end of themselves, without guidance of a mood or visual impression beforehand. "I used a swirling kind of stroke and played around with the brush. I tried to get interesting spaces in between as I went along, to catch the eye and give movement. It was not just exploring the form but the medium too."

(February 4, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3) Concept: Methods used earlier can be used again but on a higher level with new ingredients which extend them. (On November 20, 1968, Larry did a drawing which was pure brush experimentation. He made a gridwork then used different brushes, different strokes, differing amounts of water and ink within them. On February 4, 1970, the exploration of medium was not tied to a rigid division of the page, but was part of an open exploration of space, movement, form and texture.) "I just kept doing something, developing without anything special in mind. I was just sort of trying to feel out the brush and do things with it."

(February 11, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3). Concept: There are complex interactions between experiences, associations and drawing processes. Example: Larry drew a pistol without a hand or background, pointing directly at the observer of his drawing. On the way to the drawing lab he ran into an acquaintance who was going to teach in a black school and was going to carry a gun to school. He visualized the pistol as a heavy, massive, black cold object, at point blank range--a machine that almost activated itself without a human attached to it. He picked up a chisel shaped brush and used only it, a square tip, to construct very carefully the black rounded forms (see Fig. 7 in the appendix).

"I didn't realize what I was getting myself into until I made that first stroke, then I knew. It was kind of like an extra discipline for me." (The process emerged but the image was a strong guiding one from the start.) "I had the visual image when I was talking with this kid, and it just kind of hit me. It was a terrifying thing. I just felt that this gun was pointing right at me." (Larry had used a pistol just
once before.) "I didn't like it very much--I don't like what it does to me. I can't find any relationship between what I do with it and myself. It is almost like--that thing there, almost commands itself. It's a free agent. It is so easy to shoot something. I didn't really conceive that I could do it. I even shot a turtle one time with a rifle, and it was so mechanical I didn't feel like I did it. Like somebody else did."

(February 25, 1970. New material not in chapter 3.) Concept: Reflection can build up the idea of how one's successful drawings are held together. (Larry begins to conceptualize the ways he likes to go about drawing or painting.) "I think I start out with some kind of idea in my mind but with only the bare idea about it. Sort of a Structure...Kind of an organization before I start out. I get the things that are set in my mind, and from there I kind of develop around it. I kind of rely a bit on the brush, you know, and how things are turning out. The feeling is kind of the whole thing. Right from the start, from the structure to the different things I have in my mind visually that I want to try to work out, that feeling is always the kind of main drive. Kind of holds it together."

(February 25, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: A transaction occurs between drawing, the medium, and real life experience. Example: Larry at many points mentions becoming more sensitively aware of his visual environment (e.g., the greenness of the grass and the shapes in it, or how black the doorway is in a saloon entrance.) He also responds to qualities of medium for their own sake (e.g., how he liked a stroke which went from dark and wet to lighter and dry, almost around an entire form; or how good it felt to lay on dabs of thick plastic gray paint).

(April 8, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3). Concept: The artist can abstract out the qualities he feels exist in his most successful drawings. (Larry reviews his work from the second 10-week series.) "They are stark. A lot of the others are spread all over the paper. In these there is some kind of an impact." (He finds similar qualities in an exhibition he just saw.) "The ones I liked took a simple thing, like maybe galoshes near a sink, and maybe just the visual thing was captured. They were just there...I wouldn't say the lines so much but the shapes that were used to make it. It made a powerful image when you looked at it. It was something striking."

(April 8, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: The artist need not feel he is trapped in a single line of development. (Larry does not feel he must convince himself that he is always "developing"). "Each one is a different exploration. They don't culminate in anything."
(April 8, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: In-process development and interaction, or a dialogue with a drawing as it evolves, is an accepted way of working. (Larry's explanation.) "Even the stark ones were done in-process. The shapes came out differently than I planned to at first." (Question to Larry: Even with the gun?) "The gun I let go its own way. I started with the position of the barrel, and even with that, I expanded the side of the barrel until I felt it was big enough or strong enough. I just built around it."

(April 8, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: It is possible to conceptualize about what is "purely visual" in art. (Larry's explanation.) "When I think of some of the great art, it gives you such a strong visual sense in one way or another. They were so aware of what they were seeing." (Different example.) "You might be driving along in a car or walking along, or just sitting, and happen to glance at something...It just somehow, I don't know, falls together. Almost by accident." (Further example.) "I think it is a combination of mood and physical condition...Not going around in a half-ass way, at a lower level of awareness, not being fully alive, not being all that perceptive. I used to think of it as kind of an animal like awareness. It is just a superhuman awareness. You are just kind of really alive in a human way; you are seeing things and not just letting things go by...The gun hit me that way."

(April 8, 1970. New Material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: One can perceive himself as an artist—not a "professional" but an artist nevertheless. (Larry's reasoning.) "I'm an artist...maybe not, quote, like Picasso—but I think everyone can be an artist, in their own way...In the kind of expression they can work on. I think that raises a question...That everyone should have the kind of experience, you know, of trying to...of expression. A kind of a good thing...for a human to do...It affects the total life this way. You know (laughs) I look at these...I don't know if I'd hang them up in my apartment or not. Among you I could feel open, but maybe someone would look at them and "Yechh"...You know it's nothing but to me I can say it's bad but still there is something."

Concept: Directed by a pervasive mood, an open attitude, and a dialectic of exploration of tools and media, new methods are invented by the artist during the on-going drawing process. In the example given, on pp. 41-43 some technical innovations for Larry occur: The use of three different brushes for three different shades of black, white, and gray; the use of white on white to keep an open area solid, not empty; the use of suggestion, vagueness, undefined strokes in areas where emphasis should not detract from more important areas; making black something precious so it counts as something symbolic.
(April 15, 1970. New material not in Chapter 3.) Concept: The act of drawing is its own intense reality. (Larry's example.) "When you're in there, you are face to face with the visual problem. You can't just have some vague undefined thoughts. You've got to get right to it. You can't evade...I don't know what you are doing when you are drawing--your feelings, your perceptions, you have to be more aware of them."

Analysis

Already under that part of Chapter 3 headed Literary Psychology I have attempted some interpretations, in the form of summaries of Larry's case. The reader is referred to the last two paragraphs of that example, (pp. 58-59.) At this point I am going to try to summarize with more brevity the twenty-six items representing Larry's conceptualizations of how he acts. These are given in the order of their previous presentation.

1. The artist is the source of invention, selection, and mastery.
2. Drawing elements cognized separately interact producing higher order principles.
3. Skill is the basis upon which to build expression.
4. Skills and expression are interdependent.
5. Visualization of the whole can lead to sensitive handling of complex ideas and usher in a principle of consistency.
6. Specific failures reflected upon can pinpoint solutions.
7. Conceptualization guides representational efforts.
8. Relaxing control, quick sketches, and the like, can help solve some representational problems.
9. Art is pluralistic; many different qualities can be enjoyed.
10. The artist's confidence in himself and his own feelings guides his expression.
11. Departure from realism can in itself be expressive.
12. Visual phenomena have implicit meanings which, teased out as metaphors, guide expression.
13. A pervasive mood organizes and guides the drawing process.
14. Ideas must not be forced; with patience they come, in-process.
15. Medium and process without regard to representation and mood are intrinsically exciting.

16. Older drawing ideas can be redone on a higher level, as on a spiral.

17. Strong life experiences and the experience of the drawing process balance towards equivalence of structure.

18. Under a sufficient history of experience an artist can conceptualize his own consistent successful strategy, and use it like a flexible plan.

19. Drawing experience and perception of the world interact to enhance each other.

20. Qualities of one's drawings perceived as successful can be abstracted and reflected upon, as a kind of self revelation.

21. While influenced by past drawings, one is free not to develop along a line; he can explore.

22. The dialogic, transformational nature of the art process is accepted and preferred.

23. Art has to do with things "purely visual" and with a heightened, special kind of perception.

24. One can see himself as an artist (though not a professional). This perception of a special artistic self is good for everyone.

25. Under a pervasive mood and open mind, new methods will emerge in-process.

26. The act of drawing is its own intense experiential encounter.

How shall I proceed to further analyze and interpret these conceptualizations, abstracted from a mass of material which spans more than two years? Let's play with some ground rules.

First, though, I want to acknowledge again that the twenty-six "concepts about arting" just presented above owe their origin to the basic questions I asked on pages 67-68. They are a function of my intuition as to what can, in an abstract way, describe dynamics of change in a series of drawings of a given individual, where a special participant observer gains indirect access to the artist's stream of consciousness. Other questions asked, by myself or by my research assistants (also special participant observers), would eventuate in a different set of abstracted concepts.
So, the first influence, which is one not showing and one therefore not easily criticized, is that established by the basic set taken toward the data, the history, as a whole. Secondly, guided by that set, the working conceptualizations which Larry holds at various times in the series are abstracted, at this point with more supporting evidence, in the form of things he said or implied. Thirdly, these are rephrased in a brief, direct statement.

Now, how to proceed? The time-line can be examined to see how the concepts distribute themselves in time (the points are numerically in chronological order). Against this time-line, that is, further or more abstract concepts can be played. Some of these are fairly obvious.

Illustration: How conscious is Larry of his own drawing series or drawing history, and how does this consciousness enter into his conceptualizations about arting? I feel that six of the points (16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24) clearly refer to conceptualizations dependent on the cumulative nature of the series. Some of these are fairly obvious (16, 18, 20); others are subtle (19, 21, 24). They all occur, as would be expected, toward the latter part of the time-line.

But these same points can be absorbed into other questions equally well (still with reference to the time-line). Suppose we raise the more abstract question of Larry's emerging consciousness of an artistic self-identity. Here my eye would pick out a larger number of points, and these would incorporate the six already listed under "series effect" (8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26; the series effect points are underscored). Again, these occur "with time." They show attitudes and in-process thinking which conceives of arting as a dynamic, interactive dialogue, between image, feeling and medium.

In fact, if I look at the points for what I would call "in-process thinking" (indicated by 10, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 26) and combine these with the earlier "drawing series effect" (16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24), I would pretty well account for Larry's emerging artistic self-identity, as I have picked it out (only three points out of fifteen would fail to merge into "artistic self-identity" when "series" and "process" are combined). I am not making a strong case for this play with numbered points, for it is not a statistical procedure at all, but a way of speaking more abstractly about a greater number of concepts than the mind can manipulate simultaneously. I cannot keep fifteen points in mind at one time. But I can indicate that what I feel represents Larry's emerging "artistic self-identity" is composed largely of the stable cumulative history of his own drawings (which he is able to reflect on, interconnect, and evaluate over a recorded series; so that he can conceptualize that very series as regards qualities of drawings, strategies of drawing, his freedom or determined nature in the series, and the like) and of his consciousness of "in-process thinking" and his acceptance thereof. It seems all too bald, but I am saying that for Larry it looks as though his artistic self-identity is comprised of consciousness of a history of arting and a movement toward in-process thinking.
Still other concepts occur toward the latter part of the time-line. Larry speaks of art-life interactions (17, 19, 23). He becomes conscious of the guiding power of feeling and mood (10, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25). He plays with what might be called a nascent "theory of art" (9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 20, 23, 24, 26). And he responds to what I have called "idiosyncratic meaning" (4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20). He also gives evidence of a capacity for "inner drawing" (4, 5, 7, 16, 18, 20, 21). Many of these points overlap with the large "artistic self-identity" category. Certainly, if one can cognize his own drawing history; is developing an open theory of art; is aware of idiosyncratic meaning, mood and feeling; sees art and life as transactionally interdependent; and tends toward in-process dynamics, then he is constructing a viable artistic self-identity, I would argue. In so saying, I realize I put value connotations on top of what was at first an effort to merely play categories against Larry's conceptualizations about arting, as these were arranged on a time line.

But Larry had some things "going for him" from the start. If I pick out points concerning "artistic causality" (1, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24); or "intentional symbolization" (1, 7, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 23); or indicators of "confidence over fear" (1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26), then, as the reader can see, these spread throughout the twenty-six points rather evenly. This would indicate that Larry entered into the thirty weeks of self-instructed drawing (spread over two and one-half years) with an attitude that could be adjudged favorable to change toward an emerging artistic self-identity open to dynamic, interactive forces within the art process itself. He saw himself as an active force, capable of taking liberties with the medium and with the world "out there." He had feelings, ideas, and purposes consciously in mind from the start which he wished to express, and these were not wildly out of line with what he might hope to do. While not always happy with his efforts, he did not seem afraid to try new things. He felt relatively secure and confident. One is reminded of some of the research in psychotherapy which suggests that those showing marked improvement often have, from the start, a greater degree of self-insight and empathy, and a more favorable self-attitude, than those not showing comparable improvement. It is as though a weak signal is picked up and amplified.

What, however, is the specific history of Larry's changes in his conceptualizations about art and arting? Quite early he found (2)* that "elements" (such as different "pen-figures") invented separately interacted to form new super-elements or methods (light-shade and

*As before, the numbers refer to the 26 previously listed conceptualizations about how Larry thinks of art and arting.
texture were not independent representational problems). In like manner, he had to revise his first notion that skill preceded expression (3) and acknowledge that skill and expression were part of the "dialectics" of drawing, influencing each other (4). He learned to envision and plan the whole drawing to a degree, which, coupled with an eye on how the parts come together, allowed him to handle complex ideas in a consistent manner (5). At this point, he was limited to representational drawing. He realized, however, that mastery of such drawing skills was not a matter of capturing the illusion of appearances, but required his ability to conceive of space and solids, for example (7), to try an idea out and learn what went wrong (6), and to explore in more relaxed manner alternative representations (8).

Nevertheless, as our data from the interviews with Larry shows, he was feeling depressed and tight, even while slowly mastering representational skills and his power to visualize, explore, and conceptualize in this drawing mode. He learns, very quickly to an observer's eye, three important concepts about art: art has many faces and these are to be responded to and enjoyed in its own way (9); the artist centers his faith on his inner feelings rather than on skills for representing what's "out there" (10); and furthermore, the very departure from what's "out there" is in itself loaded with expressive potential (11). The account indicates some of the specific life-art events concurrent with these rather dramatic changes. (From my view, Larry's history up to this point would not have "predicted" such a noticeable shift or transformation.)

Thereafter, some consolidation of this changed view toward art and arting takes place. These are less dramatic, but important for self-direction. He plays with the analogical, metaphorical aspect of visual phenomena (12), and allows symbolic aspects of drawings to float freely, not pinned down. Not just visualization but feeling and mood guide and integrate complex drawings (13), and even interact with the power to imagine. He handles himself like a responsive, trusted instrument, which must not be forced but which will respond in action (14). He is willing to set aside representation and even mood (as associations with objects and places experienced) to explore those aspects of medium, tool, and evolving formal properties which are intrinsically interesting (15).

He sees that his own drawing history can be conceptualized (16, 18, 20) in a way which allows him to maximize his potential expression, continuity, and mastery. Yet he need not be determined by his past. Drawings can explore new alternatives because one is conscious of older solutions; they need not culminate deterministically in the next logical development (21). He finds art both more fun and excitement, but also more serious and demanding. Art and life interact (17, 19) more and more, and Larry develops a conceptualization about things "purely visual," which guides him in his drawings and influences toward a heightened perception of the world around him.
Finally, he accepts the open, changing dialogue which is creation in art (22), trusting that he and his methods will evolve and be transformed in-process (25). The act of drawing becomes an encounter, a reality all of its own (26); and Larry knows that he is (and when he is) an artist, though without professional pretensions. He thinks that this is intrinsically valuable and good, not only for himself but probably for everyone.

We have seen, in review, the development of a strengthened sense of artistic self-identity in Larry, nurtured in the matrix of his own cumulative drawing actions and in the review of these by interested but counter-intervening special participant observers. Apart from the peculiar conditions obtaining in the drawing laboratory, it appears that Larry's artistic self-identity overlaps with his consciousness of his own series history and with his gradual acceptance of in-process thinking within the drawing act itself. Undergirding the above "difficult" and highly abstract conceptualizations about his arting, we find Larry aware of changes in his perception occasioned by his immersion in art; we see that his own experiences and feelings guide him through a drawing; and we see that he can draw "inside his head" as time goes on, and tease out meanings peculiarly his own. He also enlarges his concept of art to include much more than representation. Larry began with a "good attitude" toward himself and art, but nevertheless had to come to a kind of crisis where he transcended his self-imposed limitations (even though he had been developing within his own rules). He moves beyond representation toward symbolized feeling, toward the "purely visual," and to the dynamic aspects of medium and the forming process. He utilizes himself as an instrument responsive within an encounter. He knows that he is an artist. He knows when he is an artist.

Summary of the Historical Modes

I have spent some time presenting a partial case history as illustrative of an effort at historical analysis and interpretation. I have tried to revive the events of that history on an abstract level. I have tried to escape from an historical determinism which projects the idea of an antecedent-consequence kind of causality. What has emerged is admittedly a function of Larry's stream of consciousness as reconstructed through stimulated recall and of my experience as a special participant observer who shared that history by direct observation and by interaction within the recall inquiry sessions. I was present at the birth of the conceptualizations presented. While I feel they are Larry's, I acknowledge my role, and the role of the drawing laboratory procedures, in bringing them to consciousness. I also acknowledge that the wording of the concepts as they finally appear in this analysis is mine, as is the analysis and interpretation of them.

The ultimate objective of such a presentation is that of understanding and appreciating a history of change of a given artistic serial. While conditioned, contingent, and determined from the point
of view of the artist's consciousness, the artistic serial is proactive, superstatic. Artistic causality, intentional symbolization, idiosyncratic meaning, and a growing artistic self-identity are assumed to be realities of that serial, existentially considered. The artistic and the creative emerge within this history of a live creature in a particular kind of world.

Procedurally, I have operated much as does a critic or an historian, who describes, analyzes, and interprets. The process is as follows: assumptions → designation and simple description → appropriate data → establishment of explicit set or of ground rules for interpretation → abstraction according to guiding set or ground rules, with evidence supporting the abstracted properties → simplification of abstracted properties into still more abstract form (for ease of manipulation) → analysis, by comparisons, sequences, reflections against a time-line, development of superordinate concepts, and the like (all of this guided by the set or the ground rules) → summarization and interpretation → critique of the process.

Please note again, in closing this section, that, according to the basic assumptions of this book, it is a special kind of history with which we are concerned. It is neither a strict positivism nor a pervasive subjectivism (rationalism, idealism) which guides this effort, but rather, as Van Kaam effectively indicates, the acceptance of man as both contingent and free, as concerned with meaning and value in his experience in the world. We are creatures who deal symbolically with our own experiencing. The existence of art as a dynamic process guided by an agent finding his path in the expressive act in the real world is the ground we must accept. Else there is no art and we study something else. The artist is not a rock, but a man creating meaning.

Existential-Phenomenological Reconstruction and Analysis of the Drawing Process

In this mode a closer look is taken of the reconstructed drawing process, utilizing the artist's stimulated recall of the drawing plus the special participant observer's enlargement of the subjective frame of reference through an effort to show linkages between the psychic events within the artist and observable external events. The latter are to be read as process feedback (and its likely transformation within the artist), interruptions, special medium changes and difficulties, suggestions from others, spread-effect from previous drawings, and the like.

As in the historical mode just presented, the set or viewpoint of the researcher is quite important to the presentation and analysis and should be made as explicit as possible. The general method is akin to the multiple consciousness narrative of Chapter three, except that now the effort is less narrative and more contingent on the artist's and the special participant observer's roles and the privileged viewpoints
and inferences proper to each. In general, as I approach this task, I am still operating largely as counsel in the artist's defense, but I bring to bear other concepts which I cannot disown without giving up my very perception of the extenuating circumstances and of the psychic events which are to be reconstructed and appraised.

The set toward which I am inclined might be called one stressing "artistic-expressive cybernetics." By this I mean that I am inclined to focus upon the transactional process whereby the artist's intention (idea, feeling or imagery, with its attendant implicit, idiosyncratic meaning) is projected by some selective initial strategy or act, recycled and evaluated as in-process feedback, transformed in both symbolic and procedural ways, and on into a new cycle of transformation selection or application, action, feedback, and so on. I choose this model because I believe that it best fits the drawing process. Whereas in my earlier work, however, I studied drawing strategies and conditions affecting them, and therefore took a more objective, external reference point, I now seek to play the subjective-objective conditions, as reconstructed, against each other: for drawing is neither one nor the other. While overwhelmingly subjective and covert from one point of view, it nevertheless occurs in the real world, where drawings get begun, developed, torn-up or finished; where the hand pushes or draws or strokes a soft, carbon pencil, for example, on this sheet of paper, in this kind of setting, and where the drawing in question was proceeded and followed by another, as part of one person's artistic serial.

When, therefore, I attempt an existential-phenomenological reconstruction and analysis of the drawing process, I am no longer the special participant observer, but an inquirer at still a higher level of abstraction who reflects on all of the material—the mute evidence (especially the drawings adjacent in a series, and the in-process time-lapse photos of the drawing selected for analysis), the inquiry attempting to share the artist's stream of consciousness as recalled under the stimulus of his own reviewed processes, and the observers' "laboratory notes" which indicate perceived structure in the recall and contingencies within the environment.

It is true that phenomenological observers often state that they try to set aside "assumptions" while they put all their energy into "attending" to their "feelings" vis-a-vis the phenomena of concern. Still, as I have earlier indicated, the very process of symbolization of the "attended-to-feelings" is one which, while not arbitrary, is selective, representative, and partial, and this of necessity. I chose terms such as "image", "intention", "feedback", "transformation", and the like because these seem representative of my more abstract reflections on my drawing processes and those of others whose processes I can to some privileged degree share. Therefore, even while attempting to attend to the unique drawing process upon which I focus, I attend to its uniqueness as fitting and departing from some mind set (which for the reader and for the sake of analysis I feel should be
made explicit). An ambiguity creeps in here, because I cannot attend without some set, even as my perceptual apparatus itself so operates. Yet, in transaction with the phenomena, through reflection on my feelings, I can clarify and revise that set. Further, even my "raw data," especially my "laboratory notes" and my questions to the artist during the inquiry on process recall, have within them implicit but less conscious views, on my part. While these can be themselves the subject of an analysis, I am inclined to accept them as "the given" upon which further analysis will be performed. I operated thus in the historical mode given earlier in this Chapter.

In order to save space, I am going to use material presented earlier in this book as the basis for a beginning effort in this mode. The reader is referred to the "first-person singular narrative" example (pages 41-43), in which Larry's depiction of a downtown section of Baltimore is described (Figure 3 reproduces this drawing). As a further basis for new reflections on this drawing six out of eighteen available time-lapse process shots of the evolution of Larry's drawing are presented in Figure 8, in the appendix. I will also draw upon a transcription of the inquiry session which immediately followed the drawing, stimulated by the replay of the videotape which recorded the entire drawing's history (this transcription was the basis for the "first-person singular narrative" on pages 41-43). The sequences of the drawing will be referred to according to the eighteen process samples, six of which are given in Figure 8 (as photo 1, 2, etc.).

(Photos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) In this sequence Larry lays in the central, subject of the scene, the building with the bar on the street level. He begins with broad quick strokes of a flat brush, allowing the paint to change from loaded to dry brush. Already in Photo 2 he has set down the crucially lettered "Bar" sign and the frame of the door beneath it. By photo 4, the partly opened door and the blackness inside the bar are suggested and the tones spread to the undescribed building beyond the bar entrance. Larry wanted to convey the feeling he was right in the midst of this street scene, and that it was overpowering. I thought he was viewing it at first from up above, but he corrected me. He said: "The feeling I had was not being above, by any means. It was being...everything was stronger than me, sort of."

His first strokes (photos 1, 2) were meant to get down in open fashion, the main idea. "I was trying to use stronger, bolder strokes," he said in the inquiry session, adding with an implied negative evaluation, "but you just need a lot more practice to do it." He admitted that the first strokes were a base to work within—kind of a foothold. These strokes retain their beginning identity until photo 10, when they begin to expand into a probe to determine what those buildings are like above the street level, over the bar—and the "Naked Show" which gets sketched in by photo 6 and labelled finally by photo 9 (impressionistic sign). The billboards do not get a suggestion of
a burlesque type figure until photo 17. The bar, by photo 4, is described: "It has an open entrance with the darkness around it."

"This is open here, you mean?" I asked.

"Yeah, and you see the darkness," Larry replied. "Terrifying! These bars are darker than any I've ever seen. It confounded me, sort of. I put real heavy white strokes on it...thick."

The white strokes refer to the sidewalk which gets laid in by photo 6, just as the decorative marquee of the burlesque house was outlined. What drew Larry to the sidewalk at this point? Was it to establish a feeling for "ground" or was it the contrast of outside and sidewalk with the darkness inside the bar. Perhaps it was the next extension to work within later, much as the only partially committed strokes of "building above the bar" had been. (Why, too, do untrained draftsmen often begin from the top down, and thus, moreover, when they arrive at some of their most solid constructions, according to their evaluations?)

Larry helped answer some of my questions. "Well, I was kind of looking for contrast. I didn't want a white sidewalk in Baltimore, by any means; I did dirty them up a bit. I wanted to get that...it was feeling good--the paint was feeling good right there."

By photo 8 the dark entrances to the burlesque house and two framing billboards are painted in, and at 9, as indicated,"Naked Show" appears on the marquee. During this sequence, Larry pauses to consider what to do next. He says that a lot of things were going on in his mind.

"When you say 'a lot of things'--were you thinking ahead as well as of what you were doing'?" I asked.

Larry replied: "I was kind of getting hit with all kind of possibilities of improving my technique, of expanding the things that I'm doing. I could see...later on, not here so much, a little later I was struck with the idea of getting a different color. These colors, these shades, are limited here. First of all, I thought I'd like to use some red, or some brown. I was working on something there, and I thought 'maybe if I give it a little touch of white.'"

"Like you're tinting a color?" I asked.

"Yeah, like if I drew this here, just to highlight it with a little bit of white...not so it's noticeable, but it just kind of works on the eye in an unconscious way."

Larry, then, refers to direct strokes, to improving his technique, to the plastic quality of heavy white strokes, and to the feeling of
"color" and how he could represent it with his black and white acrylic paints. At the same time as these procedural concerns were on his mind, they were process developments and not the end of his efforts, for he was guided by a strong feeling of the presence of that environment with him in the middle of it. In prior drawings, when he tries to suggest "feeling" or "mood" he seems to evoke a criterion of what is consistent throughout, but he also tries to suggest feeling by the very way he handles the medium. He tells me during the inquiry: "If you look at it carelessly, you can see it a lot better."

It seems, thus, that Larry wants to keep his painted drawing somewhat vague, suggestive, or impressionistic. I could not read the signs above the bar and burlesque at first, for example. He also wants to pull things out of the vagueness only when they become symbolic or can really count—things like the blackness of the entrances or the solidity of the sidewalks.

He did not really want to be impressionistic he told me, but literal—literal in the way that caught his feelings: "It's like—like, when I see things that kind of strike me, it's not an impressionistic blur—it's cold—it's not cold, that implies an emotional feeling—but it's there, you know, it's for real."

"A stark kind of feeling?" I asked, because he had referred to such a purely "visual" quality before.

"Yeah, I wanted to get that, because I think it's true to the way I feel about it. At the same time I wanted to get these strokes, you know?"

"This modulation between the strokes and this feeling, this visual effect, you're trying to get?" I risk.

"You see, by the strokes I was trying to get some of the forms, the shapes and...I think I'm seeing a little more strongly than when I first started painting—a little more, like aware. I can't even explain it. Sometimes it hits me like, I see things like—let's see—like walking up—I'll give you an example—walking up here this morning, I was so aware that the grass is greener. It's like, in front of the HUB, there were shapes in the grass. Like the trees, you know, the limbs, the heavier limbs, there were some maples."

Larry then corroborated that handling the drawing medium and tools interacted with this developing visual sense. "Yeah, I think they're related...like this is somehow developing my awareness."

"The acts of perception and the acts of painting kind of mix together?" I asked.
"Yeah. You see these forms and things I saw walking by here in State College, and the atmosphere, the clean air, nature, and safe feeling."

So this was in Larry's mind that morning, as a contrast with Baltimore. "It really hit me," he said of that contrast, "The forms were all too much for a man to handle. The only people that could exist were broken down whores and bums that drank...what were they drinking: Adrura port, or something like that. These are broken down people, you know. That's the only people you see...you just don't live there without getting affected."

I dwell on this description and on the contrast of that morning because these were apparently occasions of strong feeling and perception in Larry's experiencing, and he was struggling to make the drawing session symbolize some of this. Much is condensed, as in a dream, which is relevant to any given drawing.

By photo 9, changes occurred in the drawing I couldn't quite follow, so I asked: "This you brought in here, beside the bar door?"

"It says 'naked show'. I didn't care to make it real clear."

"I read it as kind of a theater entrance," I said.

"And a black door," Larry added, "It really didn't have a black door--but it kind of hit me that everything you looked into was black."

"The bar and the theater...and you're suggesting kind of the feelings of the people, too," I state, trying to probe further for his meaning.

"Yeah," Larry reflects, "they're surrounded in this darkness."

By photo 10, Larry has completed, for the time being, the bar, the burlesque theater, and the sidewalk. He now returns to "that which is above the street floor." This had been left purposefully vague and undefined, although it was represented by the very first strokes laid down in photo 1. Now, in photo 10, he expands those initial strokes, widening them and containing them with a vertical area from the division between the bar and the burlesque to the top of the page. In photo 10 there is still no indication of the dormer type window which appears by photo 11, but Larry allows the uncovered and scrubbed areas of the building facade to remain for incorporation into the window superimposed over it.

Larry describes this sequence: "Here, I was getting down those grays (photo 10, 11), but they just didn't go along with the rest of the picture. I had to break it up a bit."
"You just didn't want to fill it in?" I asked, sensing a consistency principle being applied, gathered from the staccato and broken effect of the drawing up to now. "This is just like building above the bar?" I further inquire.

"Yeah. Like first floor, second floor--I don't know what they have up above, but it--everything from the ground up, is dingy."

"You didn't want it too defined?"

"No. You're kind of surrounded by these feelings, these walls."

"The kind of things you remember are like the blackness and the general dinginess?" I inquire.

"Yeah, and it's like that's the whole thing. Like even if you look up in the sky there's smog. In fact, you don't even have to look up, it's there. It's on you."

"There," said Larry referring to the T.V. screen and the phase corresponding to photo 11, "I put a window in, kind of. I really didn't have anything in mind."

"A kind of d: mer-like thing?"

"Yeah, a big old window. There's all kinds. You can really get into windows like that. Big windows like that on second floors are kind of interesting. They're all over the place and they're all different. I thought maybe it would, like, tie things together a little bit more."

Larry didn't like the plain gray, so he sorted through his mind and came up with the big window. He said he knew he had a lot of eye-catching stuff on the bottom and that he'd have to get "something to balance out the top and make it come together somehow."

By photo 12, Larry is trying to solve the problem of the untouched space above the burlesque theater in the upper left half of the page. He puts a few stroke marks down and studies it. "I looked at it, and it did something. I don't know what exactly." He settles on what he called "nash marks" (interestingly, he had used "dash marks" in with his "pen figures" two years before).

"I'm putting these dash marks--it's somehow appropriate, but I really don't know just what it elicits in me when I look at it. (These dash marks are laid in during photos 12, 13.) I started to think about it then and realized it was kind of an impressionistic type of thing, but it did something--I don't know what. Like, you know, the tops of these buildings are all different and I thought maybe I'd try to portray that this is, maybe, a large brownstone--something like that. I didn't really know but I thought I'd get maybe like a different shape in there."
Thus a change from a freely brushed, gray fill-in, over which a large dormer is superimposed to "dash marks" symbolized different treatments for different kinds of buildings. He points out to me that he's working with bigger brushes and stronger strokes. He says, "I used a lot of power with the brush."

No discernible change occurs at first in photo 14. Larry is here contemplating his work. There is one change, however. The window shades on the large dormer window are made solid with whitish paint, to block out the tones of the building which were set down before the window was superimposed.

While watching the videotape playback I said to Larry: "I noticed that you brought in some white with the right hand and some dark with the left and did some on-the-sheet mixing here."

"Yeah, I had that white window shade and I wanted to get at -- a tinge of gray."

I continued: "You hit it with the left hand with a few strokes of black, then you just kind of mixed them in. That's a new approach, in a sense, and your palette and approach permitted that."

"Like when I started out," Larry recalled, "I had that bigger palette. I didn't have any paint marks on it. How am I going to use this? I tried something different. I put a little pile of white here, of black here, like I've done since I started; but then I put a pile of gray in the middle. And I used three brushes. Before I was working almost exclusively with one brush and I had to work it out. ...Like, I had the paper (scrap) over here, so I could keep the consistency the way I wanted it -- not too runny or heavy. Like I made one movement -- it was this door here -- I put in a black sopping wet. I wiped it off because it didn't do what I wanted it to."

"That's where you got the towel," I observed. "You like your paint usually with some body to it?"

"Yeah. I'm just touching up there a bit," said Larry pointing to the videotape replay. "I want to keep consistent what I've been doing with this picture, yet I somehow wanted to touch it off a little bit -- it didn't look quite done," still referring to the videotape. "But I didn't want to introduce some new things, you know, and break up the consistency. Like, I could have gotten a little bit too literal, or I could have used different shades that would have broken it up."

As we get to photos 13-18, then, the overt action slows down, as Larry reflects on how to unify and finish his picture in a consistent way.
"At the time of photo 17 I observed: "You put some touches on these little billboards too."

"Yeah, I put some white on there, then gray." said Larry, repeating a process he had used on the window shades. "Plain paper... (laughs) I'm pretty conscious of the plastic quality of the paint. It disturbs me if...I'd rather have white (paint) there than white paper. There," Larry referred again to the videotape, "I'm just touching up a bit. Like, geez it looks too impressionistic. Not really definite things, because I thought if I got too definite it would have broken it up."

"You still use what I'll call..'suggestion lines.' You don't want to be able to go up to it with a magnifying glass and say, 'oh, it's that.'"

"Get something just by looking at it -- at the whole thing," said Larry.

"You've done that with the signs over the doors too, haven't you?"

"Yeah." Larry paused as he watched the videotape playback, "those empty spaces bother me."

I recalled that at this point I had interrupted him so that we would have time for an instant replay of his drawing before another artist came into the lab.

"Well," he reflected, "when you came in I was just about to tackle the window. You didn't hurt it -- I was at a loss anyway."

"Did you do more to the window?"

"I think I put a little more black in it -- underneath the shades. Kind of...to be consistent with the idea of blackness inside."

Actually, the darkness beneath the window shades came in by photo 15, before the billboards at the burlesque theater were tackled (photo 17).

I referred to the end stages (photos 16-18): "I see you're working on those white spaces where they just kind of stand out -- just white paper. That's interesting. Your strokes remain but the white paper recedes out of there."

"I guess I tried to get some sort of...it's kind of hard to do when you're using only three basic colors, to use one of your colors as a kind of controlling type thing -- like the blackness inside the building compared to the 'grunginess' outside," mused Larry. (By "colors" he means "values."). He continued: "Maybe if I had more colors I could
have concentrated more on using the blacks here and here and here... He pointed to the black doors and the black under the window shades.

"To make them stand out even more than they do?"

"Yeah. But it doesn't work that well in this situation. Black, white and grays."

At this point our time was up for another artist was entering the lab for a working session.

**Particular Theorizing Mode: The Type Concept**

Arnheim has made a distinction between "type concepts and container concepts." His argument is that perception often operates on goodness, clarity and unity of structure, upon the intuitive grasp of the exemplary form or case. Cognition, as usually conceived, however, proceeds, at least insofar as it must justify itself, by way of "container concepts," which are constructed by means of criteria which determine members allowable within the concept. I would like to use these distinctions as the base upon which to construct this and the following mode of inquiry.

Perhaps the distinction seems specious to the reader. I will attempt to show that there is a real difference between the two. The closer one sticks to the single case, the more he operates from a "type concept" base. The researcher cannot claim to "generalize" from a single case. Yet he leaves us with the distinct impression that he is telling us something about, in this setting, "drawing" in general. This occurs in much the same way that we learn something about "life" and its dynamics through the reading of a good biography or autobiography. First, as earlier discussion revealed, the biographer or autobiographer assumes some viewpoint toward his data, which both limits his approach but at the same time makes meaning possible. He has symbolized and represented complex phenomena by the set evident in both his selection and interpretation of the events he takes as given. The insights we obtain are, of course, addressed toward the particular life in question, but since we as humans have much in common we grasp in this unique life something of a "type" which informs us more broadly. I have decided to speak of these insights as "speculations" or "intuitions" rather than as "generalizations." Perhaps such speculations are prelogical generalizations, a kind of tacit knowledge which cannot be shared or validated, but which generates the bases for later inquiry, yielding generalizations which can be logically defended. Thus, as in most of the modes of Chapter Three, we gain insight by sympathy, by empathy, by reverberations, as it were. The only difference I feel is that the conceptualization of the "type" should be more consciously explicated. The prelogical "work" is pushed as far as possible. Certainly speculations arising from an exemplary case or type are "grounded" and, in that sense, are not just wild speculations.
It is speculative thought that should be characterized by its fruitfulness for further inquiry. But in itself it is worthwhile. It is, at its best, a demonstration, a revelation.

The reader must forgive me for not giving a detailed example of this mode. In a way, Lowenfeld and Schaefer-Simern present their case materials as "types" illustrative of their theories, and they not only speculate but generalize therefrom. Arnheim does the same in a brief case presented as part of a more recent symposium. It may be a mere deceit, but I pride myself on more patience before the complexity of the intentional-functional behavior, covert and overt, which exists in the drawing process, conceived of as in the artist's hands and as occurring in a given situation. It is too early to do more than speculate. On the other hand, it may only mean that I do not have as clearly delineated a theory of art education as the authors referred to.

It would not be too difficult, however, to review the material on Larry under the historical mode of this Chapter (pages 69-75) with the intention of presenting him as a "type." This would take a still higher form of abstraction. I would speculate, for example, on how young adults of college age who are untrained in art (notice that I no longer refer to Larry but to a group whose parameters I am describing), who are in a self-instruction setting where they have an opportunity to review their processes and their feelings with interested and nurturant special observers, over an extended time where the procedures remain constant, begin to try to master the representational skills they lack. They feel they cannot "express" anything prior to a certain level of such mastery. Simple devices are invented, combined, and varied, whether to catch the convention of perspective (converging lines, drawing of box-like figures, changing sizes, discovering the rudiments of atmosphere); to show projection via form demarcation (structural lines, as in a face or torso); to show solidity by texture and light and shade. These devices, invented more in the classical experimental style, one variation at a time, interact to create complexity and the need for higher-order principles, which unify the many elements. Often this occurs through a dependency on mood or pervasive feeling, which as the pieces are done brings them under review for consistency.

The organization of complexity by controlling principles raises the whole issue of expression, for such feelings and moods as organize a whole unmistakenly emerge from the self and thus express that self to some degree. Complexity in a drawing also ushers in the variations of medium usage so that the physiognomic aspects of strokes, of speed, of texture, and the like enter consciousness. Hand-medium-feeling connections focus attention on "process thinking."

Even so, until the beginner relaxes his fixation on illusionistic representation as an all-encompassing goal, he is in for frustration. Further, his way of working, while progressing, is not sufficiently rewarding intrinsically. He achieves what he things he "should," but it does not stem from strong feeling, from desire.
In part, such an impasse is overcome through discarding the representational goal for the expressive goal, or at least in changing the value order of these. Connected with the expressive goal is one oriented toward the process "presence" of the drawing act itself. Expression and process-centering take priority over representational mastery (as an abstract goal overhonoring illusionistic realism). The "in-here" interacts with and masters the "out-there". Further, if one looks at the art around one in the culture, especially the "high" art, it is concerned with much more than representation. In fact, in this century, it even gives up much concern with it, or at the least transgresses consciously against it.

Departures from realism lead one to prize abstraction and ambiguity for their expressive potential. One is surprised into meanings that seem to reside within visual phenomena and in the medium itself. One's confidence goes up as he feels secure enough to risk himself in the process of drawing itself. Confidence breeds a sense of identity and patience—the belief that one's ability to create meaning will arise as he works. Continuously through repetition and extension, through discoveries out of the ground prepared (not out of nothing) in past drawings allows one to abstract from a sense of identity how it is he works and what qualities have deep and lasting meaning for him. With this feeling of identity and continuity comes also a freedom to choose a new path, to explore, even to go against the path forming.

High order abstractions about art and arting are now possible. Connections between art and life at their most intense continue to form, one feeding the other. One conceives what it is to be an artist and knows when he is an artist.

By reflecting again on Larry's case, I offer such speculations as those in the above paragraphs. These speculations present an abstraction concerning how untrained college level beginners in drawing organically develop over an extended period of time, while working in a self-instructed, self-reflective, nurturant setting. (Note that I am not speaking about how to "train" them or about to develop in them traditional drawing skills.)

I have thus risked speculating about the dynamics of change in drawing from the in-depth focus provided by my phenomenological and contextual stance which permitted me indirect access to the artist's stream of consciousness as he guided himself through an extended drawing series. So doing is tantamount to claiming a kind of knowledge has been gained and that this can be shared. It can also be criticized in terms of its own logic and development; and it can be utilized toward other ends, as in sensitizing art teachers, or as the basis for generating hypotheses for further inquiry. The latter usages, however, I see as extraneous to the knowledge ends consistent with my assumptions and methods.
It should also be noted that the "type" falls within the "chronotic" (quantitative, calculable, repetitive) time/space manifold, and not within the "kairotic" (qualitative, experiential, singular) time/space manifold (as these were discussed under method in Chapter II). As such, the type perspective leads to treating the case as "a Hegelian concrete general." The perspective consistent with the assumptions of this study falls toward the qualitative, the historical, the contextual, the phenomenological. Nevertheless, the boundaries are not that clear, so that the researcher is prone to drift in and out of "type" language generalizations. The very nature of language itself encourages this drift.

Other writers who work within a basically "clinical method," also present an individual case as though it is a type. They do this in several ways. Moustakas, for example, in writing on psychotherapy with children,23 will present a case, with commentary preceding and following it, as though it exemplifies a category: the normal child, the disturbed child, the creative child, the handicapped child. Of course one might say that Moustakas had selected the cases he discusses out of a wealth of experience. While this is undoubtedly true, the problem still remains as to how the individual and the generic are represented simultaneously. Perhaps the prefatory and concluding remarks are meant to bear the burden of abstraction toward the generic. If so, we can only conclude that this is done in an informal and intuitive way out of the wisdom accruing from experience. The work of Coles is even more to the point. In Children of Crisis24 he utilizes drawings of children to gain insight into their values, attitudes, and perceptions on racial matters and on integration. He admits to approaching these drawings clinically, from his perspective as a child psychiatrist. He says that he values what these drawings tell him of individual children, rather than what they say about children in general or about one or the other race.25 Yet much that he finds he feels is shared between children as well, so that several pages from the above reference we find him saying:

What have these children had to say in the drawings they have done these past years? Is there any reasonable way to categorize and classify their pictures so that the individual child's feelings are preserved, and yet more general conclusions made possible? I think the answer to the second question is yes, and I will try to show why by describing the interests and concerns these children reveal when they take up crayons or a brush.26

Grounded Abstract Theoretical Mode: The Container Concept (Pooled Cases).

The fact that Moustakas and Coles vacillate between emphasis on the individual exclusively, on the individual as a type, and on the individual as a member of a category or class suggests how difficult it is to draw a line between the various modes presented. For the sake of
conceptual clarity, I am trying to present the modes as distinct, but the astute reader will sense that they do indeed overlap.

If we start with an emphasis on the uniqueness of an individual case or centering on one expressive act, we are nevertheless inclined to situate our case in such a way that the spread from the private to the public texture, of which the contextualist speaks, occurs in the sense of speculations and intuitions about what we have learned about drawing in general. Sometimes this is a natural function of some larger set or perspective that we bring to all the material we present. This is true in Coles' book. He is not interested, for example, in the drawings as art expressions or as indicative of changes in drawing strategy and the like, but in the feelings children experience and express concerning racial relations. He visits the children in their homes, at school, and on the playground. He knows them over long periods of time. Thus he can establish a sufficiently rich and detailed context for interpretations or conclusions from the angle of his own perspective on the material. This is a perspective, moreover, which has determined much of the context of the drawings themselves. In this way Coles operates from both a type and a container concept approach, although I read him as dealing more with the former. Actually he does what he says: he honors the individual foremost, then he speculates according to his purposes and his speculations lead him to "more general conclusions" which still honor "the individual child's feelings."

Indeed, the case perspective in general, at least as I conceive it, commits one to a contextualist stance in which the actual historic events and their setting are accepted as of greatest value in inquiry. The method, as Pepper suggests, is synthetic and not analytical. It is no mistake that Coles speaks of preserving the individual child's feeling before anything else, or that Moustakas makes the case material largely speak for itself, adding only such commentary as extends it to the structure of his book concerned with children's psychotherapy. A pointing and a showing come first; then one can extend the sense of the qualitative wholeness of the material by exploration (notice that I find it hard to say analysis) of the textures which are its structural components.

In this section I am trying to present what is essentially a pooled case history approach, in which containers or category concepts are involved. The individual thus becomes a member of a class, and therein lies the rub. Can the method here proceed as in medicine, where the records of those suffering from some malady are pooled and studied for abstractable commonalities of possible relevance to the malady? Could I take cases from the drawing lab and merge them to see what can be said about, for example, untrained college undergraduates working under self-instruction with special participant observers, stimulated recall and inquiry and the like? Of course I could try various sortings of cases before such pooling -- for example, cases where the students had no training but much exposure to art works and art ideas, as opposed to those lacking such exposure and concepts.
Such a method seems more oriented to hypothesis generation for later operational verification than the other modes discussed so far. By this I mean that categories or criteria for class membership so abstracted do not need to rely, later, on case histories at all. The criteria abstracted can be tested out on appropriate samples more directly. That is, structured interviews, observation schedules, tests and instruments intended to measure presence or absence, or degree of presence, of the abstracted properties can be constructed and applied. At this point, however, we have moved beyond the purpose and the restrictions set for this study and its modes.

In earlier days, I often began my study of drawings by a similar procedure. Drawings of a defined sample under defined conditions would be qualitatively examined by me and others for the purpose of educing criteria potentially descriptive of the set of drawings (usually in comparison with a set where other conditions obtained). Criteria so accumulated were then made into rating scales for application and validation upon a new set of comparable drawings, to see whether the properties isolated indeed generalized.

By moving to such subsequent operations, formalizations and instrumentations, however, we move from an idiographic to a nomothetic frame of reference, and from a contextualism honoring the agency of the artist (as "a systematic whole of self-regulating transformations," proceeding through implicit intentions and meanings which guide instrumental acts toward intrinsic satisfactions unique to given situations), to a reactive view where inputs and stimuli impinge upon a "black box" at best represented by explicit inferred intervening variables within the organism.

Thus the danger of a kind of reductionism injurious to the basic assumptions of this work arises rapidly in this mode, because much that is peculiar to the individual case is jettisoned in arriving at the pooled characteristics. The individual artist's feelings and intentions, the specific expressive act and its context, are not preserved. It is true, however, that feelings and intentions can themselves be made the subject of pooling, in which case it is the context from which they arise that is lost. By taking this route, we move perforce to an emphasis on abiding structures and away from the change and novelty I have argued are closer to the expressive act. Such semipermanent structures as concern us in art, I feel, gain their meaning within the individual lawfulness discernible in a given artist's series. Beyond that, speculations about drawing in general come better from the "type" than the "container" stance, under the basic assumptions of this book, even though I am resistant to "essences", which the type emphasis resurrects, if ever so subtly. Contextualism, with its historical emphasis and its pragmatic leanings, saves one from out and out idealism.
From the perspective of this study, the traditional hierarchy or modes is inverted, for the container concept idea moves away from vital data close to the artist's reconstruction of his stream consciousness in the expressive act as shared by a special participant observer. It is thus on a lower order of value, even though on a high level of abstraction. The kind of abstraction involved cancels out the contextualist and idiosyncratic structuralist perspective compatible with our view of the making of art.

Still, there is nothing improper about proceeding according to this mode. Better and worse are labels only applicable to modes of inquiry from an explicit frame of reference. From my present frame of reference, this mode is reductive and less useful. But it is a coherent mode. I would even call this a "bridge mode," because it is here, if anywhere, that my basic contextualism (as tempered by a concern with the making of art from an existentialist, experiential base) could be sucked most easily toward what Pepper calls "mechanism." Mechanism rises as the stronger analytical and integrative theory, and contextualism as the stronger synthetic and dispersive theory. We are tempted to surmise that whatever system there is in the world is of the mechanistic type, and whatever dynamic vitality, of the contextualist sort.27

Thus an effort is made to wed a world hypothesis suffering from an "inadequacy or precision" to one suffering from an "inadequacy of scope." The one admits too little, the other too much.28 But at bottom these views are incompatible. This mode underscores the problem, because at this point we will have to decide whether to weaken our brand of contextualism which preserves the unique, the concrete, the individual in all its richness, or to strengthen the side of explicit structure, precision, control and public verification. No real merger is possible—only a master and slave relationship where some benefit is alleged to arise from the attempted association. The issue is a political one, not a philosophical one. For example, doctoral committees will usually force the candidate to cross this bridge toward the container concept or toward conceptual, away from qualitative, description. In so doing, I am arguing, they use power as a cover for their own inadequacies with the different logic of qualitative description and contextual analysis.

So, after pointing to the bridge and suggesting that one could make a valiant effort to preserve more of the individual case in entering the container concept mode, I must nevertheless admit that my inclination is to turn my back on this mode. It does not lead to a promised land, but to a different land altogether. I was there, and I can return if I wish. The landscape on this side seems structurally more similar to art as I experience it. This study is limited to the geography of the region on this side of the bridge.
Before this point, I have acknowledged that the participatory conditions of inquiry compatible with my assumptions have in themselves interacted with the phenomena under study. But this effect has been unavoidable. Without the interaction, the sharing and appreciation of the artist's actions, thoughts and feelings are not accessible. The interactive element up to now, however, has been instrumental and not deliberate. It has not been intervention, and certainly not meant to be interference.

It is possible to more consciously interact with the artist in an effort to comprehend him. In this mode, as in spirit in the earlier concept of action research or in the present notion of formative (as opposed to summative) evaluation, ongoing "treatments," "measurements," and the like are introduced in an effort to comprehend the dynamics of change within the system under study. In the context of this book, historical and aesthetic interpretation related to the individual artist's case would be pragmatically enjoined to the furtherance of the artistic serial (the string of expressive situations). This mode thus goes beyond sharing, empathy, and waiting, to conscious participation via interpretation attached to feedback and reflective inquiry into the on-going artistic serial.

The term "formative," as suggested, refers to the in-process application of the mode under discussion. It takes on, thus, the connotation of an action which intervenes or intrudes in a quasi-experimental way. As I hope to show, however, there are safeguards which tone down such meanings considerably. Hermeneutics is defined as "the science of interpretation and explanation, especially, that branch of theology which defines the laws whereby the meaning of the scriptures is to be ascertained." Hermeneutic means, then, "unfolding the signification; interpretative; as, hermeneutic theology."

The psychologist Jung speaks of "hermeneutic treatment" in his discussion of the dream series. It was his discussion which led to conceptualization of this mode. He says:

"Hermeneutic treatment of imaginative ideas leads to the synthesis of the individual and the collective psyche. ...As soon as ever we begin to map out the lines of advance that are symbolically indicated, the patient must begin to proceed along them. ...He is in truth obliged to take the way of individual life which is revealed to him, and to persist in it until and unless an unmistakable reaction from his unconscious warns him that he is on the wrong track."

The method whereby this is done is also spelled out by Jung. The explanatory method "...consists in making successive additions of other analogies to the analogy given in the symbol." Apparently the first analogy or interpretation is to be given by the patient himself, in a
kind of work of active imagination in his own behalf. Then the analyst and patient together search for objective analogies in various cultural fields and in the history of symbols and archetypes. He says:

Even the best attempts at explanation are only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language...the most we can do is to dream the myth onwards and give it a modern dress.32

The key phrases from Jung refer to "the synthesis of the individual and collective psyche," which is brought about through "making successive additions of other analogies to the analogy given in the symbol," so that the individual can "dream the myth onward." The symbol is looked upon by Jung from a pragmatic and existential stance. Its meaningfulness is dependent upon the attitude of the interpreting consciousness.

In this stance we can envision intervening in the artist's behalf, so that his frame of reference is kept expansive, flexible and open, but never oriented away from his own base in experience and meaning. Thus the culture is not mediated willy-nilly to the artist, but new conceptualizations and symbolizations in keeping with his experiential base are explored to see whether they help him "dream the myth onward." If such explorations are not helpful, the artist will say so, or his series will warn him that "he is on the wrong track."

From my own position, but not yet from my studies in a consistent way, I would predict that the most useful formative hermeneutic focus would be one which consciously constructed organizational concepts and relational concepts about making art abstracted, under the artist's lead, from his own series and his reflections thereon. Such concepts as Larry developed (summarized in brief on pages 74-75 ) would be an excellent base for extending his frame of reference by "making successive additions of other analogies" to those given in his own interpretations. The test of success is a simple one: the additions would fall into the service of meaning, they would extend Larry's aesthetic encounter into more depth.

My defense of this mode as one of inquiry in that it intensifies the artist's serial through its active nurturant frame, rather than operating from a more passive, counter-interventionist nurturant frame, but that it does not intend to deflect the artist's course any more than the more passive, "actively" waiting posture. The lead is still the artist's, even though there is an active effort to help him focus more intensely on the meaning and direction of his own series. It is as though the participant observer, in his special role, can accomodate the culture to the artist in a way that he might assimilate it, or at least interact with it toward his own ends. In terms of knowledge and appreciation of the artist's serial, the participant observer gains insight into how the artist interacts with specific intrusions, interpretations, and conceptualizations about art. There is an interface between the private and the public, between the individual and the collective psyche.
But I will not be able to speak with any assurance of this mode until I have felt its operation directly. Currently in the drawing lab the only formative hermeneutic effect discernible is in the focusing, connective, and restatement function presently at work, where the special participant observer takes his cue from the artist's own reflections and from his history of statements and helps to bring these to clarity in the artist's consciousness. My own temperament and the working ethic of the lab up to now incline me toward the more passive role. But if a formative hermeneutic mode can remain sensitive to the artist's personal causation, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization, can honor the artist's effort to reconstruct his active role in expression, then it might also speed up and highlight our grasp of an individualistic "systematic whole of self-regulating transformations." I hesitate, too, because it would seem that my role would change from one of nurturing-knowing to nurturing-teaching. My own intuition is that more artistic learning and knowledge acquisition are possible within the nurturing-knowing stance presently in effect.

Spread, Fusion and Integration: The Description of the Artist's Superordinate Concepts on the Making of Art

Readers intent on what I am saying on case modes of research may wish to skip this section, for here I want to take an interlude to discuss conceptualizations artists hold about their art which are highly abstract and metaphorical. They are, in fact, close to "individual myths." They do not arise, as a rule, all of a sudden; and they often persist, in a motivational sense, over great periods of time -- even for an artistic lifetime. The in-depth study of an artist and his artistic serial grants us the ground on which to cognize the form, growth and possible meaning of the idiosyncratic artistic myth, as I will call it for want of a better label.

I intrude this topic at this point to balance the superficial and partly reductive effect of concentrating solely on modes of interpretation and description. If this study were on one or two artists and not concerned with exploring alternative modes of inquiry into the making of art, then such superordinate concepts or idiosyncratic artistic myths as here discussed in brief would arise naturally, I believe. To a degree they arise in the case of Larry, from which I have drawn many examples herein.

It is apparent that I attach great meaning to the organizing and directing cognitive structures of the individual artist. But I would not want to suggest that the artist somehow "thinks up" these highly abstract concepts or artistic "philosophies" consciously, deliberately, or quickly -- though indeed artists will differ in this as in all else. Such synthesizing ideas usually have a long history. They may indeed go back into childhood, but they may as well be a slowly-acquired world outlook. In either case, it is their directing and guiding power in the present which is our topic.
Whatever is in mental life becomes the raw material for fusion with artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization. More than that, it interfuses with tool, medium and image directly. Yet I acknowledge the limit suggested by Malraux when he said that the artist may say what he pleases, but in practice he will paint only what he can. My own inclination is perhaps to overplay the literary aspect of the higher order conceptualizations under discussion. Be that as it may, it is clear that I will need some kind of evidence from the artist himself to guard against my own tendency to read into the serial what may not really be there. For this, written fragments from personal documents (letters, diaries, poems, and the like) and recorded interview materials are the readiest documentation.

I will take a transactional and genetic view toward the idiosyncratic artistic myth. By this I mean that existing cognitive "structures" are the raw material which interacts with the on-going artistic serial. The latter draws upon this conceptual material but transforms and shapes it in doing so. All that is in the mind cannot be linked to the drawing, but what is in the mind becomes the base for decisions which have to do with the symbolic transformation of feedback from the specific drawing itself. This is logical if we remember the link between intention and meaning (the subjective equivalent of transformation and self-regulation). It is not necessary to get caught between structuralism and essentialism in this issue. My position is merely that mental structures enter into the expressive situation and are both influential and changed therein. (I would side with Sartre's famous statement that existence precedes essence, if pressed, particularly where we talk of art expression.)

An example of what I refer to can be found in Milner's book, On Not Being Able to Paint. Milner describes how she had to learn that in art one did not work under tight conscious control, from purpose to deed. Rather, as in the case of Larry (used for many of the examples in Chapters 3 and 4) and others in the drawing lab, she had to learn to give herself up more to the art process itself, allowing her feelings, vague as they might be, and the concrete explorations in the changing drawing to guide her. So she gradually learned to do "free drawings" in which the dialogue nature of the expressive act takes over (she calls this the method of "reciprocity"). As with Larry, she learns to conceptualize her own drawing strategies and the qualities emerging in her series. She talks, however, about her drawings according to the symbolic overtones and latent content they reveal. And here, as one might suspect, since she is a psychoanalyst, the meanings which she finds relate to psychoanalysis on the one hand, and to psychic creativity on the other. It is to her credit, however, that she reserves her technical analytical explorations for an appendix. The rest of the book is closer to the actions and feelings of drawing itself. I venture to say, thought, that her drift to certain phantasies and symbolic content owes as much to the mental structures she takes to the act of drawing as to those she discovers and brings away. This is only natural, and so saying I do not at all detract from the fact that the meanings of her "free" drawings are forged in action (or in interaction.)
That the drawing process itself exercises strong influences upon intention and imagination, even when one is not completely process-centered or engaged in a "free" drawing, is suggested in the following reflection from an untrained artist working in our drawing lab. She says:

I like to draw from imagination. I've done this for some time. Imagination is drawing what you want to see. When there's a model right in front of you, you can't do this. It directs you, and you forget what you want to see. Imagination will correct for what you can't do, because you know whether you can do it, or change it to what you can do. You have to make a compromise.

This same girl later revealed that she had gone through three phases in the 30 weeks she spent in the drawing lab. (these occurred in three separate ten week periods, spread over two years): at first she told the brush what to do; then she let the process and the brush interact with her desires -- sometimes the process took the lead, sometimes she did, but it passed back and forth; finally the drawing took on a genuine autonomy of its own, almost as though it painted itself -- it flowed through her as a fused and integrated whole.

Another girl, an art major, had the opposite kind of problem. She was consciously trying to be "spontaneous" and produced one "organic abstract" after another. At the end of her ten week session in the drawing lab the following exchange took place between us as we reviewed 45 of her drawings. (B is the author, D is "Dot," the artist.)

B. At first the drawings seem both more complex and more confused.

D. That's a good word. I never know what I'm doing, but I later felt more control. Like I can direct myself. The brush wouldn't take me. I'd take the brush and move it. At first I didn't know what I was doing, but I also didn't know what I was going to do.

B. How's that?

D. I knew the process I was going through but I didn't know the product that was coming. The first ones are more like sections of something bigger. The end ones are more separate, complete in themselves.

These contrasting examples are meant to illustrate that there is no one continuum or hierarchy of concepts about how to do one's art
apart from the individual case or context under review. Beginners often do move toward freeing their intentions and preconceived images within the drawing process itself, but a more experienced artist may just as easily feel the need for greater structure and control within the dynamics of medium-image-feeling-process.

If the reader refers to Larry's conceptualizations about making art (summarized on pages 74-75), he will see that especially the last nine "concepts" listed (numbers 18-26) begin to fuse into an acquired world-outlook related to art. Here the synthesis is difficult and complex. Consider, however, an artist who can consciously theorize about his drawing strategies and the qualities of his successful works, who sees himself as an artist and the drawing process as a live encounter, where emotion is translated into "purely visual" terms. Maybe I should let Larry speak for himself:

To get any kind of a point...I have certain things that I want to do...Well, it's as much discovery, you know, as it is control. But, you know, I have something that I want to get out, and if I don't get it out, it doesn't have any real relationship to what I did before and what I do next...The visual sense...I don't know if you can develop it or not. I think (laughs) I've been having a hard time. I don't know whether I've gotten anywhere or not...The visual sense, that's the medium you're working with, and in the expression of the emotions, as Collingwood says, these emotions have to be visual...maybe tactile.

Here, interestingly, we see how Larry has been able to assimilate influences from a philosophy course directly into his drawing experience. He had talked of the "visual sense" before his contact with Collingwood, but the latter helped him tie scattered ideas together. In the inquiry on his "Baltimore drawing" (pages 41-43) Larry said:

It's like, maybe, if you can just be struck with something but not really consider -- Collingwood says "define your emotion" -- I don't know if that's exactly it, but it's something like that. I don't have words...It's like, if you're drawing it, like, the visual thing and the emotional impact that you feel, you kind of consider it more than if you just kind of keep it in your mind. Maybe I'd be just struck by this scene. I'd say I'd be a lot more aware of the scene and of my feelings after doing it.

Such examples as these direct our attention to the development of what I have called superordinate concepts on the making of art or the idiosyncratic artistic myth. Certainly an individual texture emerges
as we examine the qualitative fusion or integration of concepts that arise above an artist’s series, spreading backwards and forwards from the present. The conscious verbalization of these integrated concepts may or may not occur. In my opinion, it never occurs early in a drawing serial. It emerges through the convergence of separate strands of meanings and process discoveries, of solutions to blocks and failures, and through the slow grasp of qualitative features of successful wholes.

Contemporary Life Styles and the Search for a New Aesthetic

Trying to put together a report on case modes of inquiry into the making of art makes me both realize and admit that I am a child of an earlier generation. The seventeen year old son of a friend of mine has read through Heidegger’s Being and Time twice already. Young undergraduate and graduate students are constantly trying to educate me concerning new life styles and newer art-life connections. It is more than a matter of the rapid succession of innovative art styles which followed rapidly upon Abstract Expressionism – the Pop, Op, Minimal, Funk, Anti-Art, Intermedia Art, Environmental Art, Life Celebrations and Experiential Transcendence-Art, and the like.

Certainly, too, I have given evidence of movement toward existen
tialism and phenomenology, although the character of this influence is such that I can make no claim toward philosophical sophistication. I have followed my own empirical route. It is not a matter of abstract concepts but of dilemmas arising as I try to probe further into the making of art and am faced with problems of description and interpre
tation.

What I bring to these topics is some sense of history as the ground for my own transition. The seventeen year old reading Heidegger’s difficult work cannot have the same sense of history and change. The young students who can easily see me as a traditional medium-
centered artist hung up on object fetishism have come of age when ac
tivist politics, revolts, radicalism, the counter-culture, the Vietnam War, and the various liberation movements are pressing social realities. When I was at a comparable age, we were drifting into involvement in World War II. Certainly, to state the obvious, the texture of art and life has changed.

I offer these reflections, because I am self-conscious about how I have presented the idea of superordinate concepts concerning art which have directive and symbolic power in an artist’s creations. Those I have studied lately have not been trained in the arts. They have, none the less, acted very much as artists. They are partic
datants in the social-cultural milieu I have mentioned above, but I would have to admit that they are not at the leading edge of conscious-
ness concerning the arts. From a contextual, research point of view, this does not matter. I am inclined to believe that individual artistic myths and the emergence of self-identity in art is a process of
low accretion and growth of consciousness, much as I have presented it in the case of Larry earlier in this chapter. I am aware that his very concept of self, as related to art and consciousness today, is of a kind of self I have not grasped at in the case of Larry earlier in this chapter. I am aware that my own youth lacked. It is as though I had grasped at an identity beyond the familiar "identity" of my youth. I see this differently from our earlier emphasis on "commitment" and "works." Deliberate or accepted diffusion and confusion of identity and courting of intensive, direct "experiencing," have produced what the psychologist Robert Jay Lifton calls "protean man" -- an allusion to the Greek god who could change his shape and form with ease.35 Lifton claims this style is not a pathological one, but an adaptive or even innovative ne peculiar to the present. He also says, as in the mythological source, that Protean man finds it painful or difficult to commit himself to any form, especially one most his own, and that he is in constant danger of falling into the pitfall of "romantic totalism," which he describes as

...a post-Cartesian absolutism, ...a new quest for old feelings. It's controlling image, at whatever level of consciousness, is that of replacing history with experience.36

Earlier I found reason to object to Yeats' concept of the mask. He notion that there is no self to be expressed, but rather that the self is ever constructed in the doing relates Yeats' mask to the style of Protean man. With Yeats, and in me, the sense of historical continuity, however, remains important. Perhaps we should not seek the istorical sense in the young. What we are witnessing is the plain act that viable life styles are more clearly the creation of the young han when I came of age.

Why I digress in this fashion is to indicate that the kinds of superordinate concepts about making art can differ markedly from the examples I can give now. It is the presence of these, not their similarity, for which I argue. I believe that many young artists will ight the kind of "historical self-determinism" to which I partially succumbed. We already saw Larry fighting the idea that he was trapped in a single line of development. In reviewing his works he said: Each one is a different exploration. They don't culminate in anything." We have also seen the desire to make the drawing process vital nd take precedence over the quality of a work or the problem of skill. ot that these are issues which need fall on one side or the other, ut in the press the intensity of experience now comes first.

Maybe all that has changed is the pace and discipline of individual development. Those more in the Protean style want life and meaning now and on their own terms. There is not the slow discipline nurtured by a viable tradition with its solid sense of history and its subtle extension. If this is so, then the spirit is similar with un-rained, naive artistes and sophisticated more self-consciously innov-ative ones. I only mean to point out that the denial of historical
continuity and the play with change of self are also ready raw material for the development of artistic idiosyncratic myths.
Notes for Chapter IV


2. Levinas, Emmanuel. Ibid. pp. 179.


5. Levinas, Emmanuel. Ibid., pp. 116-117.


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Chapter V

Summary, Conclusions and Critique

Summary

In Chapter 1 I tried to lay out the explicit assumptions I hold concerning the making of art, so that the search for a case methodology could be seen in its proper perspective. I described art as an autonomous and irreducible realm of man's experiencing. Art, love, and religion were further characterized as realms of man's essential living relationships, or as passionaE, experiential realities. History and science were described as disciplines which, among other things, have the role of formulating descriptions of these realities. There appears to be a bifurcation into conceptual (scientific) and qualitative (historical, contextual) description of events. Qualitative description, with analyses and interpretations congruent with it, was presented as the perspective of this report.

Making art was described as a game of strategy and as a genuine dialogue. It functions not only out of need, but through desire. Among the basic conditions of arting can be designated: artistic causality, idiosyncratic meaning, and intentional symbolization.

The term "serial" was borrowed to designate intentional, proactive, superstatic actions of humans which weave into a history, often over a lifetime, not independent of external conditions but strongly interactive with and transformative of them. The ego system builds much of its sense of identity and continuity on serials. As conceptualizations about making art arise and are borrowed from the culture, what I called idiosyncratic artistic myths are formed. These interact with, project and direct the artistic serial, and the latter, in turn, constantly revises and keeps open this largely intrapsychic myth. The artistic serial, it was maintained, does not cause the construction and growth of a viable self-system and of self-esteem. Rather the two were seen as dynamic systems paralleling each other, furnishing ready symbolic transformations for their mutual stimulation.

The expressive situation was compared to a dream, in which, even with repetitive elements, each occasion is experienced as unique and unquestionably real. Once the expression has been formed, there are unavoidable problems of description and interpretation.

There are three major operational assumptions behind this study. Arting, it was said, is to be seen as a unitless psychic phenomenon centered in the artist's stream of consciousness in the unique expressive situation. To arrive at qualitative description of such events,
the researcher must step within the artistic serial of which the situation is a part, and move as closely as possible to the creating stream of consciousness. Such indirect but shared access to the artist's creating experience requires a special participant observer role.

Certain rituals and procedures for data collection have been held to for all of the cases done to date, which includes those used for examples in this report. The drawing laboratory was described in both its physical and psychological dimensions. The artist, conceived as in a dialogue with his work, is not interrupted during its course. While he works, time-lapse photographs capture a record of each drawing's evolution. Before the artist's next drawing session (typically one week later), the time-lapse records are projected for a feedback inquiry or shared history of the drawings so recorded.

Almost all of the participants to date have been college undergraduates not majoring in art. They are volunteers. All have come a minimum of ten consecutive weeks, some for as many as thirty weeks. Twenty-six man-term equivalents have been recorded to date.

The special participant observer role was described as chiefly concerned with making contact with the artist's mind by working through his in-process traces by means of non-threatening stimulated recall. While the focus is on each unique drawing, no drawing is seen except as part of a drawing serial, that is, contextualized within a specific history of psychic and external circumstances. Rogerian therapeutic concepts of unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence help to describe the generally nurturant climate attempted by the special participant observer in his interaction with the artist. Because the setting is not devoted to therapy, however, and because there is a tangible external "reality" focus on the drawing and its history, there are differences from the Rogerian climate. Fullness of human dialogue, but always operating through the artist's perception, might be characterized as the goal. His perceptions, acts, plans, cognitions are the guiding force.

Eight kinds of data accumulated by this method were detailed: the drawings, the time-lapse negatives, the lab notes of each special participant observer, direct observational descriptions, transcriptions of inquiry sessions, transcriptions of verbalizations while drawing (if any), faithful 4" x 6" negatives of drawings, and prints of process negatives.

Knowledge coming from such research was seen as directed toward extensionalizing perspectives on unique expressive situations, with attention to their full contextual properties. Rather than prediction, control, and mecanistic theory, such knowledge leads to understanding, appreciating, enjoying, and to responsible grounded speculations concerning acting. Because inquiry is reflexive, the researcher derives self-knowledge from his labors. Important in this regard is his concern for his impact on the experiential realities he studies. It is
not true, in human affairs, that he can leave them intact or study them as though they were stones. It was assumed, therefore, that his impact should be positive or nurturant as regards the artistic serial, without directing or controlling it, for such control must reside in the artist's hands to fulfill the assumed prerequisite conditions for art.

This study attempts to answer the following question: What methodology or methodologies permit one to describe and analyze the drawing process and the drawing series of a particular artist in a manner both cognitively adequate and close to the artist's imaginative consciousness?

The world view and general method of approach were further delineated in Chapter 2. The perspective adopted does not assume a "negative psychology" but rather that it is possible to gain knowledge of man as artist. In keeping with the historical model, the study proceeds by inclusion, not exclusion, of as much knowledge of all kinds as possible. The task was seen as comparable to that of many cultural anthropologists, such as Malinowski, who attempt to speak of the "bones, flesh, and spirit" of a particular group and who come to their work with "foreshadowed problems" but no thoroughlygoing theory and conceptual system before the descriptive task begins. History, as model, was described as a highly developed discipline, but one which is not abstractly codified. With Sartre, in his discussion of phenomenological psychoanalysis, it was deemed possible to study the subjective choice by which the artist makes himself a person. With Strasser, it was accepted that distance is an inevitable part of the questioner's stance.

Contextualism, however, particularly as developed in the writings of Stephen C. Pepper, was presented as the most fully articulated world view and method under which to consciously operate. Its root metaphor is the historic event, as alive in its present. The developed categories of contextualism provide terms and definitions which allow one to explicate method and procedure.

Collingwood's views of history offered further clarification of our position and method. History, he says, means to preserve the individual quality of events without degrading them to the status of particulars illustrative of general laws deriving from theory a priori (to science, that is). Science presupposes history as the first level of description, close to the actual qualitative events.

Counalis developed a typology of generic research designs which further clarified our position. We have operated under an assumed qualitative, experiential, singular time/space manifold. When focused on the unit object, history is produced: concerned with the unique object/event with a particular time/space locus. This typology helped draw the line between the case as history and the case as type. The former is our focus. The latter sees the singular object of study as a generalized microcosm, what we call "a type concept" or as "a Hegelian concrete general."
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to describe and illustrate actual case "modes" (a term I prefer to "methods" at this stage of development). Chapter 3 delineates modes of description close to the artist's stream of consciousness. Chapter 4 presents modes further removed (but yet in touch with) the artist's stream of consciousness.

The modes of Chapter 3 were called "presentational," to connote that the experience of the events of acting, psychic, overt, and dialogic, is as direct and as related to time and context as possible. The model here is closer to a special kind of literature or a special kind of biography. The following modes were described and, where feasible, illustrated through examples: modes of mute evidence; iconic representations of the expressive situation; process representations of evolving artwork; T-data modes (with several examples: first of three different observers focused on the same events; then a more direct example based on a transcription of a feedback inquiry session); first-person singular narratives (with three different examples); the multiple consciousness narrative, in which materials from a variety of sources are interwoven, much as in a novel (an example was attempted); and, finally, literary psychology (with an example).

Chapter 4, as indicated earlier, took up the problem of historical and interpretive modes twice removed from the artist's stream of consciousness. The key mode of this chapter is the historical mode itself. Here all kinds of data are relevant to the method. An extended example was given, the focus of which was the kinds of conceptualizations about making art which a given artist held and developed during 30 weeks of drawing, spread in three ten week terms over a two and one-half year period. Twenty-six "concepts" were abstracted from the raw data, paraphrased, and identified as to time and context. These were then further simplified, various questions put to them, and tentative interpretations offered. An effort was made to describe how, as historian, I operated in the example given.

This was followed by a different kind of historical description, one which attempted to get inside the on-going events but with direct reference to traceable acts and circumstances attending the making of a drawing. This was described as an existential-phenomenological re-construction and analysis of the drawing process. An example was given which made direct references to the time-lapse photographic record.

It then remained to present three other modes which are marginal to the major assumptions of this study, but which help to clarify the logic of the modes in general. The first of these is called the particular theorizing mode, or the type concept. Discussion revealed that the "case as history" does tend to fuse with the "case as type" at times. Nevertheless, the logic of the two is different. The former pulls back into the qualitative, the experiential, the singular, and the contextual; the latter, to the quantitative, calculable and repetitive, or to treating the case as a Hegelian concrete general. In
our examples, the case as type would attempt generalizations about "drawing" from the given, supposedly "ideal" case or type. At most, I have preferred to make "grounded speculations," and fought the tendency to idealize or generalize the unique case history.

The grounded abstract theoretical mode, or the container concept (pooled cases) was held to diverge even further than the type concept from the goals of this study. The container concept explicitly "degrades" individual events to particulars subsumed under some categorical perspective. It is therefore reductive to the approach which treats the case qualitatively and contextually as history.

Finally, the formative hermeneutic mode as applied to the individual setting was presented. Again, this mode appears to be at variance with the more passive nurturant and interactive framework of my present studies. To the degree that interaction with the artist in this mode becomes more conscious and explicit intervention, it might have advantages for, especially, instructional theory. Since this has not been a direct goal of our inquiry, this mode could be discussed only, not illustrated. In the interest of clarifying the logic of the modes it was included.

In an effort to guard against reductionism even in the modes consonant with the qualitative, historical, and contextual stance of this report, a concluding section of Chapter 4 discussed the problem of describing the artist's superordinate concepts on the making of art. The view on a case history over an extended artistic serial helps tease out how an artist's concepts and mythic structures concerning articulation, fuse, and integrate. The intention to talk about man as artist calls forth this additional depth dimension on the part of the researcher, but this desire can be forgotten when one's perspective is narrowly methodological.

Conclusions

The guiding question for this study can now be answered, because present knowledge permits. There are modes of description which permit one to describe the drawing process and the drawing series of a particular artist in a manner both cognitively adequate and close to the artist's imaginative consciousness. Consonant with the assumptions I have felt it necessary to make to engage in the study of art, these modes all fall within a descriptive stance called qualitative, historical, and contextual. Contextualism as a world view, with its categories as analytical tools and its root metaphor the historical event as alive in its present, offers the best shelter for this enterprise.

Presentational modes are adequate according to judgements which consider their expressive efficacy without losing sight of their historical origins. As with biography, these are not works of pure
fiction, but their literary quality is important to their power. Analysis and interpretation are sacrificed to the feel of closeness to the artist's imaginative consciousness in the events of forming. Its virtue resides in its imaginative method which calls to other imaginations.

The historical mode which treats the artist's process and series as an individual case as history and not as a type, remains the model and provides the methods most promising for knowledge and grounded speculations concerning arting. I will maintain that for those interested in "conceptual description," that is, in "science" as traditionally defined, the historical mode is still the fundamental source of intuitions close to the plenum of experience which forms a solid basis for later theoretical and empirical "work." But the latter argument is not at all central to the defense and logic of this report.

Critique

In the broadest sense, all world views and their categories are deficient, even though they must proceed as though they can account for all that there is in the world. Mechanism, as was said in Chapter 4, suffers from an inadequacy of precision, for example, and contextualism from an inadequacy of scope. In the quote from Pepper given earlier, he referred to mechanism as the stronger analytical and integrative theory, and to contextualism as the stronger synthetic and dispersive theory. Further, he said:

We are tempted to surmise that whatever system there is in the world is of the mechanistic type, and whatever dynamic vitality, of the contextualist sort.1

Since we have opted for dynamic vitality synthesis and dispersion, as closer to the expressive situation, we suffer the virtues and deficiencies of a contextual-historical stance willingly.

The point is, however, that one world view cannot validly criticize another, for their root metaphors and their categories are mutually exclusive. From some lofty point of view, perhaps, the contributions and deficiencies of each can be appreciated and accepted as within one human world of knowledge; but this would require that qualitative and conceptual description rest comfortably side by side. This I cannot envision happening, at least among the earth-bound practitioners of each. Epistemologically however, one cannot claim superiority to the other without recourse to extra-logical and extra-philosophical arguments.

The use of categories within contextualism, at least for application to the making of art, is in its infancy. Much more trial and testing needs to be done. I have already hinted at my belief that Pepper's categories, at least, have the chief virtue of allowing us to communicate about contextualist methods. In practice, however, the
use of a language referring to textures, strands, and the varied references he suggests seems cumbersome and academic when applied to the making of art. In qualitative descriptions of arting, the language of phenomenology and history seems more appropriate.

I have also confessed to an unintentional reductionism inherent in my effort to exemplify as many of the modes presented as possible. A depth view paying more attention to the extended artistic serial will counter this tendency to remain within the short scope and the surface. The example given for the historical mode is the merest beginning toward an extended analysis.

Emphasis on the case as history and on arting from the artist's view brings to my descriptions, I confess, an overemphasis on individual lawfulness and causation at the expense of cultural, or social and historical factors. The very language I fall into -- for example, idiosyncratic meaning, artistic causality, and intentional symbolization -- reflects this overemphasis. Perhaps it is an inescapable side effect of the desire to give the drawing back to the artist and to work through his perception and to share indirectly his creating stream of consciousness. The interesting thing is that the artist acts as though this is the way things are. This may be part of the "arting myth." If so, is there more error in acting as though this were so than in denying it? I have already confessed to an ethic arising in the researcher when he works within the artistic serial with a qualitative descriptive intent -- it is as though he helps the artist dream the myth onward though he does not strive to direct or influence. He accepts his influence as passive but nurturant.

Abell, writing on *The Collective Dream in Art*, has attempted a psycho-historical theory of culture based on relations between the arts, psychology, and the social sciences. He argues for a depth history and a depth psychology, and for a synthesis of these. Unlike the present approach, he sees severe limits in studies stressing individual interpretation. But he studies cultural works in their setting, not direct records of their creation. His emphasis is on the effect of economic and historical circumstances upon the psychic life of a given society. This he studies through what he calls the "tension imagery process," wherein historical circumstances produce psychic effects which find symbolic expression in mental imagery. This process often draws upon traditional imagery.

Abell uses the tension-imagery process as the basis for correlations between things psychic and material, individual and collective. It is a psychology of need and impulse, in relation to a storehouse of psychic energy (libido, in its broader usage), the blocking of which results in an accumulation of psychic energy -- that is, in tensions. This is a reactive theory. It leaves out desire, otherness, stimulus-seeking, curiosity, play, and those proactive, superstatic attributes we have argued for in the artistic serial. It also leaves out the dialogic, cybernetic aspects of process and medium.

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Still, Abell has again raised the possibility of a grander synthesis, or at least of a kind of history broader than now in existence. I would contend that Abell has missed much of the validity of the focus on the case as history, for as we improve in our efforts the psychic and material, the individual and the collective are of equal importance, contextually speaking. Nevertheless, his critique has laid bare to me an unintentional narrowness in my perspective.

Nevertheless, for all its unevenness and imperfection, I feel that this is a coherent and unified report. I have not found it difficult to hold to the two major assumptions upon which it is based. What these sometimes lack in clarity and logic of presentation is counterbalanced by the feeling I consistently retain for them as guiding principles. Likewise, the ethic of the face-to-face, of the fullness of relationship to the artist, the acceptance of the idealized and internalized creative relationship which is the making of art, and my insistence that the study of these phenomena must contribute to their forward motion and potential in the world--these concepts have been richly sustained by my ongoing experience of inquiry. They do not seem like merely academic or logical issues.

My relationship, that is, to the very concepts and modes I present is itself creative and experiential. The limits of my powers stream from the same source. I prefer that such deficiencies as exist be taken as exemplifying some lack in my own sensitivities and desires, and not as intrinsic to the categories themselves.

No mode is seen as finished. I have been brave or foolhardy enough to risk examples; of necessity these are imperfect and vulnerable. But if there is wisdom in the modes proposed, even uneven examples may lead to faster correction and extension than taking refuge completely in abstract discussion. To make a comparison, while I am not prepared to speak authoritatively on phenomenology, I do know that those who can refer knowingly to its vast literature can scarcely point to examples of its method at work. I am, then, here raising the plea for patience and withholding of final judgment on the alternatives given, while nevertheless getting on with the task of evaluation and criticism.

Reflexivity in Art Education Research: Inquiry with a Conscience

For some reason, the self-correction and humility that are a common ingredient in our other actions--for example, in our teaching or our making of art--have been absent from our research. Traditionless and without masters in these activities, we have proceeded as though inflation and borrowing would dress us up. Before the making of art, we stand, epistemologically, like simpletons, but we are loathe to admit it. The degrees of insensitivity to the art making of others of which I and others have been guilty, would bring us to legitimate despair were we not protected by ignorance, repression
and forgetfulness. The general stance and methods borrowed from psychology and educational research have helped to shade our eyes and minds from the obvious lack of touch we have with the phenomena central to our own field.

Such sweeping accusations are no less directed at myself than others. Nor do I accuse any methods in themselves as being faulty or the cause of our state of knowledge. In a sense, the way we have done our research has reflected the cultural climate in which art education is situated. Set within large group organizations, bureaucracies and political forces, it has been hard for us to be reflexive. This is Gouldner's main point in his book, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology. We have not sufficiently admitted our own contamination and responsibility within the inquiry behavior itself, nor the effects of the myths rampant in an over-determined scientific and technological cosmology. There is no fault to be found with so-called scientific, behavioral or empirical methods as such, nor with computers, systems analysis, and the various managerial schemas of our large impersonal organizations. But a milieu which uncritically pushes only these, which is little concerned with any other brand of correction and continuity, or which decides procedurally and within the spheres of institutional authority that all the facts worthy of study fall within their boundaries, is dogmatic and dangerous.

Reflexivity in inquiry calls for an acknowledgment of the fallibility, humanity, and, especially, the ongoing history of learning of the inquirers. To patience, humility and passion is added the virtue of ethical concern for the effects of inquiry itself. At bottom, is not the politics of research, but a kind of awe and reverence for the phenomena themselves and an acknowledgment, as Collingwood puts it, that "...in the last resort nothing but the knower can be known." Thus are we returned to philosophy itself and its necessary connection with all problems of inquiry and knowledge, regardless of method. It is this issue which brought us to contextualism as a viable world hypothesis and to a revised historical-psychological-philosophical base as our reasonable perspective on events.

This report does take sides, but it does so with no claim for completeness. My own wish is for pluralism in world view and in method. My perspective, as all perspectives, is partial. I have argued and will continue to argue for its justification and adequacy. But that is different from claiming for it what it cannot now or ever achieve, or for trying to thrust it dogmatically on everyone.

Further, even while I argue for pluralism, I must confess that inquiry itself leads one toward purity and exclusiveness. Any exclusiveness must nevertheless be positioned as one view within the many. Within the assumptions laid down herein and within the modes which I have presented, however, the reader will sense that I favor some over others.
What pervades this work is the desire to explore a range of modes not now well represented in art education research. These modes have the clear virtue and difficulty of closeness to the unique, lived event. They opt for the concreteness of experience. They bring the issue of the knower of knowledge to the fore, whereas traditional research conceals or removes it. If we go behind the modes of this report, and behind the assumptions I feel necessary to my inquiries, we arrive at the conclusion that Pepper did, that there are a number of world views which are undogmatic, autonomous, and cognitively adequate. This is the pluralism for which I argue, even in working to correct existing imbalances and in pushing the strong conviction I feel for the methods I now use.

Knower and Known

Despite the reflexivity which I insist is a necessary part of all inquiry, I may be seen by some readers to be traditional in my role differentiations. Immersion in the stream, the dialogue, the face-to-face, does not disguise the fact that such interactional phenomena still constitute an "object" of inquiry, although, admittedly, such usage of "object" is far from carrying its usual connotations of constancy and separation from the knower. I mean a broader usage of the terms. The expressive situation and the artistic serial are objects of inquiry in the way that a native village is for Malinowski.

Some will also say that my two major assumptions are not only unnecessary but inept. Of these, a number will reject outright the qualitative presentational, historical-contextual, and formative hermeneutic modes as something less than, or other than, "science." Another, more radical, minority will feel that the artist can more profitably make himself and his artistic serial the object of his own inquiry, playing himself the alternating roles. What can be said of this latter claim?

It is only because the making, reflective cycles exist within art-life connections that the image of a coherent artistic serial constructed upon and constructive of a self-system arises. My feeling is that the inquirer can speak concerning this interactional system in another person, whereas the inquirer's study of his own, the knower's mind, in time and space, in all its qualitative complexity, is more difficultly grasped, if indeed it can be analyzed at all by him, since it is part and parcel of the cybernetics of his own inquiry control system, an ongoing enterprise aided by reflection and never willingly totalized by it. The combined artist-inquirer suffers a similar fate. His reflexivity aids his serial; it does not apprehend or comprehend it.

The pragmatics of analysis and interpretation bring a working closure, a totality, to the study of expressive situations and artistic serials. Without claiming insight into the psychodynamics of the case, I would say one cannot do this well with oneself, anymore than he can.
close down on the artist when, as inquirer, he has his stance within
the artist's serial. At distance, he can do so.

With Buber, I believe that the self can have a living relationship
only with otherness. But certainly the art dialogue itself is
such an encounter. In that sense, the self can take as its object
that encounter with otherness. In this issue, I draw no sharp lines,
but argue pragmatically for the separation of roles.

Even with this separation we see cause enough for difficulty and
no end to our task. Why should there be an end? What has ended or will
end? I feel kinship with McCurdy as he tries to conceptualize the
nature of personality:

Personality is undoubtedly a multiplex unity. To
try to come to final decisions, however, on the
nature of the components which account for the
multiplicity, and on the cause of the unity, is
a supremely baffling task.6

The making of art is an equally or more baffling "multiplex unity."
Very little can be held down or roped off if we are to study its po-
tential range of meanings. What seem like facts, when taken as unique
historic events are never just facts. We find, as Collingwood7 says,
that every "concrete truth has an infinity of reasons (rationes cog-
noscendi, and for that matter rationes essendi as well)."

The making of art is intensely personal and experiential. Hence
I have begun, and literally only begun, to journey up the qualitative
prong of the fork earlier alluded to. What I have laid before the
reader suffers from incompleteness, to be sure. It is a long way to
the region of the tip of the prong (the tip itself I take to be un-
reachable).

The assumptions under which I have operated need not be those of
other researchers interested in qualitative descriptions of the events
and purposive acts comprising that multiplex unity, the expressive
situation. I find them necessary to my present thought and action.
The modes I have presented are not to be seen as techniques applicable
in any direct fashion to any given context. As explorations in method
they are barely a start. As techniques they cannot be applied like
the logical operations within conceptual description (and even there
techniques function poorly when they and not the ends of inquiry are
the focus). My purpose was more to point out some of the features of
this less known landscape for art education research.

I must hark back to the begin this report. If this effort
of mine extensionalizes our knowledge and wonder before the making of
art, its aim is well fulfilled. If it increases the quality of ex-
perience in the very artistic events it studies, or in those that
follow it, its ethic is supportable. To claim anything more is in-
fated; to try anything less is to give up belief in art education and

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in the possibility of insight into the phenomena at its core. I retain the belief that it is possible to study man as artist.

If I tried to characterize what holds the preferred modes of this report together, I would say that they attempt a phenomenological history of art, the focus of which is the individual artist, as seen from within his artistic serial. This is a case methodology that emerges, but one in which the case story of the making of art as a unique history, not as a type. It is a description (phenomenologically or contextually approached) of a description of the artist's experience of making art, or better, a describing of describing.
Notes for Chapter V

1. Pepper, Sts 0/1 California Let 1970 (original copyright, 1942); p. 148.


Appendix

Illustrations referred to in the examples of the Study
Figure 11: Fraggglys in Action from Week 4, Week 8, and Week 9. (snakes, rain, and Owl)
Figure 2: Larry's Drawings Referred to in the Winter 1970, Week 3 Transcription. (Larry Trees, Three Boxes, Ebervale Post Office)
Figure 4: Larry's Drawing of the Old Shoe Referred to in the FirstPerson Singular Narrative.
Figure 5: Frank's Drawings Referred to in the Multiple Consciousness Narrative. (Squirrel in Tree, Oak Leaf, and Sharks)
Figure 6: Series of Larry's Drawings Referred to in the Literary Psychology Example.
Figure 7: Larry's Drawing of a Gun.
Figure 8: Selected Process Shots of Larry's Baltimore Scene. (Photos 3, 9, 12, 15, 18)