ABSTRACT

The regular malaise that manifests itself in the educational evaluation community regarding its methodology, its results, its identity, could well be caused by the difference between its philosophical assumptions and those of its clients. Educational evaluation has inherited the positivist philosophical tradition through ties to American psychology. Its clients almost invariably hold the convictions of the philosophy of common sense, which is fundamentally opposed to positivism's reduction of persons to "its". The moderate realist philosophical position is not reductionistic in this way. It is open to all methods of scientific investigation, both those approved and disapproved by the rigorous scientific tradition. (Author)
FOLLOW THROUGH EVALUATION IN PHILADELPHIA

The Moderate Realist Philosophical Position
as the Base for Educational Evaluation

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Introduction

This is not meant to be an exercise in imposition of a certain philosophical point of view. The argument of the paper is rather that, while numerous prescriptions have been written for educational evaluation's regular manifestations of self-doubt, the possibility of philosophical malady has been overlooked, and there would seem to be a good case for examining the patient again, this time subjecting it to the seemingly always uncomfortable G-I series of philosophical questioning. It is this kind of examination that follows, first looking at a possible central source of educational evaluation's ills in the discrepant philosophies of evaluator and evaluated, then briefly digressing on the topic of the general need for philosophic clarification of one's assumptions in a profession such as educational evaluation, and finally suggesting that the moderate, or classical, realist philosophical position seems to offer a basic stance of "best fit" for evaluation in education, with some major implications of this position for evaluation, and citing the influence of this position on the design for the evaluation of the Follow Through Program in Philadelphia.

Educational Evaluation's Discontent

The Phi Delta Kappa National Study Committee on Evaluation (1971) thoroughly examined its perceptions of educational evaluation's "illness"
in terms of the eight symptoms: (1) avoidance, (2) anxiety, (3) immobilization, (4) skepticism, (5) lack of guidelines, (6) misadvice, (7) nonsignificant differences, and (8) missing elements.

Stake and Denny (1969) had earlier, in search of better definition, argued for sensible disassociation of educational evaluation from educational research, noting the rigid, rarefied context of research in its striving to always conform to the ideals of classical experimental design in every way possible, while educational evaluation has the overriding aim of adequate assessment of educational programs for administrative decisions, regardless of classical experimental ideals. They also, and perhaps especially, felt it important to show that there was no identity relationship between program evaluation and individual assessment, though the latter might well be a partial contributor to evaluation. In pursuing further clarification of definition, Stake (1970) issued a plea that educational evaluation acknowledge its very important responsibility to process "data that reflect judgment of what education should accomplish."

The principal issues and obstacles surrounding the evaluation of social programs were still seen by Caro (1971) as problems of definition, Methodology, roles in program development, distinctions among various forms of research, and problems of interrelationships between evaluators and the administrative organization. One has only to peruse the paper and symposia abstracts of the 1972 annual meeting of AERA, and the prospectus for the 1973 meeting, to see that almost all of these issues
continue to receive considerable attention. Perhaps this brief review of the evaluation profession's discontents cannot be better summarized than by pointing to the underlying seriousness of Stake's (1972) tongue-in-cheek remarks on the "Seven Principal Cardinals of Educational Evaluation:" Parity, Ubiquity, Diversity, Utility, Redundancy, Ambiguity, and Generalizability.


The initial thesis of this paper is that a very fundamental problem has been bypassed in all the professional literature on educational evaluation's malaise. That problem is seen to lie in the lack of educational evaluation's examination of its philosophical assumptions and the consequent disregard for the very important fact that there is a basic divergence in these assumptions between itself, its clients, and the evaluated.

There is little hesitation in making the statement that philosophy is something the scientific side of education would rather have as little as possible to do with. In this it follows very closely in the American scientific tradition, as that tradition was taken over by the new, "emancipated" (from philosophy) American psychology at the turn of the century. The paradox here, of course, is that this anti-philosophical tradition is essentially a philosophical position that can be categorized as that of logical positivism, without having to apologize very much for overly simplistic labeling. It is the contention of this paper that here
lies the crux of a major portion of educational evaluation's uneasiness. Much of what will be said applies equally well to educational research, which has its own discontents, and which will enter into the discussion of philosophical foundations below, but the focus here will be primarily on evaluation.

The real world of education is evaluation's territory. And it is a very real world for all those who work in it, for the principals, the teachers, the students, as well as for all the heads of administration who commission evaluations. The people who have anything to do with the running of schools invariably give recognition to this reality, whatever level of educational sophistication may appear on their diplomas, through adoption of the philosophy of common sense. They accept things as real, people as of a higher order than animals and inanimate objects, knowledge as knowledge of real entities independent of themselves; in short, they accept as givens all that everyday life assumes to be realities, as do all human beings, without exception, in by far the predominant part of day-to-day living. (Those whose studied philosophical persuasion is at odds with the philosophy of common sense would have a very difficult time convincing anyone else that this persuasion influences more than a very minute portion of their daily activities.)

On the other hand, the positivist tradition that pervades educational evaluation, as the offspring of an educational research tradition with immediate ties to the prevailing thought in American psychology, differs from this common sense philosophy in at least one very crucial respect.
(this one principal difference will constitute the central matter for consideration throughout the rest of the paper). Positivism, by definition, must reduce everything to "it" status, and further, has no obligation to acknowledge that it is indulging in reduction. The basic tenet of the position is that everything and everyone are all of the same order: "its" pure and simple. The view completely simplifies matters, of course, and allows one to proceed at full speed, arm in arm, with the physical sciences in their approach to scientific investigation, with only some (logically begrudging) gestures in the direction of the philosophy of common sense's convictions regarding people as being of a higher order than things. Positivism shrugs off the people business as "epiphenomena."

The moderate realist philosophical position, on the contrary, is a position that has always been closely allied to the convictions of common sense, while being open to all methods of investigation. Its openness stems, paradoxically perhaps, from its non-reductionistic views on persons. Before discussing moderate realism in more detail however, the preceding statements require further substantiation and expanded consideration to supply an adequate context for the ensuing discussion.

The Need for Explicit Examination of Philosophical Assumptions in Educational Evaluation.

The professional literature on this subject has yet to make educational evaluation the starting point for its arguments. The logic of this paper would hold that what is said regarding the parent disciplines of psychology and educational research in this respect applies all the more to the real world situation of educational evaluation.
Packer (1972) reminded psychology recently of five elementary philosophical problems inherent in its concerns, the problems of:
(1) Mind-Body, (2) Metaphysics, (3) Reification, (4) Explanation, and (5) Causality. He considers the five issues elementary since most psychologists will have become familiar with them to some extent; philosophical, "in the sense that it is unlikely they will be solved by laboratory investigation," and problems, "in the sense that both philosophers and psychologists have apparently found it necessary to give them some consideration but have resolved these, if at all, in somewhat different ways." While he stresses the very real need for psychology to take these problems seriously and not dismiss philosophical contribution to their resolution, Eacker seems to favor a philosophical position close to the reductionist stand of positivism. On the subject of common sense, he notes that it "has its defenders, and there is probably nothing basically wrong with it," but then sees common sense solutions as a possible hindrance to the "development of a science, especially one that originated in and eventually will have to explain, if it cannot now do so, common sense behavior itself."

The 1st Yearbook, Part I, of the National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) was devoted to "Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research." The need for philosophical examination of assumptions is clear from the title, but two chapters have a special pertinence at this point. Petrie (1972) in questioning the meaning of "facts" supposedly being observed in the testing of theories, makes the
statement: "... the only ultimate way to justify a position and defend it against plausible rivals is by means of a detailed theoretical cum empirical cum philosophical exposition of its own principles and a similarly detailed polemic against the rival positions in their own terms." Hawkins (1972) in the same volume, in a discussion of the scope of education in relation to the theory of human nature, makes note of the fact that only a part of scientific theory "is determined by empirical evidence supporting specific, testable generalizations."

The other part, according to Hawkins, revolves around "some framework of categories and beliefs brought to the gathering of evidence and linked by boundary assumptions which suggest the kinds of generalizations to be sought and tested and the sorts of inferences these generalizations will sustain." His reference to "categories and beliefs" is clearly related to his entire stand on three philosophical postulates underlying the classical theory of human nature: (1) equality, (2) freedom, and (3) rationality.

Scriven (1964), in final comment on the Rice University symposium on behaviorism and phenomenology, that had as participants, S. Koch, R. B. MacLeod, B. F. Skinner, C. R. Rogers, and N. Malcolm, found thirteen philosophical topics "involved, on stage and behind the scenes, in the course of this symposium." He recommended discussion of the topics as being of great benefit to "the psychological theorist or the person interested in the application of psychological theories or even the person who is simply interested in theory as a means toward doing good research."
As Scriven listed them, the thirteen topics were: (1) theories of
definition, (2) the nature of and the criteria for evaluating theories
themselves, (3) laws, (4) explanations, (5) the relation of science to
philosophy, (6) the relevance of computer simulation to psychological
theories, (7) the other minds problem, (8) the problem of the inverted
spectrum, (9) the mind-body relationship, (10) the private language
problem, (11) the difference between justification of methodological
positions and ontological positions, (12) the "nature of man" problem,
and (13) the problem of reconciling free will and determinism.

Martin (1964), in commenting on the structure of knowledge in the
social sciences, makes the statement: "To be intellectually sophisticated,
and not naive, is at minimum to be aware of one's presuppositions. There
is no (philosophically) presuppositionless science." In an earlier work
(Martin, 1957), he concluded that social sciences, which include education
and psychology, are best categorized as "practical sciences," sciences
dealing with "knowing about acting." He does not mean by the term
"practical" that such disciplines are not theoretical, but that they are
not theoretical in the sense in which experimental sciences, as
autonomous disciplines, are theoretical, or in the sense in which
metaphysics is theoretical. According to Martin, propositions
characteristic of the three disciplines would be as follows:

Autonomous Experimental Science: "There is a
relationship between malnutrition and learning
disability."
Metaphysics: "Whatever conforms to being, or the ultimate nature of things, is good."

Practical Science: "A human being should strive to achieve full intellectual development."

The "should" is the hallmark, for Martin, of practical sciences (social sciences), which he sees as synthetic disciplines constituted by both an experimental science aspect and by metaphysics, neither of which can be reduced to the other.

By way of final remark on this section, the position of the late G. W. Allport, one of the most respected of American Psychologists (although admittedly one of the most controversial, especially to those influenced to a large degree by the reductionism of the logical positivist view), called for continuous cooperation between philosopher and psychologist, as in the statement, "The psychological analysis of human personality must come to terms not only with art but also with philosophy." (Allport, 1960).

Positivism - Its Continuing Influence; Counterarguments

It is not so much that out-and-out positivism is enthusiastically espoused and constantly shouted from psychological and research (and evaluation) rooftops these days, as that it lingers on in countless ways, and, perhaps mostly in unconscious fashion, has become an unchallenged axiom in the operating creed of these disciplines.

Scriven (1972) considers objectivity and subjectivity in educational research in what he considers "a study in the evils of
ideology. In an introductory statement to his discussion he sets the tone as follows:

Well, dustbowl empiricism and radical behaviorism had their day, but the task for us now is principally to realize how much damage they have left behind that we have not yet noticed or reconstructed; and that is the concern of the rest of this essay. The problem is not just that the rubble gets in our way. If we cannot straighten out the situation, we are doomed to suffer from the swing of the pendulum in the other direction, a swing which it is easy to see implicit in the turn toward irrationalistic, mystical, and emotional movements thriving in or on the fringes of psychology today. There is much good in them on their own merits, but the ideology that is used to support them is likely to breed the same intolerance and repression that the positivists spread through epistemology and psychology for a quarter century.

(Scriven, 1972, p. 97)

The body of Scriven's essay consists of a very thorough examination of positivism's legacy in the form of the "fallacy of intersubjectivism." His conclusions are found in statements like the following: "Truth is no more the property of the mob than it is private property; it is an ideal to which we approximate through both introspection and public inspection. Moreover, we adjust each in the light of the other."

The Rice University symposium on behaviorism and phenomenology was mentioned above. The remarks of Koch (1964), MacLeod (1964), and Malcolm (1964), symposium participants, on behaviorism, considered as the counterpart in psychology of positivism in philosophy, are very much to the point here. Koch made it clear that, in his opinion, psychology had been too patient for too long with those whose approach is positivistic. He rejected behaviorism-positivism both on metaphysical and on methodological
grounds. While admitting that, in terms of metaphysics, he is at a loss to refute "a truly obstinate disbeliever in mind or experience," he feels that it can be fairly clearly shown that "the conception of science which it (behaviorism-positivism) presupposes...does not accord with practice even in those sciences which the position most wishes to emulate," and further, "its methodic proposals have had extremely restrictive consequences for empirical problem selection and trivializing effects upon the character of what are accepted as 'solutions' by a large segment of the psychological community."

MacLeod, although not framing his statements in the form of a direct argument against behaviorism and positivism, insists that "what we used to call 'consciousness' still can and should be studied." He is not sure whether "this kind of study may be called a science" but makes the following telling comments:

To be a scientist, in my opinion, is to have boundless curiosity tempered by discipline. Curiosity transforms every unknown into an inviting problem; methodology provides the necessary discipline. There have been times in the history of the sciences when weakness in methodology has permitted irresponsible speculation; there have been other times when concern for rigor of method has become so passionate as to rule out problems to which existing methods cannot be readily applied. Titchener and Watson belong, I think, in the latter category. Psychologists in their time were terribly concerned about wiping away the stains of philosophy and making their subject look and sound like physics or biology. They were successful to some extent, and perhaps it was a good thing. Today, a half century later, I do not find myself worried about psychology's status as a science; there are too many problems which strain our present methods and too many inviting phenomena for which we have not discovered an adequate language.

(MacLeod, 1964, p. 72)
Malcolm stresses not only the positivist foundations of behaviorism, but, more specifically, sees it as an offshoot of the "philosophical doctrine of physicalism, which was expounded by Rudolf Carnap and other members of the so-called Vienna Circle." He thinks it an untenable position because of "its treatment of psychological sentences in the first-person-present tense." For Malcolm first person statements are indicative of man's "puzzling status as a subject and a person," are of crucial importance in understanding man's use of language (which characterizes his essential difference from other animals), and have two extremely important characteristics: (1) "they are not made on the basis of any observation," and (2) "they are 'autonomous' in the sense that, for the most part, they cannot be 'tested' by checking them against physical events and circumstances, other than the subject's own testimony." He summarizes behaviorism's (positivism's, physicalism's) shortcoming as being "that it regards man as solely an object."

One final note before leaving this subject. An ideal positivist corollary would have man reducible to a computer. Creamer (1972) notes, in discussion of the possibility of computers playing chess perfectly, that no computer could possibly manage a 25-move game, "well below the 40 to 45 good players average."
By way of introduction to this section, some enlightening remarks by Scriven (1964) on the limitations of psychology furnish excellent perspective. He reminded psychology that, as a science, it was "essentially defined or limited in three ways, the first of them unique." The three limiting factors are: (1) common sense; "it not only steals the easy pickings from the field of study of human behavior, but it passes on to the science of psychology a set of extremely embarrassing questions," (2) "its (psychology's) territory is restricted and, indeed, constantly being annexed by other sciences -- biochemistry, biology, genetics, biophysics, physiology, neurophysiology, and so on," and (3) "It is perfectly easy to demonstrate that a great many psychological problems are not going to admit of a precise, simple, Newtonian solution in terms of accessible psychological variables."

It is the central theme of this paper that, while positivism, and all its behavioristic descendants in psychology, have ignored these limitations, and, almost in retaliatory fashion, made every effort to rub them out of existence (certainly at least as regards Scriven's first and third limitations), all the while passing on this bias to educational research, and then on to educational evaluation, the philosophy of moderate (classical) realism not only accepts, but prizes these limitations and makes the most of them. Moderate Realism, furthermore, is a philosophical position that has always been closely allied to the world of common sense, always taking its basic cues there and trying to eliminate only its inconsistencies.
Broudy (1961), one of the most prominent exponents today of Moderate, Classical, Realism, characterizes the position in the following brief statement explaining why it is called Classical (Moderate) Realism.

Realism, because it accepts as regulative principles the idea of a truth independent of the individual knower, and the idea of structures in the universe, man, and society that are normative for man's striving toward the good life and for the education that will help him to achieve it; Classical, because the fundamental notions about the structure of human personality, its goals, and its destiny owe much to the theories of Plato and Aristotle.

It is my conviction that such a view, freed from distorting historical accretions, is a highly perceptive and intelligible account of human experience—an account that many modern theories of personality and education knowingly or unconsciously presuppose.

(Broudy, 1961, p. viii)

Broudy and Martin (1957, 1964), another prominent philosopher of the Moderate Realist conviction, consistently stress the necessity for a non-reductionistic approach to persons, in direct opposition to positivism. Martin (1964) does acknowledge a temporary form of reductionism, "if consciously made and recognized." Without this acknowledgement, "there is the danger of falling into what Whitehead calls the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness,' for an epistemological abstraction is substituted for, and confused with, real existential human beings." On the subject of "real existential human beings," Moderate Realism not only avoids the reductionism of the positivist view, but also steers clear of the complete subjectivism and solipsism logically implied in most phenomenological and existential views of human nature. It argues that knowledge of the individual person
is only satisfactorily explained, consonant with all aspects of our conceptual knowing process, through the mediation of our minds' power to become identified with abstracted forms. As Broudy (1964) says, "there is no way even now of speaking precisely and conceptually about the subjective realm of life. This realm is incorrigibly teleological and can be understood only in dramatic terms -- of agents and opponents, beginnings, climaxes, and resolutions." In passing, it should be noted that the Moderate Realist position would certainly not agree with Weimer's (1973) recent statement attributing the origins of positivism to Aristotle, while at the same time joining him in his regard for Plato, his refutation of positivism, and possibly also in part, his reinterpretation of the Platonic doctrine of forms and anamnesis, which subjects it would feel open to pursue perhaps in terms of De Chardin's (1965) theory of the culmination of evolution in the development of man, or as Huxley (1965) put it, in that stage of upward development where "evolution was at last becoming conscious of itself." This is not the place to continue an extended discussion of all aspects of Moderate Realism. Some further appreciation for its breadth of view, its openness, while being solidly tied to the fundamental wisdom of common sense, should be gained, however, as the discussion returns below to the primary consideration of this paper, the primacy of persons in its conception, and the implications of this conception for educational evaluation.

As a philosophical base in education and educational evaluation, Moderate Realism holds out for, and can present impressive arguments in favor of "muddying" positivistic designs that disregard persons as persons.
While it stands for this person "nuisance," however, it remains wide open to philosophical insights, psychological and educational theories, and scientific methodologies that are consonant with or can be reinterpreted in accordance with its basic reverence for common sense and the nonreductionistic view it holds regarding persons. It can make use of all methodologies presently employed; it simply is alert to reductionism and retranslates it back into unreduced form for all reporting. A major advantage of the position, furthermore, is that it can embrace other methodologies that the positivist tradition might consider anathema, and unite them as common scientific procedures in pursuit of what is more precise truth about humans. In sum, the moderate realist position would urge the use of all the "objective" information gathering processes possible, with the proviso that one not be lured by scientific parsimony to the extent of ignoring all the proof regarding the specific case of human beings. That specific case makes it continue to defend "subjective" data on a par with the "objective." Beyond this, it relates to the world of the evaluated in directly understandable terms, not coddling the philosophy of common sense employed by the evaluated and clients when it is at odds with what can be determined as closer to the true nature of things, but basically honoring this fundamentally sound knowledge base in humans.

As a base for evaluation, the philosophy of Moderate Realism adheres firmly to the need for (1) examination of one's philosophical assumptions, (2) selection of operating theories in harmony with these assumptions, and (3) selection of appropriate methodologies and forms of analysis that can
translate its philosophical premises and promising theories into action. Each of these points will be briefly considered by way of final synthesis of the main points of this paper.

(1) Examination of Philosophical Assumptions

While it may seem puzzling or paradoxical for a stated philosophical position to declare itself in need of examination of its premises, if the philosophy of Moderate Realism is to remain on open approach, as characterized above, then it must also remain open to reexamination of its premises whenever philosophical explanations come to light. As an example, it would have to reexamine its stand with regard to each presentation in the already mentioned 71st NSSE Yearbook. Some of Petrie's (1972), Hawkin's (1972), and Scriven's (1972) views from this volume have already been cited. Moderate Realism would find them extremely supportive of its position, as it would find, as would be expected from a Moderate Realist, Broudy's (1972) explanation of strictly behavioral inadequacies in the face of the "tacit knowing" characteristics of the "life uses of schooling." It would certainly also find Krimerman's (1972) paradigm for a "science of antonomy" compatible with its views of the preeminent place of persons, and their capacity for autonomous voluntary action, in psychological and educational research and evaluation, and would welcome this attempt at development of a conception of science that does not ape that of the "hard" sciences but gives
dignity and distinctiveness back to psychology. To mention one last author from this work, the Moderate Realist position would find Gowin's (1972) comments on what makes educational research distinctive very much in line with its concerns. Gowin urges research in education to find its distinctiveness in the study of educational practice, where it will find that educational phenomena are "man-made (artifactual), not natural." The result of this finding will be recognition of the fact that: "they (educational phenomena) are therefore not likely to yield laws and other modes of invariance such as the natural sciences report in that domain. Whatever regularities researchers are to find in educational phenomena will have been determined by human beings in a social context."

(2) Selection of Operating Theories

A philosophical base such as Moderate Realism might find a number of approaches at the theoretical level of explanation useful in translating its premises into the realm of preparation for empirical testing. As such, philosophical positions are essentially eclectic when it comes to theories, and, it is suggested, provide the only reasonable means of defense against charges of arbitrariness in being eclectic, while upholding the necessity for taking this course due to our inadequacies in formulating general explanatory theories that cover all aspects of the complicated person that is man.
Moderate Realism would lean to the type of personality theory proposed by Allport (1955, 1961, 1966) for instance, because of his continuous insistence on the personal uniqueness of man, while attempting to find ways of gathering empirical evidence not in conflict with this insistence; it would certainly not discount other personality theories stressing the "self" in psychology, but would overall find Allport's views most co-extensive with its own. Among social psychological theories it would opt for the kind of explanation provided in the writings of the school of "symbolic interaction" as proposed by Becker et al. (1961), McCall and Simmons (1966) and Denzin (1970). Symbolic Interaction, an outgrowth of Mead's (1934) thinking on the self and others, according to Denzin is "a point of view that gives heavy emphasis to man's ability to guide and direct his own activities, that lodges the source of human activity in ongoing units of social organization, most commonly social groups, and that stresses the importance of symbols, languages, and gestures in the formation of social action." Contrary to Charters' (1973) minimization of the place of social psychology in education, Moderate Realism would see social psychological considerations as extremely important in translating and clarifying its concerns regarding the nature of groups, and, especially in evaluation, the "nature" of a project. Symbolic Interaction, as formulated by the above-named writers would seem most compatible with Moderate Realism's and Allport's person-emphasis.
(3) **Selection of Appropriate Methodology and Analysis**

As an overriding axiom of practice, Moderate Realism, as has already been strongly hinted above, would stress its nonreductionist stand on persons by deliberately seeking "person-noise" in its design and methodology. This would not simply be an attempt to implement a course of action along the lines of Campbell's (1967) recommendation that school people be encouraged to become research and evaluation-minded on their own, nor is it simply a question of feedback, but a deliberate effort to bring in the evaluated into every aspect of the activity, in what might be called a process of "dialogue evaluation," centering around regular briefings on the type, purposes and uses of all evaluation activities, disregarding any concern about inflated "error terms" in this respect. Moderate Realism would see it as more important to constantly treat persons as persons than worry about positivist-tinged insistence on rigorous adherence to experimental ideals.

If this seems a radical view, it must be stressed that Moderate Realism sides with Krimerman (1972) in his rejection of a science of "specific response," "single option" laws, and "statistical tendency statements...as approximations to universal laws." It feels the need, with Krimerman, for a new conception of science in psychological and educational research and evaluation, and therefore, for new analytic devices and summarizing techniques.
This is not to imply that it will not make use of the usual statistical techniques, but it will make use of them as summarizing devices in a new context, without the positivist intransigence regarding some innate power these devices supposedly have of automatically producing truth. Rosenkrantz (1972) would also remind positivism that even within the tradition of classical experimental design, Fisherian and behavioral conceptions of significance tests and randomization are not the same.

Moderate Realism would emphasize with Gowin (1972) the analogous, artificial nature of measurement devices in education and psychology, a view like Meux's (1967) statements in explaining classroom observation instruments. With Scriven (1972), Moderate Realism would emphasize the importance of the right kinds of "weak," subjective data, and the illusory quality of our so-called "hard" data. As he notes, "A weak knowledge claim is not a poorly supported knowledge claim, it is sui generis, ... it is likely that most of our verbalizable knowledge can only be expressed in terms of weak knowledge claims and always will be limited to this."

Moderate Realism would see Metfessel and Michael's (1967) elaborate and comprehensive paradigm for evaluation as admirable in many respects, but as unanchored, and in need of the kind of context and direction the philosophical premises of a philosophy like Moderate Realism could provide. It would suggest further filling out of their model with Allport's (1968) "morphogenic"
measuring devices, and with the "identity" measures from the anthropological school of thought exemplified by Wallace (1961, 1968). It would perhaps also consider it worthwhile to attempt further study of Smith et al.'s (1967) proposed concept of teaching as "rule behavior," especially if further developed in the light of Krimerman's (1972) "science of antonomy."

It might recommend initial emphasis on an "explanatory evaluation" approach, which, though considered "marginal" by Scriven in his 1967 work on the methodology of evaluation, would seem eminently useful if understood in terms of Meux's (1967) derivation of explanation (based on Scriven's earlier work - 1962) as the reduction of the "incomprehensible to its comprehensible parts" rather than rigorous establishment of causal laws. Finally, it might recommend something similar to Webb et al.'s (1966) "triangulation" process, with heavy emphasis on the need for human inference over and above, and bettering, statistical inference of any form. It would consider it imperative that human inference and human valuation activity come to the forefront in any process of evaluation, considering any process stemming from its premises having to do with passing judgment or assessing value to be derelict in duty if it disregards that characteristic and noble human endeavor centering on the marshalling of all circumstantial evidence bearing on any particular situation.
Conclusion

This paper began with the disclaimer that this was an exercise in imposition of philosophical conviction. That statement bears repeating, since statements in the paper might have led to wondering on the part of the audience whether it had been retracted. It still stands. Each one has to arrive at his own convictions in philosophy. The paper is frankly, however, meant to provide strong encouragement to educational evaluation to reexamine its philosophical assumptions, and an invitation to evaluation to give some consideration to the benefits that might accrue to educational evaluation when it rests on a Moderate Realist base.

This paper, finally, has been presented under the general heading of Follow Through Evaluation in Philadelphia. There is no question of anything approaching an oath of allegiance to Moderate Realism in this connection either. As is evident, this author is of the Moderate Realist persuasion, and the above-mentioned implications for educational evaluation associated with this position are, as might be expected, not disregarded in the evaluation staff's work, but they are certainly not imposed. Whatever influence they have is, in fact, a liberating one, allowing the staff to seriously grapple with the large issues surrounding the program, a freedom that, the paper has argued, somehow gets lost in the rigors of anything resembling the positivist tradition.
REFERENCES


