This speech examines the role of change agents in third world societies and indicates that the change agent must, to some extent, manipulate the social situation, even if his view of society is more optimistic than he finds in reality. If he considers strains and stresses to be the lubricants of change, then his focus on conflict as a mechanism of change comes more easily.

Although in pursuing directed change a conflict model of society is considered theoretically more satisfying and practically more realistic, this model does not provide guidance in controlling or utilizing knowledge and skills (nor, actually, does the functionally integrated view of society). But it does provide a different view of the future than the functional model, a future always changing, societies always experiencing stresses, individuals always negotiating relationships. If in utopian terms this is an unpleasant view, it does instruct us practically to foster the growth of individuals and groups possessing those qualities that will ensure their survival. The ethics of the change agent as agent of conflict has its foundation here. (Author/RM)
THE AGENT OF CHANGE:
THE AGENT OF CONFLICT.

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I. Fundamentals

A. Introduction. Exploring dimensions of conflict always seems to involve peering into the sinister side of human nature where baser motives, tensions, struggle, and discord prevail over order and peace. If any foray into other social systems is partially a process of inquiry into oneself and one's own society, then it is hardly surprising that social scientists have preferred to view human lifeways in more optimistic terms, where relationships are characterized by tranquility, social structures nicely patterned, and a generally stable integrated system the dominant motif. The more conservative of eufunctionalistic approaches view conflict as disturbing and undesirable for the proper functioning of the system. (Can we accuse Parsons of this bias?) Gluckman, Simmel and Coser take on a more moderately open position by examining the contribution of situations of conflict to the maintenance of a total system. Factionalism, dispute, social tensions, etc. assume integrative qualities, thus in appearing make for greater social cohesion. More ameliorative perhaps are the concerns exemplified by the Journal of Conflict Resolution for tracing the sources of conflict and the means by which it can be resolved. And at the other extreme we find the "radical" approaches, some taking their spirit from the writings of Marx, which either posit the necessity of conflict for the social process or avowedly espouse radical revolutionary movements for change to occur at all.*

Thus to say that the study of conflict has been neglected in the social sciences would hardly be accurate given both the variety of approaches and intense concern which characterizes contemporary writing. Yet, in the fields of the applied human sciences use of the concept seems to have been rather limited in scope and applicability, at best applied scientists are at odds concerning its legitimate use in programs of change. While "development" recognizes that conflict exists within client communities and even occasionally that their program produces conflict in various guises, the thrust of its proponents is not the increasing of conflict, the fostering of disruption and discord, but its dissolution. My attempt in this paper is to explore the nature of conflict as it is found in the developmental

* In Cultural Anthropology a number of professionals are now questioning the role of the scientists in contributing to a perpetuation of power elites, demanding their active participation in struggles for freedom and autonomy of oppressed peoples. (See Cough, 1968. Stavenhaben, 1971)
process at the local level through experiences in an internationally funded and
staffed project of livestock development. I shall examine the kinds of conflicts
we found, fostered, stifled, and introduced both inadvertently and with intent in
one particular "community" in Tanzania. The analysis is retrospective as well as
preliminary, for in undertaking the task my colleagues and I did not formally
focus upon conflict except where it impinged directly on our attempts at implemen-
tation. Our guiding framework was based upon the cooperative ideal and how to
achieve it within the ideological structure of Tanzania, a brand of African social-
ism labeled Ujamaa. (See Kyesere, 1970) In retrospect, we should have been more
aware of the uses of community dissent than we were, not merely for defense in
parrying the slings and arrows of local resistance to change, but in actively
utilizing local conflicts just as we intended to make use of local organizations.

The analysis is preliminary in that I have not attempted to give the complete
picture, replete with description of the development team, government policies
and administrators, and all aspects of local life, choosing rather to discuss
selected relationships, problems and results. It is also preliminary in the sense
that it is not as fully cooperative as I would wish it to be. Nevertheless, I
hope that some of the conclusions drawn will have applicability beyond the region-
al and developmental confines of my chosen case study. It is finally preliminary
in terms of theory. I shall formulate a rationale for analyzing the situation at
Bung'wana, but hardly do justice to those from whom I drew upon either in terms
of critique nor full exposition of their positions.

B. A Framework for Analysis.

1. Following Dehrndorf (1959) a conflict approach to human societies is basic-
ally a model, a way of looking at social dynamics from a particular theoretical
position. It is not intended to be in contradiction but in contrast to functional-
structural approaches, ideally bringing forth aspects of social life which other
view might leave unemphasized or unnoticed.

2. Human interaction is characterized by a process of exchanges or reciprocities
between participants who are vying for certain goals (or rewards) either contained
in the interaction itself or come from its results. Put in Americanese, people
interact with other people in order to "get something out of it."

3. Although the process of interaction strains towards a balance of mutual rewards
or reciprocities, equilibrium is impossible, for balance in one relationship
either implies or creates imbalances in others. To quote Elias: "... forces
sustaining equilibrium on one level of social life constitute disequilibrating forces on other levels." (1964, p. 26) This observation leads us to view any intercourse as negotiable, never static.

4. A society (or organization) is composed of sets of individuals (groups) also involved in maximizing transactions with similar tendencies towards imbalances.

5. Individuals or groups can be consciously aware of their desires and thus display manifest interests, or they can remain latent. They can also be distinguished by the degree of mobilization they possess. Thus a society can consist of quasi-groups, sharing latent interests but possessing little organization, and interest groups with conscious interests, and organized for their pursuance. (Dahrendorf, 1959, pp. 237 ff)

6. The nature of conflicts within a given society depends upon the kinds of strains which it displays. A strain, as defined by Beals and Siegel, "... has to do with those areas of life in which culturally induced expectations tend to be frustrated most frequently." (1966, 68) They are in a sense the cultural analogues of Balu's notion of imbalance, for they are based on the assumption that in the process of a culture's establishing stable relationships with its environment it tends to perpetuate less organized and less stable areas of relationships. For our purposes strains are simply disjunctions found within a culture arising from the interplay of incompatible values, competitive structures and/or the system's confrontation with alterations in external systems.

7. A definition of conflict. With Fink's catalogue (1968) of the incredible variation of uses of the term in mind, I'll slightly expand Dahrendorf's already very broad approach: conflict is "a relation between (individuals and) sets of individuals that involve an incompatible difference of objective..." (135) * The added phrase in the parenthesis makes it possible to focus both on individuals as well as groups in opposition.

8. Innovation and Conflict. The major implication of the above framework is that we are led to view a cultural system and its society in more fluid terms than usual. Internal social relationships are continuously being negotiated, and what is satisfactorily concluded on one level creates balances in others, which in

* Beals and Siegal consider conflict more in terms of overt behavior: "...conflict should be described in terms of breaches of normally expected behavior that leads to a dialogue recognized as an exchange of oppositions." (26)
The cultural system itself is viewed as a process of continuous adjustment to external (environmental) pressures and changes (stresses) which fosters discontinuities or imbalances (strains) in its sub-systems. Within this framework it is possible to speak of the change agent and his program as environmental variables producing measurable degrees of stress upon the client system. Thus the agent of change becomes an agent of conflict.

His initial task is to intensify awareness of local needs or to make a population aware that they have problems. This presumes then the fostering of powerful enough tension states crystallized around problem perception to induce some sort of action (the making of a choice, changing a technique, contributing time or money). An agent of change demands a similar response from collectivities where manifest interests for change must become the dominating charters for their transition from quasi into interest groups.

II. Bung’wandu, the Background.

Our segment of the Tanzanian Livestock Development Project operated in an area commonly known as Sukumaland, although our work focused as much upon the Nyamwezi as the Sukuma. Both tribes have strong enough cultural and linguistic affinities to have been considered variants of one unit in early colonial times (although they have had quite different recent histories). Bung’wandu, the pseudonym for a Ward (an administrative unit consisting of a group of villages of 100 cell units) in Tabora Region became the major focus of our attentions in the formation of a Ranching Association. In outlining its salient characteristics I shall follow Beals and Siegal’s division of strain into technological, social, and ideological (1966, Ch. 4), then briefly discuss how the community traditionally coped with conflict. Part III will contain an analysis of stresses as they pertained to the implementation of our program.

A. Technological Strains. The settlers of Bung’wandu had to face one of Tanzania’s greatest problems: the unpredictability of the rains and thus the problems of scarcity of water. The land is quickly exhausted, and erosion in Bung’wandu is marked. Its original immigrants found the area covered with bush (it was indeed a forest preserve originally) with many wild animals. Their pattern of settlement both demonstrated the need for autonomy and common protection, for unlike many communities to the north they tended to settle in small clusters of households widely scattered over the area. Since land was plentiful, albeit poor, a system of extensive farming was established. Water points belonged to household clusters,
although it was given freely to others. Environmental exigencies therefore demanded a variety of responses. Individual autonomy was mitigated by the necessity for cooperation with larger units; great flexibility had to be developed in planning when and what to plant; finally local variability of rainfall and relative availability of new land led to an "ideology of infinite expansion" accompanied by a lack of interest in proper land maintenance.

B. Social (Structural) Strains. The household was the focus of two, not always congruent, sets of broader relationships: the patrilineage and the community. Patrilineages were most commonly unlocalized, so kinsmen were scattered. Nevertheless, kinsmen had many mutual and supernaturally bidding obligations: in marriage arrangements, allocation of property and care of subordinates on the death of a kinsman, internal dispute settlement, circulation of wealth, and appeasement of ancestors.

What we call community was actually an ascending series of administrative units beginning with small household clusters, moving through a "village", and ending with a chiefdom. Membership in these units demanded both formally and informally conformity with communal rules of cooperation, allocation of land, and traditional authority in dispute settlement.

Although an analysis of the structural components of these two types of organizations might lead one to consider them cohesive, well organized manifest interest groups, in fact, the opposite seems the case. Neither patrilineage nor the ascending varieties of community could be rightly called continuously manifest interest groups, for they crystallized only when necessary. Otherwise they remained latent resources for action. The household (or household cluster) was the most visible interest group, but it too was composed of often competing units consisting first of the nuclear families residing in it. Second, strain permeated its hierarchical structure of authority. The head of the household controlled all the wealth and resources of the extended family. Thus sons and fathers were often at odds as to who owed whom what, the best example being a father's unwillingness to give his son cattle for brideprice. The unmarried youth had little option but to pressure elder kinsmen with his pleas. The married son usually took a traditional escape by eventually establishing his own quasi-independent household nearby.

C. Ideological Strain. The Sukuma and Nyamwezi live an uneasy compromise between the ideals of what men should be and what men are. Through affiliation with his patrilineage each individual is born with spiritual protection sufficient to see him through his lifetime. As he matures and becomes an active member of
the lineage and community his powers increase with his responsibilities. Thus at each status level peers are absolutely equal in individual abilities and personal power and must be respected for such. But this egalitarianism also means that no man should abuse his potentials to strive to outdo another by gaining more possessions or displaying better qualities. If he is to obtain more than his neighbor, that is a matter for his ancestors to determine, not him. In many respects this notion revolves around what Foster has called the "Image of Limited Good" (1965), although it would not be verbalized as such, for the reason achievement is regarded negatively is that a community views one man's success as another's failure. And his success cannot come from legitimate use of supernatural powers, but from manipulation of illegal medicines and witchcraft.

At the same time, everyone in the community knows that there are "evildoers" who seek their scanty resources, so they too must resort to magical means to protect them. And more informally, each man knows that he cannot survive without making use of a little magical assertiveness here and there. (See Hatfield, 1960)

The dilemma arising from this situation is that members of a community must always act as if they were paragons of cooperation and unaggressiveness and punish the uncooperative, at the same time covertly competing with their fellows even if it means secret aggression.*

These three sets of strains are of course mutually reinforcing. Technological adjustments to land use and settlement foster structural tensions which are further reinforced by conflicting ideologies of egalitarianism and individualism.

D. Coping with Conflict. If we consider conflict to the expression of strain, there are two broad ways of looking at its management. The first involves utilizing existing alternatives which would not be regarded as leading to adjudication. The second would be those sanctions and procedures which the community itself regards as legal means. The first includes such mechanisms as the covert use of medicines for assertion or revenge, becoming ill in order to escape an intolerable situation, neolocalism and migration, and finally membership in associations which "balance" strains. Associations and illness will provide examples. The fairly rigid demands on individuals to conform to kin and community rules have an outlet in a variety of voluntary associations which permit young people, in particular,

* Edgerton argues that psychologically agricultural communities are much more prone to witchcraft and sorcery as manifestations of unresolved interpersonal tensions than pastoral communities by virtue of their ecological adjustment. (1966)
to find greater freedom of expression without exposing themselves to collective sanctions. Thus a youth might join a dance society, where he can escape parental supervision, compete in legitimate contests, and achieve higher status. From one point of view this is a means of coping with gerontocratic tendencies in Sukuma and Nyamwezi society. In fact, everyone is happy, since a potentially annoying strain has been successfully sublimated. Woman, married at fourteen and thereby imbedded in a host of responsibilities within their father-in-law's household often have little means of "balancing" their interactions. One not uncommon means is simply to become ill, for the diagnosis sometimes demands they remain outside the household until cured.*

The second means of coping with conflict is through adjudication. Three principles appear to be at the basis of Sukuma/Nyamwezi dispute settlement: adherence to structural levels; utilizing sanctions of increasing violence or intensity; and representativeness.

Ideally the "front stage" behavior of each unit of kin, and community, should display internal cohesiveness, cooperation and tranquillity. Breaks in this tranquillity become more than personal delicts but communal disorders, especially with the tendency for the eruption of one conflict to invariably reveal a host of others which have remained festeringly covert. Thus, a household attempts to solve its internal problems from within, only moving to other levels of authority if that fails. The same is true within a village.

If arbitration or an authoritative judgment fails to bring back the wrongdoer into conformity, then other mechanisms might be tried. In the past a most successful sanction was the threat of social isolation. If even that failed, then physical violence to himself or property might prelude his being forcibly exiled from the unit.

The principle of representation follows the emphasis upon the cooperative nature of each unit. Those who assumed the roles of juries or judges were regarded as representative of the entire structural segment. Thus a father punishing his son did so as the head of the patri-segment. The son's lack of cooperation was more than rebellion against a parent, it was his rejection of the very foundations

* Another result of this mechanism is the revealing of the cause of the illness which is often the nasty behavior of an unattentive husband or the malevolent machinations of a co-wife or mother-in-law.
of the kin organization. Similarly in village affairs, heads of households formed a council (baniala) which along with the headman assumed the responsibility of representing the interests of the community. Although representativeness of course gave greater authority to any decision made, it also had the effect, crucial in this type of social life, of removing responsibility for decisions from any one individual. So important was this aspect that on rare occasions in which really violent overt action was required, representatives of all households had to participate. A case in point is the beating and chasing of witches from a village. Even their husbands and children were required to join in to indicate the ultimate justice of the act.

III. Stresses at Bung’wando

A. Modernization and the Grazing Scheme. About ten years before our arrival a group of villages with Bung’wando Ward were incorporated as a Grazing Scheme. The conditions necessitating this program and the manner of its implementation were indicative of how far both internal and external changes had altered the fabric of family life described above. The major changes, which we can now call stresses on the system, are summarized below.

1. Technological changes center around three primary alterations in the relation of man to land: a shift in emphasis from subsistence to cash cropping; growing scarcity of available land for resettlement; thus greater pressures on existing land holdings. Bung’wando displayed all their effects: soil erosion, relatively dense population, competition for land (although by the time we arrived almost all the land was encumbered either by individuals or by villages). The emphasis upon cash crops (especially rice) had also led to the purchase of more livestock, adding another pressure upon the already overworked territory.

The Grazing Scheme itself was one part of a wider attempt to upgrade farming and livestock keeping techniques which had existed since colonial times. Thus, another aspect of technological stress was the presence of many agents of development who were trying to get the Bung’wandoese to "develop".

In focusing upon livestock, the Grazing Scheme introduced a number of innovations which had potentially crucial social ramifications. The first was to create dry season grass reserves and a schedule for their use which involved cooperation of all ten villages (most of the reserves were connected). New water supplies were constructed and schedules for their use were also developed. A cattle dip
in the eastern part of the Scheme was also built. Finally, the development of the Scheme involved creating more rigid boundaries between it and outside villages than had existed before.

2. Social Changes. Loss of autonomy and increase of alternatives form the major stress upon social life in Bung'wandu. The community is now officially integrated into the broad national administrative structure with corresponding representation at each level. What this implies is first official recognition of some local structures as manifest interest groups mobilized for action, although they are in reality still latent and situational. Secondly, it means expansion of individual responsibilities through official participation in a national political and developmental structure. A third component is the translation of local authority and representation into a national scheme. Traditional bodies have been either dissolved (the position of chief, for example) or significantly altered to comply with new demands for communication. Analogous to creating permanently mobilized structural units, the personnel on each of these levels is defined as able to undertake the tasks required of it, when in many instances it cannot meet the responsibilities.

Alternatives were never many within the traditional structure of Nyamwezi/Sukuma lifeways. "Modernization" in all its variety has made a tremendous impact in providing new modes of livelihood, means of escape from local strains (jobs in the town, boarding schools, etc.), and possibilities for individual economic advancement. The impact of these potentials on local family, community, and kin is powerful and increasing.

Both of these complex changes are providing situations of stress as much as of advantage. One example is the disjunction between what educated children think they can achieve and what they are actually able to achieve. A number of educated young people at Bung'wandu have returned to the traditional structure of social life because they have no opportunities to find jobs elsewhere.

The Grazing Scheme introduced a number of specific stresses in implementing its goals. It too created permanently organized groups out of far more fluid entities, or at least anticipated they would remain organized. In so doing it excluded some villages - or segments thereof - which were already involved in cooperative arrangements with Scheme members and included others with whom no organized relationships existed previously. Maintenance of the Scheme's boundary and development plan demanded an organization of representatives and a powerful internal "police force".
These positive arrangements also carried with them unforeseen consequences in practically stimulating the growth of counter-organizations pursuing their own interests. I do not think that we could consider them factions, but had the Scheme itself displayed greater internal cohesion, surely they would have developed. Instead a variety of polarizations occurred: between members and non-members residing on the land; between livestock and non-livestock owners; between Nyamwezi residing at Bung’wandu and a large somewhat more cohesive Tusi minority; and finally between "outsiders" and "insiders". In many instances these polarizations were individual or perhaps village concerns and were either solved on those levels or left to fester. Apparently the Scheme committee and chairman were unable to effectively deal with exigencies, nor could they effectively pursue the developmental policies of the Scheme. One result was an increase in population of immigrant cattle-owners and livestock loaning onto what was legally private land. Another, arising from the failure of the original planners to carry out their capital works program, was the necessity of some communities making under-table deals with outside villagers to exchange resources.

3. Ideological Stresses. The concatenation of multi-faceted modernization and Independence presented a series of stresses upon the already strained ideological compromises between egalitarianism and individualism. In the first place some individuals with the support of education, new legal structures, economic innovations, and wider communication now found the means of escaping the stifling atmosphere of cooperation and invidious emulation and ventured into overt capitalism. Others began breaking rules of comportment in utilizing resources with impunity for the community was unable to mobilize its collective powers to deal with them. Yet within the same communities, most villagers still feared the invidious envy of neighbors and friends and conformed to the shadow of a traditional cooperative ideal.

But alongside the growing dissolution of local enforcement of the egalitarian ideal and parallel insurgence of individualism with all its effects for kin, household, and community cohesion, a national ideology promoting the values of the collective organization for development was beginning to penetrate the village through its various official agents of change. Thus, three incongruent systems of belief were present within Bung’wandu: the traditional system, itself a compromise between incompatible values; a fast growing belief in independence of action and individualism; and finally an elevated philosophy of African Socialism which is the basis of national policies of development.*

*Kopytoff, in his essay on African socialism, points out the many differences which exist between that social philosophy and what actually was the basis for traditional communal life. (1964)
IV. Impact of the Sukumaland Livestock Development Program.

A. The Project. From the above analysis we can see that the livestock program had not only to contend with the traditional social structure of Bung'wandu but with that structure in its confrontation with multi-farious pressures of modernization. Technologically, goals were similar to those of the Grazing Scheme although we were charged with total transformation of the community as it was formed into a ranching association.

We inherited the remnants of the Grazing Scheme: a somewhat viable system of grazing reserves, water supplies (many in need of drastic repair), a boundary mostly observed in the breach, and a non-existent organization. We also inherited the effects of those innovations: drastic increase of population of people and livestock, severely overgrazed land, antagonists to any further livestock development, and an apathetic membership. Our long range goal was to make the association into a working unit for livestock production and marketing which demanded complete control over association lands. At the same time we were to implement agricultural and social advances.

The very presence of another developmental "message" meant the threat of further stress on the community. In our change strategy we were to foster the growth of felt needs powerful enough to mobilize individuals to actively participate in forming an association for their solution. The "ideological" component of the message immediately caused us to face already existing conflict among values of traditional cooperation and personal gain aggravated by those developmental stresses which had diversified the population as well as its somewhat unvoiced antagonists to the philosophical bases of national development. Although we planned our program around the cooperative ideal following principles of ujamaa, it was necessary to somehow include promotion of individual advantages and gains through this return to collective action. The problem was that traditional cooperation had never extended to
so global an enterprise as we were introducing, nor, given the exigencies of their modernization histories, were most individuals interested in returning to what they perceived as the extension of a restrictive past from which they were slowly being extricated.

As I pointed out in a paper for this conference, given the present leadership situation at Bung’wundu, even if individuals could be made to want certain changes, mobilizing them and their communities into large implementative bodies is extremely difficult. Part of the problem is that the official structure which descends to the smallest social unit is not very effective. The household remains the major interest group, as it was in the past, but higher levels of organization seem to be less viable than they were traditionally. Authority on these levels neither exists effectively in traditional or modern terms. One reason for such a lack of local level mobilizability seems to lie in villages successfully blocking communication of undesirable messages (usually regarded by officials as “developmental”) from higher levels by electing “leaders” who are unable to lead. (See Hatfield 1972). Their success in this endeavor, however, has contributed to their relative failure in exercising collective sanctions over wrongdoers and in organizing to achieve local goals.

Thus our development project introduced stress in renewing and introducing technological changes which required revitalizing values of community cohesiveness and individual commitment to collective goals as well as restoring mechanisms of mobilization which were either in suspension or defunct. In focusing on specifics, I would like to examine the strain-producing results of our efforts in four areas at Bung’wundu: kin and family, community (the association); relationships with the outside; and individuals.

B. Kin and Family. Most farmers in Bung’wundu were involved in a reticulated set of practices involving loans, exchanges, agistment of animals both inside and outside their Ward. It made our initial efforts at learning who owned what something of a challenge. According to the technical plans for association development, all such practices would have to be rigidly controlled—actually to cease—for this would be an easy way of de-stocking. The sociological problem that had to be considered was the extent to which cessation of these relationships would aggraviate already attenuated ties between kinsmen, for
livestock on loan from outside tended to come from relatives. *

Surprisingly enough, those we discussed the matter with expressed great willingness to comply, for they were aware that their interests at home were being assailed by giving favors elsewhere. But they felt unable to return animals to the lenders without the rule that we imposed. But neither we nor they were able to predict was the effect of this rule on other aspects of kin relations and their ultimate effect on association development.

Because of the already dense population in Bung'wandu technical demands also imposed a potential threat to the composition of extended families. Just as livestock would have to be rigidly controlled so would population in the sense that no new households could be established without consent of the association. Married sons' usual practice of settling near their fathers' households might not be possible in the future. At best it could mean resettlement in another part of the association; at worst, from a family's viewpoint, it might require outmigration. No matter how viewed, technical innovations meant creating greater strains within already tenseful family relationships.

C. Community. In creating an association out of thirteen autonomous villages, we faced the same problem as did planners of the Grazing Scheme, social plastic surgery. Although we did not exclude former members of the Scheme, we did include three outside communities who had no resources of their own and would thus have to share those of insiders. In the process existing alliances were to be reconstituted or dissolved. There is not time to go into all the specific innovations which demanded these alterations, but rather I shall list some of the areas of strain they aroused or intensified. The basic problem we faced was that in trying to organize an association we

* Bung'wandu livestock transactions appear to serve different purposes than is commonly found in other areas of Sukunaland, for rather than creating alliances with strangers and sometimes relatives in distant parts, it emphasizes kin and already existing friendship bonds. It is quite possible that the system is used now for firming up slackening primary relationships. (see Hatfield. 1971 ).
necessarily fostered the creation of competing counter-organizations.

Our first dilemma concerned the disposition of non-members. According to law only a certain percentage of a community had to agree to form an association (we insisted on 80%). The remaining 20% would be completely excluded from association resources and programs and legally could be removed from association territories. We tried to find justice with mercy in devising alternatives for the association committee to consider. These included intensified efforts to get recalcitrants to join, allowing them access to their own land, which by law they didn't own in the first place, charging them for use of resources, etc. But while some members of the committee thought our suggestions just, others simply insisted we kick non-members out. We had provided in this rule a mechanism of ostracism which conformed to a traditional method which communities could no longer exercise. This radical solution, we discovered, would not be applied wholesale to non-members, but only to certain groups which individuals or villages would like to be rid of. The unfortunate were primarily Tusi, but also included some who were generally considered "individualistic" and uncooperative (including the former Grazing School Chairman).

A similar problem arose with non-cattle owners, many of whom had been ardent promoters of the association thinking membership would bring their cattle. Our goal was definitely not in that direction but to assist those in agricultural pursuits. Livestock owners, knowing that numbers of animals would be controlled, were very much in agreement with us. While in the formation stages this group had not been visible, once extension and improvement requiring communal self-help began, non-livestock owners found little incentive for cooperating in the creation of facilities for which they would have no use. Doubtless as the association progresses this group will crystallize into a powerful faction, especially when the issue of what percentage of the land will be given over to livestock arises.

*According to Tanzanian law individuals only have rights of usufruct over the land. An association, once registered, however, had this right perpetuated. Non-members would be considered illegal squatters. That absolute possession of land, albeit communal, could be legally in "owners'" hands, became a powerful selling point of ranching associations.
Perhaps the most crucial conflicts were yet to come, for we had emphasized publicly broader schemes for cooperation, communalization of herds (although individual ownership would be maintained), block farming, and self help, but had not attempted to put any of these into effect at the time of our separation (an exception was the water improvement program).

D. Inter-community relationships. In forming the physical boundaries of the association we disrupted a number of relationships that had both existed before the establishment of the grazing scheme and those inadvertently created by it, thereby fostering the development of potential interest groups outside the association. Members were basically delighted, for they realized that they could now exclude anyone they wished from their resources. But their joy was short-lived when they understood that it was to be the association's responsibility to maintain the rule, not the foreign experts. Thus they would have to police their boundaries and take poachers to court themselves. Formerly villages plagued with poachers would complain to a resident extension worker, hoping he would shoulder the responsibility of prosecution, or demand that their 100 cell or 10 cell leaders undertake the task. The latter wrote letters of complaint to their fellow leaders in the guilty villages: hardly an effective application of sanctions. In other instances outside poachers were not poaching at all but simply exercising their rights, the villages having exchanged grass for water.

Any real attempt to close off association boundaries was risky until the membership had developed powers of mobilization and representation, for retaliation could be extremely violent: burning grazing reserves, maiming livestock, destroying fields, etc. Also until facilities were available which made these informal arrangements unnecessary, some villages in the association would not be able to survive. Thus we deliberately attempted to postpone these conflicts until such time as the association and its elected committee demonstrated its effectiveness in sustaining collective interests.

A second arena of conflict, which was unanticipated, erupted between the association and other formal organizations in the Division. It centered around proper jurisdiction over and sharing of resources. The local primary
society has developed out of the cooperative movement as a produce buying association. At the time of our work in Tanzania it had become integrated into a national monopoly for purchasing cotton and food crops. In addition it provided tools, fertilizer, and was a food distributor in times of scarcity. Theoretically all householders belonged to the primary society, but in practice many at Bung’wando did not. Since the primary society also served a wider area, the two groups did not share common memberships. At one point, shortly before the registration meeting of the association, its committee learned that the primary society intended to use part of its lands for a communal cash crop enterprise. The committee absolutely refused to permit what would have been done a few months before without asking. Some local officials were brought in to adjudicate the issue, but their own vested interests were so patent that a satisfactorily resolution was impossible. Instead the association was accused of being selfish (anti-ujamaa), unco-operative (anti-traditional), and conservative (against the goals of development). Still the committee refused to change its position, claiming further that they were about to establish their own communal cash crop on the very land the primary society planned to alienate.

Although encouraging a greater sense of cohesion among members and indicating to the project that the association was beginning to assert its interests, this show of force antagonized a number of locally influential individuals, some of whom held official posts in the Ward and thus had access to District headquarters.

An even more severe conflict lay in the future: between association and District Council. The latter had assumed a monopoly of livestock sales within its jurisdiction, providing marketing facilities and staff in return for a fee for each animal sold. The proceeds went into District development projects. Both project and national government agreed that ranching associations would make a better profit and thus speed their entrance into full livestock marketing more rapidly if they sold direct to a meat packing firm in the capital. But this meant ignoring the District Council, which those of us who were working on the local level felt would be most advisable.*

* One solution tried in Shinyanga Region was to make ujamaa ranches "middlemen", buying cattle locally and selling them at a fixed price to the District Council. The latter were most unsatisfied, claiming that the fixed price was so high it was causing them to lose money.
A. Autonomy and Responsibility. The association provided many opportunities for the solution of felt needs and improvements in the life-ways of its members, but in doing so it worked towards removing a measure of autonomy which many treasured while introducing responsibilities which most had been able to avoid. Freedom from some of the traditional constraints of collective life formed a dilemma in contemporary Bung’wandu villages, for although it fostered greater independence of household and individual concerns, it also led to a relative decline in community success in dealing with internal problems. Bung’wandu is hardly characterized by lawlessness, but it is marked by increases in tensions and locally public delicts which were once manageable without recourse to higher and more formal legal bodies. From one point of view this may indicate that individuals are now making more use of the national legal system, more certain of their rights and the advantages of an impersonal adjudicative body. But from another viewpoint, it is indicative of the decline of those collective values which promoted cooperation in the past and which lie at the base of the country’s philosophy of development.

Difficulties lie less in individual disputes, but in those involving locally defined public delicts. Misuse of grazing reserves provides an illustration. One man continuously grazed his livestock on his village’s public dry season reserve before officially opened in spite of efforts by the village to prevent him. He was warned by the 10 cell leader, judged guilty by the village elders (they even imposed a fine, which he didn’t pay), yet he continued. In the past more violent sanctions would have been meted out: social isolation or actual physical violence. The former, however, had little effect on him, and the latter was not tried for it would have turned the perpetrators into aggressors according to national law not seekers for justice. The only other recourse would have been to accuse him before the primary court, but no one was willing to assume the responsibility of representing the community, nor was the community certain the court would give them a favorable ear. Villages caught in this situation appealed to the project

*Recently in order to firm up collective power, villages have been legally given the power to fine individuals who refuse to assist in their collective activities leading towards development.*
as impersonal and supposedly powerful outsiders to solve the problem. Our solutions were seldom that which they desired, for we either threw the problem back to the community or to the association committee to handle, hoping that the strain might stimulate their developing visible representation and authority.

V. Conclusions: Using and Misusing Conflict.

A. Awareness. Most books describing the vicissitudes of the change agent direct the reader to a number of local situations involving conflict: class and caste structure, rural-urban relations, internal struggles for scant resources, power conflicts, and community factions. He is advised that all of these will have great effect upon his program unless they are taken into account. Thus often he is advised to seek the power—like invisible—local leader, make friends with everyone but be neutral, deal with all factions but become affiliated with none. The agent is made aware of the importance of community strains, but awareness itself is not without its biases. The traditional self-image of the change agent is not that of a devil's advocate or revolutionary but of an expert whose task it is to facilitate positive change with as little disruption to the client system as possible. Necessarily accompanying this self-image is a broader view of society as a functionally integrated system. Certainly these images demand in the agent a kind of awareness which is significantly different from that he might have if basing his view of himself and society on the notion that conflicts are essential components of all social systems, strains characteristic of all cultures, and stresses continuously stimulating both. Being aware of conflict means not only an openness for discovering it, but an appreciation of its functions and a tolerance of its continuance.

In attempting to solve major ecological stresses on the lifeways of Bungwando, we could not avoid initiating further strains into a system already flourishing with tensions. In attempting to organize an association we necessarily fostered the growth of counter-groups competing for the same resources. Internally we intensified both individual and group conflicts by placing demands on the for responsibility and mobilization, representation, and decision-making. Concurrently we inadvertently encouraged the pursuit of individual and sub-group vested interests which were antithetical to the principles of cooperation we were supposed to instill.
In retrospect it seems now that efforts to stifle all strain, stress, and conflict in the ranching association were doomed to failure, for the greater the organizational crystallization and exercise of power, the more intense external feelings of exclusion and relative deprivation which lead to coalescence of opposition. Similarly within. The more emphasis upon collective solutions to problems, the greater strain in present technological adjustments, social patterns, and ideological compromises.

B. Using Conflict. This type of awareness leads one directly into an assessment of how strains and stresses can be used, not necessarily erased. In Bung’wandu our understanding of the peoples’ intense desire for control over their own resources (especially land), inability to effectively impose traditional sanctions on public offenders or to form viable long-term interest groups because of a basic social dilemma, and the interplay of collective and individualistic values as to the proper conduct of social life formed a foundation upon which our program of formation and extension was built.

Some forms of strain we did not make use of. For example, we did not actively attempt to either solve or further attenuate generational tensions, although strains were very much present. In part our reason was ideological—we only wished to activate tension in mobilizing forces to solve technological problem or create groups. More logistically a focus on generational differences would have been unproductive, since effective control over resources still remained in the hands of heads of families. Their sons might be more progressive, better educated, more sympathetic to our message (for they felt the stress of modernization more acutely than their elders), but they had neither the physical nor social currency to assist them. Had we begun work in an area which would attract settlers, then this source of strain would have served us well. We also avoided developing a female interest group, even though it would have been forceful in stimulating some changes. In part our neglect of this group was demanded by the fact that project staff was all male and contact with women at Bung’wandu was a dangerous enterprise. Nor did we allow individuals to actively promote their own interests through the association unless they served collective ends. In some ways centering our attentions on the powerful would have made work simpler, but the result
would have been their doing the organization. Thus any i proved in water or land was stipulated for public use.

We also allowed other forces of strain to intensify. For example, we refused to solve disputes, forcing the community or association to act. Only assisted those villages which demonstrated their organizational abilities, which overtly appeared as favoritism, but which formed a mini-campaign encouraging invidious competition in other villages.* We allowed the dissemination of rumors, as well as freely giving information, regarding the unhappy possibilities awaiting non-members once the association was registered, emphasizing the association's complete control over its territory. We sought out "progressive" farmers to participate in feeding supply trials and disease controls in calves. Their successfully fat beasts would be visible incentives for the "less progressive" to participate later. Finally we fostered the development of envy in outside communities so as to stimulate them enough to mobilize and demand from us similar perquisites as the people of Bung'wandu. Given some of its almost insolvable ecological problems, it seemed to us that Bung'wandu's value in the project lay not so much in its technical organization as a ranching association but as a thorny manifest interest group spreading shock waves of envy and competition through neighboring lands.

Finally, we attempted to stifle or resolve conflicts. Although we permitted rumors of exile or closing resources to non-members, we got the association to be temporarily amenable in continuing for or patterns of cooperation. We tried to discourage major factions from dominating association affairs by emphasizing the importance of collective unity. We also tried to find acceptable solutions to disputes between the association and other local development organizations and government officials, for they had potentials for creating an external threat powerful enough to destroy the association.

* The association committee drew up a mini-development plan listing which villages had the greatest needs in water and grass reserves. In offering our technical aid and equipment to these communities, we told them that if they could not provide the manpower, we would have to move on to the next village.
C. Ethics and the "Rosy" Future. Behind my analysis lie two vaguely growing questions which I cannot, answer adequately in this essay but possibly open for discussion. The first involves a project's future perception as to what the desirable results of its enterprise are to be. The second involves exploring the ethics of using conflict in planning and executing change.

Projects, unlike societies, have relatively short life histories. In most instances their personnel introduce and attempt to provide mechanisms for the maintenance of innovations and then depart. Development plans seem often analogous to certain romantic novels: aiming for happy endings with all loose ends tied and participants sailing into a rosy future. But in reality a client system continues to survive with many untied strings (internal strains and external stresses). Indeed, if our model of the ubiquity of conflict is accurate, then the client system has more strains than before the project existed even if the results of the enterprise are considered successful. The Grazing Scheme and our livestock project at Bung'wando are a case in point. The for initiated a series of sorely needed technological innovations as well as supportive social mechanisms; yet, the communities within the Scheme were hardly able to sustain the strains which these innovations aroused. Our project similarly attempted to introduce needed changes, but for some reason we were much more aware of the kinds of strains they would produce. As far as I was concerned, we could not judge easily the goodness or badness of these strains. Thus we fostered some, stifled others. In the time allotted to us, we could not tie up loose cultural ends, solve all conflicts, nor predict the impact of all future stresses upon the new system we were creating. What we tried to do was create the foundations for an organization which would be able to adjust to these stresses and a leadership which would be able to guide it in doing so. Our utopian goals were far from realized, but in concentrating on what we could actually do, perhaps we established a firmer structure capable of more rapid development in the future.
Doesn't fostering rumors, making vague threats, creating have-nots, deliberately aggravating individual and village tensions, and promoting envy and opposition smack of the unethical and sinister manipulator? Or does the successful implementation of a program justify the means used? To what extent is an agent of change acting responsibly in playing upon the misfortunes of a community, manipulating dissent, and actually introducing more stress than before? In considering these questions we really face two types of problems: the change agent as manipulator or even coercive force in accomplishing his goals and the dissenting theoretical views as to what are the dynamics of social life. I doubt if there is a ready- and co potent-answer to either question; yet both deserve to be explored in more detail than they have, especially with regards to development.

I have tried to indicate how the change agent must to some extent manipulate the social situation, even if his view of society is a more optimistic one than he finds in reality. If he considers strains and stresses to be the lubricants of change, then his focus on conflict as a mechanism of change co as more easily, for they are used judiciously just as any other elements of the society. Although it is my opinion that in pursuing directed change: conflict model of society is theoretically more satisfying and practically more realistic, this model does not guide us in controlling or utilizing our knowledge and skills - nor actually does the functionally integrated view of society. But it does leave us with a different view of the future than the functional model, a future always changing, societies always experiencing stresses, individuals always negotiating relationships. If in utopian terms this is an unpleasant or as Dahrendorf puts it "ugly" view, it does instruct us practically to foster the growth of individuals and groups possessing those qualities which will ensure their survival in this process. And here the ethics of the change agent as agent of conflict has its foundation.
VI. References.


