ABSTRACT

Theories and practices of social scientists in relation to cultural change are described and evaluated. The first section considers psychology's emerging ethics, reviewing the work of Maslow, Fromm, and Mcney-Kyrle. Part II presents and considers some claims that specific cultures are maladaptive or sick, according to varying standards, and Part III discusses ethical and practical issues involved in intervention at a cultural level. The final section presents some models of cultural therapy, some analogies between individual and cultural therapy, and a personal approach. The models considered include psychoanalytic cultural therapy, behavior modification cultural therapy, and existential cultural therapy. The personal approach is integrative or eclectic. (LH)
ETHICS AND CONCEPTS OF CULTURAL THERAPY

Spencer Kagan
University of California, Los Angeles

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According to Bertrand Russell, values lie out of the realm of truth and falsehood. John Stewart Mill took a similar stand, stating that questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to proof. Modern psychologists, however, have rebelled against philosophical relativism and are making claims that through the study of man they have come to know what is good for man. Further, they are recommending programs of change for entire cultural groups. Honigmann (1969) traces the transition of anthropologists and social scientists from an orientation of understanding and appreciation to an orientation geared for criticism and change. As the government pours more money into socially relevant research, this transition will become more and more complete. The aim of this paper is to describe and evaluate the theories and practices of social scientists in relation to cultural change. The first section will consider psychology's emerging ethics. The second will present and evaluate some claims that specific cultures are maladaptive or sick. The third will discuss ethical and practical issues involved in intervention at a cultural level. The final section will present some models of cultural therapy, some analogies between individual and cultural therapy, and my personal approach.


Driven by the Nazi experience and pulled by the findings of the emerging science of psychology, several men have ignored Russell's flat claim that values lie out of the realm of truth and falsehood, and have dragged the issue of ethics from the limbo of relativism back into the arena of intellectual combat. None claim to have worked out a full moral system, but all defend the view that with the aid of psychology we can establish a scientifically valid system of ethics. Although, their work is more marked by its congruence than its divergence, for ease of analysis and presentation I will take up each statement separately.
Maslow (1962) roots his hope for a valid ethics in the assumption that "values are uncovered as well as created or constructed, that they are intrinsic in the structure of human nature itself, that they are biologically and genetically based...(p. 157)." Given this assumption, it follows that "the age-old contrast between 'what is' and 'what ought to be' is in part a false one; that we can study the highest values or goals of human beings as we study the values of ants... (p. 157)." Thus Maslow has come to study "the values of the best human beings (p. 149)," and has found "objectively describable and measurable characteristics of the healthy human specimen (p. 148)."

To justify the basis of his empirical approach -- the study of the best humans -- Maslow explains why we cannot study the values of all human beings. He relates an experiment with chickens in which neurotic chickens were fed the food choices of healthy chickens, and consequently became more healthy than when allowed to eat their own choices. The neurotic chicken eats to maintain its neurotic state while the healthy chicken eats to maintain health. Thus, in determining the values of chickens we must study healthy chickens; and in determining the values of humans we must study healthy humans. To average with the values of healthy persons the values of neurotics -- the values of unhealthy persons -- would give us a distorted picture.

Confronted with this philosophically crude ethical system (which Maslow believes will answer the value question which has plagued political philosophy for thousands of years) we are tempted to smile and turn our attention elsewhere. A more interesting question appears to be how Maslow can expect us to take him seriously. How has he decided which are the best humans? Does he not slip in his value judgment through the back door, choosing as subjects for his study those who contain those values he prefers? Where then is the basis for his claim to objectivity? When he admits that values are created as well as found within the individual, doesn't he admit relativism? Are humans really so similar that what is good for the few he has studied will be good for all? Don't humans differ more from each other than do chickens?
No closer examination of Maslow would render him safe against such criticism. He has clearly provided no philosophical justification of any value system he could produce by the study of creative and talented people. Even if we grant that he can correctly discern what are the values of these people, his argument fails to show us why they necessarily ought to be the values of all. Saving further consideration of Maslow's work until later, we can turn to the second philosophical defense of the possibility of a scientifically valid system of values based on the psychological defense of the possibility of a scientifically valid system of values based on the psychological study of man.

Fromm (1941) claims that just as the doctor studies physiology to discover that his patients ought to take Vitamin A so that their eyes may realize their potential in the art of seeing, so can psychologists study the human nature and condition so that they can discover which ethical code men ought to follow so that they may realize their potential in the art of living. Psychologists can determine good because, Fromm informs us, good is what is good for man; it is "the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers."

To support his claim that "the unfolding of man's powers" is a universal and discoverable criteria of good, Fromm employs an analogy of man to a seed. He says that the seed has the potential to grow or to rot. He calls the potentiality to grow a primary potentiality and the potentiality to rot a secondary potentiality. To distinguish between primary and secondary potentialities, Fromm tell us that primary potentialities develop under "normal" conditions and that secondary potentialities are realized only in the case of "abnormal, pathogenic conditions." Fromm doesn't seem to realize that he has provided no real method of distinguishing between the two potentialities. To tell us that primary potentialities are realized under "normal" conditions calls for a definition of "normal," but this Fromm cannot provide. If he wishes "normal" to mean average, he would be in the untenable position of suggesting that the primary potentiality of a seed in a forest where the ground is
everywhere too moist for growth is to rot, because the average seed in such conditions rots. If, however, he means by "normal" those conditions which will make the seed grow, this argument is circular because he would be informing us that we can tell that the primary potentiality of a seed is to grow because it grows in conditions in which it grows, i.e., it grows in "normal" conditions. Thus we can see Fromm's criterion is at least undefined, and perhaps simply bogus. From what we can tell, Fromm is able to show that the primary potential of a seed is to grow only because he assumes it is normal for a seed to grow rather than rot. If he had assumed it is normal for a seed to dissolve, he could have explained that it is only the absence of acid which keeps the seed from realizing its primary potential. Thus, to maintain his claim of objectivity Fromm must supply some independent basis by which to distinguish primary from secondary potentialities.

At a later point in his discussion Fromm does seem to tender a second objective criterion for distinguishing between primary and secondary potentialities: Happiness. A person is happy if, and only if, he is realizing his primary potentials. Therefore "happiness is the criterion of excellence in the art of living (p. 189)." To be truly virtuous, however, is not a simple task. Many persons believe they are happy while they are really unhappy. Happiness is not a thought one has about his condition, it is an objectively discernable condition. The psychoanalyst through his use of dream analysis and free association can determine whether a person is happy, regardless of what that person may think. True happiness is "conjunctive with an increase in vitality, intensity of feeling and thinking, and productiveness...(p.189)." Fromm claims that by this criterion we can find that destruction is a secondary potentiality because "the destructive person is unhappy even if he has succeeded in attaining the aims of his destruction (p. 225)."

The reason the destructive person is unhappy is because he is acting contrary to the humanistic conscience within him. Distinguishing this humanistic conscience from Freud's superego, Fromm states that it is not the voice of an internalized authority but rather one's own voice "present in every human being and independent of external sanctions and rewards (p. 154)." Because modern man has lost the art of listening to this
"inner voice," "in many people (the voice of conscience) is so feeble as not to be heard and acted upon (p. 160)." This is not to say that the humanistic conscience is dead in modern man; on the contrary, it is very much alive; although it is not heard, it affects our conditions. Fromm states that much of modern man's unhappiness stems from his failure to act on the demands of his humanistic conscience. Although an individual may not hear these demands, an analyst, through free association and dream analysis can. Happiness, the sign that man is obeying his conscience, is an objectively determinable criterion of good. And because conscience exists in every individual and each may be opened to hear its dictates, Fromm maintains that psychology has uncovered the basis for a universal and objective criterion for values.

Even if we accept for a moment Fromm's claims that men's interests are essentially in harmony and that they should desire what they do desire, we find difficulties when we try to use Fromm's ethics as a guide in life decisions. For, although Fromm has set down a criterion for goodness, it is not certain that the criterion can be known or applied. In Fromm's own summary of the case of a young man torn between a career as a physicist and as an executive in his father's firm, the difficulties involved in setting up happiness as an objective criterion of goodness are revealed. We find that the very analyst who is supposed to objectively determine happiness, cannot be objective:

The analyst's judgment will also be influenced by his philosophy and his system of values. If one is prone to believe that adjustment to the social patterns is the paramount aim of life, that practical considerations like the continuity of a firm, higher income and gratitude toward parents, are prime considerations, one will also be more inclined to interpret the son's trouble in terms of his irrational antagonism to the father. If, on the other hand, one considers integrity, independence, and the doing of work meaningful to the person as supreme values, one will be prone to look at the son's inability to assert himself and his fear of his father as the main difficulties to be resolved. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 70.

Thus it can be seen that Fromm's own case study casts doubt on Fromm's claim that happiness can be determined objectively. Depending on the subjective values of the analyst, he will determine, as Fromm so ably points out, that the boy should realize either one or another
potential to obtain happiness. In this way different analysts define happiness in different ways depending on their "philosophy" and "system of values." Which definition is correct? We might call Fromm in to tell us, but it seems that he would give a decision based upon his values, and how then could we choose among the decisions? The subjective nature of "shoulds" cannot, it seems, be escaped by such an undefined criterion of happiness.

Where then is the humanistic conscience upon which Fromm's theory rests? Fromm has not proved that it exists, and has not provided objective methods with which it can be measured. Freud, who supposedly used similar methods of studying man, found "there are present in all men destructive and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural tendencies (Freud, Future of Illusion, p. 11)." Further, he states that "the tendency to aggression is an innate independent and instinctual disposition in man (Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 102)."

Although we may doubt Fromm's claim that man ought to be the way he inherently wants to be, it should be noted that we are using empirical evidence to do so. Unlike Maslow, Fromm claims to have found an objective method for determining the values of all men. Whether this is so is a question of fact, and will be answered by experimental, clinical, and anthropological data. Whether men ought to value what they do value is a question of value. And this question Fromm does not deal with. He assumes that what is valuable is what is valued. If his picture of man is true, it is an easy assumption to make. Who would not join him in calling man "to be himself and for himself and to achieve happiness by the full realization of those faculties which are peculiarly his -- of reason, love, and productive work (p. 45)." However we must also ask whether the criterion of happiness and the method of psychoanalysis are sufficient to discriminate those values from rationalization, hate, and destruction -- which also seem peculiar to man.

Money-Kyrle (1951) offers a way out of some of the difficulties into which Fromm's criterion of happiness seems to throw him: He defines health in terms of truth rather than happiness. Kyrle claims that just as the sick person hallucinates and thus loses contact with reality, lesser psychic disturbances also cause loss of contact with reality, only to a lesser extent. Thus he tenders an objective measure of mental health: the
fewer repressions a person has, the healthier he is. And, Kyrie claims, we have an objective measure of the health of a culture: the fewer repressions it necessitates, the healthier it is.

Supposing for a moment that psychoanalysis can objectively determine the nature and extent of men's repressions, let us look at what Kyrie is expressing. First, he sees in psychoanalysis a tool useful in convincing and healing (as well as judging and condemning) the repressed and that which caused repression. For, Kyrie claims not only that the environment which existed in Germany under the Nazis precipitated a great deal of overt illness of a pathological kind which would not have developed under other political systems (p. 84); he also claims that "if between 1933 and 1939 and 'well adapted' German had sought analysis, he would have found that he was very ill adapted to his society by the time his analysis was over (p. 147)." Kyrie claims to demonstrate that the Nazi system could only stand on the basis of a respect for authority which was based upon repression. Once these repressions are aired and subject to reality testing, the unquestioning respect would necessarily disappear.

It may be asked whether any social organization is possible if an entire nation of people were unrepressed. For, isn't all obedience irrational? Isn't analysis of the superego an immoral process? Kyrie answers no. Like Fromm he believes the superego is a sadistic demon within the individual which demands ritualistic obedience. Only when it is gone can man be truly moral. And when it is gone we need not fear that men will not respect law and order. For:

In any deep analysis, when the persecutory and anxieties of conscience-ridden patients gradually lessen in severity, they begin to become conscious of depression. Their dread of offending something feared gives place to grief at having injured something loved. In other words, the kind of guilt they are capable of feeling is less persecutory and more depressive in character, so that the form of their conscience moves away from the authoritarian and toward the humanist end of the scale. (p. 66).

Thus Kyrie can conclude that "in proportion as anyone is conscious of his own psychology, he has an empathetic understanding of his.
fellows and can neither injure nor neglect them without distress... (p. 68)." His clinical experience has led him to the conclusion that "so far as people are normal, in the sense of being integrated, and therefore rational, they are also humanistic (p. 68)."

Accepting Kyrle's definition of normal, we realize that most people are abnormal, for most people are repressed in one way or another. The authoritarians with their strict superegos have repressed their surrender to the superego demands. The hypo-manics who are ruthless and unhindered in pursuit of personal or ideological aims, exist only by virtue of an unconscious identification with the superego figure. The hypo-paranoids who project guilt and sustain righteous indignation against the real or imaginary sins of others are not healthy either, for they distort reality to fill their unconscious needs. In fact, all unanalyzed persons in our society are repressed to a certain extent because of the way which the oedipal situation is typically resolved. They can't admit either the love or hate which belongs to that relation (p. 74).

If persons became normal, they would be admittedly egoistic, but their competitiveness wouldn't contain the ruthlessness which is always found in the competitiveness which is born of concealed anxiety (p. 81). The normal person is humanistic and possesses an uninhibited capacity for work and pleasure. Because an unrepressed or normal person cannot be produced in an authoritarian society, we have an objective basis for making a value judgment against such a society. Only "a benevolent and liberal environment which provides not only the necessities of life but also opportunities for creative sublimation is likely to favour the maintenance and development of normal personality (p. 84)."

Having seen the basics of Kyrle's value system, we might ask why Kyrle can claim it is scientifically valid. As well thought out as it is, isn't it just a fancy way of expressing a preference of certain kinds of people over others? No, answers Kyrle. His value system makes only the same value judgment as does science: truth. To oppose him successfully on a question of values, you must refuse to realize certain true things. To understand this, we must take a detour into the nature of values. We can value things for only two reasons: because they are
means to some valued end, or because they are that valued end itself. If the first is the case, the question of value is one of foresight, and may also be resolved by an appeal to facts. That is, we can ask whether the object or act will in fact get us what we believe it will. If the second is the case, the question of value is based on insight, and may also be resolved by an appeal to facts. That is, we can ask whether the object is in fact valued, and whether it is valued because of false beliefs and ideas -- beliefs which the individual may not even realize he has.

Thus, Kyrle can claim that persons with different values than those shared by all unrepressed persons are not guilty of having bad values, but rather are guilty of making mistakes about the way things are. It is on the basis of his clinical experience that he concludes:

the character of the non-humanist is an elaborate defense against unconscious and ultimately irrational anxieties within himself. What is more, we can also be certain that if he could be made conscious of these anxieties and their origin and so freed from their domination, his character would change (p. 139).

It was not previously recognized that non-humanists are simply making mistakes about the way things are because the false beliefs upon which they base their value orientation are unconscious and can only be made conscious by the special techniques of psychoanalysis. As they are made conscious, however, we will see "a convergence toward a certain kind of character, and a convergence also toward a desire for a state most congenial to people of this character (p. 140)."

Thus, by equating what is valuable with what is valued, Kyrle as Fromm attempts to change the question of what ought to be into the question of what is. But Kyrle's statement is more powerful: he doesn't claim only that people without humanistic values are unhappy -- he goes further to claim that they are wrong about the way things are. Do you disagree with him on a question of values? If so, it is either because you don't know yourself well enough, or because you have irrational beliefs about the world. It should be mentioned that there is terror as well as beauty in this kind of argument: the beauty of completeness and perfection, but the terror of isolation and helplessness. For if you find yourself among those sharing the unrepressed
humanistic view you are armed with the perfect argument against anyone with different values; but if you are one of the unfortunate repressed, you are completely helpless and isolated. It doesn't matter what you say about what you feel, you can be mistaken. Fortunately, Kyrle calls for a permissive atmosphere of quiet and a couch to help the unfortunates get over their mistakes.

Logically Kyrle's system is sound. There remains the question of whether men are as he says. Not only can we again raise the question of the objectivity of the psychoanalyst and his effect in determining the outcome of analysis and the question of the innate goodness of man, but also it may be noted that there is no good evidence for the agreement Kyrle predicts among analyzed people. After "complete" analysis some people favor the Viet Nam war and others call it a crime. After analysis some of Robert Lindner's (1952) patients remained communist while others did not. Can there be only differences of foresight and insight in these people? Are there not strong inherent biological differences among people? Anthropological studies (cf: Mead, 1963) suggest there are.

Maslow, Fromm, and Money-Kyrle are using very different languages to describe what is essentially the same experience. The three taken together make one very powerful statement. For although Maslow studied creative and talented people, Fromm worked with neurotics and Money-Kyrle studied displaced Germans; they all claim to find the same objective values. Kyrle's unrepressed man looks much like Maslow's best human and they both look like Fromm's happy man. Maslow thought he would find the highest human values by studying only the best humans. But his system has more universality than he claimed: Fromm and Kyrle found the same values in studying disturbed people. Fromm is saying the same thing as Kyrle when he claims that after analysis a man will not like flavorless white bread no matter how many commercials he has had to suffer through. Fromm puts happiness at the center of his ethical system, but this happiness is contingent on man being himself, and that is contingent on his knowing himself. Thus Fromm and Kyrle seem to talk about the same person when they refer to the integrated or unrepressed person. And Maslow seems to be describing the same quality
in his best humans. The best persons trust their senses, they are open to experience, they have true perceptions of reality, they listen to their inner voice, and their work is pleasure to them.

When we consider the three theories together, Fromm's poor philosophical formulations of the notion of primary and secondary potentials gains new validity. For all three theorists agree that men are striving to become themselves, to become what they potentially are, even if they do not realize what that is and do not realize that they are so striving. Those who have studied man have come to similar conclusions about what man is striving to become. In Maslow's words:

> It looks as if there were a single ultimate value for mankind, a far goal toward which all men strive. This is called variously by different authors self-actualization, self-realization, integration, psychological health, individuation, integrity, creativity, productivity, but they all agree that this amounts to realizing the potentialities of the person, that is to say, becoming fully human, everything that the person can become.

But it is also true that the person himself does not know this. We, the psychologists observing and studying, have constructed this concept in order to integrate and explain lots of diverse data (p. 145).

Thus it may be seen that our philosophical criticism of Fromm is essentially superficial. It may be true that in some conditions man will become destructive and in others he will become productive; but it seems also to be true that man wants to be productive. Logical criticism is based on a static picture of man. Man will actively seek out those conditions which allow him to be productive. He seeks and prefers the analytic situation where he can drop his defenses and become himself, just as he seeks a loved one with whom he can do the same. Some have had to build up so many defenses that they appear to have permanently lost that self, but there is the evidence of symptoms giving us reason to believe the self is still vying for expression.

Thus we can see underlying the theories of Fromm, Maslow, and Kyrle the same picture of human nature. While we can question the validity of this picture, we must recognize that that is a question of fact. But assuming that it is correct, we must still answer the
question of whether these men have found a true ethics through their study of man. It seems they have done something strange to the question of what man "ought" to do. They have made it appear meaningless. It would be impossible for any man to say he agreed with them on the facts, but disagreed about the value of self affirmation. They would answer that he is mistaken; that man cannot desire self renunciation for himself or others; that he in fact desires affirmation of himself, and that he would desire it even if he wished he did not, and further, he cannot even wish he did not if he has a correct picture of himself and the world. Given an objective way of finding what you do want, a statement that you "ought" to want something else can only be accepted on the basis of some authority above the individual. But these theorist accept none.

An ethics founded in psychology is the logical solution for men who no longer accept political or religious authority beyond the individual. In the absence of a power above us to dictate what is good and what we ought to do, we must find for ourselves what we value and what we want to do. Perhaps with the new tools of psychology man is evolving to a time when he can truly begin to fill the old maxim: know yourself. Once men have found what they do want (opened their hearts and obtained insight), then men can turn to the question of how best to get what they want (open their minds and obtain foresight). The mind can set a thousand paths before us, but only the heart can choose one.

Part II: Claims that Cultures are Sick

Many social scientists have presented more of less detailed claims that specific cultures are systematically sick, retarded, or maladaptive. A few of the various cultures and sub-cultures so indicated are the Ancient Hebrew, Anglo-American, Appalachian, Arapesh, Eastern Kentucky, Nazi, Mexican, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Japanese, and West-Virginian. Cultures have been criticized as sick based on a number of different criteria.
First, cultures have been criticized because they do not live up to some well worked out ethical standard. Money-Kyrle's (1951) criticism of the Nazi culture as based on repression fits this category. Fromm's (1955) criticism of capitalist society as preventing man from realizing his primary potentials is another example.

Most of those who describe cultures as sick simply show how cultures do not allow the realization of what are assumed to be basic and universal human values. Among the most passionate of these claims is that of Marx and Engels (1888) who state that capitalism necessarily resolved personal worth into exchange value, converted the physicians, lawyers, priests, poets, and scientists into wage laborers, reduced family relations to money relations, and converted creative workmen into appendages of machines. Henry (1963) in his "passionate ethnography" extends the list of horrors wrought by modern capitalism including the loss of self necessitated by a system which is based on creating new needs rather than satisfying organismic needs. Slater (1970) also describes the way in which organismic needs are replaced by cultural needs in modern America. He notes evidence by Lynn (1968) that neurotic anxiety is a very good predictor of success and achievement at the individual and national level. Slater believes this "confirms a long-felt suspicion that something sick forms the driving force for our civilization (p. 81)." Like Freud (1953) Slater believes that civilization demands that individuals give up their happiness in exchange for security. Both Slater and Freud imply the success of a civilization is proportionate to the misery of its individuals.

A third basis for claiming that a culture is sick is if that culture produces individuals who behave in such a way that they cannot obtain that for which they are trying. DeVos (1969) notes that outcast groups in Japan develop psychological behavior patterns to protect their self-esteem, but those behavior patterns perpetuate a sense of mistreatment and perhaps even the mistreatment itself. The Arapesh of New Guinea as described by Mead (1935) farm in such complicated communal organization that "The men spend over nine-tenths of their time responding to other peoples plans, digging in other people's gardens, going on hunting-parties initiated by others (p. 22)." Lee (1959) claims
that these complicated food gathering patterns "were hampered by constant interruptions, suffered continual interferences and distractions; there was appalling inefficiency and waste of time and energy. As a result, they never had enough to eat their fill...(p. 167)." On the surface, this communal organization appears clearly non-adaptive, but care must be taken to get the whole picture. As Mead notes, communal planting has as a result that:

No two gardens are planted at the same time, and therefore the Arapesh lack the "time hungry" so characteristic of yam-raising peoples where all of the gardens are planted simultaneously. Where several men work together to clear and fence one plot before scattering to cooperate in clearing and fencing other plots, the harvests succeeded each other. This method of gardening is not based upon the slightest physical need for cooperative labour...but the preference is strong for working in small happy groups in which one man is host and may feast his guest workers with a little meat -- if he finds it. And so the people go up and down the mountain sides, from one plot to another, weeding here, staking vines there, harvesting in another spot, called hither and thither by the demands of gardens in different states of maturity (p. 20).

Thus the very feature which makes a culture non-adaptive from one point of view (insufficient food) makes it adaptive from another (harmonious social relations). Nearsighted social scientists, as Mead (1952) notes, focus on distortions and bits of non-adaptive behavior, ignoring the larger cultural pattern of which they are an integral part.

Kagan & Madsen (1972) note that Anglo-American children are irrationally avoidant of competition, suggesting the notion of cultural therapy. It may be, however, that what appears to be non-adaptive behavior within an experimental setting is very adaptive when considered within a broader cultural framework. As Henry (1963) notes "though I deplore the fact that the (Anglo-American) elementary school pitches motivation at an intensely competitive level, I see no sense in altering that approach, because children have to live in a competitive world (p. 3)."
A fourth basis for claiming that a culture is sick is when it retards individuals in their development in what is assumed to be a universal developmental sequence. Witkin (1962) claims that development from field dependent to field independent is a universal developmental sequence. The argument may be made that cultural child-rearing patterns which retard this process of individuation are psychologically damaging. If so, a value judgment may be made against cultures with child-rearing practices which produce field dependent children. Orthodox Jewish mothers, for example, tend to be dominant and tend to inhibit separation between themselves and their sons. Orthodox Jewish mothers produce sons who are more field dependent than liberal Jewish mothers; assimilated Jewish families produce sons who are more field dependent than those of Protestant families (Derschowitz, 1967). Thus a value judgment may be made against the orthodox child-rearing practices on the basis that they retard a universal developmental sequence. However, as with the culture of poverty and the Arapesh culture, care must be taken not to make value judgments on the basis of narrow criteria. In the Orthodox Jewish Culture, what is lost in terms of individuation is gained in closer family ties.

A fifth basis for claiming that a culture is sick is when it does not provide its individuals the life experiences for which they have been developmentally prepared. This tragedy occurs most often when a traditional culture is forced to interact with urban values. Perhaps the most touching description of such an interaction is presented by Erikson's (1950) discussion of the plight of the Oglala subtribe of the Sioux of Dakota. Erikson notes how child-rearing practices which were intuitively efficient in producing a fighting nomad and buffalo hunter are now producing a race which has turned against its own aggressiveness so as to lose initiative and become paranoid. "The Sioux, under traumatic conditions, has lost the reality for which the last historical form of his communal integrity has fitted (p. 153)."

Spindler & Spindler (1963) state that "The representation of culture in each individual is his personality and includes his perceptions, motives, defenses, and controls. In cultural contact, as the
conditions of survival change established patterns lose meaning and may become maladaptive (p. 515)." Hughes (1969) discusses a number of ways transcultural contact leads to stress. Fabrega & Wallace (1971) suggest that the greatest psychiatric disturbances in Chicanos is among those who are neither traditional or assimilated but rather only partially assimilated.

A sixth and final basis for claiming that a culture is sick is the widespread occurrence within a culture of a known psychiatric disturbance. Money-Kyrle (1951, p. 184) notes the high incidence of pathology in Nazi Germans. Henry (1963) describes the Anglo-American preoccupation with achievement as a classical obsession, the motivation for which is the fear of failure. He explains that our classrooms are designed to teach children to wring success from someone else's failures and to hate others and their successes.

To say that culture "teaches" puts the matter too mildly. Actually culture invades and infects the mind as an obsession. If it does not, culture will not work, for only an obsession has the power to withstand the impact of critical differences; to fly in the face of contradiction; to engulf the mind so that it will see the world only as the culture decrees that it shall be seen; to compel a person to be absurd (p. 296).

In 1965 the University of Kentucky sponsored a conference on ethnopsychology and cross-cultural psychiatry. Psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, anthropologists, and psychologists held lively discussions about the role of social scientists in evaluating and changing cultures (Finney, 1969). Two types of psychologically sick cultures were described: the culture of poverty and the culture of conversion reaction or hysteria. There was consensus (but not unanimity) among the social scientists that both of these cultures are psychologically sick and that social and behavioral scientists can legitimately undertake the task of social or behavioral engineering to change them.

The culture of poverty was first described by Lewis (1959). In a later work (1969) he lists some sixty specific economic, social, and psychological traits which define the culture of poverty. These include
low wages, pawning, struggle for survival, lack of privacy, gregariousness, authoritarianism, lifetime friendships, strong extended family ties, use of herbs for curing, political apathy, feeling of helplessness, marginality, dependency, inferiority, personal unworthiness, little sense of history, fatalism, male superiority, present time orientation, and impulsiveness.

The culture of poverty is not synonymous with poverty. The poor in India who are comforted by their belief in reincarnation and the poor in the Soviet Union who believe in Marxism do not belong to the culture of poverty. The culture of poverty has as its core feelings of alienation from the larger society. Finney (1969) describes the culture of poverty as mainly a function of the breakdown of belief systems and notes that it is spreading in both cities and rural areas. The culture of poverty is characteristic of certain groups in Japan, Puerto Rico, rural Mexico, and Eastern Kentucky. Based on the feelings of uselessness and worthlessness generated in its members, Finney (1969) concludes that because of the culture of poverty "whole villages can be considered psychologically sick (p. xv)."

A number of social scientists have noted some good features of the culture of poverty. Gazaway (1969) remarks on the lack of resentment and the fact that most members "would be the last to trade his lot for that of anyone else in the world (p. 56)." She tells of the sense of loss of a woman who moved from a rural hollow to a larger city. "When I lived in the Hollow these were my roaches. But I don't know who these belong to. (Gazaway, 1969, p. 74)." Suicide is unknown in these rural Kentucky hollows. Deviance is accepted.

Oscar Lewis (1969) notes the advantages of the present time orientation of those living in the culture of poverty.

Living in the present may develop a capacity for spontaneity and for the enjoyment of the sensual, a sense of adventure, and the indulgence of impulse, which is often blunted in our middle class, future-orientated man. Perhaps it is this reality of the moment which the middle-class existentialist writers are so desperately trying to recapture and which the culture of poverty experiences as a natural, everyday phenomenon (p. 152).
It is quite possible that need achievement and ability to enjoy fully the present are negatively correlated and that more achievement will be bought only at the expense of the capacity to enjoy the fruits of that achievement.

A second supposedly sick culture has been called "the culture of conversion reaction or hysteria." According to Finney (1969) in this culture

the whole population has built its way of living on a certain way of communicating, a certain way in which a person interacts with others, sends his messages to others. Those who have conversion reaction are only using in the extreme form the communication methods that are the way of life of the whole society (p. xvii).

The culture of hysteria is marked by the repression of feelings which are allowed to erupt under culturally defined circumstances. Feelings are expressed motorically without individuals becoming aware of or in control of those feelings. Although the culture of hysteria is not synonymous with the culture of poverty, external control is characteristic of both cultures. "People of this sort feel that life is a series of unpredictable events that happen to them, not something that they can plan or make for themselves (Finney, 1969, p. xvii)." The culture of hysteria is supposedly characteristic of Eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, Puerto Rico, Ancient Hebrews, Nigeria, and blue collar classes in North America (Finney, 1969, p. xvii). Ransdell & Roche (1969) describe in detail the plight of the Appalachian male who lives in a culture where the payoff for illness is greater than for work. Backaches, headaches, sleeplessness, upset stomachs, numbless, and hysterical paralysis are common. One fellow became mute, retarded in his movements, and even had seizures when forced to work. The psychosomatic seizures were quickly cured by injections of water. When the fellow did learn that he could achieve through his own efforts, he became happy and gregarious and his symptoms disappeared. The external locus of control, feelings of worthlessness, and retarded movement have been related as part of a learned helplessness syndrome (Seligman, 1971).
Learned helplessness occurs when an organism learns that what it gets is independent of what it does. Organisms in such environments become depressed. It is interesting to note the blend of depression and conversion hysteria within the culture of hysteria. The conversion reaction may be seen as active coping which is healthier than giving in to the underlying depression. If the conversion reaction does serve to cover a sense of learned helplessness, restructuring the environment so that it provides differential rewards for differential efforts may be the quickest way to eliminate conversion symptoms within the culture of hysteria.

Part III: Cultural Therapy -- Ethical and Practical Issues

There are inescapable ethical dilemmas in any approach to cultural therapy. For example, Finney (1969) spells out the bind of the social scientist facing a society which is intolerant of certain of its individuals; If the social scientist tries to change the society so that it is more tolerant, he is accused by some of being intolerant toward the culture. He may be seen as abandoning cultural relativism, imposing his narrow ethnocentric values on another culture, and of engaging in cultural cannibalism. If, on the other hand, the social scientist accepts the society, he is accused by others of being insensitive to human suffering and of rationalizing his lack of humanistic relatedness under the guise of cultural relativism.

In looking at the culture of poverty, one group of social scientists say it is inhuman to allow unborn children to come into a culture in which they will be destined to a sense of worthlessness and helplessness; if the people of these cultures do not realize their ignorance and misfortune, it is our duty to educate and relieve them. A second group of social scientists claim, as does Honigmann (1969, p. 8), "Psychiatric judgments are value judgments made by some member of a class-divided society about other members."

One of the most pressing ethical issues is determining the best level for social scientists to intervene. Psychologists, who tend to see
individuals responsible for their institutions, look for ways to modify the personality and child-rearing practices of individuals within disturbed cultures. Sociologists, who tend to see institutions as responsible for its individuals, look for ways to restructure the institutions of the disturbed culture. Ramirez (1972) addresses himself to this problem in relation to the difficulties of Mexican-American children in the Anglo-American classroom. Ramirez notes that those who realize that the Chicano culture does not prepare its children for Anglo schools usually conclude that "Chicano culture is a hindrance to the child and must be eradicated..." Ramirez, instead calls for "culturally democratic education" demanding that the Anglo school rather than the Chicano children be changed. Clearly the level of intervention called for by a social scientist is an expression of that scientist's values.

A more typical stand for a psychologist is taken by Derbyshire (1967) who demonstrated that the "Policeman Bill" program decreased the apathy of Watts children toward police. Derbyshire concluded his article by stating "This research concludes that the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Public schools must not only continue the "Policeman Bill" program, but it should be intensified." Clearly, there is no logical connection between the fact that a program reduces hostility toward police and the statement that such a program should be continued; yet Derbyshire apparently assumes that any program that reduces student hostility is good, either for the students or for their society. He does not deal with the fact that what might be good for the maintenance of society's values might be bad for the students. Opler (1969) states that "A violent group such as the Watts rioters show better mental health than apathetic ones." May (1972) makes a similar point in discussing the mental health of a student before and during participation in a campus riot in which a campus computer was destroyed. Derbyshire left the role of social scientist and entered the role of cultural therapist when he leaped from the fact that the "Policeman Bill" program reduced hostility to the conclusion that the program should be intensified. Because his leap is so blatant, his value judgment is
clear. But it is important to recognize that even if he had confined himself only to the question of the effects of the "Policeman Bill" program, Derbyshire spent time and money in research designed to help the police do what they want; he might have spent the same time and energy researching questions about the incidence and effects of police brutality, and the mental health and accuracy of perception of those Watts children who are hostile toward the police.

A similar leap from what is to what ought to be is made by Stephens (1971). Stephens demonstrates that poor school performance is associated with external locus of control. He concludes: "It does seem clear, then, that a major aim of compensatory education programs for disadvantaged children (at least, Afro- and Anglo-American disadvantaged children) should be an attempt to increase the development of Internal Control expectancies..." Stephens, like Derbyshire, takes the near-sighted stand that a program which will realize something he values is necessarily good. Stephens does not ask or answer the questions about the side effects of modifying children's perception of locus of control. Silvern (1972) reviews the literature on the adaptiveness of internal and external locus of control and concludes that "the more therapeutic intervention is to increase awareness of external sources of control rather than to take steps to increase a personal sense of internal locus of control." She cites Gurin, et al. (1969) who note that internalality among disadvantaged groups may lead to self-blame and feelings of worthlessness. Increasing internality among disadvantaged groups may be a way of stifling militant group action and social change (Sigel, 1971; Gurin, et al., 1969; Lao, 1970; Ransford, 1968).
Part IV: Models of Cultural Therapy

Individual psychotherapy as a field is unsystematic. Seven different individual therapists could quite possibly give the same individual seven different diagnoses, and seven different treatments with seven different definitions of cure as their aim. Not only do different schools of therapy define and treat patients/clients/persons differently--therapists of the same school often look at the same individual and recommend quite different diagnosis and treatment.

Cultural therapy as a field is equally unsystematic. Cultural therapy may be defined as any program designed to systematically modify a culture. At present cultural therapy is conducted by psychologists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, politicians, and educators. Seven different cultural therapists might recommend for the same culture programs based on seven different diagnoses, with seven different definitions of cure as their aim. Analogies may be made between the approaches of cultural therapists to cultures and the approaches of individual therapists to individuals. There are three main schools of individual psychotherapy today: Psychoanalytic, Behavior Modification, and Existential. Cultural therapies may be classified as essentially of one of these three schools.

Psychoanalytic Cultural Therapy. Just as individuals are often unconscious of how and why they act, so can be cultures. Psychoanalytically oriented cultural therapy can be conducted by analyzing the unconscious motivation of a culture, attempting to make it conscious. The psychoanalytic cultural therapist may analyze and interpret the shared symptomatology of the individuals within a culture, or he may analyze the symptoms of the culture as a whole. Analysis of the individuals within a culture may aim at changing the culture. Kyrie (1951) claims that psychoanalysis of individuals within a repressed culture would necessarily make them ill adapted to that culture. Finney (1969, p. xvii) speaks of "the culture of conversion reaction or hysteria," in which individuals with conversion reactions "are only using in extreme form the communication methods that are the way of life of the whole society."
Hysterical cultures systematically repress hostility and permit its eruption under culturally defined circumstances. Psychoanalytic cultural therapy might aim at loosening the grip of repression so that the culture as a whole becomes tolerant of the expression of hostility in the situations of its origin. Some psychoanalytic cultural therapists treat hostility and violence not as primary repressions but as by-products of other forces. Rollo May (1971) in his analysis of violence in modern America lays the entire culture on his couch, analyzing the Viet Nam and Campus violence as symptoms of modern man's unrelatedness to himself and others. Fromm (1947) makes similar interpretations. These therapists attempt to make conscious America's repressed need for genuine relatedness. Psychoanalytic cultural therapists have been making their interpretations to the American culture for some time; judging from the American culture's response, however, I have come to question the effectiveness of psychoanalytic cultural therapy.

Psychoanalytic therapists sometimes do not aim at the analysis of repressions; sometimes they choose the more modest goals of supportive therapy. And just as an individual therapist might support some of the patient's defenses in order to accomplish some limited individual goals, so might a cultural therapist support some aspect of a culture in order to accomplish some limited cultural objective. For example, an individual psychotherapist might analyze a patient's symptoms as due to unconscious feelings of inadequacy and so might support the patient by suggesting that he be involved in certain activities which could help him feel better about himself. Dunne (1967) and Steiner (1969) describe a similar process at a cultural level. Apathetic and alienated individuals were transformed into proud, independent, and self-respecting men consequent to their involvement in the Delano movement. Astute psychoanalytic cultural therapists, based on their knowledge of the cultural unconscious, could recommend the type of activities which would allow a cultural group to gain needed support.
Behavior Modification Cultural Therapy. What psychoanalysts regard as symptoms of some unconscious cultural dynamic, behavior modifiers regard as maladaptive learned habits. In discussing the Japanese minority groups George De Vos (1971) suggests that mistreated groups develop psychological features to protect their self esteem and these behaviors perpetuate a sense of mistreatment and perhaps even the mistreatment itself. Given this picture, a behavior modifier might not look for the roots of these people's sense of mistreatment, but might rather reinforce new and more adaptive coping methods.

Behavior modifiers emphasize the role of environmental reinforcement contingencies, rather than unconscious internal conflicts, in shaping and maintaining behavior. When faced with a disturbed individual they are likely to attribute his disturbance to his environment attempting systematic modification of that environment. For example, instead of giving a disturbed child play therapy, a behavior modifier might train his parents to act differently. Analogously, when faced with a psychologically sick subculture, some social scientists have turned their attention to the malfunctioning in the larger society. A number of authors at the 1971 Kentucky symposium on Cultural Change, Mental Health, and Poverty (Finney, 1971) concluded that the culture of poverty is a psychologically sick culture created and maintained as a natural by-product of the values of the large society.

Existential Cultural Therapy. The third force in psychotherapy has shunned extensive theoretical formulation. Existential therapists emphasize what is rather than why things are or how they ought to be. The way in which existential therapy is practiced however, expresses a strong, clear value system and etiological theory. Existential therapists value awareness and responsibility for here and now interpersonal feeling process. They attribute psychological disturbance to the tendency in individuals to avoid awareness of their here and now feelings. And just as existential individual therapists move their client toward the goal of here and now feeling awareness, so might existential cultural therapists move cultures.

Beisser (1970) suggests that the change theory used in existential therapy could be used at a societal level. Paradoxically, "change occurs when one becomes what he is, not when he tries to become what he is not (p. 77)." Beisser suggests that cultural therapy could be conducted by increasing the awareness within a culture of alienated fragments, accepting
the functional needs which produce the alienated fragments, and promoting communication between subsystems which "facilitates an integrated, harmonious development of the whole system." Unfortunately, Beisser is vague about the concrete steps he would take toward these ends.

An Integrative Approach to Cultural Therapy. Cultures produce children who are systematically irrational (Kagan & Madsen, 1972). It appears that cultures impose on their people a mode of adapting to the world the rationality of which is situation dependent. Urban Anglo-American children persist in competition to an irrational extent and rural Mexican children avoid competition to an irrational extent. These systematic irrationalities have been related to cultural differences in parental reinforcement practices (Madsen & Kagan, In. Prep.) It appears that Anglo-American mothers reinforce their children in such a way as to give them the impression that they always control what happens to them whereas Mexican mothers give their children the impression that what happens to them is beyond their control. Anglo-American mothers reinforce their children in ways producing an over-generalized sense of learned effectiveness; Mexican mothers produce a syndrome described by Seligman (1971) as learned helplessness. By making only the value judgment of awareness, it would be possible to show Anglo-American and Mexican mothers what they are doing and how it effects their children. Awareness of how they are, the effects of how they are, and awareness of the alternatives, might be sufficient to allow the parents of both cultures to make choices which would produce more rational children. An approach designed to increase such awareness would be eclectic or integrative because it would 1) make unconscious cultural patterns conscious, 2) change the reinforcement contingencies which maintain systematic cultural irrationalities, and 3) allow the individuals within the cultures to more fully realize, accept, and take responsibility for the choices they are making.
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