A model of the key processes of the political system of school-district government and a report of some of the findings generated by application of the model to the comparative study of 15 elementary school districts in the Chicago suburban area are presented here. It is hypothesized that, after controlling for variation in community expectations for educational services, and ability to pay, districts differing in levels of local resource utilization will exhibit characteristic variations in the structuring of political-system processes relating school boards to their constituents. The paper also examines what structures undertake the processes relating school boards to their constituents and how socioeconomic-status differences among districts affect the structuring of political processes. Among the findings, it is noted that referendum is an important process through which community expectations and ability to pay find ultimate expression within school district government and that higher-status communities are more likely to effectively institutionalize a caucus for the recruitment of school board members. The study also identified distinctive patterns of board-community relations in districts differing in levels of local resource utilization. (GC)
THE STRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PROCESSES IN SUBURBAN SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNMENT

David O'Shea
University of California
Los Angeles

Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association
April 5, 1972, Chicago, Illinois
Session 15.13

FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Not for quotation or reproduction without permission of the author.
CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................ iii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ................................ iii

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 1
   Objectives
   The Economic Model
   Representativeness of Cases
   Data Collection

II. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM ............................... 8
   Inputs of Demands and Supports
   Support Mobilization for Referenda
   Processing of Demands and Environmental Characteristics
   Conclusion

III. STRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ........ 15
   Overview
   Citizens Committees
   High Deviant Cases
   Structuring of the Mobilization of Support
   Structuring of Demands upon the Authorities
   Support for the Authorities
   Summary
   Low Deviant Cases
   Trenton
   Swinton
   Parkland
   Twin-Villages
   Summary
   Non-Deviant Cases
   Main Findings

IV. COMMUNITY STATUS AND THE STRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PROCESSES ........ 36
   Socio-Economic Status and Political Culture
   School District Government and Political Parties

V. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .... 39
   Conclusions
   Proposals for Further Research
APPENDIXES

I. THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS ........................................... 43
II. SCATTER DIAGRAM ..................................................... 45
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF DISTRICTS STUDIED ..................... 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................. 47
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Distribution of 118 Suburban Elementary Districts, and Cases Selected for Study, by Level of Assessed Valuation Per Pupil and Category of Deviation in Terms of 1965-66 Local Expenditure Per Pupil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Distribution of 118 Suburban Elementary Districts, and Cases Selected for Study, by Level of Socio-Economic Status and Category of Deviation in Terms of 1965-66 Local Expenditure Per Pupil</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Distribution of Cases Studied in Terms of Socio-Economic Status, Electoral Dissent, Referendum Dissent and Participation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Results of Stepwise Regression of 1965-66 Local Operating Expenditure Per Pupil for 118 Chicago Suburban Elementary School Districts upon Selected Expectation-Ability Factors</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Single Effects, Cumulative Effects, and Unique Contribution of Expectation-Ability Factors to Variation of Local Operating Expenditure Per Pupil</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Distribution of Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics, Local Expenditure Per Pupil, and Deviation of Actual from Estimated Expenditure, among the Fifteen School Districts Studied</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Model of the Political System of Suburban School Districts Based upon the Works of Easton and Minar</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Scatter Diagram Showing Distribution of 118 Suburban Districts in Terms of Local Expenditure Per Pupil Relative to the Amount Predicted</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I INTRODUCTION

Objectives

This paper both proposes a model of the key processes of the political system of school district government and reports on some of the findings generated by an application of the model to the comparative study of fifteen elementary school districts in the Chicago suburban area. In conclusion, some suggestions are offered for further research.

Three interrelated problems provided foci for the comparative study of suburban districts.

1. It was assumed that the political system of school districts provides the means by which communities decide the level of educational services which they desire, and access to necessary local resources. Therefore it was hypothesized that, after controlling for variation in community expectations for educational services, and ability to pay, districts differing in their levels of local resource utilization would exhibit characteristic variations in the structuring of political system processes relating board members to their constituents.

2. Given that school districts usually lack political parties to structure the processes relating boards to their constituents, the question arises as to what are the structures that undertake this function?

3. As districts vary considerably in the socio-economic status of their populations, what are some effects of such variation upon the structuring of political processes?

In view of the purposes of this study, districts were selected on the basis of their relative level of local resource utilization, a measure of which was generated on the basis of an economic model developed by H. Thomas James and his associates.¹

The Economic Model

James, et al., have demonstrated that the greater part of the variance in per pupil operating expenditure between school districts is attributable to factors representing their social and economic characteristics. These factors, among which are assessed valuation per pupil, median family income, and years of education in the adult population, are taken to be indicators of both community expectations for educational services and ability to pay. Fitted into a multiple regression, with account being taken of non-linearities, selected expectation-ability factors may be used to generate estimates of district expenditure from local sources only, a figure computed by subtracting state and federal contributions from the total expenditure for each district in the area being studied. The degree to which a given district's local expenditure deviates from its estimated amount provides a measure of the district's level of local resource utilization relative to others with similar characteristics among those for which data are entered into the regression. Such a measure was computed for 118 elementary districts in the Chicago suburban area on the basis

¹See, for example, H. Thomas James, James A. Kelly, and Walter I. Garms, Determinants of Educational Expenditure in Large Cities of the United States, (Stanford: School of Education, Stanford University, 1966).
of school district data for the 1965-66 school year, and demographic data from the 1960 U.S. Census.¹

Having determined the distribution of all 118 districts in terms of actual local expenditure relative to the estimated amount, ² fifteen were selected for comparative study. Four were selected from among those whose expenditure deviated more than one standard deviation, or $50, above the estimated amount, four from among those more than one standard deviation below, and seven from among those at the estimated level. Data on the socio-economic characteristics of the selected districts are presented in Appendix III. Pseudonyms are used for the districts to protect the privacy of local informants.

Representativeness of Cases

Data in Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of all 118 suburban districts in terms of assessed valuation per pupil, socio-economic status, and category of deviation of actual from estimated local expenditure. In these tables a comparison is made of the distribution of the cases selected in terms of the same variables.

Table 1 makes a comparison between the distribution of all 118 districts and the fifteen selected for study on the basis of assessed valuation and category of deviation. The table shows that there is at least one case from each of the eight cells, and more than one from each of five cells.

Reading across Table 1 also shows that for districts in both the high and low assessed valuation groups, the distribution of districts above and below their estimated expenditure levels is almost

¹See Appendix I for details of the regression analysis, including a list of variables used.

²See Appendix II for the scatter diagram of all 118 districts and location in terms of expenditure of the fifteen chosen for study.
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF 118 SUBURBAN ELEMENTARY DISTRICTS, AND CASES SELECTED FOR STUDY, BY LEVEL OF ASSESSED VALUATION PER PUPIL AND CATEGORY OF DEVIATION IN TERMS OF 1965-66 LOCAL EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessed Valuation Per Pupil</th>
<th>High Deviant</th>
<th>Non-Deviant</th>
<th>Low Deviant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of districts selected for study in relation to the distribution of all suburban districts among the categories of Table 1:

<sup>a</sup>Hamilton<br><sup>b</sup>Norton<br><sup>c</sup>Newland<br><sup>d</sup>Twin-Villages<br><sup>e</sup>Leland<br><sup>f</sup>Lincoln<br><sup>g</sup>Winfield<br><sup>h</sup>Trenton

equal. However, reading down the table shows that as assessed valuation increases, so does the variation of actual expenditure relative to the amount estimated. This reflects the existence of a base line for the level of school district operating expenditure which exercises growing constraint upon decision-makers as resources decrease. This base line is set indirectly by salary levels for teachers, and by professional pressures against allowing enrollments in normal classes to rise above the low thirties. Districts in the Chicago suburbs compete in the same market for their teachers. In 1965-66 the average starting salary in
the 118 elementary districts used in the study, for teachers with an undergraduate degree, was $5,300.¹ The range of variation around this figure was no more than plus or minus $100. If districts wanted teaching staff they had to meet the minimum demands of the market regarding salaries and working conditions.

TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF 118 SUBURBAN ELEMENTARY DISTRICTS, AND CASES SELECTED FOR STUDY, BY LEVEL OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND CATEGORY OF DEVIATION IN TERMS OF 1965-66 LOCAL EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-Economic Status</th>
<th>High Deviant</th>
<th>Non-Deviant</th>
<th>Low Deviant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>10²</td>
<td>21¹</td>
<td>22²</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6³</td>
<td>24²</td>
<td>20¹</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of districts selected for study in relation to the distribution of all suburban districts among the categories of Table 2:

²Leland
Hamilton
Lake City
³Villa
⁴Lincoln
Steelton
Brookville
⁵Trenton
Twin-Villages
⁶Swinton
⁷Parkland

The distribution of the selected cases in terms of socio-economic status is not as representative as for assessed valuation, as shown by data in Table 2, though all but two cells are covered. The most important omission is the lack of high status, low deviant, cases. Two were approached, but both declined to participate in the study. To generate a measure of socio-economic status districts were ranked according to their median family incomes, and then by years of education in the adult population. The two scores were averaged for each district, and then ordered once again to establish a single SES rank. Income and education measures had a relatively high correlation of 0.79 among the 118 districts.

Data in Table 2 show that high and low status districts are equally likely to fall above or below their estimated expenditure levels. However, there is a tendency for more high SES districts to be high deviant. The significance of this tendency is doubtful, though, as a shift of just two cases in either of the deviant categories could eliminate the association.

Data discussed so far were derived from published statistics. To facilitate comparative analysis of the pattern of relationships between school boards and their electorates additional information was required, and this was obtained by field studies in each district.

Data Collection

In studying the selected cases, data were gathered from school district records on voting returns for board elections and referenda for the years from 1960 through 1967, and interviews were conducted with local informants. Among informants the most important were district superintendents, board members, and local government officials.
Superintendents were interviewed in all fifteen districts. In thirteen, at least six of the seven board members were also interviewed. In two districts where fewer than six board members were available, former members were interviewed to corroborate data provided by incumbents. In addition, in all but two districts interviews were conducted with local government officials. In eight cases these were city, or village, managers; in five they were elected members of local government, two of whom were mayors.

Other respondents were sought when it seemed likely that they might be in a position to identify, or clarify, factors relevant to the pattern of interaction between the school board and the community. In ten districts interviews were held with editors, or staff members, of local newspapers. In five districts persons associated with opposition to the school board were interviewed. Altogether, between November, 1967, and August, 1968, individual interviews were conducted with 152 persons.

In the course of the interviews respondents were asked to discuss, among other things, the problems which had faced their district in recent years, and to identify groups and individuals who had been in touch with the board regarding referenda, and other issues. When gathered together, the individual views of respondents provide a collective image of the structure of relations between the board and the electorate from which the most salient aspects stand out in relief, being referred to by several persons. Such data were amplified by information from respondents on methods used to promote referenda and to recruit board members, and are supplemented by school district voting records.
In undertaking the comparative analysis of the structuring of political processes in the selected districts, a model of the political system was used based largely on the work of Easton, with additions suggested by Minar's research and incorporating the referendum process. The author found that variation in the structuring of mobilization of support for referenda was closely related to differences in the level of local resource utilization. In discussing this, and other findings, it will be helpful to relate them to the political system model as diagrammed in Figure 1, beginning with demands and supports.

II THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Inputs of Demands and Supports

Easton views the political system analytically as a behavioral one, making adaptive responses to inputs of demands and supports. Outputs are authoritative decisions accepted as binding by most people, most of the time. A demand is an actual request for an authoritative decision. Expectations or attitudes are not demands, though constituting important background factors. Though diagrammed in Figure 1 as entering the system at the boundary, demands may emerge internally, from professional staff or board members, as well as from strains in the enoironing social structure. For example, in Crain's desegregation study, stresses in the community led civil rights leaders to articulate demands upon the school district authorities.

---

Figure 1. Model of the Political System of Suburban School Districts Based upon the Works of Easton and Minar.
identified, one seeks to determine how they are structured. Again using Crain's study, desegregation demands were structured by civil rights organizations rather than by older political organizations in the black community.

Demands, Easton points out, are one side of a coin, the reverse of which is support. Usually demands find expression in organized groups, and the same groups mobilize support behind their demands. In addition to the question of support interacting with demands, a process diagrammed by vertical arrows in Figure 1, Easton also points to the three objectives of support in political systems: the authorities, the regime, and the political community. In making comparisons between districts the actual level of support for the authorities may be deduced from voting returns, at least in those districts where board members are elected.

As Crain's findings indicate, a key factor in the support process is the linkage which the structuring of board recruitment establishes between the authorities and influential sections of the community. Boards which proved most acquiescent to desegregation demands were those whose members were recruited from, and enjoyed tacit support of, civic elites. By contrast, boards whose members were largely professional politicians reflected the general lack of support for the civil rights movement among political leaders.

In addition to the question of support for the authorities, other objects toward which support is directed are the regime and the political community. Easton proposes three dimensions of regime: values, which derive from the cultural system of society, shaping the

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 177-205.}\]
goals and operating principals of the political system; norms specifying acceptable procedures for processing demands; and finally, the structure of authority through which decisions are implemented. It is unlikely that the regime will lack support in school districts, but frequently one finds opinion divided concerning the viability of the political community, conceived as all persons within a given political jurisdiction whenever they address themselves to questions concerning decisions of the authorities. Two types of district likely to experience difficulty maintaining their political community are small ones with inadequate local resources, motivating residents to seek mergers with more affluent neighbors, and large ones in big cities, which nowadays often face withdrawal of support in favor of decentralization.

While Easton deals with objects of support, focussing attention upon several crucial dimensions of government, he says little about support mobilization, an especially important process in school districts, most of which have to turn to their electorate for the approval of tax increases and bond issues. Reflecting their periodic nature, processes associated with referenda are diagrammed between dotted lines as stage two of Figure 1.

Support Mobilization for Referenda

Strategically, comparative analysis of the structuring of the process of support mobilization offers a fruitful approach to the identification of patterns of board-community relations in school districts. Referenda attract a relatively high level of popular involvement compared to board elections. In studying forty-eight elementary districts in the Chicago suburbs, Miner found that in the period from 1958 through 1962 the median proportion of registered voters'
attending the polls for annual board elections was 8.7 per cent.¹ For referenda the median proportion was substantially larger, reaching 12.7 per cent. Given their salience for system survival, referenda not only attract relatively high levels of individual participation; they also draw local organizations and key leaders into the support mobilization process, thus facilitating identification of those groups and personalities most actively involved in structuring board-community relations. Typically, groups which take an active part in promoting referenda are also likely to be involved in mediating demands upon the authorities, and associated supports.

As most districts lack a party organization to structure board-community relations they face the problem of locating functional substitutes, especially for the purpose of mobilizing support for referenda. In general, as Dahl found in his study of decision-making in New Haven,² the PTA plays a prominent role in this regard. In fact, though the manifest function of the organization is the promotion of parent-teacher relationships, it has the major latent function in many districts of structuring political system processes such as support mobilization for referenda and board recruitment, as well as demands upon the authorities.

Having discussed the more important factors associated with referenda, we now turn to the remaining elements of Figure 1; the processing of demands and the characteristics of the environment.

**Processing of Demands and Environmental Characteristics**

The three factors diagrammed in relation to the processing

of demands are demand aggregation, institutionalization, and decision-making. These components are specified by Minar in his model of the political system of school district government.\(^1\) With regard to demand aggregation, Minar follows Easton in pointing to the fact that many demands expressed by individuals are balanced off against one another within the structures that mediate between the electorate and the authorities. Again, PTA's sometimes play an important role here. Institutionalization refers to the fact that systems tend to set up routines or create offices to handle claims for decisional outcomes. A prominent example of this in the case of suburban districts is the creation of a caucus for board recruitment; a structure which both aggregates diverse demands for representation, and institutionalizes the processing of such demands. The third component of the processing of demands is decision-making, the focus of the political system.

In exploring the processing of demands, Minar has demonstrated that the structuring of political processes varies in characteristic ways between communities whose populations differ in terms of socio-economic status. Essentially, system processes are institutionalized in more stable structures in higher status communities. Residents of higher status districts are likely to have relatively plentiful resources of "conflict-management skills."\(^2\) Such resources are, in effect, a dimension of political culture, mediating between community status and the political system. Conflict management ability shows up not only in organizational structures, but also in the pattern of

---

\(^1\)Minar, *Educational Decision-Making*.

board-superintendent relationships within the decision-making process of school districts. Boards in white collar communities are likely to leave administrative matters to their superintendents; those in blue collar communities frequently intervene. Not unexpectedly, therefore, superintendent turnover tends to be higher in lower status districts.

In general, the environment, conceived analytically as distinct from the processes of the political system, is not only a major source of demands upon the authorities, reflecting changes in public expectations of the schools as other aspects of society change; the environment also establishes the context within which political processes are structured.

**Conclusion**

To summarize, a model of the political system is presented here which provides a theoretical basis for analysing the processes and structures of school district government. The model has been used by the author, as will be described further in the next section, in studying suburban elementary districts with a view to:

1. Identifying the pattern of board-community relations in school districts, focussing attention upon ways in which processes relating the authorities and their constituents are structured.

2. Exploring relations between variations in the structuring of school district governmental processes and the extent to which districts are able to secure access to local economic resources.

3. Studying ways in which the structuring of political processes varies between districts whose populations differ in terms of socio-economic status.
III. STRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PROCESSES

Overview

Account having been taken of non-linearities in the relationship between predictor variables and local expenditure, cases were selected for study on the assumption that the structuring of political processes outlined in Figure 1 would vary in characteristic ways between districts differing substantially in their relative use of local resources, as indexed by the degree of departure between estimated and actual local expenditure per pupil. This assumption was confirmed by data gathered from the fifteen districts studied.

Considering high deviant districts first, among three of the four in this category demands upon the authorities for educational services were structured by identifiable community groups. In the fourth case, demands originated within the board itself. By contrast, among the four low deviant districts, three had the experience of local groups structuring negative demands upon the authorities. Beyond these findings, and of great importance for our understanding of the ways in which the processes of school district government become structured, was the fact that groups involved in presenting demands, whether positive or negative, typically extended their activities into two other areas; board recruitment, a central dimension of the process of support for the authorities, and the mobilization of support for referenda. In effect, demand groups also wanted their point of view represented on the board, and were ready to intervene in mobilizing
either support for, or opposition to, referenda according to the direction of their demands. The multi-functionality of demand groups is of considerable theoretical, and practical, interest, pointing to the emergence in school districts, most of which operate on a non-partisan basis, of functional substitutes for political parties.

Relative to the high and low deviant districts, those in the non-deviant category were distinguished by the fact that a majority showed no evidence of the emergence of demand groups in their communities from 1960 through 1965, the period studied. Of the seven cases in this category, one experienced organized opposition to referenda; one other being characterized by the emergence of the organized expression of demands for educational services. Again, in both cases, the demand groups also took a leading part in structuring the other two major political processes; support for the authorities, and the mobilization of support for referenda. By way of example, in one of the two cases, the Steelton district, PTA members became concerned about overcrowding in the schools. Though the board proposed a new building, parents argued that projected population growth called for a much larger structure than the one planned. When board members proved unresponsive to their demands, PTA leaders secured the cooperation of members of the local homeowners association in forming a citizens committee to fight the issue. The committee soon succeeded in displacing incumbent board members with persons favoring the larger school. The same committee then undertook the leading role in mobilizing public support behind the necessary bond issue referendum.

In most non-deviant districts studied demands for the maintenance or expansion of educational services came from within the school district
administration, typically in the course of preparing the annual budget. Community involvement developed at the point where expenditures required an increase in the local tax levy, or a bond issue. By voting for or against the issue when it was submitted in a referendum, citizens either made the demands their own, or rejected them. In this way referenda allow community expectations and ability to pay for educational services to find ultimate expression in the decisions of school district government. In the case of referenda, the problem for the authorities is the mobilization of support. Again, the lack of political parties mediating between the authorities and their constituents creates a dilemma. In practice, among the suburban districts studied, the parents' organization typically moved into this vacuum, playing the role of a pro-school party in structuring support mobilization. The organization's ability to mobilize support varied, of course, from one district to another. From the point of view of the schools it is unfortunate that parents' groups are weakest where support is most problematic; in low income communities whose residents are likely to have relatively low expectations for educational services.

The actual extent of the contribution of parents' organizations toward structuring the mobilization of support for referenda was not always immediately apparent among cases studied, sometimes being made indirectly. For example in Hamilton, one of the high deviant cases, PTA leaders created an ad hoc citizens committee on the occasion of each referendum which, among other things, allowed them to operate under a different label when mobilizing community support. In other districts board members took the leadership in the organization set up to promote given referenda, but the PTA provided the personnel. It appears that the legitimacy of the parents' group undertaking the role
of a pro-school party is commonly in doubt, if only because there may not be a consensus on a referendum among the membership.

Citizens Committees

Apart from the PTA, among high deviant cases studied, and for a time in Steelton among the non-deviant districts, other organizations also involved themselves in promoting referenda. From 1960 through 1965 three of the four high deviant cases regularly used citizens committees for the promotion of referenda. In the fourth case, Lake City, such a structure was used just once when the success of a multi-million dollar bond issue was in doubt. Of relevance to an understanding of the factors bearing upon the structuring of relations between boards and their constituents is the fact that citizens committees varied in their format according to the organizational characteristics of their communities, which in turn varied with the socio-economic status of the population. Further, the presence of citizens committees reflected:

1. A readiness among local leaders to help with referenda for the schools.

2. The presence of substantial, though diffuse, opposition among the electorate to the demands being made upon them, necessitating intensive promotion. The level of opposition is shown by the referenda dissent indices for high deviant districts in Table 3.

3. Identifiable sources of demand upon the board for educational services, usually from the parental population via the PTA.

To illustrate these, and other, points, some brief details of the ways in which support mobilization and other key system processes were structured in the districts studied are presented next, beginning with the high deviant cases.
TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF CASES STUDIED IN TERMS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS, ELECTORAL DISSENT, REFERENDUM DISSENT AND PARTICIPATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Board Members</th>
<th>% White Collar $15,000 Plus</th>
<th>% Electoral Contested</th>
<th>Dissent (d)</th>
<th>Participation (e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Deviant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leland</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake City</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Deviant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steelton</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brookville</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winfield</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyndale</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newland</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Deviant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenton</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twin-Villages</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swinton</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parkland</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median for 15 districts</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aData from 1960 U.S. Census, interviews, and 1960-65 school district records.

bNo tax referenda held from 1960 through 1965.

cData not comparable with other districts as the Hamilton caucus nominated two persons for each board vacancy in annual elections.

dDissent indices represent the proportion of negative votes among all votes cast for either board elections, tax or bond referenda, in the years from 1960 through 1965.

eParticipation ratio is defined in footnote on page 22.
High Deviant Cases

Structuring of the mobilization of support

Leland, for example, was situated in a middle income community, as shown by data in Appendix III. Reflecting the status of its population, several non-political organizations existed in the district, though none were particularly strong. However, as the area was unincorporated, officers of the local organizations constituted, in effect, the community leadership. Given an established organizational structure, on the occasions that the school board faced the need to seek public support for referenda a citizens committee was formed by representatives of the organizations. Participating groups usually included the Woman's Club, homeowners' association, Little League, Lions Club, a couple of churches and, of course, the PTA's at each of the three schools. The district was relatively small, serving 1,100 students in 1965.

Hamilton had a population of relatively high socio-economic status, 70 per cent of employed males being engaged in white collar occupations in 1960. In terms of size the district was at the median among the 118 from which it was selected, having a 1965-66 attendance of 1,700 students. The district had a strongly organized and supportive PTA, reflecting two characteristics of the population; its socio-economic status and the predominance of Jewish residents among clients of the public schools. A high level of parental participation in the PTA was also indicative of parental desires for an intensive educational program for their children, requiring a relatively high level of local

Among the fifteen cases studied, per cent white collar workers in the employed male population had a rank order correlation of 0.93 with median annual family income, and 0.98 with level of education among adults. Data on all three socio-economic variables are presented in Appendix III.
resources for the schools. Approval of a high level of resource allocation was made problematic by the presence of a substantial minority of Catholics, approximately half of whose children attended parochial school. With a view to minimizing potential Catholic opposition, and maximizing support from public school parents, citizens committees were used to help promote referenda. About fifty persons participated, half of whom came from PTA units at the schools. The remainder included leaders of the homeowners' association, former board members, among whom was the editor of the community newspaper, who was also a Catholic, and three political leaders who lived in the district, which was one of six serving the elementary school aged children of the municipality. An important characteristic of the citizens committees in Hamilton was the relatively limited role of non-PTA members. Given the strength of the PTA there was no need of another structure to promote referenda. The function of the citizens committee therefore, performed in just one meeting, was to provide referenda with the public endorsement of community leaders and a 'front' under which the PTA could make a broadly based appeal to the electorate.

Lake City was also situated in a community whose residents, on average, were of relatively high socio-economic status. One of the largest districts in the Chicago suburbs, 1965-66 attendance was 9,400. The PTA was highly organized and normally undertook the mobilization of support for referenda, only one of which had been defeated in twenty years. However, in 1965 the fate of a $6,500,000 bond issue became problematic when civil rights leaders threatened opposition. Close to one fifth of the district's students were from a geographically
concentrated black community whose leaders were fearful that the proposed school construction program would serve to maintain existing de facto segregation in the lower grades. Though the board took steps to meet black demands, leaders of the city's business community became concerned about a possible defeat for the referendum. Responding to this danger they worked through the Chamber of Commerce to establish a citizens committee to supplement the promotional activity of the PTA. Adopting the slogan that "Lake City's chief product is education," the committee enlisted 900 persons to assist in its work. In addition, the committee mounted an extensive advertising campaign through the press, radio, and television. Following a pledge from the board to desegregate the elementary schools civil rights leaders also swung their support behind the referendum. Given the unanimity which developed, the citizens committee was able to call upon the Young Republicans' Club and the Regular Democratic Organization, as well as PTA volunteers, to conduct an intensive canvas one week before the election. An estimated 600 persons engaged in this canvas, distributing promotional literature and information on the location of polling places. In addition, PTA members phoned every parent before the polling date, and followed up with a reminder call to those who had not attended the polls by early afternoon. To facilitate mothers attending the polls baby-sitters were provided by the Girl Scouts. Given the intensity of the promotion, it is not surprising that 13,000 persons voted in the referendum, 82 per cent of whom registered approval. This large ballot generated a participation ratio of 1.30.1

1Computed by dividing the number of votes cast in a referendum by the average daily attendance in the district's schools for the given year. The overall participation ratios shown in Table 3 were generated by taking the average for all referenda in a district from 1960 through 1965.
In contrast to the three other high deviant districts, Villa served a predominantly blue collar population in which non-political organizations were few, and weak. Given this condition, while citizens committees were used to promote referenda their members were of necessity recruited as individuals, rather than as representatives of organizations. By suburban standards the district was fairly large, having 2,130 students in 1965, but even the PTA drew few parents. The development of the citizens committees in Villa, and the consequent high deviant status of the district, owed much to the unusual leadership skills of a sales executive named Stephens who resided in the community, and served as president of the elementary district board from the late 1950's until 1964. Stephens initiated the committee approach in 1951 when, following the failure of two successive referenda for a new high school bond issue, he was approached by the board for help. When interviewed, Stephens recalled accepting the high school board's request, upon certain conditions. First among these was that he would be allowed to develop a citizens committee which would have authority to fully explore the need for a new high school, and submit its own recommendations. In Stephens' view local leaders were unlikely to support a bond issue unless they understood the problem, and contributed their own ideas toward a solution. A second condition reflected Stephens' evident skill at managing conflict and coopting opposition; this was that the committee should include known opponents, as well as supporters, of the proposal for a new school. Stephens held that only by achieving consensus among key people in the community could support be secured. Finally, and an important aspect of Stephens' leadership style, he asked that the committee be permitted to work at the problem at its own pace without deadlines.
With board acceptance the committee was formed. Members soon divided themselves into sub-groups focusing upon such details as site selection, building, population projections, and staffing. Work continued for eighteen months until a final plan was agreed upon. Results were quite dramatic. In contrast to the original proposal for a $350,000 building on a five acre site the committee plan called for a $1,250,000 structure on a forty-four acre site. Though the committee proposal was very much larger than the original plan, as a consequence of extensive community involvement voters responded to the promotional efforts of the committee by giving approval to two separate referenda; one for the site, a second for the building.

Given the success of the committee approach, when Stephens joined the elementary district board in 1954 he adopted the same method to secure backing for referenda. While not always successful, the approach worked sufficiently well to permit Stephens to lead the district toward adopting a relatively sophisticated, and expensive, educational program. In fact, he was a major source of demands upon the authorities, creating the need for intensive promotion of referenda to meet program costs.

Structuring of demands upon the authorities

In the case of Villa demands upon the authorities were articulated by the unusually forceful leadership within the school board itself. Though a blue collar community, the majority of board members were business executives and professionals. As a result of their efforts, and particularly those of Stephens as board president, local expenditure in Villa reached $466 per pupil in 1965-66, a figure which compares very favorably with the $405 spent in Lyndale, a non-deviant case, and the affluent seat of the County in which Villa was located.
While demands originated within the board in Villa, in Hamilton and Lake City the PTA's served to channel demands from the parental population. Some indication of the intense concern for education among Hamilton's parents is provided by the fact that men were as active as women in the PTA. A highly organized PTA also characterized Lake City where each school had a PTA board involving thirty or more members, most of whom chaired committees involving yet more members. Through their organization parents actively promoted curriculum developments and special education programs. Parental initiative was encouraged at the local school level by the district's policy of allowing some flexibility to principals in the utilization of school funds.

In addition to the parental population, the business leadership in Lake City also implicitly demanded a high level of educational services, and provided appropriate support, as noted earlier when discussing the mobilization of support. Part of their rationale was that the quality of schools in the community was of crucial importance for the maintenance of property values.

Among the three high deviant districts in which specific groups were identified with demands for educational services, the same groups played an important role in the recruitment of board members. In Hamilton and Lake City the PTA's contributed to board recruitment both as channels for the development of persons with leadership ability, and through the influence of their delegates within the school district caucus. In Hamilton, of the seven incumbent board members in 1967, four had formerly served as officers of the PTA. While in Lake City only two incumbents, both women, had held office in the parents' organization, three of the five men on the board had been nominated for office by caucus delegates from their neighborhood PTA's. Similarly,
in Villa, where the major demands for educational services came from board members themselves, the board fought PTA leaders who wanted to establish a caucus for board recruitment in part because this would have taken away their own initiative in the recruitment of new members. The board in this case preferred to use the citizens committees, their major support structure, as a recruitment channel. Of the seven incumbents interviewed, four had come to the board through service on citizens committees for referenda.

In Leland, in contrast to the three other high deviant cases, there was no evidence of positive demands for educational services emanating from residents in the 1960-65 period. However, board members felt responsible to cooperate with the administration in maintaining services at the level established by their predecessors, mounting referenda for this purpose as required. Leaders of other organizations in the community gave their support to referendum demands by actively participating in the citizens committees. Local leaders also contributed their support to the authorities by participating in the caucus which selected candidates for school board elections.

Support for the authorities

In general, as shown by data in Table 3 on dissent indices and the proportion of elections contested, the high deviant districts enjoyed a relatively high level of electoral support for the authorities. This finding suggests a reciprocal relationship between such support and the extent to which voters are likely to respond to demands upon them. Within the group of high deviant districts Leland had the highest level of electoral dissent, and the greatest difficulty getting approval for tax referenda. In part, referenda dissent in this case reflects antagonism from Catholic residents in the early 1960's,
generated by the refusal of the board to provide buses for children attending the parochial school.

In the case of Hamilton support for the authorities was high, though not reflected in electoral dissent indices due to the caucus in the district nominating two candidates for each board vacancy. This procedure was both an adaptation to pressure from parents wanting to serve on the board, and a response to community interest in participating in the selection of board members. In effect, the Hamilton caucus institutionalized electoral conflict generated by competition among residents to achieve board membership.

In Villa electoral dissent developed as a consequence of PTA efforts to initiate a community caucus over the objections of incumbent board members who judged this an effort to displace them. This conflict, which began in 1960, could have had serious repercussions for district referenda if Stephens had not developed the citizens committee approach to a degree that permitted the board to reach the public without assistance from the PTA leadership.

In Lake City the question of support for the authorities was in no way problematic. Caucus nominees were accorded a high level of legitimacy due in large part to the structure of the caucus itself. In the 1960's two delegates attended the caucus for each of thirty non-sectarian, non-political civic organizations in addition to two from each of twenty PTA's.

Summary

Among the high deviant districts the mobilization of support was structured not only by parents' organizations but also by citizens committees. Such committees mediated between the authorities and the
electorate, giving added legitimacy to board demands upon the community as well as facilitating extensive promotional activities. Such intensive structuring of support mobilization was associated with relatively high levels of demand for educational services from the parental population or board members; participation by demand sources in board recruitment; support for referenda from community leaders, and a generally high level of electoral support for the authorities.

In contrast to the high deviant cases, a major characteristic distinguishing three of the four districts in the low deviant category was the emergence of organized opposition to referenda. As with the positive demands in the high deviant cases, negative demands among those that were low deviant carried over into attempts to influence board recruitment and electoral support for the authorities, as suggested by the relatively high levels of electoral dissent in column 5 of Table 3.

**Low Deviant Cases**

**Trenton**

As indicated by dissent indices for bond and tax referenda in Table 3, these frequently faced defeat in the 1960-65 period in Trenton. Opposition to referenda was mobilized by leaders of a homeowners' association which claimed a membership of 500 families in the lowest income sector of the community. Making up about one fifth of the district's population, these families had moved into a sub-division completed in the mid-1950's. Most came from Chicago where they were accustomed to paved streets, sidewalks, and street lights, in addition to such amenities as water and sewage disposal. Prior to post-war expansion, Trenton's residential density had been low enough for the
population to manage with artesian wells and cess pools. While new residents looked to the village government for action on streets and services, old residents, who were politically dominant, were slow to respond. School board members were part of the local 'establishment,' and consequently the discontent of the new homeowners was generalized to include them. Coupled with the predictable reluctance of low income residents to approve tax increases, the negative attitude of the newcomers toward local leaders found expression in organized opposition to referenda. From 1960 a bond issue for two new schools had to be voted on five times before receiving approval. Eventually sufficient parents tired of having their children on double shifts to generate a favorable majority. A proposal to increase the educational fund tax rate met with even more persistent resistance, being presented nine times before adoption in September, 1965, shortly after the homeowners' association ceased to function. By that time the major problems motivating the organization were either settled, or well on the way toward solution. Further, in the village elections of 1965 the old community leadership was finally displaced by persons enjoying support from the homeowners.

Apart from contesting referenda, opposition from the homeowner's association spilled over into electoral conflict, reducing support for the authorities. The homeowners ran their own candidates for the board, though in this they were unsuccessful. The case studies indicate that it is generally easier to defeat a referendum than to displace board members. As shown in Table 3, board elections consistently attracted less dissent than tax referenda from 1960 through 1965. Further, no district studied had an average dissent index for tax referenda of
less than 0.32, suggesting that one can count on at least a third of the vote being negative, even in the absence of organized opposition, thus providing a large base upon which opposition can build. In contrast, board elections over the same period seldom achieved a level of dissent as high as 0.32.

**Swinton**

Swinton experienced a somewhat similar situation to Trenton in that a group in the community organized opposition to referenda, and also tried to unseat incumbent board members. Again, though successful in delaying a bond issue, the opposition failed to change the board membership. The bond issue, for an addition to the district's one building, was presented five times from 1960 through 1965 before finally receiving approval. The inability of the district to expand facilities in the face of growing enrollments kept operating costs low as class sizes rose, and space was unavailable for physical education and kindergarten programs.

Swinton's opposition was organized by a small group of alleged members of the Birch society. One leader was actually a school board member, while another, the wife of a music teacher, had five children attending parochial school. Though few in number, the group evoked strong support in a community with many old, and poorly educated, residents. Though board members worked with the few PTA leaders to canvas all residents in the district's one square mile, popular sentiment could not be won over. Finally, introduction of double shifts and a gas leak in a mobile classroom served to swing enough votes to secure passage of the bond issue early in 1965.

**Parkland**

Though much smaller than Trenton, with a 1965-66 attendance of
580 compared to Trenton's 1,640, Parkland was similarly divided between new and old residents. Parkland's one school building was constructed to meet rapid population growth consequent upon the development of a townhouse sub-division in the late 1950's. Though old residents disliked the townhouses, they voted strongly in favor of a bond issue for the new school in 1960. By contrast, when asked to approve an increase in the educational fund tax rate in 1963, 79 per cent of the votes were negative in a poll which generated a participation ratio of 1.1. Behind this defeat was the fact that a number of problems developed in the school. The new building showed signs of construction defects; an expensive landscaping project aborted; discipline problems arose with children from the townhouses; the superintendent refused to remove a teacher disliked by a number of parents, and finally the educational program had become quite costly. Most of these problems were blamed upon the superintendent rather than the board, and critics set out to secure his resignation, as well as to displace incumbent board members.

Opposition crystallized around old residents active in the locally dominant Republican Party, through which alliances were established with some residents of the townhouses. Though not formally involved, the party served informally to structure communications among the dissidents. The PTA was more or less neutralized, its members being divided by the issue. Opposition leaders were successful in defeating the tax referendum, and also in replacing board members. Though the new members finally agreed that a rate increase was necessary to maintain the school's program, leaders among the old residents refused their support until the superintendent was replaced as they
felt he was a wasteful administrator. Finally, with his replacement the tax increase was approved. In Parkland, as in the high deviant cases, there was a clear reciprocal relationship between support for the board and parallel support for its demands upon the electorate. **Twin-Villages**

Though not overtly organized, in Twin-Villages, the fourth low deviant case, sources of opposition to increased expenditure were in evidence, reinforcing the low demand ethos of the board members themselves. Though the population was, on average, of somewhat higher socio-economic status than that of the other low deviant cases, the district was still predominantly blue collar. By suburban standards the district was relatively large, having seven schools to serve 2,600 students.

The board succeeded in securing passage of tax referenda and bond issues from 1960 through 1965, but expenditure remained low relative to resources. Board members took the view that any effort to press the community harder would evoke negative reactions. Unlike their counterparts in Villa, a high deviant district with similar socio-economic characteristics, board members in Twin-Villages made no attempt to change public opinion. In estimating public demand, board members based their judgment in part upon the fact that a junior high school bond issue failed twice in the late 1950's. Incumbents were also sensitive to the feelings of the relatively large Catholic section of the population, members of which became politicized to some extent with regard to public school issues in 1960. The size of the Catholic community was reflected in the fact that 37 per cent of the district's elementary school age children attended private institutions. In 1960 four Catholics, none of whom had children in the public schools,
decided on their own initiative that they would try to get elected to the school board, challenging incumbents at the polls. Locally this move was interpreted as an attempt by the Catholic Church to take over the schools, creating an issue that drew 4,500 persons to the polls, of whom 74 per cent voted for the incumbents. Balloting generated a participation ratio of 1.8, an extraordinarily large figure for a board election. Though the Catholics were heavily defeated this election had long term consequences, producing an evident negative Catholic vote in subsequent referenda. The voting precincts with the highest proportions of Catholic residents were also those with the highest average incomes. Prior to 1960 these precincts had been the most supportive of referenda, a situation that was reversed following the election of that year.

For the promotion of referenda the board relied upon the PTA leaders and the superintendent. Board members took little part, and no effort was made to reach beyond the parental population to the larger community, it being assumed that promotion among non-parents would attract more negative than positive votes. Though the PTA was not a strong organization, in the absence of organized opposition its members were able to attract sufficient affirmative voters to the polls.

Summary

In summary, comparing the high and low deviant cases, it is apparent that they differed on several interrelated dimensions. For example, high deviant districts had identifiable sources of positive demand for educational services while three of the four low deviant cases experienced the organized expression of negative demands. Further, high deviant districts were characterized by the readiness of community
leaders to involve themselves actively in the promotion of referenda in contrast to the situation among the low deviant cases where some actually helped organize the opposition. The fight against referenda was led by homeowners' association leaders in Trenton, a board member in Swinton, and key members of the Republican Party in Parkland.

Though referendum dissent was at a similar level in both the high and low deviant cases, one reason it lacked organized expression in the high deviant districts may have been the supportive orientation of local leaders. Finally, common to both the high and low deviant cases was the involvement in board recruitment of the groups that structured demands upon the authorities and the mobilization of support, or opposition, to referenda. These same relationships are evident in the structuring of political processes in the non-deviant cases, the main findings from which are summarized next.

**Non-Deviant Cases**

**Main findings**

In contrast to both the high and low deviant cases, among a majority of those in the non-deviant category there was little evidence of pressure from parents, or community groups from 1960 through 1965 either for educational services, or against increased school district expenditures. Prior to 1960 there had been strong demands for additional facilities from parents in Lyndale. These demands, structured by the PTA, eventuated in a change of board membership, the mobilization of community support behind a series of bond issues, and the institution of a caucus to facilitate parental involvement in the selection of board members. Essentially these issues reflected a continuing struggle for domination of community
institutions between right wing and progressive conservatives. While the latter had secured majority support by 1960, the right wing groups continued to intervene, challenging caucus nominees for the school board through 1964, which accounts for the relatively high level of electoral dissent recorded for Lyndale in Table 3.

In the 1960-65 period only Steelton and Brookville experienced organized structuring of community demands. As noted earlier,1 in Steelton parental demands for a larger school eventuated in a change of board membership and the development of a citizens committee to mobilize support behind a bond issue. In Brookville, on the other hand, negative demands against a tax increase were structured by residents of a trailer park within the district. Though not concerned with the tax rate in itself, the trailer residents wanted to veto any rate increases until they were provided with a school bus service, which the board refused. The trailers contributed one fourth of the district's 400 pupils. Again, the demand group set about displacing incumbent board members, and actually succeeded in achieving a majority for three years. Opposition from the trailers emerged in 1964. Had it come earlier, no doubt Brookville would have been in the low deviant category by 1965.

In general, associated with the lack of positive parental pressure in the non-deviant cases was the absence of involvement by community leaders in the process of mobilizing support for referenda. Typically support mobilization was handled by the PTA's, usually under the direction of board members or the district superintendent. Reflecting the relatively low level of parental pressure, only in Lyndale was the PTA directly involved in the selection of board members.

1Above, p. 16.
in the 1960-65 period. The parents' organization did intervene in board recruitment in Steelton, but only for the couple of years that the new school was an issue.

Apart from factors associated with the level of local resource utilization, case studies revealed distinctive characteristics of suburban elementary districts associated with the socio-economic status of their populations, confirming Minar's findings in this regard. ¹

IV COMMUNITY STATUS AND THE STRUCTURING OF POLITICAL PROCESSES

Socio-Economic Status and Political Culture

Having demonstrated the presence of less electoral conflict in higher status suburban communities, Minar attributes this to the greater resources of conflict management skills available to such communities. In pursuing structural correlates of conflict management, Minar found that high status districts were more likely than those of low status to have a caucus for the recruitment of school board candidates. ² Further, comparing caucuses in the two types of community, where the population was of high status the caucus was allowed to function more effectively in that its nominees were less likely to be opposed by independent candidates at the polls.

In addition to confirming Minar's findings in this regard, the author's data indicate that mediating between the organizational skills present in high status populations and the emergence of a caucus is yet another dimension of political culture, and its associated social

¹Minar, "Community Basis of Conflict."
²Ibid., p. 831
structure; the organizational density of a community. Among the seven white collar districts studied, six had a caucus, and five of these were based upon representation from local organizations. The one exception was Norton, where the caucus was initiated by the League of Women Voters and delegates were elected from precincts within the school district.

In contrast to the situation in white collar communities, among the eight districts studied which had predominantly blue collar populations only Steelton had a caucus, and as Minar's findings predict, it did not work well, or last long. As in Norton the Steelton caucus was based upon geographic representation, in this case because the community lacked organizations which might have mediated between the caucus and the electorate. Initiated by PTA leaders, the caucus was used as a means of displacing incumbent board members, a task that was accomplished in 1960 and 1961. Subsequently, apathy set in and the lack of structures relating residents to the caucus reduced its legitimacy, setting the stage for successful challenges to caucus nominees by independent candidates, a development which brought the caucus to an end by 1965.

In the absence of organizational support it is difficult to maintain a viable caucus, which is probably why most are, in fact, based upon representation from local organizations. In studying the procedures of fifty-four caucuses in the Chicago suburbs, Muns found that only eight were organized on the basis of geographic representation. Forty were based upon representation from local organizations, and six combined both organizational and geographic representation.

Local organizations provide a structural base for a caucus, enabling a substantial proportion of the electorate to participate through their organizational representatives in the selection of board candidates, thus conferring legitimacy upon the choices made.

Lacking appropriate mediating structures for a viable caucus, most blue collar districts studied had what Muns calls "self-perpetuating" boards. In other words, board members took upon themselves the task of recruiting their own replacements. An interesting aspect of such boards, related to the political culture of blue collar communities, is the extent to which the members had linkages with political organizations.

School District Government and Political Parties

Formal links between school boards and local government were quite limited in all districts studied, even when there was substantial overlap in geographic boundaries. However, five of the eight blue collar districts studied had incumbent board members who were also active in local political organizations; a situation not found in any white collar district. The presence of politically active persons on blue collar boards appears to be related to the fact that one of the major functions of boards, as Kerr points out, is to legitimate claims by the school system upon the resources of the public. School districts are therefore constrained to recruit persons who either by virtue of their social position or personal reputation, if not both, are well regarded by the public. White collar communities typically have a variety of organizations through which local leadership can emerge and

1Ibid.
be identified. In blue collar communities political parties are about the only type of organization reaching a large proportion of the residents. Boards in need of members with established reputations are likely, therefore, to look to persons who are politically active. Conversely, of course, if politically active persons in blue collar communities decide by themselves that they would like to run for school board office their established position, and network of personal contacts, gives them a great advantage at the polls. Both recruited and self-motivated political activists were found on the boards studied.

V CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Conclusions

Research results reported in this paper serve to further overall understanding of the structuring of political processes in suburban school district governments, building upon three bodies of earlier work; that of James and his associates with regard to determinants of school district expenditure; of Easton, who developed the theory of the political system as a behavioral entity, and of Minar, who has used suburban school districts as a structure for the empirical analysis of decision-making processes.

In general, the findings demonstrate the importance of referenda as the process through which community expectations and ability to pay find ultimate expression within school district government. The experiences of the districts studied emphasize that the referendum process is a dynamic one, involving not only the formal presentation of demands upon the electorate, but also the mobilization of support behind the demands. Further, given the relatively high level of public interest
in school district fiscal policy, analysis of the way in which the mobilization of referendum support is structured provides perhaps the best strategy for studying the pattern of relationships between board members and their constituents. Given the systemic nature of the political system, analysis of the mobilization of support also facilitates identification of sources of demand upon the authorities and participants in the recruitment of board members. Typically, among the cases studied, groups making demands upon board members also sought representation upon the board, thus becoming involved in the structuring of support for the authorities, and also participated in structuring the mobilization of support for, or opposition to, referenda.

Findings also support Minar's conclusion that higher status communities are more likely to effectively institutionalize a caucus for the recruitment of school board members. In addition, the findings go beyond Minar in pointing to the role of political organizations as channels of recruitment to school boards in blue collar communities, and to the dependence of the caucus structure upon the organizational density of a community.

Finally, as hypothesized, distinctive patterns of board-community relations were identified in districts differing in their levels of local resource utilization. In particular, most high deviant districts were characterized by identifiable structures channeling demands to the authorities, citizens committees for the promotion of referenda, and a relatively high level of electoral support for the authorities. Low deviant districts experienced organized opposition to referenda, negative demands upon the authorities, and substantial electoral conflict.
The non-deviant cases fell between these extremes, with only one of the seven in this category using a citizens committee for a referendum, and one experiencing organized opposition at the polls.

**Proposals for Further Research**

1. The fact that assessed valuation explains 85 per cent of the variance in local operating expenditure per pupil among Chicago suburban elementary districts suggests that local resources are subjected to steady and effective pressure across districts. There is need for more detailed information regarding the specific demands which generate this pressure, groups which structure the demands, including school staffs, students, parents, high schools with which the elementary schools articulate, and community organizations, as well as the conditions which activate these various sources to present demands.

2. To some extent variation in the effectiveness of PTA's in influencing the development of educational programs appears to be a function of the quality of the organization's leadership at any given time, which raises the question as to the conditions under which able people are likely to seek the leadership, a topic that would be revealing to pursue.

3. It would be useful to determine the extent to which differences in the ways board members define their roles are a function of differing recruitment practices. An hypothesis to test is that board members "appointed" by a caucus define their role differently from that of incumbents in non-caucus districts who have had to campaign for office.
4. Further understanding of the relations between the structure of influence in school district populations and board recruitment processes would also be helpful. Data from the cases studied suggest that in communities characterized by a relatively monolithic structure of influence the local leadership exerts direct control over school district government. In communities where the structure of influence is pluralistic the situation is more ambiguous, but the findings suggest the hypothesis that the necessity of securing public support for referenda constrains the political system of school district government to organize board recruitment in such a way as to coopt community leadership.
## APPENDIX I

### The Regression Analysis

#### TABLE 4

RESULTS OF STEPWISE REGRESSION OF 1965-66 LOCAL OPERATING EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL FOR 118 CHICAGO SUBURBAN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS UPON SELECTED EXPECTATION-ABILITY FACTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Simple Correl. with Expenditure</th>
<th>Partial Correl. with Expenditure</th>
<th>F Value to Enter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>250.794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV²</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>91.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED²</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>96.810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV⁴</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>5.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV³</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>7.668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>5.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>2.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHPF</td>
<td>-0.460</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>1.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC²</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>-0.247</td>
<td>1.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVTSCH</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>1.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>0.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVTSCH²</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key.—AV: assessed valuation per pupil, AV², AV³, AV⁴: assessed valuation per pupil squared, etc., ED: median years of education in the adult population, ED²: median years of education squared, INC: median family income, INC²: median family income squared, ADA: average daily attendance, CHPF: proportion of children of elementary school age per family, PVTSCH: proportion of elementary school children in private schools, PVTSCH²: proportion of elementary school children in private schools squared.
TABLE 5
SINGLE EFFECTS, CUMULATIVE EFFECTS, AND UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION OF EXPECTATION-ABILITY FACTORS TO VARIATION OF LOCAL OPERATING EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Single Effect</th>
<th>Cumulative Joint Effects</th>
<th>Unique Contribution of each Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AV + AV^2 + AV^3 + AV^4</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
<td>84.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ED + ED^2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INC + INC^2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHPF</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVTSCH + PVTSCH^2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key.— Same as for Table 4.
Fig. 2.—Scatter diagram showing distribution of 118 suburban districts in terms of local expenditure per pupil relative to the amount predicted.
### APPENDIX III

#### TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, LOCAL EXPENDITURE PER PUPIL, AND DEVIATION OF ACTUAL FROM ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE, AMONG THE FIFTEEN SCHOOL DISTRICTS STUDIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leland</td>
<td>$19,680</td>
<td>$8,660</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>$363</td>
<td>$80 $68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Villa</td>
<td>25,570</td>
<td>7,690</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>126 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>32,880</td>
<td>9,670</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>88 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lake City</td>
<td>36,750</td>
<td>10,120</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>75 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>28,720</td>
<td>9,035</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>92 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lincoln</td>
<td>8,560</td>
<td>5,680</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>14 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steelton</td>
<td>15,060</td>
<td>7,910</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>5 -28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brookville</td>
<td>21,150</td>
<td>7,340</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>1 -48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winfield</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>8,930</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>-4 -16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lyndale</td>
<td>24,980</td>
<td>9,060</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>-4 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Norton</td>
<td>30,470</td>
<td>10,580</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>6 -62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newland</td>
<td>35,530</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>-33 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>21,564</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>-2 -2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trenton</td>
<td>13,880</td>
<td>7,680</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>-73 -37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Twin-Villages</td>
<td>26,760</td>
<td>8,050</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>-74 -54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Swinton</td>
<td>41,360</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>-139 -40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parkland</td>
<td>60,470</td>
<td>7,610</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>-91 -28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>35,617</td>
<td>7,735</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>-94 -39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean for all 118 suburban districts</td>
<td>30,740</td>
<td>8,974</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*School district data from County Superintendent's; demographic data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population and Housing; 1960, Table P-1.*

*Data on per cent white collar were gathered for cases studied only.*
BIBLIOGRAPHY


