This report describes the workshop, sponsored by the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, that gathered in Cambridge on April 21-23, 1971 to explore the question: Is there a definable discipline of community crisis intervention (CCI) with a discoverable body of techniques which can be systematized, taught, evaluated and refined to help communities achieve positive social change through resolution of the crisis? The immediate objectives of the Workshop were to expand the pooling of knowledge and techniques in the field and to include in its report the first major statement of theory and techniques about CCI. The workshop also stressed that the accumulated knowledge and techniques in community crisis intervention should benefit grass roots, minority and otherwise powerless groups in their quest for self determination. During the conference, the participants focused on methods of intervention for social change and the future of community crisis intervention. Six appendices are also included in the Workshop final report: A-Workshop Participants; B-Workshop Program; C-Participant Evaluation; D-Outline for Case Studies in Community Crisis Intervention; E-Bibliographic Materials; and F-Summary of Findings and Theory from a Case Study in Community Crisis Intervention.
REPORT FROM A
NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
COMMUNITY CRISIS
INTERVENTION

April 21-23, 1971

COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION PROJECT
LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY
HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
REPORT FROM A

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April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel
Cambridge, Massachusetts

by the staff of the
COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION PROJECT
LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
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* * *

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I. INTRODUCTION

Crises are becoming commonplace in the neighborhoods, institutions and communities of American society. Perhaps it has always been so, but the light of the media and public opinion are more clearly focused today on the apparent inability of established systems to effectively solve the problems that generate crises -- racism, urban decay, economic insecurity, etc.

Many public officials, executives, consultants and others have been responding to crises in a hit-or-miss fashion, with little long-term, systematic assessment of their goals and techniques. Good intentions aside, their intervention often results in mere cooling of symptoms or co-opting of protest.

In the view of the Community Crisis Intervention Project of Washington University,* what is most desperately needed now is a body of knowledge to help intervenors act in a way that will address underlying problems and achieve basic social change -- an equitable distribution of power and resources, and democratization of decision-making processes.

The Project combines research, evaluation, action and education in attempting to answer the following central question:

Is there a definable discipline of community crisis intervention (CCI), with a discoverable body of techniques which can be systematized, taught, evaluated and refined to help communities achieve positive social change through resolution of the crisis?

*As of October 1, 1971, the Project is a part of the Social Science Institute of Washington University, St. Louis. During the period of the workshop covered in this report (and since its inception in October 1970), the Project was in the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School. James H. Laue is Principal Investigator. The Project is supported by the Ford Foundation.
On April 21-23, 1971, 51 persons gathered in Cambridge to explore that question. They were black, brown and white community activists; advocates for change from government agencies, religious bodies, human rights organizations and educational institutions; professional mediators; and researchers and evaluators working in community crisis and change.

The call to the Workshop invited participants to begin to work with the Project to help develop "an...overview of the field of intervention in community, neighborhood, institutional and organizational crises," and "...to institute a critical evaluation of the diverse kinds of activities currently underway." The Workshop call stressed that the overriding concern of the Project "is that accumulated knowledge and techniques in community crisis intervention benefit grass roots, minority and otherwise powerless groups in their quest for self determination."

The immediate objective of the Workshop was to expand the pooling of knowledge and techniques in the field. Important questions to be explored were listed for the invitees:

-- What links are there among community activists, professional intervenors, educators and researchers of crisis and social change?

-- Where does our work overlap, and where are there differences?

-- What kind of effective ongoing communication can be established among these groups, at the workshop and nationally?

-- What evaluated strategies for effecting social change do we have?

-- What are appropriate criteria for intervening in crisis situations and for change outcomes of such intervention?

-- Can we develop a framework for critical self-evaluation of our work?
The report that follows describes how the workshop attempted to answer these questions, but it also is intended as the first major statement of theory and techniques about community crisis intervention (CCI). This synthesis was produced, appropriately, by the interaction of workshop participants diverse in many respects -- ethnically, occupationally, geographically, ideologically. Finding common ground in that kind of diversity to help empower the powerless is what the Project is all about in its attempt to promote social change rather than settlement per se out of the social crises of our day.
II. WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

Workshop participants represented four general types of intervenor roles in community disputes and crises -- Activists, Advocates, Mediators and Evaluators. These roles are defined mainly in terms of the base of the intervenor: who pays him, what institutional structures surround and commit him, what leverages and limitations are available to him by virtue of his location in the system.

Activists are persons whose lives are most directly affected by the outcome of community disputes and crises; they are of the situation as well as in it. They are members of protest, minority, non-establishment or Out groups. Often their organized reactions to the living conditions assigned them by establishment decision-making processes are the trigger mechanisms for public-level crises which attract the attention of community crisis intervenors. Their refusal to hurt quietly and die quietly has engendered many of the crises with which intervenors are asked to deal.

Advocates find themselves, by virtue of their commitment and occupation, working for the goals of at least one of the parties in community crises, while not being of that party. Examples are community organizers, management consultants, representatives of civil rights and human rights organizations, agents of religious bodies, advocate planners, advocate lawyers, professional negotiators, etc.

Mediators represent the classic third-party intervenor -- technically "neutral", beholden to none of the disputing parties, but possessing values and commitments which influence their work as conflict-resolvers. A mediator is a third party who assists conflicting parties in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement of their differences, often through face-to-face meetings of the parties. How his underlying commitments (namely, whether his major commitment is to settlement or social change) affect the performance of his role and the kinds of changes which result from settlements he helps achieve is the major question which CCI poses to the professional mediator entering community crisis situations.
Evaluators are researchers, social scientists, policy analysts and others who study social conflict and crisis, whether on-the-scene or in a post hoc fashion. Their research may be non-policy oriented, or they may be involved in directing demonstration or action projects with a major evaluation component built in. In any case, they often are subject to deeper involvement in crises than the stance required for the professionally objective researcher. Getting them to examine the implications of their position in crisis research has been a major concern of the Project.

Each of the Workshop participants represented at least one of the roles described above, and some of them two or three. They came predominantly from the Boston, New York and Washington areas. The group was purposely diverse, and conflict among participants was anticipated -- and expected to be creative.

A complete list of Workshop participants and of invitees who were unable to attend appears in Appendix I.
III. INTERVENTION FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: ROLES AND STRATEGIES

The Workshop brought together a number of persons varying in experience, base, outlook and skills -- but with a common concern for the promotion of institutional change -- to strategize about community crisis intervention. Our assumption was that many persons and institutions are involved in such intervention activities, and that an intensive sharing of concerns and needs could help them further define their goals and methods and help the Project further develop a national network of crisis intervenors oriented toward social change.

The Project's most important concern is helping achieve through crisis intervention a more equitable distribution of power and resources in American institutions. With this in mind, the Workshop was designed to start at the point of greatest need and greatest action -- the grass roots activists who have been so ill-served by the functioning of the American system, and whose movements have been both the driving force for community change and the raison d'être for most crisis intervenors today.

The Workshop moved in concentric circles, beginning on the opening night (Wednesday) with presentation by leaders in struggles for change on two levels, local and national. They were Robert Parks, President of the Roxbury Tenants of Harvard Association in Boston, and Marcos Muños, New England Regional Coordinator for Cesar Chavez' United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (AFL-CIO). Their presentations and the ensuing discussions are described in part A below.

All of Thursday was devoted to an examination of the role of activists and other intervenors in community crisis through strategizing about the Rainbow Park Land Dispute, a composite case developed by the Project staff specifically for the Workshop. The other three roles were added to that of the Activists: Advocates, Mediators and Evaluators. The play of the Rainbow Park case is described in part B below, with a focus on the strategizing activities of each of the four groups.
Friday morning the group moved to a consideration of more specific problems of intervention, with workshops on (a) teaching intervention skills and (b) intervening in large-scale disorders, as reported in part C.

Consistent with the Project's concern for follow-up and implementation of change activities, the workshop concluded with a plenary discussion of future needs in the field, which is the subject of the concluding section of this report -- "IV. Community Crisis Intervention: Where Do We Go From Here?".

From the workshop, the staff hoped to develop a working model for cooperation and communication among intervenors in crisis sectors (health, housing, law enforcement, economic development) and among practitioners of different intervention skills (mediators, advocates, activists, researchers).

A. The Starting Point: Two Crises, Local and National
(Wednesday evening, April 21)

The people know what they want and what they need. They have always known. We don't need you to tell us what we need. But you can help us figure out how to get it.

1. Objectives of the Session

In the opening session, the CCI staff focused the workshop on techniques and strategies developed by grass roots organizations for both creating and dealing with crises regarding their situations. Two workshop invitees, Robert Parks and Marcos Muños, had participated in such activities -- one local and the other national in scope. Parks and members of the Roxbury Tenants of Harvard Association have been engaged in a land dispute with Harvard Medical School. This conflict is primarily local, although the Medical School's constituency is national. Muños, as New England regional coordinator for Cesar Chavez' United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (AFL/CIO), has organized California migrant farm workers and subsequently mobilized economic and political pressure in New England against Southwest growers. This conflict has a state, regional and national focus.
The workshop staff asked Parks and Munos to present case studies of these grass roots efforts with several comparative concepts in mind:

### Roxbury Tenants

1. Organizing a neighborhood constituency
2. Organizing in an urban setting
3. Organizing whites and blacks
4. Mobilizing pressure against a single institution
5. Developing local support
6. A housing and health crisis

### UFWOC

1. Organizing an indeterminate dispersed population
2. Organizing in a rural setting
3. Organizing Chicanos and their Anglo (and other) allies
4. Mobilizing pressure against numerous parties — both individual and corporate land owners
5. Developing national support
6. An economic and racial crisis

### 2. Case Study Presentations and Discussion

A summary of the Parks and Munos presentations is provided below. Since Parks included a considerable amount of data on the background and the degree of success achieved in negotiating with the University, his presentation has been reconstructed using an outline for case study analysis. Munos focused more on describing the working and living conditions of the farm workers than on the details of the strike and boycott. Therefore, the highlights of his talk are summarized. Because a number of issues arose from the total group discussion of the UFWOC's lettuce boycott, elaborate coverage of the Munos presentation is provided in a later section.
   (Robert Parks, President of Roxbury Tenants)

i. Setting of the Crisis

A small, physically deteriorating neighborhood of approximately 300 families in Roxbury, Massachusetts, bordering on Harvard Medical School and several Harvard-affiliated teaching hospitals. Most of the land in the neighborhood has been purchased recently by Harvard and is managed by a realty firm.

Beginning in 1965, Harvard Medical School and three of its affiliated teaching hospitals, (Peter Bent Brigham, Robert Breck Brigham and Boston Hospital for Women) initiated plans for a new medical center to combine heretofore separate medical services in one facility. The site for the Affiliated Hospitals Center (AHC) was the Harvard-owned low-income neighborhood bordering on the current medical complex.

Although aware of community resentment towards expansion and of the University's inadequate response to community health needs, the Medical School and the AHC made no arrangements for relocating the residents who would be replaced by the Affiliated Hospitals Center.

ii. Goals of the Parties to the Disputes

Roxbury Tenants of Harvard

1. prevent construction of AHC on proposed site
2. community health program in the AHC
3. proper maintenance of current housing
4. construction of Harvard-subsidized low income housing for relocation with community participation
5. some degree of tenant management of new housing
Harvard Medical School -- Affiliated Hospitals Center

1. retain site for AHC
2. prevent revision of their plans for medical facilities and programs
3. preserve tenant responsibility for relocation
4. little investment in maintenance of housing slated for demolition
5. avoid adverse publicity
6. minimize Roxbury Tenants of Harvard control of the planning of relocation housing

iii. Narrative of the Crisis

Late in 1968, Harvard sent notices to its tenants in neighborhoods bordering on the Medical School complex informing them that their houses were slated for demolition within the next two years to make way for the Affiliated Hospitals Center.

The tenants at first remained passive and began plans for relocation. Several families did in fact move to new neighborhoods; some purchased the homes they had been renting despite the financial hardships that accrued.

In April 1969, a group of students participating in the student strike against Harvard University learned of Harvard's construction plans and began to canvass the neighborhood to mobilize tenant opposition. Concurrently, the Dean of the Medical School responded to the student demand that no further housing be destroyed by establishing a Community Relations Committee to investigate the conflict and make recommendations. Only Medical School personnel and residents of other Boston communities were included on the committee; a few students were added. No residents from the neighborhood participated on this committee established to make recommendations on the needs of community residents with respect to relocation housing and maintenance of existing housing facilities.
After a series of organizing activities, the Roxbury Tenants of Harvard Association was formed and a meeting with the Dean of the Medical School and the head of the hospitals complex was arranged in August when it became clear that the Community Relations Committee lacked power or even influence. After an unproductive, frustrating meeting, tenant cohesion was increased. The Roxbury Tenants began to seek increased participation in the conflict from affected tenants.

The tenants formulated a series of demands, but were frustrated in attempts to get them implemented through the Dean's office, the AHC or the Community Relations Committee. By September 1969 tenants began to bypass the three levels and contact members of the Harvard Corporation. The Community Relations Committee was dissolved.

An architect and planner, John Sharratt, offered his services as an advocate to the tenants early in 1970. Sharratt advised the RTH to incorporate, and helped them write letters to elicit support from Medical School personnel, city officials and the news media. In addition, Sharratt worked out strategies with the tenants for achieving their goals for the neighborhood.

As a result of student, tenant and some faculty pressure, Dean Ebert agreed to take a "walk around the community". The Dean's exposure to the neighborhood and housing conditions brought the first progress. He agreed to begin maintenance measures as soon as possible.

RTH was not satisfied. To keep pressure on the Medical School, they threatened to go to court to take over all the properties. Because of this threat, but more significantly because of the extensive media coverage of tenant activities and support of their grievances, the Harvard corporation members agreed to meet formally with the tenants.

Sharratt and the RTH prepared a detailed proposal with a ten-year plan for land use and housing construction.
After repeated delays and continuous efforts by Harvard and the Affiliated Hospitals Center to reach an adjustment that would leave those institutions virtually total autonomy in planning for the area, an agreement was reached with the tenants -- two-thirds of the area originally slated for demolition will remain; one-third will be used as a site for AHC. The Medical School will build (using a federal loan program from the Department of Housing and Urban Development) 1,000 units of low-income housing. The housing will be built on Harvard property and since the monthly costs exceed the financial capabilities of the tenants, Harvard will subsidize rents for several years.

RTH will have veto power over the housing through the design stage. No arrangements have been agreed upon as yet for tenant management of the housing, although the tenants insist that they will demand considerable control.

iv. Role of the Intervenors

Students (Harvard undergraduates and Harvard Medical students) had as their goals:

-- opposing Harvard Medical School expansion without community involvement; and

-- arousing effective community opposition to University policy.

They canvassed the area and advised tenants that they could be effective in saving their neighborhood and achieving better housing from Harvard if they organized. Once the tenants association was formed, several students continued to work with tenants on strategies and were particularly effective in obtaining media coverage and in securing faculty support for the tenants.

An article written by a Harvard Medical student published in the New England Journal of Medicine brought criticism against Harvard from others in the medical profession.
John Sharratt, the advocate planner, had two major goals:

-- helping RTH develop plans for low-income subsidized housing; and

-- obtaining for himself a designing commission for the housing

Sharratt has worked and is continuing to serve as an architect-advocate for communities in Boston. He has developed strategies for securing community control of planning and for advising communities on alternative housing designs.

As an advocate for RTH, he was considered indispensible by the tenants. He wrote numerous letters, worked on publicity and helped the tenants compile a ten year housing proposal. Finally, Sharratt has continued to monitor the construction plans for the low income housing to prevent Harvard Medical School from violating its agreement with the tenants association.

Sharratt was not, however, awarded the design contract by Harvard.

v. Outcomes

A summary of the goals achieved by each of the parties, and those not achieved, follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Goals Achieved</th>
<th>Goals Not Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roxbury Tenants of Harvard Association, Inc.</td>
<td>1. Partial relocation of AHC</td>
<td>1. AHC medical program for the RTOHA community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Relocation low-income housing</td>
<td>2. Preservation of all housing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Community participation in designing the housing with ongoing veto power</td>
<td>3. Tenant management corporation for new housing when constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Repair and improved maintenance of existing housing facilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Medical School and Affiliated Hospitals Center</td>
<td>1. AHC plans only slightly modified</td>
<td>1. Prevent delay of AHC construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Medical programs for AHC unaffected</td>
<td>2. Prevent adverse publicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Subsidy of low income housing for a limited time period only</td>
<td>3. No relocation housing sponsored by Harvard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. Delay maintenance of housing slated for demolition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. UFWOC and the Development of Chicano Consciousness,

(Marcos Muños, Regional Coordinator, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee -- AFL/CIO)

The farm workers strike (Huelga) began in California in 1963. Conditions on the land were unbearable. Wages were inadequate, living conditions substandard and sanitary facilities in the fields nonexistent.

Chicano migrant workers, as was true of previous generations, are tied to the land and to the large corporate growers of grapes, lettuce, citrus and other fruits and vegetables. They must follow the harvest from place to place, taking their family wherever there is work. Migrants live in the shacks provided by the grower, buy at the company store and accordingly pay the exorbitant prices set by their employers.

Since the worker is not paid in advance, he is immediately and constantly in debt to the grower. Moreover, he has no say in determining the wages he will earn.

Marcos Muños recounted the story of his life in California and that of most of his fellow Chicanos. As soon as he was old enough to work, he was sent to the fields to help support his family. He vividly recalled the eighteen hour work days, the row after row of workers stooping in the hot sun. His bitterest memory, however, was of his mother and sisters being forced to relieve themselves in the middle of the field, all the more humiliated because of their extreme modesty.

Education for migrant children was sporadic, and what did exist was poor. Munos did not learn to read or write; he had to pick crops instead.

Life is a daily crisis on the land. The crisis of migrant life-styles strikes most heavily at the children -- innocently facing a hopeless future. This concern was foremost in the hearts of Cesar Chavez and a small group of supporters when they began to organize Chicano workers and fight the growers in 1963. They knew that inaction would doom future generations to the same horror.
The strike was undertaken against the growers for higher wages and improved working conditions. They began gradually, first striking against a few grape owners and then extending the strike to include all the major grape growers in California. Muños said "we had no idea that soon we'd have to fight the growers, the schools, the police and all the California politicians, too."

The first obstacle encountered by the leaders of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee was the economic insecurity of the workers, and their hesitance about taking part in action that could risk their jobs -- and their lives. They had no means of self-support for maintaining the strike, nor any assurance that the strike would bring any results. Workers were asked "to live on the hope that there would be changes for their children." Organizing, striking, and boycotting were foreign techniques to the workers. The legacy of oppression and dependency had to be overcome to create an effective movement.

UFWOC demands were reasonable: to bring their living conditions up to a decent standard. The negative and hostile response of growers and other establishment groups shocked the workers. The strike was transformed to a people's movement.

When the workers realized that the opposition of the growers was insurmountable without allies, the former workers went to the cities to mobilize support. As the urban population became conscious of the existence of farm workers and began to support their cause, the former workers began to change their own self image.

The strike has continued for eight years. First grape growers and now lettuce growers have succumbed to Chicano demands for unionization, higher wages and better living conditions. The movement will continue until the disastrous living conditions for all farm workers are remedied.

Self-help has been the strategy of the movement. Chavez and other Chicano leaders were not willing to settle only for new labor contracts; they have been building a Chicano community in Delano, California, where the strike began. To date, UFWOC
 owns 40 acres of land. On that land, the farm workers have built a service center, a coop, a credit union, gas station, clinic and new housing.

As for interventions, Munos acknowledged the support of churches, some segments of labor, and various agencies, but insisted that he and the workers must always set the conditions for any such help. "The people know what they want and what they need. They have always known. We don't need you to tell us what we need. But you can help us figure out how to get it. You can open doors that we can't open, introduce us to the right people, tell others who the farm workers are".

c. Discussion of the Two Crisis Presentations: Implications for Intervention

The difference between us workers and you professionals is that we act, you write proposals. That's why we have been successful, and all you have done is set up committees to study us.

During the first half-hour of the open discussion, participants attempted to compare various aspects of the tenants' and farm workers' experience. For the remainder of the session however, they debated the purpose of the workshop and its role, and that of individual participants in supporting the lettuce boycott.

Meaning of Crisis

For the Roxbury tenants and the Chicano farm workers, existing conditions in the neighborhood and in the fields were of crisis proportions even though the various establishments had not defined them as such.

Accordingly, workshop participants noted that there were two levels of crisis in both cases: first, the crisis for the people, or the crisis in existing living conditions, and second, the power crisis -- the crisis generated by a challenge
to an inequitable and inflexible status quo. The people crisis was recognized by the tenants and farm workers. They in turn initiated the power crisis, which began to move things when Harvard Medical School and the California growers responded to the demands for change.

Community organizations are not pre-packaged action groups, as seen in the experience of the tenants and the farm workers. Numerous questions about a group’s identity must be answered before it can begin to effect a strategy for challenging an institution.

Both the tenants and the farm workers, before they first began to organize, doubted their ability to effect any change. The tenants assumed that they could not challenge Harvard’s plan to build the AHC or forestall or prevent their own eviction. The Chicanos did not even recognize their right to organize and to fight the growers. Once organizational efforts were initiated, however, group skills and group confidence emerged naturally and quickly.

Workshop participants, commenting on the presentations, said that a common outcome of the RTH and UFWOC responses to crisis in their communities was the strengthening of individual and group esteem as well as power. When groups learn the political techniques of organizing, protesting and strategizing they build a more positive sense of personal worth; this new identity leads to the further development of skills for dealing with establishment powers on other important issues.

Role of Advocates

Parks strongly emphasized the contribution of Sharratt, an architect-planner, in formulating RTH strategies. Sharratt served as both an adviser to the tenants and advocate for their demands. Muños was less praising of outsiders who worked with UFWOC (for example AFL/CIO advisors). He asserted that this intervention into the crisis came only after the workers were well along the way to success in the grape boycott. The migrants organized themselves, called the strike and instituted the boycott. Chicano cohesion was the key element in their success.
Muños acknowledged the importance of the national constituency that developed from the boycott and which enforced the economic pressure that brought final success. He nevertheless stressed the role of Chicano leadership in mobilizing workers, maintaining enthusiasm and devising strategies for the strike. Although Muños agreed that AFL/CIO advisors played a crucial role in setting up the boycott and negotiating a settlement, he berated Anglo leaders for permitting the workers to struggle two years before lending support.

A Role for the Workshop as an Advocate for the Boycott?

As several workshop participants continued to assess the effectiveness of intervenors who worked with UFWOC, one questioned the right of participants to debate this point while making no attempt to deal with an issue raised that evening in our own experience with the hotel: although the Project staff had explicitly instructed the hotel that only Chavez-approved lettuce was acceptable, non-union lettuce had been discovered in the hotel kitchen and the identity of the lettuce served at the workshop dinner was therefore unknown. A number of participants insisted that the group use their "problem solving expertise" to cope with their own crisis. The commitment of the workshop participants and staff was openly challenged.

Response of the Workshop to the "Lettuce Crisis"

Many strategies for response were suggested. Some persons proposed that the Workshop take direct action against the hotel by withdrawing and reconvening elsewhere, picketing the hotel, applying pressure on the Sheraton chain, helping to picket stores in Boston and Cambridge, etc. Others suggested that the Workshop spend its time first developing strategies for dealing with situations such as the current predicament and second, developing some strategies for making the lettuce boycott more effective in our home communities. A large group wanted to select a fact finding committee to settle the problem with the hotel and then go on with the business of the workshop. They felt that they (and, therefore, their back-home constituencies) could benefit from comparing the two case studies presented that evening and by continuing with the agenda as planned.
Action on the Lettuce Issue

The Project Director, conference coordinator and a brown conference participant agreed to form a fact-finding team to meet with the hotel manager and question him about the non-union lettuce in his kitchen. The manager asserted that he had ordered union lettuce as requested and if his distributor had violated the delivery agreement, he would demand that any non-union lettuce remaining be replaced -- and if the distributor refused, he would select a new firm to supply his kitchen. The lettuce was replaced that day, and a commitment secured from the distributor to supply only union lettuce from now on.

The fact-finding team reported this information to the workshop, and participants accepted the report as a satisfactory resolution.

Implications for Community Crisis Intervention

1. Muños believed that the "lettuce debate" had been a useful learning experience. Professionals and community activists, both of whom are attempting to develop expertise in resolving crises, found it difficult to agree on strategies for the immediate crisis.

2. The "lettuce crisis" served as a platform for identity and position statements by many participants, most of whom were not willing to take any action to implement their suggestions.

3. The heated debate among participants demonstrated the difficulty encountered when change agents with diverse backgrounds, experiences and orientations toward change try to work together.

4. Professionals and non-professionals have much to learn from each other. Throughout the debate, participants appealed to Muños for a solution to the crisis. Muños refused to propose any courses of action, for he wanted the participants to face a live crisis requiring hard commitment.
B. The Rainbow Park Land Dispute: Strategizing for Social Change (Thursday, April 22)

1. Objectives of the Session

The entire Workshop was designed to allow existing conflicts in approach to come to the surface and from these conflicts to thrash out constructive strategies for achieving social change through crisis situations. The Thursday session was designed to help participants

-- think about what is meant by "community crises," and which may be amenable to intervention, what kind, and how;

-- analyze and clarify their own attitudes toward, and roles in, such situations;

-- strategize about intervention approaches in a specific role in a specific situation;

-- see how their roles complement and contrast with those of other intervenors;

-- differentiate and compare the roles that can be played by intervenors (notably Activists, Advocates, and Mediators);

-- determine limitations in data, resources and capabilities.

In designing the Workshop program, the CCI Staff had attempted to devise a method for exchanging strategies and techniques among participants and for comparing approaches. A problem recognized by the staff and one repeatedly emphasized by participants was the difficulty in getting professionals and non-professionals to learn from each other. The strategizing session using the Rainbow Park case study was tested as a teaching technique.

The strategizing session also was intended as a device for getting participants to explore their own value systems regarding suitable goals and outcomes of crises. Therefore an evaluative component was included which would elicit some definitions of
positive social change outcomes, and evaluate each set of strategies against these criteria. It was expected that the discussion of strategies would raise ideological questions: Should the intervenor be neutral? How does the timing of intervention affect the vulnerability or preparedness of a party? Should we subvert the systems which pay our salaries? If so, how can this best be accomplished?

2. Playing the Rainbow Park Case

Upon registration the night before, participants were given a copy of "The Rainbow Park Land Dispute", a composite case developed by the CCI Project staff. They were divided into groups representing the four intervenor roles -- Activists, Advocates, Mediators and Evaluators -- and each group was given a set of instructions defining its base and charge for the strategizing session. Most participants were assigned to the role-group which, in the judgment of the Project staff, most closely approximated their real-life activities. Two or three persons in each strategizing group, however, represented quite a different base in an attempt to promote cross-fertilization of disciplines and approaches.

After reviewing the case and their role assignments, three groups spent approximately two hours developing approaches for intervention (Activists, Advocates and Mediators), and the fourth working out criteria and a design for judging interventions and outcomes (Evaluators). Some strategizing sessions carried through lunch, and the groups were finally coaxed back to a plenary session at 2:30 p.m. to present their approaches. After hearing from the first three intervenor groups, the evaluators presented their criteria and design, and critiqued each of the groups' approaches. The session closed after 5 p.m. following a lengthy and intensive plenary cross-critique by the four groups.*

The Rainbow Park case and the instructions to each of the four intervenor groups follow.

*Several "Workshops on Intervention Problems and Techniques" which were to have been held late in the afternoon were cancelled by the participants to enable them to discuss the Rainbow Park case and strategies until the close of the day's session.
The Rainbow Park Land Dispute
April, 1971

Setting

Rainbow Park is a racially mixed, low-income, physically deteriorating neighborhood in Bland City. In Rainbow Park there are approximately 30,000 residents: 12,000 black (40%), 7,500 Spanish speaking (25%), 3,000 Asian (10%) and the remaining 7,500 white (25%). Of the group classified as "white", many are second- and third-generation ethnics -- Greek, Syrian, Italians, Poles, etc. -- and some recent migrants from the American South. Approximately 500 university students reside in the area during the school year.

Bland City's population is 500,000 of which a total of 175,000 persons (35%) are classified as non-white. The majority of non-whites live in two ghetto/barrio areas in North Bland. The metropolitan area population is 900,000.

Rainbow Park is located on the outskirts of the central business district of Bland. It is bounded on the west and north by John Upright University, a private university of 17,000 students, and on the east by Bayside, a predominantly middle-class white residential area. The John F. Kennedy Turnpike Extension, an elevated six lane limited highway, separates Bayside from the rest of the area.

* A composite case prepared for a National Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention, April 21-23, 1971, by the Community Crisis Intervention Project, Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Boston.
Conditions in Rainbow Park have long been considered in a state of severe crisis by the residents. The number of housing units is inadequate for the current population, which is expected to increase by 10-15% in the next ten years. Dwellings are overcrowded; 40% of the housing units are substandard; 70% are absentee-owned. There are 20% fewer housing units in the area today than there were in 1960.

Rainbow Park residents work mainly in the food processing plants in Bland, service jobs at Upright University and various clerk-sales positions in the business district. The unemployment rate for the entire city is seven per cent; the rate in Rainbow Park is 10% and at least double that among males 16-25. Forty percent of the families in the neighborhood receive some type of welfare assistance.

There are seven elementary schools, two junior high schools and one very-overcrowded high school in Rainbow Park. Absenteeism in the high school is high. Some high school-age students are bussed to Bayside and other areas.

Rainbow Park was passed over as a Model Cities area. Model Cities projects were initiated instead in the two predominantly non-white areas in North Bland. Although Model City's progress has been minimal to date, there is tension and resentment between Rainbow Park and North Bland. Rainbow Park does contain an OEO-sponsored multi-service center and 10 day-care centers.

Health care is inadequate. There are several new store-front clinics, but the nearest hospital is in Bayside (private). City Hospital is located in North Bland.

BACKGROUND OF THE LAND DISPUTE

The Bland City Renewal Authority (BCRA) has cleared some tracts of land in Rainbow Park for rehabilitation, but no construction has been undertaken. All but one tract, in the southeast corner, have been small and of little concern to city officials and residents. The southeast site, cleared by the BCRA in 1969, contains three large blocks.
Rainbow Park Land Dispute

Over the past two years, the BCRA and various city officials have indicated to several interested constituencies the strong possibility of their being awarded the site for development. They generally saw this as a firm commitment. Upright University has been planning to build several high rise dormitories and a new cultural center on the land. The Central Business Association (CBA), an organization of prominent Bland merchants, wants the land for a shopping mall with clothing and food stores, restaurants and a movie theatre. The CBA has been strongly supported by the Bland Daily News and Bland Evening Star, the largest daily newspapers in the city, which have been pushing a campaign to Save Our Bland.

The residents of Rainbow Park desperately need low-income housing and a new high school. Demands for the housing and school were put together by the Black-Brown Tenants Association, formed to counteract evictions and to force compliance with the housing code by absentee landlords in Rainbow Park. Although the Tenants Association has located possible federal funding for the housing, no specific proposals have been submitted to the BCRA.

No formal decisions were made by BCRA director Garrett Briggs, a black Upright graduate, about the disposal of the land, but Rainbow residents assumed that Briggs would favor their plans. The City Council and the Mayor were split on the issue. The Mayor had received strong support from the University community in his campaign against the incumbent Republican candidate. Council members have generally supported the Central Business Association in the past, and are known to favor a shopping mall for the Rainbow site. However, the University would receive federal grants for the building projects and pay the city for the land; the businessmen's association was relying on tax favors from the city and state for the first 15 years of their project.

CRISIS

On Wednesday, April 14, 1971, the BCRA director, Briggs, informed the Upright University President, Joseph Straight, that the University had been chosen to develop the site. On Thursday, April 15, public announcements were made to the press by Briggs. June 1 was set as the date for final transfer of the site.
Rainbow Park Land Dispute  -22d-

Also on the 15th, to keep communications with students open, Straight contacted white and black student leaders about the decision and requested their participation in the planning of the project.

The Black Student Union leaders were irate; they had supported the Black-Brown Tenants Association in several disputes with landlords, and opposed the University’s claim for the land tract in favor of the community’s.

On the evening of the 15th, the black students met with the Tenants Association. The students decided to take over the Upright Administration Building, while the tenants would sit-in at the office of the Mayor and Garrett Briggs of the BCRA.

On the following day, Friday, April 16, the black students ousted University personnel from the Administration Building. They refused to leave until the University rescinded its plan to build in Rainbow Park and supported the demands of Rainbow residents.

The Tenants, although only an organization of 60 families, had managed to recruit 300 residents to sit-in at City Hall.

Meanwhile, the businessmen’s association had initiated pressures of its own by mobilizing various Bland influentials to phone the Mayor and Council. The CBA rejected the BCRA’s decision, saying that formal hearings had not been held to solicit bids and discuss the merits of the various proposals.

Also on April 16, the Daily News and Evening Star attacked the city’s decision both because the city had bypassed the usual procedures for disposing of vacant, renewable land (as asserted by the CBA) and because they believed that the shopping mall would be a greater boost to the central city and of course to the economy than a cultural center.
Several North Bland black organizations criticized the selection of the University to develop the site, but made no definitive plans to support the Rainbow Park demonstrators.

By the end of the day, the Rainbow Park demonstrators at City Hall had left with promises of returning until the decision is changed. Black students continued to occupy the Upright Administration Building while Straight considered calling in the city police.

Business leaders announced they were seeking a court injunction against the city. The Mayor, with the advice of Briggs, Straight and his black Special Assistant for Community Affairs Robert Lee, have decided to request outside help to handle the crisis.

**INTERPRETATION**

There are now at least three levels or phases of the crisis to which intervenors could respond:

1. The *public crisis* brought to a level of general consciousness by representatives of establishment institutions (the businessmen, the university, the Mayor and Council, the BCRA) when overt conflict including building take-overs and sit-ins took place.

2. The *self-interest crisis* of each of the parties (the businessmen, Mayor, Council and BCRA plus at least the Rainbow residents and possibly the Bayside residents) when they learned the land would be assigned to the university.

3. The *turf-control crisis* for the residents of Rainbow Park which has, in fact, existed for many years -- in housing, employment and economic development, schools, recreation facilities, delivery of health care services, etc. The turf-control crisis is in many ways an intensified self-interest crisis (2), which cannot achieve the status of a public crisis (1) until establishment systems take special notice.

* * *
Rainbow Park Land Dispute

SYNOPSIS OF PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

*Mayor -- White, 43, Democrat, one year in office. Elected with support of the University community. Unsure of his support in the business community. Sides with University in this dispute.

*Garrett Briggs, Director, BCRA -- Black, 38, Bayside resident, graduate of Upright. Briggs personally favors the demands of Rainbow residents and recognizes the need for low-income housing, but as a government official he must consider the city's financial constraints and the unattractiveness of low-income housing to the majority of Bland voters. He sides with Upright. His justification: (1) dorms will free up some dwellings in Rainbow now rented by students; 2) the cultural center can be used by residents of the entire city, and especially Rainbow Park.

*City Council -- Seven members; five Republicans, two Democrats. Supports CBA. Council members depend on business community for campaign contributions; two Councilmen are ex-CBA members; seek revitalization of central business district.

*Upright University -- 17,000 students, private, 85 years old. Heavily endowed by alumni and federal research grants. The community is dependent on Upright for jobs, consumer business, cultural activities, and faculty members' contributions to Bland uplift. In recent years, Upright has acceded to pressures from the local black communities to provide scholarships and to educate black youth with less adequate college preparation.

*Joseph Straight, President of Upright -- White, 50, Ph.D. Has called in Bland police two times in the past year to monitor student demonstrations. No appreciable violence resulted.

*Robert Lee -- Black, 33 M.S. Special Assistant to the President for Community Affairs, Upright University. Hired in 1969 to handle the problems the University was encountering with the black communities of Bland: community pressure to enroll local black students at Upright and criticism of research projects undertaken in the black ghetto. Since that time, Lee has been dealing with student demands about the University's role in North Bland and Rainbow Park.
*Black Student Union* -- Four hundred members out of black student population of 600. Supported by most black students on campus, several radical white student groups, two of eight student council members and a few younger faculty members. Recent disputes with Upright officials over housing for black students and a black studies program. The black studies program eventually was set up according to student specifications, and is in its second year of operation.

*Central Business Association (CBA)* -- Forty business leaders, including two department store owners, two bank presidents, large movie theatre company president. Support from Chamber of Commerce, Retail Merchants Association.

*Bland Daily News and Evening Star* -- Family-owned, Republican, favor CBA. Often conflict with Upright University on major city issues. Oppose student power.

*North Bland* -- Black and brown minority population over 100,000. Model Cities area. To date, the black leaders in the Model Cities projects have managed to gain tight control of the planning machinery in their communities. Efforts to form a pressure group to influence city-wide politics have made headway in North Bland, but have not extended to include residents of Rainbow Park.

*Rainbow Park Residents* (See Setting for demographic data.) -- Black-Brown Tenants Association supported by 40% of minority community; blacks predominate in the organization. The Asian minority has not been involved in community action. Whites are active in the OEO multi-service center. The Center policy board is 50% white, 40% black and 10% Spanish speaking. Community activists in the OEO project have not initiated programs, but have passed upon recommendations of the professional director. Health has been their primary concern.
a. Activists*

The Activists were given the following definition of their role and instructions for strategizing:

* * *

*Participants included Julio Rodriguez (chairman), William Rivera (recorder), Ruth Batson, Tyree Broomfield, Alden Eberley, Ronald Haughton, William Lee, Jr., Armando Rendon, Juan Tennyson and Lloyd Parham. See appendix for affiliations and addresses of these and other intervenor group members.
FIRST: CHOOSE BOTH A DISCUSSION LEADER AND A RECORDER WHO WILL REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION.

National Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention
April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel -- Cambridge

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS IN RAINBOW PARK LAND DISPUTE

TIME: 1½ hours

FINAL PRODUCT: Outline of Your Approach to the Crisis on Newsprint for Presentation to Plenary Session

You are members of several constituencies most immediately affected by the decision on the Rainbow Park site. You may choose from among roles as:

-- Rainbow Park residents (including high school and university students).

-- Members and officers of the Black-Brown Tenants Association in Rainbow Park.

-- Members and officers of the Multi-Service Center in Rainbow Park.

-- Members and officers of the Black Student Union at Upright.

-- Possibly residents of North Bland or Bayside.

Your major goals all revolve around your particular interests in disposal and control of the vacant site, as described in the case study. In developing a plan for further action, you may want to take into account:

-- Power and sanctions available to you.

-- Timing.

-- Coordination of resources.

-- Allies, collateral leverage.

The Activists were members of several constituencies most immediately affected by the decisions concerning the Rainbow Park site. They were, for the most part, Rainbow Park residents, including high school and university students, members and officers of the Black-Brown Tenants Association, staff of the multi-service center, and the Black Student Union at Upright University. The Activists' major goals all derived from their interests in controlling the use of the vacant site. Therefore their first concern was to determine what power and sanctions were available to them. Timing, alliances and coordination of resources were essential to their strategies.

The group chosen as community activists at the conference consisted of individuals whose life-styles were basically activist, even though many were viewed as professionals. Eighty percent of the group's members were black or brown.
The activist group tried to avoid involving itself in definitional problems. The tone of the session was summed up by one of the participants: "Being community folks, we are constantly endowed with dispute and crisis. Our task here is to determine ways to gain control of our lands in our community". This statement was a basis of solidarity among the Activists, who identified the following problems and questions as most crucial to their concerns:

i. Lack of cohesion, cross-cultural conflict,

ii. Ultimate use of land,

iii. Allies (where, who, and when).

iv. What resources are needed?

v. What kinds of leverage do we have to unite the community?

vi. What sanctions can be used against the university and business communities?

For each problem, a strategic approach was developed.

These approaches are summarized below.

i. Cohesion
Organize students, workers, and tenants to produce the Rainbow Park Coalition (cohesion).

ii. Use of the Land
Study health, housing and recreation in Rainbow Park, then claim the land for:

a. Health

b. Low-cost housing

c. Recreation

iii. Allies
Group

- Multi-service center: legal assistance
- Union members: support workers' strike
- Urban ministry: support boycott and students
- Day care centers: children and staff support, sit-in at City Hall
- Rainbow Voters: Pressure mayor because of political voter-power

iv. Coordination of Resources

Chairman, lieutenants acting as spokesmen, task force leaders.

v. Leverage to unite community

1. Flyers and leaflets to community
2. Daily press and television coverage
3. Door-to-door solicitation of community support

vi. Sanctions

a. Support students and call for a general strike of workers, students and faculty to close the university.

b. Boycott on business.

c. Boycott newspaper

d. Urban ministry support

e. Legal action

Based on the above assessment of the situation, the Activists said they would make the following public announcement on Monday morning:
1. We fully support students.

2. We plan to continue City Hall sit-in.

3. We made a study of health conditions and can provide facts about Rainbow Park health conditions.

4. City responsible for providing decent education.

5. Call upon law enforcement officials to observe our rights to protest.

6. Low-income housing is badly needed, and we can provide proof of such a need.

The Activists planned to strengthen their announcement and their forthcoming demands by using the Advocates and Mediators for leverage -- the Advocates to arrange a meeting with university officials, and the Mediators to set up a meeting with the Mayor.

As a part of the strategy, the Activists decided that the best way to avoid being coopted was not to expose their plans to the plenary session until they heard what the Advocates and Mediators had decided.

b. Advocates*

The Advocates began with the following definition of their role and instructions for strategizing:

* * *

*Participants were John Adams, Raquel Cohen, Edward McClure, Paul Shiman, Steve Trachtenberg, Carolyn Wilhelm, and Si Wittis.
FIRST: CHOOSE BOTH A DISCUSSION LEADER AND A RECORDER WHO WILL REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION.

National Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention
April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel -- Cambridge

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL ADVOCATES IN THE RAINBOW PARK LAND DISPUTE

TIME: 1½ hours

PRODUCT: Outline of Your Approach to the Crisis on Newsprint for Presentation to Plenary Session

Joseph Straight, President of Upright University, has asked his Special Assistant for Community Affairs, Robert Lee, to contact a private consulting firm to obtain expert help in dealing with the current crisis. Lee has contacted your firm, which is racially mixed, located in Bland and often subcontracts work to University professors.

The University must deal with several problems:
(1) black student takeover of the Administration Building;
(2) possibility that the City will rescind its grant of the BCRA land tract, thus halting the University's expansion plans;
(3) threat of repercussions against the University from business leaders and the press.

Your working liaison is Lee, but Straight must give final approval to your recommendations before they can be carried out. At this stage in the crisis, Straight is more personally hurt at his sincere attempt to involve students in the planning process than he is about the problems of the building take-over. He still hopes for strong student participation in planning for University and community use of the site.

You may employ a single consultant or a team of consultants in your strategy. In developing a plan of action and time-line, you may want to consider:
Instructions for Professional Advocates

-- What goals for outcome of the crisis are appropriate (and possible) for you as a consultant to the University?

-- What are the restrictions inherent in your role?

-- Power and sanctions available to you.

-- Alternative strategies.

-- Resources and timing problems.

-- Criteria for success or failure of your intervention.
The focus of the Advocates' strategizing session was the question of whether they wanted to contract to the University and under what circumstances they would do so. Would accepting a contract mean

-- advocating the position of the University?

-- advising the school how to act in view of their own evaluation of the situation?

-- advocating the position of the Rainbow Park community:

Before committing themselves to a course of action, the Advocates wanted responses to the following questions:

-- What was the procedure of the Bland City Redevelopment Authority in deciding who got the land? Were there public hearings?

-- What was the political relationship between the BCRA director, the University administration and the mayor?

-- What was the relationship of the Central Business Association and the University?

-- How did the University develop plans for the use of the land? Was there student participation? How committed to those plans is the University -- will they be willing to alter them?

-- What is the relationship of Rainbow Park to the University? Is it a growing black and minority community which the school sees as a threat?

Early in the session the Advocates decided that their major goal was to make the University a part of the community. They continually questioned whether they could be a viable force for this kind of change while under contract to the University. With this in mind -- and the desire to be advocates for the community while being paid by the University -- the Advocates developed a series of conditions for any relationship with the University:
i. University makes a commitment to involve the community in planning for the area.

ii. University initiates a program of racial and ethnic studies.

iii. Commitment by the University to involve the students in planning their education.

iv. University will review plans for use of the land, with the possibility of rescinding them.

v. Outside police will not be summoned unless there is, in the mutual judgment of the University and the Advocate firm, a threat to life.

vi. Four week period for investigating the situation and the compliance of the University to the requests for community and student involvement.

If after four weeks the University accepts under these conditions, the firm will undertake a two-phase extended contract with the University. Phase 1 would involve aiding the land dispute. For Phase 2 the firm and University would jointly develop comprehensive plans for making the University a part of the community.

The underlying motivations and goals of the University were a strong concern of the Advocates. Was the University interested in building on the land to stem the growth of Rainbow Park? The Advocates were aware that the University might not accept these conditions, but they would not work under any others.

The Advocates assumed that the major service they could deliver to the University to justify their contract was building a comprehensive set of linkages with community groups, businessmen and students -- all of whom should contribute heavily to the development of a master plan for the area. Their extended discussion of their uncomfortable role of having head and heart with the community, but bread with the University, prevented them from spelling out specific approaches to these groups.
The major source of difficulty in role-definition for the Advocates came from this paradox. As individuals they felt more sympathetic to the community position, but they were considering assuming a position of contractual corporate responsibility to the University. They were tied to strategizing for a position they could not precisely define nor agree to accept -- and certainly not consciously advocate.

c. Mediators*

If you have the power to get what you want on your own, then you don't need me. If not, then let's talk about how I can help you get what you want short of 100 percent.

The Mediators were operating under the following role-definition and instructions:

* * *

*Participants were David Bloodsworth, Paul Estaver, Stella Frishberg, Lew Kornetzky, James Laue, George Nicolau, Lawrence Schultz, Max Shapiro and Warren Taylor.
First: Choose both a discussion leader and a recorder who will report to the plenary session.

National Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention
April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel -- Cambridge

Instructions for Mediators in Rainbow Park Land Dispute

Time: 1 1/2 hours

Final Product: Outline of Your Approach to the Crisis on Newsprint for Presentation to Plenary Session

You are members of a panel on community conflict-resolution of the National Mediation Advisory Council, a private organization financed by disputing parties, foundations and some public monies. Some of you are from other cities, and some from Bland.

The Mayor calls on the NMAC to help resolve the dispute "in the best interests of all the people of Bland City" (in his words to the press on Saturday, the 17th). He wants you to begin immediately; no firm arrangements for payment for your services have been made at this point.

The Mayor must deal with charges levied by the businessmen's association (CBA) that his administration has ignored the proper procedures for disposing of BCRA land. He hopes to avoid having the City brought to court by the businessmen, and they have agreed to talk with outside mediators in lieu of legal action for the time being.

In your initial meeting with the Mayor and BCRA Director Briggs late on Saturday, you learn that they expect the final settlement to appease public opinion as well as to settle the legal problems of the City.

You may employ a single mediator or a team.
Instructions to Mediators

Your task is to develop a strategy and, if possible, a time-line for intervention in this dispute. You will want to consider, among other things:

-- Entry into the situation.
-- Sanctions available to the parties and yourselves.
-- Goals for your intervention which will contribute to "positive social change."
-- Resources and timing problems.
-- Alternative strategies.
-- Criteria for success or failure of your intervention.
The Mediators group (most of whom were professional mediators with extensive experience in labor-management and other more traditional fields of collective bargaining), spent a good part of their session discussing the special requirements this situation placed on mediators in terms of source of invitation, number of factions and issues, and conditions of the dispute. Their approach to the crisis evolved through several stages in the discussion, and is presented here in narrative form.

Noting that the mediation service they represent has some Bland City residents on its panels, the group agreed early that a team of mediators involving local as well as non-Bland personnel was essential. They stressed that the dispute involved many factions and issues, and that several different types of persons with different basis would be crucial to making a mediation effort work. After identifying the major parties as essentially four -- the political structure, business interests University and tenants -- the Mediators decided that a three-man panel would be adequate, proposing a mix racially and in terms of age, occupation and life-style (hip and straight).

The Mediators saw some major difficulties in the conditions under which they were called in. The Mayor's announcement to the press puts them off to a bad start, making it necessary to overcome the image of being in his bag. Whether to accept payment from the Mayor of the city is another concern, which was not settled after a discussion.

There should be a clear policy from the start on whether disputants have veto power over who shall serve on the mediation team. The general feeling of the group was that such veto power was important and the Mayor especially should be educated about this condition.

The approach that emerged contained the following elements:

i. All the significant parties should be seen by Monday morning.

ii. The first need is for fact-finding, utilizing all of the members of the mediation team and
the networks they can activate throughout
the community, with an emphasis on inde-
pendent cross-checking of data so gathered.

iii. An early and continuing major goal with the
parties should be helping them clarify their
goals and determine their hierarchy of
negotiable issues.

iv. Make it clear to the Mayor and other city
officials, and to all disputants, that all
information regarding the progress of
mediation efforts shall come from the team's
spokesman. Make it clear with the team that
their decision making is by consensus, but
there is only one spokesman.

v. After meeting with the various factions, the
entire panel should meet to pool facts and
interpretations.

vi. Determine which parties and which issues seem
more ready for negotiation than others. Work
with the more susceptible parties, but keep
lines of communication open and clear with
others.

vii. There should be an attempt to bring representatives
of all the parties together with the entire mediation
team as a first step, in Rainbow Park. It is
especially important to have it on this turf, the
Mediators agreed.

viii. Periodically the Mayor should be reminded that the
Mediators do not see their role as "making the
tenants disappear", and that their work carries
an important educational role for the entire
community. The mediator is not a yes-man for who-
ever calls him in. He is an advocate of reality
-- interpreting the power realities of the situation
and helping parties predict consequences of courses
of action under consideration.
Toward what end should the approach of the mediators work? The group discussed appropriate goals for mediators at several points, with differing viewpoints being expressed. The consensus was that getting a self-enforcing agreement that sticks is the most appropriate criterion of success for mediators. Some felt that mediators ought to openly advocate for specific social change goals. One said that the most important goal for mediators in this dispute in this particular community is gaining wide public acceptance of the mediation process and establishing some form of permanent machinery for the prevention and resolution of similar disputes in the future. Some felt that since mediators obviously have values about the content issues involved, that some outcomes would be preferable to others in their judgment, and they should be explicit about it. An analysis of the decision making process of mediators was suggested as a good indicator of underlying values and commitments.

All the roles and techniques developed in traditional collective bargaining situations seemed appropriate for use at some point in this kind of dispute -- constructing packages for settlement, serving as resources expanders and brokers, carrying messages, helping parties get their thing together, working with parties on ratification, problems, polling for consensus often among panel members.

The group concluded its strategizing by examining several additional procedures that might prove useful in this particular dispute:

-- In such a factionalized and highly-charged dispute, it might be wise to start with at least one more mediator on the team than is necessary, so somebody can be "used up" in a special high risk approach (i.e., he may alienate factions so he will have to be removed from the team).

-- In a dispute like this with high violence potential, one person should be appointed to coordinate information and approaches and keep in constant touch with (and hopefully some control over) the police chief.
-- Mediators may need to help forge an alliance of students and tenants to help them get necessary clout to successfully participate in negotiations about their turf.

-- Mediators may have to hang back for a while "while the students hammer on the University's door" to build the crisis to a point (without violence) of negotiation.

-- Mediators may have to get leaders away from their constituencies at some point and ask them to confide where they are really headed, what seems negotiable, what timing seems appropriate, etc.

The usefulness of mediation in helping relatively powerless groups achieve needed social change from crisis situations was summarized by Warren Taylor, a professional mediator and arbitrator now developing approaches and systems for the resolution of community, campus and racial disputes:

If you have the power to get what you want on your own, then you don't need me. If not, then let's talk about how I can help you get what you want short of 100 percent.

d. Evaluators*

The Evaluators began with the following definition of role and instructions for strategizing:

* * *

* Participants were Ann Burgunder, W. E. Chalmers, Morton Bard, Gerald Cormick, Carrol Waymon, John Spiegel, Basil Whiting, Thomas Milburn, Stephen Nelson, C.L. Brown.
FIRST: CHOOSE BOTH A DISCUSSION LEADER AND A RECORDER WHO WILL REPORT TO THE PLENARY SESSION.

National Workshop on Community Crisis Intervention
April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel -- Cambridge

INSTRUCTIONS FOR EVALUATORS IN THE RAINBOW PARK LAND DISPUTE

TIME: 1½ hours

FINAL PRODUCT: Outline of (a) Criteria for Desirable Outcomes of Crisis and (b) Guidelines for Evaluating Intervention; on Newsprint for Presentation to Plenary Session

You have before you the instructions of the other three groups of participants in this case exercise: the Mediators, Community Activists and Professional Advocates. They will be devising intervention strategies for the Rainbow Park Dispute based on their diverse experiences and positions as outlined in the instructions.

Your task in this hour-and-a-half is two fold:

1. To develop criteria for outcomes of the crisis that will represent "positive social change." You should determine what would be the most desirable outcomes as well as the most feasible.

2. To develop guidelines for evaluating intervention strategies in the light of these outcome criteria. It is suggested that you pay special attention to the researcher-evaluator's problem of often having to enter crisis field situations without adequate time for work on design and instruments -- and indicate how he can better approximate valid measurement of intervenor impact and system change given these conditions.

At the first plenary session when we reconvene (one hour), you will be asked to present a very brief listing of criteria for outcomes by which you will be assessing the intervention strategies presented in that session by the other three groups.
Instructions for Evaluators

You will lead off the second plenary session (of 1 ½ hours) with a critique and comparison (outlined on newsprint) of the three intervention strategies presented, focusing on such variables as:

-- Gaining of legitimation with parties.

-- Skills, sanctions, power and resources available and employed.

-- Timing.

-- Goals of intervenors -- desirability and feasibility.

-- How to measure intervenor impact and system change in this situation.

-- Follow-up considerations for the three groups of intervenors.

Then the entire group will critique and compare the plans.

An underlying concern during your deliberations should be the role of evaluation and action research as forms of intervention. You may wish to comment on the differences in research approach, if any, that would develop for scholar-evaluators connected with Upright University as contrasted with those based in a private research firm or a government agency.
The evaluator or researcher of crisis situations may play an intervention role when studying them. This is particularly true when his approach is "action research" and takes place during the occurrence of the crisis. It is also true to the extent that his observations and conclusions about a crisis may have an impact on crises occurring in the future. This intervention impact is enhanced and complicated by the fact that a particular evaluator will create his criteria for evaluating the dynamics and outcomes of a crisis situation out of his own values.

The Project's Staff constructed the Evaluators' role, as the instructions indicate, both to encourage them to reflect upon the impact of their research efforts on specific crisis situations and crises in general, and to provide some central focus for the assessment and discussion of the strategies and assumptions developed out of the other intervenor caucuses.

The Evaluators were assigned what was essentially a three-fold task.

-- To determine the most desirable possible outcomes for the immediate situation in terms of "positive social change";

-- To establish some criteria by which to assess the feasibility of such outcomes; and

-- Develop methods by which to assess the strategies of each of the other intervenor caucuses (Activists, Advocates and Mediators.)

In regard to its first task, the Evaluators arrived at a consensus that, rather than develop specific "desirable outcomes" for the immediate situation, it would be more useful to work toward defining some more general desirability criteria applicable to community crisis situations. "Positive social change" did not prove to be sufficiently concrete or specific to provide a satisfactory criterion of "desirable" outcomes.
The following sets of concerns were developed as reference points in assessing the desirability of outcomes:

i. Assessing the trade-offs reflected in the outcome:
   -- The concept of gain vs. loss (the need of both sides to have some gains and some non-gains or losses in a bargaining situation).
   -- Scope for the saving of face.
   -- The reality of the substantive and procedural trade-offs.

ii. The need to create interinstitutional mechanisms:
   -- As an enhancement of the flow of communication
   -- As a basis for continuing joint determination
   -- As legitimation without the need for future overt confrontation to force recognition

iii. Shifts in power:
   -- There should be some overall reapportionment of power in the direction of greater self-determination for the community.

iv. There should be some follow-up and implementation devices built into the settlement.

v. There should be some feedback and perhaps some pseudo-enforcement mechanisms built into the settlement.

The Evaluators then proceeded to the task of determining which outcomes would be most feasible in the situation presented. Again, however, it was felt that the valid approach would be to set much more general criteria by which to assess the feasibility of outcomes, rather than concentrating only on the immediate situation.
The following criteria by which to assess feasibility emerged after a lengthy discussion:

i. **Practicality**: that is, are the outcomes implementable, in terms of such realities as the prevailing social mores, relative power of the parties, structure of the parties and the possible involvement of other interests not a part of the immediate situation?

ii. **Cost**: Can the parties realistically be expected to assume the cost of settling at the point of the trade-off or settlement in light of both internal and external pressures?

iii. **Resources available**: including both possible outside inputs of resources and the skills, abilities and other assets of the parties immediately involved in the settlement. For example, if the parties should agree on building a housing development which provided space for both students and community, would there be money available to build such a structure?

iv. **Sequence and Timing**: There are a variety of alternative sequences of how trade-offs might occur. Each of these temporal alternatives must be studied in order to determine which is most feasible. **Timing** is important since in some situations a proper time lapse will permit other events to occur in order that the next sequential step will become possible.

**Evaluator Discussions**

The Evaluators began their deliberations by wrestling with a number of definitional problems. The first of these, the meaning of crisis, was a direct attempt to deal with the materials which were presented by the CCI Project.

The Project had suggested that there were three levels of crisis with which it was necessary to cope with in the Rainbow Park dispute: 1) the public crisis, 2) the self-interest crisis and, 3) the turf control crises. A number of approaches to the definitional problem were suggested:
The crises had already been defined by the Project in terms of "level" of power structure struggle -- for manipulation of public image, for share of resources and for control.

What were termed crises in the material were not really crises per se but rather strategy points developed by the parties.

Crisis points can be judged only by developing measurements for the severity of the dispute.

Crisis are essentially a personal interpretation of the facts.

The point of "crisis" might be where all of the actors in a dispute had reached the conclusion that they were in a state of crisis.

The parties are attempting to cause both constituents and opponents to define a situation as a crisis either in order to force action on part of another group or to foster the organization and cohesion of their own troops.

The consensus reached was that "crisis" is the point at which an individual or group feels compelled to take immediate action. This is a highly personal definition since this perception is the result of an individual's perception of the power being directed at him. A dispute reaches crisis proportions when all principal actors perceive themselves to be in a crisis.

As for criteria relating to "positive social change," it was first suggested that there could be no valid consensus on definition of "positive social change" (or, for that matter, of "non-change") because of the differing values and perspectives of any group of researchers.

An alternative suggestion was that the approach of the Evaluators should be to assess what the preferred outcomes for each individual constituency were and then to assess the strategies of that constituency in terms of how well they served to reach that self-defined and self-preferred outcome.
From this perspective it would be unnecessary for the evaluator to define or recognize any criteria arising out of his own experience.

This approach was expanded by a suggestion that the evaluators take the position that the intervenor, whether as a Mediator, an Advocate, an Activist, or as an Evaluator, has no right to define or to attempt to define what the participants believe to be "positive social change". The Advocates and Activists have the responsibility to accept the goals of the group with whom they have aligned themselves. Mediators have the same responsibility to accept the goals of the groups with whom they are mediating. Accordingly, the first criteria in evaluating the strategy of the intervenor should be whether or not he is willing to accept the right of the parties to such self-determination.

The Evaluators decided to begin from the perspective that everybody wants something, whether that something is positive, negative or indifferent, and that all of these will result in some type of social change. The group would then assess strategies in terms of these concrete objectives.

At this point the Evaluator group allowed their own definitions of what was desirable to arise and rejected an earlier willingness to consider "cooling it" as a viable goal; under no circumstances should "cooling it" be the aim of the intervenor, many felt. In fact, an intervenor should be opposed to "cooling it." It was pointed out that the beginning and continuation of community power was getting and keeping things "hot."

One participant noted that the act of reaching a conclusion in a negotiating session, even when a community won "all the marbles" was, in essence, "cooling it."

It was also noted that the community is likely to be the only party that does not have "cooling it" as some part of its agenda. In fact, to achieve their agenda, avoiding "cooling it" becomes a power strategy rather than a goal.
From this discussion, the following general conclusions emerged:

-- To "cool it" should not be an acceptable desired outcome or goal for any of the strategists whose strategies the evaluators were to assess.

-- This, however, did not mean that to reach a conclusion of the crisis was unacceptable per se.

-- To "cool it" could also be a strategy of the establishment in pursuit of its goals.

-- To keep things "hot" will usually be a vital part of community group strategy.

At this point the evaluators moved on to a consideration of the issues and situation described in the Rainbow Park Land Dispute. As a first step in organizing discussion of the dispute it was decided to divide the various interest groups in terms of the position(s) around which they had coalesced.

Once this had been accomplished, the group felt that a next step in understanding the data should be to define the goals of each of these coalitions. As these goals were developed it became evident that there should be some differentiation between immediate or short-run goals or agendas, and the longer run concerns of the parties.

The discussion resulted in the construction of the following tabulation of coalitions and short- and long-run agendas as a focal point for later discussions:
An item of particular concern to the Evaluators was the difference between long and short-range agendas and the possibilities of using those agenda differences in defining possible trade-offs. The point was made that evaluators and other intervenors should remain sensitive to the notion that community groups, because of their structure, experience, expectations and pressing every day needs will probably find it more difficult to agree to any type of trade-off in which gratification is delayed. Established institutions are much more likely to be able to agree to long-range benefits.

At this point, the discussion of possible outcomes turned to a consideration of the fact that goals of the parties shift and change during a crisis scenario. As a result, to accept the initial goals of a party might be to misperceive the success of its strategies. For example, should the students sitting-in be arrested, their primary goal might change from "support of the community" to "amnesty," or release from jail. Evaluators must be sensitive to the
fact that goals will change as a result of the strategies and actions of the parties.

From these discussions the Evaluators developed the criteria for assessing outcomes of dispute situations as presented at the beginning of this section.

Applying their criteria to the role positions and prospective strategies of the other three intervenor groups, the evaluators began attempting to clarify the roles of the Activist, Advocate and Mediator. A general consensus was that it would be possible to construct a continuum of degree of involvement in the immediate situation, along which each of the intervention roles could be placed. Activists, for example, are likely to be directly involved in the immediate situation and its specific substantive and procedural demands either as principals or as organizers in support of them. Advocates are likely to be involved in the pursuit of a more general set of goals, of which the immediate goals of the constituencies they are supporting are one case. The Mediator, while seldom neutral in any absolute sense, is not personally identified with any of the constituents.

It was also suggested that the mediator in the Rainbow Park Dispute was probably seen by the community and businessmen as allied to the mayor. Since the mayor invited the mediators in, even he might agree with this view. The Evaluators noted, however, that mediators are usually initially contacted by one side or the other, and must place a high priority on freeing themselves from the stigma of the one-sided first contact.

The only criterion for all intervenor strategies which clearly and consistently emerged was that any intervention should move the various constituent groups toward greater self determination.

Beyond this limited discussion, the Evaluators did not feel that it would be productive to establish criteria to assess each individual strategy. The criteria already established some basis for judging the outcomes of the strategies. They decided that after hearing the strategies of the Activists, Advocates and Mediators it would be possible to assess whether or not those strategies were likely to achieve the outcomes suggested. The Evaluators agreed to
reconvene after the three strategies were presented to assess those strategies in light of the criteria for outcomes and feasibilities which had been established.

e. The Evaluation of the Rainbow Park Strategies, and Cross-Critiques by Participants

Black students should be brought into the policy control board of the consulting agency, but not as community liaison finks.

When the participants convened in plenary, the Activists, Advocates and Mediators presented the results of their strategizing sessions, as outlined earlier in this section. Then the group broke to give the Evaluators an opportunity to assess the three presentations in the light of their criteria. When the plenary session convened late in the afternoon, the Evaluators first explained their criteria both for desirable outcomes and feasible outcomes, then applied them to the three intervention strategies presented.

The criteria developed by the Evaluators are summarized below.

OUTCOME CRITERIA

i. Defining Tradeoffs

-- Each gains
-- None loses
-- Each saves face
-- Shifts in power occur

ii. Create Inter- and Intra-Institutional Mechanisms to Enhance Communication and the Flow of Power

iii. Shifts in Power
Satisfaction of Priority Needs of Each Group in Terms of Short-Term and Long-Term Goals
FEASIBILITY CRITERIA

i. Practicality

ii. Costs

iii. Sequence and Timing

The critiques by the Evaluators and highlights of the ensuing discussion are summarized below.

Activists

The Evaluators made no criticisms of the Activists, who initially presented only the first phase of their strategy to the total group. In fact, they applauded the Activists for refusing to reveal their course of action to the professionals until they were prepared to do so.

In the open discussion, participants approved of the separate tactics devised by the Activists for eliciting support from the community and for applying pressure on the city, but questioned whether the whole gamut of strategies could be implemented. The Activists met all the outcome criteria, but not the resources requirement of the feasibility criteria set by the Evaluators.

Advocates

The Evaluators criticized the Advocates for imposing their own goals on Upright University. Such a strategy (using feasibility criteria) was impractical and demonstrated poor timing. Moreover, the Advocates not only failed to consider the priority needs of the University which was hiring them, but did not consider the goals of the major parties in the dispute, the City and the Bland Merchants. The Advocates responded that they had indeed considered the priorities of the University — and rejected most of them. In addition, they said the difficult role in which they were cast did not leave them adequate time to fully incorporate the goals of all the major parties into their strategies.
By proposing an elaborate set of pre-conditions for accepting a consulting position to the University, the Advocates were severely narrowing their chances of being hired on a long term basis — thus losing leverage for empowering the Rainbow Park constituencies as they had hoped. The Evaluators suggested that the Advocates first try to get legitimation with the University as its Advocate, not the community's, and then try to get their goals for university-community cooperation and communication accepted. They had to establish accountability and credibility rather than playing a "con game."

The Evaluators finally were especially critical of the role the Advocates defined for themselves. The Advocates seemed intent on becoming the power brokers in the situation, they said. Furthermore, rather than serving as an advocate for the needs and goals of the community within the University, the Advocates were defining the community's role in the dispute and setting its strategies.

The Activists criticized the Advocates for assuming that they had legitimation with the community. The Advocates responded that achieving legitimation was of course an important goal, but that since they had operated in the city previously, they had many contacts. An approach through University students was possible.

The Evaluators then questioned why the black students had been left out of everyone's agenda, but focused this criticism on the Advocates by suggesting that the students be brought into the whole system "to share a piece of the pie". They insisted that "Black students should be brought into the policy control board of the consulting agency, but not as community liaison finks". By making them a part of the decision-making board, it would be their job to get the necessary information out to the activists, rather than the job of professionals.
While the Evaluators focussed at length on criticisms of the role of the Advocates, they were able to offer few constructive alternatives given the situation in which the Advocates were placed: paid by the University, but ideologically aligned with the neighborhood and student groups. The Workshop staff reminded participants of the role conflict inherent in the structure of the Advocates' task, and called for continued attempts at clarifying the leverages available in the participants' back-home situations. The Advocates role was purposely written with this built-in conflict, it was noted, because this is precisely the situation in which so many crisis intervenors and change agents find themselves today.

Mediators

The Mediators implied that they had no value system about the specifics of this dispute. The Evaluators asserted that this was impossible. Strategy and timing decisions themselves reflect value judgments in any dispute, they said. Therefore, they should not have a hidden agenda, but be explicit to all parties about their value system.

Using their outcome criteria as a measure, the Evaluators insisted that a goal for the mediators should be the "expansion of the power of those formerly powerless."

In full group session, this outcome criteria, "shifts in power", was debated inconclusively as a legitimate goal for mediators of community disputes. Nicolau asked pointedly whether mediators "...should have as a goal the enhancement of the power of a community group or the powerless even if that group doesn't have that as its goal?" Then Nicolau raised another dilemma: "There was a potential for a coalition between North Bland and Rainbow that could turn the whole land issue into one of power. Should a mediator propose this strategy?"

No one responded, but all knew the questions struck at the center of the "neutral intervenor" issue.

In a final assessment by Evaluators of all the intervenors, the following points were stressed:
--The question of race and its impact in determining strategy was not seriously considered by any group.

--Professional Advocates and Activists both emerged as advocates for housing on the land and for the powerless community. They have explicit goals and values, and are not just process-oriented "facilitators".

--Mediators are professional advocates for the process of mediation; they have a vested interest in settlement.

C. Workshop on Intervention Problems and Techniques

(Friday morning, April 23)

Power is not negotiated; it is not given.
Power is taken.

Eight separate "Workshops on Intervention Problems and Techniques" had been scheduled for late Thursday afternoon and early Friday morning. The Thursday workshop schedule was cancelled because the entire group wanted to continue discussing the Rainbow Park strategies. From the original group of eight, two large workshops met Friday morning, one on the role of crisis intervenors in large-scale disorders, and the other on teaching intervention skills.*

The goal of the workshops was to exchange experiences, findings, needs and plans on the topic among all the participants. Thus, there were no special experts or presentations; rather the participants all were resources to one another.

1. Large-Scale Disorders: Is There a Role for 'Crisis Intervenors'?

The workshop began by each of the participants stating his chief concern or what he saw as the major issue relating to the topic.

* The other workshops originally scheduled were Change from Educational Crises; Organizing Minority Communities for Change; Intervention Theory and Research; Mediated Settlement of Confrontations; Citizen Power in Anti-poverty Programs; and Justice, Repression and Law Enforcement.
The discussion that followed is presented here as it took place, with the basic issues and problems highlighted. An attempt is made to distinguish between those points made by one person and those supported by a larger consensus of the group.

1. It is important to distinguish between a "spontaneous crisis" such as a street disorder, and a planned nonviolent event which may lead to disorder and crisis on the part of participants, bystanders or law enforcement officials, said Adams. There is a much better opportunity to make plans for achieving positive change out of crisis if the event is planned, like the Poor Peoples' Campaign.

2. Another important distinction, according to Spiegel, is between phases of crisis, for intervention roles and strategies differ at different points. The discussion focussed on the pre-disorder period, and how to convince the holders of institutional power and perogatives that crisis is imminent unless resources for change are mobilized. The issue: how to get change without crisis.

A group including Spiegel, Shiman and Trachtenberg had attempted to develop preventive teams in conjunction with several Boston universities, but with no success.

3. Trachtenberg described a potential crisis he believed he averted at Boston University by acting to cancel examinations in the Spring of 1970 in the face of severe disruption and protest. Lacking time to process the decision through all the existing channels and levels, he filled a decisional vacuum created by the sense of urgency throughout the institution. A major implication from this episode is that decision-locations are mobile during crisis.

Responding to Trachtenberg's story of crisis intervention, Haughton and others said that what was described was not real "prevention" -- rather the action only changed the date or put something off, which always pleases large numbers of persons involved. Therefore, a key criterion for judging the success of intervention should be: does it achieve some important institutional change, rather than only putting something off?
4. Adams described his role and that of others in the crisis surrounding the killing of two Jackson State College students by Mississippi law enforcement officers in May 1970. He stressed:

-- Recognition of the different base and, therefore, different potentials and limitations of various intervenors (national religious denomination official as contrasted with local human relations worker or U.S. Justice Department representative, for example);

-- The crisis intervenor as orchestrator, who knows where the decision-making levels are in all the systems involved in crisis, knows the resources and leverages and how to activate them, has a sense of timing that will promote change rather than simply cooling protest, and who knows when to try to accomplish something himself and when to call on others;

-- Importance of local churches and synagogues during crisis situations -- for on-the-scene surveillance of public officials acting in crisis, for strategic support, for facilities, etc.

5. The group returned to a discussion of scheduled vs. unscheduled crisis situations. Several persons contributed a list of the advantages available to the crisis intervenor if there is some forewarning that a crisis is brewing:

-- Ability to pre-plan strategies, including especially identifying resources that can be activated.

-- Pre-assessment of the levels of power in the system.

-- Strategize how to get to the power, how to by-pass it when necessary, etc.

-- Work to mobilize to prevent a crisis.
A special problem was noted: how can intervenors interested in achieving constructive change best plan for action in a crisis without producing a self-fulfilling prophecy?

6. Hansell called attention to a paper by A.F.C. Wallace* on "levels of affiliative flexibility." Wallace identifies circumstances in which persons are willing to change both their affiliations and their actions. He discusses six levels of pain and six levels of urgency. The importance for crisis intervenors, said Hansell, is the potential for predicting who will change under what level of crisis, who will stick, etc. Waymon said that he believes many intervenors operate in this manner informally, and would welcome this kind of systematization.

7. As the session drew to a close, a consensus was developing on what is needed to be an effective intervenor in large-scale disorders. Among the components listed were:

-- Full information about the systems involved and their functioning, and about decision-makers;

-- Power to influence those structures, decisions and decision-makers;

-- A network -- locally and nationally;

-- Contingency plans.

8. Waymon and Chalmers called for a greater emphasis on the racial and ethnic components of conflict, noting that there is great variability in the playing-out of crisis situations depending on such things as whether a racial or ethnic minority is involved, which group, how powerful, what institutional resources or decisional-levels are being challenged (schools as contrasted to housing, for example), etc.

9. The discussion ended with a strong consensus that a first priority should be the training of grass roots community residents in getting and using the power and networks described by Adams and others. Their concern was shared by other workshop participants, for all the other attendees had chosen to attend the concurrent group on teaching intervention skills. A report of that session follows.

*Department of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia 19104.
2. **Teaching Intervention Skills: Is it Possible?**

The transfer of intervention skills to both professionals and non-professionals is an important concern of the CCI Project. In designing the workshop program, the staff attempted to devise a method for exchanging strategies and techniques among participants and for comparing approaches.

The Rainbow Park strategizing session on Thursday was tested as a teaching technique. The Friday morning small group workshop was designed to encourage participants to compare their experiences and discuss problems related to intervention training programs.*

**Problem Areas**

Participants were asked to enumerate some of the problems they recognized or had encountered in transferring intervention techniques. Commenting from their experiences, participants noted the following problem areas:

--- Teaching intuition
--- Screening for sensitivity
--- Defining an intervention role
--- Defining the discipline
--- Identifying intervention skills

* Virtually all of the participants in this session are responsible for or are related to a major innovative training program with national implications -- in mediation of community and racial disputes, in teaching organizing and negotiating skills to non-professionals, in developing crisis intervention teams, in pioneering conflict management training in police departments, etc.
--Imparting a value system

--Expanding a training program from a smaller select group to a total system

--Imparting commitment to a method

A problem emphasized by all the participants was the difficulty in getting professionals and non-professionals to learn from each other. Training sessions involving both professionals and non-professionals are often characterized by suspicion and an unwillingness to exchange information. As a result, strategies, techniques and experiences that might be pooled to effect positive social change from crisis become well guarded secrets. Moreover, since the role differentiation between professional and non-professional intervenors in a crisis is extremely difficult to determine, each tries to prevent the encroachment of the other into his own particular specialty or sphere of influence.

Concerns of Participants about Particular Aspects of Their own Training Programs.

After providing this framework for discussion, participants were asked to describe their own projects and training programs. Since many of these programs are new or are still in the planning stages, a number of unanswered questions were raised for consideration.

Mediator Training Programs (Taylor, Nicolau, Schultz and Zack).

Can a mediator be neutral? If we say yes, then we must ask if the inclination to be neutral is part of the sensitivity that we screen trainees for and which we try to impart.

--Our goal is to train mediators of community disputes, but we are satisfied if a trainee leaves knowing more about mediation, negotiation, etc. and therefore becomes a better community advocate.
-- We try to teach a sensitivity to cultural differences.

-- Besides training mediators, we also must train parties in the dispute to understand what the mediation process is.

-- School systems are an excellent target for mediation because they do not recognize other parties as legitimate. A major role of the mediator is to help achieve that recognition for students, making him an advocate mediator.

**Police Intervention Training Programs** (Broomfield, Estaver).

-- How can we train policemen to be intervenors in other than a forceful way? Neutrality is a serious problem for us. Up until now our police have not been neutral; they have upheld the law for the benefit of the rich, politically powerful segments of society. Is it possible to reach neutrality?

-- How can we transfer skills from a small unit, well versed in a conflict management orientation and techniques, to a department of many hundreds of persons?* How do we develop techniques for transferring these conflict management skills.

We cannot let conflict management get coopted. Police must change their role and become advocates of the people.

-- We are finishing up a program for teaching intervention in large scale disorders. How do we know whether persons completing a training program for intervention in large scale disorders did not already have these skills or the sensitivity before we started the program? How can trainees adopt these skills or rather carry them over when they go to a smaller situation such as a family crisis?

* In this case, Broomfield was speaking of his seven-man Conflict Management Unit in the 400-plus-man Dayton Police Department.
Training Programs for Non-professionals (Batson, Wittis, Nicolau, Brown).

-- We should teach community people how to get access to the system, how to seize power, how to use the system.

-- How do we get power to the community?

Nicolau: "We must determine how to get the system to negotiate."

Batson: "No, not negotiate...we've been negotiating for 'umpteen' years and where has it gotten us?"

Wittis: "Power is not negotiated; it is not given. Power is taken."

Implications for CCI.

The interchange between Nicolau, Batson and Wittis is representative of the discussion of intervention training in the small group session and, to a great extent, the entire Workshop.

The Mediators insisted that they had to be as neutral as humanly possible. Yet throughout Workshop sessions, Mediators and others questioned whether they should, for example, propose strategies to a weaker side, or whether by manipulating the timing of the settlement process they were indeed taking sides in a dispute.

Batson insisted that a mediator could not be neutral -- that to a community person, the negotiation process is cooptive and stacked against him. The community wants the mediator to be an advocate for its side, not a disinterested party.

Intervention training programs may provide an important although only partial solution to this dilemma.
Many in the session agreed that since community groups must continue to deal with power wielders who relate to formal documents and who participate in "negotiation" sessions, mediation and negotiation experts should give non-professionals and grass roots leaders the skills to negotiate for themselves, to turn the process into one that benefits the side of the powerless.
Open network to minorities. 
Help them get a piece of the pie.

A. Participant Suggestions for the Field and the Project 
(Friday morning and afternoon, April 23)

The final portion of the Workshop program was designed to synthesize the ideas generated by the participants, and to help chart a course for future directions for the CCI Project, the Workshop participants, and others in the growing intervention network.

Participants were to be divided into five groups, assigned a topic for discussion, and asked to prepare a report for presentation in the plenary session. The workshops scheduled were:

1. What Workshop Participants Expect: Tasks for the Project and Development of a CCI Network (effective devices for a clearinghouse; increasing professional intervenor contacts with less-chance communities; follow-up to Workshop).

2. Workable Definitions: Crisis, Intervention, Positive Social Change, etc.

3. Appropriate Goals and Strategies for Intervenors. (Meaning of neutrality; types of intervention strategies; goals of intervenors; timing of intervention)

4. The Role of the Non-Professional Intervenor. (Teaching intervention skills to non-professionals; intervention roles for non-professionals).

5. Communication and Cooperation Between and Within Crisis Sectors: Education, Housing etc. (Range of applicability of intervention...
techniques; possibilities for cooperation among diverse or graphically distant communities; cooperation among intervenors).

However, since the participants were deeply involved in the two sessions on large-scale disorders and teaching intervention skills, they were unwilling to break in time to hold these five group meetings. They decided instead to remain in plenary session for a general discussion of the topics. Although the time allotted to this session was insufficient for carrying out the enormous task posed to participants, a number of significant concepts and suggestions were advanced.

1. Tasks for the CCI Project

The Newsletter:

Give the Project's newsletter, Crisis and Change, a strong community base. Involve minority group members on an editorial board both to make the newsletter more relevant to community audiences and to provide necessary experience for minority people in writing and publishing.

Expanding the Network

Investigate opportunities for including minorities in community crisis intervention networks (especially in mediation and arbitration work). Locate apprenticeship programs. Encourage this network to expand minority involvement and to accept and make referrals.*

Use Project contacts and Workshop participant contacts to acquaint more intervenors and community groups with the CCI discipline. Encourage knowledge of crisis concepts and intervention techniques.

* Nicolau and others have already made some headway in this effort.
Evaluating the Network

Try to identify all the various urban consultant firms and other intervening groups and individuals. Informally rate them as a guide for other practitioners and community groups.

Consultant Activities

CCI project staff should continue to serve as a consultant to community organizations and to management regarding crisis.

Money for Projects

Use influence of the CCI Project and Harvard Medical School to encourage the federal government and other sources to fund community projects and social change innovations.

2. Definitions

(Participants did not attempt to define the terms proposed for discussion, but suggested ways of synthesizing some definitions).

Defining Crisis

Define crisis situations from the community perspective.* Pay more attention to patterns of crises, crisis sectors, role of race in crises. Sort out categories of crises.

Defining Intervention

Involve community people in defining (a) community crisis intervention (b) goals of professional intervenors (c) goals of community intervenors.

* The Project has developed two approaches with this in mind: the distinction between public crisis, self-interest crisis and turf-control crisis in the Rainbow Park case, and the analysis of community groups' attempt to build power vis-a-vis establishment institutions in terms of a group's identity crisis, organizational crisis and power crisis (developed in Cohen's case on the Harvard Community Health Care Plan).
3. Goals and Strategies
   Intervention Roles:

   The brokering role of the intervenor is crucial in a community crisis, especially in conveying and legitimating black and brown needs to white power groups. Transferring intervention skills to a community group over the period of a crisis will help develop self-sufficiency for dealing with future crises -- or preventing them by achieving significant institutional change.

4. The Non-Professional Intervenor
   Non-Professional Roles:

   Convene workshops for non-professionals, blacks and browns to share knowledge and skills re crisis intervention. Convene workshop for professionals and non-professionals to facilitate a reciprocal sharing of experiences and to compare and develop intervention strategies.

   Initiate new programs and broaden existing ones for transferring intervention skills to non-professionals. Open CCI network to minority entry.

5. Cooperation and Communication Between and Within Crisis Sectors

   The participants did not specifically discuss this topic. They focused instead on cooperation and communication between professionals and non-professionals, as reported under several categories above.

B. Implications for Community Crisis Intervention -- and Community Change

   The discussions at the Workshop, and in preceding sections of this report, addressed themselves to a number of questions about community crises, intervention and change that were the force that brought the CCI Project into existence. In addition to concerns presented by the Project staff, Workshop participants highlighted additional problem areas, as described throughout this report.
Many implications for further action by Project, participants and others appear throughout the report, and particularly in the report of the final Workshop session's discussions. While unable because of staff and budget limitations* to pursue all the activities suggested both through the ongoing work of the Project and by Workshop participants, many of the ideas are in the process of being implemented. They include expansion of networks of change-oriented intervenors (especially non-professionals), more emphasis on mutual training and interchange between professionals and grass roots community people, and brokering resources (both persons and money) to groups and situations in need of help.

Three important developments and directions spurred by the Workshop are reported in the following final section because of their importance for continued development of CCI. They include thoughts (a) toward a model of intervenor roles, (b) on the minority community advocate, and (c) on CCI for non-professionals.

1. **A Model of Intervenor Roles.**

As reported in the sections describing the Rainbow Park strategizing sessions, the definition and development of intervenor roles was a primary concern of Workshop participants. After reviewing the extensive data generated by the Workshop, the Project staff was able to develop a model that helps to distinguish among the various intervenor roles that are played in crisis situations. The model presented below categorizes intervenor activities, depicts the relationship between intervenors and parties, and indicates the intensity of concern of the intervenor in the dispute. Although the full implications of the model have yet to explored, the Project staff believes it has broad applicability to the theory and practice of community crisis intervention, and invites testing, refinement and feedback on its usefulness.

* Approximately three full-time persons for the 1971-72 Project year.
TYPES OF INTERVENOR ROLES IN TERMS OF:

-- Base
-- Intensity of concern for the dispute
-- Range of empathy for the parties

Parties in Conflict
Activists, Reactivists
Advocates
Mediator
Evaluator
Explaining the Roles

The model retains the Evaluator and Mediator roles utilized in the strategizing session, but distinguishes between the Activist and Advocate roles in terms of the party to whom the intervenor has the closest relationship. The Activist and Community Advocate are aligned with the "Out" party or the powerless group, the Reactivist and Professional Advocate with the "In" party or establishment group.

Any crisis situation includes the cumulative effects of a number of parties, positions, forces and interrelationships. Different intervenors are likely to have different ranges of concern regarding the issues and the wider implications of the dispute.

The parties, "Ins" (most frequently established organizations) and "Outs"* are likely to have the most narrow focus in a dispute, since they stand to lose or gain most in the immediate situation. The parties are also least likely to relate to or empathize with the position of others. In terms of a community crisis intervention framework, the parties are non-intervenors.

The Activist will have a broader concern with the dispute. While he relates directly to the immediate issues in dispute, he is likely to perceive the dispute in a wider pattern.

Activists are often the technically "outside" organizers and leaders who facilitate the crystallizing of deep-seated frustrations by providing some wider vision of what is possible, and some ideas for pursuing new goals.

The term Activist has been earned by and applied specifically to individuals who have been pursuing and encouraging what this Project defines as positive social change.

* "Ins and outs" recognizes the relative nature of group and organizational bases in our society. The building trade unions, for example, are "outs" in labor disputes but "ins" when the black community tries to get jobs. Similarly, where the black community has achieved some measure of control over social agencies in disadvantaged areas, they may be seen as "ins" by other minorities.
There is a corollary group arising in support of the status quo, or even status quo ante, who are designated the Reactivists. Their activity can be seen largely as a reaction to challenges to the status quo rather than any particular ideological or philosophical position. The Young Americans for Freedom and their organizers and a number of other right-wing or "reactionary" leaders can be seen in this role. Whereas the Activists encourage the disenfranchised in their resolve to take a piece of the action, Reactivists strengthen the resolve of established institutions to resist demands for change.

As was noted in the Rainbow Park situation, the Professional Advocates were consultants to the established institution. This is an intervention role played by a variety of consultants, particularly academic, who profess to teach administrators and managers the skills to deal with change. Too often, the skills provided serve only to change the institution by diluting, diverting or absorbing challenges to basic policy. One of the concerns of the Project is the growing number of individuals and firms intervening in community disputes in this way without a clear understanding of the ultimate effect of their actions.

While not included in the Rainbow Park Case, the Community Advocate plays a similar role. Although not a member of the immediate constituency, he will act as consultant to them, and frequently an advocate of their cause to the wider community, and often to their opponents. Even as in the case of the Professional Advocate, the Community Advocate is likely to broaden, or attempt to broaden, the concerns of the community and to encourage them in their position. At any rate, he will be a source of advice and some skills, and is likely to have had some experience in the area.

Currently, many Community Advocates are involved in a variety of community programs which give them continuing contact with the community and its problems and opportunity to organize the community. Social workers, particularly those in non-case work positions, have often filled this role,
as have professional staff in the anti-poverty programs and many Vista volunteers.*

As the diagram suggests, the Professional and Community Advocates are the first level of intervenor able to embrace slightly overlapping positions. They often must relate to both parties in a dispute to facilitate communications, interpret positions and even as in the case of the Professional Advocate, support the "opposition" group i.e., not the one paying his salary. Accordingly, it is at this level that a first opportunity for intervention with an eye to settlement -- as well as "winning" -- is most likely to arise.

The Mediator must be empathetic to all positions in the dispute. Further, his range of concern will be broader than that of other conflict participants; particularly, he may be inserted into the situation by some party who is disinterested in the immediate issues. Because the Mediator's sphere of concern (and often his base) is so broad, he will be able to work toward almost an infinite number of possible accommodations.

There is some evidence that Professional and/or Community Advocates may move to play a Mediator-type role. However, this may be as much a strategic play in pursuit of covert goals as a concentration on reaching an accommodation. Observation suggests that many "advocate mediators" might be Community Advocates in other situations.

The Evaluator or researcher will necessarily perceive the dispute in the broadest context and with empathy for all positions. This is the only way that his research efforts can maintain even a modicum of objectivity and scope. His values and structural base (namely, who he is working for) will have an inevitable impact on his selection and perception of "facts." Many Evaluators in the community conflict area may also have acted, or may even be concurrently acting, as Mediators or Advocates to one or the other party to disputes.

The Implications of Race

In the diagram there is a wedge-shaped notch on the

* See the further elaboration of the emerging concept of Community Advocate on p. 64.
community side. This recognizes the impact that race can have on the ability of the intervenor to gain legitimation with the "Out party". The race of the intervenor may affect (a) his credibility as a third party, (b) the amount of trust allotted to him and (c) his level of involvement in the dispute. Where, for example, the disputants are black the Advocate, if he is also black, may be able to fill an internal leadership position. If the advocate is not black, such a development is much less likely. Similarly, a black mediator may be more acceptable than a white to a black or minority community challenging a status quo perpetuated by racist policies and attitudes.

2. The Minority Community Advocate

Because of the continuing concern of the Project and of the Workshop participants about such issues as accountability of intervenors, fear of cooptation by sources of support, and ability of professionals to relate directly to the most immediate needs of powerless communities, a further elaboration on the role of Advocate is offered here.

In the CCI Project's attempt to define the various roles individuals play in crisis situations, the Advocate role has been especially difficult to clarify. Even the distinction between Professional Advocate and Community Advocate, developed in the preceding section of this report, is not sufficient. This section introduces a new role (or perhaps sub-category of the basic Advocate's role), the Minority Community Advocate.

The Minority Community Advocate differs from the Community Advocate in a number of ways. Although both are professionals, the Community Advocate plays a consultative role when he endorses and advocates the position or goals of a subordinate party in a dispute. He is not directly involved in the situation before it reaches crisis proportions; nor will he be directly affected by the resolution of the crisis. However, the Minority Community Advocate, as a member of the subordinate group, is affected by the problem situation long before it is identified as a crisis; consequently, the results of the crisis are crucial to him as an individual.
The Minority Community Advocate may be either college trained or non-college trained. The college trained advocate is a professional only in the sense of his college education. He is so closely aligned to the aspirations and the pulse beat of the community in crisis that his professionalism does not inhibit his allegiance to the community in dealing with the crisis at hand.

Unlike the Minority Community Advocate, the Community Advocate who is paid by a government or establishment institution (or will become dependent on such financing in the future) may be restricted by this base and therefore rendered ineffective in helping the community.

The CCI project staff solicits further clarification of these roles in an attempt to fully understand the range of accountability and, therefore, leverage for change.

3. Professionals and Community Folk in Community Crisis Intervention

The imbalance between professionals and non-professionals in the practice of community crisis intervention was underscored in each session of the Workshop.

The success of the Roxbury Tenants of Harvard and United Farm Workers Organizing Committee showed the high levels of expertise developed by grass roots community groups in successfully dealing with crises. The lettuce crisis at the Workshop demonstrated the inability of professionals and non-professionals -- black, brown and white -- to get far beyond rapping and identify statements to come up with a workable joint strategy for intervention in an immediate, limited and relatively simple crisis.

In the Rainbow Park strategizing sessions, the role and strategies of community activists (many of whom were, in base, paid advocates) was contrasted over and over again with those of the professional mediators and advocates who have a near monopoly on paid positions in the intervention network. The underrepresentation of community-based people at the Workshop was cited as a weakness, particularly affecting this session.*

* In a now-typical pattern of relationships between professionals and community folk, a number of grass roots activists were invited to attend the Workshop and accepted, but the staff did not offer special inducements or encouragement beyond what other invitees got, and most of the activists did not attend.
Participants who discussed the progress achieved to date in the teaching of intervention skills repeatedly stressed the need to train indigenous leadership, and noted the inadequate efforts undertaken thus far.

And in the concluding session of the Workshop, participants were primarily concerned with "sharing a piece of the pie" with non-professionals and minority group members.

In response to the Workshop findings and to a need perceived as the CCI Project was being conceptualized in 1969 and 1970, the staff has resolved to focus an even greater part of its activity in the final Project year* to rectifying the many imbalances that exist between professionals and non-professionals, including:

-- Intensifying support for all efforts that will open intervention activities to minorities and non-professionals, including many now underway by Workshop participants.

-- Hosting strategizing sessions aimed at helping professional and community-based intervenors find each other, define areas of agreement and disagreement, and use one another's skills and leverages for needed institutional change.

-- Aiming publications (including certain issues of Crisis and Change as well as especially prepared pamphlets and case studies) at community groups, for their use in understanding and bringing about change in racist and undemocratic institutions.

* * *

* October 1, 1971, to September 30, 1972
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APPENDIX B -- WORKSHOP PROGRAM

(Revised by Participants and Staff in the Course of the Workshop)

NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION
April 21-23, 1971
Sheraton Commander Hotel, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Wednesday, April 21

5:00 p.m.         Informal Reception         Mt. Vernon Room
6:30 p.m.         Opening Dinner            Mt. Vernon Room
7:30-8:00 p.m.   Introduction and Plan for the Conference
                   -- James H. Laue, Director
                   Community Crisis Intervention Project
8:00-10:00 p.m.  Two Crises

Local: Dispute over expansion of Harvard Medical School and teaching hospitals in surrounding residential areas.
       -- Robert S. Parks, President
       Roxbury Tenants of Harvard Association
       (Discussant: Mark Goode, Community Relations Officer, Harvard Medical School)

Regional/National: The continuing crisis for farm workers in American agribusiness -- the advent of unionization.
                   -- Marcos Munos, Northeast Regional Coordinator, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (AFL-CIO, Cesar Chavez, President)
                   (Discussant: Ronald Haughton, Chairman Board of Mediation for Community Disputes, New York)

Brief presentations followed by discussion of participants focusing on the nature of the crises, strategies developed by the parties, sanctions available, roles of intervenors, changes achieved, future directions.

Sponsored by Community Crisis Intervention Project, Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School.
10:00 p.m. Adjournment of Formal Session
Showing of Film on UFWOC Organizing Activities, HUELGA

Thursday, April 22

9:00-9:30 a.m. Introduction to Morning Session  Mt. Vernon Room

9:30-11:15 a.m. Strategizing Sessions on Community
Crisis Intervention: The Rainbow
Park Land Dispute Case

I. MEDIATORS  Minute Man Room

II. COMMUNITY ACTIVISTS  Salem Room

III. PROFESSIONAL ADVOCATES  Cape Cod Room

IV. EVALUATORS  Mt. Vernon Room

Task: To develop and evaluate strategies around the case that would contribute to "positive social change". Chairman and recorder to be chosen by each group.

11:30 a.m. -  Plenary Session: Strategy  Mt. Vernon Room
12:30 p.m.  Reports by Mediators, Activists, Advocates

12:30-2:00 p.m. Lunch (open)

2:00-3:30 p.m. Plenary Session: Critique  Mt. Vernon Room
of Strategy Reports by Evaluators; All Participants Critique

3:30-3:45 p.m. Break

3:45-5:15 p.m. Workshops on Intervention Problems and Techniques

Participants will sign up for workshops, and serve as resources to each other. Project staff will serve as discussion leaders.

Task: To exchange experiences, findings, needs and plans on the topic among all the participants in each workshop.
1. Organizing Minority Communities for Change
   Cape Cod Room

2. Teaching Intervention Skills: Is It Possible?
   Salem Room

3. Intervention Theory and Research: Is Impact on Policy Possible?
   Mt. Vernon Room

4. Change from Educational Crises
   Minute Man Room

Dinner Open

Evening Wine and Cheese Party Hosted by the Project -- 9:00 p.m.
Optional: Special Interest Sessions, Films, etc.*

Friday, April 23

9:00-10:30 a.m. Workshops on Intervention Problems and Techniques (continued)

1. Mediated Settlement of Confrontation
   Mt. Vernon Room

2. Large-Scale Disorders: Is There a Role for 'Crisis Intervenors'?
   Minute Man Room

3. Citizen Power in Anti-Poverty Programs
   Salem Room

4. Justice, Repression and Law Enforcement: Mobilizing Citizen Pressure
   Cape Cod Room

*Norris Hansell of Northwestern Medical School will have three video-tapes available for showing in the Cape Cod Room: "The Properties of Persons and Surrounding Networks at Crisis-in-Transit"; "Arrangements to Receive, Assess and Link at Crisis, and the Conduct of Convened Sessions for Maximal Linkages"; and "The Seven Essential Attachments and Normal Coping Functions in Man".
10:30-10:45 a.m. Break

10:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m. Community Crisis Intervention: Where Do We Go From Here?

Task: Small working groups will prepare reports on each of five topics for presentation and discussion at the closing plenary session. Chairman and recorder to be chosen by each group.

1. What Workshop Participants Expect: Tasks for the Project and Development of a CCI Network
   Minute Man Room

2. Workable Definitions: Crisis, Intervention, Positive Social Change, etc.
   Cape Cod Room

3. Appropriate Goals and Strategies for Intervenors
   Salem Room

4. The Role of the 'Non-Professional' Intervenor
   Mt. Vernon Room

5. Communication and Cooperation Between and Within Crisis Sectors (education, housing, etc.)
   Mt. Vernon Room

12:30-1:45 p.m. Luncheon for All Conference Participants
   George Washington Ballroom, lower level

1:45-3:00 p.m. Closing Plenary Session Reports and Discussion: Where Do We Go From Here?
   Mt. Vernon Room

3:00 p.m. ADJOURNMENT
This Workshop and the work of the Project are supported by the Ford Foundation.

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APPENDIX C -- PARTICIPANT EVALUATION

Workshop participants were asked to complete a short evaluation form at the end of the last day's session. Fourteen persons responded to part or all of the questionnaire.

In response to two opening open-ended questions about the "most useful" and "least useful" parts of the program, seven persons named the Rainbow Park strategizing exercise as most useful, while only one found it least useful. Six thought general discussions and interaction with other participants were most useful, and two named the lettuce crisis discussion. The only parts of the program getting more than one "least useful" response were the lettuce discussion (three), and the Friday morning workshops on intervention skills (two).

The third item asked participants how they thought they benefitted from the Workshop, in contrast to what they had expected. Five said exchanging ideas and experiences with others was a major benefit, and four said they had been helped in clarifying their own roles as intervenors.

Questions four and five asking for ideas and models for crisis intervention elicited only scattered responses and few new ideas.

In question six the participants were asked what steps they felt should be taken to establish a wider network of communication and interaction among crisis intervenors. Four suggested more regional and national meetings, with a broader base of participants. Three felt apprenticeship roles should be sponsored for minority and nonprofessional persons with intervenor interest and potential. Two respondents felt the newsletter was important for the network, but one thought the newsletter would be dangerous -- "It would surface everybody!"

Participants then were asked for a judgment on the most important issue or problem in the CCI field. Four said that simply getting a consensus on definition of terms and techniques was the most pressing problem. Three respondents listed communications problems between professionals and nonprofessionals. One each named training, networks, police actions and racial polarization.
A final question listed six goals the Project staff had in mind for the Workshop, and asked participants to rate how well they thought the sessions achieved those goals. The response pattern follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
<th>Fairly Well</th>
<th>Not Very Well</th>
<th>Not At All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Helping define a new field or discipline -- CCI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Starting to build a broad network of intervenors with concerns similar to the Project Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Developing and assessing strategies for CCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Clarifying methods for evaluating intervention -- especially one's own</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) As a device for learning intervention strategies and skills</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Promoting sharing of experiences, findings, needs and plans among all Workshop participants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the questionnaire, a number of participants sent letters to the staff in the week after the Workshop, most of which were lengthy and extremely helpful in helping define further direction for the Project. Several said they had examined their values about intervention and crisis resolution, -- and the cooling vs. change issue -- more deeply than they had before. Others said they now looked at crisis situations in a new light. One Federal official responsible for training
in a large agency said he had gained important new insights about community change which needed to be included in his training designs. Several sent additional materials and referred the Project to other persons who should be in the network. One said that the Workshop was one of the most exciting experiences he had ever had; he came expecting to play the usual role of star performing professional but learned from others (including community folk) as never before because of the format.

In addition, hoped-for interaction between Workshop participants has been generated and expanded as a result of the three-day session. Examples are numerous, ranging from a professional mediator who used a linkage he made at the workshop to get badly-needed money to a school-and-community group in a city torn by school crisis, to the dispatching of a black/white, mediator/psychiatrist team to assist a governor and the state's constituent minority groups in equitably dealing with police-community disorders.

The distribution of the first issue of *Crisis and Change* in May was broadened considerably by suggestions of Workshop participants. Several new efforts for minority entry into various intervention activities have been undertaken, and have received support from persons around the emerging network. A nationally-based program to develop crisis intervention teams has gone forward with the support and advice of numerous persons whom the director of the program first met at the Workshop Project. Staff members have developed and delivered training programs for community folk and professionals alike as a result of contacts made through the Workshop.

In summary, the Workshop provided the forum for a broader hearing of the ideology, theory, and emerging practice of community crisis intervention, and the Project staff has been pleased with the way in which the ripples from the Workshop have continued to spread.
APPENDIX D -- OUTLINE FOR CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION

Use short answers or outline form.

Variables of greatest concern:

1. Disparities in power and degree of organization between disputants.
2. Types of social change that resulted (*redistribution of power* is the most important change for our interests).
3. Which categories "work", and which do not.
4. Types of crises.
5. Specific intervention strategies.

TITLE OF CASE

I. Setting and Background

A. Location, dates (specify completed or in-process)

B. Basic unit of the case analysis (metropolitan area, community, neighborhood(s), organization(s), etc.)

C. Background (population involved, history, power structure, values, etc.)

II. Parties

A. Specify individuals or group and their affiliations and positions (established institution? protest group? public agency? consumer?)

B. Internal characteristics (history, membership, leadership, financial base, racial-ethnic characteristics, etc.)

C. Factions, allies, coalitions?

D. Sanctions available to the parties, (economic, eviction, firing, job control, publicity, litigation, protest, violence, political, etc.)

III. Major Issues

A. Goals of the parties (where do they conflict?)
B. Development of issues and goals through time (how and why do parties change?)

C. What is the central cleavage? (race, sex, age, class, power, life-style?)

IV. Narrative

A. Highlights -- who did what, when?

B. Identify any phases or stages in the case situation.

C. Relationship between parties (major areas of agreement and disagreement; willingness or refusal to negotiate, cooperate, compromise?)

D. Role of subordinate or minority group leadership

E. What was the crisis? (power, identity or organizational? public, vested interest or turf control?)

V. Role of intervenor(s)

A. Description of intervenor(s) (sex, ethnicity, approximate age, job position, relative prestige in the setting).

B. Standing with parties (past relationship, source of funds, ultimate accountability).

C. What did the intervenor(s) do? (examples of activities: advocacy, interpretation, community organizing, technical assistance, management consultation, face-saving, communication, providing or securing money, fact-finding, training, mediation, developing trades and packages, direct action, mass protest, lobbying, drafting legislation, finding and bringing outside leverage to bear, confrontation, escalation, arbitration, conciliation, etc.)

1. skills utilized
2. resources utilized
3. sanctions, power, leverage utilized
APPENDIX E -- BIBLIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

Following is a list of materials distributed to participants prior to the Workshop, supplemented by materials the attendees brought with them for circulation.

A 200-item Bibliography on Community Crisis Intervention is available from the CCI Project, in addition to several shorter bibliographies on conflict resolution, resources for training in community dispute resolution, and related concerns.

Bard, Morton, "Family Intervention Police Teams as a Community Mental Health Resource". Reproduced by special permission of the Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science published by the Northwestern University School of Law, volume 60, number 2, 1969.


Milburn, Thomas W., "The Management of Crisis", Department of Psychology, DePaul University. (mimeographed April 1971).
APPENDIX F -- SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND THEORY FROM A
CASE STUDY IN COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION

The following pages are excerpted from a "Case Study of Community Crisis Intervention in Boston, Massachusetts, November 1969 - June 1970," by Alana Cohen of the CCI Project staff. Miss Cohen was a participant intervenor in a conflict between the Harvard Community Health Plan and the Mission Hill-Parker Hill Health Advisory Committee, established by the Plan to facilitate consumer input.
Case Study of Community Crisis Intervention

This report is a case study of a conflict between the Mission Hill-Parker Hill Health Committee, a Boston citizens group, and the Harvard Community Health Plan, a prepaid medical care program. The names of agencies, institutions and groups involved in the conflict have not been altered. However, the names of individuals other than the case study writer have been changed by the author. Any resemblance of these names to real persons is entirely coincidental.

Alana S. Cohen, M.A.
Community Crisis Intervention Project

*The study was completed while the Project was part of the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Boston. The Project was transferred to Washington University in St. Louis October 1, 1971.
CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY CRISIS INTERVENTION 
in 

by 
Alana Sue Cohen 

I. SUMMARY OF CONFLICT 

In April 1969, the Harvard Community Health Plan, (HCHP), a prepaid, comprehensive, medical program affiliated with Harvard Medical School, organized a series of meetings for residents of the Mission Hill-Parker Hill area in Boston (a deteriorating older section of the city -- population, 12,500). The meetings were convened to discuss HCHP's proposal for including the community in their comprehensive medical services and to facilitate additional input from members of the community in designing the program.* 

By August, a nucleus of about ten community residents, who had repeatedly attended the HCHP initiated meetings, decided to form a permanent committee of their own. This committee, the Mission Hill-Parker Hill Health Advisory Committee, (HAC), intended to further communicate with HCHP about their health program and Community Outreach Center for Mission Hill and Parker Hill as well as to begin action on numerous health crises that plagued the community. 

Productive negotiations proceeded slowly. Members of the Committee were frustrated by the attitude of HCHP's chief liaison staff member who questioned the legitimacy of their recommendations for the Outreach Center and who seemed to want HAC members merely to rubber stamp his own program. By November HAC members were split into two factions:** one wished to 

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*HCHP had initially secured Public Health Service (PHS) funds for operating a minimal facility in the community. When community residents rejected the proposed health plan because they could not afford the fees, HCHP sought welfare money and additional funding from PHS. 

**The number of active Committee members had increased to twenty.
attack HCHP penly in order to permit constructive community participation in planning; the second believed that continued low-keyed communication would accomplish the same goal.

The author of this case study* based in HMS networks, heard about the Committee and its conflict with HCHP from medical students active in a community housing crisis. In early November, she contacted the chairman of HAC, and offered to help the Committee with both its internal organizational problems and in its conflict with HCHP.

In December the case study writer worked closely with the chairman of HAC to plan a strategy for confronting HCHP and to encourage HAC members (both those who were willing to exert pressure as well as those who feared such action) to challenge HCHP should communication efforts fail and the Committee's proposals for the Outreach Center be rejected.

In January 1970, HCHP informed HAC that their Public Health Service grant renewal application was due February 1 and that HCHP would like to "consult" the Committee before writing the renewal form. Several members of HAC decided that they had to confront HCHP at this time and refuse to settle for a "consultative" role if community participation in health planning or an even more potent goal, community control of the Outreach Center, were to be assured. HCHP administrators rejected the Health Committee's demands for medical services in the Outreach Center (all services were to be provided at their central facilities) and opposed any significant community control of staff and program.

Several crucial events followed: 1) HAC leaders, at the suggestion of health planning specialists contacted by the chairman, decided to make formal demands for designing the Outreach Center, and for community control of both the Center staff and programs. The demands were posed in the form of

*The author of this case study, Alana Cohen, served as a researcher-activist in working with the Mission Hill-Parker Hill Health Committee. Her research methods are presented in section II and her role as a change agent is thoroughly discussed and evaluated in section VD.
a Memorandum of Agreement written by a community legal aid attorney; 2) In February, Committee leaders presented the Memorandum at a monthly full-membership meeting to press for its approval. The health planning specialists and case writer convinced hesitant HAC members that their inaction at this point would defeat their efforts to secure community control. In response to this advice, a negotiating team was chosen to present the Memorandum and to use all resources deemed necessary (including recourse to PHS) for applying pressure on HCHP; 3) On March 6, after long, tough negotiating sessions, HCHP agreed to the provisions of the Memorandum: limited medical services in the Outreach Center, community control of staff and programs, and $5000 in PHS funds for the administrative needs of the Committee.

Since the signing of the Memorandum, HAC members and advisors believe that until community control is firmly established, any slackening in the momentum of the Committee would in effect permit HCHP staff to implement their own interpretation of the Memorandum. The case writer has continued to work closely with HAC, both with individual members and at monthly meetings, to prevent HAC from relaxing its pressure on the Harvard Community Health Plan. A massive community organization drive, the formation of a community health corporation, and an expansion of the scope of HAC's activities is now underway (June 1970).
II. RESEARCH GOALS AND METHODS

A. Research Goals

The researcher was interested in exploring several facets of community-institutional disputes:

-- stages or phases of the confrontation
-- development of the goals of the parties
-- strategies employed to achieve the goals
-- the use of crisis to achieve positive social change
-- the kinds of outcomes resulting from the confrontation

In addition, the researcher was both developing and testing the kinds of roles played by third party intervenors-change agents in disputes. She was interested in the following questions:

-- legitimation with parties
-- goals of the intervenor
-- timing of intervention
-- skills utilized
-- strategies developed
-- result of intervention activities

B. Research Methods

The researcher gained entry to community meetings by contacting the chairman and introducing herself as a research-activist. She agreed to aid the chairman and committee members in evaluating their progress, clarifying their goals and devising strategies for challenging the power of the Harvard Community Health Plan in designing a health program and center for the community.

The researcher took detailed notes of the proceedings of HAC meetings, recorded the kinds of internal conflicts that developed among HAC members between meetings and traced their efforts to resolve these conflicts. She was in almost daily contact with the chairman and communicated frequently with key committee leaders during crisis points.
Although the researcher did not meet separately with HCHP administrators and physicians, she did establish contacts with HCHP liaison staff at HAC meetings and later in informal settings.

The researcher's primary source of data, however, was her own intervention activities. She maintained a comprehensive journal of her activities, the response to her intervention and the outcome of her involvement at specific points in the dispute.
**VIII. OUTCOMES**

1. Recognition of HAG as a legitimate group with bargaining power.
2. 4-3 majority cn Policy Board.
3. Establishment of health corporation governed by a recognized Board of Directors.
4. Community approval of non-medical personnel in Outreach Center.
5. $5000 for corporation programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Degree to Which Goals Achieved or Not Achieved</th>
<th>Goals Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Power</td>
<td>Retention of authority over medical services and programs</td>
<td>for corporation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Power</td>
<td>Control over running of Outreach Center</td>
<td>to which medical services are provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>board of directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>establishment of ongoing mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>internal organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>development of recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>retention of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Power</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>development of recognition</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. Resources</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>retention of authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Resources</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>development of recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Improvement</td>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>retention of authority</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- Full scale community-oriented medical services in the Outreach Center.
- Community review of medical staff in Outreach Center.
- Elaborate procedure set up to protect the negatives of Pollack & Cole.
- Clear delineation of community power not yet established.
- Social work is defined as medical personnel.
- Development of the power of the Policy Board will determine degree to which medical services are community oriented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals Achieved</th>
<th>Not Achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Increased autonomy for HAC.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Increased confidence and ability of HAC members as planners.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Machinery for community control.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Implementation of community control.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Degree to Which Goals Achieved or Not Achieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Power.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Internal organization.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Ongoing mechanisms.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Power.</td>
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Type of Change:
- Greatly increased by success of negotiations, but still at an early stage of development.
- Good mechanism; some doubts about ability of community policy board members to remain independent of HCHP representatives.
- Success as yet undetermined.
IX. CGI IMPLICATIONS

A. Theory

As this case study has demonstrated, "crisis", without further definition, has become too general a term to be useful in developing a theory of intervention. "Crisis" occurs in varying intensities and contexts throughout community conflict situations. Nevertheless, for the purpose of third party intervention activities, it is feasible to set up several meaningful categories of crises.

Crisis Stages ("pre-crisis", "crisis", "post-crisis")

The description of a conflict situation by its stages -- "pre-crisis", "crisis" and "post crisis" -- is more valuable as a device for systematizing the narrative of events than as a framework for employing intervention skills. Quite often the case writer discovered that there were problem areas that would recur in more than one conflict phase.

Crisis Levels ("organizational crisis", "identity crisis", "power crisis")

In the HAC-HCHP case study, it is possible to distinguish the kinds of skills that are employed by an intervenor in terms of the nature of the crisis that occurs. Three crisis categories are easily identifiable:

1. "identity crisis"

Community organizations are not pre-packaged action groups. Numerous identity questions must be answered before a community group can begin to plan a strategy for challenging an institution.

a. The group must define what it means by community -- what are its physical boundaries, its socio-economic make-up, its common problems and concerns.

b. The group must decide if they are in fact representative of the community and must be willing to accept responsibility for their actions.

c. Community group members must develop confidence to serve as decision-makers and planners by valuing their own expertise as consumers, residents and clients.

d. The subordinate group must begin to view itself as a potential power by virtue of the fact that the institution it intends to challenge is dependent on the community either as a recipient of services or as a source of legitimation.
immediately distrust her and second, because problems arose involving a potential conflict of interest.

The case writer was unable to act in the capacity of an inside-advocate intervenor; but as a result of her interviews with Cole and observation of his activities, she is able to draw some conclusions about his role. The inside-community advocate operates on one level on the premise of his working for the interest of the institution and is therefore legitimated with that party. Moreover, the institution assumes that his advocacy of a community position or demand is squared with his knowledge of the basic needs of the institution that employs him. Furthermore, the inside-advocate does not have to rely on drastic measures and confrontation situations to communicate with the policy makers in the institution. He has informed, day to day contact with his colleagues.

On the other hand, the inside-advocate has greater problems in obtaining acceptance by the community. While his inside knowledge and contacts are valuable to a community group, a conflict of loyalties is logically suspected. It is also conceivable that the inside-advocate may lose sight of his original goals for helping the community and may come to identify primarily with the institution; the possibilities for co-optation are extraordinary.

Sills intervention role provides an interesting combination of traits. Since he had at one time worked for a health provider, he was well acquainted with HCHP's needs and goals and was respected by HCHP administrators and Cole as a colleague. However, since he was not associated with the Harvard system, Sills was acceptable to the community as an advocate.

The secretive, ostensibly peripheral role of Cohen, again necessitated by her University affiliation, produced several additional handicaps to effective intervention that are relevant in discussing problems of legitimation. Cohen utilized time establishing personal relations with HAC members that might have been more quickly facilitated by open recognition of her advocacy role. In addition, Cohen never knew whether her statements at meetings were interpreted as just another opinion of an interested party or as a well-prepared suggestion or observation by a professional. It was consequently very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of an intervention strategy. Finally, she was prevented from establishing contact with HCHP physicians and administrators with whom she could have communicated her knowledge of community feelings and ideas and in turn have facilitated HCHP-HAC communication.
b. The role of the third party intervenor in helping a community-in-crisis formulate its goals is precarious. The intervenor, who is quite often concerned with the feasibility of objectives and the creditability of demands, may find himself short-changing the plans of the group he is advising. In this situation he must either convince the community group that its goals are unrealistic and therefore must be reformulated or he must work with the community's goals and map out strategies for achieving the most advantageous compromise. Under no circumstances should an intervenor circumvent a community group and advocate his own goals or a modification of the community's goals.

In the HAC-HCHP case study, Cohen and Mumford, pressured by time considerations in making an effective presentation to HCHP physicians and administrators, proposed a series of goals for the community that they believed to be an adequate, feasible reformulation of the goals initially devised by HAC members. Unprepared for the changes, HAC members only rejected Cohen's and Mumford's presentation and thus nullified their efforts to present an organized, low-keyed proposal. Moreover, as a result, racial antagonisms within the Committee were intensified.*

The case writer, Cohen, however, was able to draw several conclusions from the failure of this particular intervention action, that proved crucial in later states of her involvement.

1) HAC members had to be committed to their goals before a challenge to HCHP could be effected.

2) This commitment was more important than the concerns of the intervenor for the feasibility of demands.

3) Compromise strategies would be effective if explained to the community group and accepted by them.

4) The community's insistence on a more radical demand (full-time comprehensive medical services and staff in the Outreach Center) proved to be more instrumental in securing the final compromise (full-time auxiliary medical care) than would have been possible by advocating the watered down version of the intervenor.

*See pp. for narrative of the December 1969 meeting between HAC members and HCHP physicians.
5) The intervenor is often as liable to underestimate and reject the expertise of the community or subordinate power he is aiding as are members of the establishment institution or superordinate power.

2. Techniques developed (generalist versus specialist approach)

a. The case writer must emphasize the possibilities of a brokerage role for the generalist-intervenor. As in the Mission Hill-Harvard Health Plan conflict, intervention skills -- legal skills, health planning -- were indispensable. An intervenor who is involved in all facets of a community conflict may provide significant service in establishing or maintaining contacts with professionals who are willing to donate specialized skills to community groups.

b. An intervenor may develop an expertise in a particular crisis sector i.e. health, housing, education. His knowledge of a specific system-power structure, power resources and change techniques becomes particularly valuable.

The case writer proposes that a comparison of these two approaches - generalist and specialist - be further explored.

C. Racial Implication of the Community Dispute

1. The Mission Hill-Parker Hill Community is both racially and economically diverse. Consequently, planning of health services by either professionals (HCHP) or community people (HAC) had to take these factors into consideration.

2. Disagreements on strategies and goals within HAC repeatedly developed along racial lines. In order to engineer the challenge to HCHP's control and to implement the mechanisms that were secured from the resolution of the conflict, HAC's internal antagonisms had to be tempered, but ultimately resolved.

3. HCHP was able to capitalize on the racial divisions within the community in an effort to weaken the Committee. Cole, a black, repeatedly sided with black HAC members against whites and urged them to break off from their group. He also attempted to use racial antagonisms to undermine the legitimacy of the Memorandum of Agreement, by showing that HAC was disorganized and unrepresentative.

D. Implications of Racial Divisions for the Intervenor

1. Intervenors had to gain legitimation with the various racial factions. This was particularly crucial during an "identity crisis" or an "organizational crisis".
2. The race of the intervenor often determined the facility with which he was able to communicate with each HAC faction and with HCHP staff.

3. Intervention strategies had to be calculated to take the community's racial divisions and disparate needs into account.