This paper deals with two specific issues: the explanation of moral conduct and the structure of moral character. The purpose of the paper is to describe a new psychological perspective on moral conduct, and to discuss some empirical findings which follow from this perspective. Morality is regarded here as a natural phenomenon which considers understanding of moral behavior to be dependent on knowledge of man's biological and psychological nature. The implied assumption is that an evaluative tendency is an integral part of social conduct and, moreover, that moral conduct is social conduct. Definitions are provided for morality, moral behavior, and moral character. Five important aspects of character development that are pertinent to the explanation of moral behavior are: moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, the ethics of conscience vs. the ethics of responsibility, and autonomy. Each of these dimensions is defined in terms of a specific assessment device, and the relationships among the scales are examined. (Author/SJM)
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MORAL CONDUCT AND MORAL CHARACTER:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The Center for Social Organization of Schools has two primary objectives: to develop a scientific knowledge of how schools affect their students, and to use this knowledge to develop better school practices and organization.

The Center works through five programs to achieve its objectives. The Academic Games program has developed simulation games for use in the classroom. It is evaluating the effects of games on student learning and studying how games can improve interpersonal relations in the schools. The Social Accounts program is examining how a student's education affects his actual occupational attainment, and how education results in different vocational outcomes for blacks and whites. The Talents and Competencies program is studying the effects of educational experience on a wide range of human talents, competencies, and personal dispositions in order to formulate -- and research -- important educational goals other than traditional academic achievement. The School Organization program is currently concerned with the effects of student participation in social and educational decision-making, the structure of competition and cooperation, formal reward systems, effects of school quality, and the development of information systems for secondary schools. The Careers and Curricula program bases its work upon a theory of career development. It has developed a self-administered vocational guidance device to promote vocational development and to foster satisfying curricular decisions for high school, college, and adult populations.

This report, prepared by the Talents and Competencies program, examines moral conduct and the structure of moral character in order to better understand moral maturity.
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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with two specific issues: the explanation of moral conduct and the structure of moral character. Definitions are provided for morality, moral behavior, and moral character. The paper describes five aspects of character development that are pertinent to the explanation of moral behavior: moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, the ethics of conscience vs. the ethics of responsibility, and autonomy. Each of these dimensions is defined in terms of a specific assessment device, and the relationships among the scales are examined.
Introduction

The subject of moral conduct contains some of the most intriguing problems and paradoxes in the social sciences. These problems (e.g., why a man would follow the path of greatest resistance; why saints seem obsessed with a sense of sin) have preoccupied social thinkers since Plato, including, more recently, Durkheim, Weber, Freud, Piaget, William James, and George Herbert Mead. In the early stages of American psychology there was great interest in the "psychology of moral conduct;" however, the Character Education Inquiry (Hartshorne and May, 1930) seemed to demonstrate that most such behavior is situation specific, and the subject fell into subsequent neglect. In a series of papers beginning in 1958, Kohlberg revived interest in moral psychology, and his research on moral judgment exemplified the relevance, complexity, and psychological richness traditionally associated with the topic. The purpose of this paper is to describe a new psychological perspective on moral conduct, and to discuss some empirical findings which follow from this perspective. We begin with a few preliminary remarks about morality, moral behavior, and moral character, observations which serve to define the framework of the discussion. However, the bulk of the paper deals with two specific issues: the explanation of moral conduct and the structure of moral character.

An earlier paper (Hogan and Henley, 1970a) suggested that, as an alternative to explaining social behavior in terms of needs, drives, traits, or mechanisms of coping and defense, it might be useful to consider man as a rule-producing and rule-following animal. The
argument derives from a more comprehensive theory of social behavior based on psychological (as opposed to sociological) role theory, existentialism, and an image of man as a game-playing animal (cf. Goffman, 1959; Huizinga, 1955; Peters, 1958; Sartre, 1953; and Wright, 1971). While the details of the argument are not important here, three of its assumptions are pertinent. The first two assumptions are substantive; the third follows as their methodological consequence. It is assumed first that all purposive social behavior occurs within matrices of overlapping human rule systems (e.g., grammars, legal codes, rules of courtesy) which have varying degrees of specificity. (It follows, somewhat tautologically, that behavior not guided by rules is non-purposive or "random.") Second, associated with every human rule system is an ethic, variously called sportsmanship, fairness, justice, equity, or the spirit of the game. This ethic is usually known and acknowledged by seasoned participants of a given rule system; moreover, it is a spontaneous natural emergent, a product of role-taking experience and cognitive development. The function of this ethic is to provide a perspective from which the equity of conventional rules may be judged. Third, the broad outlines and general patterns of social behavior can be explained in terms of formal properties of various applicable rule systems. Individual differences, however, must be accounted for in terms of the differing fashion in which persons think about and use rules. That is, much of the variance in a situation will be attributable to structural variables (the rules which apply), while the "error" variance will be a function of how people use the rules.
Many contemporary psychologists consider moral action to be in some way distinct from ordinary social conduct. Thus Kohlberg (1958) remarks that in the moral domain persons feel the rules are constraining in and of themselves, whereas in the social (non-moral) area persons recognize the content of convention as artificial. Wright (1971) similarly observes, "Both the conceptual framework in which they are formulated and the experience which goes with them mark out moral rules as distinctively different from, for example, the rules of tennis, grammar, or etiquette" (p. 14). In contrast, the present paper is grounded in the Aristotelian tradition in ethics, a tradition which regards morality as a natural phenomenon, a product of man's biological evolution, and which considers understanding of moral behavior to be dependent on knowledge of man's biological and psychological nature (cf. Hamilton, 1971; Lorenz, 1966; Waddington, 1967). The implied assumption is that an evaluative tendency is an integral part of social conduct, and that morality has a social job to do; i.e., the function of morality is to regulate and moderate human affairs. McDougall (1908) epitomized this attitude: "Moral conduct is essentially social conduct, and there could be no serious objection to the use of the two expressions as synonymous; but it is more in conformity with common usage to restrict the term 'moral' to the higher forms of social conduct which man alone is capable" (p. 150).

These remarks serve as a background for the definitions of morality, moral behavior, and moral character which follow.

**Morality.** According to H. L. A. Hart (1962), the basis of any morality is a system of rules of conduct which defines a network of
reciprocal rights and obligations and which prohibits at least gross acts of malevolence. Moralities, then, are systems of rules that are external to people, designed to guide social or interpersonal behavior, and which may to some degree be codified and spelled out. This definition does not require a morality to be entirely compatible with or unequivocally further the welfare of individuals subject to it, nor does it require that a particular morality be completely equitable when viewed from a perspective outside the system in which it applies. In fact, the requirements of justice or fair play in a given situation may occasionally run contrary to the prevailing moral code.

Moral behavior. Moral behavior consists of actions carried out with regard to the rules that apply in a given social context (see also, Wright, 1971, p. 15). Obeying, disobeying, enforcing, subverting, learning, and using rules are all types of moral conduct or misconduct requiring explanation. For pragmatic and statistical reasons, one form of moral behavior (obedience or conformance) is unusually salient. The most impressive single feature of everyday life is the degree to which people obey the norms of their culture. Even such self-consciously debauched men as Aliester Crowley, the Marquis de Sade, and Cesare Borgia committed only a statistically insignificant number of deviant acts each day, and these were of a highly idiosyncratic and specialized nature, confined to limited subsystems of behavior. Because moral action typically comes down in the final analysis either to following or disregarding a social rule of some sort, a major problem for the psychology of moral conduct is to account for social compliance or non-compliance.
Moral character. Freud pointed out that neurotic symptoms could be understood only by considering them within the context of the character structure of the person involved. Thus cigarette smoking in an anxiety neurotic might represent a means for gaining social approval, whereas it would be self-destructive behavior in a depressive. For Freud, then, neurotic character rather than neurotic symptoms became the primary subject matter. Similarly, within the context of moral psychology, delinquency, civil disobedience, and altruistic actions can be understood only by taking into account the character structure of the person involved. The concept of character closely resembles the notion of personality. Character, however, is normally defined in terms of those dispositions and traits that are subject to moral evaluation within a society. That is, character is defined not by what a person does, but by his reasons for doing it, by the recurring motives and dispositions that give stability and coherence to his social conduct. A second major problem for moral psychology, therefore, is to determine the dimensions along which character structure seems to vary.

There are five recurring themes in philosophy and psychology which, when taken together, explain a considerable range of moral behavior and define certain important parameters of character development. These elements are at least conceptually independent and seem to characterize, in a formal way, how people differ in their use of rules. That is, these concepts are abstract dimensions of individual differences in nomotic (rule-governed) behavior, and as such they should help to explain moral conduct in any socio-cultural context. The first dimension is simply moral knowledge. The second corresponds to socialization in
the Freudian sense of superego development, and is denoted by having an internal as opposed to an external viewpoint concerning the rules of one's society. The third dimension involves role-taking and the recognition of the rights of others; it is the disposition to adopt the "moral point of view." The fourth dimension concerns the degree to which a person considers rules to be useful for regulating human affairs. The final dimension is defined by the degree of autonomy a person displays in his moral conduct.

As an aid to understanding the interrelationships among these five concepts, consider the following example as a paradigm case. A college student of modest talent, while taking a difficult examination whose outcome he believes will affect his future career, observes the answer sheet of an unusually gifted student lying in plain view in front of him. However, he deliberately ignores the answer sheet, thereby losing an opportunity to improve his score. How can we explain his action?

Moral Knowledge

The first answer to our paradigm question is that the student knows a rule that prohibits copying answers from another person's test. This is important because people can follow only the rules that they know. Moral knowledge means knowledge of moral rules, and a proper test of moral knowledge will assess the number and kinds of rules a person can state, or the variety of rules that he can correctly use. It will not determine how he feels about these rules, how he reasons with them, or how he evaluates them.
Because moral knowledge implies that moral learning has occurred, the next question concerns the kinds of things that are learned during the moral education of the child. Children seem to learn three distinct types of rules:

1. Specific, primarily negative, injunctions related to particular acts, such as "Don't get dirty; "Don't hurt the cat."

2. Moral principles--concepts, corresponding to Piaget's notion of a schema, that permit flexibility in social conduct and enable the child to choose between conflicting injunctions. An example of this type rule is the concept of reciprocity (cf. Gouldner, 1960).

3. Comparison rules--cognitive strategies by which the person is able to compare what he is doing with some ideal norm of behavior.

The first two rules are substantive while the third is procedural; that is, comparison rules (3) operate primarily on injunctions (1), while moral principles (2) mediate between them.

Moral knowledge is important because it provides the potential for self-control. That is, by learning a set of specific injunctions, moral principles, and comparison rules, one acquires the cognitive foundation for self-criticism, which in turn is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the later development of self-control. Assume, for example, that a tennis player is losing a match and, after applying a series of comparison rules to the various rules of tennis form, decides he isn't volleying deeply enough. Whether or not he alters his subsequent strokes in accordance with this self-critical perception depends largely on his interest in winning. Thus, knowledge of the appropriate rules and the capacity for self-criticism afford the possibility but not the assurance
of self-control (for an alternative perspective on the development of self-control, see Aronfreed, 1964).

Although considerable effort has been spent studying the behavioral implications of moral knowledge (cf. Pittel and Mendelsohn, 1967), this research has produced essentially negligible results. For example, the Hartshorne and May studies (1930) included several measures of moral knowledge, none of which predicted resistance to temptation in check situations. Nor was there a significant relationship between a child's evaluation of the wrongness of cheating during interviews and his behavior in experimental situations. Similarly, Gordon, et al. (1963) found no differences in the degree to which six groups of teenage boys (black and white; delinquent, non-delinquent, lower class, middle class) positively endorsed middle class norms. Moreover, as Maller (1944) observed, tests of moral knowledge correlate about as highly with IQ tests as IQ tests correlate with themselves. Moral knowledge seems to be primarily related to intelligence, background, and desire to make a good impression (cf. Kohlberg, 1964). Because we are normally justified in assuming that people know the rules, it seems naive to assume a strong connection between knowledge of the rules and willingness to abide by them. As Malinowski pointed out in Crime and Custom in Savage Society, there are deviants in every society; however, no one ever doubts what is held to be right and wrong. The problem lies in learning to live with the "right" of one's society.

Socialization

The second answer to the paradigm question is that our student may consider the rule about test cheating to be personally binding; i.e., he
may be socialized with regard to the rules of test-taking. The term socialization has few distinctive conceptual properties remaining after years of uncritical use (cf. Clausen, 1967). For the purposes of this paper, however, a person may be considered socialized to the degree that he regards the rules, values, and prohibitions of his society as personally mandatory. Conversely, to the extent that one feels estranged from the rules and procedures of his social group, he will tend to be unsocialized. Hart's (1962) distinction between an internal and an external attitude toward social rules reflects the phenomenology of socialization:

When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords an opportunity for many closely related yet different kinds of assertions; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the 'internal points of view.' (p. 86).

Hence a society with law contains those who look upon its rules from the internal point of view as accepted standards of behavior, and not merely as reliable predictions of what will befall them, at the hands of officials, if they disobey. But it also comprises those upon whom, either because they are malefactors or mere helpless victims of the system, these legal standards have to be imposed by force or threat of force; they are concerned with the rules merely as a source of possible punishment (p. 197).

Considerable research has been directed toward discovering the developmental antecedents of socialization. The resulting literature is too extensive to review here. The available evidence, however, strongly suggests that warm, nurturant, and consistently restrictive or "authoritative" parents produce the most socialized children (cf. Bandura and Walters, 1958; Baumrind, 1971; Becker, 1964; Bronfenbrenner,
1970). It is conventional to assume some sort of natural antagonism between the individual and society. Freud, for example, believed that a child becomes able to live in society only after his natural, but implacably anarchic, instinctual tendencies are permanently repressed. One might equally hypothesize, however, that children are not anarchical but social by nature, that they enter the world preprogramed to be obedient, and that warmth and nurturance are essential in eliciting these tendencies. For example, in a sample of 11 month old infants, Stayton, Hogan, and Ainsworth (1972) found the only parent-child variable that predicted obedience to commands was maternal warmth (r = .74). Baumrind's (1971) research indicates, however, that as children become more mobile, control factors play a correspondingly larger role in socialization. Thus, rather than ask, as Freud did, what must be done to the child to fit him into society, it may be more important to ask what must be done to the child in order to drive him out.

It is with regard to the socialization dimension that a major measurement breakthrough in the study of moral conduct first occurred. The Socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough, 1957; Gough and Peterson, 1952), an empirically-keyed measure developed by comparing the responses of a large number of delinquents and non-delinquents, was specifically developed to assess the degree to which a person has internalized the rules, values, and conventions of his society. This scale may be the most carefully developed and best validated measure in the history of personality assessment. As an example of its remarkable properties, the measure was given in eight
different languages in ten countries to totals of 21,772 non-delinquents and 5,052 delinquents. In every comparison the test differentiated significantly between delinquents and non-delinquents; furthermore, in no instance was the mean of a delinquent sample in one country greater than the mean of a non-delinquent sample in any other country (cf. Gough, 1965). The scale seems to work equally well at various levels of socialization as well. At the upper level, Holland (1959) found, for example, that Socialization scores significantly predicted academic achievement among National Merit Scholars. At the lower end, Vincent (1961) found that the scale differentiated between female welfare recipients with one illegitimate child and those with two or more. Thus, Gough's Socialization scale seems to be a highly valid empirical index of the degree to which one has internalized culturally defined rules.

Willingness to follow rules is an important determinant of moral behavior and a major component of character development. Nonetheless, two considerations suggest that further information is necessary in order to assess adequately a person's character structure. First, other things being equal, well-socialized persons are also likely to be stuffy, rule-bound, pedantic, prigs. Second, many people who consistently comply with social norms did not enjoy the sort of childhood experiences that produce a high degree of socialization. As Megargee, et al. (1971) demonstrate, within any population of college students, it is always possible to identify a sizable subgroup characterized by low Socialization scores. Phrasing the question in terms of our original paradigm case, how can we explain the student's refusal to cheat if we discover that he is in fact poorly socialized?
Empathy

For at least 300 years philosophers in the Anglo-American (or Utilitarian) tradition of ethics have assumed that man has an innate social sensitivity or altruistic tendency which plays an important role in moral development. John Stuart Mill suggested, for example, that man is innately sympathetic and that a sense of duty depends on the development of these natural social feelings. Kurt Baier, a modern representative of the Utilitarian tradition, proposes that certain social rules are justified when seen from the "moral point of view," a perspective which tends to promote the common good. This viewpoint is a natural attitude which may be taught to children: "When we teach children the moral point of view, we try to explain it to them by getting them to put themselves in another person's place: How would you like to have that done to you!" (Baier, 1965, p. 107). Thus, when a person acts from the moral viewpoint, he tries to consider the implications of his actions for the welfare of others. The disposition to take the moral point of view is closely related to empathy or role-taking.

Several social psychologists, including J. M. Baldwin, W. McDougall, and G. H. Mead, have also assumed that people have an innate capacity for empathic sensitivity, a capacity which is elicited by social experience and which produces differences in rule-taking ability. For these role-theorists, group participation and an increased sensitivity to the demands of others results in self-consciousness which, in turn, causes the child to observe the rules of his society. The implication of all this for the explanation of social compliance is that the
test-taking student in our paradigm case may refuse to cheat because doing so will have bad consequences for student society in general; cheating might be seen as "unfair," as contrary to the spirit of the academic game.

Hogan (1969) developed a 64-item, empirically-keyed empathy scale by comparing the responses of 211 subjects, divided into high and low subgroups on the basis of empathy ratings, across 957 items taken from the CPI, the MMPI, and a special pool of additional items. The best item on the scale in the original item analysis was: "As a rule I have little difficulty in 'putting myself into other people's shoes.'" The scale correlated .00 with Socialization, indicating that the two dimensions are indeed independent. It also correlated +.58 with rated social acuity, +.53 with overall skill at playing charades, and +.43 with rated ethical sensitivity. Hogan and Henley (1970) asked 40 students to encode a series of abstract designs in such a way that strangers could match their encodings with the original designs. The correlation between empathy and derived scores for encoding ability was +.60, suggesting a relationship between communication skill and scores on the empathy scale.

If socialization and empathy are independent aspects of moral development, then individual differences along these two dimensions should be associated with differences in character structure and moral conduct (see Table 1). Specifically, other things being equal, persons scoring low on both scales will tend to be delinquent. Those receiving low scores for empathy but high scores for socialization will tend to be rigid rule followers—moral realists in Piaget's (1964) terms.
Table 1

Suggested Characterological Implications of the Interaction between Socialization and Empathy

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Persons with low scores for socialization but high scores for empathy will tend to be cavalier about the conventional rules of society; they will be "emancipated," mildly sociopathic members of normal society--i.e., persons who double-park in parking lots, don't return borrowed books, and fudge on their income tax--Piaget refers to them as "chic types." Persons with high scores for socialization and empathy will tend to be morally mature--their compliance with social rules will be effortless but tempered by a sympathy for the moral frailties of others.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then using the two variables together should permit more accurate predictions than using either by itself. The mean scores for socialization and empathy for a sample of 100 inmates for a New York State reformatory were 26.2 and 29.1. Comparable values for a group of 100 Air Force officers were 36.4 and 37.7. By considering all persons scoring below 36.5 on socialization and 39.0 on empathy as delinquent, 95 percent of the delinquents were accurately classified, while 27 percent of the non-delinquents were misclassified. In a sample of 594 male undergraduates, Kurtines and Hogan (1972) identified 130 students whose socialization scores were less than or equal to the mean socialization score of 119 incarcerated delinquents (X = 26.88). As expected, the unsocialized students were relatively empathic compared to the delinquents (rpbis = .44). In a study of the personological correlates of undergraduate marijuana use (Hogan, et al., 1970), students were placed in three groups: Users, Non-users, and Principled Non-users (e.g., students who said they hadn't smoked marijuana and never would). Relative to men in general, Users received low scores for Socialization and high scores for Empathy, while
the pattern was precisely reversed for the Principled Non-users. Thus there is some evidence for the predictions outlined in Table 1.

In spite of the importance of empathy or role-taking ability as an explanation for moral conduct, little is known about the developmental antecedents of this disposition. The following observations, consequently, are quite speculative. Four factors seem related to the development of empathy. First, G. H. Mead (1934) thought role-taking ability was the "g" factor in intelligence. Role-taking requires that a person adopt alternative perspectives with regard to various issues; the process of shifting perspectives seems similar to spatial reasoning; and the empathy scale correlates between .30 and .50 with several measures of intellectual performance. It seems reasonable, therefore, to expect some association between intelligence and empathy. Second, being required to adopt alternative perspectives vis à vis one's parents should facilitate the development of role-taking skills. Thus parents who either over-indulge or consistently reject their children probably fail to stimulate their natural empathic tendencies. Third, intelligence and practice at role-taking are necessary but insufficient conditions to produce empathic behavior—the child must also be willing to act on his empathic perceptions. Such a willingness probably depends on two kinds of experience: (a) receiving empathic treatment at some time in one's life; and (b) enduring sufficient injustice, ridicule, betrayal, or persecution that the experience makes a lasting impression. The fourth factor that may contribute to an empathic disposition is a relative absence of repression or denial—an openness to inner experience, a willingness to attend to intuitive promptings and non-verbal cues.
In spite of the obvious importance of an empathic disposition in the formation of moral character, it is neither the only nor the most important factor in the process. There are two reasons for this. First, interviews with subjects who receive very high scores on the empathy scale suggest that these persons often suffer from an excess of role-taking—they are too concerned with the expectations of others, they excessively inhibit hostility and aggression, and they suffer from identity diffusion. Unleavened role-taking can produce an equivocating jelly-fish as well as a compassionate person with a broad moral perspective. Furthermore, many persons whose behavior accords with social norms and conventions have experienced none of the developmental circumstances necessary to elicit an empathic disposition. To return to our paradigm case, how might we account for the student's reluctance to cheat if we discover that he is both unsocialized and non-empathic?

The Ethics of Conscience and the Ethics of Responsibility

There is a branch of moral philosophy which analyzes and evaluates arguments used to justify social and legal institutions. It considers questions of the following type: "To what kinds of considerations is appeal properly made when the authority of the political and legal order and our obligations to comply with its dictates are called into question?" (Olafson, 1961). In the history of modern legal philosophy two forms of justification continually recur. Advocates of the first point of view argue that there are higher laws, unrelated to human legislation, which may be discovered by intuition and reason; a human law is just if, and only if, it corresponds to or can be derived from the higher
laws. Those who take the second viewpoint deny the existence of "higher" laws. Instead, they justify their arguments in terms of the instrumental value of the manifest law as a means for promoting the general welfare of society. Laws and political institutions are merely instruments for the realization of the common good; just laws are those which tend on the whole to maximize happiness.

With certain exceptions, the first position has traditionally had the greater influence:

There can be little doubt that the system of justification which has exerted the widest intellectual influence and most decisively shaped the further development of social philosophy is the theory of natural [i.e., higher] law. It may even be said that with the idea of a natural law the whole enterprise of calling existing institutions to a moral accounting gets underway (Olafson, 1961, p. 8).

Utilitarianism and legal positivism emerged in the 18th century as a reaction against the theory of higher law. The Utilitarian philosophers, primary architects of English social reform in the 19th century, had little use for the concept of higher law because they felt it was an arbitrary standard for appraising institutions, and they thought it encouraged an anarchical individualism inconsistent with the rule of law and settled society.

The intellectual and psychological postures underlying the higher law and positive law traditions in moral philosophy have numerous counterparts in everyday life and represent a relatively unexplored dimension of character development. The everyday equivalent of higher law morality can be called the ethics of personal conscience, while the ethics of social responsibility reflects the positive law tradition. The ethics of conscience is the dominant viewpoint of the contemporary American intellectual establishment; it is represented, for example, by

Hogan (1970) developed a measure of the disposition to adopt one or the other of these viewpoints. There are two forms of the test, called the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, each with 35 items. The following statements are representative:

1. All civil laws should be judged against a higher moral law.
2. Right and wrong can be meaningfully defined only by the law.
3. An unjust law should not be obeyed.
4. Without law the life of man would be nasty, brutish, and short.

These items are answered by checking one of five response options ranging from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The parallel form reliability of the test in a sample of 98 college men was .88. The measure is uncorrelated with intelligence, and in two separate samples it discriminated very strongly between persons whose vocational choice reflected a belief in law and established procedures (i.e., policemen, ROTC seniors) and persons who believed in civil disobedience as a means for promoting social change (cf. Hogan, 1970).

In contrast with Kohlberg (1963) and Piaget (1964), the author assumes that moral conduct is fundamentally "irrational," that differences in even such obviously cognitive phenomena as moral judgments derive from more basic personological structures. If so, then there should be clear-cut personality correlates of the disposition to adopt the ethics of
conscience or responsibility. Correlations with the CPI, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers, 1962) and several other personality measures suggest that persons who adopt the ethics of personal conscience possess an interesting set of positive and negative characteristics. They are independent, innovative, and form-creating; however, they also tend to be impulsive, opportunistic, and irresponsible.

From peer descriptions the adjective with the highest correlation (.49) with the ethics of conscience was "rebellious." Persons whose moral judgments reflect the ethics of social responsibility also show a blend of attractive and disagreeable features. On the one hand they are reasonable, helpful, and dependable; on the other hand they often seem conventional and resistant to change. The single adjective from peer descriptions most characteristic (r = .47) of the ethics of responsibility was "thoughtful."

Consider once again our hypothetical, non-cheating student who we have discovered is neither well-socialized nor empathic. If he advocates the ethics of responsibility, he may then comply with rules because they make his world more orderly and predictable. That is, a belief in the instrumental value of rules may produce social compliance despite deficient socialization and a lack of concern for the welfare of society. We might also hypothesize that persons who are non-empathic, unsocialized, and endorse the ethics of conscience will very likely be delinquent.

Evidence for these hypotheses, however, is scanty. The author has obtained Survey of Ethical Attitude scores for a small number of non-delinquents who are also low on both socialization and empathy. Although
these persons tended to endorse the ethics of responsibility, their numbers are too slight to warrant serious attention.

The next question concerns the developmental antecedents of the ethics of conscience and responsibility. A study by Hogan and Dickstein (1972a) provides some insight into this problem. Interviews with high and low scorers on the Survey of Ethical Attitudes suggested that both groups were highly sensitive to injustice, but differed markedly with regard to their perceptions of the sources of injustice in society. The ethics of conscience seemed related to the belief that people are naturally benevolent and that social injustice is produced by dehumanizing and oppressive institutions; the ethics of responsibility seemed to rest on the notion that people are naturally malevolent and that institutions restrain the implacably antisocial impulses of men. Scores for the tendency to blame people or institutions were assigned on the basis of a projective test (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972b). The average correlation between these scores and the Survey of Ethical Attitudes across three groups (total N = 92) was .58 (.77 when corrected for attenuation), suggesting that the ethics of conscience and responsibility are indeed related to a person's perceived locus of injustice. Thus home environments which encourage a belief in natural human goodness and a suspicion of institutions will tend to promote the ethics of conscience. Conversely, parents who foster skepticism concerning the motives of others will encourage a belief in the instrumental value of law and, consequently, the ethics of responsibility (see also MacDonald, 1971). Finally, it is important to reemphasize that the moral and developmental implications of the ethics of conscience and responsibility
can be properly understood only within the context of a person's total character structure.

Autonomy

Two considerations suggest that the dimensions of moral development discussed thus far (i.e., moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, and the ethics of conscience - ethics of responsibility continuum) are, by themselves, incomplete either as explanations of moral conduct or descriptions of character structure. First, from a philosophical perspective, these dimensions reflect a distinct Utilitarian bias. The concepts of the moral point of view and positive law, for example, are explicitly derived from Utilitarian writers. However, Kant argued that when compliance with social norms is based on self-interest (or the larger welfare of society) it is in no sense moral. Rather, the truly moral man has an autonomous will and governs his actions by a personal sense of duty. Reflecting the Kantian ethic, Nietzsche described Utilitarianism as a morality fit only for English shopkeepers. Thus, from the viewpoint of traditional ethics, a complete description of moral development must include the factor of autonomy. The discussion of character development presented thus far also appears inadequate when seen from the perspective of common sense. That is, a well-socialized and empathic adherent of the ethics of conscience or responsibility will tend to be a model citizen when judged in terms of the standards of his socio-cultural milieu. However, social and legal institutions are never totally just, and political leadership is often misguided (if not actually corrupt). Consequently, it sometimes happens that a model citizen may
act immorally as a result of complying with collective norms. The development of an autonomous set of moral standards will serve to insulate one from the potential immorality of the community.

Autonomy is a troublesome concept. An autonomous person who is also unsocialized, non-empathic, and disregards the pragmatic value of rules as well, is likely to be an autocratic, anti-conforming villain, a great rogue and scoundrel. Obviously this dimension, like all the others, can never be considered in isolation.

As a quantitative index of autonomy, the author uses a measure of independence of judgment developed by Barron (1953). This 22-item scale was constructed by comparing the responses of yielders and non-yielders in Asch's original (1956) conformity studies. The measure has provided some positive results, however, the items are quite complex and the resulting scores have only marginal reliability. An alternative measure of autonomy with simpler items and improved reliability would be a useful measurement contribution.

Although social psychologists have spent a great deal of time studying suggestibility and conformity, not much is known about autonomy. In an unpublished study, Kurtines and Hogan gave the CPI to 30 fraternity members who were undergraduates at The Johns Hopkins University. Eleven of these persons rated all the others for autonomy using a seven-point scale. Each person was assigned an autonomy score based on the average of the 11 ratings he received; the average interrater correlation was .41, and the reliability of the composite ratings was .89. Eight of the 18 CPI scales correlated above .39 (p < .05) with these ratings; they were: Dominance (.56); Capacity for Status (.60); Social Presence (.42);
Self-Acceptance (.52); Good Impression (.47); Communality (.39); Achievement via Conformance (.40); and Intellectual Efficiency (.57).

To estimate the pattern of personological variables most related to autonomy, a step-wise regression analysis was conducted, selecting five variables. The resulting equation, which had a multiple $r$ of .76, included Dominance, Capacity for Status, and Self-control with positive weights, Sociability and Femininity with negative weights. Although the size of this sample permits only tentative conclusions, the pattern of zero-order correlations with the CPI and the regression equation suggest that the autonomous person is strong, forceful, and self-ascendant; he manages his affairs very carefully, and is little affected by others in choosing or achieving his goals. Such a person resembles an Old Testament patriarch or Melville's Captain Ahab.

In *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Piaget (1964) suggested that children's morality is initially "heteronomous," authoritarian, and conditioned upon a unilateral respect for adult authority. If left alone by adults, the child will acquire through the natural processes of cognitive development and peer interaction an "autonomous" and democratic morality based on mutual respect among peers. On this point Piaget seems surely to have been wrong. Comparing child-rearing practices in the Soviet Union and the United States, Bronfenbrenner (1970), observes for example, that exclusive peer interaction in American children has produced effects precisely the opposite of those Piaget predicted: while American children, relative to Russian children, became emancipated from adult authority earlier, they remain thereafter excessively dependent on peer approval (see also Boehm, 1957).
In a carefully documented monograph, Baumrind (1971) suggests some important developmental precursors of autonomy. First, early development of cognitive and linguistic skills and stimulation of interest in school achievement seem to enhance a child's competence, and therefore, the self-esteem necessary for autonomous behavior. Second, parents who are undemanding, passively accepting, and over-protective inhibit the development of autonomy in their children. Third, parents who are themselves individualistic, independent, and demanding provide their children with the strongest models for autonomous conduct. Fourth, warm, controlling parents produce immature and "avoidant" children. Finally, parents who clearly label certain actions as praise-worthy or blame-worthy, explain their rules, and encourage verbal give and take, also promote the child's ability to "order" and control his own behavior.

We can now review the complete model for the explanation of moral conduct. Returning once again to the modestly talented student who didn't cheat on an important test, at least five considerations bear on his actions: he knew a rule which prohibited cheating; he had internalized the rule about cheating; he thought cheating would be unfair to other students; he believed in the instrumental value of rules per se; and, finally, he wasn't the sort of person who cheats on tests (as Nietzsche remarked concerning why the Übermensch would keep his word, "That's the way men treat one another when they are free").

Discussion

We have described five important aspects of character development which, we suggested, are related to five considerations required for the
explanation of moral behavior. Each dimension is defined in terms of a specific assessment device. While the dimensions are conceptually independent, the relationships among the scales used to define them can be determined empirically. Table Two is based on data taken from a variety of sources, and represents the best current estimate of the magnitude of these relationships. The correlations with moral knowledge for Socialization, Empathy, and the survey of Ethical Attitudes are based on associations with the Scholastic Aptitude Test. The correlation between Autonomy and Moral Knowledge is an estimate derived from Krech's (Krech, et al., 1962, p. 526) report of a dependable correlation between IQ and non-yielding in his experiments. The other correlations summarize data from the author's files. No claims are made for the generality of these coefficients, and other investigators will want to determine the interrelationships for themselves.

These dimensions also work moderately well together. Hogan and Dickstein (1972b) gave three fraternities (N = 92) a 15-item sentence completion test on which Ss were asked to respond quickly and briefly to such statements as:

1. I think it is unnecessarily cruel to keep condemned prisoners on death row for so long, and to make the execution such an elaborate ritual.

2. The police should be encouraged in their efforts to apprehend and prosecute homosexuals. Homosexuality threatens the foundations of our society.

Responses to these items were scored for overall maturity of moral judgment using the following scoring elements:
Table 2
Estimated Relationships Among Five Dimensions of Character Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Correlations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>So</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Knowledge</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization (So)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (Em)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Concern for the sanctity of the individual.

2. Judgments based on the spirit rather than the letter of the law.

3. Concern for the welfare of society as a whole.

4. Capacity to see both sides of an issue.

Four raters scored each protocol; two points were assigned to an item if any of the four scoring elements was clearly present in the response, one point if any of the scoring elements could be readily inferred, 0 if they were missing. The interrater reliability was estimated to be .88, and the reliability of the test itself was .82. Each member of the fraternity also rated the others for "sensitivity to injustice," defined as "...one who is quick to perceive unfairness in the decisions of persons or groups, or in the treatment that persons or groups receive from others. He may or may not openly express his concern; however, his feelings will be obvious to those who know him. One who is insensitive to injustice will be less likely to notice the unfairness in a situation, and will rarely show concern when such unfair treatment is pointed out to him." The reliability of these ratings, after refinement by factor analysis, varied between .86 and .93. An important preliminary question concerns the relationship between scores for maturity of moral judgment and rated sensitivity to injustice—the coefficients were .43, .13, and .52 for the three fraternities respectively. If scores for maturity of moral judgment are taken as a partially valid index of "moral maturity," then correlations between these scores and the five dimensions of character development provide some indication of how well
the total model works. These data are presented in Table 3, which contains no information about the relationship between mature moral judgment and moral knowledge. Kohlberg (1964) reports, however, that for a population of 72 adolescent boys the correlation between IQ and maturity of moral judgment (with age controlled) was .31. With the exception of the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, the correlations in Table 3 support the model fairly well; e.g., persons who make mature moral judgments tend to be well-socialized, empathic, and autonomous. The correlation with the survey of Ethical Attitudes means that the ethics of responsibility is negatively related to mature moral judgment. This finding is inexplicable; i.e., if the test worked correctly, there should have been no correlation between it and moral maturity because there is no moral advantage to either the ethics of conscience or responsibility.

Specifying dimensions of character development leads inexorably to a discussion of character types. Psychologists have proposed a number of character typologies which, while varying considerably in detail, also have many features in common (cf. Kay, 1968, p. 218; Wright, 1971, pp. 202-228). In The Psychology of Character Development, Peck and Havinghurst (1960) presented what is perhaps the most important of these; it might be useful to trace the parallels between their typology and the model of character development presented here. To define empirically the primary dimensions of character development, Peck and Havinghurst obtained in situ ratings of their adolescent subjects on 35 "moral" traits. These traits were intercorrelated and factor analyzed, and the three factors which emerged should by now be familiar. The first described "...behavior which conforms positively to the
Table 3

Correlations Between Four Dimensions of Character Structure and Maturity of Moral Judgment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Mature Moral Judgment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey of Ethical Attitudes</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note -- N = 41
established moral code...a person who exemplified this vector is one who is conventionally moral, socially conforming to both the maternal and peer codes of approved behavior, and shows no hostility or emotional discomfort in doing so.... We might infer that the person high on this characteristic conforms, not so much from pressure to do so, but because he enjoys it and finds it the most comfortable and satisfying way to live" (pp. 244-245). This dimension is clearly Socialization.

Peck and Havinghurst's second dimension was defined by: (1) the "degree to which subject accurately recognizes the usual behavior patterns of the people around him, can predict what they are likely to do, and how they are likely to react in a given action;" (2) the "capacity to understand other people's reasons for acting as they do;" (3) the "capacity for 'feeling with' other people; for experiencing, at least to some extent, the same emotions they are experiencing at the moment;" and (4) the "degree to which conscious or preconscious self-perception is congruent with the behavioral self" (cf. Peck and Havighurst, 1960, pp. 221, 223, 244). This second dimension closely approximates Empathy.

The third dimension was more ambiguous. It was defined as "...the degree to which behavior is directed by, or is in accord with a present and functioning superego." This depends on "...the degree to which superego directives are integrated into behavior, i.e., a person with only self-punitive superego 'voices' which do not forestall immoral behavior does not have an integrated system of principles...guilt perse is not a direct measure of superego strength..." (p. 236). The third dimension resembles what we have called Autonomy.
Peck and Havighurst next define five character types, "each conceived as the representative of a successive state in the psychosocial development of the individual." The five types were labelled Amoral, Expedient, Conforming, Irrational-Conscientious, and Rational-Altruistic. The first represents a person who lacks any self-imposed control or concern for the moral requirements of social living. However, the "...last four represent the four kinds of reasons why a person may behave according to the moral standards of his society" (p. 4). And the development of these character types is explained in terms of the dimensions we have called Socialization, Empathy, and Autonomy (cf. Peck and Havighurst, 1960, p. 87). The correspondence between the character types and dimensions of moral development discussed by Peck and Havighurst and the outline of moral character presented in this paper suggests that the recent model may have more than local validity.

Finally, this paper has argued that the concepts of moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and the moral judgment continuum are critical for explaining moral conduct and defining moral character; however, these concepts do not exhaust the set of considerations relevant to moral development. For example, the paper says nothing about the manner in which the self-concept may guide moral conduct, nor is there any discussion of the role of conscience in these affairs. These omissions were deliberate, based on the fact that conscience and the self-concept seem remarkably resistant to quantification, and that the relationship between these variables and overt moral conduct is extraordinarily complex, both conceptually and empirically. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that a complete psychological account of the lives of
such persons as Saint Francis of Assisi, Mahatma Gandhi, and the suffering souls so vividly portrayed in William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, will require additional concepts to supplement those outlined here. Thus, while it seems more faithful to reality to consider moral development in terms of a multi-dimensional model than in terms of single dimensions such as superego development, role-taking ability, or the heteronomy-autonomy continuum, there is still much work to be done before we arrive at an adequate understanding of moral maturity.
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