In this paper, a comparison of the Latin American and the North American society is presented as a preliminary to future refinement of the concepts into instructional devices for secondary students. Following discussion of the distinctions between the two general societal types (Latin America as organic-centripetal and North America as pluralistic-centrifugal), 17 characteristics illustrating 68 general concepts relating to these societies are charted in terms of: 1) traditional, contemporary, or dominant societal tendencies; and, 2) the pressures promoting conflicts and change. The characteristics—religion, social classes, family structure, education, agrarianism, urbanism, philosophy, ideology, violence, economy, the military, public administration, political parties, representation and voting, and affluence—are then analyzed narratively to provide concrete examples of how the general concepts can explain commonalities among Latin American societies, with special reference to the political consequences of the characteristics. A description of an experimental game replicating a Latin American election and a list of more than 70 selected readings on Latin America are appended. (GC)
A COMPARISON OF NORTH AMERICAN AND LATIN AMERICAN SOCIETIES AND THEIR SOCIAL-POLITICAL PRESSURES: A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT FOR INSTRUCTIONAL CONCEPTS

Ronald H. McDonald
Syracuse University

Political and cultural environments provide a filter through which we view other nations. Where obvious differences emerge, we often assume our own institutions provide the model toward which others will or "should" develop. The attitude is pervasive even to a distressing degree in social science research. Only within the past decade have political scientists, for example, become aware of the pervasiveness of their own cultural orientations and their impact on comparative political research. The growing awareness is prompting a re-examination of many traditional concepts about foreign political systems, and in the process perhaps opening to closer scrutiny notions of our own.

Educators bear a formidable responsibility, particularly at the primary and secondary levels, in sophisticating students to the acceptance of cultural differences. Not only is this task clearly justified and necessary to promote international awareness and tolerance, but in those areas of our own culture where subcultures persist, the need for accepting the legitimacy of difference becomes an immediate and crucial civic preoccupation.

This paper makes certain fundamental comparisons between North American and Latin American societies. Latin Americans are
our nearest neighbors in the international community, although chronically ignored in our foreign policy. Immigration to the United States from Latin American nations has provided a significant component in our national demography. Despite national variations in Latin America, the vitality and distinctiveness of Latin American culture, society, and politics often challenges implicit North American notions. Where in the United States they are strong, Latin American cultural norms provide a source of potential social, cultural, and even political conflict. More than any other "developing region," Latin America owes its historical and cultural antecedents—like the United States—to Europe; but, unlike the United States, the European influence primarily was from one source—Spain and Portugal. It is perplexing for us to cope with a pervasively different culture which on the one hand seems to spring from similar Western sources, while on the other hand is so clearly different. It is perhaps easier to appreciate the distinctiveness of more esoteric cultures where similarities are few than to try to relate to one which is so like yet unlike our own.

This paper provides a comparative model of Latin American and North American societies with a specific practical application: to generate some concepts which are suitable for teaching purposes. It is not intended that this model provide a "hand-book" for teaching about Latin America; it is a preliminary statement, severely limited by its oversimplification and necessary vagueness. Seventeen characteristics of North and Latin American societies have been arbitrarily identified, and some sixty-eight concepts generated for
comparison. I am convinced that these concepts, particularly the thirty-four relevant to Latin America, can provide a useful focus for teaching about the region. Illustrations and sub-concepts can be derived from these fundamental concepts or others like them. I am also convinced that until these fundamental questions are raised, no real progress can be made in sensitizing the student or teacher to the underlying contrasts between these two ways of life.

I.

What The Model Is And Is Not

The model assumes that at least as important as static differences between Latin and North American societies are the pressures toward change or conflict inherent in each. Thus the descriptive concepts for each characteristic are of two types: the static or mode characteristics of the society which represent the traditional, contemporary, or dominant tendencies; and the pressure or pressures relating to each characteristic which are promoting tensions, conflicts, and change in the mode. The descriptions contained under the mode and pressure categories in Chart I are imprecise, subjective, and grossly overgeneralized. They are primarily illustrative rather than definitive. That is, they illustrate or exemplify the trait rather than precisely define it.

To summarize, I have set three fundamental objectives for this analysis:

1. To formulate general concepts which can separate Latin
# Chart I

## Comparison of North American and Latin American Societies and Their Socio-Political Pressures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>North American (Pluralistic - Centrifugal)</th>
<th>LatAm (Organic - Centripetal)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td>Institutional Diversity</td>
<td>Institutional Centralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Classes</strong></td>
<td>Mobile, poorly defined</td>
<td>Stratified, low mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family</strong></td>
<td>Role instability &amp; flexibility</td>
<td>Role stability, differentiation, &amp; hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>Occupational-civic orientation</td>
<td>Aesthetic-formalist orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agrarianism</strong></td>
<td>Largely economic base; commercialization</td>
<td>Largely social-economic; rural traditionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanism</strong></td>
<td>Suburbanization; Racial, social, &amp; economic neighborhood differentiation</td>
<td>Central City decay; Integration; urban violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophy</strong></td>
<td>Pragmatism</td>
<td>Idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td>Implicit, procedural, non-goal oriented</td>
<td>Rationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violence</strong></td>
<td>Anomic</td>
<td>Cause directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARACTERISTIC</td>
<td>NORTH AMERICAN (Pluralistic - Centrifugal)</td>
<td>LATIN AMERICAN (Organic - Centripetal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Laissez-faire/competitive, Industrialized</td>
<td>Economic centralization, state-regulation and fiscal participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Centralized, mercantile, agrarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Obsolescence of bartering component; diversification and intensification of production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal System</td>
<td>Common-law origins; judicial interpretation</td>
<td>Intensification of statute &amp; administrative law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Law origin, positivism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal adjudication, legal obsolescence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Functional limitation; economic influence</td>
<td>Technology, costs, &amp; control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-functionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditionalists vs. Technocrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Admin-</td>
<td>Decentralized, egalitarianism, profession-</td>
<td>Local patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tration</td>
<td>alization</td>
<td>Fraternal, Patronal, welfare function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Informal, decentralized, non-organic</td>
<td>Strong-perceptions vs. weak organizations; voting realignments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formal, organic, centralized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elite vs. mass parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
<td>Constituent-Party &quot;Log-rolling,&quot; com-</td>
<td>Ideology-Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>mittee power groups</td>
<td>Personalismo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Single-member districts, majority system</td>
<td>Rationalistic vs. deterministic voting inclinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi-member districts; proportional representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Disenfranchisement; abstention, fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluence</td>
<td>High, consumer-oriented, regional equalization</td>
<td>Inflation, pockets of poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Variable, investment orientation, regionally isolated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inflation, population, irregular economic growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
American societal traits from North American ones. Latin American societies are conceived at this level of generalization as "organic-centripetal" in contrast to North American as "pluralistic-centrifugal."

2. To generate specific descriptive concepts about Latin America derived from fundamental societal characteristics. Seventeen characteristics have been selected to illustrate the general concepts. These descriptive concepts are viewed within the mode and pressure context.

3. To provide concrete examples in the subsequent analysis of how these general concepts can explain common observations about Latin American societies, with special reference to the political consequences of the characteristic traits.

No attempt is made to differentiate between one nation and another in Latin America. The impossibility of such an approach is obvious: it is nearly as impossible as trying to generalize about Europe in one sweeping generalization. However, despite obvious differences of development and culture, there are certain "common" if not universal traits, and it is toward these that the model is directed.

The characteristics identified are not exhaustive, nor are the items particularly parallel in nature. Affluence, social class, agrarianism, and economic systems clearly overlap in what they describe. However, the points seem urgent enough to justify this imprecision. Greater stress is on political-governmental factors and characteristics directly relevant to them because of the professional preoccupations of the author.
There are no prescriptive assumptions contained in any of the concepts. It is not necessary to describe a society for a prescription to be made as to its "goodness." This is crucial in the area of politics. When the model discusses the relative multiplicity of functions served by the military in Latin American cultures, it is not simultaneously assumed that this must of necessity be "bad" merely because it contradicts our own prevalent value notions to the contrary. If one wishes, value interpretations can be placed on the concepts as long as the standards are explicit and precise from the outset, but such endeavor seems both irrelevant and perhaps contradictory to the purpose here.

Likewise, there is certainly no assumption contained in the model that either North or Latin American societies are evolving in a fixed, determined, or even necessarily coherent fashion. Pressures may change, sometimes rapidly, and evolution may redirect itself. One can make a strong case that certain aspects of both societies are evolving similarly (as in, say, certain traits of their urban communities) while they move further apart in others.

Finally, it must be re-affirmed that the model is not designed as a teaching tool, but as a means of seeking new teaching concepts, and an introduction to the educator or expert in other fields.

II.

Fundamental Categories in the Model

The two general societal types, North American and Latin American, are posited as "pluralistic-centrifugal" and "organic-
centripetal" respectively. A word of explanation is due regarding the intended meaning of these concepts.

Pluralistic and organic are terms chosen for apposition. An organic society, culture, economy or political system is one in which all the parts exist in interdependent and interrelated fashion, usually with established hierarchy, authority, and organization. The concept is one of "a whole," in which the parts lack independence or autonomy. A pluralistic society, culture, economy or political system is—like the United States—a whole in which the components enjoy limited autonomy in circumscribed areas; one in which the movements and boundaries of a part are not necessarily interrelated to the functioning of the other parts. Consequently, in culture, several cultural gravities can be said to co-exist, interacting, but independent of each other. In politics, groups can be said to compete for momentary advantage, with none enjoying ultimate sanctions or justification. Consensus in a pluralistic community is at the procedural level, since final ends can not be easily or arbitrarily imposed on all. In organic societies, equilibrium is greatest when all the components function in harmony with each other toward agreed ends, with each component contributing its designated function or role in the societal processes. Of course no Latin American nation fits this stereotype completely, just as the United States is not entirely pluralistic. Large Indian communities in Latin America, for example, provide a clear cultural dichotomy in the Andean nations and elsewhere. The organic society often excludes vast Indian civilizations, or includes them in a very inconsequential way.
With the dangers implicit in such an undertaking, perhaps the differences between organic and pluralistic societies can be more easily conceived graphically. Figures 1 and 2 represent organic societies, Figures 3 and 4 pluralistic societies. In Figure 1 the way in which the components mesh to form the organic society is distinctive. Figure 2 represents both a larger and more complex organic society, in which various components mesh differently to form the organic whole. In Figure 3, intended to represent a relatively uncomplex but pluralistic society, the units co-exist in a semi-autonomous fashion, although their aggregated characteristics give property to the whole. Figure 4 suggests somewhat more complex, larger pluralistic society, and, as indicated by the unattached segments on the left (b), in the process of growing by inclusion of new elements. There may be elements of hierarchy in a pluralistic society, since not all elements are of equal importance. In our example Figure 4, one element (a) actually rests for its power upon several component bases which it covers but does not wholly absorb. There is in a pluralistic society only minimum pressures toward etching the whole in clearly defined boundaries.

Development, as well as affecting the size and complexity of societies represented in Figures 1-4, can also affect the clarity with which they are formed. Figure 1, represented in lighter, less clearly defined components, could be said to be a society in the process of "emerging," in which the components were simple, few, small, and imprecisely defined.
A MODEL OF ORGANIC AND PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES AND THEIR GROWTH:

ORGANIC SOCIETIES

PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4
Implicit in the models is an assertion that significant change in any component of an organic society directly affects both the entity as a whole and the inter-relation of all the components. In a pluralistic society, considerable change can be accommodated in any given component without impeding the existence of others or changing radically the society as a whole, although very significant change clearly does affect the whole society and influences the relationships of its components. However, there is no assumption whatsoever that either the organic or the pluralistic model is inherently more or less stable than the alternative. What gives strength and stability to an organic society is the clear definition of function and hierarchy of its components, providing purpose and justifying maintenance of the whole by the stability of the parts. What gives strength and stability to a pluralistic model is its highly adaptive quality, in which the whole becomes a product of the components, lacking clarity itself perhaps, but accommodating considerable change within its boundaries. The obvious weakness of an organic society is the problem of accommodating major shifts and balances within it, or redefining the nature of the society as a whole. In a pluralistic society, weakness arises from the almost accidental (or perhaps, opportunistic) union of its components, their relative isolation from each other and from a notion of the whole, and the failure to define ultimate goals explicitly. But, to reaffirm my original proposition, neither society is inherently more stable than the other, and major pressures for change can
disrupt one as easily as the other under specific conditions. These graphic analogies are primitive, but perhaps begin to suggest the complexity of phenomena involved in the societies. Comparison ultimately must provide for:

1. Number, diversity, and size of the components.
2. Clarity with which the components are defined.
3. Patterns of growth or development within a society, particularly in relation to the ease with which the society at large can accommodate changes in its components.
4. Pressures created within societies, and means by which they are resolved, controlled, or pacified.
5. Relation of rapid change, such as economic development, diversification, or specialization, upon other components of societies.

Perhaps it would be more sophisticated and in the final analysis more realistic to view all societies as possessing elements of both tendency. But the object here is to force distinctions to help explain obvious dissimilarities between cultures without worrying about the more subtle comparisons which might be made. One can also set aside for the moment the ultimate questions as to why a society is likely to follow an organic or a pluralistic pattern of development. Here it is sufficient to say that there are multiple causes (cultural, historical, and social) which combine to make the tendency likely.

The notions of "centrifugal" and "centripetal" are somewhat redundant ideas. They suggest merely that in a pluralistic society components often mutate, separate or specialize, whereas in an
organic society there is a pressure to bring about an integration of all aspects of the society to maintain the overall balance. In the pluralistic society it is a key trait that individuals identify with many components simultaneously in often dismaying complexity, whereas the identifications in an organic society are less complex. A professional person in an urban North American city may be a Catholic or Baptist, a Democrat or Republican, a Negro or white, a member of the American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars, a Rotarian or a Mason, etc.; a professional person in a Latin American city, despite the somewhat comparable environment, is likely to be a Catholic, identify with a specific political party representing his social-economic interests, and belong to set organizations characteristic of his position in society.

If the mode is taken to represent the traditional, contemporary, or dominant trait (or a combination of these), then the "pressures" are those conflicts which produce either contradictions in the mode or a threat to its persistence. It is assumed in this model that pressures within a society are as important or more so than the mode, and comparisons between North American and Latin American societies become more revealing and realistic when phrased in terms of change rather than traditional stereotypes.

If these general concepts are taken for what they are, gross simplifications and overgeneralizations for the purpose of raising some fundamental comparisons, then we can proceed to consider how they relate to a series of characteristics found in both societies.
The model should not be assumed to be causally oriented or predictive, nor should it be assumed to relate wholly to any specific nation. Considerable variation exists within Latin America between nations, just as it does within the United States between localities and regions of the country.

III.
A Comparison of Environmental Characteristics

Each of the seventeen characteristics used for comparison are related specifically to the political systems of Latin America and North America, more to illustrate how different practices emerge than to suggest that politics is most significant or centrally affected. Since it is assumed the reader already is familiar with the United States, we will proceed to consider primarily those concepts related to Latin America.

Religion. An easy point of departure in comparison is the institutional differences in religion in the two societies. The United States, while essentially protestant in orientation, is characterized by an institutional pluralism in its religious life, with many protestant sects co-existing with each other and with numerous other religions, particularly Catholicism and Judaism. The pluralism of U.S. religious life, quite apart from its doctrinal implications, is a clear contrast to Latin American societies where Catholicism is the dominant religious institution. As in other parts of the world, the Catholic Church is itself--unlike the protestant
faith in the United States—united, stable, and hierarchical in its organization. In view of the unity with which the Church exists in each nation, a unity guaranteed by the nature of the Church itself, the Church in Latin America plays a formidable institutional role in many aspects of life. In much of Latin America it was the first institution to affect the lives of citizens, and in many parts of Latin America today the Church still penetrates further and more strongly into remote, rural portions of the nation than secular or governmental institutions. Its functions in society are diverse and numerous, including politics, where it periodically plays an important role. It has often cooperated with regimes (such as Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Peron in Argentina), only at a later time to disavow its support and bring about a government's downfall. It has recently stimulated a mass-movement whose political aim is major reform of economic, social, and political structures: the Christian Democratic political parties. Although only in Chile is such a party in power, other national parties show promise of eventually gaining greater significance. Other religions also exist in Latin America, but to an insignificant extent. Relationships between the Church as an institution and the State, particularly in regard to property and education, have been historically significant in Latin America.

There are many pressures upon and within the organized church. While the church is dominant, it is less influential and effective in some nations than others. Uruguay is, for example, not known for
being a "religious nation," whereas Argentina, its neighbor, is. Within secular political circles, the influence of organized Masonry has been strong in many Latin American nations, and strains of anti-clericalism emerge periodically in political elites. Within the church and between national churches, many differences of opinion exist regarding such basic issues as population control and the social responsibilities of the Church. The Chilean Church, for example, is relatively progressive in doctrinal and ideological questions, whereas the Church in Colombia is not. Although these pressures within and upon the Latin American Church are often strong, unlike in a pluralistic community Latin Americans still generally view the Church as an integral component of society, and one within which unity must be maintained despite differences of opinion regarding what the purpose of that unity may be.

Social Classes. Historically class in the United States was a reflection of income and wealth rather than family, race, or tradition. As a result, class to the extent that it was a viable concept involved both weakly defined and generally mobile groups, dominated by an expanding middle-sector. In Latin America class has been historically based not only on income and wealth, but also on family, tradition, and race. Classes have been rigidly stratified, with few in the middle-sector, and hierarchical. As a result, mobility has been chronically low. What has elsewhere been described as a "middle sector" has always been small, and in terms of political power inconsequential.
Politically and socially powerful classes are being increasingly challenged by newly emerging pressures: heightened political awareness of previously unaware masses, due principally to communications' developments; the rise of large, urban settlements of the poor living within reach of the nerve center of national government; and the intrusion of mass-based parties which seek to use lower classes as a basis for political power. Not all mass-based political movements and parties, it should be noted, are Marxist in origin or doctrine. The exception of the Christian Democrats has been mentioned. Numerous indigenous movements, often adhering to a specific, charismatic leader, find it opportune to seek a power base from among the disadvantaged. Among these are the Peronistas in Argentina, and the followers of Rojas Pinilla in Colombia and Arnulfo Arias in Panama. 3

Economic development is challenging the traditional class structure, particularly in urban areas, where a demand for skilled and semi-skilled labor has attracted many to a higher standard of living and increasingly created upwardly mobile expectations. These emerging middle sectors are visible in such unfamiliar localities as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Caracas, and elsewhere, as well as those cities where the middle-sectors have been historically significant—Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Santiago. 4

Family Structure. Three characteristics of Latin American family structures can be evaluated: all are based on the concept of "role." These are: role stability within the family, role differentiation, and the hierarchy or authority assigned to different roles.
Family structure in Latin America, as it has been historically in the United States, is influenced and in certain ways fixed by class. Lower urban classes and the rural frontier classes of the 19th century in the United States saw considerable stability and even hierarchy within the family, but often little differentiation in role. In the urban areas, both husband and wife (and often children) worked in industries or small enterprises. On the frontier, the rigors of rural life necessitated mobilization of all manpower possible at certain tasks regardless of traditional family role structure. However, even in these circumstances it is reasonably sure that the authority of the family structure and role stability could be considered traditional.

In Latin America family roles undergo similar class pressures, although the relatively high stability, hierarchy, and role differentiation of the Spanish concept of the expanded family predominates. Nowhere in Latin America has the equality, interchangeability of roles, and relative instability of family life characteristic of contemporary American families found a counterpart. Yet considerable variation exists, not only between classes but between national cultures. The mobility of women offers a revealing example. In urban centers where economic development or achievement is substantial, the woman finds greater similarity in her position with that of her North American counterpart. In some cultures, notably Chile, the flexibility of the woman's position is inexplicably high. However, for all the movement and change which has occurred, and for all the
variation which exists within and between cultures, the dominant mode of family structure in Latin America is internal hierarchy, clear role differentiation, and relative stability in the traditional ways of family life.

The implication of this unified, almost molecular concept of the family upon politics is considerable. First of all, women have been by role excluded from politics. They received the right to vote in most Latin American nations very recently following World War II. In most cultures it is still uncommon for women to vote regularly, and by law they vote separately from men in segregated polling places.

Another characteristic of the Latin American family, and one found in previous epochs in the United States, is the notion of the extended family. Family ties are strong beyond the immediate primary unit. Uncles, aunts, cousins, in-laws, etc., are all bound by tradition in ways uncommon in the United States today. Allegiance to the basic family unit is often stronger than allegiance to any other institution—including the government, party, or even civil service. "Favors" for relatives, a still common practice in the United States but contrary to dominant norms, is prevalent in Latin America and consistent with prevailing norms. Part of the difficulty in promoting independent professional bureaucracies in Latin America stems from this contradiction in family expectations and norms and more alien ones imposed upon the culture by the bureaucracy. In a perverse manner, even in nations where a few extended families
control the politics, competition is often severe between clans (not unlike the "Hatfields and the McCoys") over power, and occasionally clans divided over spurious issues ultimately find political expression in rival political movements or parties.

The extended family also has economic significance. In former times the extended family, usually under the hierarchical leadership of the "patron," held common lands which descended to the first son upon the death of the patriarch. In Argentina, where lands have become divided through inheritance among members of a family and where some of the traditional family ties have broken down, many large estancias are still managed for their absentee owners as family businesses although the original social-familial basis of the estancia has long since passed into obsolescence.

Many pressures are influencing family structures. Education has opened new outlets for women in Latin America. In Chile many women--as in the United States--pursue professional and even commercial careers along with their husbands. Economic development and inflation also often encourage the feminine member of the family to seek employment to improve the relative standard of living of the family, requiring flexibility and realignment in traditional role structures.

The Church has itself been influential in defining the family role structure and asserting its primacy within society. In many respects the strength of the traditional family concept still depends on the endorsement of the Church, and is strongest in those
cultures and those stratum of society where the Church enjoys its strongest influence.

**Education.** There are several institutional differences in Latin American education. The most obvious is the need for primary education and literacy. The combination of inadequate facilities, staff, and economic preoccupations make extensive education difficult and perhaps impossible. Because of Church influence, education still remains a heavy responsibility of Church schools. In few nations, however, is the state willing to give complete educational control to the Church. State or public education exists in all nations, in some to a token extent and in considerably lower quality than Church schools.

The idea of mass education characteristic of the United States still has yet to achieve general acceptance in Latin America. Only in four nations—Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and to a lesser extent Costa Rica—is mass, public education common. It is interesting to note that Argentina and Chile, which have high literacy and extensive university training, were influenced like the United States by Horace Mann, whose wife collaborated with educational leaders in Argentina and subsequently Chile to establish universal, public education.

While Uruguay and Argentina are more economically developed and likely to have advanced educational systems, Chile—whose living standard is comparable to Mexico—has achieved both very high literacy and an advanced university system: more Chileans relative
to the total population attend universities than in any European nation. Also, advanced and relatively high quality education is not inconsistent in Latin America with high illiteracy and poor quality primary instruction. Colombia and Mexico, which have limited primary education and rather widespread illiteracy, both have quality university systems.

Apart from the institutional differences, there are other significant educational contrasts in Latin America. These include:

1. A formalistic approach to education which places emphasis on rote learning and cultural achievement, rather than pragmatic, occupational and civic education characteristic of the United States.

2. A higher education system plagued by excessive demands and insufficient financial support. Most faculty are part-time (as much as 80 percent or 90 percent in many universities), with the remainder receiving uncommonly low wages.

3. A higher education system unresponsive to the occupational demands of the economic system. Social prestige accrues to those who follow certain traditional higher education patterns: law, architecture, and medicine, rather than technological or applied fields.

4. Greater national political significance and involvement by students than traditionally has been true in the United States. The lack of occupational opportunity breeds alienation, frustration, and hostility which finds political outlets among university students. Students form a significant sector of the politically sophisticated
and aware public, and universities normally are located close to the
center of national governmental institutions in the capital city.
Many major national political leaders find the university campus
their springboard into national politics, and allies made during
this period persist onto the national scene. It is perhaps true
in regard to political activism that higher education in North American
society is moving closer to the Latin American model than vice-versa,
although there is also evidence that some traditional avenues to
affluence are changing in Latin America. Mexico and Chile have begun
major programs to revise higher education and provide incentives to
technological fields, but as yet the impact is slight.

5. University autonomy is another concept alien to North
American culture. Without delineating the historical conflicts which
produced this notion, it is worth noting that university administra-
tions, faculties, and students are traditionally hostile to govern-
ment control or interference. Many "autonomous" universities are
legally off-limits to national police and other kinds of governmental
interference. The relationship regularly breeds political discontent
and conflict.

Agrarianism. By agrarianism I mean not only the process whereby
food is produced, but the overall manner by which such activity is
organized and its relation to other aspects of society. The basic
point to be made in regard to much of Latin America is that agrarianism
has been traditionally more than economically significant. It has
carried with it a well defined social system with strong political
and even legal implications. The traditional notion of a large ranch was one in which the owner provided law within his domain. The social-economic system, while not slavery, was stratified and extremely hierarchical. In Colombia these agrarian units identified with one of the traditional political parties (Liberal or Conservative), and all whose lives fell within the domain of the ranch affiliated with the party and fought neighboring ranches affiliated with the opposition. A largely bartering economy existed within the confines of the agrarian unit, while the owner became increasingly indifferent to increased production or efficiency.

There is perhaps no area of greater concern or political pressure in Latin America than the agrarian system. The key issue is land reform, the problem of breaking up the great concentrations of ill-used land into parcels for individual landless peasants. The economic issue, however, is somewhat different: how to increase food production so as to become more fully self-sufficient or perhaps earn foreign exchange from agricultural exports. In terms of population density or productive capacity Latin America is not particularly overpopulated; in many areas it is decidedly underpopulated. However, in terms of food production, it is overpopulated and growing increasingly so. Land Reform if it accomplishes merely land distribution to peasants attacks the political dilemma, but is economically self-defeating, since experience shows that the result is often subsistence farming which adds nothing to the resolution of the basic agrarian problem. Perhaps in no aspect of
Latin American society can the inter-relation between the physical, economic, political, and social spheres be so clearly perceived as in the dilemmas of agrarianism. Population and economic pressures upon the land are creating political problems for the established system and promoting change in the nature of land reform, which in turn has profound effects upon the social system in the rural areas as landless peasants either gain plots of land or see their social system upturned through communalization of unproductive lands.

**Urbanism.** Both North Americans and Latin Americans are city dwellers, and in both instances increasingly so. There are several distinctive physical characteristics of major Latin American cities:

1. Capital cities tend to have a monopoly on urbanization. Other cities are normally far smaller and less significant than the capital. This is particularly true of small nations where the population is insufficient to support a multiplicity of cities, but even in such large nations as Argentina and Mexico the capital area overwhelms other urban centers. Of the major nations, only Brazil has several major urban foci.

2. Urban areas tend to be far more advanced in services, modernization, and normally standards of living than other regions of the country. The difference between the capital and the interior is far greater than in the United States. The rate of modernization is also faster.

3. Latin American cities often have a substantial income mixture in their neighborhoods. Although perhaps the wealthiest
sectors are isolated, in most others relatively prosperous houses stand beside modest ones and occasionally near business or industrial enterprises. The kind of racial, social, and income isolation characteristic of many North American urban neighborhoods is less apparent in most Latin American cities.

4. While Latin American cities have sprawled like their large North American counterparts, the process of suburbanization is less significant partly because of the inadequacy of utilities and services in the suburbs. In some cities security is thought to be greater in the central area than in the outlying neighborhoods.

The pressures upon the cities are largely demographic and technological. The very rapid growth and insufficient public funds for coordinated development has created tremendous problems of housing, power, transportation, and air pollution; in a few notable cases, particularly Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Guayaquil, Caracas, and Mexico City, growth has also prompted tremendous problems with slums and squatter settlements. Rapid migration from rural areas to slum communities, while discouraging from the foreigner's point of view, is rational if one realizes that in many instances slum dwelling is preferable to the hopelessness of rural poverty from which the immigrants come. With the massive immigrations, however, come additional social and economic problems from unemployment.9

The peculiar process of urbanization in Latin America has political significance. Besides the normal discontent visible from urban living problems, large numbers of unemployed or underprivileged
inhabitants provide a potent political base for radical political movements and leaders. They also tend to restrict the meaningful political arena nationally to the capital urban area, where in more than a few instances governments rise and fall.

**Philosophy.** The centripetal pressures toward integration are clearly evident in the influence of rationalism on Latin American thought. Besides its expression in the positive law or Roman law tradition, Latin American philosophy has tended historically to reflect a rationalistic concern for the total integration of systems of political and social speculation. Besides the appeal of rationalistic philosophy itself, indigenous philosophers have brought to their inquiry a highly systematic, integrated approach.¹⁰

Perhaps the clearest manifestation of the rationalistic intellectual orientation is in politics, where even in the everyday world of political campaigning and oration politicians normally feel an obligation to devise a "program" which fully integrates all their programic ideas into a philosophical structure. While it is true that these efforts are rarely significant as philosophy or important as policy influences, the cultural expectation that the exercise will be executed is itself significant. Many political leaders devise uncommonly intricate philosophical doctrines to assist their careers. The dominance of rationalistic intellectual patterns affects also the overall approach to education (discussed above) and many other aspects of Latin American societies.

**Ideology.** It can be argued, I think persuasively, that the
pluralistic and procedural bases of North American society has promoted implicit, non-goal oriented ideological traits designed essentially to support the procedural mechanisms of government rather than define or defend ultimate goals of society. In Latin America ideological pre-occupations have tended in the contrary direction toward specification, definition, and justification of ultimate policy goals in an explicit rather than implicit manner. Of course the types of ideological concerns are tremendously varied, including conservative-authoritarian, fascist, Marxist, liberal, and many indigenous orientations. But the point of common concern is with the explicit formulation of fairly carefully defined goals for society. In the United States there has been a recent dialogue over the validity of the notion of an "end of ideology," observing that what little hold on American politics ideology once had has collapsed. However one sides with this debate, and however one cares to define what ideology is, it is clear from a casual observation that North American politics has been traditionally non-ideological while Latin American politics is often ideologically conceived and oriented with political parties relating to strongly etched if not always consistent or controlling ideological positions.

It can be argued that a pre-occupation with ideological formulations is neither more or less stable for a political system than indifference to ideology. In the United States, little has stood in the way of a gradual, moderate definition on pragmatic grounds of national interest. The rise in conservative ideology
preceding the 1964 Presidential campaign, and the subsequent rise in radical ideology prior to the 1968 campaign, may in their own way signal an increasing inclination for defining—at least for a part of the electorate—political issues in ideological or idealistic terms. The critical question, it would seem, is whether the society can meet during a period of rapid social-economic change the demands of the time and articulate them clearly in terms of ultimate policy goals.

Ideological ferment has always been characteristic of Latin American politics. The Mexican experience is a case in point, where the ideas of "land, non-succession [in the presidency] and anti-clericalism" formed an ideological triumvirate which the dominant political elite still uses to coalesce the nation. Marxism, because of the very fact that it provides a coherent and articulated ideological position, has often been a significant intellectual force in Latin America. So too have indigenous ideological expressions, such as that of aprismo which was born in Peru and has influenced other areas such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico. The concern of the newer Christian Democratic parties with a clear definition of their ideological position reflects more recently this continuing preoccupation with explicit, goal-oriented ideology.

Violence. Both Latin American and North American cultures contain significant strains of violence, but—I believe—the violence has traditionally been different in function and origin. In both
societies the nature of violence seems to be changing and perhaps partly reversing traditional orientations.

Although urban violence in the United States has become a recent preoccupation, one could certainly argue that a high level of violence has been traditionally characteristic of the United States. The pursuit of justice and self-preservation during the great westward movement, the proximity of weapons of violence to frontier life, clearly illustrate its fundamental importance. Contemporary high homicide rates and incidence of crimes involving violence also support this proposition. However, violence in the United States has historically been non-political, of a personal or "anomic" nature; that is, it has been the result of individual aggression, whether prompted by external threats, financial frustration, or personal anxiety and neurosis. The fact that many Presidents have been assassinated in the United States—far more than in most Latin American nations—still must be perceived within the context of personal acts of individuals for whom the President has been a symbol of personal hostility. This personal, non-directed political violence differs from the traditionally directed type in Latin America which regularly has had definite realizable political goals.

I do not wish to suggest that anomic violence has not been present in Latin America, for it clearly has, but rather that anomic violence has been traditionally overshadowed by the organized use of violence to achieve social-political ends. Social disruption,
as often initiated by elites as by masses, has repeatedly produced violence. The military, specialists in violence, have exerted an unusual and persistent influence in many political systems. Presently seven Latin American nations have military type governments, three of which came to power by the use of violence. Student violence and rural violence has been historically common, and normally directed toward the remedy of specific "injustices" perceived by the participants.

The change in North American culture is perhaps more obvious than the change in Latin American cultures. Violence in the United States is becoming a more common and perhaps among certain elements of society more acceptable means of achieving political and social ends; that is, it is acquiring as it has had in Latin America historically a cause orientation. Of course anomic violence continues to co-exist, but the extension of violence into cause-directed spheres is a significant change in North American culture which brings it closer to that of many Latin American societies.

On the other hand, in Latin America, particularly in the cities, anomic violence is rising. The massive experience of Colombia from 1948-1958 in widespread anomic violence, only part of which had definable ends, is a grim illustration of the trend. Nearly a quarter of a million Colombians were killed and mutilated in this episode correctly referred to as La Violencia.

The political implications of cause-directed violence, or threat of violence, is significant. Others have more profoundly
inquired into this phenomena than time permits here, but is perhaps safe to say that the whole nature of the political system must respond to this trait and accommodate it in its political alignments.

Economy. The centrifugal and centripetal pressures in North and Latin American societies are clear in the economies characteristic of each. Setting aside for the moment the level of economic development—admittedly a major distinction—the are very different economic histories involved in the development of each region which illustrates this basic thesis.

Perhaps the most significant juncture in the development of the U.S. economic system was the economic reform of the Sherman (1890) and Clayton (1914) Anti-Trust Acts, and subsequent legislative and judicial interpretations of these acts. The national government acted to counter what was a dominant trend in the economic system—centralization. Economic growth in the 19th century provided a rapidly expanding economy with goods and services, and as a by-product, economic centralization and a decreasing number of firms. This kind of centralization, exerting a centripetal force upon the economy, was reversed by the national legislation and a program to maintain or control competition within the economy. A recognition of the inherent function of a partially decentralized economy composed of viable and competing entities represented a gesture consistent with the dominant mood of the society. The United States began regulating the economy half a century earlier than most European nations, but in a way not to give the national government an entrepreneurial role
but a role as "referee" of the economy. Subsequent national policies in regard to the economy have essentially continued this procedure, giving the North American economy a highly pluralistic and centrifugal direction.

In Latin America the economic systems evolved with governments essentially performing a sponsoring or protective role. Latin American economies today are centralized within agricultural and partially industrialized sectors with the government protecting, guaranteeing, and advancing the interests of a small number of economic units. This characteristic is true of a small, underdeveloped economy such as El Salvador, just as it is true of a more advanced economy like Mexico or Chile. The forces, in other words, are toward concentration of economic power, and integration of all aspects of the economy into the most harmonious relationship possible with the government. Instead of refereeing the process, governments advance and advocate economic interests and their development.

Just as there have been counter-trends periodically in the United States, there are contradictions in the Latin American experience and pressures toward change. Many of the contradictions and pressures in Latin America arise from economic expansion and industrialization. Some are also endemic, such as the exclusion of vast numbers of the population from the pricing and monetary economy. Bartering, and semi-autonomous economies exist in rural regions--particularly in Indian regions--and provide a striking
contrast and pressure on the national economic system. Economic development also presents challenges for increasing efficiency in the industrial sectors of Latin American economies, which almost without exception are notoriously expensive and inefficient in production. A majority of Latin American industries would collapse without the governmental protectionist policies. Pressures toward economic regional integration exert a similar pressure and obstacle in the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market.

If the product of the U.S. economy has been a degree of competition, decentralization, and the maintenance of multiple points of industrial and commercial semi-autonomy, the product of most Latin American economies has been centralization, mercantilism, and pressures toward the integration of production and industrialization policies.

The political impact of the economic systems upon the political structures has been different. In Latin America, economic units have historically looked to the government for protection and encouragement, whereas in the United States economic units have traditionally viewed government as a potentially restrictive force. The interrelation and interdependence of economic and political elites in Latin America is a consequence of the historical evolution of the economy, and a significant force in the culture.

Military. There is a major constitutional difference between the status of the military in Latin American nations and in the
United States. In Latin America, military establishments commonly are recognized by the constitution to have an obligation to "protect the integrity of the national government and the constitution," a responsibility which has given periodic constitutional rationalization for military interference with civilian political activity. By contrast, the military is compartmentalized in the United States by the constitutional provision which clearly establishes civilian supremacy at all times over the military and which assigns no "protective" function to the military.

Quite apart from the more formalistic bases for military participation in politics, there are geographic and economic pressures. The military represents the most effectively organized national institution in many Latin American nations, and it is not uncommon to see it perform functions which in other areas are performed by administrative agencies. Road building, rural development, police, these and many other functions are commonly executed by military institutions since they alone can carry out the tasks. In cultures where violence is cause-directed, the military is frequently used to maintain political order and provide a countervailing influence to this pressure. The military is also a vehicle for social mobility in Latin America where other channels are closed or restricted. While considerable variation exists in Latin America, it is true in many nations that lower class and provincial recruits move upward to positions of influence and find the military an economic and political basis for self-improvement.
There are within both North and Latin American cultures pressures bearing upon the traditional role of the military. In the United States, nearly 70 percent of the national budget is for military purposes (compared to a maximum of 20 percent in Latin America). This great military consumption has economic implications, and it is argued by some (including former President Eisenhower) significant political implications in the concentration of power within the military establishment and the scope of its economic resources. In Latin America, there is a reform movement which is ameliorating if not revising the traditional role of the military. This reform movement could be best described as a "technocratic" influence, in which the military sees political involvement as an institutional responsibility to promote political stability and economic growth, but less as a mechanism for personal power and arbitrary rule. Technocratic military regimes can be found in many parts of Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, to mention but a few. These military regimes are not by and large oppressive, but managerial. However one might question their right to rule, the kind of rule experienced from the military is changing. In a few nations (e.g. El Salvador) the military has been a relatively constructive force toward modernization and social reform. Of course in a few nations (Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Costa Rica, and perhaps Colombia and Venezuela) the military exercises very restrained political and governmental influence.

Public Administration. The context of public administration
in Latin America is so decisively different from that in North America that the product is often confusing. The mode for bureaucracy in the United States is fairly well established: a professionalization of organizations, impartial recruitment of staff, impartial execution of policies, regularization of procedures through laws and directives. In Latin America public administration is not impartial, professionalized, nor regularized in its operational procedures or staffing. What has emerged must be viewed, however, within the boundaries of Latin American society.

Several factors shape the nature of public administration today in Latin America. These include:

1. A society which places high value on fraternal and patronal loyalty extending beyond the institutional environment and objectives of the bureaucracy.

2. Low salaries caused by often unavoidable overstaffing (see below) and inadequate government funds. Low salaries weaken control over the bureaucracy. Employees often hold several jobs within or outside of the bureaucracy, and morale is low. It also encourages "bribes" or "special fees" to supplement salaries.

3. Bureaucracies supply a necessary welfare function in much of Latin America, providing jobs with meager but still supplemental income for many who would be otherwise unemployed, and dignity of work to those for whom unemployment would be viewed as degrading. The welfare function is particularly important in absorbing the lower middle and upwardly mobile urban class who are too educated
for most work opportunities available but unable to generate income themselves without salaried employment.

4. Complicated procedures result from poorly defined policy goals in the national government, and an overconcern with procedural mechanisms resulting from a positivistic, rationalistic perception of administration and public law.

Graft, bribery, and "special fees" often perform valuable services in Latin American bureaucracies, providing both supplemental income for bureaucrats and short-circuits to the bureaucratic maze which affect action from an unresponsive administrative structure. While considerable variation exists, fees paid "under the table" are usually fixed at a nominal level.

While the above argument obviously contains its weaknesses, just as public service often contains more serious corruptions, the major point which must be underscored is that public administration exists within a significantly different context in Latin America, and that culturally derived values from the latter cannot be meaningfully used to evaluate the former. Moreover, public service in many areas of Latin America and within some bureaucracies is often impartial, responsive, and even efficient. In such cases, the achievement must be viewed as remarkable, since the great pressure within the traditional Latin American society is for public administration to be viewed as part of the society as a whole where personal obligations—economic and political—are primary.

Political Parties. The number of political parties in a
political system is not necessarily a very meaningful description. More relevant is the relation of the political party to the overall political and governmental system. In the United States, political parties were an afterthought. Madison, warning in the Federalist Papers (No. 10) against the divisive tendencies of factions, expressed the common fear of his time of political parties.18 Most Latin American constitutions recognize political parties at the constitutional level to be an integral part of the political and governmental system. Partly this may be because most Latin American constitutions are newer than the U.S., and take parties into consideration. It is also true that political parties are conceived in Latin America as an integral part of the society.

The centripetal pressure in Latin America is visible in political parties. Despite the generally low level of national integration and the strong provincialism in many nations, political parties throughout Latin America are centralized in their organization and leadership. U.S. parties are, by contrast, significantly de-centralized—at least to the State level—and generally informal in their organizational structure. Latin American parties tend to be highly formal in their structures. If political parties in the United States can be described as de-centralized, informal, and non-organic, then Latin American parties are centralized, formal, and organic to the society.

There are major contradictions within Latin American party cultures. For example, a high degree of personalismo or "personalism"
characterizes leadership and party activity. Despite their organic, centralized, formal basis, political parties are often divided on personalistic grounds and designed to further personal careers despite an ideological facade. A distinction can also be made between mass parties and elite parties. Elite parties exist only in a formal sense, having little or no popular support or perception. The rising number of parties relying upon mass awareness and discontent for political power is a significant challenge to elite party systems. Even within mass parties, centripetal pressures exist toward an integration of party structure, national hierarchy of authority, established and articulated doctrine, and clearly defined, differentiated roles within the organizational structure.

The most dramatic example of the total integration of a political party within the national society is the dominant Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which has ruled Mexico since its inception in 1929. PRI, an amazingly sophisticated organizational and interest structure, incorporates nearly all elements of Mexican society within one immense organizational structure so as to make it difficult to separate the party from government itself. Yet the party contains channels for considerable competition and representation, if in a manner very different from the North American experience. The Mexican example is perhaps the most integrated, organic party structure within Latin America.

Representation and Voting. The organic concept is illustrated by the techniques of representation found in Latin American electoral
systems. In the United States, one nominally assigns principal responsibilities for representation to the individual Congressman who is elected by a majority electoral system to represent a given number of voters or a state. All Congressmen rely essentially upon their own skills and resources for election, and their affiliation with political parties is a secondary influence.

In all Latin American nations except Mexico, where representation is accomplished through the immense integration of interests within the PRI, all electoral systems employ proportional representation in which several deputies are elected from a district with seats assigned to parties roughly in accordance with the percentage of vote received. The difference is significant: in Latin America, the concept of representation is viewed with relationship to the total party system rather than atomistically or pluralistically. The myth of one's "representative" is extended to include the party as well as the delegate; normally, who is to be elected is decided by the party in listing its nominees on the party ballot. The voter does not select specific candidates. This technique is known as the closed ballot election.

There are counter-pressures in both societies. In the United States, political pluralism is somewhat diluted by patronage, Congressional "log-rolling," relatively strong party voting on key legislative issues, and persistent voter identifications with parties. In Latin America, the notion of party representation is counter-balanced by the stronger personalistic basis of representation.
The effects of these two approaches to representation and voting are seen in campaigning. In the United State, party campaign appeals traditionally have been moderated to grievances with the party in power over tangible political, social, or economic issues. Although this kind of issue is also found in Latin America, there is also strong competition among parties to establish themselves as the "true" or "valid" interpreters of national goals and culture. The campaign strategies of the PRI in Mexico in elections it cannot lose illustrates this approach.21

Affluence. Affluence is most accurately viewed as a product of other societal influences rather than an isolated characteristic. Beyond obvious differences in aggregate levels of well-being between Latin America and North America, more significant contrasts can be drawn in the relatively uneven distribution of affluence on a regional and class basis in Latin America.

The essential characteristic of affluence in the United States is its leveling quality. Regional and class differences in standards of living in a developed, consumer oriented economy are reduced to a minimum relative to the spreads of income involved. Growing awareness, however, of rural and urban poverty within our culture is challenging the accuracy of this traditional interpretation.

In Latin America not only are the standards of living generally lower, but much greater differences in welfare are common relative to regions and classes. Without exception the major
cities, particularly national capitals, enjoy much greater affluence than provincial and rural areas. This condition contributes to the rapid migration patterns to urban areas, where urban poverty is perceived by the poor to be more attractive than the rural poverty from which they come. Significant differences in living standards between social-economic classes are also obvious. The distribution of affluence in Latin America tends to maintain the organic basis of society by limiting the economic autonomy of its individual components. The leveling characteristic in the United States has far more equalized the position of consumers, and strengthened his purchasing autonomy.

Low and unevenly distributed affluence is an obvious source of political discontent and radical movements. The spread of education often worsens the situation politically by providing unrealizable and unrealistic economic expectations. Political activity, however, is also tempered by the characteristic affluence in Latin America, since involvement is expensive relative to the amount of leisure available. Where subsistence requires more time and energy, direct participation and political awareness is expendable and necessarily restricted. It is perhaps remarkable that individual political involvement in Latin America is as high as it is given the realities of the economic environment. Economic development could have a strong impact on traditional political cultures in the region, although development does not guarantee either higher levels or more evenly distributed affluence. Population pressures
undercut economic growth, which can increase as well as decrease regional and class distinctions in welfare.

IV.

Summary

The preceding comparisons offer an introduction to what seem to be significant differences in Latin American and North American societies, with special recognition of the political implications of these characteristics. The concepts however loose provide a focus for instruction and a departure for further development. The analysis has been largely descriptive and non-evaluative, because I believe that realities can be meaningfully evaluated by normative standards only after they are sensitively perceived. Normative standards, such as the meaning of democracy, representation, stability, development, and modernization, are relevant and indeed crucial questions. But further instruction in these normative pursuits is impossible until the realities of the societal context are clarified. Differentiation of cultural realities and a willingness to accept, or at least recognize, differences would seem a prerequisite to any evaluative inquiry or instruction.

Refinement of these concepts into instructional devices is, I believe, a realizable goal despite problems in the availability of teaching materials. Some suggestions in this direction are included in the Appendix. Clearly the critical variable is the attitude of the instructor toward foreign cultures, and perhaps
preparation at this level is the most immediate task. Greater sensitization to cultural and societal variations will in the long run promote not only greater sophistication in public understanding of our "good neighbors" to the South, but a far greater recognition of the depth and inherent validity of minority cultures within our own society.
NOTES

1. Within political science research these tendencies toward static and developmental analysis are clearly differentiated at the conceptual level. For an example of the former, see David Easton, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965); illustrative of the developmental approach is H. Eulau, "Harold D. Lasswell's Developmental Analysis," WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY (1958), pp. 229-242.

2. A nominal statement of pluralistic theory is found in the writings of Morris Ginsberg, eg., REASON AND UNREASON IN SOCIETY (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1947). Pluralistic theory also can be found in much political science writing, particularly in the works of David Truman.


5. A fascinating profile of the Chilean woman and her changing role has recently been published by Armand and Michele Mattelart, *LA MUJER CHILENA EN UNA NUEVA SOCIEDAD* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial del Pacifico, S.A., 1968).


11. The issues are clearly established by Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Further Comments on "The End of Ideology," both in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (Vol. 60, Mar. '66), pp. 5-19.


14. Anomic means literally without direction or purpose. The phenomena has been discussed by David Riesman (THE LONELY CROWD) and others in terms of North American society.

15. Nations currently ruled by military regimes include: Argentina, Peru, Panama, Brazil, Honduras, El Salvador, and Paraguay. The first three came to power by a coup.

16. The interpretation of La Violencia in terms of contemporary Colombian society has become a passionate intellectual concern within the country. It had aspects of political violence and of banditry, but neither of these explanations is wholly satisfying.


18. Madison, writing in the Federalist Papers No. 10, reflected:

"The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society...So strong is this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts..."


One of the techniques of research which is currently providing considerable insights into politics is that of "games," or "game theory." Without delving into the intricacies of gaming in the field of political science research, it would seem that a possible application of game theory to instruction in Latin American studies could be made on a limited basis for secondary education. The following game is offered purely for illustrative purposes in its highly experimental form.

A GAME OF LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS: AN ELECTION

The purpose of the game is a replication of the societal and cultural factors influencing participants in Latin American politics. Considerable variation is possible within the rules and procedures of the game, but the primary objective is to encourage the participants to identify with roles common in the Latin American environments.

1. Participants' Roles. This game requires between 8 and 13 players and the class. The players are divided into two types: candidates for the Presidency, and representatives of political interests who possess special power within the system.
   a. Candidates. From 3 to 5 participants are candidates, each seeking nomination for the Presidency and eventual election. Of the contending candidates, the field is ultimately reduced to two.
   b. Interest Representatives. From 5 to 7 participants
identify and articulate special interests with political influence within the society. Possible interest representative roles include:

1. The middle-class
2. Urban salaried workers
3. Rural peasants
4. The military
5. Students - Intellectuals
6. Business-commercial Elites
7. Agriculture Elites

All participants (candidates and interest representatives) are asked to learn the special problems and goals of their counterparts in a Latin American society (preferably a specific country) and pursue or advocate these interests in the game.

2. Purpose of the Game. The purpose of the game is to be elected President. The steps are twofold: first the candidates must bargain with the interest representatives who vote secretly to select nominees. The bargaining is also secret: no candidate knows what concessions or promises another has made to the representatives. Representatives make notes on the promises made to them, and vote for the two candidates whom they find preferable. Votes are totaled, and all candidates but those two who receive the largest number of votes are eliminated. Then following a period of "campaigning" within the class, each of the two candidates make short speeches to convince members of the class to vote for them. They must in these speeches advocate those promises they made to interest representatives in the prior nomination process. Interest representatives are held
responsible for checking and challenging candidates who don't express their interests, and can inform the class (which serves as the electorate) if a candidate fails to affirm a pledge to them. Finally, the class votes: keeping in mind that they are acting as Latin Americans, and as judges on how effectively the candidates have put together a base for national power.
APPENDIX B

SELECTED READING ON LATIN AMERICA

A. General


B. Area Studies in Latin America

Argentina


Bolivia


Brazil


Chile


Colombia


Williamson, R.C. "Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia." WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY (Vol. 18, No. 1, Mr. '65), pp. 35-44.

Costa Rica


Cuba


Ecuador


Honduras


Mexico


Panama


Paraguay


Peru

Puerto Rico


Hanson, Earl Parker. PUERTO RICO: ALLY FOR PROGRESS. N.Y.: Van Nostrand, 1962.

Salvador


Uruguay


Venezuela


