The papers in this report fall into three focus areas: (1) new goals and objectives for educational institutions, with a stress on normative analysis of public policy alternatives and a reexamination of prior assumptions on which research is based; (2) the political education of youth, with a particular examination of directions in research on political socialization inclusive of cross-cultural studies; and (3) an analysis of the governance of educational institutions, with special emphasis on power, role, and decisionmaking issues. A section on workshop background, participants, and procedures is also available as ED 051 567. (Several sections of the document, between pages 90-214, page 318, and between pages 506-527, may reproduce poorly.) (Author/JF)
COBRE Research Workshop on POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION September 14-18, 1970 Stanford, California

FILMED FROM BEST AVAILABLE COPY
WORKSHOP REPORT "POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION"
by Michael W. Kirst with the assistance of David L. Grossman

1. "Education and the Pursuit of Happiness" by Stephen K. Bailey
2. "A Proposed Study of Educational Policy Impact" by Joel S. Berke
3. "The Politics of Education: Some Thoughts on Research Directions" by J. P. Crecine
4. "The Relationship of the School to the Movement for Community Control" by Daniel J. Elazar
5. "Political Science and Education: The Long View and the Short" by Heinz Eulau
8. Thoughts in Memo to the Workshop Coordinator by Robert D. Hess
9. "Research Priorities in the Politics of Education" by Laurence Iannaccone
10. "Feedback from Changes in the Educational System" by Herbert Jacob
12. "On Studying the Politics of Education" by Michael Lipsky
13. "Sustaining Public Commitment Among the Young: Experiential Political Learning" by Edgar Litt
14. "Community, Neighborhood and Educational Performance" by Norton E. Long
15. "Comparative Research on the Relationship Between Political and Educational Institutions" by John W. Meyer
16. "Models of Decision-Making" by Paul E. Peterson
17. "Social Selection and Social Citizenship" by Kenneth Prewitt
18. "If I had My 'Druthers' " by Robert H. Salisbury
19. "Within-State Distributions of Educational Spending: A Coincidental Examination of State-Wide and Sub-State Data" by Ira Sharkansky
20. "Learning to Tolerate Dissent: Political Socialization, Education and the Meaning of Conflict" by Hans N. Weiler
21. "American Schools as a Political System" by Frederick M. Wirt
22. "Politics, Education and Theory" by Sheldon S. Wolin
WORKING DOCUMENT

RESEARCH WORKSHOP REPORT

POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

Stanford University
Stanford, California
September 14-19, 1970

Sponsored by the

COMMITTEE ON BASIC RESEARCH IN EDUCATION
DIVISION OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES—NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

and the

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION

Workshop Director: Dr. H. Thomas James, The Spencer Foundation
Workshop Coordinator: Dr. Michael W. Kirst, Stanford University

January, 1971
Prepared by

Michael W. Kirst, Workshop Coordinator

with the assistance of

David L. Grossman
Stanford University
Table 1
PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH WORKSHOP ON POLITICS OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
Stanford University
September 14-19, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joel S. Berke</td>
<td>SURC</td>
<td>723 University Avenue, Syracuse, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Elazar</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>Temple University, Philadelphia, PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Jacob</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>Northwestern University, Evanston, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Litt</td>
<td>College of Liberal Arts and Sciences</td>
<td>University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Lanoue</td>
<td>Columbia Teachers College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Prewitt</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>University of Chicago, Chicago, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ira Sharkansky</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheldon Wolin</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>University of California, Santa Cruz, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Minar</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>Northwestern University, Evanston, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen K. Bailey</td>
<td>SURC Policy Institute</td>
<td>Merrill Lane, Syracuse, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick Crecine</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurence Iannaccone</td>
<td>Ontario Institute for Studies in Education</td>
<td>102 Bloor St, Toronto, ON, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Lipsky</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>MIT, Cambridge, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton Long</td>
<td>R.F.D. 1</td>
<td>Sidney, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul E. Peterson</td>
<td>Department of Education</td>
<td>University of Chicago, Chicago, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert H. Salisbury</td>
<td>Department of Political Science</td>
<td>Washington University, St. Louis, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick M. Wirt</td>
<td>School of Education</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley, CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Harmon L. Zeigler  
Department of Political Science  
University of Oregon  
Eugene, Oregon

Hendrik Gideonese  
Bureau of Research  
U.S.O.E.

Edward Greenberg  
Department of Political Science  
Stanford

Hans Weiler  
Departments of Education and Political Science  
Stanford

John Meyer  
Department of Sociology  
Stanford University  
Stanford, California

Heinz Eulau  
Department of Political Science  
Stanford

Robert Hess  
School of Education  
Stanford

H. Thomas James  
The Spencer Foundation

Michael W. Kirst  
Stanford University
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PROCEDURE

The politics of education is a new and still largely uncharted area of research concentration. As recently as 1959, Thomas H. Eliot presented the need for a beginning of research in this field in the American Political Science Review. In 1969, AERA had enough interested members to form a special interest group concerned with the proper scope, methods, and objects of inquiry.

Neither of the parent disciplines -- political science or education -- has provided clear concepts or ready-made, tried and tested, methods for study of educational politics and policy formulation. The reform of school administration in the early 1900's sought to divorce education from overt political conflict. This reform tended to remove incentives for scientific research that questioned the tenet that politics and education do not mix and deflect concern from the intersect of politics and education. Students of the government of education usually paid their way by seeking answers to questions of urgent interest or importance to school administrators (particularly how to raise more money). Studies dealt largely with internal and stable aspects of educational institutions and practices, delimited in scope to specific program areas, educational levels, states or localities, and so on. Moreover, the value educators attached to isolation of their activities from general government may, to a large degree, explain the absence of research directed to the comparison of public school systems with other social institutions having education-related goals.

A number of environmental influences in the last decade have brought about a significant change in research preoccupations. Funds
from U.S.O.E. and private foundations stimulated work by a variety of social scientists from other disciplines. Legislators began to ask for more precise evaluations of the results of formal schooling before assenting to the open-ended cost estimates of schoolmen. Far reaching proposals to change the traditional relationships among the three levels of educational government were widely discussed across the country by such scholars as Conant, Gardner, and Heller. At the local level, parents, teachers, minority groups, and students have gone into action to redistribute political influence previously held by professionals. Research focused on curriculum change, school desegregation, community involvement, etc., raised questions about political structures and processes that would impede or encourage educational change.

Lindblom has described public policy-making as marked by "complexity and apparent disorder," a statement equally applicable to the present study of educational politics. Research still tends to deal with a single level of government, with a restricted set of variables, or a small number of units, studied in depth. Recent studies have highlighted different components of the educational-political system, but the units of analysis are not yet numerous or broadly enough defined to be fully representative; and the research designs are sufficiently similar to provide the basis for amassing cumulative or comparative findings. We have little insight into the functioning of political processes over time or the relationship between the various federal levels and branches of educational government. Efforts to study the effects of school bureaucracies on policy formulation and implementation have lagged. Political socialization research has been limited by a model which conceptualized socialization as the
transmission of belief systems and behavior patterns from adults to pre-adults.

In short, little agreement exists about priorities or theory to guide research. Political norms in education policy making have not been seriously considered. As was the case in the early discovery of America, a variety of explorers have staked out and laid claim to sections of unsettled terrain. Little attention has been given to the development of conceptual or normative frameworks; rather concepts and constructs previously put forward by various social scientists have been adopted, and imported models have tended to suggest rather than control the research design. Research designs using survey techniques and multiple regression have tended to mask political variables. Case studies have limited usefulness for building generalizations. Political systems analysis has been used as window dressing but has yet to prove rewarding as a method for studying the politics of education. The political aspects of the future of American education have been largely unexplored.

These are common deficiencies of a new field of inquiry, and should not be attributed to the insensitivity of the researchers. The conference hoped to use this rather unexplored research focus of politics and education to try out some new approaches and avoid the pitfalls experienced in other research areas in political science. Conferees were selected from the following aspects of the relationship between politics and education.

- the interaction of political and educational institutions, i.e., the ways in which the politics of community, state, and nation affect the operation of educational institutions.
the political analysis of educational institutions, including processes of bargaining and decision-making, and models of governance.

- the contribution of education to the development of political institutions and behavior, including patterns of political socialization and recruitment.

Some of the participants had worked extensively in one of these areas, and others have completed research that could be related to education and politics thereby providing new insights (see Table 1). Ideally, the conference could have mapped the conceptual boundaries of the whole research field of politics and education and, then, derived an explicit ranking of research topical priorities. The lack of theory from either political science or education, however, to guide our efforts impeded such an outcome. A sound way to rank research priorities is through the contribution of a proposed study to an overall theoretical structure - but we have no such theoretical structure. Recent conferences in political science were not fruitful in finding priorities for research in that entire discipline because of the same problem.¹

Given limits on the state of the art, the pre-conference papers were designed around the following charge: "If you were to study something that would contribute the most to this field, what would you study and how would you do it." Two of the participants (Eulau and James) were asked to prepare opening presentations on the boundaries and intersect between education and politics. Through this procedure the conference

could begin with several specific research proposals and then could proceed to explore linkages, gaps, and sequencing. This approach proved to be useful in that the papers fell into four distinct clusters with each cluster representing considerable internal similarity in orientation. The clusters and their participants are listed below:

THE FOUR RESEARCH FOCUS AREAS AND PARTICIPANTS

CLUSTER I:
NEW GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: STRESS ON NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RE-EXAMINATION OF PRIOR ASSUMPTIONS UPON WHICH RESEARCH IS BASED

BAILEY
GREENBERG
MINAR
SALISBURY
WOLIN
EULAU

CLUSTER II:
THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF YOUTH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION INCLUDING CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

HESS
LITT
MEYER
PREWITT
WEILER
JACOB

CLUSTER III:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNANCE OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: ESPECIALLY ISSUES OF POWER, ROLE, AND DECISION-MAKING

GIDEONESE
ELAZAR
IANNACONE
LA NOUE
LIPSKY
PETE RSON
ZEIGLER
WIRT
KIRST
CLUSTER IV:

THE STUDY OF INPUT/OUTPUT/FEEDBACK RELATIONSHIPS IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING -- INCLUDES ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF FINANCIAL INPUTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO OUTPUTS

BERKE
CRECINE
JAMES
LONG
SHARKANSKY

After initial discussions, Cluster IV disbanded and redistributed its membership among the other three. Consequently, the viewpoints of this cluster were integrated with the other groups.

After an opening discussion on the intersect and boundaries of politics and education, the conference proceeded through small group discussions within each cluster, cluster reports, and critiques of these cluster reports by all conferees in general sessions. The final reports written by participants were by a reporter for each cluster. Given the lack of theory and embryonic state of the prior research there was no logical way to rank priorities among the three clusters. Presumably people who are interested in research relating politics and education will choose among the three based on their own interest, values, and views of national priorities.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

The conference objectives were met in a significant way before the conference began. The pre-conference papers generated a high quality of proposals addressed to the research gaps and new paradigms for the study of education and politics. Since part of our aim was to galvanize experienced researchers to think about ways to study an
emerging field of inquiry, the papers provide specific suggestions and insights on useful methods. In total the papers display a range of orientations from those who had been active in research in this specific area for several years to the newcomer who saw important applications from his prior work in education. The former was closer to the interests of the educator in the field and the latter was more concerned with the contribution of the educational domain to the development of political science.

The brief summary of the papers provided below is not designed to reflect the multitude of specific research proposals and approaches mentioned in the papers. Rather the objective is to highlight some of the general themes and show the derivation of the four clusters. Given the amount of information and analysis in the papers, those interested in this field need to read the papers themselves.

Cluster #1 - Establishment of new goals for educational institution: stress on normative analysis of public policy alternatives and a re-examination of normative assumptions upon which prior research is based. (Wolin, Greenberg, Salisburg, Barley, Eulau)

Most of the participants in this cluster contended that we are in such a crisis in our educational system that we need to question old assumptions and concepts of the goals of public education. As Sheldon Wolin emphasized:

Civic man is, in large measure, the product of our schools, and the future vitality of our civic life and its values is being determined in the present. If, in the midst of a profound political crisis affecting education, it is proposed that we study the latter by means of a theory which assumes that the former is functioning normally, the results are bound to be misleading. The task which confronts us requires a political theory that will illuminate both politics and education, but it must be a theory which starts from the
assumption that the society is in deep trouble, proceeds by searching for a formulation which identifies those troubles, and concludes with some sketch of the possibilities, necessities, and dangers for a better politics and a better education.

Wollin eschews the use of systems analysis for studying education and politics because:

Political theories deal with structures which embody and exercise the most awesome powers of which man is capable of concentrating. On some occasions these powers are used violently and destructively; more often they are used to intimidate ... In the case of systems theory these distortions are crippling. It enables its exponents to talk about 'outputs' but not about distributive justice or fairness; about 'steering' but not about statecraft; about 'messages' or 'inputs' but not about the quality of the citizens or their lives.

Wolin also questions the validity of Lindblom's contention that the "political system" has exhibited a natural and healthy genius for slow, piecemeal, incremental advance as a basis for researching politics of education.

Wolin does not claim he has the theory but he did advance the notion of a "technological society" as portraying the future direction of American society. He proposes we should project the nature and characteristics of this technological society into the future, explore its implications for the educational system, and if we do not like the future impact of the technological society on humanism decide how to establish through education a "counter culture." He concludes:

There can be no theory of technological society which is not also a theory of evil, and hence there can be no politics and no education worthy of their names which are not committed to countering many of the forces and promises of the new society and to preserving, rather than merely redefining, what is human.

Edward Greenberg applies some of the concepts and viewpoint of
Wolin to the "civic miseducation of American youth." He also contends we are in the midst of a public crisis "which threatens to tear asunder the fragile network of sentiment and shared loyalties that constitute the social fabric of a people." Greenberg argues the current picture of American politics that students receive in the educational system (largely through civics and history courses) is inaccurate and breeds cynicism among the young. He outlines his view of the dominant paradigm of political science textbooks on American government. In view of recent events, he asserts this paradigm is filled with anomalies:

We are, I believe, in that disconcerting period of time when the old has lost its ability to make sense of the world, but a new formulation has not arrived to fill the gap. The young who have no strong attachment to older perspectives are conscious of the turmoil and are searching for new ways to deal with the world. We would do well to emulate some portion of their behavior by beginning to seriously re-examine the way we perceive the American policy.

Both of these papers raise basic questions about the connection between the learner, learning, and the society, and the provocative comments on this by Heinz Eulau. Eulau proposes a 180° turn in the values and assumptions underlying most research relating politics to education. Much of our research on political development and socialization, for instance, proceeds from the assumption that the good society will emerge if proper socializing and educational procedures harness the right components of the political culture in the right direction. Eulau questions this underlying research assumption that the good political order is created out of a good educational system. He points out, however, this viewpoint can be traced to Plato's
observation that education is not an end but the means by which human nature can be shaped in the right direction to produce the harmonious state.

Eulau posits it is more likely that the relationships between politics and education is the other way around. Government and societal happenings are the independent variable and education is the dependent variable.

If the political order is sound, stable, legitimate, just or whatever other criterion of "goodness" one wishes to apply, education and all that is implied by education, such as the creation of new knowledge or the transmission of traditional knowledge, flourishes. If the political order is in trouble, education is in trouble. If we were to follow Plato or for that matter Aristotle who believed that education is prior to politics, we would have to conclude that our public troubles - the war in Vietnam, poverty in the ghettos, pollution of the life space, and so on - are due to our educational system. Of course, John Dewey and Dr. Benjamin Spock have been blamed, but I seriously doubt that we can take such scape-goating seriously. On the contrary, therefore, if we find our educational system wanting, I think we should try to look at the public order rather than, as we have done so much in education, contemplate our navels as if the outside world did not exist.

If we start from the premise that the political process and the condition of political affairs make education what it is, then we have a basis for investigating many of the objectives of the schools that are merely specified in public. For example, conference chairman contends H. Thomas James posits the functions established by the political environment for the public schools overshadow the more widely discussed functions of teaching subject matter and basic skills.

First and highest priority is a high-security system of custody to see that the peace is kept by children in the
in the city. The second priority is that children shall
be taught to dress, speak, and behave in ways that will
not outrage the majority of the adult population most
frequently exposed to them. The third, which by all odds
leads to the most significant and pervasive characteristics
of the successful graduate of the American school system,
is teaching children to look interested and attentive, even
though thinking about something else.

That the highest priority is custodial and readily demon-
strated. No failure of the school in any conceivable
function...is capable of focusing the public's attention
so quickly as a reduction of the custodial services such
as, for instance, putting children on half-day sessions.¹

Stephen Bailey returns to the theme underlying the Greenberg and
Wolin's paper - the use of education as an independent variable to create
a better society. His paper stresses normative political speculation
about the personal and social functions of education. At the core of
Bailey's paper is education for life styles that "maximize the incidence
of inner joy over time," and that minimize the frequency and severity
of the inevitable pains that accompany and infuse human experience.

Is there an emerging moral structure that can fill the void
left by the disappearance of traditional norms. If a new
moral system is not rapidly apparent, are there bits and
pieces lying around? Can these bits and pieces put together
at least a foundation for the longer future and, building
upon such a foundation can contemporary education be re-
designed or modified in such a way as to give young people
hope and confidence that a combination of societal and
personal attributes can be cultivated that will substantially
increase the sum and intensity of joy in the world.

Robert Salisbury is also concerned with charting goals for
education but he emphasizes the required redirection of research to
direct consideration of how major social change can be effected to

¹ H. Thomas James, "Quality Education: Whose Responsibility?" Speech in
Buffalo, N.Y., August 19-20, 1969.
accomplish concrete goals. In three midwestern states he proposes to
ask education - elites their perceptions of "the problem" in public
education and to outline a political strategy for major innovation,
e.g. how they would bring about the changes necessary to correct what-
ever he thought was wrong. The second study phase would focus on two
policy objectives - 1) the separation of financial support from policy
making and administrative control and 2) making the administrative
structure more responsive (e.g. decentralization and community control).
Salisbury's stress on the usefulness of elite viewpoints clashes with
the position of Wolin and Greenberg.

Cluster #2 - The Political Education of Youth: New Directions
in Political Socialization Research including Cross Cultural
Studies.

A common theme of these writers was to challenge the historic
strategies, assumptions, and underlying values of prior research on the
political education of youth. Hans Weiler argues the maintenance of a
political system constitutes only one of the possible frameworks for
the conception of political socialization, and should be supplemented
by the inherent conflictual properties of political systems in general,
and pluralist systems, in particular. He advocates a re-examination of
the dominant research assumption about the need for a substantial con-
gruence between the outcome of the ongoing political socialization
process, and the belief system already prevalent in the political system.
On the basis of these arguments he elaborates on a concept of "conflict
socialization," primarily in terms of the capacity for dissent toleration
or - in terms of group psychology - of the "latitude" of accepting deviant,
dissenting, or nonconformist types of politically relevant behavior.

Robert Hess pursued some of the same lines of inquiry pointing out in 1961 he was explaining why American youth were so uninvolved in political controversy. He concluded it was because the socialization process was unusually effective and the system secure. Trust and confidence in the system were high, so why get worked up about politics. The contemporary scene is obviously quite different and it is difficult to explain it by applying traditional socialization modes to political behavior in young people. A few years ago he was stressing models of political learning (rather than socialization) that made allowance for acquiring political attitudes and behavior. He concludes.

The major concern I have at the moment about political socialization in this country is the extent to which political behavior in young people is learned or whether it is spontaneously derivative from a confluence of internal states and external pressure and appeals. Occasionally, I wonder if the origins of political behavior in pre-adult cannot be better understood in terms of alignments and emotional sympathies rather than formal learning.

Edgar Litt pursues Hess' conception of political learning in a specific direction. He laments that too often research has tapped student responses within closed educational systems as if political learning was equated with cognitive learning within formal educational systems. In his view, experimental learning in which the young cope with the realities of politics in America becomes the only way of breaking the binds that have gripped researchers. He advances a specific design for experimental research in order to discover what values are capable of being changed by politics and which are simply incapable of being negotiated, modified, or changed in any fundamental way.
Kenneth Prewitt and John Meyer turned their attention to a different aspect of political socialization. Schooling is socially chartered to direct students toward adult social and political status positions. Schools help define these positions as well as legitimate the assignment of differentially educated people to them. In so doing schools are affected by and affect the political structure of society.

In short, school structures provide an important means of legitimating a whole system of inequalities, both in the eyes of students or graduates, and in the view of sectors of the adult population including government officials.1 Clearly when we view schools in this light we see a broader intersect between schools and the political order than if we concentrate on school board decision making or the attitudes of children toward political parties, and we also see the political stress inherent in our educational institutions that are responsible for teaching youth about the American idea1 of equality and at the same time sorting people out to unequal social-economic positions.


This cluster focusses on the governance of public education including such things as models of decision making, roles, federalism, and bargaining. Their concerns center around who runs our schools and the policy implications of changes in the influentials. For instance, Harmon Zeigler asserts little is actually known about the relative distribution of

influence among various potential and actual participants in the educational-
decision making process. He contends:

Our first task is not more theory. Our job is to compile
a list of participants in governing the schools and assess
the influence of each. I suggest we consider the activities
of the following participants: 1) administrators, 2) school
boards, 3) teachers, 4) interest groups, 5) students.

Professor Peterson suggests three decision making models through which these
various actors make policy - the organizational process model, the political
bargaining model and the rational decision-maker model. He stresses each
model presents only one facet of the totality of the situation and only
by inter-relating the three models does the full picture emerge.

Professor Lipsky, Iannaccone, and Elazar concentrate on specific
actors or models for decision making in public education. Building on his
prior work on street level bureaucrats Lipsky proposes a study of teacher/client
interactions including: 1) incentive systems in which teachers work
and 2) recruitment and maintenance of employees within the school systems.

One objective would be to provide a critical link in our understanding of
the relationship between student achievement and intervening variable of
client encounter with the system.

Professor Elazar would combine the systems and policy making process
to explore community control. Among other things he proposes to tackle
the unsettled issue of what is "the community" and the implication of the
federalist system for community-self government.

Professor Iannaccone believes priority should be on the local
education agency, particularly the growing gap between policy studies and
planning versus implementation and administration. His experience with
preparing school administrators leaves him troubled about the development
of outside networks of a "new intellectual proletariat" without responsibility for the action. He does not defend the establishment but proposes researching the "gap between planning and action," and the consequent lack of change within the local educational agencies.

Cluster No. 4 - The study of input-output-feedback relationships in educational policymaking - includes analysis of the distribution of financial inputs and their relationship to outputs (Sharkansky, Crecine, Berke, Long, Jacob).

This cluster proposes to explore various aspects of the input-output-feedback process in education policy making. Professor Crecine asserts we should be interested in political variables only if they turn out to be important determinants of educational outcomes. A logically prior decision is to determine which set of outcomes one is attempting to explain, predict, etc. Professor's Long, Sharkansky, and Berke accept this premise and nominate some specific outputs. Sharkansky focusses on intra-state distribution of educational spending. His proposal rests on the assumption that policymakers do not make their decisions only with an eye toward macro-levels of state performance. This issue is not how much for the whole state but which districts within a state should get how much.

Professor Berke advocates a concentration at even a lower level of financial distribution - e.g., the distribution of funds to individual schools within a given school district. We have some evidence that poor and black students are getting less resources within a single school district, and we need to explore the patterns of resource allocation and the political processes through which these patterns are established.

Professor Long picks up the other strand of Crecine's viewpoint and criticizes the identification of quality of educational input with
quantity of dollars output. Among various studies the Coleman report suggests the critical importance of the environment outside the four walls of the school for pupil attainment. Long would research the politics and sociology of a school's environment that dispose children favorably or unfavorably for educational attainment. Part of this is the sense of efficacy of the child. He suggests starting with study locations where literacy would widely diverge from what census characteristics of neighborhood population would lead one to expect.

Professor Jacob is more concerned with the feedback part of the process than the outputs. In particular, he would research circumstances which evoke altered demand and support for the educational system. He is also interested in the set of characteristics of those who respond and those who remain passive to particular action by educational authorities.

Professor Crecine encompasses all of the above with his view that:

The most important kind of investigation to conduct is one that might be labelled 'uncovering educational production functions'. What we really want to know first is what inputs in the actual educational process we would like to change in order to get what predictable changes in a particular set of outputs.

He reviews studies on production functions and finds we know "very, very little about the technology of producing educational change". Consequently, it is hard to see where detailed political knowledge of the existing process of financing and delivering educational services could be very useful. The same can be said for political factors that determine the formal educational system because this may not be very important. Crecine then goes on to suggest how better studies of educational production functions may be implemented, and the relationship of politics to research-
ing the causal variables.

Summary

The papers present a fascinating and stimulating array of research suggestions. The range is enormous and the approaches differ in fundamental ways. There is a recurring theme that we should not repeat some of the false starts in other policy areas in this emerging area of education. This theme is highlighted by frequent assertions that education is in a crisis, and consequently, we need to discard fundamental assumptions and implicit values upon which prior studies are based. There is not much detail on the methods for implementing particular studies — rather there is a questioning of what we should research and an unease that the more fashionable methods will probably not get us where we need to go. This leads us to an analysis of the outcome of the conference discussions.
Research Guidelines: Cluster I

What was distinctive about the research concerns of Cluster I, as opposed to those of the two remaining Clusters, was a general reaction against the paradigms commonly used in the study of the relationship between politics and education, and beyond that, for some of the participants at least (e.g. Wolin, Greenberg), a reaction against those paradigms used in the discipline of political science generally. While, in the main, Cluster II dealt with the interface between political and educational processes, and Cluster III with the outputs of educational and political systems, Cluster I challenged the processes and outputs themselves and their underlying assumptions. Rejecting such well-known modes of analysis as systems "theory", political socialization theory, or production function models, this group instead focused on the search for new approaches for the study of politics and education.

As might have been expected from the nature of the task they accepted, Cluster I became, at once, both the least defined and the most controversial of the three Clusters, and the intra-group conflict was only suppressed by the arguments at the meetings of the whole. Still, certain common themes did appear, or can be extrapolated from the participants' papers, their discussions, and their final report. These themes should bear on the formulation of future research questions in the study of the politics of education.

As suggested by Bailey in this Cluster's final report to the Conference, the concerns of Cluster I fell basically into four areas:

(1) broad speculative questions about norms - including questions
of what kind of world/society do we want, and what does the educational system have to do with getting us there;

(2) **questions of assumptions** - about nature, man, society, etc.; here emphasis was also placed on the question of the nature and direction of the relationship between politics and education, i.e., the question of the dependent versus independent variable in the relationship between politics and education raised in Heinz Eulau's paper, and repeated in the introductory section of this report.

(3) **descriptive and analytic questions of how views/values/goal are formed in the educational system;** and

(4) **a series of instrumental questions** dealing with possible alternative goal formations, including questions of what is researchable, and questions of how do we get from here to a more desirable there.

As broad, encompassing, and open-ended as these four areas of speculation may seem to be at first glance, the actual discussion of these issues in Cluster I was framed within a particular context. That context was provided by Sheldon Wolin's conference paper, "Politics, Education, and Society." In his paper, Wolin offers us a tentative outline of an alternative paradigm (in particular, vehement opposition to "systems theory") which he hopes will from the beginnings of a new theory of the politics of education. While it is not possible or useful to completely recount Wolin's proposal here, some discussion of it is necessary to provide a basis for understanding Cluster I's proposals.

In brief, Wolin offers us a new paradigm for the study of politics and education, that of "technological society" or more broadly, "technological culture." As Wolin himself explains,
Today there is scarcely a sphere of society or a major aspect of human activity which is not infected by a technological component. There is daily confirmation that contemporary politics is mostly about the future imperatives and past consequences of technology; that education is increasingly affected by it; that, in short, our society can be most accurately described as technological. Neither politics nor education, nor any combination of the two, can be properly understood apart from the technological society. (See Wolin, pp 9-10)

In his paper Wolin proceeds to enumerate some of the possible characteristics which is paradigm, or incipient theory, of the technological society might include. In harshly abbreviated form these concepts are as follows:

(1) Like all previous societies, technological society constitutes an order but of a distinctive kind.

(2) Although many previous societies have accorded a high place to the pursuit of knowledge and to the value of "useful" knowledge (and have supported the institutions of knowledge) technological society is not only deeply dependent on knowledge, but particularly reliant upon knowledge which is systematic and interlocked.

(3) Technological society is not classless; the destruction of work and the everchanging demands of technology (e.g. new complex skills) threaten the lower classes with permanent subjugation.

(4) Technological society accentuates concentrations of power and influence.

(5) In technological society it becomes increasingly difficult to alter or significantly modify the society by means of political action.

Much of the early argument in Cluster I focused on Wolin's conception of the "technological society" and its implications for the goals and processes of educational institutions. As Salisbury summarizes these
implications in Cluster I's final report:

First is the rapidity of changes in environment, in work roles, and in nearly every aspect of one's physical and social circumstances. Secondly, there is the steady shrinkage in the social requirements for physical labor in the production of goods. Third, is the probable drive for increased efficiency and/or stability in the allocations of resources with the result that pressures will mount to close out deviant or dissonant activities and groups.

While it must be said that not all of Cluster I (much less the whole conference group) could agree on the validity, relevance, and usefulness of Wolin's model and its implications, there was wider agreement on the model's ability to generate broad major questions often neglected in the pursuit of empirical political data. Three of these major questions were formulated and expressed as follows:

1. What shapes might a future society take?
2. Given these futures, what role might education take?
3. How might alternative futures be changed and at what price? - including the question of how the relationship between politics and education might change in the future.

In answer to those, particularly in the meetings of all conference participants, who challenged such formulations as illegitimate, arrogant, or unanswerable, Heinz Eulau argued that indeed the construction of futuristic models was a legitimate task of political science (a la Lasswell), especially when linked to and used to shed light on the present. On the other hand, Professor Eulau criticized Wolin's model for failing to provide the requisite connections between his hypothesized future and a past and present. Wolin, it was argued, failed to present an empirical basis for his model either in the form of trend lines based on present empirical data or selected
empirical indicators for the future society he was attempting to describe. Eulau further criticized Wolin's model for failing to provide these same linkages in terms of measurable political variables, such as the composition and behavior of elites. In any case, as was indicated above, many conference participants were willing to accept the validity of questions of alternative futures as research pursuits, while taking exception to the validity of Wolin's particular model.

A second and related phase of the discussion of the research concerns of Cluster I focused on Wolin's notion that because of the implications of his notion of the technological society, that the role of education in the future might be constructed to be "counter-political." Because of the inchoate nature of his theoretical conceptions, Wolin neither could nor would specify the nature of his concept of "counter-politics," but it was clear that the notion was neither "anti-political" nor "non-political" in substance. Rather what was implied here is that once the characteristics of the technological society (or at least some of the concepts therein) is accepted, that one must then distinguish between its fortuitous and its destructive aspects. According to Wolin's conceptualization, inherent in certain tendencies of the technological society, such as the growth of interlocking control and the demand for increased efficiency, there are clear and present threats to both human and democratic values, and that these threats have become increasingly manifest in contemporary America. (It became clear during the conference that Wolin's paradigm was largely one of "incipient evil," -evil derived from the imminent values of the technological society).

It was in the context of these destructive tendencies of the techno-
logical society that Wolin prescribed educational institutions that were to be "counter-political" - that is, counter to the destructive thrusts of the technological society. The role of the educational system in his formulation thus becomes to teach people to question, if not resist, many of the societal forces acting upon them. This was not, Wolin argued, a defense of traditional liberal arts or humanistic curricula as it questioned the rational objectivist values which lay at the base of such curricula. A "counter-political" educational system would in contrast, value personal expression and subjectivity. However, Wolin's "counter-culture" is not the privatized withdrawal from society. His concern is rather to assure that educational programs will not serve only the manifest requirements of efficient technology, even on the consumer side of that technology. A counter-system education would build into the curriculum the direct examination of the society's assumptions and practices so that within the system a critical dialogue could be maintained and support a dialectic of social change.

Objections to Wolin's formulation of a "counter-political" educational system came rapidly and heavily, particularly when presented to the entire group of conference participants. In general, those who objected fell into three categories: (a) those who were willing to accept Wolin's notion of education as "counter-political," or at least to allow education the role of critic and innovator, but who had serious doubts about the ability of a society to tolerate such diviant institutions, (b) those who wondered if such a counter-cultural role could be institutionalized and still survive, e.g., could the state actually fund a "counter-political" university without compromising the thrust of its counter-politics. Here
it was suggested that in order to be truly "counter-political" a movement, group, or institution would almost by definition have to stay outside of established systems; and (c) those who thought it was beyond the jurisdiction of political scientists to prescribe the context and structure of educational institutions.

The final phase of the discussion of Cluster I's research concerns centered on the implications of the questions raised for research designs in the study of politics and education. Because of the broad and assumptive nature of the issues raised in Cluster I, the proposals for research scattered in various directions and were expressed at various levels of generality. No concrete list of research proposals emerged in Cluster I's final report, nor was a specific list of priorities proposed. (In fairness, it should be added that the topic faced by Cluster I was not amenable to the completion of such tasks in a week's time.) Instead we are forced to present our own distillation of research proposals, based on the conference papers, discussions, and Cluster I's final report.

The broadest of the proposals made by Cluster I was by Wolin himself, who advocated that a small number of political "theorists" or "thinkers," (who would be "relatively easily identifiable" in the field) be subsidized for one or two years for the development of new paradigms for the study of politics and education. Whether these paradigms would turn out to be those of the technological society or not would make little difference. The important task would be the identification of a range of alternative futures. Or as Norton Long put it, the task would be to develop ways of thinking about our society's problems in a way that solutions are not inhibited. In
short, it was proposed to support people who are judged to be good bets for critical insights into societal patterns and institutional linkages and their implications. Here capacity for critical thought and willingness to give sustained, disciplined attention to broad problems would be more important than fully elaborated research designs.

The remaining, and more specific, proposals for research generally fell into two categories: (a) those that emphasized education, educational institutions or the educational system as independent variable(s) with impact on the individual as the dependent variable, and (b) those that used the political system, or sets of political variables, as the dependent variable in the study. No typology is ever completely satisfactory, but this one adequately represents the two major thrusts of suggested research designs.

In the former category were basically four proposals:

(1) a study of what makes individuals adaptive to change, and what role education might play in such a process. The concern here was that if technology creates a rapidly changing environment, then education should strive to produce individuals capable of dealing with change. At one level the rapidity of technology induced change might lead us to study an educational program that stressed modes of inquiry and "learning about learning" rather than conveying a particular body of knowledge or set of skills. At another level, how does one teach a child so as to induce adaptive openness toward change? It is a matter for research to establish a) what images of time and of the flow of events through time people hold, b) how and when these are acquired, c) what consequences these images have for adaptiveness and for other basic social postures and predispositions, and d) how alternative educational processes might alter these images of social and historical time.
(2) a study of how in a consumption culture, "connoisseurship", or the ability to discriminate with taste might be taught. In the technological society, the student grows up to be a consumer. What are the implications of this for education? How might education prepare students for this role?

(3) a study of how primary and secondary education might be made less monolithic, i.e., more responsive to differing types of individuals. In the technological society, for example, the large comprehensive high school has become the norm. Is it this kind of standardization and size we want in our educational institutions? Can we provide alternatives and options for various kinds of individuals? Two studies that were suggested by conference participants focussed on the politics of a) alternative and/or "free" schools, and b) of the tuition voucher system. The former proposal would involve such questions as the political use of state regulations to close down alternative and/or "free" schools. The latter would involve examination of experimental uses of the voucher system (as in Christopher Jeneks' program), in terms of various political variables; and

(4) a study of how structural changes produce changes in values and value orientations. Here the focus was on researchable questions of what happens to individuals in schools, and how schools might be changed to produce different value structures in individuals. Again it was proposed to study the impact of alternative structures and changes in existing structures of education.

In the latter category of the research proposals of Cluster I come a set of suggestions in five areas:

(1) a study of the future orientation of educational elites. As
Salisbury explains, opinion research has too seldom tapped the projective side of the ways people look at the world. To draw out and articulate what are now half-formed and inarticulate preferences might reveal, among other things, a greater range of political alternatives than we now believe exists.

(2) a study of change in professions to assess both the effect on the authority structure of the profession and on the behavior of the professionals in the public order. Has there been any change in the professions - law, medicine, engineering, etc.? If so, in what areas, and what impact has it had on the authority structure of the profession, and the behavior of the professionals? For example, what is the meaning of such phenomena as community clinics run by medical students, or community legal services donated by law students?

(3) an examination of the cost factor of alternatives both within and outside the present educational system. Here the basic issue is incremental change within system versus changing the system itself. To what extent can desired changes be carried out within the present educational system? Or, as Wolin has suggested, have we reached a point where significant alternations will only occur outside the present system? Which direction is more costly? Here "costs" referred to both political and economic costs.

(4) a study of what strategies produce structural changes in the educational system. If one assumes that significant changes can be induced within the present educational system, how are such changes to be introduced? Is it possible to get beyond those traditional case studies in the education literature, e.g., "how bond issue X was passed
in County Y," into a new theoretical area of political strategies in
education? and

(5) a study of how a new set of orientations becomes a political paradigm. On the one hand, it was suggested that there be studies of the
development of political paradigms in textbooks and curriculum materials
(e.g. see Greenberg paper), or those paradigms held by elites (e.g. see
Salisbury paper). On the other hand, studies of how ideological symbols
get into schools and become legitimate were proposed. Here the suggested
pattern of studies was to investigate how schools and school systems deal
with such phenomena as a) elections, b) the presidency, c) the draft,
d) the Vietnam war, and e) the legal system and legal rights. The need
for longitudinal as well as cross sectional studies in this area was
stressed.

This list gives us little in the way of clues as to where to start,
for Cluster I never attempted to assign definitive research priorities.
However, Sheldon Wolin did give us a clue as to his own set of priorities.
According to Wolin, the basic problem our society, as well as our educational
and political systems, is change. Citing the case of the university in
the past five years, Wolin argued that often by the time we study a
system, it's gone in the form we knew it. The great priority, Wolin
continued, is for future study in the area of politics and education
to be more projective.

But, lest it be underestimated, Wolin's argument for priorities
should be examined in the light of a new and prominent branch of research
(largely funded by USOE) in the study of politics and education, that
of "alternative future histories." Groups like the Educational Policy
Research Center of the Stanford Research Institute (Menlo Park, California) and Johnson Research Associates (Santa Barbara, California) have constructed as many as 40 future histories for the purpose of investigating their educational policy implications. In a report based on their work, BPRC/SRI and Johnson Associates, report that there are very few plausible future histories which avoid some period of serious trouble between now and 2050. The few that do, moreover, seem to require "a dramatic shift of values and perceptions with regard to what we come to term the, world macroproblem." As the report further explains,

This macroproblem will be the predominant concern of the foreseeable future for all the alternative paths. It is the composite of all the problems that have been brought about by a combination of rampant technology application and industrial development, together with high population levels (in turn, a consequence of technology-reduced mortality rate). These fall mainly into three groups: problems of the ecosystem; technological threats of various kinds; and an intrinsically expanding "have - have-not" gap (increasingly seen as unjust exploitation of the have-nots). It is so named since the problems are mutually exacerbating and since there appears to be high likelihood that they can be solved only in systematic fashion and not piecemeal. Further, it appears that although various aspects of the world macroproblem may be ameliorated or postponed by certain technological achievements, its nexus is intrinsic in the basic operative premises of the present Western industrialized culture. If this is correct, then it follows that education toward changing those premises, directly or indirectly, is the paramount educational task for the United States and for the world. This means that education should be directed toward responsible stewardship of life on earth with the associated changes in values and premises that are necessary for this shift.

(Quoted from W.W. Harman, O.W. Markley, and Russell Rhyne, "The Forecasting of Plausible Alternative Future Histories: A Progress Report of Methods, Tentative Results, and Educational Policy Implications," -- abstract, p. 6)

It is just the kind of priority suggested by this report that
the members of Cluster I were concerned with. However, as political scientists, we would suggest that residual questions remain which are of particular relevance to our discipline. First of all, there is a clear implication in the passage cited above that the key independent variable in long range systemic change is the education system while the political system is the dependent variable -- an assumption which, as Professor Eulau points out in his paper, is open to serious question. Secondly, the authors of the cited passage, and rightly so given their concerns, concentrate on the shape of the educational system. Yet the question remains, given the kind of concerns expressed, what should a future-oriented political system look like.

Therefore, given the nature of these residual questions, we would suggest (using some poetic license) that the kind of priorities that Cluster I would finally propose would be as follows: First, that research attention should be devoted to the construction and explication of futuristic model(s) of the political system which allow for the solution of such "macroproblems" as might be facing our society, and which at the same time delineate both the nature and direction of the relationship between political and educational institutions; secondly, that the construction and existence of such models be validated by studies of past and present trends in the political system, e.g. that Wolin's assertion that technological society accentuates concentration of power and influence by empirically demonstrated, and at a third level of priority, case studies of structural changes in both the educational and political systems in terms of the kind of values and value orientations they produce (i.e. do they provide the kind of value orientations that
allow for the solution of these "macro-problems." This last level would include experimental and quasi-experimental research into alternative institutional arrangements.

In conclusion, it might be said again that Cluster I's lack of closure was largely due to the nature of the task. When a group's basic task is to examine the normative assumptions behind the goals and objectives of the study of politics and education, a few days of discussion, however, intensive, will hardly suffice. In the long-run, however, and especially if Professor Wolin and others are right, it may prove to have been the most crucial topic.
Research Guidelines: Cluster II

As the title of this Cluster indicates (i.e., "The Political Education of Youth: New Directions in Research on Political Socialization Including Cross Cultural Studies"), the participants, in contrast to Cluster I, took as their starting point a relatively well-defined and prominent branch of research in the study of politics and education (although a recent one), that of political socialization research. Here the issue became one of defining what directions this branch of research should take in the 1970's and beyond. Once more, this problem was confronted both in intra-societal and comparative terms.

To the extent that a trend has been identifiable, political socialization research on education has commonly focused on what is learned about the political system in schools. Moreover, the prototype studies in the field (e.g., those of Hess and Easton) tended to concentrate on what political norms were learned in school and the degree to which these norms contributed to the stability of the political system. Yet, as the late 1960's approached, these cross-sectional studies of the late 1950's and early 60's seemed less and less explanatory of the empirical data on school disruption, student alienation, and the general trend toward increased student activism on political issues. Without examining in detail all aspects of the early models of political socialization, suffice it to say that their emphasis on the transmission of adult political norms, knowledge, beliefs, and orientations to pre-adults was faced by an increasing number of anomalies in the schools of the late 1960's.

It is against this kind of conceptualization of the political
socialization process that the members of Cluster II were reacting, albeit in a positive sense. For example, Robert Hess himself sent a provocative memo to the conference participants in which the following points were made:

The contemporary scene is obviously quite different and it is difficult to explain it by applying traditional models of socialization to political attitudes and especially to political behavior in young people. It seemed to me a couple of years ago that a model of political learning which made allowance for acquiring political attitudes and behavior from peers was more realistic than a model which conceptualized socialization as the transmission of belief systems and behavior patterns from the adults to the pre-adults. I found the notion of political learning more comfortable than political socialization in attempting to understand anti-establishment feelings and activities on the part of students and other minority groups. It was not completely satisfactory, but it helped me move out of a too-rigid way of thinking about the growth of citizen-type behavior.

It was in this spirit, one critical of previous models and designs in the field of political socialization research on schools, that the discussion and final report of Cluster II were framed. In an effort to overcome the conceptual limitations of previous models, Cluster II stressed two criteria which they felt should be invoked in researching the political effects on youth of schools and schooling.

First of all, they argued that research questions in this field should represent a clear point of connection between political learning and the schooling experience. Here an attempt was clearly made to separate the concerns of Cluster II from conventional political socialization designs. As was indicated above, the conventional design incorporates political data in schools, but very little data relevant to the nexus between politics and schooling. For example, it is only necessary to collect surveys of political
attitudes found in school children, but also investigate how and to what extent the authority structure of the school and/or classroom shapes attitudes which are transferred to the political system. It is this kind of connectedness between education and politics that merits research attention, according to Cluster II. The implication here is that research should focus on phenomena which are simultaneously affected by educational and political processes. It is also implied that findings should enrich theory-building about both schooling and political life.

Secondly, the members of Cluster II maintained that research should not separate the learner, the learning, and the learned from the structures of society. This criterion implies more than the conventional injunction that students should not, for purposes of research, be lifted from their learning environment (though the importance of this injunction is acknowledged) Here the thrust, as in the case of the first criterion, is toward a widening of conceptualization of the political learning process which, in turn, it is hoped will increase the explanatory power of theory in this area. The emphasis in this context is on a research program which investigates political learning by also investigating social and political stratification, the criteria of political and social differentiation, and the conditions of access and influence. (For examples of such research designs, see the papers of Meyer and Prewitt.) Schooling, it is argued, is socially chartered to direct students toward adult social and political status positions, and through credentialing activities, schools define these positions as well as legitimate the assignment of differentially educated people to them. In so doing schools are affected by and affect the structures of society.
While in isolation these ideas might seem somewhat commonplace, in the context of political socialization they could mark a significant shift of emphasis. As Kenneth Prewitt put it at the conference, it is time to realize that there is a politics of learning as well as a learning of politics. In other words, what is learned in schools is determined to some extent by certain political and social variables (in turn traceable to other structures in the society). What these variables are is not altogether clear at this point, but Cluster II could delineate certain areas for investigations as possible independent variables in the case of political learning in the schooling process.

Of course, the teaching and learning process is the arena in which political norms and behavior are transmitted to students. The formal curriculum has obvious effects on students which must be investigated. In large measure, they result from, and affect, the expectations which students and others have about schooling. However, the expectations of school and political leaders themselves influence and are influenced by attributes of teaching and learning contexts -- attributes that may reinforce, negate, or have no influence on the social and citizenship norms and behavior which are acquired. Thus, in any investigation of the political meaning of the schooling process, the kind of independent variables we would have to consider would be as follows:

(a) Students have expectations about education; in particular its methods for judging their social and citizenship accomplishments. Parents, peers, and teachers all influence the individual directly and through their expectations about the life chances and roles which schools control, and what they are supposed to do in sorting out students among the political
and economic strata of society. Agencies of schooling, such as testing and curriculum, produce these effects. It is imperative to know how these expectations of school and student influence the political attitudes and actions the young adopt as they become functional members of the polity and the economy.

(b) If the schools are expected to operate in major ways to differentiate political elites and followers, then these expectations and their structural reality are themselves an important source of school effects. Schools exist in a larger structural context than that of teacher-classroom-student; the elements of which play crucial roles in defining the schools' right to train, influence, and allocate students. Civil service rules, the orientations of political elites, occupational gate-keepers, and dominant myths about the social and political nature of schooling affect the political expectations and activities which schools create in their students.

(c) The academic core of teaching and learning is a critical, and often neglected source of political learning. Expectations of academic performance by students and elites importantly shape the extent to which groups regard education as an agency to influence the allocation of political and economic resources, the distribution of those resources, and the creation of norms and experiences designed to attain the objectives in mind. In particular, the political significance of learning, credentials, and grading needs to be seen as a source of other citizenship and social outcomes we have stressed.

(d) The social context of education in the schools contains elements of conflict and participation designed to influence the distribution of re-
wards and sanctions and future sorting into the political and economic domains. Once more it is imperative to understand the expectations of students and those who govern the schools about the scope and qualities of participation. Moreover, expectations and behavior in response to political conflict about the assignment of citizenship rights and duties need to be investigated as sources of political socialization.

Thus, in this set of variables, Cluster II has attempted, consistent with the criteria it set, to get at the nexus between politics and schooling, while at the same time connecting these processes to the larger structures of the society. In this context what was stressed was that persons who control educational resources, and thereby shape educational institutions, have assumptions about society. Moreover, they have assumptions about how children should be prepared for membership in the society. These assumptions serve as reference points during times of choice regarding the allocation of resources. However, implicitly held and however variable across the relevant population, these assumptions become translated into legitimate and authoritative curricula, teacher training and selection, testing procedures, extracurricular programs, and so forth. Providing a socially sanctioned and institutional setting for the political learning of children reflects an attempt, albeit a clumsy one, to prepare children for membership in the civil and commercial adult society, and to define such membership.

Using this mode of analysis, the members of Cluster II concluded that in important ways the experience of being "educated" is to be sorted into groups which vary widely in cognitive development, relevant skills and talents, self-esteem, access and influence, social status, cultural norms, and so forth. This grouping process in part assigns students to different political and
social statuses. Moreover, persons not currently in schools recognize the connection between differential education and the different groupings, and thus the impact of the school is to be traced into populations other than students.

Given the nature of these observations, Cluster II was led to an emphasis on specific types of dependent variables, particularly variables linked to the ambiguities and expectations associated with political citizenship, and variables linked to the privileges and penalties associated with different levels of social status. The bulk of the discussion in Cluster II was spent on the development of these dependent variables, as it was felt, with justification, that the range of variables in previous political socialization research has been limited and confining (e.g., see Weiler's paper). While it would be impossible to recount their discussion of these variables, let us present their own summary of these variables from their final report. The dependent variables were divided into four areas:

(a) Political systems are characterized by significant, if varying, degrees of conflict over both specific policy issues and more fundamental normative assumptions about the goals to be achieved through the system's operation. While some political norms are shared by the members of the system, others are controversial and become subject to more or less polarized opinions and beliefs. The citizen's role comprises both agreement and disagreement, both consent and dissent, both acceptance and rejection of others' beliefs and behaviors. His socialization into the world of politics will have to be conceived in such a way as to reflect the condition
of conflict under which his role is performed. Whether as a result of
deliberate direction or not, the various processes of learning about
politics result in the acquisition of cognitive and evaluative orientations
towards diversity, dissent, and conflict. Thus, measuring the degree to
which, and the conditions under which dissenting individuals and groups
in the system are tolerated in the attitudes and practical behavior of
socializees becomes an important further dimension in the study of political
socialization.

(b) Both the assumptions guiding the role of the school in the
process of political learning, and its actual effect on the results of
the learning process, are subject to being at variance with the expectations
held by significant other groups in the system, especially under conditions
of rapid change and/or substantial cleavages within the society. The
resultant discontinuities and inconsistencies create situations of stress,
and uncertainty and social change. The capacities for handling such
situations has to be conceived as a function of certain role norms which
may or may not have been acquired in the socialization process. The
ability and willingness to tolerate stress and uncertainty does, therefore,
become a variable directly relevant to understanding the process of change
which results from the lack of congruence between societal expectations
and socialization outcomes. At the institutional level, it is important
to examine the ways social changes may follow from incongruities between
training expectations and principles of social allocation built into the
educational system (and those held in the wider society).

(c) Schools both create political attitudes, and quite independently
affect the actual political activity of their products. A causal chain leads
from schools through their immediate consequences on students to these students' ultimate participation in the political order. But there is a more direct effect. Schools are chartered with the right to allocate students into the various differentiated parts of the political order. This authority operates to socially locate students and to affect their roles and activity quite apart from any immediate effects it may have (perhaps operating through anticipatory socialization) on their attitudes. And because the authority of schools to allocate students into social and political positions occurs over long periods of time, their effects must be examined by long-term longitudinal research. School effects will appear quite different, and operate through different mechanisms if we study their products much later than if we study them while they are still students.

Further, if schools have the social authority to lead their students in actual political participation during the educational process itself, they greatly affect the present and later participation of these students. Student groups in many societies are participating political elites, as the social boundaries of the educational system are extended to include parts of the political system itself. Through such processes attitudes may be affected, but activity is directly created by the institutional structure.

(d) School structures provide an important means of legitimating a whole system of inequalities, both in the eyes of students or graduates, and in the view of large sectors of the adult population. The chartering of a given set of schools with the authority to allocate present rights and future roles to students may have crucial effects on many parts of the
society -- quite beyond the student population being socialized. School structures, and the charters or rights of allocation on which they are based, provide a basis for many myths about equality, the rights of citizens, and the rights of elites. Is it not surprising that we rely so much, in modern societies, on the specialized competences of professionals who we privately may suspect of having training of dubious utility? And is it not surprising that we place the ultimate powers in the hands of ordinary citizens whose every idea we suspect? Clearly we explain and justify these extraordinary concessions partly by referring to the charter and presumed effects of the various parts of the educational system. These institutions, if they do nothing else, provide comforting and stabilizing justifications of our dependence on both elite and citizen. Whether or not an educational system improves the political competence of these parties, it helps to provide a legitimization of their "proper" participant roles.

It is necessary to investigate the consequences of the development of educational systems, and the expansion or contraction of their authority over political instruction and allocation; for all sorts of groups in the political system, not only the students themselves.

As valuable as this discussion of dependent variables is in terms of broad insights into the impact of the schooling process on political learning, it is hardly specific enough to provide us with a clear set of research priorities in the field of politics and education. Yet Cluster II did attempt to briefly define four areas which they thought were essential to the variables they emphasized and the kind of social reality they were attempting to describe. This is as close as Cluster II came to setting
research priorities and indicating specific research designs (beyond those
developed in their individual conference papers). These are the areas
Cluster II considered most significant for further exploration:

1) In order to trace the development of political norms and
styles of political activity among adults and to understand the unfolding
of the social sorting and selecting process, some indicators must be
collected longitudinally. Such effects can be traced to characteristics
of schools and schooling only (if at all!) through longitudinal research
in which those who are subjected to different schooling patterns are
observed as they progress through later life.

2) Identification of schooling patterns which are likely to make
a difference in later political life and their isolation in quasi-experimental
designs using 'field experiments' will conserve research funds and simplify
data analysis. We can stage experiments (as Ed Litt suggests) or take
advantage of the wide variations which already exist in the schooling
patterns in this country and abroad.

3) The use of field experiments implies the preservation of con-
textual elements of the data. Concepts like conflict, consensus, status
allocation, or docility must be operationalized in ways which have meaning
for the contexts in which they are observed. If, for example, we posit
different results from schoolings provided blacks and whites in American
schools, we must be certain that the concepts have valid meaning in both
contexts even if that requires that we use somewhat different measures of
the concept for each social group. Expectations about the consequences
of schooling may not only be different among several social groups or geo-
graphical area but they may also exist along different dimensions.
4) In order to obtain data about expectations and the cognitive maps of the educational process from students and non-students, individuals must be approached as informants as well as respondents. The picture of reality that individuals perceive are evoked by quite unstructured interviews while responses to particular attitudinal and behavioral stimuli provide data about norms and role perceptions in situations that are highly structured by the researcher. How individuals see the effects of schooling is as important (or more so) as the roles and norms that are evoked by the researcher's structured inquiries.

In summary, the members of Cluster II, given the nature of their stated interests, would probably suggest the following kind of priority for the further study of the political education of youth. Cluster II, it seems, would choose to direct research into the "nexus" between politics and schooling. They would emphasize the study of certain phenomena in the schooling experience which are simultaneously affected by educational and political processes. To use Kenneth Prewitt's phrase again, it is time to recognize that there is a "politics of learning" as well as a learning of politics in school.

In this context, Cluster II calls for the use of a set of independent variables in future studies which will place political learning in a wider social context. To what extent, it is asked, is what is learned in the schools traceable to other structures in the society (and, in particular to the patterns and criteria for political and social differentiation)? At another level, Cluster II would call for the expansion of the kind of dependent variables used in studies of the political education of youth. Can we ascertain, it is asked, the different kinds of political learning
that result from variance in the school experience of youth? In approaching such questions, Cluster II suggests a wide variety of research designs (depending on the scope of the question), including survey, longitudinal, experimental and quasi-experimental designs.
RESEARCH GUIDELINES FOR CLUSTER III

Major Areas of Consideration: General Research Guidelines

In a meeting where ideas are many but the focus is uncertain, some scatteration follows in any presentation of the outcome. Several themes appeared. These are statements of what this cluster believed it is important to study in understanding the politics of education. Among these themes will be found ideas in many of the papers offered under Cluster III and IV; additions arose out of the group sessions. At the present time, we can not rank order the specific research suggestions discussed below. We began with some general considerations and then moved to some proposed thrusts.

1. Given the great variety of American school systems, how can we generalize about their politics? Whether the element of these systems we wish to understand is, in Eastonian terms of environment, needs and demands, policy conversion, or outputs, we must work toward classificatory schemes which emphasize comparative analysis. This theme had several, oft-repeated insistences. The case-study alone, selected randomly or fortuitously, is obviously inadequate to this task. Macroanalysis provides more answers, of course, but it alone often masks important political variables and is also insufficient. Much was heard about the need to match macroanalytic survey results with identification of deviant cases (e.g. high achieving slum schools, free schools) for the illumination they provide of the norm from which they deviate. In short, typologies are useful as long as they are exposed to aggregate data for the distributional or developmental lessons they may provide.

2. Whether the focus of policy research should be upon the total
process in which policy is born, authorized, and administered, or whether the focus should be upon one level with a range of policies operating, is a query of some disagreement. But most participants stressed the former, insisting upon the need to understand policy primarily by following it vertically through all levels of government from the federal government to classroom units. This permits developmental analysis for a given policy, demonstrates all the operative forces at work, and encourages theory building about the life histories -- or pathologies -- of policy. Yet horizontal focus upon one unit of decision-making -- Washington's Office of Education or the East Hogs ville, Ark. School District -- enables us to see what is happening to an array of policies (curriculum, integration, teacher retraining, etc.) in the conversion-output-outcome chain. In this way we can build toward general theory that spans sub-system decisional structures.

Note, however, two aspects of either analytical framework. Each partakes of the case-study, whether it is a single policy studied through vertical layers of decisional apparatuses or a single layer through which an array of policies are viewed. Second, little of either kind of study exists in the literature. More typically, studies consist of one phase and substantive focus of the policy process, e.g., policy conversion alone (Congress makes a law, the school board finally votes to accept sex education courses). Or, there may be a review of a few policy decisions at one level, but certainly not the full range which commands the energies and other resources of the local school system. The absence of research fitting either of the two alternative approaches may well be an indication of the difficulty and expense of execution each involves. In light of the paucity of research via either alternative, the resolution of the
methodological debate awaits more research along both lines. Regardless of which option is pursued, more will certainly be assembled than we presently have.

Two Specific Research Projects

The subject of innovation or educational change enjoyed considerable importance, to judge from the time spent on dissecting its phases for future analysis. There were suggestions about uncovering peer clusters, and information circuits as one way of finding how new ideas might get effectively to policy-makers*. Curriculum innovation as a specific policy study was urged, particularly in light of the disappointing evaluation methods presently employed to urge or continue such new notions. Strategies for achieving innovation were urged as highly useful information for policy-makers, particularly given the capacity of the school bureaucracy to absorb or deflect innovative thrusts into their territory.

The basic framework of analysis underlying these suggestions seems to run as follows. There is imputed a chain of innovation which theoretically underlies the adoption of any new policy into a closed system. Thus, how do ideas enter a system (what are the communication chains which filter novelty to powerful people so that they perceive it?) Next, how does the perceived innovation differentially affect actors so as to cause them to use their resources to oppose or defend it? Finally, once accepted in policy form, how does it affect the school system? The pay-off for acquiring such knowledge of the innovation process is a wiser use of resources by those wishing to introduce innovation. Note that basic to all

* One study was specifically cited that found certain leading lighthouse superintendents and school districts that many of its neighbors followed.
this is the assumption that innovation means improvement, namely, that the
difference between present and desired conditions can be narrowed by a
new policy. This is not the only place where normative judgements were
brought to bear upon empirical propositions.

The special independent force exerted by the quality of leadership
upon policy decisions appeared in several forms. One specific proposal
suggested viewing superintendents in some typological fashion (Heroes and
Bums) to see what differences in policy outcomes were associated with
each. Such categorization of leaders matched with policy differences
appeared in less conceptual terms in numerous anecdotes of what specific
superintendents did under given circumstances with what consequences. Or,
given the constraints which are imposed upon policy by structural characteristics of place (which may be inferred from some macroanalysis), how much independent effect exists for personal leadership under what kind of
conditions (e.g., at what level can a hero make a difference)? How much
of this independent personal force is diluted by decisions made outside
the jurisdiction of the leader, e.g., USOE guidelines, court orders,
professional certification requirements?

Such a general inquiry was widely discussed and approved, but
one counter-suggestion should be noted. If one finds the difference
which personal leadership qualities can make, but these are absent in
given locales, maybe then we need systemic explanations for policy
change. Knowing these it would be possible in the absence of leadership
to gauge better what can be done.

What is the Dependent Variable

A theme of constant recurrence was dissatisfaction over the kind
of dependent variables to be studied. There was little enthusiasm for studying the political process only (such as board elections as an end in itself). All agreed that it was imperative to focus upon policy or outputs that are "important" (e.g., who benefits). Possible benefits ranged from financial inputs to changes in achievement test scores or self-concept. But without agreement otherwise upon what "important" means, studying policy should not be studying only conversion and leaving out the more vital question -- what difference does the conversion make for the society in which it takes place? The search for such notions of significant outcomes against which to measure results was inherent in every theme outlined above. Classification in the sense of morphology is not sufficient; what difference in policy outcome is associated with differences, in forms, structures, processes, personalities, etc.? Whether studying the vertical or horizontal policy process, the pay-off will be what difference the process or the level makes for the real world in which it operates -- and that means an evaluation of effects upon important outcomes. Innovation is not important either, unless we know what the desired end it is we have in view, and hence wish to achieve by policy change. Obviously an evaluation of the effect of leadership must proceed within the framework of knowing the answer to the question: leadership for what ends?

Various suggestions floated in the air about what the important dependent variables were. "Docility" and educational achievement had its numerous champions; "accountability" and institutionalization of a counter culture were offered; and at the plenary session pleas for "being free" or "happy" will be recalled. But the free-floating anxiety about
this problem never focused. One participant noted that uncertainty about the dependent variable gave an air of unreality to discussion about methodology and research strategies. Yet others noted that the public was becoming increasingly concerned about productivity in their schools, although what that meant at times, one suggested and others supported, was a docile, controlled student body. Part of our inability to identify dependent variables was caused by the lack of learning theory and inconclusiveness of studies like the Coleman report.

Other Themes

Although most of the discussion was conducted loosely within the input-conversion-output framework, certain types of research which do not fall clearly within these categories were felt by some to be of value as well. First, Easton himself would emphasize that analysis of value allocation may be no more important than analysis of the way in which political structures seek to maintain their legitimacy. The crisis in contemporary education may not be simply (or even primarily) an allocative crisis. It is quite possible the crisis centers over the symbol of legitimacy. The way in which systems respond (or fail to respond) to the demands articulated by new social forces, and the consequences of these processes for the legitimacy of the system itself was felt to be a significant area of inquiry. Looked at from this perspective, the study of who governs may not simply be acting as a court chronicler to King Lee, but a matter as critically significant as the examination of the consequences of their governing.

Secondly, the tools of political analysis might also be applied to the evaluation of current policy proposals, such as state wide bargaining
between teachers and the authorities, the movement towards community
control, and changes in state aid formulae. The political consequences
of these proposals need to be considered systematically before hasty
adoption. For instance, on the one hand we see a movement for centralized
control through such devices as Program Planning Budgeting Systems and
teacher accountability. On the other, we see movements for community
control, free schools, and storefront academies. What are the changes
in the locus of political influence under these alternatives? Do school
professionals still dominate?

Thirdly, it was suggested that macroanalyses of the contours of the
American educational system and its relation to American politics
and society more generally might clarify the parameters of the system
within which variations in the policy-making process occur. As mentioned
in the general sessions, such macroanalysis might be profitably undertaken
from an international comparative perspective, such a study would demonstrate
that the values parameters take in the American context are not universal
constants.

Fourthly, in any analysis of policy the distinction between policy
adoption and policy implementation is critical. The character of the
organization responsible for "actualizing" policies becomes such a crucial
aspect of the policy process that it deserves special attention. Little
is known about administrative politics and the way this affects educational
policy. Likewise, little is known about intra-district variations in
educational practice and results ... what goes on within individual
schools and classrooms. Does the bureaucracy form a barrier (as con-
ventionally defined) and educational outcomes? Do educational administrators
shape the agenda of decision-making so that crucial questions are kept solely within their purview?

A related issue stressed by Professor LaNoue is the political aspects of teacher accountability. If the development of objective criteria for teaching performance (e.g. achievement tests) may take too long and require too much emphasis on "knowledge bits," perhaps there is some value in examining the method of peer group standards that are used in higher education to achieve quality control to see if any of it is transferable to public education. The implementation of the higher education model, however, would be impeded by the tendency for collective bargaining agreements to dictate the outcome of many policy issues. Increasingly, decisions like student discipline, compensatory opportunities, and ethnic studies are made through collective bargaining. Consequently, political scientists need to investigate these collective bargaining trends and their implications for accountability. Neither research into peer group processes nor collective bargaining takes us very far into the problem of accountability for socialization. One way to further accountability is to research the nature and intensity of the public's value preferences regarding education. A follow-up study could collect information on how the school system had responded to the value choices expressed by its citizens.

Summary

There was general agreement that any proposed research project in this cluster should be comparative and work toward classificatory schemes which assist us in generalizing about the great variety of American schools. Within this overall guideline two thrusts were viewed as most important:

1) following a policy through all levels of government from the federal
government to classroom units; 2) exploration of a wide array of substantive policies at any one unit and level of decision-making.

A high priority for the first thrust would be to explore the chain of innovation around some important policy area such as curriculum. The second thrust could be implemented with great potential through a focus on the special independent force exerted by the quality of local school superintendent's leadership.

Other areas that deserve urgent consideration for research support are the political legitimacy of contemporary educational institutions, and accountability.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS

This report has attempted to accurately synthesize and interpret the outcome of a five day conference. The individual papers were only summarized briefly and contained many good ideas for further research. The major theme in most of the papers was discussed and is reflected to some degree in this report. However, the treatment here could not convey the full argument or analysis in most papers. Consequently, the reader is urged to review each of the papers individually.

The conference was successful in bringing out many new ideas and good research projects in educational politics. The priorities are inherent in the major areas of concentration in the discussion and the conclusions of each cluster. An analysis of gaps was not difficult given the paucity of past research. In short, the research projects and approaches included in this report all deal with gap areas. We have attempted at the end of each cluster to tackle the questions of which individual projects should be undertaken first because they would contribute most to later projects.

We were not successful in defining the specific limits or nature of the intersect of politics of education. We could not rank order proposed research endeavors or some scale of utility. We could not do this because the state of the art, empirical base, and theoretical frameworks in political science and education are not sufficiently developed. The difficulty in specifying dependent variables discussed by every cluster is a good example of the above limitations. The problems in establishing a dependent variable for cluster's I and II stems primarily from the lack of political theory and data. For Cluster III the dependent variable
problem is basically caused by the inability of practicing educators and educational researchers to agree on the most important "goals" of schools (achievement versus other outcomes) and to discover education production functions.

It would have been extremely helpful if theories could be borrowed from political science to guide priority setting and to explore the boundaries between education and politics. As Landau pointed out, however, this discipline is marked by a "high information level and low theoretic yield." Unfortunately politics of education is not one of the areas where the discipline has chosen to focus or develop a high information level. Consequently, a decision on which of the research endeavors discussed here should come first is difficult to answer from the standpoint of theory but relatively simple if one looks at unexplored substantive areas.

In sum, the conference and the papers were replete with specific suggestions for urgently needed research in politics of education. The conferences felt each of the specific research thrusts could be grouped under one of three different clusters of interests and fact. There was no logical way to decide which of the three clusters deserves highest priority. Within each cluster, however, there was substantial agreement on the desirability of using specific new paradigms. The relative importance of certain research projects in each cluster is covered in the reports of the proceedings.

It is difficult in a report of this nature to convey the tone of the conference that political research should receive sufficient support to begin work soon on the agenda described herein. The concepts of "crisis"

---

2 Martin Landau, "On the Use of Functional Analysis in American Political Science," Social Research 35 48-75; 1968
and "turning point" were used frequently to describe the current politics of education. There was also a general sense that the conferees had agreed on some very different conceptual approaches, had higher potential for yielding important results and were more powerful in an analytic sense.
EDUCATION AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

An Outline of Proposed Research in the Field of
The Politics of Education

By

Stephen K. Bailey
Chairman, Policy Institute

Most of those concerned with illuminating the politics of education are interested in developing a "science" of educational politics. For this purpose they are searching for "theoretical frameworks" and for "methodologies" that will be sufficiently logical and rigorous to permit "valid generalizations" and "experimental replications." Presumably the ultimate goal of such work is the discovery and refinement of knowledge about past and present reality. For those temperamentally so inclined, God Speed!

But there is another stream of political inquiry that has roots deep in history and that especially needs attention in unsettled times: normative political speculation about the personal and social functions of education. Most of the memorable political philosophers of the Western World have attempted to conjur scenarios about the nature of good or great societies. And they have then asked a number of fundamental questions about the kinds of education needed to achieve the personal and social goals they have espoused.
In retrospect, at least three constraints or errors have marred the instrumental worth of such speculations: (1) parochialism — i.e. too limited a view of the effectively interacting parts of man's universe; (2) utopianism — i.e. too idealized and too static a view of personal and social possibility; and (3) ameliorative discontinuity — i.e. the assumption that social systems can be reformed by articulating a norm and ignoring the intractabilities and perversities of men and institutions.

These constraints or errors are little more than paraphrases of the "idols" of Lord Bacon. As he pointed out four centuries ago, these "idols" have traditionally stood in the way of man's creating a heaven on earth.

Alas, a heightened awareness of these interfering "idols" at a time of rapid and psychologically disruptive change has produced an almost apocalyptic pessimism in modern social thought. So, teachers and preachers concentrate on man's fall, and upon the sullen bargains among the powerful that keep privilege secure. So, disturbed students thrash around for answers and end up as noisy masochists and flaggelants. So, box-office movies dwell on the absurdities of the affluent and the sensate compulsions and moral nihilism of the young. So, schools and colleges, laden with archaic paraphernalia and anachronistic content and structure, worry about the semblance of internal order vis-a-vis next year's budget, rather than about a fundamental review of purpose and method.

Man can exist with considerable cacophony and with a substantial overload of stimuli. But he cannot, I believe, develop a sustained and sustaining inner joy without some sense of traditional or emerging moral structure. His traditional moral structure has largely dissolved. This is more than the triumph of a new apostasy. It is the collapse of an entire cosmology, the dissolution of
a psychological "steady state" under the pounding of war, technological innovations, and an informational and sensory overload.

Is there then an emerging moral structure that can fill the void left by the disappearance of traditional norms? If a new moral system is not rapidly apparent, are there bits and pieces lying around? Can these bits and pieces be put together at least as a foundation for the longer future? And, building upon such a foundation, can contemporary education be redesigned or modified in such a way as to give young people hope and confidence that a combination of societal and personal attributes can be cultivated that will substantially increase the sum and intensity of joy in the world?

No one phrase encapsulates the essence of such an inquiry. The political concept of "the pursuit of happiness" probably comes closest -- even though "happiness" has too transitory and superficial a connotation to be precise in this context. What is really involved is education for life-styles that maximize the incidence of inner joy over time, and that minimize the frequency and severity of the inevitable pains that accompany and infuse humane existence.

There are scores of ways of approaching this issue. It is hardly new. The classic debates among Epicureans, Stoics, and Sophists touched on most of the important alternatives. It is a standard theme in religious and moral philosophy.

The question is whether we have now reached a point in time and knowledge when we can establish a series of attitudinal and behavioral propositions that can be explicated and internalized in educational contexts with some expectation of felicitous long-term consequences for individuals and for society generally.
Can we find truths that will make men free -- and if not all men all of the time, then a large number of men over a greater length of time than presently obtains?

To avoid the mistakes of past utopians, it is essential to begin with a series of assumptive questions about human beings; for example:

1. To what extent is human happiness linked to freedom, i.e. to manifold options; and to what extent is freedom the enemy of happiness -- as "the Grand Inquisitor" believed? And what kinds of combinations of order and freedom seem to be most satisfying to man over time?

2. Is there a meaningful difference between "substantive" happiness and "procedural" happiness? If the two are in conflict, must not "procedural" happiness win if the melancholy of stasis is to be avoided?

3. Since different individuals, and different age cohorts, derive satisfactions from different kinds of experiences -- experiences that are often in conflict in time and space -- what spatial arrangements and what kinds of planned intermittencies, would tend to maximize happiness for all?

4. Since most human beings suffer rhythms of discontent that seem to stem from such ordinary factors as weather, physical or mental fatigue, organic periodicities, and chemical imbalances, should attempts be made to modify these, or should they be left alone (or to aspirin) on the grounds that they are the referential base of the cyclical or intermittent psychic "glows" that are associated with a joyous life-style?

5. We observe that war, poverty, sickness, and discrimination cause pains, anxieties, and deprivations that exacerbate human unhappiness. Perversely, we also observe that the struggle against these evils creates enormous psychic
exhilaration. Is man so constructed that supreme happiness is found only or largely in heroic acts? If so, what happens psychologically to man when all the dragons are slain?

6. Much of the unhappiness in the world seems to stem from the deflation of egos and the general anxieties caused by overbearing or unloving parents, sibling rivalry, unrequited love, competitive peers, oppressive spouses, and unrealized personal expectations. How many of these sullen hurts can be modified or mitigated by education -- including education about healthy distractions, creative sublimations and cultivated options?

7. What are the consequences of numbers and physical crowding for happy life-styles?

8. What are the consequences for human happiness of the modification or disappearance of the work ethic? What "activity ethic" might be substituted

This is a suggestive not an exhaustive list of assumptive issues. But issues of this kind need a new attention before anyone begins consciously to construct an education and a social order designed to maximize human happiness.

What we do know about lasting happiness we have known for a long time: we know the delights of nature, of discovery, of love, of laughter, of music, of art, of food, of physical strength and well-being, of options of people and privacy. We know the lasting satisfactions of disciplined work leading to accomplishment; of legitimate anticipation; of risk taking; of sustained compassion; of courage; of helping others; of allowing others to help us.
We also know more than we like to admit about the perverse effect of certain kinds of satisfactions -- especially those satisfactions that heighten a sense of dominance in individual egos. We know the hangovers and the lasting and dangerous hurts that these impose, the spiritual callouses they form -- thereby limiting man's sensitivity to the real joys of the world.

Can education help man to distinguish between "evil-producing" pleasures and "good-producing" joys?

What combination of ancient wisdom and new insight can direct education toward man's pursuit of happiness?
A Proposed Study of Educational Policy Impact

by

Joel S. Berke
Policy Institute
Syracuse University Research Corporation
and
Department of Political Science
Syracuse University

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970
This paper argues the need for more research on educational policy. Its particular emphasis is on the need for understanding the final stages in the policy process, the outputs expressed both in terms of the form policy takes as it is implemented, the impact it has on the education of children, and the processes in local education agencies that determine those outputs and impacts. Like so many scholarly ideas, the concept of research proposed in this paper derives from a curious mixture of systematic thought and research on the one hand, and chance conversations, insights, and stimulation on the other. Let me explain.

At a recent meeting an economist of international repute in his own field and a man of considerable wisdom and experience in a broad range of public concerns remarked that he had recently resigned from the advisory board to his local public school "because," as he put it, "federal regulations have become so restrictive." He explained that on issue after issue the school board had been told that the requirements of federal law "left nothing for the board to decide," and my economist friend had therefore concluded that continued service was simply a waste of his time.

To one who had recently completed two weeks of interviewing officials in the U. S. Office of Education, such remarks from a sophisticated observer were troublesome. For a very different, if preliminary, view was emerging from my research as well as from that of my colleagues who are studying decisionmaking on federal aid in state education and local education agencies. We have been finding that vigor in the enforcement of federal legislative mandates and administrative regulations is a rare
commodity in the governance of education at all levels. One could explain away the economist's views in a variety of ways, of course, and at the time I did. I am not sure that was wise.

A second apparent paradox is also in point. The largest program of Federal aid to education, Title I of ESEA, has been distributing more than $1 billion a year since 1965 for improving the education of disadvantaged children. Yet the simple question, has it made any difference, remains unanswered. The massive bodies of evaluation data required by the legislation often fail to show improvement in tests of reading and mathematical ability. Detractors, therefore, argue that the program has failed. Supporters, on the other hand, point to health and dental care, breakfast programs, and other activities under Title I designed to offset environmental inhibitions to learning among the poor, and suggest that the evaluation techniques so far employed are not even touching the broad purposes and activities of the Act. Whether Title I funds have increased resources for the poor or have simply freed state and local funds for other purposes is likewise debated but unresolved. In short, we simply have not comprehended the impact of Title I of ESEA despite one of the most ambitious, nationwide attempts at responsible program assessment in the history of federal legislation.

The direction in which both these examples lead, I submit, is toward more research in the politics of education which is focused upon the end product of policy. We must inquire into the effects of policies as they impact on and produce outputs in local education agencies and ultimately as they affect the education of children. Two
types of questions need investigation: first, what are the patterns of resource allocation and educational output that result from particular educational policies, and second, what are the processes through which these patterns are established.

**Patterns**

We know quite a bit, for example, about the overall operation of state aid formulas, but we know far less about the patterns of allocation within school districts through which finances are transformed into functional resources. The question of who gets what, why, and how needs to be applied to school children so that we can determine the differential resources -- both locally raised revenues and intergovernmental aid -- devoted to different types of pupil populations. While exercises in macro-analysis are extremely useful to understanding, for example, central-city/suburban education resource disparities, a far sharper focus is needed if we are to understand resource allocation -- including disparities -- within communities characterized by income and ethnic differentiation. Do the children from predominantly low-income populations have higher or lower educational expenditures devoted to them? Is the relationship of income levels to school expenditures U shaped or linear? Answers will have to come from an examination of educational policy at a school-by-school, track-by-track, program-by-program level of aggregation if research is to tell us something about the real meaning of policies in operation.

Resource disparities, moreover, must be expressed in a far more precise manner than simply by differences in per pupil expenditures, the most common measure employed in research on school finance. For while many of us cling to the hope that higher expenditures will result
in better schooling, researchers have been unable to find a strong correlation between expenditures and pupil achievement. The joker is, of course, that dollars don't directly interact with pupils—teachers do, curricula do, and the school environment does. Unfortunately, those real actors are harder to quantify, and the actual interactions even more difficult than the variables just noted. While this paper is not proposing an exercise in interaction research, it does propose that we attempt to measure variations in actual resources, not simply variations in expenditures. Measures to address that question would include, among others, ratios of pupils to teachers, to non-teaching professionals, and to library resources. Evaluation of teacher quality through seniority, educational background, and the more imaginative criteria used in the Coleman research are critical. Likewise, the adoption of new curricula in science and math, the breadth of course offering, the use of team teaching, modular scheduling, computer assisted learning, and other program-related measures all add to the picture of the priorities assigned by the school system in serving its constituencies, including children.

Less quantifiable but equally important features of the educational atmosphere in different schools and different tracks within schools are another significant aspect of the impact of educational policy. Sophisticated observers can often tell more about the quality of learning in a school than many of the imperfect achievement test instruments. Observation of and interviews with administrators, teachers, pupils, and parents must be made. Real output data, of course, is scarce. Achievement tests of various kinds are available and should be
utilized, but their significance is often questionable. Dropout and higher education rates are of significance, but longitudinal studies of career patterns—potentially the most useful information—are not now available.

Relating variables that symbolize attendance area socio-economic (or even political complexion) with variables expressive of educational resources and student performance will uncover important patterns of relationship. But identifying patterns does not describe or analyze the linkages that constitute the processes that bring about those patterns. In other words, who gets what is significant. But how and why they get it is the stuff politics is made of. To those aspects of the politics of policy implementation we now turn.

Process

The governance of education has much in common with that of other domestic public services. Authority is shared by elected officials, on the one hand, who are in theory the policy setters, and on the other hand by appointed officials who administer day-to-day activities. Behavioral patterns, too, appear to be not dissimilar in some regards to those in other areas. Full-time officials, trading on their professionalism and control of information, frequently appear to dominate part-time elected school board members, even in the area of policy formulation. Education resembles many other public functions in its intergovernmental character, too, with all three levels of government participating and interacting, usually cooperatively, in the design and delivery of services. Interest groups are no less active in the educational arena, and a wide range of public and covert techniques are brought to bear by parent and civil
rights groups, unions, John Birch societies, and business interests.

What is most distinctive about education, however, particularly in view of the massive proportion of domestic governmental expenditures it accounts for, is the success with which schoolmen have insulated themselves from the prevailing partisan political process. That goal, of course, has been shared by professionals in other fields. In every area, from health to public garbage collection, elites seek to keep the image of their service "above politics." But educators despite the magnitude and visibility of their responsibility, have been more successful than most.

At the local level they have used such devices as fiscal independence, non-partisan school board elections, and rigid civil service systems. In state capitals, separate boards of public instruction and the selection of state education commissioners through either election or appointment by state school boards has provided a measure of protection from gubernatorial or legislative control. At the Federal level, the antipolitical attitude of educators has taken the form of an over-riding fear of Federal control of education, and officials of the U. S. Office of Education have often preferred to avoid effective activity rather than to incur charges of Federal dictation.

This pervasive denial of politics in education has left its mark on other aspects of the educational policy process. In their dealings with school boards, for example, school superintendents, trading on the role of "neutral professional," often resolve on grounds of "good administration" or "accepted educational practice" important value questions which affect the interests of community groups. School boards,
like many public boards, characteristically approve such actions and recommendations, accepting the professional judgment of the superintendent as determinative. Budgets, for example, are often passed by the board with minimal background information.

Despite the nonpolitical pose of schoolmen, or perhaps because of it as Robert Salisbury has argued, highly emotional attacks are often made by groups -- like civil rights groups and John Birch societies -- which forcefully deny the legitimacy of a unitary professional view of educational policy.

The results of all this for our interest in policy impact is that processes of resource allocation except in unusual circumstances tend to be hidden from public view. Thus as the chairman of this conference noted in his research on big city budget practices, a Chamber of Commerce in one city was regularly permitted to set the outside limit for school budget increases.

In assessing the implications of school politics on policy impact, one obvious area for investigation is the way in which educational goods and services are assigned to subunits within school districts. If there is variance in, say, teacher pupil ratios, supplies, and facilities among attendance areas, how are decisions reached as to which pupil populations will be the more favored? If target areas are selected for special treatment, to what degree is there interaction with other agencies of local government, say recreation departments, model city, or poverty program agencies, to say nothing of Mayors' offices, in setting priorities? What role is played by PTA's, community groups, labor unions, business interests? If seemingly automatic allocation formulas are used, what are they? What criteria do they use? Are they
compensatory in nature, or do they simply reinforce environmental disparities?

A second range of related questions is of direct interest to those whose concern is in revising techniques and mechanisms for intergovernmental policy implementation. What effect do federal aid categories and regulations have in shaping school priorities? Where they appear to be influential in causing change and innovation, what are the administrative techniques that were responsible. And conversely, which were ineffective? There has been considerable scholarly interest in federal educational policymaking and policy implementation, and it has been suggested by several observers that federal aid has been the major stimulus for innovation in major urban school systems. As yet, however, studies of the implementation of federal aid have seldom extended to the point of impact. Indeed, the first study tracing federal aid and the related decision-making practices through state education agencies into school districts is just being completed. The further step of following aid and examining the intradistrict decision-making process which allocates it and shapes its use clearly requires systematic exploration.

Research Method

The research techniques to be employed in a project of this kind consist of an exercise in micro-analysis brought to bear on a sample of school districts by a research team composed of political scientists and specialists in educational finance, administration, and curriculum. The levels of aggregation will compare pupils grouped by schools, programs, tracks, ethnic and socioeconomic status. Variations
within individual school districts will be particularly emphasized regarding patterns of resource allocation and pupil achievement. On questions of decision-making processes, the study will consist of a series of parallel case studies. While the limitations of generalizing from such data are recognized, the need for a rounded, integrated, dynamic description of the patterns and processes involved suggests to this researcher that the substantive benefits outweigh the methodological costs.

It is an assumption of this author that in studying the politics of education, the state of the art is such that there is still a pressing need for highly empirical inquiry that can serve as the foundation for subsequent theory building. It is expected, however, that this research can serve more immediate ends as well, namely providing reliable analysis of the operation of policy in order to add a higher degree of rationality -- both in political and substantive terms -- to considerations of educational policy.
REFERENCES

For some recent work directly related to aspects of the research proposed in this paper see:


The Politics of Education
Some Thoughts on Research Directions
J.P. Crecine

In many respects a research program focusing on the "politics of education" or "political variables in the educational process" would be concerned with the wrong set of questions. The reason we are interested in political variables per se (or rather the reason we should be interested in political variables) is due to a logically prior interest in the outcomes of certain formal educational processes. It seems more appropriate to first look at the processes which generate these outcomes. If "political variables" turn out to be important determinants of educational outcomes all to the good. If not, that should not particularly disturb us. Naturally there is every reason to include "political variables" and "political processes" in an a priori check list of things to look for when investigating educational processes, but if we are truly interested in education and educational outcomes, "political" phenomena are relevant only with respect to those outcomes and hence should be examined in that context.

How Do Educational Processes Work?: A Prior Question

In order to look at processes that generate educational outcomes one must first focus on specific outcomes of particular interest. (E.g., average annual income of ex-students after five years etc.) By choosing a particular set of outcomes one partially defines the processes to be examined. A logically prior decision, therefore, is to determine which set of outcomes one is attempting to explain, predict etc. In that context two kinds of processes seem of crucial interest in the area of education.
In my judgment the most important kind of investigation to conduct is one that might be labelled "uncovering educational production functions". What we would really like to know first is what inputs in the actual educational process we would like to change in order to get what predictable changes in a particular set of outputs. The answers to these questions (or our best guesses as to the answers to these questions) define the political and administrative problems of relevance and hence partially determine the range of research questions dealing strictly with political and administrative phenomena. We need to know in some detail the existing technology, or a better one, as the appropriate context for an examination of the "political".

In view of our ignorance of what actually produces different outcomes, examination of the existing technology(s) is probably a good place to start. Recent attempts to assess the long run impacts of federal educational programs aimed at racial minority (Head Start, grants to inner-city school districts, etc.) and economically deprived groups have failed to identify any significant effects. Eric Hanushek has shown in a re-analysis of data from the Coleman report and a detailed analysis of data drawn from a large school system in California, that even though school administrators assume the level of education of teachers matters (an M.A. is better than a B.A.), class-size matters, and years of teaching experience matters in determining educational outcomes, the data suggest that these factors are not very important.

---

His data further suggest that even though administrators are willing to pay more for certain teacher and classroom characteristics, increased resource inputs do not lead to an improvement in outputs. Hanushek's results also indicate that the nature of the educational process is quite different for whites and minority groups. The Coleman report suggest that peer-group influences are more important than teacher influences. A study conducted by Richard Morgenstern also gives no evidence to support the common assumption that more resources generate better education. His data, like Hanushek's, support the notion that there are several different production functions for education; the differences between the South and the rest of the country are dramatic. Once one controls for this regional effect, per capita expenditures on education seem to have little, if any, positive influence on results (per capita expenditures per pupil do not seem to positively affect later earnings of students).

At the very least the preponderance of the studies aimed at trying to estimate some of kind of production function for education at the elementary and secondary level suggests we know very, very little about the technology of producing educational outcomes. Given this ignorance it is hard to see where detailed knowledge of the existing process of financing and delivering educational services could be very useful. E.g., what good does it do us to know the factors that determine per capita expenditures per pupil if per capita expenditures per pupil do not seem to be very important in terms of their effect on students? Who, aside from members of the academic community and other school administrators, really cares if we know that school administrators have all the behavioural

characteristics of a big city mayor?

The state of our knowledge about the educational process should make thoughtful men suspicious of proposals for changes in the process. It would seem reasonable to find out how and why the current educational mechanisms work before tinkering further.

If we identify the a priori determinants of educational outputs for a given student, i, at any time, t, \((E_{i,t})\) the list might look as follows:

1. Cumulative effects of family input to the education and life experience of the student at time, t. \((F_{i,t})\).
2. Cumulative effects of peer group influences to the educational output of the student at time, t. \((P_{i,t})\).
3. The set of innate endowments available to the student (native ability) \((A_{i})\).
4. The cumulative effects of school or educational system inputs on the student to time t. \((S_{i,t})\).

\[ E_{i,t} = f (F_{i,t}, P_{i,t}, A_{i}, S_{i,t}) \]

To summarize our above discussion, we do not know what the relationship between the inputs, f, is. We do "know" that there are many different f's, that there are probably important inter-relationships between the inputs, \(^3\) and that we probably do not even have the proper set of inputs.

\[^3\] In the language of econometrics, there is probably a multiplicative relationship among the input variables; formal schooling \((S_{i,t})\) must be supported by family and life experience \((F_{i,t})\) in order for either to effectively influence outcomes \((E_{i,t})\). E.g.,

\[ E_{i,t} = g (S_{i,t} \cdot F_{i,t}) \] is probably more significant than

\[ E_{i,t} = h (S_{i,t} F_{i,t}) \]
From this formulation it is clear that the primary "political"
effects are through the inputs of the school or educational system.
If one is interested, as I am, in the primary outcomes of this educational
system \(E_l,t\), if this formulation is even approximately correct it would
seem important to first demonstrate that school or formal educational
inputs are important with respect to the outputs we are interested in.
The amazing thing is there is no strong evidence that this set of inputs
is all that important independent from the others. Until we can show
that the formal educational system is indeed important is it not premature
to study political factors just because they are "political"?

There are some important reasons why the current educational productio
function studies are inadequate and have yet to show clear results. The
primary reason, of course, is that the data are generally cross-sectional.
Most sensible observers would emphasize the cumulative effects of the
four classes of input mentioned above and the importance of the inter-
actions between these inputs; are three of the four inputs all acting in
one direction: do they reinforce one another? Briefly, two kinds of
research are called for to uncover these kinds of dynamic relationships.
To uncover existing educational technologies requires panel data over a
long period of time with a sufficiently large sample to estimate
parameters and to detect different technologies among different groupings
of the producers (teachers, classrooms, schools and school systems,
regions of the country) and consumers (population groups - minorities -
among students). We would certainly want to monitor policy variables
(educational preparation of teacher, size of classes, per capita
expenditure on school equipment, racial and economic composition of
in-class peer groups, years teaching experience of teachers etc.) in
order to make these studies useful to practitioners. One thing seems
clear, however, it seems entirely possible to conduct this kind of research without explicitly considering "politics of education" questions. Where politics of education questions seem important is after we have decided to change the existing system, educational technology, etc. in particular ways. How might we implement these changes?

A second branch of research on educational production functions seems called for as well. In particular we would like some clues as to what better technologies might look like (programmed learning and teaching machines, mixed individual and mass instruction, Head Start programs etc.) This of course suggests a series of well-designed and monitored long-run experiments. Even recognizing all the difficulties this would involve (Hawthorne effect, expense, generalisability etc.), the potential benefits would seem to far outweigh the cost.

An Important Administrative and Political Process (s)

More to the point of this conference one of the first kinds of processes worth investigating in greater detail would be the determinants of the level and allocation of expenditures for education. Almost any outcome one would care to examine, almost any change in the educational system one would care to consider includes financial resources as an important restraint or input. The outcomes of the resource allocation process form the context of most of the outcome-determining processes further down in the educational system; i.e., what do students learn that enables them to survive economically? If, as the result of research suggested above, one knows why and in what sense one is interested in an educational process then the resource allocation process becomes of prime importance. Resource allocation is important in its own right as
a focal point of political and administrative decision-making as well. Research in this area is clearly doable; it involves repetitive processes and metric variables. It provides the researcher with the chance to uncover the underlying dynamics of systematic elements of decision processes. Once the systematic elements are uncovered the remaining (or unexplained) events are explicitly identified as interesting or unique in their own right and perhaps deserving of detailed case study (analysis of residuals).

I would argue that most research to date on the determinants of the level and allocation of educational expenditures is inherently misleading with regard to process; partly because most researchers to date have ignored bureaucratic and political processes and have assumed that decision-makers in the educational system were merely passive translators of well-defined and unambiguous public taste with regard to education.

Let us confine our attention to elementary and secondary school systems. If one looks at the process by which expenditure and allocation decisions get made in school systems, it is clear that an important determinant of outcomes concerns total revenues from local taxes — for the most part federal and state contributions are out of the control of the local district. Local taxes equals rate times yields. It is pretty clear that general economic well-being and local assessment practices explain the bulk of the variance in per capita expenditure levels between districts because of their systematic influence on yields. Political factors in processes, the constitutional tax structure of the school district and tax burdens imposed by other units of government (which share the property tax with the district) in the area are the important determinants of rates. To the extent that rates are determined
by community referenda the process is inherently political. The relation of public response to school tax proposals to the need and demands for quality of education in a district is largely an unknown quantity.

Most school districts divide their budget into capital and operating budgets. The decision processes within the school system for these two kinds of budgets are drastically different. We know very little about capital budgets except for a suspicion that various concepts of neighbourhood schools, maximum walking time to elementary schools etc. are important policies with respect to capital decisions. We know a great deal more about the process of determining resource allocations within the operating budget. The works of Gerwin and Decker are particularly revealing. My own work on governmental budgeting in cities and the Department of Defense would seem to be relevant too.

One of the most important resource allocation decisions made by local school boards has to do with salary schedules for teachers. Gerwin has shown in a rather convincing way that this is largely a market phenomenon. School districts compete with a limited set of other school districts for teachers and when either teacher organizations force increases, or a district is unable to hire teachers to fill authorized slots, or the

2/ Decker, Michael,
school-district-starting-salary levels fall to the bottom of the set of reference group school districts, a salary increase occurs. Quite different neuristics for allocating the remainder of the budget exist. Whether they are consistent across school districts or not is another question.

On an a priori basis a study of budgeting in school districts should be more interesting than studies of budgeting in local government. In local government there is no way to make trade-offs between the many incommensurable functions of local government. In a school district setting, however, the units among which the pie must be allocated are much more comparable. There exist widely-agreed-upon, objective measures of quality (even though little evidence exists that these are really relevant to educational quality) such as student-teacher ratios, classroom size, hours per day of instruction or days per school year, per capita expenditures, per pupil expenditures, etc. Exactly how these measures do or could enter the resource allocation process seems to be an extremely important question. These measures are important especially as they relate or do not relate to the results of research on educational production functions. I.e., can one substitute more relevant measures for the existing ones in the allocation process? What changes in the political and bureaucratic system would be necessary to make these substitutions? Knowledge of the existing political and administrative allocation system is necessary to properly design social change strategies.

Research into the characteristics of the processes that determine total revenues per school district, the resource allocation process in the capital budget, the allocation process in the operating budget all requires time series data on one or more educational units or school districts, assumptions about the degree of change in the process
during the period examined, and some assumptions about the generalizability of findings between school districts (similarity of processes). The professionalization of teachers and educators gives some cause for optimism concerning process stability over time. Similarity in revenue and structures (property taxes, state contributions and federal funds) of school boards, the existence of comparative data on teachers' salaries, per capita expenditures (or per pupil, for capital and operating costs) promotional criteria, output measures (exam performance or drop-out ratios) give some cause for hope that there are a reasonably small set of processes that are different in any fundamental sense (and therefore, findings about the characteristics of a process are likely to be generalizable). It is relatively easy to define a priori conditions suggesting causes for differences in process, both over time and currently. For example: Morgenstern's data suggest the South is different. Different reference school districts or determinants of teachers' salaries suggest different structures of external stimuli, etc. To get similar processes, perhaps school districts should be grouped by city size and tax structure by community wealth -- and education? --, different city political structures (cities where education performed by city rather than independent), formal linkages between city and school revenues, machine politics vs. non-partisan, etc.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SCHOOL TO THE MOVEMENT 
FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL

Daniel J. Elazar*

The question posed to us as participants in this conference is 
slightly modified. "If you were to study something that would con- 
tribute most to the study of the politics of elementary and secondary 
education, what would you study and how would you do it." As the advance papers circulated to the participants indicated, there are many unexplored facets of the field. What I propose is a study which would combine the systems and policy making approach to deal with one of the most pressing questions of political policy confronting Americans today, that of community self-government or, as it is frequently referred to, community control, not only of schools but of local institutions generally.

This issue is bound to be one of the most significant and disturbing ones confronting educators, other public officials, and citizens in the immediate future, whether it is defined in terms of particular ethnic or cultural groups seeking a voice within large local systems or in terms of satisfactorily scaled local systems seeking to preserve their autonomy in the face of outside, namely federal and state, pressures. What I propose to do here is to define the problem, place it in the larger perspective of the American political system and suggest some of the researchable questions which flow from it.

*Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University.
The Problem

The demand for community control of the schools is usually understood as a demand by blacks and other racial or quasi-racial minorities for great control over the institutions within their inner-city "ghettos". In fact, it is, in one form or another, a well-nigh universal one in the United States today. Indeed, it is no new demand but a revival of a traditional one that has simply been brought into the public eye by the demands of blacks in the country's great central cities for a right common to most Americans but which they have never been able to exercise.

The blacks' demand for decentralization of big city school systems which includes the demand for control over the personnel responsible for the schools within them, is the most widely recognized but is not the only aspect of the quest for community control. The suburban residents' desire to maintain relatively small independent school districts is of the same order only, because the suburban school systems were constituted in that way from the first, their demand does not involve a militant campaign for the attainment of the objective but a more subdued campaign to maintain it that generally goes unrecognized for what it is and, worse than that, is usually attacked for what it is not. One additional dimension has now been added to the suburban interest in community control. It was in the suburbs that the notion that education was somehow "not political" reached its peak. With the erosion of that idea, one finds growing demands in the suburbs for moderating the professional educators' control over the schools and injecting greater citizen participation at least in the shaping of educational policy. This, too, is part of the demand for community control, one that is no different in its essentials, from that of the inner-city minorities.
Finally, the demand for community control still flickers in the peripheral areas of the United States, in those small town and rural communities which have borne the brunt of the consolidation movement of the past generation and were the first to lose control at the immediate community level for the sake of principles of administrative and organizational efficiency widespread in educational circles beginning a generation ago. While the reduction in the number of school districts from a high of approximately 25,000 some 30 years ago to the present 16,000 or so has virtually limited the question in its original form for many communities, the reshaping of the communities themselves in light of technological changes connected with the metropolitan frontier has no doubt revised it in the new consolidated districts with the added dimension there of how to maintain community control while at the same time maintaining a sufficiently comprehensive educational program manned by personnel of sufficiently high caliber.

In all three cases, two other problems remain crucial factors in the quest: budget and racial segregation. Virtually no school system today is immune from budgetary problems while the demand for equalization of fiscal resources, whether on a metropolitan, statewide, or national level, has become an insistent one. Regardless of the level of political interest in community control, the fiscal problems must be solved if it is to be considered available arrangement. At the same time, political decisions can be taken that will adequately deal with the fiscal issues within a context that provides for community control, if such should be the will of those who shape the political decisions involved.
Racial segregation as an issue is intimately tied to the entire question of community control, especially since the argument for segregated schools was generally couched in those terms. There are even strong hints of it in the black militants' present demands for the same in their areas. By its very existence as an issue, it raises questions about the limits and possibilities of the demand with a national society such as that of the United States.

The question that is placed before students of education and politics is precisely that; to determine the possibilities, limits and likely consequences of community control of the schools or its alternatives so that policy-makers (politicians, public servants and citizens) may be better able to make decisions on the issue. In my opinion, it is a question that is essentially a political one. That is to say, there are no extra-political considerations that will automatically determine how the decisions on community control should go. Rather, by taking particular political decisions it will be possible to shape the other factors in the way in which we want them to be shaped, hence the vital importance of this question in the context of the relationship between politics and education.
1. While we are concerned here with the demand for community control of schools, we must begin any inquiry into the meaning and likely consequences of that demand and its satisfaction or frustration by understanding that it is part of a larger demand for community self-government. Again, just as the suburban experience is especially useful in defining the meaning of this demand in the case of the schools, so is it useful in defining the demand for community self-government generally.

The political meaning of the development of suburbs lies in just that area. People sought suburbanization for essentially private purposes, revolving around better living conditions. The same people sought suburbs with independent local governments of their own for essentially public ones, namely the ability to maintain those conditions by joining with like-minded neighbors to preserve their styles of life which they sought in suburbanization. They soon discovered that control of three great functions was necessary to provide a solid foundation for meaningful local self-government: (a) control of zoning to maintain the physical and social character of their surroundings; (b) control of the police to protect their property as they wished it protected and to maintain the public aspects of their common value system; and (c) control of their schools to develop needs and pocketbooks. It has become evident over and over again that suburbanites will fight as hard as necessary to retain control over these three broad functions as long as they see them threatened by "outsiders" who would change them in such a way as to alter the life styles of their communities. The suburbanites' instincts were quite correct in all this despite the thrust toward centralization in American society, control over these three functions does main-
tain the kind of local control which they want.

The functions that suburbanites will fight to retain as "close to home" as possible are essentially the same as those presently being demanded by blacks in the great cities who seek the same rights as their suburban countrymen for their neighborhoods (most of which are not really neighborhoods at all but congeries of neighborhoods with populations as great as those of the more substantial suburbs, if not of large cities). They, too, justify these demands on the grounds that it is necessary for them to control their destiny in these public matters in order to be able to achieve their private and public goals and, given the premises from which they begin, they are indeed correct. The same reasons lie behind the efforts of peripheral communities to maintain their institutions of self-government.

2. The struggle over community control is necessarily conducted within the context of the American political system and is accordingly bound by that system. Thus it is not a struggle for the recreation of the sovereign polis (except perhaps in the minds of the most extreme militants) but for the achievement of maximum local control over vital public functions in a properly-scaled locality. Most Americans of whatever race, creed or ethnic origin, share common values and goals as Americans. What they seek are variations in the "American way of life", not completely separate ways. Thus they strive for local control that makes the maintenance of those variations possible, not local separatism. Moreover, they strive for that control within the context of a meaningfully sized place, the definition of which has changed periodically throughout American history.
The most pronounced characteristic of the American system, from this perspective, is its federal character and the precise nature of that federalism. In the first place, the very existence of federalism offers the possibilities of legitimately achieving a very substantial degree of community self-government within the system. Indeed, one might say that the existence of federalism stimulates the demand for community self-government. Regarding the second, the highly intertwined system of cooperative relationships linking governments on all three planes - federal, state and local - in common action to perform functions and deliver services shapes the limits and the possibilities for community self-government. Both of these aspects will be further treated below.
The study of the problem of community control must begin with the exploration of two questions: what is the community and what is the place of the schools within it. In the United States, communities are essentially artificial (i.e., consciously man-made) creations founded and organized in the course of the country's development by people with immediate common interests. With some rare exceptions, they have not been organic entities embracing all of life and linking the same families over generations nor were they ever conceived to be. Rather, their residents are linked by the need to cooperate in pursuing certain interests that thereby take on a political or civil character. Hence they are best understood as civil communities, people living in a common territory bound together for political or civil purposes. The maintenance of common political goals provides the basis for community and the existence of institutions designed to pursue those goals provides its framework.

Given the nature of the American political system which tends to encourage what is often called "fragmentation" of government on the local plane, responsibility for the maintenance of those goals is usually entrusted to many different institutions which can be grouped in "sets". Taken together, they create the institutional "bundle" that gives shape to a particular civil community, defines its limits and character, and serves its needs.

The sets are:
(1) the formally established local governments serving it, such as the municipal governments, the county, the school districts, and the like; (2) the local agencies of the state and federal governments similar as they are adjuncts of the local community existing
primary city to serve. (3) The local branch of the state employment office and the local office of the public nongovernmental bodies serving local government and governmental purposes, such as the civil service and the community welfare council, (4) the political parties exercising power and influence within the civil community to organize political competition, (5) the system of interest groups functioning in the local political area to represent the various local interests; and (6) the body of written constitutional material and unwritten tradition serving as a framework within which concerted political action must take place and as a check against factional political behavior.

A civil community consists of the set of the governments, quasi-governments, public institutions, and politically relevant "games", which function in a given locality and which are tied together in a single bundle of governmental activities and services. This bundle of governmental activities and services is manipulated in the locality to serve the local political value system. There is no standard set of political jurisdictions that can be used to delineate the individual civil community. Each civil community must be delineated in its own terms. In any particular, the territorial basis of the civil community may consist of a city or township, an entire county or other regional political entity, a school district, a regional planning district, or the like.

The school and the "game" which surrounds them are subsumed under one or more of the foregoing categories. The public schools are among the local governments while the parochial and perhaps even the private schools can be counted among the public nongovernmental institutions.
the previous section of the text and the references of the relationships between the latter's and the civil committees are questions that must be investigated for every civil community as the very outset of the study reported here. So too, the legal, political, and administrative relationships between the school systems and conceived constitutions and their civil committees as presently constituted are primary matters for study. The play of political forces within the civil community upon the school and the place of the schools in the local political "game" must be closely investigated. Finally, the role of the various schools as instruments of socialization and the socialization and social change's value system, including the community's perceptions of expectations from the larger political orders of state and nation must be studied.

All the foregoing must be done in relation to the civil community as is and in relation to potential civil communities, i.e., those likely to be created under conditions in which community self-government spread and there is a readjustment of the size of particular local units in the process. Not every entity with its own local government is, willy-nilly, a civil community. Some entities are too small, some are too large and some are too fragmented. In the case of the first (a category that embraces quite a few suburbs and some of the country's peripheral cities or town), their governmental and other institutions may simply mask the fact that what is really involved is a neighborhood, capable of political expression but not really capable of self-government, even in the limited sense used here.

In the case of the second (a category which embraces every city of over 50,000 population in the United States and some smaller ones),
the character of their total situation. In fact, we have already seen that in certain cases, especially local governments, the government of the entire area is in fact neither local nor dependent. More often than not, the true local government without local ability to provide the necessaries of government provided by the state, or by federal government.

The term civil community is used to refer to functions as civil communities where governments are for some reason unable to pull together sufficiently to do so. Unable to successfully pursue any common goal, the elements obtain some politically regardless of the character of their total situation.

The study of the question suggested above is designed to distinguish between the three categories in order to reveal civil community where it does exist. Thus it may be that investigation will reveal that there are good convergences among all the appropriate elements or seats in existing civil communities, that there are better convergences in potential civil communities than in actual political jurisdictions, or that, particularly in the case of the biggest cities, local government exists but not civil community.

The conclusions to be derived from the foregoing research questions must necessarily lead to questions as to the role of the school as an educational instrument within, local or potential civil communities. Our interest here is mainly in political organization but we must not forget the role of the school in relation to other kinds of perceptions and ex
call for, the teacher is more certain to work with a teacher who is
delineated for curricular organization and whose work is based on
the core content. For this reason, it is essential to develop a form
of such a position in the context of the new direction. The
Government, through the Commission and in detail in implementing
the Civil Community (Community of Teacher for the Study of Education, 1998).
-,

*.

t
!

-.t

S

t!...;;"

'4.

t

7

;

4

!

4

:

1

4

T"

t

A' AiL

1.

-.I

r.ot

t he u

(.

t

S

ary.

1 tr.1;k:

1

(.)

1a

.1

I

t

s'

,-

a

';

:.
;

.

;.

diCt' 1

.

E1

113,.
V

I;

j

1

t:1*.

s

1.t

`*-14.11(ii k

t..:

C./.
.4.. .

F;

;

;

N1

I

r

!,1()Pl',11,:;4:14:f.
t

L.-- Ct.'

...

1 ILl !'n

t

,11
;

ti
4.*

i

:

105

I.

" i!;)

i 'TY


More recently, a new view of the civil community has begun to emerge which sees its primary components as social or cultural groups that function in place of or within neighborhoods rather than homogeneous neighborhoods as such. Heterogeneity in such communities either cuts across all potential neighborhood lines or is manifested in symbolic rather than homogeneous neighborhoods where two or more such groups live together for reasons of mutual advantage. This emerging view is manifested in a second set of options which consider non-public as well as public schools as parts of the civil community's overall educational system. The non-public sector used to consist exclusively of parochial schools and a few upper class "academies". Today not only has the variety of parochial schools increased but "private" schools catering to a wide variety of middle class interests have begun to emerge.

The study of the role of the non-public schools in local political systems has been substantially neglected. Today such neglect is no longer possible, particularly as Americans begin to seriously consider options such as the issuance of educational scrip to every family so that each may choose the kind of schooling it wants for its children, that would drastically change or even eliminate the present system of public education as we know it.

Clearly, such factors as the size of a particular civil community or the composition of its citizenry would influence the impact of such changes and the changes themselves would clearly affect the character of the community. In very large cities, for example, the proliferation of "freedom of choice" schools not built on any neighborhood principle might very likely exacerbate the already fragmented character of the community.
while in small and medium size civil communities, the very lack of distinctive neighborhoods and the availability of other opportunities for intergroup contact might lead to very different consequences. All the options involving non public education should be examined in this context: religious (or parochial) day-schools, private day schools for special purposes or interests, and shared time programs that combine public and non public education.

In this connection, the contents of the educational program in the public schools should also be examined as a third option. Under the system of testing at the circus practiced in the United States until well into the twentieth century, local school systems (which were usually quite small) determined their own educational programs including the religious, cultural and social values they attempted to transmit as representing the "American way of life". The major thrust of the twentieth century until very recently was away from such local decision-making and toward the imposition of common national standards of what could or could not be taught. The rise of black and other militant with their demands for an education that would strengthen their people's search for a common identity, has opened the possibility for a new version of the older approach toward the use of the school as a medium for transmitting different versions of the "American way of life" rather than any single one. Consequently, even the maintenance of public schools as we know them may bring local curricular character of a very distinctive character for neighborhoods, for whole civil communities, or even "neighborhoods" on their way to becoming civil communities.

All of these new options must be studied as major political questions, not simply as educational ones, since it is at precisely this point that
education and politics meet. Viewed from this perspective, education is, indeed, the hand maiden of politics in the highest sense.
The Mobilization of Educational Resources

We have already pointed out that the question of community control can only be considered in the context of the American political system as a federal one in which the political units are bound together in cooperative relationships. Consequently, a significant aspect of the study of the question must involve inquiry into the roles to be played by the extra-local governments in any system of locally-controlled education. In other words, we must ask what can a community actually control and what can it not, politically, administratively and economically? Under what conditions can it exercise control? What resources must be made available to it? By whom? Under what conditions? Are there any extra-local units, forces or actions that will particularly advance or deter community control? Why?

Studies of intergovernmental relations have repeatedly confined that, while participation in the provision of resources for given programs virtually guarantees the donor a role in shaping those programs, it does not by any means guarantee a level of influence commensurate with the resources provided. Thus most states have rarely exercised control over education in commensurate with the amount of money they provide their school districts. Conversely, some states exercise more control than their contributions might call for. In essence, the provision of resources and the exercise of influence represent separate political decisions which are related only when the decision-makers wish to relate them. Consequently, they may be studied as separate decisions, potentially related, when investigated in the context of support or opposition to community control in one form or another.
while the role of all the extra-local governments or authorities in the United States—state, federal and regional—are potentially significant in determining the outcome of the community control issue, the role of the states will in all likelihood be the most significant. The states begin by having authoritative custody over the organization of education within their boundaries, the development of educational standards and requirements, and the determination of the mode and character of financing educational systems. More than that, they have final authority over the legitimation of the civil communities themselves. In both connections they are bound to affect the school systems within their boundaries.

Theoretically, at least, they have the ability to make true community control possible by creating the legal framework for it and by "backstopping" their communities with technical assistance, financial resources and proper standard-setting so that community control becomes feasible. On the other hand, the existence of conditions of interests supporting the status quo with power in the state house could render the possibilities for achieving real community control remote. These are matters that deserve study in both their theoretical and practical aspects.

The federal role in education has been growing again in recent years, not only on the provision of support for certain educational endeavors but in the stimulation of educational innovation. An activist federal government can operate to lend its support to the movement for community control or to work against it. The trends run in both directions, supporting black ghetto efforts on one hand and seeking the metropolitanization of local educational systems on the other, encouraging local innovation and restricting local policy-making on religious questions. The very existence of any clear-cut federal policy is doubtful. This, in itself, deserves...
to be the subject of study. The relationship between federal aid and the educational establishment must be viewed from this perspective as well. The various federal programs can be examined individually in terms of their effects on the community control issue. Since "community control" works both ways and is often used as an argument to maintain racial segregation, federal policies can be examined in this regard as well.

Finally, the growing - if still small - influence of regional arrangements on the educational scene also has its bearing on the community control issue. Regional arrangements are of two kinds: there are interstate arrangements such as Education Commission of the States which serves over 40 states primarily in a research and advisory capacity and the Appalachian Regional Commission which provides both funds and a forum for political "trades" among the other states for educational purposes related to regional economic development. The first has yet to demonstrate any direct impact on the community control issue but is important for its efforts to reintroduce the country's political leadership into the educational picture. The second has already had an effect on the peripheral communities in its region, strengthening the educational systems of those it considers provoking from an economic perspective and weakening others by denying them additional resources for growth. There are also intrastate regional efforts, usually but not exclusively in metropolitan areas. These, too, are essentially coordinating or new, but their efforts are aimed at creating a new fiscal base for financing educational programs. Thus available funds are under severe strain, the metropolitan areas, too, and service districts, too, can be supported only by distributing into their communities to those in need. There is a political will, too, of those left out and their needs are implemented.
Investigation into the occasional influences is probably best effected through one or more other traditional methods of political research. Though here opinion is the key term, so policy research can be partic-

ularly useful.
The concept of political scientist is described on the next page.

In recent years, the study of political systems and the study of public policy have come to be of particular interest to educators. The subject itself is central to the political scientist's work and will be of crucial importance in the politics of education in the coming decades.

No particular methodological innovations are required to study the issues posed here. Rather, a synthesis of existing knowledge and a revival of some that have been disparaged in the search for new ones. Built into the above package is something of an alternative approach to the study of political systems. This writer is convinced of the value of this methodology precisely because it is not a doctrine with limited application. He has discussed it as a methodology in more detail in Appendix A of his Cities of the Prairie. At the same time, other methodologies are clearly appropriate for dealing with aspects of the question. For example, survey research to determine the extent, character, and focus of popular interest in community control, both on a national and a local basis, is of crucial importance. Survey research in depth should be used to explore the extent of the differences, if any, between the desires of citizens and the educators serving them for the good of the society.

Case studies of particular systems and issues have their value. But it is important to be aware of understanding or each school system within the context of the entire society. Actual experience in such cases must be carefully compared to the systematic study of community control.
Political Science and Education: The Long View and the Short*

Heinz Eulau
Stanford University

Some years ago, reviewing the contemporary state of political science, I noted that "political scientists are riding off in many directions, evidently on the assumption that if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there."¹ I am very glad, therefore, that we--both students of politics and students of education--have this opportunity to consider the relationship between our respective disciplines and to explore common ground before we rush off our separate ways doing all kinds of things we should not be doing and neglecting things that we should attend to.

No political scientist who has ever smelt the scent of Utopia can escape a fascination with education, and

---

* This paper has been prepared for the research workshop on "The Politics of Elementary and Secondary Education," sponsored by the Committee on Basic Research in Education, Division of Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Science--National Research Council, held September 14-19, 1970, at Stanford University.
for once, I think, we are not riding off because something is fad or fashion. To believe otherwise would be taking a very short view indeed. And if one were only to take the short view, one would deprive oneself of the sustained efforts made through the centuries by political philosophers to understand the relationship between politics and education.

But if one took only the long view, the result would be stultifying because one would inevitably come to the conclusion of toujours la même chose. If the short view is short, the long view, paradoxically, is even shorter. I propose to tread in-between, partly because by education and inclination I have a historical bent of mind, partly because by trained incapacity I cannot ignore the shape of things as they are. Happily, history has always meant to me the study of how things have come to be what they are, so that I have always succeeded in eluding the comfortable assumption either that the past is full of infinite wisdom or that present trends will continue indefinitely into the future.

Let me begin, therefore, at the beginning. The trouble is, of course, that political scientists not only may not know where they are going but also may be disagreed on where they come from. As I wrote at the
earlier occasion, "whether one prefers to trace political science back to Plato and Aristotle, or to the more empirically-minded Machiavelli, or to the establishment of independent academic departments of political science in the late nineteenth century, or to Charles Merriam's *New Aspects of Politics* (1925), is largely a matter of taste." Fortunately, the challenge of this opportunity leads me to amend the statement. Where one begins is perhaps not a matter of taste after all but dictated by what one is interested in. And if one is interested in politics and education, one better begin with Plato and go from there.

What makes Plato so pregnant with meaning today is the current impasse over the relationship between the educational system and the political order. There are those who, because they believe that education is dominated in any case by something they call the Military-Industrial-Political Complex, would make the schools staging areas of reform or revolution. And there are those who, because they mistake their establishment views and values for universal verities, would rather throttle education or choke it to death than have it sullied by political reality. Both sides, I suggest, might find it profitable to read Plato. For Plato's *Republic*, it seems to me, re-
presents this myopic view of the relationship between politics and education; in fact, it is the educational institution. There is simply no difference between the state of the Republic and its educational system. They are the same because they have the same goal—the well-being of the state. Education is not an end but the means by which human nature can be shaped in the right direction to produce the harmonious state. As the virtuous citizen can only fulfill himself in the polis, the state must see to it that training of the young is consonant with the welfare of the state. If the educational system is good, almost any improvement is possible in the political order.

There are two things to be derived by implication from this mini-presentation of Plato on education. First, there is the utopian scent—education can create the perfect political order. And second, because the image of the political order is perfect, at least in the beholder's mind, education can be nothing but the handmaiden of politics. Both presumptions, I daresay, are still very much with us—in whatever guise. They explain, I think, both the optimism and dogmatism of all those, whether of the Right, Center or Left, who believe that if something is wrong with the social and political order,
all that is needed to rectify things is more education, better education and morally right education. But, as I said, these are only presumptions, and a presumption is, by definition, a conclusion that is not based on evidence.

Let me put it differently. I know of no political order in the real world which, even if we could agree on its being close to perfection, has been created out of or by an educational system. If anything, the relationship between politics and education, it seems to me, is the other way round. If the political order is sound, stable, legitimate, just or whatever other criterion of "goodness" one wishes to apply, education and all that is implied by education, such as the creation of new knowledge or the transmission of traditional knowledge, flourishes. If the political order is in trouble, education is in trouble. If we were to follow Plato or, for that matter, Aristotle who believed that education is prior to politics, we would have to conclude that our public troubles--the war in Vietnam, poverty in the ghettos, pollution of the life space, and so on--are due to our educational system. Of course, John Dewey and Dr. Benjamin Spock have been blamed; but I seriously doubt that we can take such scape-goating seriously. On the contrary, therefore, if we find our educational
system wanting, I think we should try to look at the public order rather than, as we have done so much in education, contemplate our navels as if the outside world did not exist.

Perhaps I am over-stating the anti-classical view somewhat, but I do so only because I sense the spell of Plato and Aristotle is still so very much with us, even though it is camouflaged these days in the rhetoric of Herbert Marcuse or the aphorisms of Chairman Mao, on the Left, and the "public philosophy" of Walter Lippmann or the homilies of Max Rafferty, on the Right. But if we assume that it is the political process and the condition of political affairs that make education what it is, I think we find ourselves at the interstices of polity and educational system where political science as a theoretical science and education as an applied science can truly meet on empirical ground.

Let me state all this more formally. I think we have to think of politics, broadly conceived as including both government and societal happenings, as the independent variable and of education as the dependent variable. Now, what bothers me about most of the recent research in political science that deals with education or education-related topics like socialization or attitude formation
is that it has been largely cast in the teleological model that is implicit in Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the polity. Let me single out as an example The Civic Culture, not because it is unique but because it is undoubtedly the most majestic work of this genre of research. Almond and Verba discover nine relationships between level of education as the independent variable and a variety of political perceptions, attitudes and behavioral manifestations as the dependent variables. They conclude that "educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political attitudes." I have no doubt that these relationships exist. But I believe that one or another mix of all the variables subsumed under what is called political culture—whether parochial, participant, subject or civic—is nothing but one huge tautology that, like Plato's Republic, so completely absorbs politics into education and education into politics that explanation of the relationship between politics and education is foreclosed. What is involved is, of course, more than formal education which, Almond and Verba point out, "may not adequately substitute for time in the creation of these other components of the civic culture." But in their subsequent discussion the Platonic-Aristotelian
model (which is basically a teleological and practically an engineering approach) implicit in their premises and inferences is made quite explicit: "The problem, then, is to develop, along with the participation skills that schools and other socializing agencies can foster, affective commitment to the political system and a sense of political community." Now, these are not the words of Plato and Aristotle but their spirit is there. The good society will emerge if, through proper socializing and educational procedures, in whatever channels and by whatever agents, the right components of the political culture are harnessed in the right direction.

The belief in the omnipotence of education in shaping the political order is reflected in much of the literature on political development. "The educational preparation of at least sizeable segments of a population," writes Robert E. Ward, "is a basic factor in the modernization of political cultures." I find all of these writings troublesome because the formulation of the problem strikes me as eminently circular. For, it seems to me, the introduction of a sophisticated educational system is an act of modernization and can, therefore, not be its cause. In many underdeveloped nations which mobilize educationally there are, indeed, effects on the political order,
but not necessarily effects that are conducive to a viable politics. The over-production of high school and college graduates who cannot find meaningful employment often makes for disorder rather than order, but the resultant revolutionary regimes cannot solve the problems that brought them into being. Although an educated elite is a necessary condition of political viability, it is not sufficient. If the educated elite reinforces traditional status values or special privileges and, at the same time, betrays a sense of insecurity as a result of the new education, the political process suffers. "Hence the paradox," writes Lucian Pye of Burma,

that is the common tragedy for so many underdeveloped countries: those who have been exposed to modern forms of knowledge are often precisely the ones who are most anxious to obstruct the continued diffusion of the effects of that knowledge; they desperately need to hold on to what they have and avoid all risks. The lasting consequence of their formal education has thus been an inflexible and conservative cast of mind. Modernization has bred opposition to change.

Not all students of development follow the Aristotelian lead. Holt and Turner, for instance, posit the primacy of government. Referring to the government's participation in modernization, they point out that "during the take-off stage, however, the government became much more involved in the enculturation process
through its contribution to and regulation of education, especially at the elementary level."\textsuperscript{10} Political development in England, for instance, took place prior to educational development.

My point in all this is merely to suggest that a model that postulates the primacy of politics in the relationship with education may be more appropriate than the classical approach, and the underdeveloped nations certainly offer a rich field for testing relevant hypotheses.

Fortunately, modern political philosophy gives us an alternate to the classical model. But this brings us quickly into the nineteenth century. Hobbes, as far as I can make out, is silent on education, and Locke, though concerned with it, significantly did not see it as a function of education to develop in citizens a sense of civic duty--quite logically, I think, because in his view ideas solely stem from one's own perceptions and can therefore not be subjected to an authority other than that of the person himself. I do not want to dwell on Kant who, insisting on man being treated as an end rather than as means, is probably Plato's most distinguished antagonist; but the American tradition was barely influenced by him. I shall turn, therefore, to John Stuart
Mill's *On Liberty*.

Mill's conception of education flows from the premise that, given the great variety of opinions on questions of value, moral training must leave room for error. Although one opinion may be dominant, the expression of contrary opinions is necessary and desirable because the dominant opinion may turn out to be partial, false or even dangerous. *On Liberty* was written before universal education, which Mill favored, had been introduced. "If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education," he wrote, "it might save itself the trouble of providing one." Implicit in this statement is an interesting distinction between "State education" and the "enforcement of education by the State." Arguments against the former, he believed do not apply to the latter "but to the State's taking upon itself to direct that education; which is a totally different thing." And why did Mill reject "State education?" Let me quote him, for this view is so very different from the Platonic-Aristotelian conception:

All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another, and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases
the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation; in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.11

I need not linger over the fact that the times have passed Mill by. Rather, I find his position remarkable for two reasons. First, if I do have to smell the scent of Utopia, I find Mill's version much more attractive and congenial than Plato's, for reasons that should be self-evident. But, second, just as the Platonic-Aristotelian conception provides the latent premises for the model of empirical research that takes education as the independent variable, so Mill provides the premises, I think, for any model that takes it as the dependent variable. Almost a hundred years after On Liberty was published, another eminent English political theorist and scholar, Ernest Barker, echoed Mill to the effect that "the field of education...is not, and never can be, a monopoly of the State." And he gives a reason: "Educational associations --of parents, of teachers, of workers, and of members of religious confessions--are all concerned in the development of educational experiments, and in offering that liberty of choice among types of school and forms of instruction which is essential to the growth of personal
and individual capacity."\textsuperscript{12}

What I want to bring out, simply, is what we all know but rarely articulate as specifically as we might; namely, that our value bias is an important criterion in the specification of what we study and how we study it. Our research designs are not neutral by nature, but by articulating and guarding against our value biases, we can at least hope to neutralize them as long as we do our research. It seems to me that there is a profound difference between a research design that takes education (or related processes, such as socialization, indoctrination, propaganda, conditioning, and so on) as the independent variable and a design which takes it as the dependent variable. For if we start from the other end, I think we have a much richer area of investigation opening up before us. And this, I think, is what we mean when we speak of "politics of education" as a field of inquiry.

I do not know why the field has been neglected for so many years; why, in fact, there has never been a consistent effort to continue the research on "civic training" that Charles E. Merriam organized and directed in the late twenties. There were eight country studies and Merriam's own \textit{The Making of Citizens}. Each study,
Merriam reported, was given wide latitude, but each collaborator was enjoined "(1) that as a minimum there would be included in each volume an examination of the social bases of political cohesion and (2) that the various mechanisms of civic education would be adequately discussed."

Among these mechanisms, Merriam continued, are those of the schools, the role of governmental services and officials, the place of political parties, and the function of special patriotic organizations; or, from another point of view, the use of traditions in building up civic cohesion, the place of political symbolism, the relation of language, literature, and the press, to civic education, the position occupied by locality in the construction of a political loyalty; and, finally, it is hoped that an effective analysis may be made of competing group loyalties rivaling the state either within or without.

In his later Systematic Politics, Merriam emphasized that "the struggle for the schools is almost as significant as that for the control of the army, perhaps more important in the long run.... We may merely note that some of the most vital of the power problems center in processes often only remotely associated with the grimmer realities of conventionalized authority."

There is certainly something of the prophetic in Merriam's appraisal. We surely witness today a struggle over our educational institutions unmatched in history. Unfortunately, empirical political science has little to
contribute to either an understanding of the conflict over the control of education or to possible solutions (though I suspect we may have to learn to live with unsolved problems for a long time to come). I must plead a good deal of ignorance in the matter, but as I search through my library I find only a few items that, in one way or another, meet Merriam's challenge to investigation. If one leaves out the burgeoning literature on political socialization and related topics which, I argued, is really inspired by the education-as-independent-variable model, I can think only of such works as State Politics and the Public Schools, by Masters, Salisbury and Eliot;\textsuperscript{16} of The Political Life of American Teachers, by Harmon Zeigler;\textsuperscript{17} and of the stimulating, if "soft," The Public Vocational University: Captive Knowledge and Public Power, by Edgar Litt.\textsuperscript{18} And I don't think the situation in political sociology is much better. There are, undoubtedly, case studies of local situations (as in Dahl's Who Governs?), but a systematic, empirical body of knowledge on the politics of education does not exist.

I hope very much that this workshop will generate enough research ideas to remedy the situation. Just to be constructive, let me put in some input.

1. Instead of doing so much work on political
socialization, we might ask how the rapid circulation of political elites in America influences the educational system. How is the educational system affected by the conditions of political recruitment and turnover in personnel among those who control it? Are some of the troubles besetting the schools due to the volatility of recruitment processes?

2. How is the educational system affected by the existence of individual differences in intellectual interest and capacity, on the one hand, and government policies to provide equal opportunities for education, on the other hand? How can the educational system be "calibrated" to meet the variety of societal needs for different jobs--from janitors and unskilled workmen to Supreme Court Justices? What are the political implications of "manpower manipulation" through education?

3. Why is it that the "educational lobby" is relatively weak? Who are the "natural" allies of education in the determination of national, state or local educational policies? Would education be better off, or would it be worse off, if it were "taken out" of politics or politics were taken out of education? Why do most interest groups other than those directly involved in education not see the stakes they have in education?
4. What are the consequences of centralization and decentralization of control structures for education? Although this has been much debated, I don't think there is much reliable evidence. Cross-national comparisons are indicated.

5. What are the effects on education of the continuing efforts on the part of those who would use educational institutions to achieve their own political ends? How can education resist the encroachment of outside interests, be they rightist-oriented legislative inquiries or leftist-inspired movements? How can the school be a "laboratory of democracy?" and yet remain sufficiently autonomous not to become, as in the Soviet Union, an instrument of the garrison state?

6. In treating the school itself as a "political system," we must surely ask questions about the balance between authority and liberty that is conducive to education; in short, reconceptualizing the school as a political system cannot avoid the old controversy over "discipline." How true is the progressive notion that too much (what is "too much?") discipline makes for aggression which is the enemy of tolerance and corresponding guilt which is the enemy of political responsibility? (To judge from the current generation, presumably brought
up in a relaxed manner, there is even more aggression and guilt.

Let me leave it at that. Let me also reemphasize that my premise, throughout, has been the Millian view of the individual as the goal of all educational effort. This is, of course, both a normative and an utopian premise. As I see the excesses now being perpetrated on our high school and college campuses in the name of freedom I am by no means sure that this premise is viable. But, I think, it is a premise worth defending. Perhaps it is up to government to protect the schools against their own excesses; which is, I posit, a nice twist on John Stuart Mill. But such must be the view of a latter-day liberal who, unlike conservative and radical, does not see in government the source of all evil.\textsuperscript{19}
Footnotes


2. Ibid., p. 131.

3. I could cite here just as well the late V. O. Key's chapter on "The Educational System" in Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 315-343. Key orders his variables in the same way as Almond and Verba do. But I think both his premises and inferences are different—in fact inconsistent with his data presentation. Almond and Verba, on the other hand, are highly consistent and interpret their findings within the contours of the underlying model.


5. Ibid., p. 502.

6. Ibid., p. 503.


Some Ideas for Research in the Politics of Science for Education
by
Hendrik D. Gideonse

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California
September 1970
I have interpreted the question we were to direct our attention to in slightly different fashion since I, as a government official, am not in a position to carry out such research at the present time. The issues I have developed below are significant, not just for education, but for mission-oriented behavioral and social science generally.

The Problem

In recent years resources available for educational research have experienced very rapid growth followed first by leveling off and then by negative increments owing to inflation. At the same time, however, strong pressures are being exerted upon Federal educational research programs to orient themselves much more sharply to a carefully delimited set of goals and objectives in order to make demonstrable dents in some of the major problems confronting education in the Nation. These pressures have come from Departmental, Bureau of the Budget, Office of Science and Technology, and Congressional sources.

Coordinate with the pressures to target research and development more sharply has come a degree of controversy, sometimes constructive, more often acidic, which has dogged the program for five years now. Part of the consequence of this controversy has been a stimulus perceived on the part of some of us in Washington to engage in the kind of analysis which might begin to explain this problem. The recent OECD policy review of educational research led to the preparation of Educational Research and Development in the United States and that effort in turn led me to
propose a policy framework for educational research which will appear shortly in Science.

During the course of the OECD review and after, it became clear that one of the most serious problems facing administrators of educational research lay in the determination of objectives. Everybody wanted in on the act, in and out of government. Different levels of staff and line competed openly, covertly, accidentally, or in parallel for extremely scarce resources. Interest groups outside of the government and inside the government (but not in research) often espoused diametrically opposed positions on research priorities and objectives.

This discovery ties rather nicely to some emerging ideas about important differences in the character of the behavioral and social sciences as compared to the natural, physical, and bio-medical sciences. These differences occur for both the science, research, or conclusion-oriented activities in behavioral and social science and for the development, technology, or decision-oriented activities based on those sciences.

Let me phrase it in the following way. The natural, physical, and bio-medical sciences work on variables or entities that are quite different from those worked on in educational or behavioral/social science research. The essential difference is that in the behavioral and social sciences virtually all of the objects of research or variables under study either possess free will (that is to say, they are self-conscious) or are inextricably imbedded in a value structure of some kind or other.
I am not saying here that the outcomes of physical, bio-medical, etc., sciences don't relate to choice or values. Clearly they do. What I am saying is that the materials, units, and variables with which and on which they are working are not themselves self-conscious, possessed of free will, or value-laden. Atoms do not choose nor do chemicals or glands. But learners, and parents, and society, and institutions do. Rats and mice possess no human values nor are human values involved in the immediate intricacies of a high-energy physics experiment. But learning itself is a value. Failure in its achievement in any large-scale experiment involving real children or adults is a value question. Indeed, it seems clear that all matters involving education, welfare, or social futures are inextricably bound up in questions of worth, propriety, and preference.

What this conclusion means is crucial. If educational R&D or any mission-oriented behavioral and social science research enterprise is in its practice as well as its implications value-laden and choice-rich, then science as it is practiced and managed in support of education is as much a social and political activity as it is a scientific one.

Some Constraints

If the propositions presented above hold any water, they begin to explain why we in educational research have had such a difficult time presenting our case to Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Science and Technology, and the performing and using client groups with which we deal.
Several ideas come to mind. First, political and social activities require political and social decision structures. We in research don't have them.

Second, if science is somehow inextricably bound up in politics as this analysis suggests, then perhaps we need to explore the degree to which, as sciences, the disciplines applied to human behavior and society need to develop models (political models?) of themselves which are different from the models applied to the natural and physical sciences. Perhaps the nomothetic drive associated with these latter sciences as exemplified by mathematical grounding needs to be exchanged for the development of sciences more oriented to the idiographic. Another way of saying the same thing is to strive for developing conceptions of science which are oriented not toward the development of generalizations, but oriented toward the explanation and (in the neutral sense of the term) manipulation of individual, discrete, non-replicable situations which have never existed before and will never exist again.

Some Possible Lines of Analysis

Three lines of analysis suggest themselves. The first is aimed directly at the decision-making processes at the Federal level. Is it possible to devise models of decision-making for research and development in education which are effectively and responsibly political as well as sound in terms of technical requirements? What would such models have to encompass? How can one deal with the dual role of the science community?
which acts at the same time as technical advisers and as an intellectual political elite of sorts with definite views about goals and objectives all their own worth listening to?

The second line of inquiry would look to the need for creating new political models of executive government. Administrative agencies are increasingly called upon to perform political functions which used to be handled by legislative branches of government. More and more discretionary authority accrues to administration as the complexity of issues causes legislatures to in effect delegate responsibility for such decision-making to major areas or generalized purposes selected by the legislature. The mythology, however, is still quite prevalent that legislatures make policy and executives administer it. The shibboleth still remains that civil service is apolitical, and there is great hesitation to engage in the kinds of activities which appear overtly or covertly political (prohibitions against "lobbying," for example, and the flexible definitions attached to that term).

The third line of inquiry deals with the institutional structures for sponsoring and performing educational research. We have tended to think in terms of educational research striving for status as a sub-set of national science policy which, in turn, is almost necessarily pyramidal in structure and dependent upon securing the very best talent across the entire nation for decision-making about policy, individual grants, criteria and the like. Conceptions respecting the political character of research (and much more needs to be said to
elaborate and define what that idea means) would suggest very different notions about institutional structures. Perhaps funds should be distributed to States for research purposes. Perhaps research policies should be developed in autonomous agencies scattered regionally around the country.

****

The ideas sketched out here are trial balloons, really, very much in the formative stage. But they spring from real problems confronting us of a conceptual nature and perhaps peculiarly suited to treatment from the perspectives of political science.
The Civic Miseducation of American Youth:
Political Science and Paradigm Change

by

Edward S. Greenberg
Stanford University

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970
INTRODUCTION

We are in the midst of a public crisis. The continuing debate over the questions of American foreign policy, racism and economic justice threatens to tear asunder the fragile network of sentiment and shared loyalties that constitutes the social fabric of a people. Few Americans are any longer shocked by riot, arson, bombing, police repression or the taking of political prisoners. Mass habituation to such horrors is perhaps the truest operational indicator of the depth of the crisis.

The crisis is and will continue to be nourished by the growing alienation of American youth, whether they be black youth from America's wretched ghettos or privileged white youth at elite universities. The most pervasive orientation I have personally encountered among the young in teaching and research is a deep cynicism about the American political process. Students claim that what they hear and read in the classroom fails to correspond to the world as they experience it.

It is the argument of this paper that the sanitized, perfumed and inflated picture of American politics that students receive at all levels of the educational system is grossly inaccurate, and feeds the cynicism of the young. It is further argued that we, as professional political scientists, have contributed to this problem by the way we interpret the world and convey it in our work. And, finally, it is argued in this brief paper that we may have something to learn from the often incoherent ramblings of the young; that many of their admittedly unsophisticated critiques still manage to strike at the very heart of the prevailing paradigm of political science.
We have been charged by this conference to raise for examination the question or questions we feel are of greatest import for education and politics. I can think of no more pressing public issue or intellectual problem than the growing alienation of youth. The roots of growing alienation are no doubt multifaceted and I do not for a moment believe that changes in civic education will necessarily change the drift toward alienation. Yet the educational process is a promising place to begin, not only because educational institutions touch upon the lives of all young people, but also because it is one of the few institutions upon which change can be wrought. We, as political scientists, have more impact than we perhaps imagine. Our work finds its way into elementary and secondary school texts, curriculum materials and the college education of school teachers. We have, I am afraid, contributed to the miseducation of American children by offering them a picture of a society and a polity that cannot but lead to disappointment and disillusion. I believe that we have been a part of the problem and that it is time to become part of the solution. Such a process first requires some serious self-examination.

The Paradigm of Political Science

A past president of the American Political Science Association recently announced the arrival of a paradigm of political science. My own claim is somewhat narrower. While it is still questionable whether a paradigm of political science exists, I believe that one exists among those whose specialty is American politics. There exists
among such scholars a certain commonality of perspective, a commonality of perspective that incorporates both empirical and normative elements. In short, these scholars tend to share, in Kuhn's terminology, a paradigm.

A paradigm is a very powerful tool indeed, for it represents a "strong network of commitments -- conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological...it provides rules that tell the practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and science are like..." Such a phenomenon is not to be sneered at. A paradigm simplifies and defines the world in such a way that it allows for the advancement of what Kuhn calls "normal science." This concentration of perspective has its price, however, and that is the failure to perceive, incorporate or take account of phenomena outside the boundaries of the paradigm. Political science has made very impressive strides in its normal science, but it pays a price in its failure to deal with matters inconsistent with the paradigm.

Following a suggestion implicit in Kuhn's analysis, I turned to an examination of leading and representative political science textbooks of American government in order to elucidate the main components of the paradigm. While textbooks do not seem to play as important a role in the social sciences as in the natural sciences, it still remains the case that it is in textbooks that the orthodoxy of a discipline may best be found. This is probably true for two reasons. Almost by definition, a textbook is based upon the cumulative work of a field of study; it is the distillate of the hundreds of research
monographs that make up the literature of a field. Moreover, simple economics enters the equation. In order to enjoy wide sales, the authors of a textbook must convince other political scientists of the reasonableness and propriety of their treatment, and as a consequence rarely venture beyond the bounds of acceptability.

I turned, therefore, to three of the most generally respected and best selling textbooks in the field of American politics: Burns and Peltason, Government by the People; Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States; and Irish and Prothro, The Politics of American Democracy. While each differs in style, in favored methodological approaches, and in several other nuances, the shared perspective that undergirds them is rather striking. The three elements which follow are, I believe, the building blocks of the paradigm.

1. American politics is best described as a pluralist democracy.

Group theory or the pluralist model is probably the dominant point of view among political scientists today. In group theory, mutual noninterference is replaced by conflict among groups with "shared attitudes." Majority coalitions must be created on each issue, and many individuals and groups fail to apply their potential resources in the coalition-building effort. As a result, the system contains considerable "slack"... power is highly decentralized, fluid and situational. There is no single elite, but a "multicentered" system in which the centers exist in conflict-and-bargaining relation to each other.

The authors take their stand with pluralist democracy. With all its failings, this kind of democracy nourishes a tolerance for differing ideas, a respect for minority rights, and a concern for the individual that we consider essential in a decent and ordered society. But our intention in this book is not to defend pluralist democracy; our intention is to show, as objectively as we can, how it works in the United States.
Because one center of power is set against another, power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of power, will be reduced to a minimum.

Because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they strongly object to, the consent of all will be won in the long run.

How is it that the system which exalts freedom over order actually enjoys greater order with its greater freedom?

Decisions are made, even in a pluralist democracy, by a relatively small group of decision-makers, with most of the public on most issues being unconcerned and uninvolved. Yet there is a rough correspondence between what public officials do and the interests of most of the people because of competition among political decision-makers.

2. American history is best characterized as a history of progressive change; a history of the steady improvement of the life chances of the average man.

...The Civil War has been the only major breakdown in our political institutions during two centuries of continuous development in the arts of operating, on a national scale, a democratic republic in which unity yields to diversity, and diversity to unity: not without strain and conflict, to be sure, but without extensive civil strife or the introduction of those poisonous hatreds and resentment that seep through a system until it collapses in paralysis or in violent paroxysm.

The United States... has undergone changes that half a century ago no one foresaw: the expansion of welfare measures and government intervention in the economy; the almost overnight assumption by the United States of its role as a major, the major, world power; and since the early 1950s huge steps toward the ultimate political, economic and social liberation of Negroes.

...of increasing political significance is the differential in incomes between white and nonwhite families. In 1966, the average nonwhite family income was only about 60% of the average white family income. But that was an improvement over the 51% of 20 years ago. Moreover, the improvement is likely to continue if nonwhites are able to take advantage of better educational opportunities.
3. Elites are the repository of democratic convictions and the guarantors of the viability of the democratic system. The masses, on the other hand, are to be feared because of their anti-democratic intolerance and proclivity for mass action.

...democratic values and habits are more prevalent among the politically active minority. However much they may disagree on issues, political activists seem to serve as the carriers of the democratic creed, learning through actual experience to recognize the problems of others, to compromise differences rather than insisting on total acceptance of their own particular principles, and to appreciate the relation of specific actions or issues to broader democratic principles. Discussions of democracy tend to overlook the functional nature of apathy for the system... many people who express undemocratic principles in response to questioning are too apathetic to act on these principles in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most democratic principles are also those who are least likely to act.¹³

The Framers tended to think of government as kings and ministers who were not politically accountable to the electorate and who were likely to suppress legislatures, arrest citizens for criticizing the authorities, search homes without warrants. Today, many of us think of the government as our own elected officials and responsive to us.¹⁴

Democracy is preserved not only by the convictions of the mass but also by agreement among leaders on the basic rules of the game. Competition among leaders is indispensable to democratic government.¹⁵

[Democratic government is the outcome of] a series of responses to problems of diversity and conflict, by leaders who have sought to build and maintain a nation, to gain the loyalty and obedience of citizens, to win general and continuing approval of political institutions and at the same time to conform to aspirations for democracy.¹⁶

While I am sure that there may be additional elements of a world view to which many political scientists would adhere, I believe that these three are shared by almost all working political scientists and thus comprise a paradigm, no matter how crude. Like all paradigms, this paradigm structures the world in such a way that some phenomena
are incorporated, whereas other phenomena make no impact. Thus, the above textbooks are as interesting for what they fail to say as for what they say. All of the texts attempt to be contemporaneous by including materials on black power, Vietnam and the urban crisis, but none of the authors are led by this material to ask very hard and searching questions about their paradigm. Irish and Prothro, for instance, honestly deal with the rise of a military-industrial complex, the failure of the civil rights movement and the increasing bureaucratization of decision-making, but never allow such matters to shake their faith in their view of America as democratic, pluralistic, progressive and ruled by benevolent elites.

**Anomalies**

Kuhn has suggested that revolutions in scientific paradigms are processes whereby cumulative anomalies arise which cannot be explained or fit into the dominant paradigm. A series of phenomena are discovered which violate the expectations formed by the dominant world view. There comes a point when so many anomalies have arisen that the old paradigm no longer makes sense of the world. It is then time for the formulation of alternative modes of explanation.

I believe that we are at such a juncture in political science. The sound and tumult raised by the young in the past decade and a half over the issues of American foreign policy and domestic racism raises some very serious questions about how the majority of political scientists look at America. I realize that some well argue that as scholars we should shun the type of phenomena usually referred to as "current
events" and focus our efforts instead upon questions that have scientific payoff. I would suggest, however, that a focus on "current events" can lead to the raising of issues that are the equivalent of Kuhn's anomalies and thus scientifically important.

Take, for instance, political science glorification of elites and fear of the masses. Such a perspective arises out of the rather impressive voting and opinion studies of the past three decades. The evidence gathered in these studies documenting the greater knowledge, sophistication and expressed compliance with democratic norms by elites is certainly incontrovertible.

And yet it must also be acknowledged that the voting and public opinion studies represent a rather narrow peninsula of evidence, and interpretations of American politics based on them alone ignores a great deal about American political life that is neither open to the opinion survey nor relevant to elections.

The Vietnam war and American foreign policy in general should suggest to us that if elites are the repository of democratic values, they don't allow it to show in the area of foreign policy. Very few people can agree on very much about Vietnam, yet I believe a generalization that can be accepted by all is that that abomination was and is an elite adventure. The masses certainly did not force elite national decision-makers to intervene first with advisors and then with massive air and ground power. I doubt that the masses really fear for something called American "credibility." It was not the masses that forced cruel and inhuman tactics such as search and destroy, strategic hamlets,
saturation bombing and the forced urbanization of the peasantry.

If Vietnam were an isolated mistake in a sea of American benevo-
ence, one could excuse political scientists for constantly praising
elites. That national tragedy has, however, helped stimulate a second
look at the history of American foreign policy, particularly the post-
World War II period. The research results of the "revisionist"
school of historical scholarship sheds a very different light on the
Cold War years than most Americans encounter in the media and in their
schools.

One might argue that generalizations made by political scientists
about elites are only meant to apply to the domestic scene; that the
foreign policy arena represents an entirely different set of ground
rules and considerations. And yet the issue of racial justice raised
by the tumult of the past few years must serve to seriously call into
question the vision of elites as the repository of the democratic ethic.

It has only been very recently that we have begun to look to the
heart of inter-racial relations in the United States. For years social
scientists have focused primarily upon individual prejudice. The
research in this area has been most impressive to be sure, and the
evidence demonstrating the greater tolerance of the upper reaches of
the education-income-occupation hierarchies is uncontestable. And yet,
that research is terribly limited in that it failed to examine and ser-
iously consider the institutional nature of racial oppression in the
United States.

In almost every institutional sector of American life, governmental
and non-governmental elites have had a hand in national policies that
have been to the detriment of black citizens. It is a harsh fact indeed, but true, that almost without exception, the institutions of American life are racist. Whether we look at business, education, the administration of justice, health care, housing or politics, major institutions have worked against the liberation of black citizens.

Housing is a particularly apt example. Government policy until quite recently has served to, in effect, concentrate black people in the inner-city and provide cheap housing in the suburbs for fleeing whites. FHA loans were confined primarily to suburban housing beyond the financial reach of most black citizens. Until the courts intervened, the FHA actively encouraged the use of restrictive covenants in order to protect the financial position of investors. Public housing and urban renewal served to exasperate problems by destroying more low-income housing than it provided in return and leaving no decent place for the poor to live. Financial leaders, builders and real estate men were of course quite enthusiastic about these policies and, not surprisingly, profited enormously. In short, many groups that would probably score high on any test of tolerance toward minorities, increased their life chances by diminishing those of blacks.

The story could easily be repeated for almost every other sector of American life. In education, elite decisions have been an important element in the miseducation of black children. They helped write the texts which perpetuated myths of white superiority and black inferiority, formulated culturally biased I.Q. tests and established tracking systems that doomed many black children to menial futures. In business,
elites denied black people adequate credit or insurance and helped insure white domination of ghetto businesses. The legal system oppresses black people through racially biased and often brutal police, white dominance of the legal profession, bond and sentencing practices and lack of adequate counsel. The list could go on. Let it suffice to say at this point that while individual prejudice has always been a problem in American life, black advancement is hindered more by the major institutions of our society, all of which are run, by definition, by elites.\footnote{17}

In view of all of this, is it any wonder that a goodly number of our best students sneer at the picture of American society painted by political scientists. There is a basic incongruency between the harsh realities of American life and our dominant paradigm. Discomforting anomalies arise all around us whether they be raised by intemperate students, desperate ghetto residents or respected scholars like Lowi, Edelman, Rogin, Gamson or Mills, among others.

I believe that we are in the midst of that process whereby scientific revolutions come about. We are only at the very earliest stages of what may prove to be a long process. We are at the point where anomalies are beginning to appear and to accumulate. We are at the point where younger scholars are beginning to struggle with the inappropriateness of our current model for the understanding of American life.

We are not at the point, however, where a new paradigm has been formulated to take its place, and that fact contributes to our problem. Kuhn has demonstrated that old paradigms are not discarded until a new
one is at hand that explains both phenomena incorporated in the old paradigm and the accumulated anomalies.

We are, I believe, in that disconcerting period of turmoil where the old has lost its ability to make sense of the world, but a new formulation has not yet arrived to fill the gap. Because they have no strong attachment to older perspectives, the young are especially conscious of the turmoil and are searching for new ways to deal with the world, whether it be in new political perspectives, cultural stances or family arrangements. We would do well to emulate some portion of their behavior by beginning a serious re-examination of the way we perceive the American polity. To cling to the outmoded paradigm not only feeds the disenchantment and cynicism of the young, but, I might add, distorts our analysis of American political life as well.
FOOTNOTES

1. To say that significant segments of white and black youth are politically alienated does not imply that their alienation derives from similar problems or demands similar solutions. Research on these matters is sorely lacking and much needs to be done. In addition to the sense data we receive from our not so tranquil sojourns on college campuses, there are some longitudinal survey data which support the generalization of increasing political alienation among the young. See Roberta S. Sigel, "Political Orientations and Social Class: A Study of Working Class School Children," paper prepared for the VIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970. A recent Harris poll in Newsweek ("The Black Mood--Summer, 1970," June 8) reports a fantastic increase in the percentage of blacks under 25 now willing to use violence in their struggle. A recent report in The San Francisco Chronicle offers convincing evidence that a majority of black soldiers (as opposed to just two years ago) now think that it might be necessary to apply the weapons and skills acquired in the military to the domestic needs of the black population.


5. Irish and Prothro, p. 255.


8. Irish and Prothro, p. 88.


12. Irish and Prothro, p. 56.

13. Irish and Prothro, pp. 77-78.


17. Because of time and space limitations, I have chosen not to deal directly with the other two elements of the paradigm. Sufficient research and interpretation critical of these elements is at hand and there is no need to be repetitious. The literature critical of the pluralist interpretation of American politics, for instance, is every bit as persuasive as those supportive of that interpretation, and I suggest that the reader turn to the standard sources. Worthy of special attention, however, are the following: Ted Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969); Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964); William Connolly, *The

It should be noted that Robert Dahl reports that one of his students measured the degree of poliarchy and pluralism in ten countries and found that the United States did not rank particularly well, namely, eighth. See Robert Dahl, "The Evaluation of Political Systems," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

18. If prediction is the companion of explanation in the scientific enterprise, then recent events attest to the failure of political science. A reading of recent political science literature fails to prepare us for the public crisis in which we are now embroiled. There is no hint in that literature of the alienation, passion and energy loosed in the ghettos and on the campus.
Dear Mike:

As I indicated to you in our conversations earlier this week, I am compelled to withdraw from the workshop on the politics of elementary and secondary education. As you know, Professor Bush's heart attack and subsequent decision to take a sabbatical leave resulted in some reallocation of responsibilities at the R & D Center. I assumed directorship of a national program in school staff development and the deadlines and pressures have been such that I have not been able to prepare a paper and indeed, must be in Washington for a planning meeting on Wednesday through the remainder of this week. I'm disappointed that I can't make the sessions; the topics and papers are fascinating and I was eager to join the discussions, especially about the usefulness and possible new directions of research and theory on political socialization.

I suspect that the amount and intensity of political dissent and activity among college, high school and even junior high youth is forcing us to modify our initial conceptualizations of the ways political behavior is socialized, learned, acquired or generated. In our first paper on the topic in 1961 in a volume edited by Lipset, Dave Easton and I struggled to explain why American youth were so uninvolved in political controversy and conflict and concluded that it was because the socialization process was unusually effective and the system secure. Trust and confidence in the system were high, so why get worked up about politics.

The contemporary scene is obviously quite different and it is difficult to explain it by applying traditional models of socialization to political attitudes and especially to political behavior in young people. I have discussed some preliminary notions about the shortcomings of traditional models in a forthcoming chapter in a volume edited by Gil Abcarian, based on a lecture series at Florida State University. It seemed to me a couple of years ago that a model of political learning which made allowance for acquiring political attitudes and behavior from peers was more realistic than which conceptualized socialization as the transmission of belief systems and behavior patterns from the adults to the pre-adults. I found the notion of political learning more comfortable than political socialization in attempting to understand anti-establishment feelings and activities on the part of students and other minority groups. It was not completely satisfactory, but it helped me move out of a too-rigid way of thinking about the growth of citizen-type behavior.

I still have doubts and reservations. We are far ahead of the state of the field that I encountered in the mid-fifties when I tried to put together a lecture on political learning for a course in adolescence at the University of Chicago when there was virtually nothing available other than some intra-family data on party preference...
and a study by Centers on children of the New Deal. But we are somehow still getting ourselves oriented trying to redefine the problem in more realistic and effective terms.

The major concern I have at the moment about political socialization in this country is the extent to which political behavior in young people is learned or whether it is spontaneously derivative from a confluence of internal states and external pressures and appeals. From both an individual and group perspective, political behavior (as contrasted with political beliefs, attitudes and knowledge) is in part a matter of maintaining existing status and power relationships within a social structure and of attempts to change these relationships. Such maneuvers involve profound responses at the visceral level which may be accompanied by verbalizations and more "cognitive" operations but are not necessarily controlled or initiated by them. In short, having observed my students and colleagues and been sensitive to some of my own responses during campus protests and near riots, I am very skeptical about the usefulness of concepts of political socialization to explain what happened to us as individuals or to the departments, schools and universities involved as social and "political" units. The responses of faculty members to students who demand in non-traditional ways a greater share in decision making may be understood by some behavioral dynamics as other than the socialization of these faculty members when they were in elementary and high school. Not that the early belief systems are irrelevant; they are simply not adequate to explain political behavior when we get down to non-routine cases. Similar arguments can be made with regard to ethnic nationalism and power, and probably to women's liberation movements, which may well have more political significance than we would like to believe. (I note that the only women listed as participants in the Workshop are staff members.)

Occasionally I wonder if the origins of political behavior in pre-adults cannot be better understood in terms of alignments and emotional sympathies rather than formal learning. The identification of the young with political structures, both formal and informal, may do more than slogans and concepts learned at school to influence their political behavior. I have been impressed several times recently with the simplistic and by now hackneyed arguments which some young people use to justify their anti-establishment stance, and how little solid conceptual and realistic content they carry. They were interesting and impressive a few years ago but they seem to me insufficient to sustain the contention that the youth protests are essentially based on thoughtful moral principles. This is not to say that they are incorrect, but to indicate my feeling that the statements are often verbalizations of an alignment, rather than themselves the basis for the position taken. This view does not entirely discount the role of cognition in political behavior but suggests that other factors may have been underestimated in studies of the development of political attitudes, knowledge and behavior in the young. Political behavior includes at least the components of ideas, action and emotions. Much of the training in the schools deals only with ideas. In times of dissent and crisis, particularly, these ideas and facts learned in the classroom may be insufficient to serve as guidance systems for political action.

If political behavior in the young is derivative rather than learned, what is the role of the kind of teaching that goes on in civics, government, U.S. history courses, etc. in the schools? Perhaps it is to provide verbalizations which enable the individual to articulate, in social discourse, underlying political alignments and to
recognize in others the signs of one or another type of affiliation and alignment. Certain phrases or words in conversations, for example, will quickly signal to a listener how a speaker feels about black power, women's liberation, or the war in southeast Asia, and as such provides the listener with options as to what his own response might be and how it will be received.

So long as we are permitted to be speculative and tentative in this Workshop, I'll squirm a bit further out on the limb (which is probably in danger of being sawed off anyway) and suggest that the primary purpose of political socialization is to encourage an unshakeable identification with the state and its goals. Studies of socialization in authoritarian and closed ideological and political units will, I believe, be consistent with this possibility. Once a sense of national loyalty is firmly established, the educational process is more likely to be as much a matter of providing labels for communicating acceptance of appropriate ideas as furnishing a groundwork for future political behavior. Political education in the schools in the past has thus provided a verbal and intellectual framework within which alignments may be articulated and elaborated.

If this general line of argument has any merit, there are a number of implications and observations about youth protest and socialization. First, if the extent and intensity of protests against the government increase and thus incur a reaction by established forces of institutions and government, this reaction is not likely to serve a political socializing function. Witness the radicalization of campuses and how quickly alignments (and consequent verbalizations) can be altered often with painfully incomplete or distorted information (rumor, a caption, a slogan, the ethnicity of a student arrested, etc.). It will be seen as (and probably will be) repression and will be unlikely to bring about changes in attitudes. The critical point is not the transmission of concepts and facts about political systems in the country as much as it is the influences that have alienated them from a sense of identification and affiliation with their country.

In this formulation, the socialization of the young into patterns of political behavior could be more adequately studied as an indirect outcome of socialization in other areas, such as moral ideology, attachment and dependency, modelling, etc. than as a body of information, concepts and knowledge passed on by an older to a younger generation. Perhaps these comments naturally lead to a suggestion that a proper area for the study of political behavior among the young is political alignment, identification and affiliation with visible established politically oriented groups and structures. Such a perspective might allow us to bring to bear concepts about human behavior which are of a dynamic sort appropriate to an analysis of political action, energy and conviction in the young.

I hope to have an opportunity to join you on Tuesday and perhaps to chat with members of the Workshop informally. I hope it goes well; sorry I cannot be with you.
Research Priorities in the Politics of Education

by

Laurence Iannaccone
The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970
There are a number of ways of talking through the question of allocating priority to research in the politics of education. The issue is obviously subjective in part, but autobiographical considerations need not concern us at this time. Two other issues do concern me. The priority question may be answered either with an eye toward the issues of understanding contributing to knowledge, if you wish, or the questions of social action\(^1\), although in the long run these must run together. Priority, as I view it here, however, is not addressed to the long run.

Nevertheless, if I were to answer the question of priority with an emphasis on the understanding needed in the politics of education rather than the immediate needed social action, I would seek to maximize our grasp of the politics of education in the local school district or L.E.A. The challenge which Thomas H. Eliot threw out, although he may not have thought of it as a challenge, is nearly irresistible for the theoretician in me.\(^2\) To know "the go of it, the real go of it" especially of the L.E.A. has top priority for me, when the focus is upon understanding. This is so, because, I think we have made some dent in sorting out states and the politics of education in states.\(^3\) Also, because, while the centre of legal power in education lies in the state, long tradition of keeping the state education departments weak, in some cases because of neglect to use this power, in other cases of deliberate policy by education interests groups and state lobbies, has put the action in the L.E.A.\(^4\) Similarly, we know much more, though it is little enough, than what we did a few years ago about the federal politics of education.\(^5\)

Briefly, were I to seriously tackle the understanding of L.E.A. politics, I would take the following approaches:
1. I would distinguish L.E.A.'s into urban and others on the grounds of the persistence of educational politically oriented interest groups institutionalized in the large cities as well as their general separateness from state educational interest groups linked to the macro political universe of the state capitol.

2. Examine the other L.E.A.'s beginning with an adaptation of Becker's typology of sacred and secular societies. Some fruitful theoretically guided research exists along these lines suggesting this typology can supply a useful framework to life the thousands of L.E.A.'s involved from the random universe suggested by Eliot to a meaningful universe. This categorization and the sacred-secular continuum has already produced useful insight and some empirical testing of theoretically guided hypotheses within the larger and more abstract theoretical framework of dynamic tension existing between a continuously changing societal dimension and an intermittently changing governmental dimension.

However, the main thrust of this paper will take the social action choice as defining priority. As I turn to this, I note:

(1) There is a growing gap between policy studies and planning versus implementation and administration. The seriousness of this issue may be highlighted by Kissenger, "Where to draw the line between excessive commitment to the bureaucracy and paralyzing aloofness depends upon so many intangibles of circumstance and personality that it is difficult to generalize." But he points out that the intellectual in order to contribute to policy, "Must steer between the Scylla of letting bureaucracy prescribe what is relevant or useful and the Charybdis of defining these criteria too abstractly."

(2) Litt's work in Massachusetts politics suggests that (whether a growing gap or not) this gap is more than a game played by university based intellectuals. It may be rooted in the social facts of a growing
intellectual, technical managerial class as a significant element in American politics. Thus, the gap of which I speak may be a manifestation of a deeper and politically more significant cleavage in American political life. Attitudes of disdain, if not contempt, each for the other by the policy-maker and bureaucrat are doubly dangerous if rooted in social or political class differences.

(3) The problem becomes the more serious as the bureaucrat becomes thought of by the intellectual increasingly as a mere bureaucrat. The point I wish to make is I think made by Yarmolinsky when he says, "When I speak of the government bureaucrats...I speak of the individual who has the action, because the primary responsibility of the bureaucrat is not to figure out the best way to do something but to get it done." He continues, "It is their very commitment to getting things done that makes them resist new and perhaps better ways of doing things. The effect of bureaucrats in the system is to encourage attention to the business at hand. It is, also, frequently a useful antidote to sloppy thinking. But it emphatically does not encourage the production of new ideas, or suspension of judgment until new ideas can sink in." Yarmolinsky restates the fundamental problem this way: "How improve the climate for new ideas in government?" His solutions or proposals for solutions need not concern us here, I am merely concerned at this point in emphasizing the nature of the problem.

(4) With this in mind let me turn directly to education. If Kepple's dictum that education is too important to be left to educational administrators or to school men, means that others, and specifically the intellectuals outside of education, have a role to play too, it is one thing; if it means instead, that policy making in education is too important to let school men be seriously involved in it, and that only others should be making policies then it means something quite different. More and more it seems
to me the perception is developing both within the educational bureaucracy and among the zealot disciples, the whiz kids, if you will, of the Kepple-Howe era, that the statement means only others should be making policies. Were this trend to continue, the gap between policy-making and those who have the action would inevitably increase. It seems to me this is the process already underway.

(5) Thomas E. Cronin in "The Presidency and Education" makes the point, "It has become fashionable to call for the creation of new structures staffed by policy scientists who would integrate research efforts and priority setting throughout federal domestic programs." This has resulted in what he called 'outside networks', by which he means "Those individuals, groups or advisory institutions who contribute to Whitehouse intelligence and decision-making processes, but who are not generally employed by either the Whitehouse or the federal government." By people not generally employed in the federal establishment, they are talking about individuals who do not have the action and this specifically pinpoints the gap with which I am concerned.

Ironically, this reminds me of an event some fifteen years ago in New York State in education, where a leader of one key organization in the educationist establishment said at a meeting one time, "We are against the idea and my research division is going to research that question and will give our reasons."

In connection with the outside networks, Cronin and Greenberg say that one form of needed research are "comparative studies, empirical examinations of alternative advisory network roles, and the varied outcome and effect of these roles." I concur with their judgment, but suggest not only that this is a problem requiring research now, one having high, perhaps the highest priority, but would also suggest this needs to be done within a
context larger than the examination of the outside networks in federal policy-making, and one might add state policy-making, in education. It is to that larger context that I would like to address myself shortly. For now let me point out that we are not merely observing the development of an outside network or of outside networks, a new intellectual proletariat, in, but not of, education with a safe base outside of the public schools, and without the responsibility for the action, but we are, in addition, seeing the development of a new power structure in education.

(6) The gap itself is further extenuated beyond the outside network problem by the rising demand for accountability, by the efforts at assessment in education, by the crude application of program planning-budgeting systems in education and more immediately by performance contracting which raises the entire issue of accountability and measurement and which transforms the issue, it seems to me, into the question Plato raised a long time ago with his guardians, to wit, "who guards the guardians?"

My point is, the research venture is itself a political factor when the subject of study is a public service area, its operations, its ideological developments, and above all, its effectiveness. Ironically, in passing, I note the stance taken by one of the critics of the establishment, one who like Kepple feels education is too important to be left to the educator, and also from Harvard, now, after the Kepple program has been in existence for some time, says, "You can't research outcome per se or learning outcomes in order to judge program effectiveness when you deal with social programs." 14

I hope no one misunderstands me here as spending my time defending an establishment which I have long attacked. But I think there is a
very real problem before us. Beneath the gap to which I refer and the recent mechanisms that have been developed partly to deal with and partly creating it, are a history and types of people who are making political history and I think these warrant our attention.

Public education as we have known it, has long been sick in the United States. The cumulative effects of the depression and World War II were among the chief recent causes of its illness. The invisible scar of the depression stands not too invisible in the operation of 110 Livingston Street. The hiatus of World War II for the public schools left the task of building physical plants to the late forties and the explosive suburban growth led to rapid growth of new school districts with no chance for thought about schools. The cycle of the Lonesome Train in Levittown became the characteristic pattern; a cycle, which runs from rural districts to guilded showplace, to target for John Birchers in one generation. 15 The illness of the public schools resisted the remedies of the physicians who undertook its treatment prior to sputnik. In many ways, that resistance tells us a great deal about the nature of the educationist establishment particularly in the big cities where to this day the invisible scar of the depression is seen in those central office personnel, the majority of whom, I might add, see their role as that of defending the system against the corrupt politicians of city hall. With sputnik, the treatment of the system seems to have gained momentum, in effect, the system itself seems to have rallied and the patient appeared to respond to the NDEA effort, with the development of teacher power and with the development, even though on a small scale, of the cooperative research program in Washington.

With the sixties and the passing of ESEA, a new direction moving the schools not firstly towards improved quality of education, middle class
education one might add, but instead with the concern over the racial problem appeared on the scene. This direction can now be seen coming to fruit in the combination of proposals for a voucher system which seeks to break up the monopoly of education, the segregation academies in the south and I might add, the Bircher particularly in the southwest. I wonder, at this point, whether these actors may be viewed better not as physicians but as the morticians called in to bury the moribund patient.

So long as the criticisms of education were concerned with increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of schools for learning skills and intellectual content, the critics had the support of much of the public even though they confronted the opposition of the establishment. But I note when criticism shifted to the school's failure to fulfill its social role on the racial issue in American society, the public, including many former critics, either moved back to supporting the status quo in schools or distinguished themselves from the new critics, the social action types. Thus in part a polarization of the critics of the schools has taken place with the John Birch group on the right and the Ford Foundation on the left. These may find in the voucher program a political basis for working together, resulting finally in the complete social class school system. This may still be public education, but if so, it is likely to carry our class structure into the classroom operation by distinguishing one school from the other along class and race lines as never before. Ironically, we might add, the job of integration, the job if you will of reducing inequality, of bringing people together in a single institution, poor though it was done, seems to have worked better so long as the focus of attack on the school was on the quality of its education rather than on the schools as firstly instruments of social policy only secondarily concerned with the task of reading, writing, and learning.
As it may appear, what I have been briefly sketching out, can be viewed as three periods in the recent history of educational policy making in America. The first period being one controlled by the bureaucrats inside the educationist establishment. The second period displayed the activity of others ranging from critics like Bester through Conant. It saw the appearance as influentials of the research types in education who may be seen as interested in enhancement of learning per se, perhaps, less concerned with social problems than many, heavily influenced by backgrounds in educational psychology research and who are research and theory oriented. Viewed in terms of organizational reference groups and linkages the first group can be found at the national level in association with the American Association of School Administrators, meeting in Atlantic City each year; whereas the second group is associated with the American Educational Research Association. Let me add a personal note in terms of my own biases, my reference group within the educationist network, tends to be with the research crowd. A third group is increasingly seen in policy-making in education. These are individuals who are essentially concerned with social action, who do not see the school as the kind of place where they expect to spend their life's work and are much more concerned with the school as an instrument of social policy and are only generally concerned with the process of teaching-learning that goes on in it. They are needed. They have a valuable role to play but only if that role has a significant effect on improving the quality of life through education, specifically in elementary and secondary education.

Let me now move beyond this brief, and I'm certain biased description, both historical and sociological, to suggesting some hypotheses concerning what has been and what is happening. My central hypothesis is
obvious. But let me state it. There is a growing gap between the indivi-
duals who have the action and groups composing an outside network in
educational planning and policy making.

Some alternate hypotheses may be offered, the utility of which
need to be tested, concerning the origin of this gap and its nature.

(1) The gap is due to fragmentation in the politics of education
with a growing pluralism within education characterized by
different schools of "scribblers". Just as the scribblers
identified by Bailey and others such as Paul Mort, functioned
to articulate social need at one stage into a program of action
for schools in various states, so new social action types are
functioning to provide articulation of what is needed in schools
in our day.

(2) What we are witnessing is a revolution in education, and
the desertion of the intellectuals noted by Crane Brinton empha-
sizes the failure of the old system and suggests that we are on
the threshold of a real revolt in education and the end of that
system. This suggests that the future may be seen in the
beginning of the political alliance between the northeastern
liberals led by the Ford Foundation in part, by some of the
people at Harvard and other universities, and the southern
segregationists with their academies. This includes the relation-
ship between the Wisconsin economists and the Birchers in the
southwest as well.

(3) A third hypothesis may be suggested in more psychological
terms. What we are now experiencing is the result of a frustra-
tion of the intellectuals, the failure specifically of John
Gardner and others to change the educational operation, and the shift, a kind of sublimation in Rubinoff's terms in his Pornography of Power, is a characteristic result of frustration and a substitution of concern with change in words rather than deeds.

As may be apparent, what I've called hypotheses, are still rather global, and are not hypotheses but theory in the sense that they are explanatory. With these in the background, however, let me move to a less fundamental but more immediate class of socio-political mechanisms, the functions of which may provide, and I think would provide, a useful purchase on answering some of the questions that are raised by the statements I have made above and by my concern for the possibly growing gap between policy-making and action. You will note the methodological assumption, I am sure, that an examination of such mechanisms and their functions can help answer the kind of questions that are raised by the explanatory frameworks, such as I proposed earlier.

Let me advance the thesis that evaluation by which I mean not merely assessment, some demand for accountability, or something as specific as program planning and budgeting, but also such things as surveys, and studies in general, of public institutions are in and of themselves political mechanisms. I do not mean by this what David Cohen refers to in a recent article in the AERA journal, that the findings of research and of evaluation have political relevance and, therefore, constitute an element in subsequent political struggles. Instead, I mean that the mere act of study, of doing a survey, of doing research, of evaluation, in and of itself, is a weapon, a tool in political struggles too. For example, the attempt by any organization to do a self-study at a point in time when critics are beginning to mount criticism against it is rather clearly a mechanism of
defence in the political struggle for existence by the organization.

This suggests one dimension along which we can sort out studies in attempting to understand their political function, i.e., the simple notion of "in" versus "out". An examination of who calls for the study related to a notion involving the dynamics of social time in or out of office, may be useful. I note, for example, in passing, that the individuals who demand a study when they are "out" not infrequently let it die after they have moved into office. And so the dimension of whether a study is initiated by those in office or out of office, in and of itself, seems useful. This in turn, related to the three categories of persons I mentioned earlier, the established school men, the education researchers, or the social activists, suggests a two by three table of in-out and the types of persons or the types or orientations of these persons as one way of looking at who conducts and who initiates studies.

There is also the possibility that studies have a function related to the difference between "cooling out" versus "cooling off" political conflict around education. What I mean by this is easy enough to state. Studies take time. The time that they take may allow for the height of conflict, the intensity of conflict, the heat of conflict, to be reduced, increasing the chances for real change, and this is "cooling off". On the other hand, the study may have as its major function the filling of time while tempers cool with no notion the study will make any difference whatsoever, merely "cooling off" the situation.

Finally, let me suggest an additional dimension, a fourth, derived from the sublimation hypothesis, that one examines the people who do the study not only in terms of the categories mentioned earlier, but also in terms of one other aspect of all political mechanisms involving people, which is: what is the effect of the study upon the careers of the
individuals involved. Combined together, it seems to me that these suggest a very crude taxonomy which could be used as a basis for studying studies and, also, at least lead us to the moral question to which I will return at the close of this paper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who initiates</th>
<th>Who conducts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School men</td>
<td>In control of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out of control of schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research types</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And each cell related to career effects.
Let me for the moment point to examples of those studies where those who are out attack the ins. These range, on a continuum from the attack of would-be officials to unseat an incumbent to the less immediately self-interested expose or muck-raker and finally to the social critics document which is intended to move the public service. The history of education is filled with these, some of them have been very effective. Joseph Mayor Rice and his work at the turn of the century is singled out by many as a significant landmark in changing schools. The Celci Report of recent day may not be as significant, but I would tend to classify here too. The second category, that is the defence of those who are in versus the outs, fill the dissertation files and survey files of schools of education all over the country, Callahan has spoken at some length this.

The study of studies emerges when one looks at those kinds of studies which are designed, it would seem, to merely cool out the situation rather than cooling and doing more. Mark Shinerer's report on New York City's schools which he called a study of studies on New York City is a classic case of describing studies designed to do nothing except take the heat off. Finally, it seems to me as I look at the Hope Commission and its work on Ontario, one finds a long extensive study which disappointed many people because much of what the study pointed to was not done afterwards and, yet, if one examines carefully not only the makeup of the commission itself but the kinds of ongoing negotiations which took place and the changes in provincial education that went on during the study, one may conclude that the process itself involved political manipulations and negotiations which resolved many of the fundamental political issues that the commission was designed to study. Cooling off with action deserves special attention from the student of educational politics in our day.
In connection with this form of study, let me add one observation, the Flexner Report in medicine seems to have done an enormous job of moving that field. If Flexner had done a more bone-cutting, sharper, incisive job with his survey of medicine, the probabilities are that his report would never had been accepted by the medical profession since it would have called for more change than they felt they could possibly handle. The ten year history of studies of decentralization issue in New York City provides examples of each of the categories above except the last. Enough has been written of the efforts of the system to study itself to defend the status quo in the early sixties and to cool out the situation without action in the mid-sixties. Lindsay's picking up the spring legislative mandate of 1967 and giving it a thrust the legislative leaders never expected is an instance of the "out" trying to use the study to get "in". Much of what the Ford Foundation did clearly fits the sublimation hypothesis and footnotes the disdain of the "policy maker" intelligentsia's contempt for the bureaucrats. The efforts of the Board of Regents thrust alone, though late and very incompletely, came close to the cooling off while negotiating type of study.

This suggests the following categories could be used in looking at surveys, studies, etc.:

1. initiating source.
2. the resources and where they come from.
3. the selection of personnel.
4. the characteristics of personnel.
5. the characteristics of groups supporting.
6. the characteristics of groups opposing.
7. the verbal outcomes of the report.
8. the action outcomes of the report.
9. the career outcomes of the report.

In closing, let me point out, that such a venture might speak to a moral problem which concerns me greatly. Steve Bailey and I used to disagree over whether there was any real power in the educational establishment. I think part of the time we were talking past one another. Part of the time I was talking about its power to maintain its autonomy versus what, I think, Steve was talking about, its influence over governmental affairs. I think that the educationist bureaucrat's power is a kind of power that slaves have, dumb-looking, looking even dumber than they really are; the kind of power that results in what the Italians refer to when they speak of making a hole in water. This is what I see in the attempts to change elementary and secondary education, making a hole in water.

The process of the last decade especially begins to concern me, because it seems to me that out of it are coming the following kinds of possibilities at least:

1. An increase in the gap between planning and action. This, I think, is reflected in what is beginning to happen to training programs - training of day to day operators is completely divorced from the production of bright planners who never intend to and never will occupy day to day action roles in running schools.

2. This can lead to the esoteric research of esoteric social action.

3. It seems to me that all the talk of policy ignores the action at the building level in the L.E.A. and that not much change ever goes on there.
4. I am concerned that the best people will no longer move into the action of working in schools, but increasingly satisfy their career needs and kid themselves about making a difference by engaging in studies of planning and policy-making unrelated to operation at any point.

5. My real object of study throughout recent years has been school administrators and I am beginning to feel worried about the extent to which they may welcome this gap.


4. In Massachusetts, for example, it is clear that the S.E.A. has automatically reallocated its discretion over federal programs to the L.E.A.'s as these reflect the states localism and its organized educational interests.


8. Ibid.


10. Adam Yarmolinsky, "Ideas into Program", in Cronin and Greenberg, pp 92-93.


12. Ibid. p. 89

13. Ibid. p. 90


15. (a) Bailey, *op cit.*


18. David Cohen, *op cit*.

19. See, for example, Ramond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, University of Chicago Press, 1962.


21. Callahan, *op. cit*.

22. no citation.
FEEDBACK FROM CHANGES IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
A Research Proposal
Prepared for a Research Workshop on
The Politics of Elementary and Secondary Education
at Stanford University, September 14-19, 1970

by

Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University

This paper has been commissioned and all rights are reserved by the National Research Council’s Committee on Basic Research in Education, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C.
We often take for granted the effects of ongoing public programs. When the subways run and people are taken to and from work on schedule, we presume they are fairly satisfied with the transportation system. When parks are open and clean, we presume that people who use them are satisfied with the recreation the parks provide. When schools are open and children exposed to education, we presume all is well, especially as we are reassured by annual graduation ceremonies and promotion reports that all is going according to plan.

Even when all is going according to plan, the outputs produced by public programs have an effect. They provide satisfactions to many and generate support for the status quo. But what is satisfactory to some will arouse jealousy and opposition from others. Facilities which are perceived as essential by some users will be considered luxurious frills by others. While some are satisfied with school concentration on the 3 R's, others will want more concentration on science, civics, or ethnic history. Many people who have no children in school pay little attention to educational outputs; others take up the role of taxpayer or the civicly interested citizen. Many parents of school-aged children are lulled into passive support for ongoing programs as long as their children progress satisfactorily and stay out of trouble and so, long as college opportunities are available at reasonable costs. Others become avid supporters of the local schools or vocal opponents of particular policies.

Although we observe these effects every day, we have little systematic evidence of the conditions under which support or demand is
aroused by school programs. My proposal is that we study the generation of feedback—the flow of support and demands which is generated by the actions of public educational programs.

The feedback process is central to the democratic underpinnings of school organization in the United States. The Bundy Report makes this ideological commitment explicit in its argument for decentralization of New York City's school system when it states:

The concept of local control of education is at the heart of the American public school system. Laymen determine the goals of public education and the policies calculated to achieve them.... The public's right to evaluate and to hold publicly employed officials responsible is fundamental.¹

Descriptions of school politics assume some relationship between school actions and parent or citizen demands or support for the school system. Dahl, for instance, describes the recruitment of PTA leaders and speculates that personal interest in their children is one of the chief motivations of the PTA activists. He writes: "...the focus of the individual PTA is narrow, since parents are more interested in the current education of their own children than in enduring problems of the educational system as a whole."² But it is not clear which elements of the school program provoke parent or citizen interest.³ The situation Dahl describes involved the manipulation of parent demand for a new school building by a principal. Such changes in school programs undoubtedly are one of the occasions for clientele demand but only one of many.

Richard Carter—in one of the few systematic studies of citizen response to school systems ⁴—shows that more parents of school children are active participants and vigorous communicators in educational
politics than citizens without children in school. A smaller number of citizens without children in school play an active role in school politics as taxpayers or concerned citizens. But Carter does not isolate the conditions under which actions by school authorities evoke various responses from the several kinds of citizens. As Carter's title indicates, he is principally concerned with voter responses and does not emphasize responses to the schools which occur outside the electoral arena. Thus he does not isolate the occasions for parent-teacher or citizen-principal contact nor does his study focus on changes in demands or support which are aroused by school actions.

The feedback process in the politics of education also has significance for the broader political arena, for there is little understanding of the effects of using government services on the demands and supports articulated by clientele groups. We do know that where police are reputed to treat citizens badly, support for the police is relatively low and there are many demands for changes in the structure of police forces. Likewise, it has often been asserted that certain aspects of welfare programs—such as the means test—degrades the welfare recipient, affects her support for the system, and perhaps has provoked demands for changes in welfare administration. Yet as with schools there have been few systematic efforts to trace the articulation of demands and support to specific elements of ongoing programs or announced changes in them.

Operationalization of Key Concepts

Our focus is on the generation of feedback in terms of altered demands or support. These latter terms are taken in the Eastonian sense as inputs to the political process. Demands are requests for maintaining
or changing elements of the government process. We may speak of manifest demands when they are made evident through some behavior. The most common means of exhibiting manifest demands is through their verbal articulation either in public forums such as hearings or through written documents presented to decision-making bodies or broadcast through the public media. Voting is another common way to say "yes" or "no" to public officials although not all votes are expressions of demands. Demands may also be made manifest through nonverbal behavior. Sending children to school or holding them at home is a means of articulating a demand for school programs; allowing children to take sex education classes manifests a demand for such programs while refusing permission is a manifestation of the opposite demand. Thus we may measure the existence, direction, intensity, substance, and scope of manifest demands by observing verbal expressions and nonverbal behaviors. Latent demand, on the other hand, may be measured through interviews seeking to determine needs which are not so intensely felt that they have been articulated or which, because of ignorance of appropriate channels or feelings of ineffectiveness, have not been directed at public agencies. Under changed circumstances, such latent demands may become manifest.

Support is a different set of attitudes and behaviors. Support consists of attitudes and behaviors which are directed at maintaining or undermining existing governmental structures and programs. While demands are requests or desires for specific kinds of services, goods, or features of a program, support is a more generalized underpinning of the system. It may be manifest or latent. Manifest support is often expressed through attitudes that are characterized as loyalty or disloyalty, patriotism or treason. As these terms suggest, support is often associated
with symbolic behavior such as participation in rituals which underpin the system. In school systems, support may be expressed by attendance at testimonial dinners, affirmative votes for school taxes or school bonds, or participation of parents in school ceremonies and educator-managed organizations like the PTA. But support may also be withheld. For instance, a boycott of school ceremonies or school elections or a negative vote on school bonds are expressions of negative support for the educational program. Such negative support may or may not be linked to any specific demands for change.

Figure 1: The Intersection of Demand and Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Latent Support</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Manifest Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latent</td>
<td>Latent Support</td>
<td>Latent Opponent</td>
<td>Nonprogrammatic Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Positively</td>
<td>Negatively</td>
<td>Articulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonverbal</td>
<td>Positively</td>
<td>Negatively</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oriented</td>
<td>Oriented</td>
<td>Articulator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Activist</td>
<td>Articulator</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1 characterizes the several roles an individual may assume with respect to a school system. But Figure 1 oversimplifies because an individual may engage in several of these activities at once. He may both make verbal demands and be engaged in nonverbal demand activities. He may also show ambivalence by exhibiting both some positive and some negative support.

Our concern, however, is not with demands and supports in general. Rather we are interested in changes in these inputs which result from actions by educational authorities. As we have already implied, demands and supports have several dimensions. These dimensions—and alternations in them—include:

1. The existence of demands and support. Not everyone in the political system will express demands or supports. Although at some level such inputs probably lie latent in all citizens, some people may be so little concerned with the educational system that actions by school authorities arouse no perceptible demands or supports. For such individuals, the schools are invisible.

2. The direction of support and the substance of demands. Support may be both positive and negative; demands may change from one object (e.g., curriculum) to another (e.g., teachers' salaries).

3. The intensity of demands and supports. The tone of the rhetoric and the passion with which inputs are expressed indicate the degree of intensity. Saliency may also be an indicator of intensity, for those who perceive demands as not salient are not intensely concerned with them.

4. The scope of demands and supports. Demands may be quite specific or include the whole range of educational issues.
Support may be focused on an individual authority (e.g. the teacher), the whole school, or the entire school system.

5. The volume of demands and supports. Support and demands may emanate from a few sources or many; they may be articulated occasionally, frequently, or constantly.

These dimensions of demand and support must be examined with respect to two elements of the feedback process. The first is the set of circumstances which evoke altered demands and support for the educational system. The second is the set of characteristics of those who respond and those who remain passive to particular actions by educational authorities.

The circumstances which evoke feedback are legion. Almost any action by a school official is likely to evoke some response from someone in the community. Substantial responses, however, are more likely to come from a limited set of actions. Prior studies in the politics of education suggest that controversy (and hence, feedback) are particularly aroused by the following actions:

1. Changes in the composition of student populations in particular schools. The most common change has led to increasing racial integration of schools. Our concern is with such changes which are the result of decisions by school authorities such as the adoption of an integration plan, the erection of a new school, or a shift in school attendance boundaries. Changes which result from shifts in the population are environmental changes; feedback produced by such changes are not our concern in this research.
2. Changes in school programs. The program which perhaps has aroused greatest controversy is adoption of sex education classes. But similar controversies have been aroused over the released-time programs and other efforts to dovetail public school programs with those of the parochial schools. The controversies reported in the media are indicators of changed demands and altered patterns of support in response to decisions by schoolmen.

3. Changes in school personnel. Changes in the racial composition of school staffs often arouse controversy but changes from more to less experienced personnel or changes in the qualifications of teachers are also likely to evoke altered patterns of demands and supports.

4. Decisions to raise the level of expenditure. The expenditure may be allocated to salaries or to capital improvements. Large scale shifts are likely to require raising tax levels or issuing bonds; either often requires voter approval or the acquiescence of other governmental agencies. Such occasions arouse taxpayer opposition to "frill" expenditures, teacher union pressure for higher salaries and better working conditions, and neighborhood demands for a share in the improvements promised by the new expenditure rate.

5. Changes in the decision-making structures. The controversy over decentralization has been a heated one with some groups seeking to obtain new toe holds while others try to maintain their present influence in the decision-making structure. The groups excited by decentralization proposals, however, may be quite different from those activated by other changes.

Such circumstances, however, do not always activate the same people. We must learn which decisions arouse what kind of feedback from which
particular groups. Taxpayers may be aroused by expenditure changes, churchgoers by sex education, blacks by proposals to teach black history, teachers by salary changes, realtors by school attendance area changes, and parents by changes in the teaching staff. Such broad categorizations are undoubtedly too gross. Only a portion of each group is likely to be activated by any school decision; some decisions will arouse several of the potential feedback groups. Our concern, therefore, must be to match the characteristics of those who articulate altered demands or supports to the decision which evoke such responses. In addition we are concerned with the overall distribution of altered demands and support after particular decisions have been made by school authorities.

Research Design

The research problem is to find data by which we can establish the presence or absence of links between altered educational programs and response by segments of the public. We need data on overt behavior by members of the public and on latent demands and supports for the educational system. In order to establish links between changes in educational programs and alterations in the pattern of demands and support, we may utilize a quasi-experimental design which will permit collection and analysis of the appropriate data without the expense of money and time required for a time series analysis.

School districts in which one of the previously mentioned changes have taken place in the recent past are designated as experimental conditions. We should examine districts in which such changes have occurred within the twelve months prior to the collection of data and districts in which such changes took place as much as three years prior to the research.
in order to observe both immediate and delayed feedback effects. In order to randomize local peculiarities, several districts with each experimental condition should be observed. In addition, a group of control districts should be selected. Control districts are those in which none of the experimental conditions existed within a period of three years prior to the research.

In so far as practicable experimental and control districts should be matched for socio-economic characteristics with each having roughly similar mixes of population and resources. It is also desirable that the districts span the range of population and resource characteristics. However, it is not necessary to control for school organization or political characteristics since our concern is with the generation of feedback and not its utilization by decision-makers.

In each of the districts selected two kinds of data should be collected. The first consists of manifest responses which have been recorded in public documents or the media. Where school boycotts have taken place, attendance records should be examined to determine the extent of the boycott. The extent of public controversy should be examined through a content analysis of the local press and, if possible, the other media. Where public meetings took place, the record of these meetings should be examined for manifest expressions of demand and support.

In addition, data on manifest and latent demands and supports must be collected through interviews with random samples of the population. Since we are concerned with the generation of feedback from particular elements of the population and know that most people remain passive, several small samples of particular groups will be more effective than a
to the subcultures included in the samples. 9

The analysis would rely on comparisons within school districts of the several samples and on comparisons between control and experimental districts. If our hypotheses about the generation of feedback are correct, we would expect different patterns of demands and supports in experimental districts than in control districts. Moreover, school patrons should respond to different issues than non-patrons and show more response to school decisions. The literature on blacks suggests that responses among black patrons and non-patrons will be different than that among white samples. The design I have suggested should reveal such differences if they exist.
Footnotes


2. Ibid., p. 153.

3. In addition—but beyond the scope of this proposal—are the effects of schools on children. Some of the research on this question is reviewed by Frederick W. Wirt, "American Schools as a Political System," mimeo, 1970, pp. 15-16.


THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY:
A RESEARCH PRIORITY IN THE
POLITICS OF EDUCATION FIELD

by

George R. LaNoue
Teachers College
Columbia University

Paper prepared for C. O. B. R. E. Research Workshop on
The Politics of Elementary and Secondary Education

September 14 - 19, 1970
Stanford, California
This paper was written under some limitations which should be mentioned. In the middle of August I left New York to begin a research – convention – vacation junket to the West Coast. The materials and specific agenda for this conference did not reach me in California until early September. The A.P.S.A. convention provided somewhat less than an ideal setting for sustained contemplation and speculation and I was without access to a research library, office files and secretarial help. I hope some of the paper's ideas will serve as a springboard for discussion but I regret the lack of the usual citations and bibliography. I would be pleased to supply any references to the sources in this paper and a copy of the rather lengthy bibliography I have compiled on accountability to any participant who requests them. (Box 133, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, 10027.)

BEYOND SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

In one sense, however, the timing of this paper is fortuitous. As co-author with Professor Bruce Smith of Columbia, I am just finishing a book based principally on case studies of the politics of school decentralization in six cities, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Detroit, St. Louis and Los Angeles. (An interim report called "The politics of School Decentralization" was presented at A.P.S.A., 1970 and is available from the author.) We have been at this project for a year and a half and enough of this data is in so that
my thoughts have turned to the broader significance of our findings. Although, of course, it is still premature to attempt to be definitive about the school decentralization movement, this paper gives me the opportunity to speculate on the next steps in research. Before taking that step, however, it may be useful to indicate the premises for looking beyond school decentralization.

Essentially decentralization advocates have argued that new control mechanisms centered in the neighborhoods need to be created to produce more responsive administrators and interested parents. This, it is argued, will lead to better student socialization and learning. The strength of this rhetoric (there is very little hard evidence one way or the other about most of its underlying proportions) and the growing political power of "minority" groups have combined to make decentralization an important trend (almost a fad) in school politics.

If one includes administrative delegation as well as experiments in community control (but excludes programs which are totally funded through Title III E.S.E.A. in Model Cities), at least 8 of the 28 cities with population over 500,000 have decentralization components in their school systems. They are New York, Detroit, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Washington, D.C., Seattle, Chicago and Philadelphia. This
decentralization ranges from the state imposed system-wide plans in New York and Detroit to the tentative steps toward administrative delegation taken in St. Louis and Philadelphia. Baltimore, Boston, Atlanta, San Antonio, Houston, and New Orleans have area administrators; but according to the reports we have received, these administrators have little policy discretion. In addition, a number of other cities like Cincinnati, Denver, Pittsburgh, and San Francisco are formally discussing decentralization but have not taken official steps as yet.

Another kind of evidence about the symbolic power of decentralization can be found in the results of a survey of community group leaders in the neighborhoods of the three New York City experimental school districts (I.S. 201, Two Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville). The survey was taken after a period of internal conflict and many school interruptions, but as table A shows, the support for decentralization symbol is 90% or more for nearly every category of leaders. When the questions attempted to move beyond symbols to the probe into the substantive areas of curriculum, budget and personnel, support for community control of the schools remained very high. In these neighborhoods, at least, decentralization has become the panacea for school reform.

Yet our analysis of the way in which school decentralization would probably effect participation in school decision making, bureaucratic accountability, educational achievement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th>Percentage Affirming</th>
<th>Percentage Affirming Community Control of Various Policy Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N=154</td>
<td>School Decentralization Concept</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Poverty and Community Action Agencies (40)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers (17)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil Rights Groups (4)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chic Groups (25)</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Groups (23)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Clubs (10)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (65)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (6)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-30 (55)</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 (58)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-74 (21)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (63)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (24)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (22)</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (5)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (65)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (6)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (112)</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.c (22)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and racial equality and integration shows that the potential assets and liabilities to be about equal. (This is an abstraction; decentralization should only be judged in the context of a particular city and particular plan).

Furthermore the first electoral activity under decentralization has been ominous for its supporters. According to the Institute for Community Studies, a Ford Foundation advocate of decentralization, "the (Spring 1970) community school board elections were a disaster unparalleled in the history of the New York City school system." From the Institute's viewpoint this new device for citizen participation has convinced the wrong citizens to participate.

As Table B shows, although whites constitute only 40% of the pupil population, they elected 72% of the new school board members. Proportional representation which was supposed to insure minority group representation on all boards, did not prove very successful. Puerto Ricans were unable to elect any members in 9 districts where they were 10% of the pupil population; blacks were shut out in 10 districts under similar circumstances. Whites on the other hand had a representative in all but one district.

The election, however, was not confined to the parents of public school children. When one compares its results to the city population totals which are 72% white, 19% black, 9% hispanic and 2% other, it is obvious that the election
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>% Voting</th>
<th>% Pupil Population</th>
<th>Elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>B*</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronx</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Averages</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
quite accurately reflects New York's ethnic composition. Nevertheless, ordinarily parents vote more often than non-parents in school elections. The failure for that to happen is this election means that in many districts white local school boards will control the education of minority group youngsters. The minority groups are more poorly represented on these local boards than they have been on any of the recent city-wide boards.

There is not space here to analyze in any detail the causes of this result -- the low turnout among minority groups was created by a boycott the militants, the non-partisan, complicated proportional representation ballot, and the lack of publicity and campaign devices. In contrast middle class whites energized by their fear of blacks, and organized by Catholic and Jewish groups interested in aid to parochial schools, voted disproportionately. It is not certain that this will be an irreversible pattern in New York neighborhood school board elections, but the immediate consequences appear to be highly disheartening for the school decentralization movement.

In Detroit school decentralization advocates have received another setback. The new law decentralizing the Detroit schools required the School Board to set the district boundary line. The Board found that most black and white spokesmen preferred racially homogenous districts. Nevertheless, by a four to three vote, a Board majority representing the liberal-labor-black coalition that has govern
Detroit, adopted pro-integration boundary lines. The result was an unusual recall campaign launched by white neighborhood associations, and joined by some black separatists, against the four offending Board members. In an election this summer the Board majority was removed despite the opposition of the press and almost all civic associations. Even if the results are overturned by the Courts, these neighborhood groups have built up the organization and the momentum to make them very influential in the November election when the new central and local boards are elected.

One purpose of decentralization was to insure the participation and representation of minority groups in school politics and to provide them with the sense of "control". These goals are thought to be related to educational outcomes but they also are considered to have intrinsic merit. While it would be premature to base conclusions on the New York and Detroit elections, they do raise some warning flags about the participation-representation aspects of decentralization. Research on participation-representation in Model Cities and anti-poverty decentralized programs enforces these doubts. Another purpose of decentralization was to provide new forms of educational accountability by changing the structure and emotional climate of the relationship between the clients of the school and school professionals.
As the decentralization laws in Detroit and New York require, and as experience from decentralization in other cities shows, the professionals demand and will receive legislative protection for their jobs. Consequently, no matter how much the participation-representation status of minority group parents improve; they would still have to deal with the professional organizations in education which have rapidly increased their strength and militancy. As the Ocean Hill-Brownsville incidents suggest, they would have grave difficulties in achieving accountability in their terms. The confrontation in this district caused lengthy strikes and poisoned the climate in schools all over the city. Ghetto residents are acquiring allies on this issue as middle class parents are now questioning school practices as never before. Accountability has become the "in" concept in educational policy and all sorts of devices are being discussed.

There is always some danger in setting research priorities according to what is fashionable in the polity, but the concept of accountability has been a traditional concern of political scientists. Given the learning failures, especially in urban public education, and the conflict over school policies, the interest of the government and the interests of social scientists regarding research about accountability coincide nicely.
ACCOUNTABILITY

School professionals have always been held accountable to some extent, but the standards have been poorly articulated and the evaluation process has been arcane for the layman to follow. Now there is an insistence that both the standards and the processes become visible, rationalized, and effective.

Schools serve both to impart knowledge and to socialize students, and accountability can relate to either function. Although the term is most commonly used in connection with demands that a teacher's students must meet certain performance standards in reading and other achievement tests; as is evident from conflicts over sex education and racism, parents also seek to hold teachers accountable for the attitudes their children learn.

Among the processes for achieving accountability that are currently discussed are merit pay, decentralization, performance contracting, and the voucher plan. All of these are dependent on agreement about the things for which schools and teachers can properly be held accountable. Not only is it a matter of elementary justice that the standards for school professionals should be clear, but it is also a political necessity if accountability is to have the cooperation of the powerful educational organizations.

One approach to this cooperation is represented by the following statement in the preamble of the most recent (1969-1972) contract between the United Federation of Teachers.
"The Board of Education and the Union recognize that the major problem of our school system is the failure to educate all of our students and the massive academic retardation which exists especially among minority group students. The Board and the Union therefore agree to join in an effort, in cooperation with universities, community school boards and parent organizations, to seek solutions to this major problem and to develop objective criteria of professional accountability."

Although this statement may just represent a rhetorical defense against the threat of decentralization felt by Union and Board, it does have some potential significance since it was signed by the nation's largest union local and the nation's largest school system. A committee which included representatives of parent and community organizations, university staffs, and the co-signers of the contract, was formed. A federally funded conference was held this summer, but not much else has resulted from the committee's efforts. Some slightly cynical observers believe that the Union has committed itself to the "objective criteria" standard, because it knows that development of these criteria will be so difficult and that accountability will be a long time coming. Nevertheless, the problem of standards remains.

Most attempts at "objective criteria" have tried to judge a teacher's performance on the basis of test scores of students. There are several problems with this approach. First, different subjects are amenable to objective testing in different degrees (reading versus art, for example). Second, most test results are reported according to grade levels (the
median score attained nationally by students in a particular grade). The public doesn't always understand such things as normal curves and may demand unrealistic achievement results. A newly elected chairman of one large school district recently insisted that his goal was that all children should score above grade level. Furthermore, it is easily demonstrable that the socio-economic background of a child contributes enormously to learning readiness. But it would take more research than we now possess to determine just how much a classes' socio-economic background should be weighted in judging test scores and teaching performance.

Assuming that the technique will eventually be available so that we could document Miss Jones' heroic effort against great socio-economic odds to teach her first graders to print legibly, and could also trace the lack of grace in the sonnets of the senior honors class to Mr. Smith's pedagogic style, there is little consensus about the level of performance expected of public school teachers. Should all teachers reach some objectively determined minimum, or should teachers, like athletic coaches, be judged competitively — those who fall below .500 in the win-loss column to be weeded out and shunted into the lower echelons of administration.

One accountability system now being tried in the public junior colleges in Virginia requires a teacher to teach well enough so that X number of students complete a
course in a length of time. Completion of the course requires satisfactory standardized test performance and this often encourages a "knowledge bit" approach to teaching. Indeed there is an educational equipment company now compiling all the "knowledge bits" it can find for use in its teaching machines. Human teachers properly fear that some systems of accountability may lead to emphasis on "knowledge bits" rather than education.

If performance accountability is threatening, the demand that teachers be held accountable for their socializing role is doubly so. There are solid historical grounds for their fears. Not so long ago in the cities, and still today in less cosmopolitan areas, school boards felt that they had the right to regulate a teacher's social life and command allegiance to local political and religious norms. It has been an arduous struggle to free teachers from their parochial demands, but the professional's victory has been at the cost of what many parents believe is a crucial issue of accountability - the parent's right to control the values their children learn.

Whether the schools should play a primarily analytical or affirming role is a question every society must decide. In general, Americans have permitted the professionals in higher education to play more of an analytical role than their public school counterparts. But if these schools are to affirm values, whose values should be paramount? Decentralization is raising these issues sharply as some minority
group leaders assert the need for community control of the schools in order to encourage ethnic solidarity and challenge traditional American political myths. Some have even called this function "nation building".

The voucher plan also is related to value accountability. Although Milton Friedman and others have urged its adoption to improve school performance on the naive assumption that what is needed is more marketplace competition, the modern version of the voucher plan was first advanced by Father Virgil Blum S. J. and his organization, Citizens for Educational Freedom, mainly to insure parental control of the schools socializing role. In Christopher Jencks' new proposal, parents would be able to use their publicly-funded vouchers to select schools that might be religiously or politically homogenous but not exclusively of one race or class.

If the question what values teachers should teach and be accountable for is complicated, criteria for measurement are nearly impossible. In the Woodlawn School district in Chicago, an experiment in community control, parents and administrators have attempted to construct a paper and pencil test to detect racism in teachers. Its earlier drafts, at least, did not seem to me to be very promising. More often though there is no attempt to establish standards for the teachers socialization role. Instead accountability for values turns into rather crude forms of prior censorship.
Research on none of the participation-representation aspects of accountability are already underway in centers across the country. Much of the research needed to develop standards for the measurement of teaching performance is not in the domain of political science, (although the due process issues raised by certain types of measures would be of interest to specialists in public law). Nevertheless, there are several important alternatives still to be considered.

If the development of objective criteria for teaching performance may take too long and require too much emphasis on "knowledge bits", perhaps there is some value in examining the method of peer group standards that are used in higher education to achieve quality control to see if any of it is transferable to public education. This system decreases reliance on the development of sophisticated data and methodologies and might reduce the fears of teacher organizations. One objection at the outset might be that this suggestion is really quite reactionary since excessive professional control of the schools is part of the problem that accountability is aimed at eliminating.

Actually, however, teachers in public schools, unlike most college faculties, have had very little control over the selection and evaluation of their colleagues. Those decisions are made almost entirely by the administration. Merit pay which exists almost everywhere in higher education is rarely
found in public schools because teachers feel that would strengthen the already great powers of administrators. Because they feel such powerlessness, public school teachers are increasingly turning toward unionization, collective bargaining and strikes, tactics which emphasize adversary relations between school and community and which may have severe disfunctional consequences for education.

The process by which college faculties select, pay, and promote their peers and thereby shape the character of their institutions is casually referred to as academic politics, but it has rarely been studied by political scientists. Yet it is widely believed that the "better" the college academically the stronger the faculty role. Another widespread belief is that peer group standards overemphasize professional commitment at the expense of institutional loyalties and concern for students. Obviously, it would be unwise to urge public schools to adopt college personnel procedures without further research.

Among the questions to be researched are:

1. What are the effects of peer group personnel standards on individual roles, and
2. What are their effect on the internal politics of the institution and on relationships with comparable institutions?
3. What are the politics of transition from administrative centered to faculty centered personnel policies?
4. What models of personnel policies exist in the "best" junior college and high schools, and what are their consequences?

5. What models exist for providing constituency (student and parent) inputs into the personnel process?

If more accountability in the sense of better teaching performances might be achieved by strengthening the role of public school faculties in the personnel process, there is another area in which accountability might be served by reducing teacher power. Increasingly both N.E.A. and A.F.T. affiliated teachers are establishing their conditions of work through collective bargaining procedures. The detail and scope of these agreements are constantly expanding. To use a very crude measure, New York's U.F.T. contract in 1969-1972 is at least fifty per cent longer than its predecessor. One can only imagine the length of the first contract negotiated with the participation of the 31 decentralized districts.

The problem for political scientists is not really in the verboseness of the contract, but in the role in the educational policy process collective bargaining is beginning to play. Traditionally major school policies were decided after hearings in which citizens and various pressure groups could make their viewpoints known. How many issues are preempted by the collective bargaining process, and decided legally without any citizen participation. Indeed, the
Of course it can be argued that the school board represents the public, but the union's membership has the opportunity to vote on their negotiator's agreement while the general public does not have a comparable ratification opportunity.

Since teachers' salaries are often 70 to 80 per cent of a district's budget, the wage settlement is an important policy question. Increasingly, however, decisions like student discipline and compensatory opportunities, building maintenance and construction, integration and ethnic studies are being made through collective bargaining.

Consequently it seems important for political scientists to study these new trends in collective bargaining and to create the new theories of accountability which this development requires.

Neither research into peer group personnel processes nor collective bargaining takes us very far into the problem of accountability for socialization. It is now being argued that what is really wrong with public education is that it is based on a fallacious view of the unitary nature of American society. This attack goes to the heart of the common school idea that despite their differences the American people shared enough values that they could be educated together. While most of our educational policies in the
past were based on the common school assumption, there is now discussion of public sponsorship of a more pluralist/separatist kind of education.

How much consensus on the goals of education really exists in America? We know surprisingly little about such an important question. Richard P. Carter's study, *Voters and Their School* surveyed the attitudes that might lead people to support public education but this research tells us little about opinions toward restructuring public schools or alternatives to them.

In July 1969, a Gallup poll asked whether the respondent would choose to send his child to public, parochial or private schools if tuition were free. Despite the fact that 85% of the enrollment in elementary and secondary education is now in public schools, only about 40% said this was their first choice. The majority was divided almost equally between the parochial and private alternatives. If taken literally the implications of this survey are enormous should governments decide to pursue voucher plans and other aid to private school mechanisms. Yet it is difficult to judge what values these responses represent. They may simply reflect the feeling that it is better to send your boy to Groton or Exeter than to Central City Tech or they may reflect deep-seated needs for an education based on different values than those in the public schools. The latter finding would not automatically mean

---

211
that government should act on it. For among that group would certainly be a sizable percentage who oppose the concepts of integration, religious neutrality, academic freedom and due process for students and teachers which the Supreme Court has said the 1st and 14th Amendments require of publicly-financed education. Others, however, prefer values which are quite compatible with public policy and there could be considerably more diversity of styles and values among the public schools in our densely populated metropolitan areas than currently exists.

I would suggest then that one way to further accountability is to research the nature and intensity of the value preferences regarding education. This survey might follow the pattern of the better market research, which can indicate consumer choices about hypothetical alternatives. With proper sampling techniques, surveys could be taken periodically without great expense. The results should be made public. Perhaps federal grants could be conditional on the taking of such surveys.

The second part of this process would be the development of a system of educational (in addition to the normal fiscal) audits. These audits should include not only data that is often impossible to obtain, such as achievement scores and suspension rates, but also information on how the system had responded to the value choices expressed by its citizens. Like the educational market survey, the
educational audit might be required by the federal government and should be made public.

Producing this information will not necessarily reduce political conflict, but it would make the debate more rational. This approach might be useful to explore, if the other paths to accountability turn out to be dead ends.
ON STUDYING THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION

Michael Lipsky


An important focus for research on the politics of education is the study of the interaction between teachers and their "clients", both parents and students. This perspective is supported by the following observations:

1. Social scientists for some time have advocated greater research on governmental services at the point of consumption. To understand the relationship between government and citizens, research has been advocated on aspects of government service where government "meets" people. While legislative politics on educational matters may determine the allocation of resources in education, the ways in which teachers as public employees "dispense" government services may play considerably larger roles in determining citizen regard for government in general and educational institutions in particular.

2. With increasing recognition that students of public policy must attend to the "outcomes" of public policy, analysis of teacher/client interactions may help to explain variations in reading levels, achievement test scores, and other measures of educational policy outcomes. Teacher/client interactions conceptually may be seen as intervening in explaining the relationship between policy outcomes and system inputs in education.

3. Recent research in educational policy has specifically suggested the importance of teacher/student interaction in determining achievement levels. Rosenthal's research concerning the relationship
between teacher expectation of students and student achievement supports the contention that teacher attitudes toward students may influence student achievement levels independent of teachers' training, congruence of teacher/pupil backgrounds, and student socio-economic profiles. Recent interest in introducing performance standards in educational innovation is based on similar conclusions and reasoning. Hypothetically, manipulation of tangible incentives to teachers and students in the school setting will result in changes in attitudes and measurable improved performance.

4. Teacher/client relations today are severely strained in many urban settings. This may be illustrated by reference to debates on school decentralization. Many if not most of the reasons offered by supporters of school decentralization proposals focus on alleged difficulties in teacher/client relations. It is alleged that teachers for the most part are insensitive and incapable of responding to the needs and strengths of minority group students. Decentralization proponents consider the trade union interests of teachers antithetical to the promotion of administrators from backgrounds similar to those of the students. It is charged that civil service protection of white personnel continues to receive support in educational politics at the expense of minority student development.

3. These problems are exacerbated in school systems where children continue to perform below national standards, regardless of the extent to which schools bear primary responsibility for performance levels. Anger and frustration directed toward schools are likely to continue as piecemeal educational reforms and additional resources are directed toward schools.
whose students fail to display significant improvement.

5. To the extent that interest in decentralization continues, attentive publics of educational policy will demonstrate increasing concern with relatively microscopic factors. Just as individuals active in educational politics have recently appeared more interested in affecting decision-making at the individual school level (in some cases out of despair over their ability to affect system-wide decision-making)⁴, so they are also interested in the determinants of individual school success, perhaps (and to some extent regretfully) at the expense of interest in system-wide success determinants.

In a recent paper I have tried to initiate a mode of analysis which would focus on the interaction of teachers and certain other public employees with their non-voluntary clienteles.⁵ The work of teachers, welfare workers, policemen and other "street-level bureaucrats" under certain circumstances is characterized by direct interaction with citizens during the regular course of jobs; wide latitude in job performance; and extensive impact on citizens. To a considerable degree such public employees encounter work related stresses because of a scarcity of personal or organizational resources, threats and challenges to authority, and contradictory or ambiguous job expectations. To process large case loads or service clients in accordance with role expectations, street-level bureaucrats must develop mechanisms for dealing with these pressures. The analysis focused on the interaction between the development of bureaucratic coping mechanisms in response to job related stresses, and the interaction of street-level bureaucrats with their non-voluntary clienteles. In general, this paper represents an attempt to inquire
into aspects of contemporary urban bureaucracies that display analytical continuities, and is thus an attempt to encourage the comparative study of urban bureaucracy within a single political system.

The framework developed in this paper may be useful in facilitating understanding of some observations concerning teachers in urban environments that previously had not been linked. The importance to teachers of keeping students "in line", avoiding physical confrontations, and insisting on demonstrations of deference to authority, for example, may be related to the need to impose classroom routines in order to realize role expectations. Authority may be imposed to a greater degree than might otherwise be considered necessary, since the threat of the negative consequences of assaults and disorderly classrooms may only be avoided if routines are imposed in every case of potential disorder. The functions of various teacher attitudes toward students may also be explained by bureaucratic needs to fulfill role expectations in spite of pressures mitigating to the contrary. Teachers may attempt to perform in some way in accordance with perceived role expectations, and thus may display interest in some children who are considered bright, when all cannot receive special attention. Teachers and other street-level bureaucrats seem to develop attitudes toward clients which function to facilitate fulfillment of role expectations by placing responsibility on the clients of service. This is the function of teacher attitudes which consider children to be primitive, racially inferior, or "culturally deprived". From this perspective, tracking systems may be viewed as supportive of bureaucratic needs, since with such mechanisms the "system" becomes responsible for student progress and direction and teachers
are freed from making all but marginal decisions about student progress. Similarly, the "red-tape" difficulties encountered by parents in appealing school decisions about children function to protect teachers from challenges to authority and to ration access to the system.

Perspectives on an appropriate research agenda in pursuit of these concerns may be gained by reviewing some of the ways in which evidence on the behavior of street-level bureaucrats has been collected in the past.

1. Survey research techniques have been utilized to collect data on citizen attitudes toward and experiences with a variety of government agencies (police departments, the post office, penal systems) in which bureaucrats have personal, frequent and significant relations with citizens. Focused sample, unstructured interviews providing qualitatively different kinds of data have also been undertaken with the clients of bureaucratic involvement. Such studies may provide important data on the effect of bureaucratic routines on citizen attitudes toward government services and opportunities.

2. Surveys have also been employed to better understand factors affecting attitudinal structures of street-level bureaucrats.

3. Participant observer techniques have been combined with interviews to analyze bureaucratic styles and incentive systems within bureaucracies.

4. Observational techniques have been utilized to analyze bureaucrat-client interaction. These techniques provide data on the interactions themselves, not only on factors which may affect such interactions.

Utilizing these techniques in combination where appropriate, I would propose to initiate a study of teacher/client interaction.
Just as Albert Reiss and David Bordura have been engaged in observing, classifying, and analyzing police/citizen encounters, so it would be useful to have similar research on the nature of teacher/client interactions. Just as Reiss provided data on questions of police brutality and of biases of race and class imputed to policemen, so we might provide insights into the impact of teacher behavior on student attitudes and motivation, in addition to illuminating such specific considerations as the effect of teacher career expectations on different kinds of students.

Research on guidance counselor interactions with students, for example, might investigate counselors' expectations of and advice to students in terms of their socioeconomic backgrounds, language capability, and general demeanor. Interviews with teachers and students following counseling sessions might illuminate the exchanges observed. Interviews with the participants, in addition to observations of the interaction, might provide a three-dimensional picture of the exchanges.

The following kinds of teacher/client interactions might provide appropriate foci for the study:

1. Student classroom relations with primary teachers.
2. Student and parent interactions with secondary teachers (guidance counselors, principals, disciplinary personnel).
3. Teacher/parent conferences.
4. Parent complaint procedures.

Although it would be useful to subject specific hypotheses to analysis, such a study would be considered primarily exploratory in its initial phase. We would be as interested in framing useful questions for further empirical research as we would be interested in initially testing specific hypotheses.
The focus on teachers as street-level bureaucrats suggests two further areas in which it would be appropriate to collect data. If the frequency and direction of various bureaucratic interactions are the primary dependent variables, as students of bureaucracy we should also collect data on the 1) incentive systems in which teachers work; and (relatedly) 2) recruitment and maintenance of employees within the school systems.

On incentives, we should ask what kinds of behaviors are rewarded and what kinds are negatively sanctioned with the systems? To what extent are teachers influenced by the reward structure of the school and school system? What is the nature and the extent of the "zone of indifference" of school administrators, in terms of which teachers may exercise discretion? What is the relationship between work-load strains (such as class size) and administrative demands in determining teacher role behavior.

With regard to recruitment and maintenance, we must know what kinds of individuals comprise teaching staffs. As in the study of any organization, we should know what kinds of people are recruited to the organization, and what kinds of people are induced to continue in employment. The study of school incentive systems should help explain the answers to these questions. In turn, the profiles of school personnel will facilitate explanation of variation in teacher/client interactions - our primary concern.

Thus far I have omitted discussion of the proposed field of inquiry. It would seem most prudent, in the spirit of an exploratory study, to limit the initial investigations to teacher/client interactions in a single inner city school with sufficient socio-economic variation to develop analysis of the impact of these factors on teacher/client relations, and to minimize the significance of cross school and cross
system variations. In a second phase of the research, the investigation field might be expanded to develop analysis of the impact of varying administrative styles and incentive systems on teacher/client relations.¹³

In conclusion, I will try to place this proposed study in the larger and comprehensive agenda which is the concern of this conference. In one way or another, most, if not all, of us will be interested in the determinants of educational success. While we may disagree on details of the components of success, few will be unwilling to relate their concerns to the improvement of educational systems. Yet in studying the determinants of educational system outputs we encounter considerable difficulties at the sub-system level. Aggregate output levels may mask important variations in expenditure distribution. Similarly, systems comparable on distributional measures may vary considerably in the distribution of resources within sub-systems. Most importantly, the distribution of resources may bear little relationship to student achievement levels.

It may be possible and would be highly desirable to relate the research suggestions enumerated above to achievement levels, system utilization and other measures of system impact. However, the justification for this proposed research lies not in its promise to explain variations in student achievement and related concerns but in our understanding of the role of teacher/client interactions, a critical link in our understanding of the relationship between student achievement and intervening variables with the system. If and when social scientists recognize the considerable methodological difficulties involved in testing techniques and control procedures...
in explaining gross variations in achievement levels, they will then be presented with questions concerning why one school succeeds while others fail, why one teacher succeeds while others fail and other successful teachers leave the system. The studies proposed here would assist in building theory to such ends.
FOOTNOTES


8 On tracking, see the decision of Judge Skelly Wright in Hobson v. Hanson, June 19, 1967, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1-57).

9 As in the recent research of Herbert Jacob and Robert Weissberg.


12 As in the recent research of David Borduna and Albert Reiss.

13 In these brief comments I have not addressed significant problems of acquiring access. However, while these problems are considerable, they should prove no more insurmountable in the study of teacher/client relations than they have been in research on police/citizen encounters.
TOWARD A THEORY OF STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY

Michael Lipsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

I

This paper is an attempt to develop a theory of the political behavior of street-level bureaucrats and their interactions with clients. Street-level bureaucrats, defined below, are those men and women who, in their face-to-face encounters with citizens, "represent" government to the people. This paper is also an effort to inquire into aspects of organizational life common to various urban bureaucracies, so that we may begin to develop generalizations about urban bureaucratic behavior that transcend discussions of individual bureaucratic contexts. This paper seeks answers to the general question: what behavioral and psychological factors are common to such bureaucratic roles as teacher, policeman, welfare worker, lower court judge? To identify such
common elements would be to make a start toward theory in the study of urban bureaucracy. 1

Concentrating on the reactions of some urban bureaucrats to conditions of stress, this paper also draws attention to various structural factors which may contribute to the inherent inability of some urban bureaucracies to provide objective, non-discriminatory service, to recognize the existence of biased behavior, and to respond to pressures from some client groups. These assertions are matters of public urgency at a time when police departments, school systems, welfare offices, and urban legal systems increasingly have come under severe criticism.

The discussion is focused upon two urban bureaucracies currently undergoing considerable strain: policemen and teachers. The example provided by lower court judges is also utilized considerably, and other urban bureaucracies are referred to when relevant.

While the paper concentrates on the relationship of some urban bureaucrats to conditions of stress, the term street-level bureaucrat is used throughout to draw attention to individuals in organizational roles requiring frequent and significant contacts with citizens. Specifically, a "street-level bureaucrat" is defined as a public employee whose work is characterized by the following three conditions:

1. He is called upon to interact constantly with
citizens in the regular course of his job.

2. Although he works within a bureaucratic structure, his independence on the job is fairly extensive. One component of this independence is discretion in making decisions; but independence is not limited to discretion. The attitude and general approach of the street-level bureaucrat toward the citizen may affect the individual significantly. These considerations are broader than the term discretion suggests.  

3. The potential impact on citizens with whom he deals is fairly extensive. This paper will concentrate on the interaction of street-level bureaucrats and the non-voluntary clients with whom they deal in the course of their jobs.  

In American cities today, their work environments frequently require street-level bureaucrats to confront problems stemming from lack of organizational and personal resources, physical and psychological threat, and conflicting and/or ambiguous role expectations. People in these bureaucratic roles both deliberately and unconsciously develop mechanisms to cope with these problems. Street-level bureaucrats are also receptive to and supportive of organizational structural mechanisms which simplify and reduce the burdens of office. This paper will attempt to describe and assess the impact of selected bureaucratic resolutions of
these problems on job performance and community relations.

A few other job conditions common to street-level bureaucrats should be mentioned here. Not only do they perform their jobs with non-voluntary clients, but, no doubt related, these clienteles for the most part do not serve as primary bureaucratic reference groups. These points may be illustrated by considering the nature of police interactions with offenders and suspects, teachers' interactions with pupils, and lower court judges' interactions with individuals charged with criminal or deviant behavior.4

Another condition commonly characterizing the bureaucracies discussed here is that they have limited control—although extensive influence—over clientele performance, accompanied in part by high expectations and demands concerning that performance. Police and lower court judges are charged with controlling behavior which has profound social roots. Teachers are asked to compensate for aspects of children's upbringing for which they are not responsible.5

Although the theoretical aspects of this paper to some degree are generally applicable to interactions between street-level bureaucrats and citizens, they are most applicable to interactions with low-income and minority group clients. This is because poor people, and minority group members, command fewer personal resources than more favored individuals, and thus are more dependent upon governmental
bureaucratic structures for fair treatment or provision of basic services.

In this brief paper I will not be able to provide a comprehensive analysis of these bureaucratic groups. Nor can these jobs or professions be described in monolithic fashion; they encompass a wide range of variation. In attempting to develop a parsimonious theory of governmental organizational behavior and client interaction, I am interested rather in making more understandable certain problems of these bureaucratic structures, and in initiating critical analysis of certain aspects of governmental organizational behavior at the point of consumption.

The discussion will apply to aspects of street-level bureaucracy when the following conditions are relatively salient in the job environment:

1. Available resources are inadequate.

2. Work proceeds in circumstances where there exists clear physical and/or psychological threat, and/or the bureaucrat's authority is regularly challenged.

3. Expectations about job performance are ambiguous and/or contradictory, and include unattainable idealized dimensions.

Although to some extent these conditions prevail in most bureaucratic contexts, they are relatively salient in street-level bureaucracies in the contemporary American
urban setting. They are the results of (and I will suggest they are in some ways the causes of) what is known as the urban "crisis." Evidence of the existence of these conditions may be found in contemporary discussions of these professions, and to some degree in general analyses of organizational behavior. They do not invariably obtain, and are less salient in some bureaucratic contexts than in others. In some settings street-level bureaucrats are relatively free from these conditions. This does not invalidate the argument. It only suggests that at times the inferences drawn here are not applicable, and that it would be useful to specify those conditions under which they are applicable. Although the analysis is concentrated on police, teachers, and lower court judges to some extent, it is intended to be relevant in other bureaucratic contexts when the characteristics and qualifications discussed above obtain.

The remainder of this section extends and amplifies the discussion of conditions of stress under which street-level bureaucrats often must work.

Inadequate Resources

Resources necessary to function adequately as street-level bureaucrats may be classified as organizational resources, and personal resources. Organizationally, street-level bureaucrats must be provided with adequate technical
assistance and tools, and with settings conducive to client compliance. Perhaps most importantly, the manpower/client ratio must be such that service may be provided with a relatively low degree of stress consistent with expectations of service provision.  

Typical personal resources necessary for adequate job performance are sufficient time to make decisions (and act upon them), access to information, and information itself. For the policeman in many encounters with citizens, scarce personal resources frequently make it difficult to collect relevant information, or process information adequately. When breaking up a fight in a bar, a policeman may not have time to determine the initiating party, and so must make a double arrest. The need to mobilize information quickly in an uncertain bureaucratic environment may account for police practices of collecting or hoarding as much information as possible on individuals and situations in which policemen may be called to intervene, even if this information is inadmissible in court. It is not only that guidelines governing police behavior are inadequate but that inadequacy of personal and organizational resources contribute to the "improvisational" ways in which law enforcement is carried out.

In big cities, lower court judges who process tens of thousands of cases each year and have great difficulties
bringing cases to trial in timely fashion, hardly have time to obtain a comprehensive picture of every case on which they sit. One might attribute this to lack of manpower, since more judges would permit each case to be heard more fully. But whether one attributes the pressure to lack of time or to inadequate staffing, lower court judges lack the resources to do their job adequately. Many big city teachers must perform in overcrowded classrooms with inadequate materials and with clients requiring intense personal attention.

Threat and Challenges to Authority

The conditions under which street-level bureaucrats are asked to do their jobs often include distinct physical and psychological threats. This component is most clearly relevant to the police role. Police constantly work under the threat of violence that may come from any direction at any time. Threat may exist independent of the actual incidence of threat materialization. Because policemen spend most of their time in non-threatening tasks does not reduce the threat affecting their job orientations.

Teachers in inner city schools under some circumstances also appear to work under threat of physical harm. But more common may be the threat that chaos poses for a teacher attempting to perform his job. The potential for chaos, or a chaotic classroom, implies the elimination of the condi-
tions under which teaching can take place. The threat of
chaos is present whether or not teachers commonly experi-
ence chaos and regardless of whether chaotic student-class-
room conduct is caused by students or inspired by the
teacher.

Although the institutional setting in which lower
court judges conduct cases reduces the potential for threat,
judges are harried by the enormous case backlogs which con-
front them and the knowledge that individuals who cannot
make bail spend long periods in jail without trial. They
are under constant pressure from administrative judicial su-
periors to reduce this backlog. The imperative to "keep the
calendar moving," reinforced by the (often unrealized) ju-
dicial goal of a minimum wait from arrest to trial, is dis-
 tinently dissonant with the component of the ideal judicial
image which stresses hearing each case on its merits.

Threat and authority seem reciprocally related for
street-level bureaucrats. The greater the degree of per-
sonal or role authority, the less the threat. One might
also hypothesize that the greater the threat, the less bu-
reaucrats feel that authority is respected, and the more
they feel the need to invoke it. These hypotheses tend to
be confirmed by invocations to teachers to establish class-
room control as a precondition to teaching. They also
tend to be confirmed by studies of police behavior. Danger
and authority have been identified as the two principal variables of the police role. The authority vested in the role of policeman is seen by police as an instrument of control, without which they are endangered. Hence comes the often reported tendency to be lenient with offenders whose attitude and demeanor are penitent, but harsh and punitive to those offenders who show signs of disrespect. Indeed, policemen often appear to "test" the extent to which an offender is respectful in order to determine whether he is a 'wise guy' and thus has an improper attitude.

Expectations about Job Performance

Street-level bureaucrats often must perform their jobs in response to ambiguous and contradictory expectations. These expectations in part may be unattainable. The unattainability of some goal orientations may be unrealistic, mutually exclusive, or unrealized because of lack of control over client's background and performance, as discussed above.

Role theorists generally have attempted to locate the origin of role expectations in three places: in peers and others who occupy complementary role positions; in reference groups, in terms of whom expectations are defined, although they are not literally present; and in public expectations generally, where consensus about role expectations can sometimes be found. While we cannot specify here how role
expectations are generated for various street-level bureaucrats, we can make a few points concerning conflict in urban areas over these bureaucracies.

Conflicting and ambiguous role expectations stemming from divided community sentiments are the source of considerable bureaucratic strain. As public officials, street-level bureaucrats are subject to expectations that they will treat individuals fairly and impartially. To some degree they are also subject, as public officials, to expectations that individuals and individual cases will be treated on their unique merits. Providing services in terms of the ideal is constantly challenged by "realists" who stress the legitimacy of adjustments to working conditions and the unavailability of resources.

Apparently in direct conflict with expectations concerning equal treatment are expectations from more parochial community interests, to which street-level bureaucrats are also subject as public officials. In a real sense, street-level bureaucrats are expected by some reference groups to recognize the desirability of providing unequal treatment. Invocations to "clean up" certain sections of town, to harass undesirables through heavy surveillance (prostitutes, motorcycle or juvenile gangs, civil rights workers, hippies), to prosecute vigorously community "parasites" (junkies, slumlords), and even to practice reverse discrimination
(for minority groups)—all such instances represent calls for unequal bureaucratic treatment. They illustrate the efforts of some community segments to use street-level bureaucracies to gain relative advantages.

Conflicts stemming from divisive, parochial community expectations will be exacerbated in circumstances of attitudinal polarization. As relative consensus or indifference concerning role expectations diminish, street-level bureaucrats may respond by choosing among conflicting expectations rather than attempting to satisfy more than one of them. In discussing police administrative discretion, James Q. Wilson suggests that the prevailing political culture creates a "zone of indifference" within which administrators are free to act. In times of value polarization, we may suggest that the zone becomes wider, but that indifference and, as a result, discretion, is diminished as bureaucratic performance is increasingly scrutinized and practices formerly ignored assume new meaning for aroused publics.

The police role is significantly affected by conflicting role expectations. In part stemming from public ambivalence about the police, policemen must perform their duties somewhere between the demands for strict law enforcement, the necessity of discretion in enforcement, and various community mores. They must accommodate the constraints of constitutional protection and demands for effi-
ciency in maintenance of order and crime control. They must enforce laws they did not make in communities where demands for law enforcement vary with the laws and with the various strata of the population, and where police may perceive the public as hostile yet dependent. Police role behavior may conflict significantly with their own value preferences as individuals, and with the behavior and outlook of judges. They are expected to be scrupulously objective and impartial, protective of all segments of society. Speaking generally, we may expect lack of clarity in role expectations in these cases to be no less dysfunctional than in other circumstances where results of lack of role clarity have been observed empirically.

In discussing the generation of role expectations in street-level bureaucracies, the relative unimportance of non-voluntary clients should be noted. The non-voluntary clients of these bureaucracies are not primary (nor even secondary) in creating role expectations for these jobs. Contemporary political movements that appear to be particularly upsetting to some street-level bureaucrats, such as demands for community control and student power, may be understood as demands for inclusion in the constellation of bureaucratic reference groups by non-voluntary clients. It may not be that street-level bureaucracies are generally unresponsive, as is sometimes claimed. Rather they have
been responsive in the past to constellations of reference groups which have excluded a significant portion of the population with whom they regularly deal.

Public bureaucracies are somewhat vulnerable to the articulated demands of any organized segment of society because they partially share the ethos of public responsiveness and fairness. But street-level bureaucracies seem particularly incapable of responding positively to the new groups because of the ways in which their role expectations are currently framed. Demands for bureaucratic changes are most likely to be responded to when they are articulated by primary reference groups. When they are articulated by client groups outside the regular reference group arena, probabilities of responsiveness in ways consistent with client demands are likely to be significantly lower.

II

In order to make decisions when confronted with a complex problem and an uncertain environment, individuals who play organizational roles will develop bureaucratic mechanisms to make the tasks easier. To the extent that street-level bureaucrats are threatened by the three kinds of problems described in the first section, they will develop coping mechanisms specifically related to these concerns. In this discussion we will focus on the ways in which simplifications, routines, and various coping mechanisms or
strategies for dealing with the bureaucratic problems described earlier are integrated into the behavior of street-level bureaucrats and their organizational lives.  

By simplifications we refer to those symbolic constructs in terms of which individuals order their perceptions so as to make the perceived environment easier to manage. They may do this for reasons of instrumental efficiency, and/or reasons of anxiety reduction. By routines we mean the establishment of habitual or regularized patterns in terms of which tasks are performed. For this paper we will concentrate on routines developed for the purposes of, or with the effect of, alleviating bureaucratic difficulties arising from resource inadequacy, threat perception and unclear role expectations.  

This paper may be said to focus on the trade-offs incurred in, and the unintended consequences of, developing such mechanisms.

Having discussed three conditions under which street-level bureaucrats frequently must work, we now examine some of the ways in which they attempt to accommodate these conditions and some of the implications of the mechanisms developed in the coping process.

Inadequate Resources

The development of simplifications and routines permits street-level bureaucrats to make quick decisions and thereby accomplish their jobs with less difficulty (perhaps
freeing scarce resources through time saving), while at
the same time partly reducing tensions with clients or
personal anxiety over the adequacy of decisions made.
"Shortcuts" developed by these bureaucracies are often made
because of inadequate resources. Police limit enforcement
because of inability to enforce constantly all laws\(^\text{38}\)
(even if the community wanted total enforcement). Route-
inization of judicial activities in the lower courts is
pervasive. Decisions on bail and sentencing are made without
knowledge of the defendant's background or an adequate hear-
ing of the individual cases, as judges

\[\ldots\text{...become preoccupied simply with moving}
\text{the cases. Clearing the dockets becomes}
\text{a primary objective of all concerned, and}
\text{cases are dismissed, guilty pleas are}
\text{entered, and bargains are struck with}
\text{that end as the dominant consideration.}\]  

Not only does performance on a case basis suffer with
routinization, but critical decisions may effectively be
made by bureaucrats not ultimately responsible for the
decisions. Thus, for example, judges in juvenile courts
have effectively transferred decision making to the police
or probationary officers whose undigested reports form the
basis of judicial action.\(^\text{40}\) Both in schools and in the
streets, the record of an individual is likely to mark him
for special notice by teachers and policemen who, to avoid
trouble or find guilty parties, look first among the pool
of known "troublemakers." Certain types of crimes, and certain types of individuals, receive special attention from street-level bureaucrats who develop categorical attitudes toward offenses and offenders.

Additionally, routines may become ends in themselves. Special wrath is often reserved for clients who fail to appreciate the bureaucratic necessity of routine. Clients are denied rights as individuals because to encourage exercise of individual rights would jeopardize processing of caseloads on a mass basis.

Threat Reduction

Routines and simplifications are developed by street-level bureaucrats who must confront physical and psychological threat. Inner city school teachers, for example, consider maintaining discipline one of their primary problems. It is a particularly critical problem in "slum" schools, where "keeping them in line" and avoiding physical confrontations consume a major portion of teachers' time, detracting from available educational opportunities. Even under threatening circumstances, elementary school teachers are urged to "routinize as much as possible" in order to succeed.

"You gotta be tough kid, or you'll never last," appears to be the greeting most frequently exchanged by
veteran officers in socializing rookies into the force. Skolnick has called individuals so identified "potential assailants." Police may find clues to the identity of a potential assailant in the way he walks, his clothing, his race, previous experiences with police, or other "non-normal" qualities. The moral worthiness of clients also appears to have an impact on judicial judgment. In this regard, the police experience may be summed as the development of faculties for suspicion.

Mechanisms may be developed to reduce threat potential by minimizing bureaucratic involvement. Thus policemen are tutored in how to distinguish cases which should be settled on the spot with minimal police intervention. Ploys are developed to disclaim personal involvement or to disclaim discretion within the situation. "It's the law," or "those are the rules" may be empirically accurate assertions, but they are without substance when weighed with the relationship between discretion and law enforcement. Street-level bureaucrats may totally evade involvement through avoidance strategies. Thus, according to one account failure to report incidents in ghetto neighborhoods are "rationalize(d)"
...with theories that the victim would refuse to prosecute because violence has become the accepted way of life for his community, and that any other course would result in a great loss of time in court, which would reduce the efficiency of other police functions.51

Routines also serve to provide more information about potential difficulties, and project an image of authority. "Potential assailants" are frequently approached by police in a brusque, imperious manner in order to determine if the person respects police authority.52 Early teacher identification of "trouble makers," and the sensitivity of policemen to sudden movements on the part of a suspect (anticipating the reaching for a weapon) further illustrate the development of simplifications for the purposes of reducing the possibility of physical threat.

 Threats to the systems of which street-level bureaucrats are a part also contribute to the sense of threat personally perceived. Thus street-level bureaucrats attempt to provide an atmosphere in which their authority will be unquestioned, and conformity to their system of operation will be enhanced. The courtroom setting of bench, bar and robes, as well as courtroom ritual, all function to establish such an environment.53 Uniforms also support the authoritative image, as do institutional rules governing conduct and dress. Imposition of symbols of authority function to permit street-level bureaucrats to test the general
compliance of the client to the system. Thus the salute to the uniform, not the man; thus a policeman's concern that disrespect for him is disrespect for the law.

We may suggest the following hypotheses about these mechanisms for threat reduction. They will be employed more frequently than objective conditions might seem to warrant. This is because for these mechanisms to be effective they must be employed in all instances of possible threat, which can never be known. The consequences of failure to guard against physical threat are so severe that the tendency will develop to employ safety mechanisms as often, rather than as little as possible. This contrasts significantly with routines invoked for efficiency. Traffic law enforcement, for example, may be insured by sporadic enforcement, where occasional intervention serves as a sufficient deterrent for the police department. But in threatening circumstances, the risks are too great for individual bureaucrats to depend upon sporadic invocation.

Threat reduction mechanisms also are more likely to be invoked in circumstances where the penalties for employing them are not severe, rarely imposed, or non-existent. One might suggest that penalties of this kind are least likely to be invoked in street-level bureaucracies where employees are most exposed to threat, because for these bureaucracies ability to reduce threat and thus reduce
personnel anxiety are organizational maintenance requisites. Additionally, street-level bureaucrats may have a stake in exaggerating the potential for danger or job-oriented difficulties. The reasoning is similar. If the threat is exaggerated, then the threat reduction mechanisms will be employed more often, presumably increasing the likelihood that actual physical danger will be averted.\textsuperscript{57}

Exaggerating the threat publicly will also reduce the likelihood of imposition of official sanctions, since bureaucrats' superiors will have greater confidence that knowledge of the dangers accompanying job performance will be widely disseminated. Thus street-level bureaucrats paradoxically have a stake in continuing to promote information about the difficulties of their jobs at the same time that they seek to publicize their professional competence.\textsuperscript{58} One function of professional associations of policemen and teachers has been to publicize information about the lack of adequate resources with which they must work. This public relations effort permits the street-level bureaucrat to say (to himself and publicly) with greater confidence that his position will be appreciated by others: "any failures attributed to me can be understood as failures to give me the tools to do the job."

The psychological reality of the threat may bear little relationship to the statistical probabilities. One teacher,
knifed in a hallway, will evoke concern among teachers for order, even though statistically the incident might be insignificant. Policemen may imagine an incipient assault and shoot to kill, not because of the probabilities that the putative assailant will have a knife, but perhaps because once, some years ago, a policeman failed to draw a gun on an assailant and was stabbed to death. Such incidents may also be affected by tendencies to perceive some sets of people as hostile and potentially dangerous. In such circumstances the threat would be heightened by the conjunction of both threatening event and actor.

Expectations of Role Performance

Role expectations that are ambiguous, contradictory, and in some ways unrealizable represent additional job difficulties with which street-level bureaucrats must cope. Here we will discuss two coping processes with which street-level bureaucrats may effectively reduce the pressures generated by lack of clarity and unattainability of role expectations.

Changing Role Expectations. Street-level bureaucrats may attempt to alter expectations about job performance. They may try to influence the expectations of people who help give their roles definition. They may try to create a definition of their roles which includes an heroic com-
ponent recognizing the quality of job performance as a function of the difficulties encountered. Teachers may see themselves and try to get others to see them as the unsung heroes of the city. They may seek an image of themselves as people who work without public recognition or reward, under terrific tension, and who, whatever their shortcomings, are making the greatest contribution to the education of minority groups. Similarly, policemen appear interested in projecting an image of themselves as soldiers of pacification, keeping the streets safe despite community hostility and general lack of recognition. Judges, too, rationalize their job performance by stressing the physical strain under which they work and the extraordinary case loads they must process.

One of the implications of role redefining may be the disclaiming of responsibility over the results of work. It is surely difficult to demand improvement in job performance if workers are not responsible for the product. Furthermore, the claim of lack of responsibility is often not falsifiable unless illustrations are available of significantly more successful performances under similar constraints.

Another facet of role redefinition may be efforts to perform jobs in some way in accordance with perceived role expectations. This is manifested in greater teacher
interest in some children who are considered bright ("if I can't teach them all, I can at least try to teach the few who have something on the ball"); in the extraordinary time some judges will take with a few cases while many people wait for their turn for a hearing; and in the time policemen spend investigating certain crimes. In these cases, street-level bureaucrats may be responding to role expectations that emphasize individual attention and personal concern for community welfare. The judge who takes the time to hear a case fully is hardly blameworthy. But these tendencies, which partially fulfill role expectations, deflect pressures for adequate routine treatment of clienteles. They also marginally divert resources from the large bulk of cases and clients, although not so many resources as to make a perceptible dent in public impressions of agency performance. Like the public agency which creates a staff to insure a quick response to "crisis" cases, these developments may be described as routines to deal with public expectations on a selective case basis, reducing pressures to develop routines conforming to idealized role expectations on a general basis.

Changing Definitions of the Clientele. A second set of strategies by which street-level bureaucrats can attempt to alter expectations about job performance is to alter assumptions about the clientele to be served. This may
either take the form of attributing responsibility for all actions to the client, or of perceiving the client as so victimized by social forces that he cannot really be helped by service. Goffman explains well the function of the first mode of perception:

> Although there is a psychiatric view of mental disorder and an environmental view of crime and counter-revolutionary activity, both freeing the offender from moral responsibility for his offense, total institutions can little afford this particular kind of determinism. Inmates must be caused to self-direct themselves in a manageable way, and, for this to be promoted, both desired and undesired conduct must be defined as springing from the personal will and character of the individual inmate himself, and defined as something he himself can do something about.⁶²

Police tendencies to attribute riots to the riffraff of the ghettos (criminals, transients, and agitators) may also be explained in this way.⁶³ Instances of teachers beating children who clearly display signs of mental disturbance provide particularly brutal illustrations of the apparent need of at least some street-level bureaucrats to attribute self-direction to non-compliant clients.⁶⁴

The second perceptual mode also functions to absolve street-level bureaucrats from responsibility by attributing clients' performance difficulties to cultural or societal factors. If children are perceived to be primitive, racially inferior or "culturally deprived," a teacher
can hardly fault himself if his charges fail to progress. 65 Just as policemen respond to calls in different ways depending on the victim's "legitimacy," teachers often respond to children in terms of their "moral acceptability." 66 Undeniably there are cultural and social factors that affect client performance. Similarly, there is a sense in which people are responsible for their actions and activities. What is important to note, however, is that these explanations function as cognitive shields between the client and street-level bureaucrat, reducing what responsibility and accountability may exist in the role expectations of street-level bureaucrats and perhaps contributing to hostility between clients and bureaucrats.

The street-level bureaucrat can also conform to role expectations by redefining the clientele in terms of which expectations are framed. This may be called "segmenting the population to be served." In police work the tendency to segment the population 67 may be manifested in justifications for differential rates of law enforcement between white and black communities. It is also noticeable in police harassment of "hippies," motorcycle gangs, and more recently, college students, where long hair has come to symbolize the not-quite-human quality that a black skin has long played in some aspects of law enforcement. 68

The police riots during the Democratic National Convention
of 1968,\textsuperscript{69} and more recently in various university communities, may be more explicable if one recognizes that long-haired, white college students are considered by police in some respects to be "outside" of the community which can expect to be protected by norms of due process. Segmenting the population to be served reinforces police and judicial practices which condone failure to investigate crimes involving black against black,\textsuperscript{70} or encourage particular vigilance in attempting to control Negro crime against whites.\textsuperscript{71} In New York City, the landlord orientations of public officials and judges concerned with landlord-tenant disputes are reinforced by diffuse but widely accepted assumptions that low-income Negroes and Puerto Ricans are insensitive to property and property damage.

As coping behavior these strategies are similar to defense mechanisms, in that they involve reappraisal and distortion of the conditions of threat and work-related stresses.\textsuperscript{72} For street-level bureaucrats segmentation functions psychologically to permit bureaucrats to make some of their clienteles even more remote in their hierarchies of reference groups. At the same time, it allows bureaucrats to perform without the need to confront their manifest failure. They can think of themselves as having performed adequately in situations where raw materials were weak, or the resources necessary to deploy their tech-
nical skills were insufficient.

We may conclude this section by noting some of the institutional mechanisms developed in street-level bureaucracies which are conducive to greater bureaucratic control over the work environment and thus responsive to the needs of street-level bureaucrats. These relationships obtain regardless of the reasons for introducing the structural arrangements discussed here. The tracking system, whereby early in a pupil's career, schools institutionally structure teacher expectations about him represents one such institutional mechanism. Thus the educational "system" becomes responsible for pupils' progress and direction, and teachers are free to make only marginal decisions about their students (to decide in rare cases whether a student should leave a given track). In addition to reducing the decision making burden, the tracking system, as many have argued, largely determines its own predicted stability. 73

Another institutional mechanism which results in reducing client-related difficulties in street-level bureaucracies is the development of procedures for effectively limiting clientele demands by making systems financially or psychologically costly, or irritating to use. For lower courts this kind of development results in inducing people to plead guilty in exchange for lighter sentences. 74 Welfare procedures and eligibility requirements have been
credited with limiting the number of actual recipients.75 Inability to solve burglary cases results in peremptory investigations by police departments, resulting further in reduced citizen burglary reports.76 The Gothic quality of civilian review board procedures effectively limits complaints.77 The unfathomable procedures for filing housing violation complaints in New York City provides yet another illustration of effective limitation of demand.78

Still another institutional mechanism resulting in reduced pressures on the general system is the "special unit" designed to respond to particularly intense client complaints. Illustrations may be found in the establishment of police review boards, human relations units of public agencies, and public agency emergency services. The establishment of such units, whether or not they perform their manifest functions, also works to take bureaucracies "off the hook" by making it appear that something is being done about problems. However, usually in these cases the problems about which clients want something done (police brutality, equitable treatment for minority groups, housing inspections and repairs) are related to general street-level bureaucratic behavior. Thus they can only be ameliorated through general attacks on bureaucratic performance. These units permit street-level bureaucrats to allege that problems are being handled and provide a
"place" in the bureaucracy where particularly vociferous and persistent complainants can be referred. At the same time, the existence of the units deflects pressures for general reorientations.79

III

Routines, simplifications and other mechanisms utilized by street-level bureaucrats in interactions with their non-voluntary clients are not made in a social vacuum. The ways in which these mechanisms are structured will be highly significant. Some simplifications will have a greater impact on people's lives than others, and the ways they are structured will affect some groups more than others. The simplifications by which park department employees choose which trees to trim will have much less impact on people's lives than the simplifications in terms of which policemen make judgments about potential suspects.

In urban bureaucracies, stereotyping and other forms of racial and class biases significantly inform the ways in which simplifications and routines are structured. This simple conclusion is inescapable for anyone familiar with studies of police, teachers, and judges.80

Stereotypes affect simplifications and routines, but they are not equivalent. In the absence of stereotypes, simplifying and routinizing would go on anyhow. Categoriza-
tion is a necessary part of the bureaucratic process. But in American urban life, easily available stereotypes affect bureaucratic decision making in ways which independently exacerbate urban conflict.

First, in a society which already stigmatizes certain racial and income groups the bureaucratic needs to simplify and routinize become colored by the available stereotypes, and result in institutionalization of the stereotyping tendencies.

Second, as will be discussed below, street-level bureaucratic behavior is perceived as bigoted and discriminatory, probably to a greater degree than the sum of individual discriminatory actions.

Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the results of the interaction between simplifications, routines, and biases are masked from both bureaucrats and clients. Clients primarily perceive bias, while street-level bureaucrats primarily perceive their own responses to bureaucratic necessities as neutral, fair and rational (i.e., based upon empirical probabilities). The bureaucratic mode becomes a defense against allegations of unfairness, or lack of service. By stressing the need for simplifying and routinizing, street-level bureaucrats can effectively deflect confrontations concerning inadequate client servicing by the mechanisms mentioned earlier. And when confrontations
do occur, street-level bureaucrats may effectively diminish the claims of organized client groups by insisting that clients are unappreciative of service, ignorant of bureaucratic necessity, and unfair in attributing racial motives to ordinary bureaucratic behavior.81

In addition to the interaction between stereotyping and simplifications, three developments may be mentioned briefly which tend to reinforce bureaucratic biases: (1) playing out of self-fulfilling prophecies;82 (2) street-level bureaucrats' acceptance of partial empirical validation; and (3) their acceptance of illustrative validation.

In categorizing students as low or high achievers, in a sense predicting their capacity to achieve, teachers appear to create validity for the very simplifications in which they engage. Evidence has recently been presented which suggests that on the whole students will perform better in class if teachers think pupils are bright, regardless of whether or not they are.83 Policemen insure the validity of their suspicions in many ways. The provoke "symbolic assailants" through baiting them or through oversurveillance tactics.84 They also concentrate patrol among certain segments of the population, thereby insuring that there will be more police confrontations with that group.85 In this context there is triple danger in being young, black, and noticed by the law. Not only may arrest be more frequent,
but employers' concerns for clean arrest records, and the ways in which American penal institutions function as schools for criminals rather than rehabilitative institutions—all increase the probabilities that the arrested alleged petty offender will become the hardened criminal that he was assumed to be turning into. Hospital staffs, to illustrate from somewhat different sets of bureaucrats, appear to "teach" people how to be mentally and physically ill by subtly rewarding conforming behavior. Value judgments may intrude into supposedly neutral contexts to insure that the antipathies of some bureaucrats will be carried over in subsequent encounters. This occurs in the creating of client "records" which follow them throughout their dealings with bureaucracies.

Partial empirical validation of the legitimacy of simplifications informed by stereotypes may occur through selective attention to information. Statistics can be marshalled to demonstrate that black crime has increased. A policeman may screen out information which places the statistical increase in perspective, never recognizing that his own perceptions of the world have contributed to the very increases he deplores. He also "thinks" he knows that Negro crime is worse than it was, although some studies have suggested that he overestimates its extent. Similarly, it is unquestionable that children from minority
groups with language difficulties have greater problems in school than those without difficulties. Obviously there is something about lack of facility in English in an English-speaking school system that will affect achievement, although it may not be related to potential.

Illustrative validation may confirm simplifications by illustration. The common practice of "proving" the legitimacy of stereotypes and thus the legitimacy of biased simplifications by example, is not only a logical horror but a significant social fact which influences the behavior of street-level bureaucracies. Illustrative validity not only confirms the legitimacy of simplifications, but also affects the extent to which simplifications are invoked. The policeman killed in the course of duty because he neglected to shoot his assailant provides the basis for illustrative validity not only about the group of which the assailant is a part, but also about the importance of invoking simplifications in the first place.

IV

To better understand the interaction between government and citizens at the "place" where government meets people, I have attempted to demonstrate common factors in the behavior of street-level bureaucrats. I have tried
to suggest that there are patterns to this interaction, 
that continuities may be observed which transcend individual 
bureaucracies, and that certain conditions in the work 
environment of these bureaucracies appear to be relatively 
salient in structuring the bureaucrat-citizen interaction.

This analysis may help to explain some aspects of 
citizen antagonism to contemporary urban bureaucracies. 
Clients may conclude that service is prejudiced, dehumanizing 
and discriminatory in greater degree than is warranted by 
the incidence of such behavior. Just as it may take only 
one example of a policeman killed by an assailant to rein-
force police tendencies to over-react to potential assailants, 
so it only takes a few examples of bigoted teachers or 
prejudiced policemen to reinforce widespread conviction on 
the part of clients that the system is prejudiced. As 
Herman Goldstein has put it in discussing police/client 
relations:

A person who is unnecessarily aggrieved 
is not only critical of the procedure 
which was particularly offensive to him. 
He tends to broaden his interest and 
attack the whole range of police proce-
dures which suddenly appear to him to 
be unusually oppressive.89

To refer again to propositions concerning threat, 
citizen stereotyping of bureaucracies may be greater in 
direct relation to the extent of control and impact that 
these bureaucracies have on their lives. Thus these ten-
dencies will be relatively salient in institutional settings with considerable impact on citizens such as schools, in courts, and in police relations. And they will be relatively salient to low-income clients, whose resource alternatives are minimal. Furthermore, such clients may recognize the sense in which the bureaucracies "create" them and the circumstances in which they live.

Just as street-level bureaucrats develop conceptions of non-voluntary clients which deflect responsibility away from themselves, so citizens may also respond to bureaucracies by attributing to bureaucracies qualities that deflect attention away from their own shortcomings. This may result in citizens developing conceptions of bureaucrats and bureaucracies as more potent than they actually are. On the other hand, because of predicted neglect or negative experiences in the past, citizens may withdraw from bureaucratic interaction or act with hostility toward street-level bureaucrats, evoking the very reactions they have "predicted." Minority groups particularly may have negative experiences with these bureaucracies, since they may be the citizens most likely to be challenged by street-level bureaucrats, and most likely to be unable to accept gracefully challenges to self-respect.90

Citizens will also share to some extent the role ex-
pectations of street-level bureaucrats, although they may have had little influence in shaping them. This may be another source of tension, since citizens may expect personal, individualized consideration, or may demand it in spite of bureaucratic needs to provide impersonal treatment in a routinized fashion.\(^{91}\)

This analysis may help place in perspective the apparent paradox that some community groups insist that street-level bureaucracies are biased and discriminatory, while at the same time members of these bureaucracies insist in good faith that their members do not engage in discriminatory and biased practices. Regardless of whatever dissemblance may be involved here, we can partially explain the paradox by noting: (1) the way in which relatively little discriminatory behavior can result in client ascription of a great deal of bureaucratic behavior to discriminatory attitudes; (2) the ways in which mechanisms developed by street-level bureaucrats to cope with problems in job performance are informed and colored by discriminatory stereotypes; and (3) the ways in which street-level bureaucrats institutionalize bias without necessarily recognizing the implications of their actions.

If this analysis has been at all persuasive, it suggests that in significant respects street-level bureaucracies as currently structured may be inherently incapable
of responding favorably to contemporary demands for improved and more sympathetic service to some clients. Street-level bureaucrats respond to work-related pressures in ways which, however understandable or well-intentioned, may have invidious effects on citizen impressions of governmental responsiveness and equity in performance. If indeed government may be most salient to citizens where there is frequent interaction with its "representatives," and where the interactions may have important consequences for their lives, then these conclusions should evoke sympathy for current proposals for urban decentralization of authority. These proposals commend themselves at least for their concentration on fundamental alterations of the work environment of street-level bureaucrats.
FOOTNOTES

* For many useful insights and warnings, I am grateful to Hayward Alker, Kenneth Dolbeare, Murray Edelman, James Eisenstein, Roy Feldman, Herman Goldstein, Joel Handler, Herbert Jacob and Ira Sharkansky. Graduate students in political science at the University of Wisconsin provided helpful comments on a preliminary draft. I am particularly indebted to Martha Wagner for inspired and persevering research assistance. I am grateful for the research opportunities provided by the Institute for Research on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 1969, New York, N.Y.

1 The reader will recognize the tentative nature of some of the conclusions and analyses which follow. No claim is made that bureaucratic behavior may be fully explained by this analysis, only that through this analysis propositions may emerge which illuminate individual bureaucratic encounters with citizens and form the groundwork for the development of more elaborate theory.

2 James Q. Wilson has suggested that the greater exercise of discretion at the lower hierarchical levels is a unique characteristic of police and a few other organizations. See Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 7.

3 Thus this discussion is not intended to focus on such urban bureaucrats as: police precinct captains, school principals, and welfare district supervisors, whose primary interactions are with subordinate bureaucrats rather than with citizens; driver's license examiners, whose job discretion is relatively restricted; and policemen on traffic detail, whose decisions on the job are limited in social impact on citizens. While some of the generalizations which follow may obtain to other urban bureaucrats, they are intended to apply to street-level bureaucrats as defined.


4 Although attention in this paper is focused on non-voluntary clients, such as offenders and suspects in the case of police, future research might focus on street-level bureaucrats' interaction with other clients, such as those who initiate complaints. Cf. Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), ch. 3; Amul Itzoni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 95ff.


The ratio of policemen to population has remained static in recent years, despite extraordinary increases in complaints. See Task Force Report: The Police, p. 15.

Less than sufficient time and information undoubtedly characterize almost all bureaucratic decision-making contexts in the real world. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 2-3, 75-78. Thus we must again stress the relative degree to which, in some circumstances, these conditions prevail for street-level bureaucrats, and the consequences of these conditions for job performance.

One of the critical factors in gaining voluntary citizen compliance with policemen in face to face interaction revolves around "the gathering of an adequate amount of relevant information about a situation and the citizen prior to and during the interaction...." McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work," p. 169. See generally pp. 168-177.


See the critique of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in its Report, pp. 312-314.

This situation has been widely noted. See, e.g., Task Force Report: The Courts, p. 31.


Policemen have a "Hobbesian view [in which] the world becomes a jungle in which crime, corruption, and brutality are normal features of the terrain." Arthur Niederhofer, Behind the Blue Shield (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 9. See also Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, p. 251. Psychological threat may account in part for the high rate of suicide among patrolmen. See Wilson, Varieties of Police
Behavior, p. 29, note 20. For a description of "typical" police activities, see Wilson, ibid., pp. 18ff.


18 Lauter and Howe point out that because of the pervasiveness of threat perception, control has become the main value held by teachers and administrators in the schools and has been elevated to the status of "educational idol." Lauter and Howe, "The School Mess," p. 254. See also Robert Crain and David Street, "School Desegregation and School Decision-making," in Gittell and Hevesi, The Politics of Urban Education, pp. 118-119.


20 Carl Werthman and Irving Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," in Bordua, The Police, p. 74; Skolnick, Justice without Trial, pp. 84ff.


24 For an extended discussion of this phenomenon, see

25 The theme of role conflict pervades the literature on police. On these points, see e.g., Gerthman and Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," p. 66; Herman Goldstein, "Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real," Public Administration Review 23 (September 1963): 142.


31 Research findings in this area are summarized in Sarbin and Allen, "Role Theory," pp. 503-506.

32 This is not to say that children are unimportant to teachers, or that litigants and defendants are unimportant to judges. But they are not determinant of bureaucratic role expectations. This may be contrasted with determinants of role expectations for higher status public officials. See, e.g., Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), pp. 253ff. The analysis in this paper suggests the desirability of research on the specific determinants of street-level bureaucrats' role expectations, a neglected topic in empirical studies.


34 I have attempted to demonstrate this point for pro-


37 "Activities (are)...routinized...to the degree that choice has been simplified by the development of a fixed response to defined stimuli." March and Simon, Organizations, p. 142. See also Thompson, Modern Organizations, pp. 14-15. The notion of routines has been exploited effectively in discussions of budgetary processes. See Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Thomas Anton, The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966). See also Ira Sharkansky, The Routines of Politics (New York: Van Nostrand, 1970).


39 Task Force Report: The Police, p. 31. See also pp. 18, 30.


42 "Some judges have particularly strong aversions
to certain types of crime and tend to be more severe when confronted with such a case." Donald Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence without Trial (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 61. Conversely, some judges, in categorizing offenders, do not rank some offenses as serious. This is the case when lower court judges in New York City fail to treat landlord violations of housing codes as serious offenses. One reason may be that they consider narcotics violations so much more serious that, in comparison, landlord offenses are treated leniently. See Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), pp. 112-113. For police attitudes toward categories of offenses, see Dallin Oaks and Warren Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 21ff; Skolnick and Woodward, "Bureaucracy, Information, and Social Control," p. 130.

43 See Handler, "The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System," p. 32; and Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, pp. 177-178.


46 According to Niederhoffer, Behind the Blue Shield, p. 53.

47 Skolnick, Justice without Trial, pp. 45-46.


50 Skolnick describes the policeman's strategy of displacing hostility from himself by stressing his "instrumental status as societal agent." Justice without Trial, p. 107.

51 Niederhoffer, Behind the Blue Shield, p. 61. See Lazarus' discussion of avoidance in Psychological Stress and the Coping Process, p. 262.

52 Skolnick, Justice without Trial, p. 105; Herthman and Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," p. 87. That a policeman's approach to a suspect is a strategy for dealing with an uncertain environment in part may be inferred from the ways in which police attitudes reportedly change after the confrontation has ended and the suspect is in custody. See, e.g., ibid., p. 86.

53 For the importance of ritual and ceremony in establishing an environment of accepted authority, see Erving Goffman, Asylums (Chicago: Aldine, 1961), pp. 93ff.

54 Ibid., p. 115.

55 "The police expect law-abiding citizens to express their respect for the law by addressing its representatives with various gestures of deference...[t]he use of such terms as "Sir" and Officer" are expected as indications that the humble status of the juvenile in the eyes of adult and legal authority is properly understood." Herthman and Piliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," p. 87.

56 Arbitrary or discriminatory factors of course may also affect the traffic ticketing process. But the need to invoke "protective" simplifications will be significantly less. The invocation of disciplinary routines in prisons to minimize the danger of attack is noted in Cressey, "Prison Organizations," p. 1064.

57 Although increased invocations of threat reducing routines may evoke the very dangers that are feared. See below.

58 This is analogous to the paradox of police ad-
Ministrators who thrive simultaneously on public anxiety over crime waves (and the budgets to fight them), and on publicity concerning victories over crime.

59 The discrepancy between actual threat and perceived threat may be paralleled at the aggregate level by the police tendency to consider public attitudes toward police as hostile (see, e.g., Wilson, "Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect," p. 147) when there is some evidence that most people (particularly whites) have a high regard for the police (see, e.g., Task Force Report: The Police, pp. 146-147). Also related to the phenomenon of "overperceiving" hostility may be the tendency of police to overestimate the rate of Negro crime. See William Kephart, Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 88-91.


60 On this tendency in teachers, see Herbert Kohl's description of his first day in the classroom, Thirty-Six Children (New York: Signet, 1967), p. 193; Kozol, Death at an Early Age, pp. 150-152. In police work, see Reiss and Bordua, "Environment and Organization," p. 34; Niehrofshoff, Behind the Blue Shield, p. 71.

61 See Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, pp. 177-178. Also see Niederhofer, Behind the Blue Shield, p. 13.

62 Goffman, Asylums, pp. 86-87.

63 For police convictions along these lines, see Rossi, et al., "Between White and Black." That riots are not attributable to such elements is demonstrated in Robert M. Fogelson and Robert B. Hill, "Who Riots? A Study of Participation in the 1967 Riots," in Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. For evidence that police attitudes are not completely homogeneous on this subject, see the Report of the Chicago
Riot Study Committee to the Honorable Richard J. Daley (August 1, 1968), the Honorable Richard B. Austin, Chairman.

64 Kozol, Death at an Early Age, pp. 10-19.


66 According to Howard Becker, children may be morally unacceptable to teachers in terms of values centered around health and cleanliness, sex and aggression, ambition and work, and age group relations. See Becker, "Social Class and Teacher-Pupil Relationships," pp. 281-282. These considerations are particularly related to class discrepancies between teacher and pupil.

67 This has often been noted by students of police. See, e.g., Wilson's discussion of relative "legitimacy" of different classes of victims in Varieties of Police Behavior, p. 27. See also Skolnick's discussion of police polarization of the world into respectables and criminals in Justice without Trial, p. 218.


71 See Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, pp. 157ff.
72 See Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coning Process, pp. 266ff.

73 For an extensive commentary on the tracking system as conducive to the "self-fulfilling prophecy," see the decision of Judge Skelly Wright in Hobson v. Hanson, June 19, 1967, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967). See also Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto, p. 128; Rosenthal and Jacobson, Pyromania in the Classroom, esp. pp. 116-118.

74 "If all the defendants should combine to refuse to plead guilty, and should dare to hold out, they could break down the administration of criminal justice in any state in the Union. But they dare not hold out, for such as were tried and convicted could hope for no leniency. The prosecutor is like a man armed with a revolver who is cornered by a mob. A concerted rush would overwhelm...The truth is that a criminal court can operate only by inducing the great mass of actually guilty defendants to plead guilty." Task Force Report: The Courts, p. 112. For some judges, asking for a jury trial, and then being found guilty, constitutes an "offense" in itself (against judicial routine) and is grounds for being particularly harsh in sentencing. Ibid., p. 143.

75 It has been suggested that destroying this rationing system by enrolling as many eligible recipients as possible would effectively overwhelm welfare administrations, and result in necessary reforms. See Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, "The Uprising of the Poor: A Strategy to End Poverty," The Nation, May 2, 1966, pp. 510-517.

76 This rationing effect is somewhat countermanded by citizen reporting of burglaries for insurance purposes.


78 See Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, pp. 69, 105.

79 For this analysis regarding housing emergency repairs, see Lipsky, ibid., pp. 177-178. For two views on the experience with police review boards, see Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, pp. 278ff; Gellhorn, When Americans Complain, pp. 179-195. Goffman describes the
tendency for professionals in mental hospitals to be used as "window dressing" for the purposes of enhancing the institution's image in the outside world. See Goffman, Asylums, p. 92.

80 Supportive references can be found throughout this paper. But see, e.g., for judges, Newman, Conviction, pp. 155ff. For police, see Task Force Report: The Police, pp. 164ff.

81 The conflict over the tracking systems in Washington, D.C. and other cities illustrates this point. The school bureaucracy defended tracking as an inherently neutral mechanism for segregating students into ability groupings for more effective teaching. Rigidity in the system were denied, reports that tracking decisions were made on racial bases were ignored, and evidence of abuse of the tracking system was attributed to correctable malfunctioning of an otherwise useful instrument. Missing from the school bureaucracy's side of the debate was recognition that in the district school system, tracking would inevitably be permeated by stereotypic and biased decision making. See Hobson v. Hanson.

82 Generally, see Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), ch. 11.


84 See Chevigny, Police Power, p. 139; McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work," p. 171.

85 See, e.g., Werthman and Riliavin, "Gang Members and the Police," p. 76. It should be remembered that oversurveillance, perceived as harassment by the subjects of patrol, may be welcomed, and requested, by other groups.

This can be observed in school, police and court records. Goffman makes this point in the case of mental hospitals. See Goffman, Asylums, pp. 157-158.

See Kephart, Racial Factors and Urban Law Enforcement, pp. 88-91.

Herman Goldstein, "Police Discretion," p. 147.

On this last point and the police, see Chevigny, Police Power, p. 138.

See Robert Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in Robert Merton, Ailsa P. Gray, Barbara Hockey, and H. Selvin (eds.), Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 368. Joel Handler suggests that in some circumstances, such as welfare investigations, where personalized attention to clients may be undesirable, lack of job resources and routinization can be a blessing. David Matza makes the same point in approving routinization of juvenile court judicial decision-making, arguing that "making the punishment fit the crime" by routinizing sentencing is preferable to individualized diagnoses. See David Matza, Delinquency and Drift (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 129ff.

For an excellent critique and summary discussion of such proposals, see Alan Altshuler, Community Control: The Black Demand for Participation in American Cities (New York: Western Publishing Co., 1970).
There is an old Yiddish tale about a gatekeeper in an Eastern European village whose job it was to wait for the coming of the Messiah. After many years of faithful duty, he complained to the village elders about the meager pay. 'Yes, we know that the pay is meager,' replied the elders, 'but consider that the work is steady.' The job of studying American education has also become steady, if a bit dangerous. For the Political Scientist, it has also become exceedingly frustrating. Having at last rediscovered that education is highly politicised, we became enthralled with the study of political socialisation and then shocked by the extent to which our research failed to account for the waves of stress, conflict, and confrontation throughout the educational system. In a background paper to this conference, Professor Kist reminds us that educational systems are often closed to innovation, especially those involving political relationships. The same point can be made with regard to prevailing modes of professional research on education and student activism. It is true that terms such as 'deauthorisation' and 'desocialisation' are now being used to describe
behavior and attitudes dissonant with the adjustment model that has dominated Political Science for more than a decade. It is also true that new winds of 'relevance,' 'criticism,' and 'research involvement' are blowing through the meeting rooms of the social science fraternities.

The rub comes in continuing to regard education, in particular political education, as distinct in context, research orientation, and anticipated results. Too often paradigms and research methods tapped student responses within closed educational systems as if political learning was equated with cognitive learning within formal educational systems. (The point is eloquently made by David Sears in his review of the Easton et al. study of children and politics, HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Summer 1969.) Furthermore, most of us continue to regard political learning research in conventional ways. In his otherwise excellent presidential address to the American Political Science Association (1969), David Easton, after taking a fresh and sympathetic look at the 'post-behavioral!' genre of emerging Political Science professionals, proposes that we devote more resources to 'applied research' designed to yield relatively quick policy-related conclusions, while continuing to pursue our normal scholarly endeavors—this under the distinct rubric and methodologies of 'basic research.' Now the split between cognition and action has plagued the social sciences since Descartes. The balance is not easy to secure hence one finds irony in Gouldner's recent book in which he claims that radical sociologists have been exceedingly conservative in their intellectual formulations—the cries of 'social relevance' retard opportunities to be intellectually innovative in what Gouldner calls 'the crisis of Western Sociology,' which by extension becomes the crisis of Western science and education itself.

In my view, experiential political learning in which the young cope with the realities of politics in America becomes the only way of breaking
the double-bind that has crippled us. Teaching and research are themselves
distributive values and resource capable of influencing both human develop-
ment and the distribution of values and resources in the larger polity.
Political learning includes the synthesis of cognitive, affective, and
behavioral activities in a purposive way. It has an impact upon human
beings, dominant institutions with which they deal, and the distribution
of power, esteem, respect, enlightenment and other public goods. Purposive
political learning—and any research designed to understand it—always in-
volves elements of striving, negotiation, protest, and tactical formulation
that adequately reflects the efforts of a sensitive and less powerful strata,
such as adolescents or young adults, to secure some of their claims for life
space and resist the containment policies of the authoritative political
state. This means a return to the idea of experience as the prime teacher,
with organized bodies of knowledge considered as sources of material which
can only be useful once the student has already learned how to gain from
it what he needs in order better to understand how to cope with his
political culture.

One of the most obvious characteristics of those who come to college
from the American high school is the extent to which the entrant is con-
ditioned by the external stimuli and cultural phenomena of the society in
which he has been living. The style of life in the high school and the
community reinforce each other and conditions him to see the world as the
sum total of its external conditions. The entrants have not extracted
meaning from their experiences, not related it to the ongoing political
realm, and it is precisely this prefabricated gestalt that has been tapped
by much of our extant research.

It is for this reason that the radical view, and the one taken by
student activists, is that personal action, intellectual and political,
must precede and become part of very serious political learning projects involving the educational system. As far as education itself is concerned, the radical view turns in many ways on the kind of radical empiricism supported by William James and his concept of the stream of consciousness, and in many other ways on the kind of thinking about psychic behavior which stems from Freud and the psychoanalytic movement. From both sources and recent studies of student activists at all educational levels comes clear evidence that the intellect, emotions, and political realms are so closely intermingled in function that they cannot be dealt with in an inappropriate research context. It is not possible to do this in an atmosphere of distrust or in an atmosphere of authoritarian control since defense mechanisms are readily called into play. On this score, I can mention one study of Black adolescents I conducted that would never have been so richly affirmative were it not for the fact that we traded political information for responsiveness—the credentials that mattered to these young men were our knowledge about the poverty program, welfare mechanism, and political structure of their city.

We are back then to the double problem of creating a free environment in which the student may act as a member of a cooperating political community and an agent of his own growth, and of systematically studying the consequences of such endeavors. In any event, it is clear that when purposive striving is involved the young—and not only the young—create their own alternative systems. True that these systems may be episodic and sporadic but whether in a Vietnam summer project or a computer network linking Dartmouth to Princeton to Capital Hill, it is here that the raw materials of political learning research are to be found.

The key substantive problem for us is the absence of an alternative research system that deals with experiential political learning and that
combines some qualities of scholarly inquiry with ongoing efforts to bring about substantive changes in the political world. Let me say again that I regard this as the only way to act effectively as political educators and to learn more about the sources of political commitment amidst the reality of stress, confrontation, negotiation, avoidance, and passion that are the stuff of politics. This requires a more activist orientation for research than most of us are accustomed to. It also requires a more active engagement of students utilizing their interests, concerns, and skills. (In this connection, the new National Science Foundation program to support Student-Run Environmental Research is a belated, but welcome recognition of student concerns.) As for the role of Political Scientists—a subject that has now received endless debate—I can but quote my friend Paul Kress in anticipating weary disclaimers about our objective professional stance:

Today's political scientist is more likely to take the view that whenever, and on whatever level, he acts or speaks as scientist, he must seek to sterilize himself of all taints of values. He will argue that he may hold values and engage in political action, but when he does so it is as 'citizen' and not as scientist. This position sometimes involves some rather bizarre claims. We are asked, for example, to accept that a man whose business in life is acquiring superior scientific knowledge about politics abandons that status when he acts. The separation of science and practice, or in this case, thought and action, takes a curious revenge, for knowledge can retain its superior status only so long as it is not implemented. (POLITY, Fall, 1969, p. 12).
THE RESEARCH PROPOSAL: A REGENERATIVE SYSTEM

If our concern is to synthesize political learning among the young and to develop appropriate feedback mechanisms that have research value, it is necessary to think in terms of a contextual perspective that accomplishes these objectives. I propose the creation of a regenerative system, regenerative in the sense that it fundamentally unites intellect and emotion on one hand, and research and action on the other. What would the components of this system look like on a national level or at the level of discrete research projects? First, we must inventory the psycho-social resources of the student participants. Here we are on familiar ground with a plethora of findings about ego strength, self-esteem, anomie, and other variables. Of greater consequence, psycho-social resources have now been explicitly linked to political activity and to the probable contextual politics by which the young advance or frustrate their commitments. In his intellectual tour de force, RADICAL POLITICAL MAN (Schenkman, 1970), Hampden-Turner investigates data about student 'radicals' within a rich model of synoptic behavior. He finds, among other things, that radical students cluster near opposite ends of the Kohlberg scale of moral values, a scale that reveals much about the level of psycho-social development of students. While most 'radicals' have developed a high level of commitment beyond normal civic levels of duty and contract, a significant minority are operating at the impulse, self-gratification level. Hence, the insight that personal resources of activists are likely to be influential in contextual politics, influencing their perceptions of adult institutions, strategies, tactics, and ideologies employed to cope with the authority and distributive systems of our complex society. We now have the opportunity to utilize reliable affective knowledge before participants engage in overt political activity.
A second dimension of a regenerative system designed to explore the uses of political commitment includes cognitive knowledge about an aspect of the American polity. I propose that the researcher prepare a 'short course' or working curriculum designed to inform students about the project in which they will be engaged. Emphasis on the distribution of power, sanctions, resources, and benefits available to an institution would be key items in the curriculum.

Third, the participants would develop a program designed to influence specific aspects of the system. The sources of concern would be concrete grievances with the administration of justice, allocation of educational opportunities, composition of the agencies designed to deal with urban poverty. Hence, the scope of the project is flexible ranging from an examination of several institutions in an urban polity to a single agency such as the relationship of sanctioning authorities to varieties of student protest, movement, and so-called social behavior that is fundamentally political in nature.

The 'field project' presents the area of greatest difficulty. I suppose the backlog of experience among Political Scientists here includes intern programs, Congressional fellowships, and the once useful National Center for Education in Politics. None of these programs premised some fundamental differences in outlook, interest, and behavior between the initiates and the managers of the system. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the recognition of differences is critical and that in fact political learning proposals must build on points of manifest stress between the generations, students and institutions, as the case may be. There is risk as well as uncertainty here. It is not our wish, in the name of science, research, or sympathy with some demands of student protestors to produce more 'Milgram traumas' (I refer to the psychological 'studies' conducted
at Yale designed to induce subjects to administer shocks on authoritative command. Relationships with police departments are often very sticky in many communities, yet we know enough about them and the significance of what used to be called 'the state's instruments of violence' by Weber. The concern about authority models and authoritative institutions among the transitory 'youth culture' is well established in the depth studies of Erickson, Kenniston, Lane, Hampden-Turner, Friedenberg, and others.

The research problem—and it is the critical one—is that of establishing the contextual environment of experiential knowledge, relations between the participating parties, and a sense of known differences in role, values, interests that are potentially the subject of some modification. The point is that in this matter of authority, at one end stand the police of the police state, ready to beat the citizen into submission to the state's conception of law and order as defined by the abstract will of the state and carried out by a constellation of enforcement agencies. At the other end, stands the teacher-activist-researcher ready to help create a situation in which his students may act in freedom, secure in the faith that in an atmosphere of trust, acts will turn themselves away from destructiveness, aggression, and hostility toward cooperation, mutual respect, and affection. And this is the prerequisite to political efforts to alter unduly sanction-prone behavior. In between these two poles stands the conventional educational system, and conventional educational research, sometimes moving toward the police, at other times toward intrinsic uses of political knowledge, but in general unaware of the psychological or political meaning of its own actions. The effort to initiate such awareness in students, researchers, and political agencies is the core premise of experiential political learning, that is to explore the often unknown realms of differences and selective perceptions in an effort to make ameliorative changes in concrete, public relationships.

232
Having developed models of change the core of the study is an examination of the effectiveness of strategies and tactics designed to produce change, more specifically those designed to enhance key values among the young. I view these activities as tangential in the sense that they occur between the formal educational system and one or more of the outside agencies mentioned. This vantage point also provides the opportunity to assess the political responses of educational administrators, teachers, and other students on the margin as it were. How supportive are elements in the formal educational system? How freely or restrictively does the high school, for example, make resources such as influence, facilities, information available to the participants? The contextual activities can be measured, for instance along a continuum from system-oriented ways of bringing about change, such as informal negotiation with institutional leaders, to student-oriented ways of bringing about change, namely using the resources of protest available to the outsider.

In addition, the research team has the difficult task of providing support to the project's goals and maintaining sufficient intellectual distance in order to report accurately the varieties of politics that occur and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of varied ways of influencing responses by the system. There ought not be any overarching problem here with the aid of division of labor, evaluation sessions with students and the 'significant others', and whatever sense of neutral ground for the discussion of ideas and proposals still obtains to those who work in American universities. The yield here is that we can learn much about the independent impact of the form of political activity. What responses follow a series of formal conferences with the police department as compared with responses following encounter sessions on the campus, sessions in which the police can freely vent their feelings about long-haired
hippies, privileged, irresponsible middle-class students and the rest. Indeed without the elements of measured stress and disagreement, the project becomes yet another game, another way of playing at pseudo-politics divorced from any sense of power, disagreement, conflict, and interests.

Another source of 'data' is the continued flow of project reports both by participating students and by representatives of the participating agencies. (Incidentally, the project obviously requires some political finesse on the part of the researcher in securing at least the reluctant cooperation of all parties.) Moreover, I am persuaded that these varied techniques can tell us more about how effective negotiated change under pressure is in fact. The microcosms to be created in this proposal after all reflect the core problem of American society, namely our inability to find alternative ways of producing productive responses by both institutions and individuals who deal with them. Value research has always been a loose term in the social sciences. Hence, experiential research carried on in the kind of context I have sketched provides a way of finding out what values are capable of being changed by politics and which, as some of the young suspect, are simply incapable of being negotiated, modified, changed in any fundamental way.

A proposal of this kind does not guarantee the kind of significant change in institutional response desired by the young in the educational, police, or other spheres. It does open up, or so it seems to me, the critical uses of political knowledge, the ability of the social scientist to study induced efforts at social change, and the utility of findings about the uses of politics itself as an instrument of persuasion and influence. In other words, the contextually based political learning project will, in the final analysis, enable the young to know the nature of the 'social contract' they have with the administrators of their schools, police, governmental agencies. And more importantly it will
enable them to test out their preconceived notions as to how the system works, how tractible the 'Establishment' is in its professed positions, and how viable are the inherited tools of democratic politics which, after all, form the basis of any regenerative efforts directed against repression and toward the fulfillment of human needs that depend markedly on institutions capable of adaptation and change.
The Political Socialization of Student Activists: A Pilot Study

Edgar Litt
University of Connecticut

ABSTRACT

This study proposes to examine the development of the radical attitudes, opinions and behavior characteristic of student activists. To understand the young rebels who constitute one of the most important political phenomena of this decade we propose to go beyond the surface manifestations of the activists' belief systems. Through the application of current interviewing techniques the study will endeavor to uncover specific factors of individual maturation which are commonly experienced by radical activists. The personal histories, supplemented by an analysis of the general environment and the specific milieu of radical activity, should allow us to identify significant factors which determine the nature and extent of campus unrest.

The proposed project is a pilot study. It is the aim of the researchers that this study accomplish two major goals: (1) to increase understanding of student activists and (2) to test the adequacy of the models and methodological techniques contained herein. Based on the results of this project the researchers shall propose a multi-campus study where the diversity of school milieus and their impact on student protest can be examined. The present study should provide the necessary data to put a larger study on solid theoretical footing.

Request is herein made for support of a study of political socialization of student activists in several colleges and universities in the State of Connecticut. This specific area of concern within the social sciences is of major interest to the principle investigator. The particular orientation of this proposal is based upon a series of informal interviews conducted during the past academic year (1968-69) under the auspices of the principle investigator. The theoretical basis for the proposed study is an extension and elaboration of the current literature and thinking in political socialization: it proposes a distinct model of early political learning based on the dual concepts of conflict and reinforcement. This model along with the ideas of personal political conflict, crystallization of the political self, and the environmental settings, form the matrix within which the study will be conducted.
A Detailed Description of the Proposed Study

Political socialization is concerned with the development of the norms, behavior, and attitudes possessed by members of a politically organized society. A person first learns a basic set of values, then he acquires a perception of the world consistent with these values. The learning of basic values is the first period of the political socialization process and occurs while the individual is still a child. The second period of the process, which we call politization, normally occurs as the individual is emerging from adolescence to adulthood, but it is not limited to this time period. The theoretical framework we shall be using in the proposed study centers around this division of the political socialization process. The discussion which follows relates this framework to current knowledge of political socialization and the student activist.

The earliest studies in political socialization were started in the 1950's. These studies documented the fact that children in the United States acquire a positive attitude toward government. Despite drastic changes in the political atmosphere this positive belief in government continues. It is important to note that the attachment to the political community is highly emotional, occurring before the child has the capacity for rational understanding. The political world of the child is expressed in ameliorative terms. He does not comprehend it, yet he embraces it unquestioningly. There are no intermediaries between him and his government. This simplistic, emotional attachment to the government is so common among children in the early grades of elementary school that it can be considered the norm for these young Americans.
In the growing literature on the student activist, whether polemical or scholarly, there has been no indication that these students differed markedly from their peers as young children. The people who are now so open and adamant in their opposition to the government probably possessed a strong emotional attachment to it as children. Much of the opposition can be explained by the activist's ultimate politization, however, a critical difference in their early political socialization is indicated. People do not acquire or change their entire perception of the world without an underlying predisposition capable of sustaining the perception. What is needed is a model of early political socialization which can account for the development of both the activists and their non-activist peers. The model, therefore, must serve as the basis for subsequent relevant politization.

To account for the simultaneous development of the student activist and his non-radical peers we must begin in earliest childhood. The basic political socialization process in the United States, as in most nations, starts with an appeal to youthful idealism. The child learns to identify the elements of the nation's political credo with the nation itself. Abstractions such as freedom, liberty, and justice quickly become synonymous with the concept America. Both the abstractions and the idea of the nation are extremely vague at this time. As the child's cognitive capacity increases the concept America undergoes coalescence. As it does so, it is defined in terms of the institutions and structures of our political system. The child no longer conceives of America in terms of its myths or political credo, but in terms of Congress, the Presidency, the policeman, the mayor and states. At this time the child views all these institutions as 'good'. He does so because they are part of the concept 'America' which is the embodiment of the idealistic abstractions learned in early childhood.
The process described above accounts for the positive feeling children have toward their government. The initial appeal to ideals and the identification of the ideals with the vague concept "America" is the prelude to the definition of America in terms of its political institutions and structures. This phase of the first period of the process encompasses the first two steps of our model: (1) the appeal to ideals and the learning of these ideals and, (2) the subsequent transference of the ideals to the concept of America and the redefinition of America in terms of its political institutions and structures.

The radical and the non-radical are probably indistinguishable at this early age. We feel, however, that the beginnings of the differences which will some day divide these groups is already present. The division is imperceptible and would probably evade the notice of the most skillful observer. Both groups manifest their positive feeling toward the government in the same manner. We theorize that for the future radical 'America' is still defined more in terms of the idealistic abstractions in its political credo than in terms of the constituent parts of the political system. The transference of America the ideal, to America the political system did not occur completely. We are using theory here as a microscope to look inside the mind of the child. In theorizing this difference we are not saying that the non-radical child does not still possess the belief in, and we should add, faith in America in terms of the ideals and myths. But his view of America is more in terms of the institutions than the abstract concepts.

At this young age both groups still possess a romantic vision of the United States and hold a strong emotional attachment to it. This sets the stage for the third step in our model: a conflict of value sets. We perceive, however, a second
set of values coming gradually into conflict with the political values of the young. Although these are not explicitly political there are very definite political ramifications involved in their acceptance. We have labelled the second set as secular values. They include the drive for security, the urge for competition and concomitantly the desire to 'get ahead'. Moreover this would also include political realism. It is the realist's vision of the world coming into conflict with the idealistic vision. Through the conflict of value sets the child loses the innocence of youth and replaces it with a realistic positive attachment to the government. The process through which he becomes a political realist is very gradual. A major study of children from second through eighth grade finds a gradual decline in their idealistic view of government. It was slowly replaced by a more realistic view, which means one that is more appropriate to the role of the adult citizen. This is the result of both increasing knowledge and the acquisition of the secular set of values.

Within our model we consider the gradual loss of idealism the result of a conflict of value sets. During his early life the young child is appealed to through ideals. As he becomes older he is presented with a second set of values. The child finds that these secular values are continually reinforced and emphasized in the adult world into which he is quickly entering. Gradually these values become the basic set for youth as it is for most Americans. The earlier idealistic political values are incorporated and subsumed by this pervasive secular value system.

The student radical goes through the same process, but at a different stage of the maturation cycle. It follows that the conflict with the secular value system is much sharper for the radical. In fact, it appears from our previous interviews that the radical loses his political innocence at a much later stage in
life than do non-radicals. This is possible because the future radical grew up in an environment which reinforced the idealized set of values. This is consistent with our knowledge of the background of the radical. The major literature which discusses the home life of the activists emphasizes that they grew up in upper middle class families. In these homes there is a constant stress on the quality of life; success was assumed. We also discovered that the radical activists we interviewed were religious as children and also that they participated in many youth groups. This type of youthful involvement also serves to reinforce ideals. The merging of these factors may well account for the prolonging of childhood idealism through adolescence into early adulthood. At some point this protected individual is confronted with reality. He can not accept its imperfections and problems because the idealistic set of values have taken on a moral strain as well as political orientation and rest at the heart of the person's perception of the world. A person in this position has three alternatives: (1) change his perception of the world to match reality; (2) ignore the existence of reality and; (3) confront reality armed with his ideals and attempt to change it to match his ideals. The student radical opts for the third alternative. Although we question whether only children of upper-middle class families hold to the idealistic value sets we assert that this is the basic manner in which the radical activists are politically socialized in the first period of this process. Thus he completes the first period in a state of unresolved conflict between the two basic value systems which constitute the political culture of the United States.

During the second period of the socialization process the individual acquires the political orientations which have overt meaning for the political system. These orientations should be consistent with the basic political
perceptions and values learned during childhood. The young person gains his position in relation to the political community through a series of attachments including political parties, ethnic, religious, professional and regional affiliations. The key here is that there are intermediary groups between the government and the individual. Robert Lane in Political Ideology points out that the common man sees himself as distant from the government. The early attachment to the government slowly wears off. It is diverted to these secondary groups. The individual becomes detached from the government and his motivation for political action, other than voting, can be understood in terms of self-interest. The influence of these secondary groups plus the self-interest derived from the secular values are the keys to understanding the crystalization of the political self. Once this political self is formed it is extremely hard to change. A person's role in life may change and his political interest may be altered to fit this new role, but his basic political self remains.

The student radical has an extremely difficult task in acquiring a political self. We call the process he goes through radicalization. In attaining this new self-concept he alters his basic position in relation to the larger society by placing himself outside of society. He does this by relying on his root values. Here no simple model can be constructed. However, some key elements of the process can be placed together to form a sequential ordering of events in the individual's radicalization. Some of these concepts are the following: alienation, rebellion, identification, acceptance, rejection, and reinforcement. One possible sequential chain is:

1. Sense of being different
2. Isolation from early peer group
3. Attraction to new friends based on similar value sets.
4. New peer group pressure to be involved
5. Involvement leads to conflict with 'establishment'
6. We-They distinction develops
7. Escalation of activity
8. Radical critique of society
9. Steps 4 through 8 repeat themselves and the individual finds himself in greater and greater conflict with society.

This particular ordering of events holds for most of the young people Kenneth Keniston studied in his book, The Young Radicals. The actual process from the time a young person becomes aware of being different to the time he is sitting-in at Harvard or provoking the police in Chicago is unique for each individual. The person goes through this process under extreme stress and basically alone. There are few, if any, intermediary groups besides his newly acquired peer group which serve to reinforce his new position. Because he is alone, he sees himself in direct personal conflict with 'the government.' His emotional drives are not siphoned off but are maintained as a source of strength in his personal confrontations. The student radical is operating from idealistic motives, hence every decision to him is a moral decision. There are times when a rational choice would demand one action, yet the radical chooses the alternative. This combination of factors (idealism, morality, and emotionalism) continually leads the individual into conflict with society. They also guarantee the uniqueness of the radicalization process for each individual.
The Proposed Study: Objectives and Methods

The central concern of the planned study is a thorough analysis of the nature and causes of student unrest. To this end we are primarily interested in developing a meaningful understanding of the student activist who is the principal actor in campus turmoil. Our objective involves more than knowledge of the few radicals who make headlines or conduct dramatic confrontations. Our concern is with the generation of idealistic youth who are now, or who have recently been participants in campus agitation. In pursuance of the central concern of the study we are cognizant of the fact that the political milieu, both immediately surrounding the individual and the more general environment are important determinants of unrest. The selection of the University of Connecticut for special analysis was guided by our interest in obtaining data with relation to the activist's immediate political milieu. The data collected from the University will be supplemented by knowledge gained from existing studies of student activists. The result should be a complete picture of the varied political contexts in which student radicals may be found.

The interviews we conducted last year yielded important information with regard to the nature of student activism on various campuses. Based on this knowledge we have derived a series of general propositions pertaining to the differences and similarities among campus radicals and the forms of their activity. There are basic similarities in the personal concerns of radicals: (1) how to act upon their ideals: (2) uncertainty about their futures and; (3) awareness of the moral consequences of decisions. They perceive the general political environment of the United States as hostile to change. Thus they do not expect significant
change as a resultant of their activity. They lack a Utopian vision, therefore most of their activity is manifested in negative terms. These activities evolve around situations which the radicals view as being the most overt examples in which the American creed is absent. Concomitantly, since they are idealists, they demand that the government live up to these ideals. Implicit in these demands is a basic romantic faith in the government as capable of curing all ills if only it were controlled by 'honest and brave men.' The student radicals are extremely individualistic in their activity which accounts for the absence of permanent leadership as well as consistency of programs. This individuality being clearly manifest in the lack of concern between campuses for coordinated programs and actions even in a state as small as Connecticut. The individual is a result of the radicalization process during which each person found himself to be alone in the face of severe personal conflict. Lastly, there is a strong emotional content in all of their activity resulting in an emphasis on fraternity and community among themselves.

Despite these basic similarities the manifestations of the radicals' underlying discontent is channelled into a wide variety of activity. Their individual political contexts define a gamut of possible behavior which varies from campus to campus and from individual to individual as well as for any single individual over time. The problem, then, is to define the relevant factors which distinguish one political context from the next. We propose that there are nine significant factors which define the range of possible political activity on the part of student radicals: (1) The educational philosophy and purpose of the institution; (2) The nature of the student body; (3) The location of the campus; (4) The size of the radical student element; (5) The support for radical
activity from within the institution; (6) The presence or absence of radical graduate students; (7) The presence of specific conflict provoking situations; (8) The directness with which the influence of the government is felt and; (9) The quality of the radicals' critique of society.

Most student radicals hold the same basic political and moral beliefs. They share the same personal visions and feelings acquiring much of their identity from 'the movement.' Although similar in these ways their activity varies in accordance with the political context of their immediate environment as it is defined by the above mentioned factors. Some student radicals rise above their milieu and ferment activity which can be considered unexpected. The majority, however, act within a limited range and this range changes as the context of the situation is altered. Thus, when students from campuses untouched by protest found themselves in front of the Pentagon in 1968 or at Grant Park in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention the overt manifestations of their beliefs and feelings found a different mode of expression.

Methods: General Institutional Setting

Preceding any interviewing of the radical activists, background data will be collected about the University. Attention will be given to the factors which define the nature of the school. Prominent among these are: the socio-economic background of the student body; aspirations of the students as indicated by the occupations they enter after graduation; the governance of the institutions, especially the role of the faculty and students; the physical location and facilities of the school and; the major events since September, 1964 which have affected the institutions. To acquire this data we shall review school statistics.
and publications for the past six years. Publications will include the student newspaper and yearbook, alumni mailings, school reports and other such material where appropriate. We shall also rely upon discussions with school administrators, faculty and student leaders. A complete file of background material will be compiled.

Thus, prior to the interviewing of student radicals we shall have acquired a hopefully objective knowledge of the school they are attending. The aggregate picture woven together in this manner will serve as a comparison to the image of the school portrayed by the radicals. It will provide material which can be worked into the interview schedules thereby allowing the interviewer to be specific in at least some of the questioning. This type of data collection will continue during the interviews with particular emphasis being given to those events or factors which the radicals believe to be important determinants of the university's character.

Methods: Composition of Radical Sample

The selection of the student radicals to be interviewed will not follow the mathematical procedures used in statistically guided studies. In conformity to the principal concerns of the research a diffuse sample of student radicals must be secured so that both leaders and followers are included. The expected procedure for acquiring information about the identity of those to be interviewed would be to garner data when the background material is collected. Although we shall be attempting to identify radical organizations on and off the campus and the students who participate in their activities during this time, there are special considerations which dictate an alternative approach. Some student
radicals will shy away from being interviewed unless they have confidence that the interviewer is a 'friend' and that the data collected will not be used to incriminate them or their organization. Although this touch of paranoia is not universal among student radicals we became aware of it in our interviewing last year. There was a direct correlation between the degree of openness exhibited by the radicals and their knowledge of, and confidence in the interviewer. Therefore, an alternative method must be used in which the initial contact with the radicals is made under friendly auspices. This will be attempted through the use of various other sources in 'the movement.' To this end, we have already started making contacts with organizations where the research associate is known. From these groups the names of student activists on the campuses to be studied should be obtained. The interviewers will then have an entrée into the radical community on each campus. Once rapport is established between the researchers and the radicals, approximately twenty individuals will be identified at each institution as potential interviewees.

The criteria of what constitutes a radical activist will center around two variables. (1) Activity of some order will be the primary standard for separating radicals from non-radicals, and (2) membership in dissident organizations will be important but not essential. Our sample must be broadly representative of the student radicals at the University. Therefore, we will be selecting both the best known by reputation and exhibited leadership and the silent activists who participate without recognition.

Once individuals are selected they will be contacted either in person or by telephone to arrange the time and place of the interview. Once rapport has been established with the radical element at the University, we anticipate no problems in obtaining these interviews.
Methods: General Survey Questionnaires

We shall make use of a general questionnaire as well as the lengthy personal interviews with the student radicals. There are three distinct reasons for using survey research methods to acquire information from the student body. First, this methodological approach provides data which can be used for comparative purposes with the least amount of subjective interpretation on the part of the researchers. The information obtained through these questionnaires will allow for comparisons with other studies of students. How different is the student body at the University background, visions, beliefs and aspirations? We should also acquire sufficient knowledge to uncover any distinctions which separate the radicals from the mass of students. In particular we will be interested in the value orientations of the student body in comparison to the radicals. If there is a difference in value sets adhered to in the directions indicated by the model of political socialization presented earlier, then it should serve as evidence supportive of these models. If the differences do not appear or the direction is reversed, then there will be ample indication that the models are incorrect.

Second, the data collected from the questionnaires will aid in the definition of the political context of the institution. What type of attitudes do students hold toward their fellow students, the faculty and the administration? What are their attitudes with regard the limits of dissent? Do they feel a great amount of freedom to express themselves on academic and political matters and do they feel they are listened to and taken into consideration in the institution's decision making process? In this respect we shall be interested in the nature of student grievances, the part each has played in these matters and their feelings about the quality of the education they are receiving.
Third, by sampling mass student opinion, knowledge should be accrued concerning the extent of student unrest. Here our interest will center around four factors; attitudes towards the government; sense of political efficacy; sympathy with the radical students and their activity and; belief in their own potential for participation in radical programs.

Five percent of the full time student body will be requested to complete the questionnaire. We shall choose these individuals from official school listings of students. The selection will be based on a table of random numbers. These questionnaires will be mailed to the students with a covering letter explaining the nature of the research being conducted and guaranteeing anonymity to the respondent. Follow-up letters will be sent if necessary to assure a high return rate. The radical sample will also be requested to complete these questionnaires.

The questionnaire, itself, will be composed of approximately 150 items. The division of these will be in accordance with the reasons for the survey outlined above. The form of the items will vary depending on the type of information being obtained. Therefore, we shall make use of fill-ins, open-ended questions, both short and long answer, and statements to which the students will be asked to indicate the strength of their agreement or disagreement. Some categories of items will be presented in continuous series while others will be more generally distributed throughout the questionnaire. The latter technique will be used especially where consistency of belief is being examined.

We anticipate the inclusion of approximately 600 individuals in the survey. A complete enumeration of all of the items to be included in the survey is impossible at this time as we are still in the process of refining the questions and statements to be used.
The major concerns of the threefold division indicated above in the approximate order of appearance on the survey are described below. Some overlapping of ideas are endemic to this type of division and the analysis will take note of this fact.

I. Political Context.

1. Attitudes towards current events.
2. Personal feeling of freedom both on and off the campus.
3. General attitude toward the quality of education being received (ideal vs. reality).
4. Opinions about fellow students, faculty and administrators.
5. Position with regard the limits of dissent.
6. Specific grievances harbored toward the institution and government.

II. Scope of Student Unrest.

1. Support or rejection of political authority.
2. Sense of political efficacy.
3. Sympathy for radical students' ideals and beliefs.
4. Approval or disapproval of the radicals' tactics.
5. Belief in possible personal involvement.

III. Autobiographical.

1. Background data.
2. Personal political development.
3. Agreement or disagreement with parental attitudes.
4. Value sets adhered to, both in ideal form and realistic expectations.

Methods: Analysis of Political Context and Occurrences of Student Unrest.

The uncovering and analysis of the political context of the University institution will be a continual process lasting the duration of the study. The information garnered from the general institutional setting will serve as a starting point for this investigation. The data from the surveys and interviews will provide descriptive material essential for an accurate portrayal of the
political climate at each school. Basically this concept hinges on the perceptions of the students. Some may view the milieu as politically stifling while others may find it completely open to political action. Some individuals will constantly feel the presence of authority, but others may have no awareness of it. Our task will be to balance these diverse perceptions creating a synthesis which is both accurate and complete.

The analysis of overt activity by radicals will depend greatly on the background data and the interviews. Most of this should be straightforward with special attention being given to the roles played by those in the radical samples. In connection with our concern for the radical activist's development we will pursue at length his motivation for participation in these activities and the outcomes he desired to come from them. The only problem we can anticipate is when the activity resulted in a sharp conflict with other students or school authorities. Endemic to these situations is a divergence of opinions as to the facts surrounding the events. It will then fall to the investigators to ferret out the relevant facts when reconstructing the situation.

The research conducted into these events will stress both the specific issues involved in the activity and the more general underlying reasons and causes for its occurrences. For instance students may demand that R. O. T. C. be removed from campus and picket the building in which these classes are held. The underlying motivation, however, may be discontent with the war in Vietnam and the picket is a manifestation of the more general discontent.
The Radical Interviews. We anticipate that all interviewing will be done in and around the University. In particular, past experience has led us to believe that most will be conducted during the odd hours of the night in the radical's living quarters. We have found that student activists are most open in familiar surroundings when they are not being pressured by their usual routine.

Much of the information desired can only be obtained by letting the radical tell their own stories and in the spontaneity of intense interchanges between the respondent and the interviewer. Therefore, the interview schedule as shown below varies from semi-structured in the sections on early life to completely unstructured when the inquiry concerns the radicalization process itself. The interviewer will continually ask qualifying questions to expand upon the interviewees' answers to specific questions. This type of rebuttal on the part of the interviewer is essential when he is probing for details and feelings. We have not, however, indicated its presence on the schedule produced here. It should be assumed that this type of questioning will go on in every part of the interview. Much of the interchange in the latter stages will be directed by the interviewer back to prior statements so that the radical is constantly re-assessing his present situation in light of earlier experiences. Detailed questions surrounding events at each college or university will be incorporated after the study of the institutional setting.

These interviews will be taped and a selected number transcribed. After reviewing the tapes and transcripts it may be imperative that some radicals be contacted again to clarify certain details uncovered but not explored in the initial interview. The nature of this consultation will depend upon the character of the information being sought.
The specific questions contained in the format below cannot be considered exhaustive or even definite. They have been included to indicate the direction being taken under each of the general rubrics.

Part I  
**Early Political Socialization**

A. Personal History through Elementary School:

Where did the respondent live as a youth? What was the school like that he attended? Did he like the school? How well did he do grade-wise? What role did religion have in his life during this period? What type of peer groups did he belong to? Was he looked upon as a leader or a follower in these groups? Who were his heroes? What did he want to be? How would he define his relationship to his family? Was he shown respect in his home?

B. Political Development through Elementary School:

What political events does the respondent remember from this period? How did they make him feel? What were his feelings toward the United States, the Presidency, Congress, the police, etc.? Did he discuss politics at home or with his friends? Were there any major events during this period which affected his life? These may have absolutely nothing to do with politics. If yes, what were they and what was the effect believed to be?

C. Family History:

Who are the radical's parents? What is their background? How far did they go in their education? What are their occupations? What social class do they move in? What part does religion play in their lives? Has it changed since the respondent was young? How many brothers and sisters were there in the family? What is the respondent's attitude toward them now and how has it changed, if it has? What did the respondent like most (least) about his home? How much pressure was put upon him to do well so that he could better himself? How much emphasis was there on money in family discussions? Did the mother or father make the important decisions in the house? Did the radical favor one parent over the other? Does he now? Taking advantage of hindsight, what are the qualities that the respondent admires most (least) about his father (mother)? Did any of their values influence the respondent to be what he is today? What values did he acquire directly from his parents?
D. Personal History through High School:

The questions in this section will be similar to those included in the earlier personal history. There will be, however, additional questions. Was the respondent active in high school? If yes, in what ways? What organizations did he belong to outside of high school? What was his self image? Did he feel different or separate from his classmates? If yes, why? What were his visions of college? When did he decide to go to college? Did he care where he pursued his education? Was the respondent money conscious? Did he thrive on competition? Did he have a compulsion to be first in whatever he did? Did he take pride in his work no matter how others judged it? Did the respondent ever feel that he had been treated unfairly in school or elsewhere?

E. Political Development through High School:

What are the political events which the respondent remembers most clearly from this period? Which were the most important to the respondent personally? Why? How did he react to them? What did he think of student radicals? What did he think about the civil rights movement? Did the respondent doubt that the United States government was doing all that it could in this area? When did he become aware of the Black problem in this country? Poverty? The war in Vietnam? What did he think about these issues? Did he see himself as different from his friends or parents on these issues? Was the respondent active politically in any manner while in high school? Did he discuss politics with his parents or friends? What were the respondent's general feelings toward the government? Towards Russia? China? Germany? Hungary? If he had been given a large sum of money to be given away to poor or starving people, where would he have sent the money?

Part II

The Radicalization Process

A. Present Image of the United States:

What does the radical see as the defining characteristics of this country? Who are the people (individuals and/or groups) the respondent admires most (least)? In this nation? Outside of the nation? What is his attitude toward governments in general? Authority?

B. Present Values:

What are the most important values that the respondent is fighting for? Why are these so important to him? Where did he learn them? Is violence compatible with these values? What is the end that the respondent is attempting to achieve? Do any tactics justify the attainment of these ends?

305
C. Motivation for Activity:

Why does the respondent demonstrate in general? What does he hope to accomplish? Is there a serious pressure from his peer group to participate? These questions will be followed up with specific questions about the respondent’s activity at protests on his particular campus.

D. Image of World Prior to Becoming a Radical:

What were the respondent’s attitudes toward the United States before he became a radical? How did the individual define himself politically? What were his major concerns? Was he active in politics? What did he anticipate he would do after finishing college? Did he feel that he had complete control over his life or did he feel that he just accepted what came along? Were there any values he used in guiding his actions?

E. The Radicalization Process Itself:

How did the respondent become a radical activist? How different does he see his beliefs and values from before the change? Has it affected his personality and self image? How does he define himself politically? Has the respondent’s vision of human nature changed?

Part III  Major Problems Facing the Radical

A. Personal:

What are the major problems facing the radical in his personal life? Does he act consistent with the values he espouses? Is he basically an optimist or pessimist? Does he feel discriminated against because he is a radical?

B. Politically:

What are the chances of the respondent creating a better society? Does he feel that a society can exist based on his values? How will the change come about?

Part IV  Personal Aspirations: The Future

What does the future hold for the respondent? Where will he go from where he is now? What will he do? Can he find peace within himself or will he always have a compulsion for political activity? Does he see an inevitable retreat from his values as he becomes more and more emersed in the problems confronting the working individual?
Projected Timetable for the Study

Certain aspects of the study have already started. Collection of data for the institutional setting and the establishment of contacts with various 'movement' groups were commenced in January, 1970. Upon receipt of the expected support in April, 1970, we shall move ahead at an accelerated pace with the aid of a competent staff. The detailed material necessary for the reconstruction of the institutional setting should be completed by the end of June, 1970. The mass surveys will be distributed in the middle of April, while the interviews with the radicals will start in April and will continue to the terminus of the 1969-70 academic year. Transcription of the interviews with the radicals will also commence in the summer and continue approximately one month past the final interview. Completion of the interviews with the campus radicals will be in September and October, 1970. November, 1970 through March, 1971 will be primarily devoted to analysis of the data and completion of the project reports. Completion date for the study will be the last day of March, 1971.
Relevance of the Proposed Study

The proposed study should be of special interest to the policy makers, educators and general public of the State of Connecticut. The University of Connecticut has had its share of student unrest to date. As state and private institutions of higher education expand, enrolling a greater number of Connecticut's youthful citizens, what is the probability that this unrest will grow in size and intensity? Part of the answer to the question lies in a proper understanding of who the dissidents are, what they want, and why they demand in such a vociferous fashion. Increased knowledge must be gathered to understand the motivations, values, problems, and aspirations of not just the activists but the general student population who at times support the vocal minority. The adequacy of this knowledge will permit the policy makers and educators of the state to plan best for the future.

The limiting of the study to the University of Connecticut will subject the findings to some qualifications with regards to generalizations. As a pilot study however, we are interested in testing the ideas contained herein for their applicability for a much larger study. Moreover, it should also be pointed out that most of the studies concerned with the radicals are limited to single institutions similar to this study. In proposing this pilot study the researchers will be inquiring into the conditions which characterize a large state university. It is our belief that this approach will be extremely fruitful in gaining a real understanding of the nature and causes of student unrest and will thus put the subsequent multi-campus study on solid footing.
The proposed study combines two of the major academic concerns of the principal investigator: political socialization and higher education. In bringing these two areas together under the scope of one project it is the hope of the researchers that the knowledge gained will be sufficiently accurate and complete to increase our awareness of the specific and general reasons for campus turmoil.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney

American Council on Education

Axelrod, J., Freedman, M., Batch, W., Katz, J., Sanford, N.

Barzun, Jacques

Cohen, Mitchell, and Hale, Dennis (eds.)

Cox Commission Report

Dawsen, Richard E., and Prewitt, Kenneth

Erickson, Eric (ed.)

Erickson, Eric

Eisenstadt, S. N.
1956 From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure.

Feuer, Lewis S.

Greenstein, Fred

Hess, Robert, and Torney, Judith V.

Hyman, Herbert
Jencks, Christopher and Reisman, David

Keniston, Kenneth

Keniston, Kenneth

Kennan, George, F.

Key, Jr., V. O.

Lane, Robert

Lipset, Seymour Martin

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Lowenthal, Leo

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Wolin, Sheldon S. (eds.)
1965  The Berkeley Student Revolt.  Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday.

Litt, Edgar (ed.)

Lynd, Alice (ed.)
1968  We Won't Go.  Boston: Beacon Press.

Mead, George H.

Newfield, Jack

Riesman, David, Glazer, Nathan, and Denney, Reuel

Remmers, H. H., and Radler, D. H.
1957  The American Teenager.  Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill

Rosenberg, Morris

Whyte, Jr., William H.
Wolfenstein, Martha and Eliman, Gilbert
1966 *Children and the Death of a President.*

Wood, Robert C.

Zeigler, Harmon
1966 *The Political World of the High School Teacher.* Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon.

Zinn, Howard
Articles and Periodicals

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
1964 Special Issue: "Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process." CCCLXI, September.


Almond, Gabriel

Bernstein, Basil

Bronfenbrenner, U.

Daedalus

Dodge, R. W., and Uyeki, E. S.

Easton, David

Edelstein, Allen S.

Flacks, Richard

Greenstein, Fred I.

Harvard Educational Review
1968 Special Issue: "Political Socialization," XXXVIII (No. 3).

Jahoda, Maire and Warren, Neil

Keniston, Kenneth
1963 "American Students and the Political Revival," The American Scholar, XXXII, 40-64.
Keniston, Kenneth


Lane, Robert

Langston, Kenneth

Litt, Edgar

Maccoby, Norton, and Matthews

McClimtock, C. G. and Turner, H. A.

Middleton, Russell and Putney, Snell

Schick, Marvin and Somit, Albert
1963 "The Failure to Teach Political Activity," The American Behavioral Scientist, VI (January), 5-7.

Spender, Stephen

Vaughan, Roger
CITATIONS


2 For an extensive analysis of this relationship, see Fred Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), esp. Chap. 3, "Children's Feeling about Political Authority."


Community, Neighborhood and Educational Performance

Norton E. Long

James Coleman's massive investigations into educational achievement invite enquiry into the significant characteristics of educative environments. Political scientists, were their interest in Greek political theory and institutions other than sentimental or honorific, might have been expected to be among the first to recognize the city as the educational institution. Indeed, for Plato education was the main spring of politics. The late V. O. Key in the first edition of his party's text had chapters on violence and education. These chapters were prescient beyond their time and were removed in subsequent editions. Even earlier than Key's work, Merriam's "Making of Citizens" series concerned itself with the newly rediscovered subject of political socialization - itself an educational field. Doubtless Merriam's work was inspired by the problems of post World War I nationalism as similar current interests have been by the new nations of World War II. The interests of V. O. Key and Merriam are a far cry from the extension of conventional political institutional interests that is exhibited in political science concern with educational referenda on school bonds and taxes and apportionment of funds by legislatures.

The superficiality of this latter concern is partially due to the self-serving and simplistic identification of quality of educational output with quantity of dollars input. Coleman's studies and those of others have cast doubt on what had been a pleasing and labor saving assumption. With its own preoccupation with aimless institutional description to the neglect of the selection, explanation and evaluation of important
outcomes, political science is scarcely in a position to throw stones. It has never quite assumed that governments that raised or spent the most money had the best product. Perhaps if it had made such an explicit assumption it might have gone further along the road of explaining and evaluating outcomes than it has. The uncriticized common sense imputation of outcomes to the institutions laboriously described has served both to justify the effort of institutional description and to inhibit realization of the critical need for explanation and evaluation of the outcomes of the institutions described if political science were to go beyond mere institutionalism.

As so often, the acute problems raised by social change force a relevance on a discipline that has become remote from everyday life. Black concern with education and its crucial place in determining and legitimizing role assignment in a society putatively meritocratic and increasingly credentialist has revived interest in the Platonic politics of the who and the how of the determining of the men of gold, silver and brass. Cicourel and Kitsuse's study of college counselling in the high school shows that not only Blacks need to be concerned with the Platonic politics of education. Chalmers Johnson, in his essay on revolution, maintains that a critical stage in the process is the erosion of the accepted legitimacy of the system of role assignment. While the I. Q. provided the analogue of the Indian caste system in explaining a bad karma, the problem of role assignment was social and divine or natural rather than secular, human and political. Even the supposition that education gave skills such as reading, which in their turn justified role assignment, has been called in question. Thus, Christopher Jencks, reviewing the Coleman Report a year after, expresses doubts that the schools ever taught great numbers.

317
to read and surmises that their real contribution to employability was
docility. Ivar Berg in his "Great Training Robbery" in similar fashion
calls in question the reality of the manifest function of industry's
educational job prerequisites.

A slaveholding society passed laws forbidding Negroes to learn
to read. It would be ironical indeed if schools succeeded where slave
state laws failed. What the Coleman Report suggests is the critical im-
portance of the environment outside the four walls of the school for what
goes on or fails to go on inside them. We have known from our experience
with the Peace Corps that it is difficult, if not impossible, to teach the
children of a village if the teachers are unwilling or unable to live in
the village. If there is one thing our expensive experience should have
taught us in Vietnam it is that if the village chief can not or will not
stay the night in the village you do not own the village. It seems highly
likely that if Coleman is right there is a politics and a sociology of
a school's environment that disposes children favorably or unfavorably
for educational achievement. Lyford has portrayed achieving schools in
a most untoward environment and Havighurst asserts that exceptional prin-
cipals in Chicago have achieved superior results. However this may be,
the cases are likely exceptional and dependent on unique factors with the
Coleman findings representing the norm.

The paradigm case for an untoward environment such as depicted
by Lyford in "The Airtight Cage" and by Kelley and Green in "The School
Children" might well be the Muslim Church as described in the autobiography
of Malcom X. Malcom describes an institution with the power to grip much
of the humanity whose condition is so despairingly described. The logic
of such an institution, if it is susceptible of practical realization,

3.
would entail children with the quality Coleman finds preeminently impor-
tant, a sense of capacity to meaningfully determine their own fate. Such
children could be expected to learn to read and the schools of such a
church, like that of Calvin, could be expected successfully to teach.
Clearly the Muslim model has drawbacks, not least of which is that the
severity of its demands may severely limit the range of its application.
Its value is that it does suggest a social organization of a neighborhood
that might motivate children to learn. The model of this organization
may reveal one of the logics by which desired educational results might
be achieved. It suggests a politics by which such a model might be brought
into play.

The politics it suggests may be most relevant to those for whom
large money expenditures to purchase educational results are out of the
question. The politics of the model are of course repugnant to the ideals
of privacy, individualism and limited community involvement. Like the
Calvinist church, they make unpleasantly personal and onerous demands.
The demands, none the less, are highly rewarding to many despite their
invasions of privacy and their incompatibility with a merely dues paying
membership. A revival of the closed or partially closed highly interac-
tive neighborhood community that has been eroded by the national market,
a free floating national and state citizenship and a monetized set of
social relationships is an alternative for those who have not the means
to purchase their amenities but must resort to collaborative social
self-help if they are to enjoy them.

If Coleman is right that the attitude of the child, his sense of
efficacy, is critical and if this attitude is significantly the result
not only of family but of neighborhood functioning, we badly need to know

4.
what are the characteristics and the dynamics of the educationally achieving neighborhood. This suggests the desirability of doing some intensive neighborhood ethnography in areas whose educational performance indicates that their intensive study might yield insight into the variables whose interaction may account for differential neighborhood educational performance. Appreciation of the critical variables and the manner of their interaction that accounts for significant variations in educational performance is a first step toward the development of explanatory theory. This in turn is a necessary prerequisite to informed intervention strategies which can serve to alter existing logics in desired ways and whose results can serve to edit and improve theories. The Muslim church is a useful example of a bundle of interacting variables whose examination may yield an underlying logic of wider and potentially useful applicability.

With some notion of the kind of neighborhood variables whose interaction might produce attitudes among children favorable to educational achievement it may be possible to locate sites of natural state experimentation whose examination would help both to build and edit theory. In the country at large the play of events must be producing wide variations in the mix of critically relevant educational variables. If we could spot the interesting natural state experiments their study in situ like natural state medical experiments could be highly rewarding. The problem is to locate the sites of these experiments to make possible their intensive ethnographic study. What one might be looking for is a critical educational dimension such as literacy.

Performance on the literacy dimension that would widely diverge from what census characteristics of neighborhood population would lead one to expect would indicate a territory that might be promising for study.
Substantial change in favorable or unfavorable direction of the literacy performance would also indicate interesting sites. The value of these sites is the likelihood that they would highlight the action of variables that are critically important for an explanation of system performance.

A major reason for the failure to measure and explain outcomes of the political and, more to the point, the educational system has been the lack of available comparative performance indicators. In part this has been due to schoolmen's concern with the invidious and politically uncomfortable nature of other than dollar comparisons. In part it has been due to a metaphysical quest for an educational standard. This last is an outgrowth of an inappropriate conception of the task of evaluation and the function of standards as tools whose justification is in use rather than in essence. In a discipline heavily indebted to John Dewey it is surprising that other than politically pragmatic tests should have failed to develop, gain acceptance and improve with use. Be this as it may, the attainment of literacy seems a good first approximation standard of at least an important dimension of educational performance. Hopefully, it will prove to covary in interesting ways with other significant educational and societal dimensions. All this, of course, will have more point if a useful available indicator of comparative literacy performance should prove forthcoming from the existing social bookkeeping.

The draft tests contain a literacy predictor which should be susceptible of disaggregation to area levels that might approximate neighborhoods. A major problem consists in the territorial definition of likely local social systems whose characteristics may account in important degree for educational successes and failures. Existing concern with community control of local schools to the extent it has a rational
base depends upon a reasoned belief that a local community relevant to school performance exists or could be brought into being. Indeed, much of the Ford Foundation advocacy of decentralization and the hopes for experiments and disasters such as Ocean Hill-Brownsville seem to be based on the assumption that power over a school could activate latent neighborhood potentialities and in doing so prove therapeutic for neighborhood and school alike. Much of these hopes may be as well and as ill grounded and many of those of colonial nationalism. Neither community nor self-governing capacity are free gifts of nature.

What might be attempted is to take some of the existing territorially defined areas, school districts and perhaps other minor civil jurisdictions and see if in the general performance of the draft literacy predictor an areal performance that approximates neighborhood size shows up. Hopefully the social interaction patterns of limited definable territories will prove significantly related to the behavior of the literacy predictor of the draft test. If this proves the case it should be possible to spot areas in which, despite highly adverse or highly favorable census characteristics, the literacy predictor behaves in unexpected ways. Dramatic changes in the behavior of the literacy predictor over time might turn out to be connected with observable movements of other variables suggesting causal connections. The literacy predictor of the draft test then if it can be meaningfully disaggregated to interesting local areas might enable research to zero in on the active sites of natural state experiments. These natural state experiments quite possibly will prove theoretically heuristic by exemplifying the action and interaction of critical variables in a more readily observable way. Observation of this interaction should prove helpful both in the building and the editing of explanatory theory concerning
the societal variables associated with variations of the localized educational performance along the dimension of literacy.

Explanatory theory that embraces the social variables significantly accounting for the localized literacy performance should suggest intervention strategies that would in principle alter the existing logics in desired ways. Thus a successful mapping of patterns of localized interaction accounting for literacy performance might yield an understanding of the relevant structure and process and the means to its desired modification through political action. One might hope that the literacy predictor would covary in interesting ways with other variables. Thus it might be that a local neighborhood that is achieving a significant aptitude for literacy on the part of its young is producing an effective normative structure that would significantly affect rates of crime, deviancy, dropouts, work attitudes and other important dimensions. If there proves to be a societal interaction, a socio-political process whose variations account significantly for differences in the behavior of the literacy predictor, we may advance our understanding both of the way in which neighborhood forces as well as family generate the youth attitudes Coleman finds critical. In doing so we may learn what constructive intervention strategies are possible. If nothing more we can explore the behavior of a seemingly significant social indicator that the social accounting routinely produces. This indicator is all the more valuable since we so sorely lack available means of standardized comparison over places and times.
Comparative Research on the Relationships between
Political and Educational Institutions

by

John W. Meyer
Department of Sociology
Stanford University

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970
There has been a good deal of thinking about the ways in which the political and educational institutions in social systems affect each other. Most of it has been concerned with problems of political and economic development. There have been many arguments about the ways in which the development of modern educational systems might contribute to these kinds of modernization. (See, for example, Harbison and Myers 1954, and the papers in Coleman, 1955). It is also recognized, of course, that economic development and political modernization lead to educational expansion but this relationship has been given less consideration in view of the great concern in the social sciences with the sources of political and economic development. In the present proposal we are concerned with research which would continue the investigation of these traditional problems of institutional interrelationships, suggesting some ideas for exploration and some research designs which could effectively utilize more recently available information.

The studies we propose are comparative. It seems clear that many of the ways in which political and educational institutions may affect each other are system-level in character and concern not the details of political influences on the expansion or direction of educational institutions or the effects of particular patterns of educational instruction and interaction on individual students' political ideas, but rather quite general ways in which these institutions operate to create networks of symbolic definition setting cultural conditions or providing cultural materials for each other. To study such problems comparative research is absolutely essential because it is necessary to examine not only the

*Michael Kannan and Richard Wilson, who are collaborating with me on research on several of the problems discussed here, provided helpful comments and suggestions which are incorporated in this paper.
operation of particular organizational forms but the impact on each other of quite highly institutionalized political and educational structures which vary primarily from society to society.

We can illustrate the need for comparative research with several specific examples. If, in developing societies, expanded secondary school systems really politically function, not to train a few students to have the attitudes and values appropriate to elite status, but to give everyone in the society a new sense of the basis or legitimacy of a modernizing elite, we cannot discover this by comparing the political socialization of graduates of different secondary schools within a society. They may all acquire quite similar characteristics, and we may learn nothing about the way the educational system supports the political structure. We must compare the socialization of students in societies in which the educational system is more highly expanded, and is more closely connected with the political system, with the socialization of similar students in other societies. Or as a second example, if secondary schools affect political socialization when they have the social power to confer upon students entry into political elites, there may be few differences among such schools within a society, but enormous differences between societies depending on the relative development of the institutionalized control by schools of entry into political elites (Nelson and Walker, 1969). Or as a third example, comparative research may be the only way to show how modernizing political elites tend to expand educational systems as a means of creating and symbolically justifying a new political system and new political goals, rather than as a way of producing new kinds of training or individual socialization. No results at all may appear in studies of specific methods of political control, or comparisons of the effects of specific schools within societies. In short, to discover if political and educational institutions affect each other at the system level, rather than through individual socialization or through specific structures of political control, comparative research, with social systems as the units of analysis, is required.

Two Research Problems. A tradition of rather rationalistic thinking about the effects of educational institutions has lead to two mostly tacit assumptions about the ways political and educational institutions affect
each other. a) Education is thought to socialize people to political ideas and norms and train them for political positions (including the social position of citizen). By preparing students for norms and social positions which are not necessarily developed in their societies, schools are even thought to create dissatisfied and sometimes revolutionary elites (see Schumpeter, 1950, Kerr and Dunlop, 1960, and the discussions in Coleman, 1965). b) Political development or modernization is thought to lead to an emphasis on education as a means of socializing people to new and modern political structures. Modernizing political elites are thought to use educational means to emancipate the citizenry, to create new elites, and to provide kinds of socialization which make possible economic development.

These two assumptions are generalizations which describe how two extremely massive and complex social institutions may affect each other. They are also causal assertions describing relationships among particular variables or measures which describe properties of these institutions -- in particular, their expansion or relative modernization. But the two assumptions contain opposite lines of causal reasoning about the ways political and educational structures affect each other. The first line of reasoning argues that educational institutions affect the development of political ones, and in particular that educational expansion and modernization may play an important role in creating political development. The second line of reasoning argues that developing or expanding political systems may create educational expansion. The two arguments are by no means inconsistent, and it is conventional to suppose that both may be true -- that the institutions of society reinforce each other. But only one of the arguments may be true -- or neither of them -- and it is of the greatest intellectual and practical importance to distinguish empirically between them. If, for example, it is generally true that developing political systems tend to create expanded educational systems, but that these in turn play an unimportant role in affecting the political system, educational investment may be a very poor strategy for affecting political change.

In particular, either or both of the causal arguments above could account for the empirical observation that countries which are relatively high on measures of political development are also likely to have rather
highly developed or expanded educational systems. The first main proposal of this paper is that research is needed which can distinguish the two types of causal effects, developing and using longitudinal data on national societies. Only with such data is it possible to isolate the distinctive effects of political development on educational expansion from the converse effects of educational development on political modernization. An empirical study using presently available information will be able to completely answer such a general question, but the research we propose would at least begin the effort to define and develop the appropriate analyses. This study is concerned with very general relationships between whole institutional sectors of societies. It uses nations as the basic units for analysis. This kind of brute force attempt to approach a complex problem will leave many questions open and many uncertainties in interpreting its results. But research of this character is an absolutely necessary adjunct to other developing lines of research, such as case studies, and quantitative studies of the interrelations of organizational structures within societies.

In the long run, however, the prevailing ideas in the literature about the nature of the interrelations of political and educational institutions are too limited. Educational institutions may socialize people to hold substantive political ideas but whether they do this or not they play a powerful role in defining for everyone the types of groups which exist in a modern society. Whether the members of these groups, as isolated individuals, have acquired given political ideas or loyalties, they hold, by virtue of their educational statuses definite and specified places in the social, and in particular the political, order. Highly developed educational institutions, whether they teach anyone anything or not, may create and define basic constituent parts of society. Similarly, while political institutions may in fact need educational means to train individuals to play their parts in a modern society, they also need school systems to define and justify these parts as elements of the institutional order. A politically modernized state may need secondary schools and universities to justify its elites in modern terms. It may need elementary schools to define large masses of people as citizens, and as appropriate for impersonal participation in the modern state. Beyond the circumstances of individual
socialization, that is, schools may provide the kinds of initiation ceremonies which construct, maintain, and justify the elements of the political society (Young, 1949).

These larger socializing functions of schools and school systems greatly need examination. As a second major proposal of this paper we suggest research to investigate them. Comparative research is needed on the political impact (conceived more broadly than in terms of simple socialization) of educational institutions. The research must be cross-national but cannot simply employ nations as the sole units of analysis. It must consider the impact of specific types of schools over a wide variety of political and cultural conditions. And it must examine the effects of institutionalization of schools and school systems not only on those attending them but on other parts of the society as well.

1. A Longitudinal Cross-National Study of the Interrelationships of Political and Educational Development

No matter what particular measures of political and educational development of nations are employed it is found that the two variables are closely associated. Harbison and Myers, (1964), employing a general index of development, show a close association with the indicators of relative educational enrollments. Garms (1967) also shows some clear associations between political variables and national educational expenditures. The literature on educational expenditures, however, generally shows that such variables are more closely associated with economic factors than with distinctively political ones (James, 1963). Garms, however, shows some positive correlations with political variables, even when economic development is held constant. Meyer (1959) in a cross-sectional study also shows a number of associations between indicators of national political development or politicization and relative educational enrollments when economic factors are held constant. In this study it appears that indicators of political development and the expansion of political authority are particularly related to educational enrollments at the primary and university levels.
The interpretation of cross-sectional studies like these is, of course, quite difficult. It is obvious that political development or modernization may be one of the sources of expanded educational systems (see, for instance, Bendix 1964). There are many reasons why this effect might be thought to occur. Political development leads to demands for educated citizens and more highly trained elites. It produces expanded ideas about the rights of members of society to such resources as education, and is associated with the expansion of economic capacity which can generate both the demand for education and the facilities to meet the demand.

Political development also means the shift of loyalties to national political symbols and structures from more local and familistic ones. It may thus lead to the development of educational institutions as devices to create and symbolize more impersonal and national foci of identification. In the same way, educational institutions may be developed to provide more modern and impersonal ways to recruit and legitimate elites. Finally, political development may lead to educational expansion as a way of institutionalizing or symbolizing the values placed on scientific knowledge, individual responsibility, and so on.

But the same finding of an association between political and educational development may result from precisely the opposite effects, too. The possibility that a causal impulse to political modernization is created by developed and expanded educational institutions is one of the main themes of the literature on social and political development (Coleman, 1965). Education can create demands, both in elites and in the citizenry, for political expansion. It can do so by socializing people to the skills, values, and goals of modernization, and also by defining a more modern status structure and by shifting people from traditional statuses into the industrial economy. Institutionalized systems of education can provide a new basis for legitimating modern elites and modern citizenship as core values in many different sectors of a society.

There are thus, many causal arguments which suggest that political and educational development affect each other. What is obviously needed here is research which separates the political effects on educational development from educational effects on political development. This is difficult to do partly because isolating such interdependent causal forces requires
carefully controlled data over considerable periods of time. Only such data can show how each variable tends to create changes in the other variable over time, and thus begin to isolate the two causal processes.

The simplest beginning would be fairly straight-forward: To study political effects on educational development requires measures of both variables. It is necessary to compare, among countries of given levels of educational development at one point in time, the rate of subsequent educational expansion of those countries which are classified as more advanced politically with the expansion of those which are less advanced. Thus, considering only those countries with developed educational systems, if those which are more politically modernized expand their educational systems more rapidly over time, we begin to have information which suggests independent political effects on educational development. These data would be, of course, much too simple to make possible any clear conclusions. It would be necessary to hold constant other variables than political ones which might have produced the result. Obviously economic development might have accounted for the apparent impact of political modernization on educational expansion. Economic development at the very least must be held constant (or its effect included in the analysis) in studying the impact of political modernization. But the data we describe, however fraught with problems of interpretation -- difficulties in measuring the variables, and the potential operation of spurious factors -- would at least eliminate the possibility that our observed effects showed not political impacts on the educational system but educational impacts on the polity.

Similarly, it is possible to begin to isolate the political effects of educational expansion. How do countries which are politically similar but differ in their relative educational expansion change politically over time? (Economic factors must be held constant, of course.) Do educationally developed countries show greater increases over time in levels of political development? Do they show changes toward political stability? Even political instability could be a hypothesized consequence at low levels of economic development, however, if an over-expanded educational system is indeed a source of revolutionary political elites (Schumpeter, 1950). Again, in such a venture, all kinds of spurious factors may be operating.
Many problems of measurement may beset us but at least in this way we begin to isolate educational effects on political development from the reverse effects.

**Measurement:** Obviously we are not the first to suggest the importance of disentangling the causal relations between institutional structures with quantitative data over substantial periods. The importance of the present proposal lies in the fact that data which characterize over time the political and educational characteristics of countries are beginning to be available. Data, however inadequate, on national educational enrollment patterns go back to 1950 for a substantial number of countries (UNESCO, 1965). It is possible to describe countries by the development, relative to the appropriate population groups, of their primary educational enrollment, secondary educational enrollment and their university enrollment. It is possible to do this separately for male and female students.

Using these enrollment data, it is possible to characterize national educational systems by a number of attributes measuring their relative development or expansion. First, the proportions of the appropriate age groups enrolled in primary and secondary schools, and in universities can be calculated. Second, ratios of the relative development of various sectors of the national educational system can be calculated by showing the ratio of primary school enrollment, and the ratio of university enrollment to secondary school enrollment. These ratios indicate in a rough way the probability that a student at a given level in an educational system will continue to the next level. Thus, countries can be described, not only by the proportion of children who enter the educational pyramid at the bottom, but also by the relative extension of the pyramid, or the proportions of those who enter who reach any given step. Third, the educational experience of any given generation or cohort in a society can be described by taking the ratio of the university enrollment to the secondary enrollment about five years earlier, and the ratio of that secondary enrollment figure to the elementary school enrollment in a still earlier period. These ratios would describe the educational possibilities faced by a given generation within a country. Their relationships with later political
changes produced in that country as the generation passed through the age cycle could be usefully examined.

Data are also available describing national levels of educational investment (Garm, 1967) so it is possible to characterize at least some nations by their relative expenditures per capita on education over substantial periods of time. These data are complex, since expenditures on education are not always closely associated with actual levels of educational enrollment (Ieyer, 1969). This finding may reflect measurement error. Or, educational investments may reflect such economic factors as the relative size of teachers salaries and the level of current investments in school facilities, thus assessing a different set of structural factors, operating over different time periods than educational enrollments.

It would also be possible to examine comparative data on various substantive aspects of national educational systems— their relative emphasis on the significance of technological fields, political ideology, and civil service requirements, and so on. However, although these issues have been much discussed in the literature on education, data are not available on a systematic comparative basis.

Systematic measures over time of national political characteristics are more difficult to obtain, in part because such concepts as political development or modernization are not formulated or defined clearly, and in part because comparable data for many countries are hard to obtain. Political development means many different things, and a major research problem would involve sorting out, and studying the consequences of, measures of these various meanings. In part, political development means political expansion -- the increase in the resources and number of activities controlled by the political system. This is, of course, closely related to economic development. But in part, development means politicization, or mobilization, which means the expansion of political control relative to other institutions, as in the socialist state. Development also is used to refer to the character of the political system -- the degree to which it incorporates or represents many different social interests, the degree to which it is oriented toward social change and economic modernization, and the degree to which success in it is determined by competence or training rather than more traditional criteria.
Unfortunately, measures of most of the aspects of political development suggested above are unavailable, or available for only one point in time, or very inadequately measured. So, for the most part, beginning research in this area must use measures which contain many biases and a great deal of error. The effect of these problems on the kind of research we are suggesting is generally to lower the likelihood that positive empirical relationships will appear. But exploratory research of this kind is one of the requisites for the conceptualization and development of more adequately measured variables in this field.

Measures over time of a number of national political characteristics have been developed, however. Cutright (1965) has, for instance, developed an index measuring political representation using data which are available for a number of decades. Banks and Textor (1963) have developed measures of a number of political characteristics of countries. These measures are sufficiently stable that they could be employed as independent variables in the analysis of the effects of political characteristics on changing educational structures. Russett, et al. (1964), have also collected a number of political indicators. This work is especially valuable because the same researchers are now publishing a second set of measures of national characteristics, ten years after their first attempt. These data, therefore, could provide measures of political change with which to assess the political impact of relative educational development.

Beyond explicitly political characteristics, it is extremely important to incorporate into the research measures of other aspects of the social organization of countries. All sorts of economic data are available -- measures of income, of industrialization, of trade, of energy consumption, and so on. There are also available data on the distribution and characteristics of human populations -- their size, urbanization, growth rates, and age distributions. But for many central aspects of social organization, available measures are very inadequate, either because data are missing, because they are full of measurement error, or because they assess only very indirectly crucial organizational characteristics. There are few good data, for instance, on the degree to which such institutions as labor unions, religious organizations, voluntary or welfare-oriented groups, or professional organizations are highly developed in
different societies. In fact, to describe the social integration of societies in any general way, we must rely on such indirect measures as telephone or postal messages per capita.

The weakness of the available measures of national social organization, as with political variables, makes the research effort we are proposing exploratory in character. When measures of uncertain meaning must be used, the interpretation of results becomes more ambiguous, and the absence of findings may not reflect an absence of actual corresponding effects, but only the utter inadequacy of the available comparative data. But it would be a major error to postpone research on the interrelationships of political and educational characteristics of countries until some hypothetical time when ideal measures might be available. Research even at present may be able to show many suggestive results, and in any case may be able to do a great deal to show us what kinds of concepts, measures, and modes of analysis must be developed in the future.

There is every reason to believe that time-series data on institutional characteristics of countries will become increasingly accessible. And with the availability of modes of multi-variate analysis of sufficient sophistication to analyze data on the limited number of countries which exist in the world, beginning research on these problems would be very fruitful.

II. A Series of Comparative Effects of the Political Effects of Schools

In all sorts of societies, the political positions, resources, and attitudes of people who differ in education tend to be very different (see, for instance, Almond and Verba, 1963). More educated people are much more likely to hold political offices, to exercise political influence, to perceive themselves as politically efficacious, and to know about and identify with the political system. Cross-sectional studies within countries almost invariably show substantial results along these lines.

Yet the available research on the effects of specific schools on the political attitudes and values of their students shows that they generally
have quite limited effects. (See Jacob, 1957, or the excellent summary by Feldman and Newcomb, 1949.) Despite their massive efforts to broadly educate their students, most schools with only infrequent exceptions produce very weak effects on the political identifications and knowledge of their students. How does it happen, then, that the graduates of these same types of schools, when they are investigated as adults in cross-sectional studies, differ so dramatically from other groups in the population?

The answer to this question, we argue, is that there has been too narrow a conceptualization -- and thus empirical examination -- of the kinds of politically socializing effects schools may have. When the potential effects of schools on the political system are conceived and studied on a broader basis, it will become possible to understand why education turns out to be so closely associated with political ideology and values, and with actual power. In this proposal, we suggest a complex and long-range program of research organized around such an effort.

Most of the available thinking about the political effects in schools has developed around a conventional model of individual socialization. Depending on their internal structure -- their patterns of interaction among teachers and students, their "peer cultures" and the organization of their curricula -- schools are thought to affect the political attitudes, values, and personality characteristics of their students. They affect larger political structures because these students, as they move out into the larger society, carry with them the attitudes and values created.

However, this is a very limited view of the ways schools socialize members of societies (Meyer, 1965, 1970). First of all, a school is likely to greatly affect a graduate whether or not his values or skills are changed in the least. A school can have an effect simply by defining him as a graduate. His job prospects change greatly. His opportunities for entry into political and civil service elites are modified. Everyone else defines him as a different person, and he sees himself as having very different rights and possibilities. He is a changed man whether his internal qualities have changed or not.

The fundamental fact that schools have a social charter to produce a graduate who will be given a certain kind of social definition has many
Important consequences for political socialization. In this discussion, we use the term charter to describe the structural position of the school and the social definition which is attached to its graduates. The institutionalization of a system of schools involves the specification of the ways its graduates are entitled or expected to enter into the wider society. And the more highly institutionalized the schools, the clearer is the social charter, or the ideas defining what they produce. The graduates are understood to possess distinctive qualities and rights. Sometimes these rights are legally protected, as when certain levels of the civil service or the practice of certain professions are reserved for graduates of certain schools.

We argue that the effects of schools in politically socializing students are determined as much by the charter or public definitions of the school as by any internal curricula or modes of interaction. Students and graduates are likely to adopt (and others in the social structure are likely to expect them to adopt) those qualities which are generally seen as attached to their educational statuses. When schools are chartered to produce political and administrative elites, their students will take on (and be encouraged to do so by others) the qualities which go with such elite membership -- the appropriate aspirations, roles, and values. When elementary schools are defined as institutions creating national solidarity, and are used to channel their students into positions in the modern economic and political order, their students will tend to think of themselves as citizens of the nation and to divorce themselves from particular or local identifications. All these effects will be supported in public opinion, not only the private ideas of students or graduates themselves.

But the institutionalization of a charter for a set of schools affects not only students and graduates, but all the other groups in the political system as well. In defining the legitimate position and rights of graduates, a changed model of society, and of their own position is created for these other groups -- elites and non-elites, graduates and non-graduates. As we will see, this can have a broad set of consequences for many sectors of the political system.

Once we conceive of educational institutions as not only having internal effects but also consequences by virtue of their institutionalization in the
political system a number of research problems become important. Most of those require comparing the effects of essentially similar educational institutions in social structures in which they are differently institutionalized or chartered. Thus, the basic independent variables of the proposed studies are characteristics of national societies -- the ways in which they establish institutionally the political meanings or charters attached to various schools and types of schools. There are obviously many different variables involved in the degree to which schools are politically chartered or have institutionalized political significance. We consider some of these later.

**Research Design:** We want to suggest the comparison of the effects of schools in different societal settings. But studying the effects of schools is in itself a complicated business (Jacob, 1957, Barton, 1959, and Feldman and Lowcomb, 1969). This is particularly true given the intellectual perspective we are suggesting. If schools and school systems have their impact by attaching certain quite general labels to people -- labels which have wide currency in the society -- then there is no reason why the effects of schools should in any way be restricted to students during the period of their studenthood.

The traditional sort of before-and-after studies of students must be expanded in three ways:

1) In examining the effects of institutionalized school systems on students themselves it is necessary to follow them over a much longer period of time than their actual residency in the school. If attendance in a given school or type of school has some generally understood consequence for a student's political location in society -- whether it confers membership in a particular political elite or simply modern citizenship in the society as a whole -- the student, we argue, will tend to espouse this location as a consequence of a whole series of steps in his educational career. This should happen at many points, not simply when the student interacts in the social system of the school itself.

a. An individual encouraged by others to aspire to a given school or type of school will presumably begin to acquire the chartered political attributes attached to that school. The effects of a school, that is,
begin with the actor's identification with it as a symbolic element in the social system. Organizational devices, such as preparatory curricula, probably encourage this process.

b. Application to and acceptance by a given school or type of school may change the social status of an individual and lead to his adoption of the political values or aspirations attached to products of such schools. As an individual, in other words, moves toward membership in a given school he may adopt its chartered qualities and others may encourage him to adopt them before he has any formal or informal interaction in the school structure itself.

c. After the student has completed his school experience, a whole series of post-graduate effects on his political ideas are possible and likely. As he experiences the special treatment others give school graduates in the political system his ideas and aspirations are likely to be changed. In the more extreme instance, as he comes to occupy the political offices or jobs to which his education tends to entitle him, his conceptions of the political system and his own role in it must inevitably be affected. In other words, one of the ways in which schools may affect their students is not through a direct impact on their values or attitudes, but by leading them into distinctive roles. These roles, then, by well known social-psychological processes, may lead their incumbents to have definite attitudes or values. It is traditional in the world of education to hope that a school may have some distinctive impact on its students such that they become mighty and successful. We are arguing that schools may have impact on their students by being allowed to confer on them probable success and might.

2) In studying the political effects of schools it is necessary to cover a broader range of variables than simply the values and attitudes of students. If schools create political effects by attaching roles to students which they are legitimately chartered to confer, it is crucial to study not only school effects on the values of students, but the actual types of social positions into which the students are allocated. Thus we need to investigate how schools increase the political interest of their students, but also the degree to which these students are actually channelled into political organizations. It is necessary to study not only student's
attitudes and identification with the national government but also the actual likelihood that students will be located in government offices. In studying the elementary school effects in developing societies it is important to see both whether graduates have acquired a patina of national identification and also whether they actually tend to control the local political organization of the society. More important than the examination of the impact of schools on the psychological self-esteem or sense of political efficacy of the graduates is the study of the actual esteem and efficacy which these graduates are chartered to acquire. If we discover that schools astonishingly increase the sense of political responsibility, efficacy and self-esteem of their graduates, it is much more likely that this results from the fact that graduates of the schools are entering into a social elite which is, in fact, authenticating respect, esteem and political efficacy, than that it results from some dynamic internal attributes of the school (Mayer, 1965).

Thus it is important to study how schools affect the allocation of students into actual positions in the social structure, not only how they affect abstract ideas or values. It is also important to see how the wider range of social rights allotted the students and graduates are developed in their own awareness and intentions. It is important to see how their own plans for occupational and especially political careers are constructed and modified by the types of school which they attend. In all such research, of course, to study the distinctive impact of schools, background and ability factors must be held constant. We want, that is, to compare those who do attend given types of schools with similar individuals who do not. But the importance of such comparisons run beyond the need to simply have a control group against which to assess the impact of schools on their students. For, it is a basic part of our argument that schools have impact on those who do not attend them as well as upon those who do.

3) It is necessary to examine the political effects of schools on other groups in the society as well as on students. The most obvious application of this observation is to the study of school non-attenders. If schools have political effects because a variety of political positions or memberships are, in effect, reserved to their graduates, then the process
of becoming a non-attender or a non-graduate, whether by elimination or positive intention, is a process by which actors in effect are separated from these memberships. Thus in societies in which schools are highly politically significant, or chartered, those who attend should be expected to undergo a process of politicization or involvement in the political system and those who do not attend should end up as detached from the political system — especially from elite positions in it. The only way we can tell this, of course, is by comparing socialization in such societies with that in societies in which schools are less closely connected with the political system. In these latter societies the differences between graduates and non-graduates in political involvement should be reduced and the apparent effects produced by the schools should also be reduced.

In the same way the attenders must be followed beyond their educational career, it is also necessary to study non-attenders. The processes by which an individual is allotted the qualities of a non-graduate can presumably take as long, and as many steps as those which prepare the graduate.

Beyond specific comparisons of graduates and non-graduates it is crucial to examine the impact of the development and political institutionalization of schools on many different sectors of the society at large. The development and chartering of a system of schools as the basic source of political citizens or elites may affect the political conceptions of all sorts of people — graduates or non-graduates, elites or non-elites. The redefinition of the bases of ordinary political membership from localistic and familistic identifications to those built around nationwide and universalistic systems of elementary schools may produce important shifts in the political conceptions held by all sorts of actors, whatever their own educational and political experience. And people of all sorts may be inclined to see elites defined in educational terms as more legitimate, better justified and explained, and more oriented to modernization than elites recruited or defined in other terms. This may be true, even though the elites are in fact the same people as would have been defined by a more traditional system, and even if they actually have no more competence or commitment to modernization when defined in educational terms.
The effects we are discussing here probably occur through the intermediate social organization and communications system of societies. The development of new and education-based definitions of citizens and elites is probably transmitted to the wider society through the structures of local economic and community organization, labor unions, religious organizations, mass media, and so on. It is therefore extremely important to study how the specific elites involved in these institutions are affected in their political ideas and activity, and in their own recruitment and organization, by the educational changes we are considering. It seems most likely that the conceptions of ordinary people are at least partly affected by changes in these intermediate organizations.

These ideas suggest some of the enormously complicated ways in which educational institutionalization may affect political structures. It is our intention to encourage research on a much wider range of problems of political socialization than have been discussed traditionally. By doing this, we hope to account in a more adequate way for the complex, but substantial, relationships between educational institutions and political ones.

**The Independent Variable:** The basic studies we propose investigate the effects on political socialization of greater and lesser political institutionalization of the educational system. Obviously there are many difficulties in defining or measuring this variable as an attribute of national societies or of specific educational organizations and systems within societies. In practice, it is necessary to develop a number of measures and to investigate empirically their interrelationships. At this point it is useful to suggest some of the dimensions which might be employed in conceptualizing and measuring the degree to which educational structures are politically chartered:

1. The extent to which the educational system or its various parts are the direct responsibility of the national state.

2. The extent to which graduates at any given level are in government service, and the degree to which positions in the government service are reserved for such graduates.
3. The degree to which the political party apparatus is managed by graduates; and the degree to which positions in the political elites are reserved for such graduates.

4. The degree to which elite political and governmental positions are conceived in public opinion to be the appropriate property of specific educational elites. Obviously, public conceptions of the activities of graduates may be different than the activities themselves.

5. The degree to which the social status or position of student is seen as a distinct social position. This factor is presumably a consequence of other aspects of the institutionalization of educational systems, but also plays an important causative role. That is, the greater the degree to which an educational system is politically chartered to produce future elites, the more likely the creation of a distinctive conception of students as a group of people with special political and social interests and status. The degree to which the social status of the student is conceptualized as distinctive and the degree to which it is seen as political in content are extremely important factors in political socialization and require a great deal of investigation.

6. The degree to which educational backgrounds or status are used in explaining or justifying political status. Knowledge, competence and intellectual authority -- qualities which are constructed and defined by the educational system, will be used more frequently to explain and justify the authority of political elites as educational systems are more chartered to produce them.

7. The degree to which political ideas are explicitly used to explain and justify the investment in educational institutions. The more commonly educational institutions are created to have political consequences in training citizens or elites, the more likely they will be to have such consequences.

8. The size relative to the appropriate population groups of educational enrollments in particular sectors of the educational system: Presumably, simply increasing the proportions of the population who are processed by a nationalized elementary system may increase the extent to which this system tacitly begins to define membership in the society. In this way it
comes into closer correspondence in its cultural meaning with ideas of citizenship.

We have suggested above attributes which might indicate the degree to which educational institutions are chartered to produce political products. Since these attributes probably reflect many different social processes, a major research task is to investigate the interrelationships across countries of such characteristics as these.

**Some Specific Hypotheses to be Investigated:** In order to make clear the value of comparing the effects of schools in systems where they are differentially institutionalized, we can suggest a number of rather specific hypotheses. In the studies suggested below it is, of course, necessary to hold constant many characteristics of countries beyond the one in which we are primarily interested -- the political chartering of educational institutions. In particular it is necessary to hold constant measures of the general levels of economic and political development so as to isolate the particular effects of educational organizations.

1. The more politically institutionalized or chartered a given school or school system, the more students in it will come to identify with the political system and perceive themselves as politically efficacious. They will also be more likely to see the political system itself as legitimate. They may be more likely to identify with the values and goals of national political development and to perceive the political system itself as leading in this direction. This attitude may occur, in part, because political recruitment from the educational system is itself seen as indicative of modernization.

Students in systems which are more politically chartered may also identify more with their social status as students and see this status as having distinctive political interest and greater political authority than students in other kinds of systems. This follows from our argument that one feature of the political chartering of educational systems is the greater institutionalization of the social status of student.

2. In societies in which educational institutions are more politically chartered, even non-students and adults who are not members of elites, may come to perceive the political system as more legitimate and a modernizing
force. They may, however, see themselves, if anything, as less efficacious than in other types of systems, since political rights and authority justified on educational terms may exclude them.

Effects on identification with the political system are less clear. It may be that non-students in such social systems, even though they perceive the political elites as supported by legitimate educational institutions, would be less likely themselves to identify with the political structure because of their relative exclusion.

3. In systems in which educational institutions are more chartered politically, modernizing elite members, whether or not they themselves have attended the appropriate schools, should tend to acquire qualities similar to those of students in such systems. We expect that they would identify more with the political system, see it as more legitimate, perceive themselves as more efficacious, and identify more with the values and goals associated with political development. This should follow if educational institutions in such societies in fact contribute broadly to the support and legitimacy of political institutions. This added structural support should add to the confidence of elite members in general, whether or not they have attended the appropriate schools.

Of course, highly chartered educational systems may cause the breakdown of the political community itself. Students and elites may constitute a revolutionary force in the political system by virtue of the confidence in their own legitimate authority which may extend considerably beyond the established boundaries and established positions of the political structure (Schumpeter 1950, Goldrich 1965, Arnove 1967, and Coleman 1965). It is clear that in colonial societies these groups -- educationally chartered elites -- were fundamental sources of political revolution. This may also be true in other developing societies.

Traditional elites in societies in which educational institutions are increasingly chartered as sources of political membership and authority would not be expected to show these same effects. Such elites may be quite likely to become alienated from political systems which cut off their access to power and the definition of their positions as containing essential political authority. Such elites may react against a political
system simply because of the way authority is being redefined and re-allocated in terms of educational qualifications, even though the actual benefits of education may come primarily to them.

**Overview**: The studies proposed above all attempt to analyze the effects of educational structures on the orientations and actions of actors in the political system. Longitudinal studies of both students and non-students are needed. They should cover more phases of the educational cycle than are usually considered (including educational effects which occur before and after a given schooling period), and should consider a much broader range of political consequences than simply the attitudes or values of individuals. In particular it is necessary to focus on the actual placement which students and non-students receive in the social and political order, and on the consequences which this placement may have for political orientations and activities. Such placements reflect the social charter of schools -- the status which is defined and socially established for their products or graduates. These social charters may greatly affect the ways in which both students and non-students acquire -- and are encouraged by others to acquire -- political orientations.

The social charters which define the political significance or status of graduates of various types of schools also may directly affect other elements of the political system, quite apart from their contribution to the socialization process. These processes need to be examined with comparative, cross-sectional studies of the effects of the political institutionalization or chartering of educational systems on the political behavior of many different groups -- political elites, leaders of and participants in all sorts of intermediate organizational structures, and ordinary citizens.

### III. Conclusions

The lines of research we have suggested in this paper all consist of attempts to define more clearly and to expand our conception of the ways educational systems effect political institutions. -- in particular, political modernization or development. Traditional lines of thinking in
In this field have tended to focus on relatively limited numbers of effects—the ways educational systems lead students to adopt new norms, and the ways they may contribute more highly trained individuals to the modern economy and political system.

In the first of our proposals we suggest a way to begin to distinguish educational effects on the political system from political effects on education. We suggest the longitudinal analysis of interrelationships of political and educational characteristics of national societies as a first major step in this direction. In our second major proposal we suggest a series of studies designed to outline a broader range of sets of educational effects on political organizations. An examination is needed of the effects of schools both on students and on non-students. A wide range of political effects should be examined, including those on political attitudes and values and those on the actual status—political and occupational—of individuals in the social structure. We also suggest studies of the effects of the political chartering of schools—their use to define new social conceptions of political elites and of political citizens—on a wide variety of elites and non-elite groups in social systems.

All of these studies are attempts to transcend more individualistic conceptions of the ways the educational system functions in societies. By emphasizing comparative research we stress quite general structural features of societies in organizing the interrelations of political and educational institutions.
REFERENCES


James, Thomas, WEALTH, EXPENDITURES, AND DECISION-MAKING FOR EDUCATION, 1963, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California.


More...


Models of Decision-Making

by

Paul E. Peterson
University of Chicago

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970
MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING

by

Paul E. Peterson

The charge to write a simulated research proposal can be a stimulating opportunity. Assuming unlimited resources, one can propose to study in depth and with the necessary verstehen a large enough sample of cases so that a definitive account of the topic under investigation could conceivably be written. Whether or not the proposed undertaking could be realized, the attempt would still provide standards against which actual investigations could be compared; moreover, simple concentration on a utopian proposal, unconstrained by usual considerations of foundation or governmental expectations, available skills, and the competing demands on the proposal writer's own time and energy, may entice one's imagination into perhaps fanciful but in the end more rewarding realms than those which one pursues in more practical moments. Many proposals discussed at this conference will surely reveal the virtues of an opportunity for such wide-ranging reflection. But there may also be some merit for at least one participant to reflect instead on a soon to be completed study that he hopes will contribute "something" to the field. It is true the study may be too limited by resource and other constraints to contribute more to the field
that than other research projects/might be devised. On the other hand, the discussion will be based on some experience with the "real world" of educational politics and a prolonged effort to make some sense of one aspect of it.

The study of the decision-making of the Chicago school board, which Thomas Williams and I hope to complete in the not too distant future, has all the defects of the case study approach that have been identified in the background papers written by Wirt and by Kirst and Mosher. Although it may have the virtue of permitting a closer look at the internal processes of big city school systems, enabling the analyst to examine urban school board decision-making both in terms of the structure of its own organization and in the context of its political environment, one certainly cannot offer a case study as a major contribution to the data base on educational politics. Our methodological approach was also undistinguished by any novelties worth discussing here. A certain amount of statistical data was analyzed by methods which we hope were not more sophisticated than were appropriate for the data. But the bulk of the information was gathered through interviews with participants in the policy-making process, through the examination of school records, and through close attention to newspaper reports.

Yet contributions to the study of educational politics can be theoretical as well as methodological or sheer increments in the size of the data bank. Although theorizing was not specifically mentioned in the charge to conference participants, one can argue, on
the basis of the data presented in the background papers, that
continuing theoretical contributions are badly needed in this
emergent field, if it is a field, of educational politics. With
the discovery that Easton's systems analysis, however insightful and
provocative many of its details clearly are, may be too general a
theory to help with the specific theoretical problems of a special
arena of policy-making, students of educational politics may begin to
cast a broader net in order to develop useful analytical insights.

Any attempt to theorize about educational politics must begin
by noting what is distinctive to the field. Only if it can be shown
that educational politics are distinctive in some fundamental respect
from politics in other policy areas can one speak of a particular
theory of educational politics. We doubt that any such claim can
be sustained. But it may be worthwhile to consider the theoretical
implications of the one effort that has been made to identify a
unique characteristic of the politics of education: the claim that
educators are particularly guilty of declaring politics to be an
illegitimate intrusion into their professional enterprise. Perhaps
the polemics of this debate can be transformed into analytical tools
that will provide a beginning towards middle range theorizing about
the urban educational policy-making process.

Political Scientists, Educationists and Three
Models of Decision-making

Conflict between school boards and their administrative staffs
over educational policy has been an endemic theme in the politics of
education. The growth of large educational systems in rapidly growing
American cities, the increasing diversity and complexity of services provided by schools, the professionalization of educational administrators, and the general reform movement in urban politics all reduced the control that lay boards of education exerted over school policy. Shrewd politicians, who awarded contracts and positions of responsibility on the basis of kinship, friendship, and partisan regularity, gave way in many cities to more honest and efficient direction of educational policy by professional administrators. It was generally conceded that the proper relationship between the school board and administrator was for the board to determine policy and for the superintendent to administer that policy. But it became increasingly prevalent for superintendents to offer their professional advice to school boards on policy items. As a consequence, the distinction between policy and administration, which was never clearly delineated theoretically, has also become hopelessly obscured in practice. Today, in many urban cities contradictory criticisms of the school system are offered simultaneously. On the one hand, it has been argued that the board is an ignorant, innocuous legitimator of decisions made by an autonomous administrative staff. On the other hand, it is said that the board is politically motivated and interferes in matters which more properly belong in the administrative sphere, where decisions could be made according to educational principles.

The study of the politics of education in fact began with an interesting, though ultimately muddled, debate over the proper relationship between the professional educators and politicians, as
represented by school boards, public officials, and interest groups. Urban reformers thought education should be separated from the "dirty world" of "machine politics" by bringing its direction under the control of professionals. Their slogan "Keep politics out of education" was particularly effective because education has for centuries been seen as a distinctive activity, which was not to be directed by the same people as those who determined sanitation, street, and police policies. School boards have since the Nineteenth Century operated with considerable independence from other municipal institutions. More recently, political scientists, seeking to defend politicians from the disrepute into which they had fallen, argued that it was impossible to keep education out of politics. Educational decisions in modern societies are public decisions, they claimed; as long as the compulsory power of the state is used to enforce educational policy on the citizenry (through taxation, compulsory attendance, and regulation of the schools), educational decisions are political decisions.\(^1\) Though the argument sounds convincing, it is merely a tautological observation. Political scientists have simply defined as "political" those activities which are related to the "authoritative allocation of values for a society."\(^2\) Although the definition may be analytically useful, it does not by itself prove, as the early studies of the politics of education implied, that power had shifted too far in the direction of the professional administrators. Political scientists seemed to believe that once the public character of educational policy had been noted, it was obvious that professionals
should play an advisory and administrative role only, that policy should be left to the determination of a lay board chosen according to rules that had some democratic legitimacy. We might agree with such a normative position, although it remains to be shown whether lay or professional control produces the wisest pattern of educational policy. Yet normative conclusions cannot be drawn from tautological observations.

Even though this debate has produced no definitive normative guidelines, it has suggested to us an analytical strategy. The debate in fact points to two competing models of decision-making. The first, which we shall call the organizational processes model, is the analytical counterpart to the normative position of traditional educators, who argued that schools should be kept safely within the hands of professional administrators. The organizational processes model says that large school systems can be co-ordinated only through the activities of a large, complex, formal organizations. Urban school boards, therefore, are extremely dependent upon that organization for information, for policy recommendations, and for policy implementation. Consequently, the policies that the board pursues will be determined by certain characteristics of the organization upon which the board depends. Organizational interests, the "shared Values" of its membership, and its code of standard operating procedures all limit the alternatives available to decision-makers. Together they shape the character of educational policy. This analytical perspective shares with the traditional...
educationist the assumption that the professional educational experts are crucial for determining educational policy. But it does not necessarily perceive the expert as the diviner of educational truth and wisdom; instead, it understands the expert as being limited in his search for the truth by his interests, values, and routine pattern of operations.

The political bargaining model is a second, competing analytical framework that can be drawn from the debate we have reviewed. It is the analytical analogue to the argument of political scientists and certain avant garde educationists that the school board and elected public officials have the right, as democratically selected public leaders, to determine the character of the public's educational programs. The political bargaining model says that educational policy is the outcome of a political contest among the disparate interests, groups, organizations, and segments of opinion within the political community. Each actor (or group of actors) in the political game advance his (or their) preferences with more or less conviction, greater or lesser ability, on a wider or narrower range of topics. The relationships among actors are structured in such a way that some actors have more influence over the outcome than others. The power relations among the actors and the skill and perseverance of each of them will influence the outcome of the bargaining game. The model shares with the political scientist a concern for the way in which the school board members, as representatives of the general
public, influence school policy. But it does not see the board as
the expressor of the public interest; rather, it sees members of the
board as one of many participants in a political contest so structured
as to favor some participants over others.

Note, however, that the argument as reformulated no longer
focuses on power relations between two concrete, empirical structures--
the school board and the administrative staff--but deals instead with
the adequacy of two distinct analytical models. While it is true that
the organizational processes model seems most adequate for understanding
the administrative staff's contribution to policy, structures external
to the school system have organizational characteristics as well.
PTAs, political parties, citizen's committees, teachers unions,
neighborhood organizations and civil rights groups are organizations
whose contributions to educational policy might well be interpreted
from the perspective of the organizational processes model. Even
more surely, the political bargaining model does not apply simply to
the external environment of a school system. The bargaining which
occurs within the administrative staff may be extensive and bitterly
contested. Conflicts between staff and line, between central office
and field administrators, among administrators in socially and
geographically distinct areas, and between the "old guard" and the
"young Turks" are often the major preoccupation of organizational
"insiders". If the organizational processes model identifies the
common interests and values of bureaucrats, the bargaining model
explores the power struggle among them. Moreover, it draws no sharp
boundary line between an organization and its environment. Different segments within an organization may develop different contacts with power centers external to the organization, which are useful and can sometimes even be determinative for the internal organizational struggle.

If the debate between political scientists and traditional educationists points directly towards two distinct models of educational decision-making, the debate itself implicitly rejects still a third model of decision-making. Both sides to the debate begin by rejecting the premise that administrators function in such a way as to help boards of education achieve their goals in the most efficient manner possible. They agree that policy decisions are not based on rational consideration of the best method for achieving the agreed goals of the board of education; both sides implicitly agree that the staff does not assist the board by identifying and implementing the most desirable methods available for achieving these goals. Otherwise there would be no conflict between school board and administrative staff, and the entire debate would be meaningless. The point of departure—for the debate, then, is a common rejection of a rational decision-making model.

An extreme formulation of a rational decision-making model would be offered only by a naive simpleton. In fact rational decision-making models have frequently been constructed as "straw-men" to be knocked down by hard-headed empiricists. Yet the model, properly reformulated, may not be totally irrelevant for understanding school board decision-making.
Each of the three models—rational decision-maker, organizational processes, and political bargaining—offers a distinctive way of understanding the decision-making of the school board. It should be clear from the beginning, however, that we believe that each model presents only one fact of the totality of the situation. Although the analogy may not be exact, it can be said that each model is like one snapshot of a three-dimensional event. Only by inter-relating the three models does the full picture emerge. In the remainder of this paper we shall develop more fully each of these analytical approaches.

Model I: The Board as a Rational Decision-Maker

In order to revive the rational decision-maker from his present status as a "straw-man," it is necessary to avoid both the Scylla of too exact a definition of rationality and the Charybdis of such a loose notion of rationality that the concept is meaningless. It may be possible to steer safely through such a dangerous course by regarding rational decision-making as a middle range rather than a "covering all" theoretical model.

The debunkers of rationality models demand that the actor have rationalized both the goals he seeks and the means he chooses to pursue them. Accordingly, it is argued that the rational actor must identify the exact inter-relationship among man's values which will realize the Good and Perfect Universe. If it is conceded that this is not necessary, it is said the actor must have a value system which
is consistent, coherent and gives precise guidelines for action in practical situations. Attacks on rationality models focus on the difficulty, in fact the virtual impossibility, of maximizing all values that are important to actors and to the imprecision with which actors have established principles for selecting among values in conflict. Board members want a school system to pursue universalistic policies, to respond to local needs and problems, to minimize costs, to hire well-qualified teachers, to win and maintain public support for the schools, to instruct the children according to sound educational principles, and to assure a rapid flow of information throughout the system. All of these and other goals are part of what board members mean by serving the public's interest in good education. Yet these values may in many cases compete with one another, and no clear hierarchy of values exists for board members, which enables them to choose among conflicting values. The very plurality of values makes rational decision-making very nearly impossible.

All of this may be conceded without denying that a more limited conception of rationality may still provide a useful basis for analyzing board decision-making. If it is difficult to speak of rational value systems, one can speak of the rationality of the instruments which the decision-maker selects to achieve the goals that he seeks to maximize. Instrumental rationality does not assume that actors have a consistent hierarchy of values; it only assumes that a rational actor selects from the alternatives available to
him the one which is most suited for achieving whatever goals (rational or not) the actor has in mind. The actor is instrumentally rational, for he selects the most efficient means to reach the desired ends.

One can speak of a school board, then, as being instrumentally rational, even though its members do not hold to a consistent value system.

In any given policy situation, certain goals can be identified which board members are seeking to maximize. In developing a policy affecting the racial distribution of pupils in a school, for example, the board may be seeking to stabilize the white community. In organizing its administrative staff, it may seek to maximize staff efficiency without jeopardizing the staff's autonomy from outside pressures.

In determining teacher salaries, it may wish to pay no more than is essential for attracting adequately qualified teachers to the system. Even though one or more of these goals may not be rationally selected (in the sense of fitting consistently within the board members' value systems), the board may be acting in an instrumentally rational fashion so as to maximize these particular goals.

Even with this more modest instrumental conception of rationality, it has been persuasively argued that any political actor (to say nothing of a board of education) can scarcely decide among alternatives rationally. The analogy of a chess game illustrates the difficulty of acting rationally in a complex situation even when the goal of the actor is clearly defined. Selecting the best of all possible alternative moves in a chess game is a task which exceeds the capacities of the most sophisticated of contemporary computers, to say nothing
of the limited capacity of the human brain. Moreover, even if such information could theoretically be obtained, the costs of collecting additional information may exceed the benefits to be gained through adopting a more efficient strategy rather than a less efficient one.

These limitations on even instrumental rationality have induced certain scholars to offer an alternative, more subjective, definition of rationality, which avoids the Sisyphus rock that destroys any actors' claim to rationality only to be sucked into the Charybidian whirlpool that reassures every actor that he is acting rationally, thereby reducing rationality models to meaningless tautologies. Utility theories in economics, and, more recently, in political science provide instructive examples of the advantages and problems involved in a completely subjective definition of rationality. An individual acts rationally, utility theory assumes, whenever he adopts a strategy which he believes has the greatest probability of maximizing the values which he believes to be relevant to his situation. Note the contrast with the still objective, though instrumental, conception of rationality offered in the preceding paragraph. There it was assumed that once an actor's relevant values and goals were known, his behavior could be judged by an outside observer as being more or less rational, depending on the efficiency with which the acts were realizing his goals and values. From the perspective of the subjectivist, however, a man may be acting rationally even when to an outside observer the actor appears to be destroying his own cherished goals; if the actor himself does...
not perceive the error of his ways, the actor is presumed to be acting in a subjectively rational fashion.

The subjective notion of rationality has been offered as a solution to a difficult problem for microeconomists. Theories of the firm have assumed that the firm acts rationally in an objective sense so as to maximize profits. Empirical studies of the market behavior of individual firms, however, indicate that at least in some cases firms clearly were not maximizing profits, thereby calling into question certain of the basic assumptions of microeconomic theory. Utility theory has been offered as a response to this difficulty. Firms maximize their utilities, the theory goes; while profit maximization may be among the utilities that firms seek to maximize, it cannot be said that it is in all cases the only utility of the firm. The point is clearly valid. Yet the theory which says that firms seek to maximize utilities cannot be verified, since accurate information about the utilities of individual firms cannot be obtained. If at any point market behavior is inconsistent with utility preferences, as measured by the instrument of some observer, it can only be said that the instrument did not accurately measure the utilities of the firm accurately.

An analogous debate between objectivists and subjectivists has occurred recently in a body of literature which is seeking to develop a theory of micropolitics. In an early seminal work, Anthony Downs argued that political leaders in democratic polities seek to maximize their winning coalition in elections; all their political activities are oriented rationally towards this end.
Mistakes and errors are due simply to the lack of information available to the political actor. This theory faces the same difficulties that the profit maximizing theory in microeconomics confronted: observable behavior is at times rather obviously inconsistent with the basic assumption of the theory. Certain politicians, for example, pursue such extremist goals that they can scarcely be oriented primarily towards maximizing a winning coalition. Frolich et al., recently refined the theory by suggesting that political entrepreneurs are interested in maximizing utilities, not winning coalitions. Only in certain cases are the two identical. Some political actors receive greater utilities by remaining in permanent opposition than they would receive if they gained office. But, again, this reformulation of micropolitical theory cannot be disproven; as Kelley has pointed out, by definition "an actor will always choose . . . outcomes with highest utility." It is impossible to identify behavior which is not rational, for in no case can you prove that the individual is not maximizing his utilities.

The circularity of the argument for this concept of rationality reveals it to be a Charybdian whirlpool. In order to avoid its strong but ultimately disastrous currents, let us steer back towards a more objective definition which, with all of its difficulties, has the potential for providing the basis for a middle range, if not a "covering all," theory of political action. Insisting on an objective definition of rationality, it must be emphasized, does not mean insisting that goals and values are rationally determined. Behavior
is instrumentally rational whenever the means selected are appropriate for the goals being pursued, no matter how these goals were established. More exactly, "action is rational in so far as it pursues ends possible within the conditions of the situation, and by the means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end for reasons understandable and verifiable by positive empirical science."11

Parsons' critique of this positivist position points out that inasmuch as "there is nothing in the theory dealing with the relations of the ends to each other, but only with the character of the means-end relationship," the theory assumes "that there are no significant relations (among ends), that is, that ends are random in the statistical sense."10 But as Parsons himself admits, the criticism carries weight only if the theory "is held to be a literally descriptive of concrete reality" rather than being "consciously 'abstract'," which is our intention here.11 For certain analytical purposes it may be assumed that the school board is seeking to maximize the probabilities that white communities are stabilized, or that the board is interested in obtaining the best teachers at the lowest possible salary. Microeconomists make a similar assumption when they assume that firms are interested in maximizing profits. Anthony Downs' assumption about the behavior of politician's was also a simplification for certain analytical purposes. It is true that the rationality of means cannot be separated from the rationality of ends insofar as one is attempting to describe concrete reality, but this in no way denies the usefulness of developing abstract models based on such an assumption.
The analytical character of the model is particularly evident when the analyst claims that he is offering no more than a middle range theory, which is the case here. Attacks on assumptions that firms maximize profits and politicians maximize votes are most persuasive when they criticize any pretensions that these assumptions can lead to the development of general or "covering all" theory. Empirical data simply does not warrant such a claim. Our argument would be open to similar criticism if we were to argue that all school decision-making was based on the board's commitment to a particular policy goal. If it is simply claimed, as we do here, that what is offered is only a middle range theory which helps explain certain aspects of board decision-making, the force of the critical attack is considerably blunted. It is conceived that boards at times may not use generally available information in order to identify the most instrumentally rational strategy. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to assume that boards do seek to devise the strategy which seems to be the most efficient for achieving their goals and that they do seek to gather information that will help them choose among various strategies. A commonly agreed upon goal will powerfully constrain a board's discussions, as each alternative is examined carefully to see whether it will further that goal.

Such an assumption of objectively rational action is increasingly helpful for analyzing board behavior the more clearly and definitely the goal can be specified. Profit maximization and vote maximization are reasonably (but not perfectly) defined goals.
"White stabilization" and "lowest salaries for the best teachers" are more clearly defined goals than is "quality education for all children." By assuming that the board is maximizing a clearly defined goal, the analyst minimizes the danger of slipping into a subjectivist-concept of rationality. The more vaguely the goal is defined (maximizing utilities is the best illustration), the more one is in danger of speaking tautologically when one says that boards seek to devise the strategy which seems to be the most efficient. But the more clearly defined the goal, the more it will become clear when a board is not devising the strategy which seems to be the most efficient for achieving that goal.

The rational decision-making model thus becomes appropriate for analyzing the decision-making of a collectivity of actors, such as a school board. It is often claimed that only individuals can be rational, not boards, firms, or institutions. In a sense this is true. But if it can be assumed that the individual decision-makers for the institution (the members of the school board) have a common conception of institutional goals, then it is possible to consider objectively whether their decisions implement these institutional goals. The rational decision-making model helps to show the limits within which these debates occur and indicates the basis for the decision: certain arguments in the discussion indicate one strategy is instrumentally the most rational.
If Model I regards the board as a rational decision-making entity, Model II identifies a set of constraints on the information of the decision-maker, which limit the number of options the board considers and biases the board's perceptions as to which of the still available options is most rational. This set of constraints stem from the fact that boards gather information, consider alternative policies, and must eventually implement policy by means of a large, complex, formal organization. The organization enormously increases the amount of information that can be collected for decision-makers, provides an opportunity for the board to receive recommendations from professionally trained individuals sufficiently experienced so they can anticipate the consequences of alternative options, and increases the board's capability of implementing its policy decisions. An organization that approximates the "ideal-typical" bureaucracy that Weber described is a proficient instrument for enlarging the scope of instrumentally rational action. Yet no organization has a bureaucratic structure which is a perfect instrument for the policy-maker. However essential organizations may be, organizational characteristics establish their own set of constraints on the alternatives open to decision-makers. These constraints are a function of the organization's standard operating procedures, organizational interests, and the shared values of its members.

Organizational routines. An administrative staff communicates to its board through channels which are structured by certain formal
guidelines and informal norms and expectations. These channels of communication are likely to be structured in such a way as to facilitate the rapid conduct of routine affairs. In Allison's words: "Organizations perform their higher functions, such as attending to problem areas, monitoring information, and preparing relevant response for likely contingencies, by doing 'lower' tasks, for example preparing budgets, producing reports, and developing hardware." These operating procedures, once established and standardized, place constraints on the problem-solving activities of an organization. They narrow the options that are actively considered. They bias the evaluation of options in directions consistent with organizational structures and routines. They limit the range of policies that the organization is capable of implementing. Consequently, organizational behavior is prone to "error" in crisis situations, those times when almost by definition the routines of the organization will be inappropriate for dealing with problems the system faces. Rather than selecting the most rational alternative, the organization is likely to suggest one which more closely conforms to the standard operating procedures.

Organizational interests. The structure which evolves in order to perform routine functions efficiently also gives rise to a variety of roles within the organization. These roles, as do any set of social roles, have certain interests. The concept of role interests has been challenged on the grounds that social roles do not have interests, only individuals do. This may be true of the "real"
Social roles are analytical constructs that do not exist in the "real" world, and therefore they cannot have any "real" interests. However, role interest as an analytical concept can have great utility, as is evident in the frequency with which it is used. Organizational interests, class interests, union interests, judicial interests: all of these and similar phrases are commonly used and accepted. In every case, the reference is not to any particular individual but to the role which the individual is performing. Indeed, it is easier to settle on a definition of role interest than to conclude what is in the interest of an individual. One school of thought argues that individual interests cannot be known apart from the preferences of the individual; another school of thought argues that individual interests cannot be reduced to simply what the individual wants. An individual may not be aware of his own interests, the argument runs. Yet it is difficult for any outside observer to take into account the relevant information necessary in order to determine what is in the interest of, i.e., what is "good for" a particular individual. The problem is more easily resolved when speaking of social roles. Those things that enhance the desirability of performing a particular role are in the interest of that role. Policies which improve the life chances of incumbents of specific roles by increasing the wealth, power and/or prestige of role incumbents serve these role interests.

Since organizations are complex sets of role relationships, organizational interests are those things which enhance the desirability of performing roles within the organization. Policies which are in
the interest of an organization are policies which increase salaries of organizational members, increase the number of positions within the organization (for this improves the promotion opportunities of incumbents of existing roles), recruit higher-ranking personnel from lower ranking positions within the organization (for this also improves promotion opportunities), increase organizational autonomy from outside pressures (for by increasing the number of options available to role incumbents, it increases their power), and improve general working conditions.

Organizational interests limit the instrumental rationality of the actions of decision-makers dependent upon the organization for information, policy recommendations, and implementation. Goal displacement theories emphasize the extent to which organizational maintenance needs interfere with the maximization of the ostensible goals of the organization. In order to secure substantial private donations, hospitals may emphasize glamorous public relations gimmicks at the expense of patient care. Unions may concede demands for pay increases and improved working conditions in exchange for employer recognition of union legitimacy and "check-off" privileges. Schools may emphasize flashy music programs and art shows for parents and interested citizens, even when school personnel realize that basic educational goals suffer in the process. In short, organizational interests have been known to place limits on the instrumentally rational character of policy formation.

Shared values of organizational members. If organizations are reluctant to act contrary to their interests, neither do they eagerly
promote alternatives inconsistent with the values of the members of the organization. Members may come to hold values which are sufficiently distinctive and sufficiently relevant for decision-making that they independently influence the processes of informing, recommending, and implementing. This occurs particularly when organizational members belong to a single profession, as is the case with educational administrators. Members of a profession tend to be recruited through similar channels, to have a similar educational background, to endure similar "periods of testing," to perceive in similar ways the heroes who pioneered in the field, to orient themselves towards similar career goals, to read and hear of "progress" in the profession from similar sources, to relate to colleagues in a similar fashion, to develop common images about clients and other outsiders who are relevant to the work of the profession, to understand professional problems in a similar way, and to evaluate the importance of particular professional endeavors similarly. In short, the "sharedness" of the values of organizational members can only increase when it is an organization of professionals. Educational policy-making will be less than fully rational to the extent that the images and myths of the educational profession are inappropriate for the problems with which they are dealing.

Organizational routines, organizational interests, and the "shared values" of organizational members have more than a random relationship to one another. The share values of organizational members are usually consistent with their role interests. In fact
professional values may provide effective reinforcement of and justification for structurally determined bureaucratic role interests. Standard operating procedures, too, are likely to be consistent with both organizational interests and professional values; moreover, they in turn may become valued objects themselves. Procedures that may be purely instrumental at the time of their inception may become sacred and revered patterns of operation as time passes.

Since organizational interests, shared values, and operating procedures dovetail together to bias the decision-making process, the contribution that each of these factors makes independently may be difficult to decipher. In a school system based on the concept of the neighborhood school, organizational structures, interests, values, and operating procedures may work together to perpetuate that system. Efforts to change that system may well be frustrated by the challenge they pose to interests, values, and routine patterns of operation. In such a case it is difficult if not impossible to determine to what extent interests, values or routine procedures bias the administrative staff's orientation towards proposed changes. Yet it is more important to demonstrate the way in which the decision-making is affected by the cumulative and interactive impact of all these factors than to specify the independent contribution of any one of them. Such is the analytical purpose of the organizational processes model of decision-making.

The organizational processes model modifies the rational decision-making model previously presented. It identifies a set of
constraints on decision-makers that depend upon large, formal organizations for information, policy recommendation, and policy implementation. These set of constraints, it is hypothesized, will tend to bias decision-making away from the rational maximization of board goals so that the decisions are more consistent with organizational interests, values and operating procedures. But the organizational model is similar to the rational decision-making model in that it assumes the school board to be a unitary actor, even though subject to a set of uniform constraints imposed by an organization. School boards, however, consist of a number of discrete individuals, each of whom has his own interests, values, perceptions, and goals. Although the assumption of a unitary actor may be useful for certain analytical purposes, a comprehensive analysis of decision-making cannot depend completely upon this simplifying assumption. The political bargaining model to which we now turn permits an exploration of the divisions and conflicts within the school board which until now has been assumed to be a unitary actor.

Model III: The School Board as an Arena for Political Bargaining

Models which assume that school boards are unified actors ignore the internal struggles for influence over school policy among board members themselves. But school boards usually consist of five or more members each with his own interests, beliefs, perceptions and capabilities. They have different conceptions of the goals that the
school board should maximize. They have different views of the way in which these goals could best be maximized. And they have differing sources of information coming from the school administrative staff and other sources. It is therefore essential to introduce a model which sees the decisions of the board as something other than maximizing common goals in an instrumentally rational fashion or as the product of the selective biases of the administrative staff. This model, which may be called the political bargaining model, conceptualizes the board as an arena within which various actors pursue differing ends with differential resources and with varying capabilities of resource mobilization. Decisions that are reached are the outcomes of the bargaining among the various actors.

The political bargaining model has been widely utilized for analyzing domestic policy-making in the United States. Case studies in urban politics and the legislative process have used the model extensively. Allison's particular achievement was to point out its utility for understanding foreign policy-making within the executive branch of the government. In so doing, however, Allison obscured the range of policy-making processes that can be subsumed under the political bargaining model. Allison observed that each actor has certain "stakes for which games are played." This includes "each player's conception of the national interest, specific programs to which he is committed, the welfare of his friends, and his personal interests." This inclusive listing of the stakes of political bargainers overlooks the fact that as the stakes vary, the character of bargaining games change dramatically. Rather than simply
characterizing all such activities as bargaining games, it may prove helpful to distinguish at least three distinctive types of political bargaining which are distinguished by the varying assumptions made concerning the "stakes" of the decision-makers.

**Democratic bargaining.** The democratic decision-maker is the political leader who implements policies preferred by the majority of the population. He enacts majority preferences for the very self-interested reason that he is seeking to maximize his votes in the forthcoming election. In fact it is the ambitions of politicians which a number of analysts have identified as the key to the possibility in a large complex industrial society of a democratic polity where leaders are responsive to the will of the majority.21

The democracy of a New England town meeting at which each citizen speaks his mind and the majority decides is impossible in all but the smallest and most homogeneous of communities. Yet the political leadership can implement what the majority prefer (or would prefer if they gave the matter their consideration) so long as the politicians are subject to popular control in free, competitive elections. The politician, ambitious to remain in office, will anticipate what the public wants and pursue the appropriate policies so that he will be rewarded with re-election.

Groups who wish to influence the decisions of democratic politicians must then shape public opinion in accord with their preferences and convince political leaders that the goals they favor coincide with the preferences of the majority. They will try to
obtain the maximum amount of favorable publicity for their cause; they will supply evidence to show that their position is backed by large numbers of voters. The decision-maker, in turn, will wait for the development of coalitions that will aggregate group demands until a majority position has emerged; they will search for compromises which are supported by a majority.

Of course, democratic bargaining will not be found unless decision-makers are subject to the control of the electorate. Although theories of democratic bargaining usually treat free elections as a dichotomous variable which are either present or absent, the reality is more complex. School members vary in their dependence on the voting electorate even within a formally democratic polity. Some are appointed rather than elected, and terms of office vary in length. The comparatively obscure position that individual board members often play in the total political scene further limits their accountability to the voters. For these and other reasons, the democratic bargaining model must be supplemented by other models of the political process.

**Pluralist bargaining.** The pluralist decision-maker is the political leader who responds sympathetically to the legitimate interests of all groups participating in the political process. The pluralist politician is not interested solely in re-election, and therefore he does not hinge his decisions simply on what the majority wants. Rather, he feels that there are a variety of groups in the city with an interest in the character of the school system,
and that each group may appropriately seek to protect or enhance its interests. Although the pluralist is not cynically interested in re-election, he is realistic about the need for cooperation among a wide range of interests in order to keep a complex system as a viable functioning entity. The pluralist politician will search for ways of satisfying—at least minimally—the various competing interests that have a claim to be heard. The pluralist waits patiently in order to give all points of view an opportunity to express himself, takes into account the intensity with which various interests feel about the issue, and mediates a reasonable compromise.

In a pluralist bargaining situation groups focus their attention on the decision-makers. They seek to gather expert testimony that will show the impact of the policy on society as a whole, and, particularly, on their special interest. They will seek to convey this information to the decision-maker through both public and private channels, but the private channel may be used to convey the most critical information. Groups who have private as well as public access to the decision-makers are those that are regarded as having more legitimate stake in the outcome than groups given only public access, and their influence on the outcome is likely to be greater.

In contrast to the democratic bargaining game, in which decision-makers implement the preferences of the majority, the pluralist bargaining game may well be biased so as to prefer certain groups and interests over others, even when the latter are a numerically larger body of people.23 Only groups who have been
admitted to the institutionalized bargaining order are likely to carry much weight in the process. These groups may be nothing other than the "power elite," "power structure," or "ruling class," as the economic, social, and/or cultural elite have been called by sociologists. In some cities the business community may be the only interest with legitimate covert access to decision-makers. But this is not necessarily the bias of all urban political systems in the United States. The institutionalized bargaining order may include organized labor, and it may include certain professional interests in particular policy areas. In fact in larger, more complex cities the institutionalized bargaining order is likely to change with the functional areas of urban policy. The bargaining order with respect to educational policy will usually include teachers, PTAs, educational reform groups, religious groups (reflecting the religious composition of the community), civic (re: business) leaders, and, in a union city, organized labor. In some cities ethnic and racial groups have recently been admitted to the institutionalized order, provided that they call for harmonious cooperative, and integrative relationships among nationality and racial groupings. In order to discover the particular bias of any specific institutionalized bargaining order, a detailed investigation of the policy-making process is required.

**Ideological bargaining.** The political ideologue reaches decisions that are in accord with his own well-elaborated system of beliefs. The decision-maker has a well-developed conception of the public interest, and he relies on this ideology to guide his decisions
on controversial issues. His ideology may be consistent with the interests of the social groups of which he is a member. His ideology may be consistent with his political ambitions. He will none the less sacrifice the interests of his social group or his political ambitions on an ideological alter. The ideologue is therefore generally unpersuaded by group pressures, noisy demonstrations, lengthy public hearings, detailed private communiques. His political position is only likely to be shaken if (1) expert testimony indicates that the goal he is pursuing will not be achieved by the means that he had been intending to employ, or (2) individuals or groups with a known ideological preference that is similar to his have taken a contrary position on the issues at hand. The ideologue is not interested in compromise for its own sake; he will only compromise if forced to do so by the political power of the opposition. The ideologue sees the issues as conflicts over principles rather than as competition among various interests. Convinced of the correctness of his position, the ideologue is not likely to stray from it if he is simply subjected to the traditional tactics and strategies of group politics. Rather, he will become angry with the "pressure" being placed upon him, and will feel it is his duty to stand up against these pressures.

The consistency of the belief system of ideologues produces reasonably consistent actions by individual ideological bargainers over time and across a range of issues. Ideological actors will see a variety of problems from a consistent perspective, they will see inter-relationships among the various policy questions with which
they must deal, and they will attempt to establish a consistent orientation with respect to most of them. In contrast, the pluralist politician will pursue conflicting ends as he moves from one position to another simply in order to distribute benefits to all groups within the institutionalized order. The democratic politician will be only as consistent as his electorate, a population which is not known for its stability or consistency on most political matters.

Consequently, a crucial group strategy will be to place ideologically allied actors in strategically placed positions. Groups seek to elect or have appointed favorably predisposed ideologues to authoritative positions where they can promote policies of interest to the group. In fact, groups prefer ideological to pluralist decision-makers whenever the decision-maker is ideologically convinced that the position of the group is right, for the ideological decision-maker will try without being pressured to protect the group's interest rather than simply responding to mobilized group influence. On the other hand, if the decision-maker is ideologically opposed to group's position, the group is at a severe disadvantage. Whereas in the democratic bargaining process groups could win victories simply by demonstrating that they could defeat decision-makers, in ideological opponents (i.e., remove them from office) in order to win policy victories.

Decisional outcomes in an ideological bargaining game will be determined by the ideologically dominant perspective among those in authoritative positions; an ideologically cohesive majority can
administer regular and repeated defeats to the minority. Change can occur quickly, but this is most likely to happen when decision-makers change.

**Three types of bargaining models.** These three types of political bargaining models range along a dimension that makes varying assumptions about the degree to which decision-makers act according to explicit principles. The democratic politician is a purely self-interested, ambitious politician who is entirely unprincipled in his behavior. The pluralist politician is guided by only the most general principles that decisions must not threaten the vital interests of any member of the institutionalized bargaining order. Within that framework, the decision-maker is permitted considerable latitude. The political ideologue, on the other hand, has a set of programmatically relevant principles that give more or less explicit guidelines on particular policy issues, which the ideologue regards binding upon him. The ideologue may be willing to compromise these principles, if this is necessary in order to get the necessary political support. But the acceptance of less than a "whole loaf" is done only when it is politically expedient and never on the grounds that compromise is a good in itself. The political ideologue is the polar opposite of the democratic politician along a continuum of principled versus unprincipled action.

These are analytic models, it must be repeated. It is difficult, if not impossible, to comprehend and interpret the motives of political actors. Did a board member act for reasons of political ambition, out
of a desire for compromise, or out of a conviction that his decision was the only option that was in accord with his principles? Any attempt to suggest the "real" reasons for the decision are inevitably doomed to fail. On the other hand, some assumptions about the bases of political action are more useful than others. Some assumptions can explain a wide range of actions over an extended period of time. They are more consistent with the totality of available data on decision-making. They may even have predictive value. Although these assumptions cannot be shown to correspond with the "real" reasons for the decisions, they are nonetheless extremely useful for understanding, interpreting and even predicting political action.

Political bargaining models differ from the rational decision-making model in that they do not assume constant rationality on the part of political actors. Bargainers may or may not be maximizing their goals in the most instrumentally rational fashion. In fact the outcome of bargaining games will not simply be a function of the distribution of political resources among actors but also a function of their effectiveness (i.e., rationality) in bargaining situations. Political bargaining models also suggest that policies of a group of decision-makers may not be instrumentally rational implementation of specific policy goals because (1) no majority of actors agree on policy goals and therefore compromises must be reached which no one would fully endorse; (2) the majority may have agreed policy goals but the political ambitions or the desire for compromise among one or more members of the majority may inhibit the realization of those
policy goals; or (3) members of a majority may differ in their assessment of the proper means of implementing the policy goal and in the bargaining process compromise on a solution which is not only not the most efficient but even is recognized by all concerned that it is not the best alternative. Thus, the political bargaining model, as does the organizational processes model, points to a set of constraints on actors which limits the utility of the rational decision-making model.

Nonetheless, there is a point where the distinction between political bargaining models and rational decision-making models disappears. If the requisite number of decision-makers (for enacting authoritative policies) consists of political ideologues who have an agreed set of policy goals and agree on the most rational strategy for implementing these goals, the result of the bargaining among them will be identical to the result predicted by the rational decision-making model. The rational decision-making model thus becomes a specific case of a particular political bargaining model. But this special case assumes an agreement on goals and means which, if it existed, would hardly call for processes that could be called bargaining. Then it is more useful to assume the decision-making body as a rational decision-maker than as a group of political bargainers.

Conclusions

The policy-making process is complex; any single model of decision-making will either be so general as to be tautological or,
in being more specific, provide only a partial explanation for the decision. Drawing on the insights that Allison has brought together, we have in this paper sought to develop three major different models of decision-making—the rational, the organizational and the political bargaining. We have found it necessary to further explicate the political bargaining model by developing three subtypes of bargaining processes. In our analysis of Chicago school politics we hope to develop further the inter-relationships among these models and show the way in which they can be usefully applied to the study of urban educational politics.
FOOTNOTES


2 This widely used definition of the political system is taken from David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1963).

2a The approach developed in this paper has quite obviously been influenced by Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," American Political Science Review LXIII (September, 1969), 689-718.


4 Profit-maximizing and utility theories, as used by economists are discussed in Ibid., pp. 629-636.


8 Actually, the theory argues that actors consider both the utility of outcomes and the probability that they will occur in choosing among alternatives. The relevant probabilities are those that actors assign to outcomes. Even if the actual probability of an outcome occurring were .9, the actor would be acting rationally if he acted as if the probability were .1—only provided that he believed the probability were .1. This definition of rationality provides the
theorist with double the requisite insurance. Not only does the identification of behavioral choices with utility maximization insure (by definition) rational action but the assumption that actors choose on the basis of their own perceptions of the probabilities that particular outcomes will occur (rather than according to probabilities than an objective observer might assign) reinsures that the actor will always act rationally.


10 Ibid., p. 59.

11 Ibid.

12 In fact the assumption remains useful even if only the smallest number of individual members of the decision-making group necessary to commit the institution to a policy (usually, a majority) hold a common conception of the institution's goals.
15 Allison, 700.

16 The whole problem is most adequately discussed in Richard Flathman, The Public Interest (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964). See also Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), Ch. VII-IX.

17 For more on this problem, see Paul E. Peterson, "Forms of Representation: Participation of the Poor in the Community Action Program," American Political Science Review LXIV (June, 1970).


19 Allison, 710.

20 Ibid.


New York City politics, a city for which the pluralist bargaining model seems peculiarly appropriate, is written from this viewpoint. See Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965).


24 The institutionalized bargaining order consists of those vested interests which are generally recognized by policy-makers as legitimate participants in the policy-making process whose vital interests need to be considered in reaching decisions. For a fuller discussion, see J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, Politics and Participation (Russell Sage Foundation, forthcoming).
Introduction. School systems vary in their importance as institutions of citizenship instruction and as institutions of social differentiation. Where, as in the new nations, the educational system is very important regarding both citizenship instruction and social differentiation, two things are likely to follow. First, there will be strain on the education system as it attempts to serve the society according to two potentially inconsistent values. Second, the student will incorporate into his own definition of citizenship some norm which allows him to adjust the values of citizenship equality with the realities of status inequality.

Although these observations provide only the barest outline of the research problem to be explicated, they

* This paper has been prepared for the research workshop on "The Politics of Elementary and Secondary Education," sponsored by the Committee on Basic Research in Education, Division of the Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Science -- National Research Council, held at Stanford University, September 14-19, 1970.
will have to suffice as introduction. It is necessary to begin with background materials, for before the problem can be stated we will need a vocabulary which expresses the major concepts. The background materials also provide the rationale for the problem.

The beginning point is with two familiar theses. I review the familiar, and risk boring the reader, for placing these theses side-by-side is the most economical way in which to establish the vocabulary we need. The first thesis is taken from Parsons' "The School Class as A Social System" and refers to the school as an agency which simultaneously socializes persons into role norms and allocates them to social roles. The second thesis is taken from T. H. Marshall's "Citizenship and Social Class" and refers to the tension between the egalitarian norms of citizenship and the inequalities of a social status system.  

a) The School as Socialization Agency and the School as Selection Agency. Although Parsons is not the only commentator to have observed that the school simultaneously performs the task of general socialization and of role allocation, his formulation of the problem is a useful one. He writes, "Our main interest, then, is in
a dual problem: first of how the school class functions to internalize in its pupils both the commitments and capacities for successful performance of their future adult roles, and second of how it functions to allocate these human resources within the role-structure of the adult society."

With respect to citizenship roles, our main interest, these two tasks of the school may be in some tension. Socialization into the citizenship role in the democratic society implies the learning of egalitarian norms. Selection, especially in a stratified, industrial nation, implies learning to accept status inequality.

Parsons also notes that social strain can be produced by the selection activities of schools, though his argument differs somewhat from the one we later make. He is concerned about the strain which occurs when children are differentially placed, whereas we will be concerned about the strain when citizenship norms conflict with observable practices in the school. Nevertheless, Parsons' argument is similar enough that a brief review will aid in developing our point.

He suggests that differentiation always introduces social strain "because it confers higher rewards and
privileges on one contingent than on another within the same system. However, at least in the American system, this strain is not too severe. The socialization processes lead the loser in the competition for status to accept the stratification, and his status, which derives from the selective activities of schools. We cannot here review Parsons' entire argument, but will restate his main point.

Children, as well as their parents, place a common value on achievement. Moreover, they come to accept that the school system does selectively reward and punish on the basis of individual achievement. They also believe there to be a realistic opportunity for all and a "fair" application of selective criteria. The criteria do not systematically reward children of higher status families, and thus the achievement norm in the classroom compensates for the ascriptive advantages of certain children. To allow Parsons to speak for himself, "It may be noted that the valuation of achievement and its sharing by family and school not only provides the appropriate values for internalization by individuals, but also performs a crucial integrative function for the system... This common valuation helps make possible the acceptance of the crucial differentiation, especially by the loser..."
in the competition. Here it is an essential point that this common value on achievement is shared by units with different statuses in the system. It cuts across the differentiation of families by socio-economic status."

Our task is not to argue with Parsons, and thus we refrain from mobilizing the wealth of data about American education which make a shambles of his assumption that the criteria of achievement, as well as their application, do not covary with ascriptive status in the society. It is well known to participants in this conference that individual prejudice as well as the automatic effects of institutional practices do systematically benefit middle and upper-middle class white children. Everything from teacher attitudes to I. Q. tests have a bias, sometimes slight but often exaggerated, in favor of children singled out on the basis of ascriptive traits acquired long before entry into the formal school system.

The empirical accuracy of Parsons' observation is less important to us here than the light shed by his formulation on the question of socialization and selection. And because our research problem has as its focus education and political life in the developing nations, we are most interested in what happens to his formulation when it is transferred to a research site such as, for instance,
East Africa.

Here we can draw upon an essay by Jon Anderson entitled "Socialization and Selection: Incompatible Functions for Schools in Developing Countries." In this essay Anderson considers the tension between the socializing and the selecting activities of the education systems under the conditions we associate with "new nations." His thesis is that these two functions are much more incompatible under such conditions than the general proposition by Parsons would lead us to expect.

In developing nations, as in developed ones, the school is the decisive agency for managing the life chances of individuals. This happens because children who do not attend school can expect a life much like that of their parents, and because for children who do attend school their performance regulates movement up the educational ladder. And where you get off that ladder very nearly determines the job, hence social status, you can expect. Anderson notes, however, that there is an important distinction to be made between the selective function of education in the industrialized and the developing nation.

"In the industrialized countries the selective function of education is gradually being delayed and in some ways made less rigorous as secondary education, now
generally available for all, becomes more comprehensive and progressive. In consequence the socializing function of education is tending to act upon the majority of the student population in a less selective atmosphere, and under more equal conditions, until fairly late in their school careers." He contrasts this with the situation in developing societies. In such nations, "with their high population growths, and limited resources for educational expansion, the selective function of the school system is, if anything, developing earlier and is becoming more rigorous. There is evidence in Kenya for instance that 'better' primary schools (i.e., those with good examination records) now set unofficial tests to select the most able entrants from the nursery schools, which, incidentally, are run on a self help basis by parents, largely in order to give their children a 'good start.' In consequence the general socializing function of the school system has to be carried out in an increasingly selective atmosphere and with very clear differences existing between schools at a fairly early stage in the educational process."  

From Parsons, then, we derive the notion that schools simultaneously socialize and select. From Anderson, we derive the hypothesis that these functions may be particularly incompatible in the developing nations. 7 We will
take their observations an additional step and inquire into the consequences for citizenship norms.

Whereas citizenship norms in new nations tend to stress social duty, the elective practices of schooling tend to emphasize social ambition. For the most part, the individual student is left to his own devices in adjusting the inconsistencies which result. Analysis of how education affects citizenship in the new nation must pay particular heed to the manner in which these inconsistencies are resolved. The way in which citizenship is affected by inconsistencies between social duty and social ambition, and possible resolution of these inconsistencies, establishes the first issue relevant to our research problem.

b) Social Policy and Citizenship. T. H. Marshall's important essay on "Citizenship and Social Class" reviews the history of citizenship in England. The review stresses the variability across time, and by implication across nations, in the social policies which directly bear on citizen rights and duties. Because Marshall's thesis is well-known, we include here only a brief summary.

Citizenship in England developed in three major stages. The eighteenth century was the formative period for civil citizenship. "The civil element is composed of
the rights necessary for individual freedom -- liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contacts, and the right to justice. The last is of a different order from the others, because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law. This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice."

The next stage in the development of citizenship more or less belongs to the nineteenth century. It was during this period that the political element of citizenship most benefitted from specific social policies. "By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government." The civil element of citizenship arose with the growing significance of the bourgeoisie whereas the political element is more closely associated with demands of the working class.

Finally, and most clearly belonging to the twentieth century, there is that part of citizenship which Marshall
labels the social element. The social rights of citizenship range from "the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services." 11

Marshall then goes on to demonstrate how the development of citizenship affects a changing class structure in England. We cannot here concern ourselves with his entire thesis, but instead note two ideas relevant to the present exercise. With respect to both of these notions, the new nation experience is very different from that outlined by Marshall. And it is in these differences that we trace out the second issue relevant to the research problem.

First, deliberate social policies fostered each set of rights associated with the different stages in the evolution of citizenship. However, the three elements of citizenship, and the institutions associated with them, have separate histories; "it became possible for each to go its separate way, travelling at its own speed under the direction of its own peculiar principles." 12 The devel-
development of citizenship in the new nation has and will continue to have a very different history. The three elements are fused, and national elites are expected to establish the institutions which simultaneously, and immediately, make the full range of citizenship rights available. Numerous commentators have already observed about the burdens this places on the administrative, judicial, and legislative systems of the new nations. We will be interested in what this implies for educational policies and citizenship training.

The essay on which we are commenting was initially an address delivered as part of the Alfred Marshall Lectures, Cambridge University. And it is to Alfred Marshall that we turn to formulate the next point, though it is T. H. Marshall who provides the relevant interpretation. Alfred Marshall suggested that though full community membership implies a basic equality, this equality is not inconsistent with a superstructure of economic inequality. A central theme in "Citizenship and Social Class" is whether citizenship, especially when it incorporates political and social as well as civil elements, implies a rejection of the hypothesis that citizenship equality can coexist with economic inequalities. In a guarded passage, T. H. Marshall writes that "the preservation of economic
inequalities has been made more difficult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship. There is less room for them, and there is more and more likelihood of their being challenged." Nevertheless, he continues, for the present we proceed on the assumption that the equality fostered by citizenship can coexist with status inequalities linked to the economic system.

We now take note of the point at which Marshall's analysis suggests an important difference between the history of citizenship as he describes it for England and the likely development of citizenship in the new nation. It does not do too much violence to available evidence to suggest that many new nations are struggling to define citizenship such that all members of the society can expect equality before the law, equal rights as political participants, and equal benefits from national policies. That is, there is an attempt to foster civil, political, and social citizenship, and to recognize in social policy the egalitarianism this implies. (My own data base is largely restricted to East Africa, though I believe that in respects the definition of citizenship the experience of East Africa is similar to that of other new nations.)

What is important for present purposes is the place of the educational system in the definition of
citizenship. For Marshall, education was one of the basic social rights of citizenship. "The right to education is a genuine social right of citizenship, because the aim of education during childhood is to shape the future adult. Fundamentally it should be regarded, not as the right of the child to go to school, but as the right of the adult citizen to have been educated." Such a sentiment has been voiced in the halls of parliament of probably every nation which has freed itself from colonialism during the last several decades.

However, and this is the point of difference, in the new nation the education system has been viewed as something much more than a social right. It has also been burdened with the task of acquainting the new citizen with his civil rights and providing him with the skills pertinent to his political rights. In other words, the educational system is not a major aspect of just one element of citizenship, it is interwoven in all three elements. The architects of the social policies of the new nations are simultaneously offering education as a social right and expecting of education that it establish the foundations for civil and political citizenship. At the same time the rigorously selective effects of education must be maintained, for it is through the education
system that manpower plans (with all their implications for status inequalities) are being implemented.

We can now formulate the issue we derive from Marshall. To repeat a critical theme in his analysis, "Status differences can receive the stamp of legitimacy in terms of democratic citizenship provided they do not cut too deep, but occur within a population united in a single civilization; and provided they are not an expression of hereditary privilege." To this we would add another qualification: 'and provided that the institution which fosters the status differences is not also the institution burdened with the task of uniting the population in a single democratic civilization.'

The Research Problem. The lengthy introduction has been necessary to establish a vocabulary on which to draw and to provide the rationale for the research problem. The problem can be explicated by beginning with two specific research questions. The reader should bear in mind that my referent is East Africa, though I hope that the theoretical significance of the problem extends at least to similarly situated developing nations, and possibly even beyond those boundaries as well.

1. To what extent is the formal school system ex-
pected to transmit the norms and skills of citizenship? This is a question of social policy, or more specifically of educational policy. We do not here inquire about the success or even probable success of the school in this task. Rather we inquire about the definition of education as it emerges from ongoing policies of those responsible for teacher training, curriculum development, allocation of funds, school expansion, entrance requirements, testing and certification, and so forth. Because we believe the answer to this question is "to an overwhelming extent," we can go on to ask a derivative one.

To what extent is the formal school system not only expected to transmit these norms and skills to matriculated students, but also through them to the unschooled population as well? This secondary question is important, of course, because our research site is in countries removed by decades from universal education.

If, as we expect, the answer to the secondary as well as the primary question is "to an overwhelming extent," then we can conclude the following: there is a strong component of social duty in the education offered the youth of new nations. Whether this lesson takes can be answered only with data not yet available, but that it
is intended can be inferred from readily available docu-
ments.\textsuperscript{16}

2. To what extent is the school system serving
as the major institution of social selection and social
differentiation? This is not a question of educational
policy so much as a question of the consequences, whether
intended or not, of the general social policies of the
nation. There are several ways in which the question can
be extended. The most pointed extension, of course, is
to inquire about the bond between education and oc-
cupation. If educational attainment is closely associated
with occupational status, then the school is at least one
of the major institutions of social selection. There is
little doubt but that this is the case in East Africa.
Prescribed examinations guard the entry way to higher
education, and higher education guards the way to status
occupations. Great respect is paid to school certifica-
tion in the awarding of scarce jobs in the civil and
business sectors.

It is not an exaggeration to claim that in the
East African context mobility is largely concentrated
within the school years. Schools, and the barrage of
matriculation and certification requirements, examinations
and tests, degrees and diplomas, which accompany them, are
increasingly assuming the responsibility of sifting, sorting and selecting from among the young of East Africa those few who will one day occupy high status positions in the society. Education proceeds by classification. And the repeated classification of the young into distinct groups by school performance comes, eventually, to imply homogeneity within groups and distance between groups. Of such stuff is social stratification constructed.

If educational policies linked to citizenship are expected to foster the norm of social duty, then the practices linked to selection can be expected to foster the norm of social ambition. Whether this lesson takes can only be answered with data not yet available, but that it is a likely consequence can be assumed. The lesson of social ambition can hardly be lost on the herdsboy who travels the tremendous distance from the mud hut to the glitter of the national capitol.

In answers to the two questions just posed, or, more accurately, in assumptions about the answers, is to be found the research problem which intrigues me. The problem has both a micro and a macro dimension, though both dimensions share a common concern with the interface between social selection and social citizenship as
they are affected by the educational system. Let us consider the macro dimension first.

We assume that education is looked upon as one of the benefits of citizenship in the new nation; we also assume that the educational system is expected to transmit the norms of citizenship; further, we assume that citizenship is egalitarian in intent and that it is so regarded by those who claim it; finally, we assume that the selective function of schooling is not diminishing but, on the contrary, is increasing in significance.

I should like, then, as part of the research problem to re-raise Marshall's question in the East African (or new nation) context. How is the equality implied by universal citizenship to coexist with the inequality implied by social stratification if the same institution (the educational system) is responsible for both the lessons of equality and the lessons of inequality?

At the micro level the analogous problem refers to the individual's recognition of the simultaneous claims of social duty and social ambition and to his ability to cope with both claims. We assume that lessons of social duty are being taught explicitly and that lessons of social ambition are being taught implicitly, though in
some respects explicitly also; we assume as well that the student is able to perceive that citizenship implies equality but that his own scholastic performance, when meritorious, is rewarded with privilege; finally, we assume that the student has evolved some method of coping with the seeming contradiction between the claims of social duty and the claims of social ambition.

I should like, then, as part of the research problem to inquire, in the East African context, **How does the student define his own citizenship role, especially as that role incorporates norms about social duty and impulses toward social ambition?**

* * * * *

It always is tempting to answer research questions as they are posed, as if the uncollected data were of only marginal significance to the answers. I will partially resist this temptation, and, instead, do two different things. First, I very briefly state a third question, an answer to which points to the research strategy appropriate to the problem just outlined. Then I will make a few comments about research strategy and methodology.

What has been said of revolutions -- that they
dramatize and personalize history -- might be said of the rhetoric of nation-building. Students are constantly enjoined to make their individual behaviors and attitudes relevant to social goals. There is a potential consequence of such rhetoric, a consequence which bears on the present research problem.

The student of the new nation may view his life possibilities as directly and immediately linked to national events and policies or, if you will, to history. Scattered evidence suggests that this is the case for the East African student. He appears to see a close relationship between personal destiny and national development. For him, citizenship is a role which directly connects his personal choices and his personal fate to the collective life of the nation. His school performance, career choice, attitude toward work, and so forth, are not isolated, private and personal attributes; they are components of his citizenship role. And this role, in the student's mind, is related to the kind of nation his country will be.

As one Ugandan student stated, "As Uganda is not yet developed each citizen has to do his best to develop it. At school a good citizen should help his schoolmates in their difficulties whenever it is possible. He should work hard bearing in mind that he is working for his
country and for his own benefit."\textsuperscript{17} It is the last sentence which is most significant. This student's definition of citizenship marries social duty and social ambition \textit{because} the latter is dependent on the unfolding of national events.

This is not to imply that such a student is self-sacrificing; social ambition is not being denied. The point raised is a different one. For the school child in the developed nation, where for the most part social change occurs incrementally and only by the massive movement of a largely invisible bureaucracy, the distance between national events and personal life-chances is very great indeed.\textsuperscript{18} For the school child in the new nation, however, the patterns of history merge with personal life-chances in a more immediate and salient manner. For all the talk about center-periphery in the new nation literature, Kampala is probably less remote to the upcountry secondary student in Uganda than Washington D. C. is to the high school student in a rural community of the midwest.

There are, of course, national policies which might be viewed as attempts to foster a norm of citizenship which stresses the link between self and society. The
practice of bonding wherein students must work for a period of years in designated occupations might be noted. Also relevant is the stress on national service, a type of domestic work corp which organizes students during their vacation periods for tasks in the "national interest." The rhetoric surrounding these and similar arrangements always stresses that students must somehow "repay" the society which has been so beneficent toward them.

We are less interested in whether students do feel this obligation than in whether they see their life-chances linked to national developments, and to the extent that they do, what this means for their conception of citizenship. Without here developing the hypothesis at length, we are assuming that a conception of citizenship which firmly establishes the link between self and nation is one way of incorporating norms of social duty as well as norms of social ambition. It is usually the case, as Marshall suggests, that the national community is too large and remote to command the type of loyalty he characterizes as the "Dunkirk spirit." But for the educated class in a small, developing nation, the "remoteness" may be lessened by a very accurate calculation of the implications for personal lives of national events.

Research Strategy and Methodological Notes. Joining
as I have two separate research problems, one at the micro and one at the macro level, dictates a research strategy which generates data appropriately conceptualized at both levels. Data about the citizenship norms of the educated class in a developing nation meet this criterion.

To take first the macro formulation of the research problem. If the equalities implied by universal citizenship are to deny the inequalities implied by the social stratification system, then the educated class will be the key to understanding the dynamics of this process. For one thing, out of the educated group will come the leadership of the movements which would disrupt the system of inequalities. In addition, the privileges of the educated would be an early target of the protest. But even more important, the very institutions of education would be the locus for the early signs of serious strain. At least this is likely if our assumption about the dual function of schooling is correct.

If, however, citizenship equalities and status inequalities are to coexist, then again one would have to understand the behavior and norms (and policies) of the educated class. For in the social policies, I suspect, would be found the clues for understanding how the educated
maintain their privileges while at the same time spreading the benefits of citizenship throughout the nation. It would not be the first time in history that self-serving values of an elite class were so interpreted to the non-elite that the legitimacy of those values was widely accepted.

For the micro formulation of the research problem, the norms of the educated class, on its way to achieving that status, contain the answer to the relevant question. The simultaneous incorporation of norms about social duty and norms about social ambition can be best investigated by exploring how the student population defines citizenship.

A study of the citizenship norms of students is analogous to the research tradition now commonly viewed as "political socialization studies." Without here launching a full-scale critique of the methodologies often used in political socialization research, I can nevertheless append a thought about the study of citizenship norms.

It is necessary to be very precise about the locus of political socialization, especially if one is interested in a research design which does more than collect attitude survey from school children. Specifying the locus of
socialization has two ramifications. First, unless this specification occurs, we can conduct a great many studies and still be surprised by the actual turn of events. Thus, we may study classrooms and come to some understanding of the lessons of social duty being taught, and then be surprised when it later comes forcefully to our attention that the meaningful lesson of social duty was the one taught on the playground. One clear implication is that we may have to investigate the inaccessible, or what is sometimes assumed to be inaccessible. It may well be on the playground or in the peer group or home in the village that the student develops his beliefs about community, justice, property, authority, and so forth. This further suggests, I believe, that we often cannot ask the child directly about his learning experiences. We may have to devise methods of inquiry which do not rely on children's self-reports.

Second, the "locus of socialization" issue has implications for the selection of the unit of analysis. It may be necessary to the investigation of citizenship roles that the "learning space" of the child is studied rather than the child himself. It may be necessary to study the entire family unit, for instance, plus whatever influences are carried into the family through other channels (media,
children's stories, relatives, and so forth). For the child in school, the task is even more complex. It is important to study, simultaneously, the family, peer group, and classroom. In other words, the research design should focus on a network of persons rather than on the isolated child.

This appears to be the advice of one who has never faced the costs and complexities of collecting data. Such is not the case. Indeed, it is because I have collected survey data from students in a new nation that I am moved to consider an alternative design.

The question is not the cost of research, it is the cost per finding of research. Shifting from the individual to the collective unit of analysis (from the child to the family, from the student to the school milieu, from the scout to the scout troop, etc.) may raise the cost of each unit of analysis, but it should lower the cost of each finding. A survey instrument administered to several hundred children may produce fewer findings, if more IBM cards, than a sustained, in-depth analysis of the learning space of fewer students. The design I would suggest, therefore, stresses the cost per finding (to the extent such could be calculated) rather than the cost per datum.
Concluding Thoughts - Relevance of the Research Problem. Three things are merging in the educational systems of the new nations: institutional experimentation directed toward national development, citizenship instruction professing the value of equality, and social differentiation related to the manpower needs of the society. It is as if nations not yet "developed" and with citizens not yet "equal" and not yet suitably "differentiated" could reach those goals by fiddling with the organization and the curriculum of the schools. Nyerere's "Education for Self Reliance" is a dramatic expression of this assumption, though policy statements by political and education leaders in many new nations cover the same ground.

I could list a dozen reasons why it is important to study the implications for citizenship of the merging and mixing in school systems of social experimentation, norms of citizen equality, and criteria of status differentiation. Such an exercise, however, strikes me as superfluous. Any study can be defended as "relevant" and "important" if the researcher assumes, as I do, that everything is more or less connected with everything else. Thus, instead of asserting that the research problem I have outlined touches upon this or that policy issue or theoretical inquiry or normative question, I conclude my paper
in a different manner.

One criteria of relevance for a research problem in the field of education and politics is whether the particular problem represents a point of connection between the two. This is the case for the major variables I have singled out for attention -- citizenship and social differentiation. Not many problems of research interest to the political scientist are so clearly and sharply affected by what occurs within the educational system. Similarly, citizenship and differentiation, more than most research problems of interest to the student of education are affected by events within political institutions.

A second criteria of relevance, and one related to the first, is whether the findings produced by the research will much affect our understanding both of educational processes and of political processes. I believe that the distribution of citizen rights in society and the distribution of status and power in the society, as well as the connection between equality and stratification, point toward issues of central theoretical significance, and that the student of politics and the student of education will gain from understanding these issues. This is an article of faith on my part, and I am content to report it as such.
Thus I simply suggest that inquiry into the system of equality fostered by citizenship and the system of inequality fostered by differentiation, as well as inquiry about the norms of social duty and the norms of social ambition, touch an important point of connection between political science and education, and that the point of connection overlaps issues central to the operation of educational and political institutions.
Footnotes


2. Parsons, op cit., p. 130.

3. Ibid., p. 145.

4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. 7.

7. It should be noted that Anderson's interest in incompatibility differs from the one we develop in this paper. He discusses the difficulties of rural development programs which require that students be content with a particular status in life.

8. It is probably not necessary to spell out the reasons for this at length. I have attempted to present support for this contention in another essay. See my "University Students in East Africa: A Case of Political Quietude," in W. Hanna (ed), University Students in Africa. (New York: Bascic Books, 1970).


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., pp. 78-79.

12. Ibid., p. 80.
13. Ibid., p. 128.

14. Ibid., p. 89.

15. Ibid., p. 127.


18. National events such as wars, depressions, and so forth, may quickly alter the psychological distance between student and his sense of historical events. The Viet Nam War can certainly be interpreted in this context. The transition from the "silent fifties" to the "active sixties" has been explained in terms of the increasing saliency of national politics to draft-age young men. I do not fully agree with such explanations, but there can be little doubt that the distance between individual citizen and national event has been shortened.
I begin from the following baseline assumption: Social science research has been inadequately linked to the future. At its best, social science has provided sensitive analysis of past performance. Its theoretic imagination and empiric richness have been almost entirely confined to looking at the way things are and have been, hardly at all addressed to the ways things might become.

This existential bias of social science research has a very important result. It limits our conception of the future to whatever paltry vision can be developed through extrapolation. We are trapped by our conviction that the past is prologue to the future and that the only possible worlds must emerge incrementally out of those we already know. Small wonder that brave new policies so often consist of spending more money on the same old programs. And small wonder that the radical young, unwilling to accept a future so bound by the present but every bit as trapped by extrapolation as the rest of us, simply refuse to talk much about new social designs and strategies for achieving them.

It follows from this argument that social science research should be redirected so as to encourage more direct consideration of how major social change can be effected. I regard this position as valid for nearly all of social science, but with particular respect to politics and education it seems to me especially crucial. It is beyond dispute that the mighty edifice of American elementary and secondary education falls woefully short of accomplishing or permitting the accomplishment of the educational and social responsibilities placed upon it. Moreover, it is
apparent that extrapolation of programs and policies from the past will leave us even farther behind. We must find out what quantum shifts are possible and, unless we intend to rely as before on traditional lore and dumb luck, social science had better help chart the territory.

How can social science, qua science, bridge with imagination the gap between description and prescription? First, description can address strategies and goals of social change far more directly than it customarily has done. Second, empirical investigation can uncover previously inarticulate visions and unformed utopias by asking normative, future-oriented, questions of people. Third, serious theoretical and conceptual inquiry into public policy alternatives, especially at more abstract levels than have usually been attempted, can enrich our understanding of what can usefully be done and of which routes have less promise of taking us anywhere. The first two points can be addressed through the empirical investigation proposed below. The third point calls for imaginative theorizing which, I believe, would be much enhanced by the empirical work outlined.

**Proposed Research Topic**

The institutional structures and rules governing public education are specific to each state, and although there are regional and national commonalties of importance it remains true that programs of institutional change will differ from state to state. Accordingly, I propose to study three states only, seeking intensity of coverage rather than a nationwide perspective. Because of previous research experience on their politics of education I would choose Missouri, Illinois and Michigan. The study would consist of extended interviews with education-related elites. Initially, four categories of relevant elites can be identified. State legislators and
executive officials including the governor, the chief state school officer and perhaps additional administrative staff personnel would comprise one set. School administrators, classroom teachers and other "schoolmen" would constitute the second group. The third category would be school board members. The fourth would be drawn from community elites, official and non-official.

Legislators and community elites would be sampled so as to include those most directly concerned or actively involved with school matters as well as some in each group who were not so engaged. Samples of "schoolmen", board members and community elites would be drawn first on the basis of community type. Core cities of SMSA's would all be included and it might be desirable to oversample suburban districts also. There would be no special effort to match schoolmen, board members and community leaders from the same communities. Such an effort might entail problems of confidentiality and access and in any case would not be particularly germane to the main theoretical interests of the inquiry.

The size of the samples would depend partly on the available resources, of course. Face-to-face interviews would be required, and it might not be feasible to get more than fifty state officials and one hundred from each of the other three groups. If a clear choice were required, it would seem preferable to interview larger numbers in two states rather than have fewer respondents in three states.

The focus of the interviews would be two-fold. One would be to probe the respondent's perceptions of "the problem" in public education and how he would proceed to make the necessary changes to correct whatever he thought
was wrong. The respondent would be pushed and prodded to offer his diagnosis and policy remedy and also to outline the political strategy by which the remedy might be effected. As far as possible respondents would be discouraged from expressing a preference for the status quo as long as there was any glimmering of even a half-formed idea concerning change. Respondents would be encouraged to contemplate major innovations, particularly those which they felt might get at the roots of what they regarded as central problems. They would also be encouraged to think in terms of how to formulate appropriate policies that would, in fact, achieve the educational ends they desired. In asking about political strategies, specific probes would explore the principal sources of support and opposition, anticipated methods by which to alter the balance of friends and opponents, whether to pursue an "inside" strategy working within the institutionalized areas or an "outside" strategy of public pressure, and so on.

The second phase of questioning would focus on two rather specific policy objectives. Respondents would not be asked whether they favored or opposed them, but only what formulation of policy and what strategies they would recommend in order to accomplish the objectives. One objective would be the greater separation of school financial support, on the one hand, from policy-making and administrative control, on the other. In other words, what would the respondent recommend to overcome the tradition that those who pay the piper should call the tune? The second question is somewhat more general but it also involves the institutional structures in which schools are embedded. The question is how to make the administrative and control structure of the schools more responsive. Respondents would need to indicate something of how they interpreted the notion of responsiveness and
to whom responsiveness was mainly owed, as well as suggesting policies and strategies for increasing it.

It would be useful to establish not only the respondents' vision of desirable change, but also their sense of its urgency and the likelihood of making significant progress. One would expect, a priori, that state officials and perhaps general community elites would have less sense of urgency and more optimism than the schoolmen or board members. Length of residence, time in position and other mobility items might also be expected to relate to both the style and the substance of respondents' views about policy change. Cosmopolitans would presumably have a different orientation toward the strategy options than locals. "Localism" may not be adequately identified by simple indicators like age, position, or geographical mobility, however, and an important by-product of this research would be to identify the variables leading to local and cosmopolitan perspectives.

This kind of study would provide systematic data regarding the range and distribution of views on interesting questions among these elites, and these data alone would be most intriguing. How much clustering is there, and among whom, on the questions of what is wrong with public education, and what it would take to change it? Do views regarding workable strategies of action cluster according to position, community type, age, or indeed is there much range at all? Hopefully, too, some usable visions of the future might be generated as respondents are encouraged to talk explicitly about matters that previously had remained below the line of self-conscious articulation.

We cannot be overly confident that elites will, when asked, think of stimulating policy ideas to solve complicated social problems. I cannot read the voluminous literature on educational reform without being impressed
by how seldom there are public policies, even implicitly, to accompany the
diagnosis. I believe this is due in part to a pervasive confusion in the
minds of many between policy and outcome. Educational reformers generally
focus on outcomes. They want Johnny to read better, to love learning, to
love other children, or at least not hate them or beat them up, and so on.
Reformers may realize that the choices public officials make are not
whether or not Johnny shall read well but how much money will be spent,
where to build the new school, how to draw district boundaries, whom to
hire, etc., etc. These are not, for the most part, educational outcomes,
but they are the only questions amenable to authoritative public action.
We need to address far more attention than we have done to the forms
public action can take, to the conceptual and theoretical analysis of
public policy so that we can gain a better purchase on how public policy
can be expected to affect outcomes.

Apart from the perennial cry that additional money is required for
the schools; an almost equally perennial request is for reorganization.
Consolidation and decentralization are two of the themes in the long
contrapuntal flow, and there are others. In other work I have explored
the difference, which I think is fundamental, between what I call allocation
policies and structural policies. Reorganization is a structural decision,
and further theoretical consideration of this kind of policy seems to me
to be very much needed. For example, if blacks are to urge decentralization
of control, do they mean that to apply to white suburbs as well? Or do they
want a policy which gives self-determination to black ghettos but requires
middle class whites to accept greater socio-economic diversity? And is it
the symbols of power that are at stake, or is it substance? What kinds of
substance are affected by particular types of decentralization? A very
large part of the possible public policy decisions in education involve changing the institutional structures, and it would behoove us to contemplate these questions at length and at every level of abstraction.

One approach to the particular organizational problems of public education would be to establish multiple organizations for the several distinct activities schools engage in. Thus there seems no good reason to have a "city-wide" system for all the school purposes of Chicago or St. Louis, and indeed there is, de facto, all sorts of administrative decentralization and diversity on the organizational chart. But there is only one authoritative control source -- one board and one superintendent -- and as we now see this presents some serious difficulties. What would it be like if "the" schools were converted into a dozen or more autonomous systems, whose boundaries might sometimes be functional, sometimes geographic, sometimes defined by clientele? What theoretical criteria do we have for contemplating such "messy" schemes? Our capacity to think about these questions is underdeveloped and needs attention.

It is to be hoped that the responses provided by interviewees in the empirical phase of this project would enlarge the possible alternatives that theoretical inquiry into structural reform could take into account. In any case, however, we must expand the list of values which are linked explicitly to organizational structures so that we can evaluate the available choices on grounds other than efficiency. We have come lately to recognize that both symbol and substance of significance to blacks are involved in the organizational pattern of the schools and that, indeed, any complex institution has a myriad of social values tied up in it. We need more carefully to sort out these normative implications of our structural arrangements and this is, in large measure, a task for theorists.
I propose, then, two complementary undertakings. One is an empirical investigation of the images and conceptions of policy changes and strategies for accomplishing them that are held by four elite cohorts of critical importance to the making of educational policy. The second task would concentrate on improving the theoretical understanding of the forms public policy can take regarding educational affairs and especially of the alternative patterns of organization that might be contemplated.
WITHIN-STATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL SPENDING: A
COINCIDENTAL EXAMINATION OF STATE-WIDE AND SUB-STATE DATA

Ira Sharkansky
The University of Wisconsin

Prepared for the Research Workshop on Education and Politics, School of Education,
Stanford University, September 1970.
WITHIN-STATE DISTRIBUTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL SPENDING: A COINCIDENTAL EXAMINATICA

STATE AND SUB-STATE AGGREGATE DATA

This is an exercise in aggregate analysis. It focuses on measures of state and local government policies in the field of education and social, economic, and political features thought likely to influence the policies. Like countless studies of education and other fields of public service, it reports statistical associations between "independent" and "dependent" variables. Yet it departs from the prevailing mode of research in its choice of governmental arenas. It does not stop with policies offered throughout each state. Instead it focuses on the distribution of educational services among the localities of several states. It is concerned with questions about distribution as well as with questions about the overall magnitudes of educational service.

We already know a great deal about the environmental characteristics that correspond with high -- and low -- levels of educational spending and other indicators of policy across whole states. The typical study employs measures of central tendency for policy and those environmental characteristics thought to influence policy. We know very little about the distributions of policy-benefits within states. Are benefits distributed evenly among the local jurisdictions of most states? Do certain kinds of communities usually fare better or worse than the average? Do biases in state and local policy systems consistently favor communities with certain kinds of economic, social or political characteristics? How do intrastate distributions vary from state to state? Are some states, for example, "redistributive" in providing high levels of benefits in poor communities, while other states provide the greatest benefits in the wealthier communities?

Questions like this have wide appeal both for the policy-maker and the social scientist. For the official and the involved citizen, the questions should produce important information about "Who gets what?" out of the policy process. Inequalities that advantage -- and disadvantage -- particular groups should be the subject of awareness and dispute among policy-makers. For the social scientist these
questions should produce more understanding of the forces that shape policy "outputs." If outputs are not distributed evenly across each state jurisdiction -- and who can believe that they are -- then we still have a lot to learn about the factors that determine policy outputs in the American states. Do the economic and political features that correlate positively with policy outputs at the state-wide level also correlate with policy outputs within the states? We already know that economic traits which correlate highly with aggregate policy outputs of all local and state units within each state do not correlate with the policy outputs of the state governments alone. Similar discontinuities may appear when we compare the correlates of within-state distributions of policy with the correlates of aggregate state-plus-local measures of policy. The alleged economic and political influences on state and local policy may not have their same impact on all aspects of policy. By looking separately at an analysis of policy distribution, we can add to our understanding of "What influences what?" in the policy system.

This study rests on the assumption that policy-makers do not make their decisions only with an eye toward macro-levels of state performance. Not "how much?" but "who should get how much?" appears central to many policy debates. We cannot say which question is faced most often by policy-makers. However, we can see if findings from the two levels of analysis (i.e., state-wide macro levels of policy or the distribution of policies within states) are similar.

Depending on the kinds of policy involved, the distributions among the localities of a state can be influenced by local officials alone or by the combined efforts of officials from several governments. When policies reflect the combined efforts of local, state and/or federal authorities, their distribution may depend on the actions that local authorities take within the standards established by state or federal agencies, or upon the actions of local authorities outside of established standards. When the distributions of policies reflect local actions outside of federal or state standards, they may depend on the tolerance of state or federal
officials for local deviations, or the weakness of state and federal controls vis-

a-vis local actions. In this paper, we cannot assign the appropriate share of
responsibility for within-state distributions to federal, state, or local officials.
However, our methods of analysis will lend themselves to other projects that
might assess the contribution of each level of government to the distribution of
policy benefits.

Problems of Measurement and Analysis

When moving from simple aggregate measures of policy magnitudes to measures
of policy distribution in the field of education, we encounter the peculiar nature
of school district boundaries. The school district is the local unit of policy
distribution, but its boundaries seldom coincide with those of other jurisdictions.
In some states the districts tend to coincide with municipal, town or county
borders, but elsewhere they cover only part of these jurisdictions or cut across
several of these jurisdictions. This is a problem because the measurements of
economic, social and political traits — which we shall test as the correlates of
educational policy — are available only in terms of these other jurisdictions.
In order to compute measures of association between educational policy and their
likely determinants, we must develop policy indicators for sub-state areas that
coincide with the areas for which we have indicators of the educational environment.

For this study, which is limited to measures of educational expenditures, the
county is the obvious unit of analysis. The City-County Data Book of the U.S.
Bureau of the Census provides data for local education spending aggregated by
county, and provides county data for a variety of economic, social and political
indicators. Our use of the county as the unit of analysis requires us to make
some inferences about the environmental characteristics that affect the decisions
of local school boards. We assume that the associations found with the county
as the unit of analysis also prevail for school districts. This assumption will
fail to the extent that various districts within counties pursue different policies.
This assumption is no problem in those few states (e.g., Florida, Georgia, South Carolina) where the typical school district is coterminous with the county borders.

The obvious limitation in our policy data is its limitation to expenditures for education by the local governments within each county. It includes the state and federal aids that are funnelled through local authorities, so it is a reasonably complete record of spending for education. However, it does not record the items or services that are purchased with the funds, the qualities of service that are provided in each county, nor the impact of those services on the students. These other topics are crucial in any total understanding of the policy process, and we know they are not simple correlates of spending. For some of these items, there are data reported by state departments of education, usually by school district. With sufficient resources it would be feasible to aggregate these reports to the county level of analysis. A preliminary search of state department bulletins indicates that measures of teacher salaries, teacher-pupil ratios, average daily attendance, and drop-outs can be computed, by county, for a sufficient number of states to support comparative analysis. With this kind of data, we could push our understanding of intrastate distributions of educational benefits beyond the point demonstrated by this paper. My recommendation is that we seek resources for this research.

To answer our questions about the within-state distribution of educational spending, we offer several measurements of distribution. Our initial variable is expenditures per capita for education within each county of 36 states. From this, we calculate state-wide means and coefficients of variability for each state. Coefficients of variability show the equality of spending among the counties in each state. A low coefficient signifies a more equal distribution, while a high coefficient signifies a distribution that is highly skewed from the mean. By comparing coefficients of variability with state-wide means in each state, we can see if the states with a generally high level of spending also show equal distributions of spending in different counties. Our concept of equality is
arithmetic identity. We make no claim that it approximates more elaborate concepts of equity. A concern with equity would lead to a complex and controversial discussion of the criteria that officials ought to consider when making their decisions. By looking merely at the differences in policy from one county to another within each state, we have an empirical goal: determining where county-to-county differences exist, and what features of counties and states account for the differences. We also compare within-state distributions of educational spending with the distributions of several other policies. This tests the uniqueness of our findings, and permits some inferences about the conditions that may affect distributions in different fields.

Secondly, we compute for the counties of each state separately, and for the counties of all states together, coefficients of correlation (Pearson's r) between each county's policy and various social, economic, and political traits of the county. These correlations describe the quality of policy distribution, i.e., the kinds of counties which show the highest (and lowest) spending. A positive correlation between spending and, e.g., family income, indicates that the highest levels of spending tend to occur in high-income counties. A negative correlation indicates that the highest levels of spending tend to occur in low-income counties. A weak correlation indicates that there is no linear pattern between county spending and the environmental trait. In this paper we focus on correlations between the policies in each county and:

a. the proportion of Negroes in the county's population;
b. median family income in the county;
c. participation: i.e., percentage of adult population of the county voting in a national election;
d. competition, i.e., 100 minus the percentage of the two-party vote in the county received by the major party of each county. 7

With these correlations, we describe some traits of the counties that show high (and low) policy scores. Then we use the county correlations of each state as
variables in a further analysis to show the kinds of states in which counties of various types show high (or low) policy scores.

How to identify the characteristics of states that show various distributions of policies among their counties? This will involve further tests of association between the measures of policy distribution and additional measures of likely influences. Our measures of likely influences on policy distributions are two socio-economic and two political "factors" that have been developed in earlier studies of the states. They are:

1. state scores on Industrialization factor
2. state scores on Affluence factor
3. state scores on Professionalism-Local Reliance factor
4. state scores on Competition-Turnout factor

With these factor scores, we can test the salience of certain statewide features for the distribution of policies within states.

Findings

Between the counties of most states there are inequalities in spending for education. However, these inequalities are less pronounced than in other fields of public service. Table 1 shows coefficients of variability for local government spending in five different fields, for average welfare benefits given for five different programs, for total property taxes and local employees' salaries. Within-state differentials in educational spending are less marked than differentials in spending for health, welfare, highways and police, for total property taxes, and for general assistance payments. Conditions in the field of education may work to keep spending (and perhaps other indicators of service) more equal across the counties of most states that services in other fields. These influences may include the high level of communications among the professional educators and the policy-making boards in different counties, the pervasive effect of state standards for minimum teacher salaries and other items requiring
local expenditures, plus the effect of state aids that are distributed in a manner to make up for economic differences among local jurisdictions.

Although within-state distributions of educational spending appear relatively equal in comparison with the distributions of other policies, there are some states where the distribution is more and less equal than elsewhere. Equal distributions tend to exist with generally low levels of spending. The coefficient of simple correlation between state-wide averages and coefficients of variability is .40. There is also a tendency for equality to occur with low scores on the economic factor of Affluence (i.e., personal income and education) and the political factor of Competition-Turnout. These conditions also correlate with low state-wide levels of educational spending. (See Table 2) Equality of spending generally -- but not always -- comes at the expense of uniformly low funding. Among the states that have both relatively equal and high spending are Arizona, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Mississippi offers both low spending state-wide and an unequal distribution of spending. Table 3 shows state-by-state data.

There are consistent patterns of educational spending with respect to the social, economic, and political characteristics of counties. Table 4 shows that when the counties of 36 states are considered together, high levels of spending occur in the counties with a low incidence of Negroes, but high levels of family income, political participation, and competition. These findings are consistent with results from state-wide studies. They also help to explain the coincidence of high state-wide spending with intra-state inequalities: it is in the wealthier, high participation and competitive states where some communities -- showing the highest levels of wealth, participation, and competition -- reach very high levels of spending. In contrast, most of the poor states lack communities of extreme wealth (the wealthier counties of South Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia do not approach the resources found in the wealthier counties of New York, California,
and Illinois), and few communities spend at levels far in excess of the state average.

A combination of party competition, professionalism in government, and economic resources seems to push local spending for education to its highest levels. Table 5 shows that high state-wide scores on Industrialization, Affluence and Professionalism—Local Reliance coexist with high county correlations between party competition and educational spending. This means that county spending and competition go together in those states that score high on Industrialization, Affluence and Professionalism—Local Reliance. Perhaps the spending potential that comes from environmental wealth and professionalism attain their greatest realization in an atmosphere of party competition. It has been long believed that competition increases service benefits. Some challenges to this expectation come from studies of state-wide aggregates of spending. But this study of within-state distributions suggest that local competition plays a part in the realization of spending potentials that lie in the resources of economic wealth and professionally-trained personnel. The states of Colorado, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania are the clearest examples of local competition and high spending occurring along with state-wide conditions of wealth and professionalism.

One of the rewards coming from within-state analysis is the discovery of individual states whose patterns of distribution depart from the norm. Table 4 shows a number of states whose counties do not fit the pattern found when we consider all states' counties together. Massachusetts, Montana, and Wyoming are prominent "deviants" in having the highest levels of educational spending in the poorest counties. These departures from the norm are appropriate subjects for intensive case studies. It is significant, perhaps, that these departures for educational spending are fewer than similar departures from the norms in other fields of policy. As we saw in the coefficients of variability above, policy in the field of education seems to be held rather tightly to state norms, perhaps as a result of the pervasive professionalism in this field.
The Utility of Within-State -- and Other Modes of Aggregate Analysis -- for the Policy-Maker

It is important to ask if this exercise with the intrastate distribution of educational spending -- and the expansion of the research that is recommended -- offers anything of relevance to the policy-maker. As academic social scientists we can market techniques that make a direct contribution the deliberations of policy-makers, or that would make a useful addition to the training of policy-makers. Since within-state analysis is a spin-off from a larger and more well-established mode of aggregate analysis, it is appropriate to describe first some pay-offs associated with the parent field. Then we can identify some particular pay-offs that come from studies of within-state distributions of policy.

Our concern is with comparative studies that measure the quantity and quality of policies in several jurisdictions, and define the statistical relationships between measures of policy and various features in their environment. Although some of this literature is cross-national in scope, we focus on comparisons of policies in different American states and localities. The concern is not simple with "How do policies differ from one jurisdiction to another?" More complicated questions are asked, which concern the most salient or distinctive differences in state policies, and the elements that are related to the distinctive policies. Some scholars are interested in explaining the policy differences that exist; they look at certain policies as "dependent variables" and consider their relationships with the economic, social, or political characteristics that seem likely to shape those policies. Others are interested in explaining the effects of different policies; they look at certain policies as "independent variables" and consider their relationship with the economic, social, and political characteristics that may feel the effect of those policies. 9

The comparative analysis of state or local policies shares certain traits with planning-programming-budgeting, but it also shows important differences. Both favor the most rigorous measurement feasible for the quality or quantity of
policies, and both are self-conscious in their choice of the statistical procedures appropriate for each problem. There are differences, however, in technique and in the kind of information produced. Comparative policy analysis operates at a higher level of abstraction than ppb. The concern of comparative policy analysis is with aggregate indicators of policies provided within several different jurisdictions rather than with alternative proposals for certain elements of one jurisdiction's program. It is not so much concerned with the costs of program elements as with the magnitudes of entire program "outputs" or those of several related programs -- and with the environmental features found alongside various magnitudes of output. Comparative policy analysis is less directly useful to the policy maker. At its present stage of development it is more clearly "basic research" than is ppb. Its findings provide useful information to the policy-maker -- as demonstrated below -- but the policy-maker must add important elements in "translating" the results of comparative policy analysis to his own needs. He can determine where his own jurisdiction stands in comparison to others in certain aggregate measures of performance, and he can estimate the chances of his jurisdiction (given its environmental features) making certain changes in performance. At the present state of the art in comparative policy analysis, however, the policy-maker must provide much from his own insight to local conditions to judge "what it would take" by way of a proposal and strategy to produce those changes in performance. Comparative policy analysis also offers a valuable perspective to a policy maker. It can broaden his horizons and familiarize him with the programs and problems of other jurisdictions. Like ppb, it may comprise a useful training exercise even if it does not pay off as its most optimistic promoters might hope.

Generally speaking, comparative policy analysis is more concerned with description and explanation than with prescription. Yet it is relevant to one's interest in the proper forms of policy. Indeed, an interest in the environmental features that may influence policy, and in the influence that policy may exert on
the environment represents the use of social science to produce better information about the policy process. It can tell the policy-maker and the students of public policy what features of the environment are -- and are not -- likely to constrain a major change in policy, how strong the constraints are likely to be, and how much of a difference a certain policy change is likely to make in certain features of the environment.

Selected Findings of Comparative Policy Analysis

In order to see the possibilities and limitations of comparative policy analysis, it is necessary to look at some representative findings. Some early research produced surprising refutations of widely accepted propositions. The equality of state legislative apportionment was typically assigned a priority position in the desires of urban reformers. With greater urban-rural equality in legislative districting, state governments were expected to become more responsive to the interests of urban citizens. Yet a sizable body of scholarship has found no substantial differences between the states that have been well- and poorly apportioned in the policy fields of taxes, welfare, education, health, highway, and natural resources. Likewise, many people assume that competition among political parties is a "good thing," and is likely to make itself felt on the policies offered by state and local governments. In their quest for popular support, competitive parties should "bid up" the nature of services offered. But here, too, there was disconfirming evidence. Taking account of the economic differences among the states, the early research found no substantial policy differences between those states with competitive parties and those states dominated by a single party. Since the first wave of revisionist scholarship, some later research has specified certain conditions that give rise to a policy role for the nature of legislative apportionment or the competition between political parties. The relationships with policy are not as strong as that suggested by normative reformers or casual observers; but neither is their role
Economic-Policy Relationships

One line of research seems to be especially fruitful in identifying areas of constraint and opportunity for the policy-maker. It concerns the level of economic development within a jurisdiction. The model used to guide this research is simple. It merely posits that economic features of a jurisdiction have something to do with the nature of public policy. The model appears in several forms: as part of a "systems" framework that sees the economy providing the "inputs" of resources, demands and supports to an arena where other inputs from a political sector may affect the economy's relationships with policy; and in less elaborate formulations of economic-policy linkages that are posited without theoretical explanations. For some, the economic-policy model is too simple; it leaves out many specific features of the policy-making process. This is true, but the simplicity of the model also offers several benefits. It has a demonstrated capacity to support empirical research, and to produce a series of propositions about the conditions that create more or less powerful relationships between various features of the economy and various features of public policy. The practitioners of comparative policy analysis append various additional aspects of the policy-making process to this basic model and consider various kinds of economic traits as correlates of public policy. The literature provides us with richer information about economic-policy relationships than about other features of the policy process, and there are allegations in the literature that the most pervasive influences on public policies come from the economy. Many of these allegations are misleading or exaggerated. By reviewing the findings that are available to date, we can assess the strength of the economic-policy linkages, and how much latitude for innovation in the face of economic constraints there exists in the policy process.
According to much of the current literature, the nature of a jurisdiction's economy limits the magnitude and quality of the "policy outputs" that the jurisdiction may produce. By limiting the resources that are available, economic constraints can limit an official's capacity for current performance and for innovation. It is important to understand which limitations may come to the policymaker from economics, and under what conditions these limitations are likely to inhibit innovation. The first wave of research into the economic-policy linkage tended to exaggerate the strength of the economic influence over policy, and to neglect those findings that provide clues to policy arenas that are relatively free from economic influence. Professor Thomas R. Dye makes the strongest argument that the level of economic development within a state imposes severe limits on the nature of policy outputs. High levels of economic development (measured by such variables as per cent urban, per capita personal income, median education level, and industrial employment) are generally associated with high levels of expenditure and service outputs in the fields of education, welfare, and health. Service outputs in these fields are measured by teacher salaries, the rates of pupil attendance in schools and success of a national examination, average welfare benefits, and the incidence of medical facilities. Economic development may provide the wherewithal to purchase these services, or increase the service-demands of clientele groups.

It is true that economic development and policies generally stand in the relationships to one another than are outlined above. Yet the relationships are not so strong as to preclude non-economic factors from having a crucial impact on the nature of public policy. Dye reports 456 coefficients of simple correlations between policy measures and his four economic measures of income, urbanism, industrialization, and education, but only 16 of them (4 percent) are strong enough to indicate that an economic measure explains at least one-half the inter-state variation in a policy measure. He also reports 54 coefficients of determination that show the combined strength of his four economic measures with policy
measures. Only 19 of these (35 percent) indicate that all economic measures together explain one-half of the interstate variation in policy. Governments in many states either surpass or fail to reach the policy norms that generally are associated with their levels of economic development.

The general weakness of economic-policy relationships does not mean that policy innovation comes easily. Some relationships between measures of policy and other variables are strong, and suggestive of deep-seated non-economic influences that retard program development. One type of influence that seems pervasive is "previous policy decisions." For the most part, governmental officials pursue incremental decision-making. A number of checkpoints in the practices of administrative agencies, executive staff units and legislative committees make it difficult to justify dramatic changes from existing operations. Even in those arenas where the economy seems to have minimal constraining influence over policymakers, officials may be bound tightly by the inhibitions of their own decision routines.

Variations in Economic-Policy Relationships

Several writers have begun to chart the policy arenas that seem more or less subject to economic influence. The economy does vary in its influence over policy. This variation can occur between different levels of government, different periods of time, different kinds of public service, or at different levels of affluence. The findings below reflect the kinds of variation that find some support in the literature.

Economic influences appear to be strongest in policy processes of local governments and weakest in those of state and federal governments. Data for 1962 show that the coefficient of simple correlation for per capita personal income with the per capita expenditures of state governments is .14, that with the total of local government spending within each state is .82, and that with the total of
state and local government spending within each state is .62. The federal government demonstrated its relative freedom from economic constraint during the Depression. From 1932 to 1940, it increased its share of domestic spending for functions pursued in common by federal, state, and local authorities from 14 to 42% of the total. It is local officials who feel the greatest pressure from their economic surroundings. Differences in economic resources and fiscal opportunities help to explain the greater dependence of local governments on the economic resources within their jurisdiction. Most local governments must draw upon a limited geographical area for resources, and they are confined to only one major revenue source (the property tax) which generates a great deal of political controversy. State governments draw upon their larger jurisdiction and can transfer resources from "have" to "have not" communities. State officials also have wider revenue options that include taxes on income and retail sales. The state income and sales taxes appear to be less upsetting politically than is the local property tax, and the state taxes appear to be less vulnerable to an economic downturn. As a result, state officials can escape many of the constraints on policy than seem to originate in the economic sector and limit the policy discretion of local government officials. Federal officials can also escape economic constraints, partly because of their ability to tax resources of the wealthy areas throughout the country, and partly because of their power to borrow in the face of current deficits in the taxing-spending balance. Indeed, the federal government operates numerous programs to control levels of employment, interest, and wages, and may be as much the master as the subordinate of the economy. Moreover, not all local governments are equally influenced by the nature of the local economy. Where the locality has adopted "reformed" government structures there is less of an economic-policy linkage than where the city has an unreformed structure. The principal features of a reformed local government structure are a professional city manager, non-partisan elections for local offices, and a council selected at-large rather than by wards. These
features seem to "depolarize" the social and economic cleavages within a community, and permit local officials to make their policy decisions with less than the average concern for economics.  

The influence of economic conditions on state and local government policies appears to be diminishing. This is evident in data comparing economic-policy relationships at intervals since 1902. Policy makers now have more opportunities to spend at levels above the "norm" for their economic conditions. Some of this increased flexibility may reflect changes in federal aid. By transferring resources from "have" to "have not" jurisdictions, grants-in-aid made up for some of the differentials between states. Also, state and local governments now have a more flexible tax structure. With state taxes on personal incomes and/or retail sales now used by over 40 of the states (whereas no state used either tax at the beginning of the century) and numerous local governments now turning to these forms of taxation, policy makers can tap an increasing proportion of the resources within their own jurisdictions. Even the poorest states (e.g., Mississippi, South Carolina, Arkansas, Vermont) have some pockets of wealth that can help support services in their poorest counties.

It is also apparent that economic conditions exercise less of a constraint on some kinds of policy than upon others. The political saliency of a policy is one of the factors that can lessen the influence of economics. To the extent that programs are made the subject of prominent disputes among individual candidates and political parties, they can provoke the use of substantially more resources than is normally associated with the jurisdiction's level of wealth. Officials "try harder" under the impetus of public demand. Under other conditions -- when public demand runs counter to a program -- there is less performance than expected on the basis of economic conditions. There are also differences between policies supported by "earmarked" revenues and those policies that compete in each budget cycle for their share of the "general fund." Highway and natural resource funds generally come from certain taxes or license fees that are set aside for them by
the state statutes or constitution. They get what each year's economic activity produces through those taxes and fees. Only occasionally does the legislature grant a change in their allotments or a special appropriation. In the case of most states' welfare and education programs, however, officials in the executive and legislative branches make funding decisions during each budget cycle. There is a much greater chance for political or program considerations to affect education or welfare budgets that are higher -- or lower -- than expected on the basis of economic indicators.

The economic-policy relationship can also vary with the level of affluence shown by a jurisdiction. One study finds that relationships between welfare policies and economic conditions are strongest among those states at the highest and lowest levels of wealth and income. In the middle range of states there are numerous cases of both higher and lower levels of service than expected on the basis of economic conditions. Wealthy states seem to have sufficient resources to facilitate generous levels of service, while the poorest states have so little resources that they are constrained against generosity. To those reformers who would alter the nature of state government or politics, their greatest chances for exerting influence on policies seem likely to come in the middle range of states.

Findings about the policy arenas that are more or less subject to economic influence does not mean that research has proceeded smoothly or without controversies among the practitioners, or between the practitioners and other political scientists or economists. Some disputes have been productive in opening new insights into the policy-making process -- apparent when we have examined the differential results produced by various analytic techniques. For a long while, it was customary to lump together the policies produced by the state and local governments within each state. It became apparent, however, that these measures stand in different relationships with environmental characteristics than do measures of state -- or local -- policies alone. There are several good arguments on each side of the state and local vs state or local controversy;
but it is perhaps more important that it highlighted the finding that state and local governments respond differently to economic resources. Analyses of change in policy reveal different findings than cross-sectional studies of policy and environmental characteristics at a single point in time. We know, as one result, that economic-policy relationships are declining in strength. There are also disputes that arise from the inclusion of certain non-economic variables in multivariate analysis. To some observers, the discovery of incrementalism (previous levels of policy show the closest relationships to current levels of policy) is trivial; to others, however, it reveals some features about the policy-making process that are of primordial importance: its conservatism except in the face of unusual circumstances that provoke rare departures from previous levels of activity. Other discoveries appear from experiments with different measures of policy. For a long while it was customary to rely on measures of expenditure as the surrogates for levels of public service. Now, however, it is apparent that expenditures may not substitute for direct measures of the quality or quantity of services rendered. This also supports the more concerted search for non-expenditure components of public policy that may affect services; and the distinction within the policy process of such features as "policy," "performance," "utilization," "output," and "impact."23

The Study of "Distributions" in Aggregate Analysis

The research into within-state distributions of educational spending that is reported above belongs to a recent line of departure from simple aggregate analysis. In another piece of the same mode, Bryan Fry and Richard Winters have examined the "allocation of the burdens and benefits of state revenue and expenditure policies across income classes." Their findings suggest that state political characteristics may have the most to do with the allocation of
burdens and benefits, while economic characteristics determine the total magnitude of those burdens and benefits. This finding resembles our own discovery above about the interplay of county competitiveness, state affluence, professionalism and the distribution of educational spending. "Who gets it?" seems to be decided by the political process. "How much?" in contrast, may reflect the level of economic resources that are subject to the state's taxing power.

A related body of research concerns itself with the distribution of social, economic, and political traits within states, and their correspondence with policy. It may not be only "how much" a state has in terms of economic resources, but "who controls them" that triggers political controversies and shapes policies. Likewise, policies may reflect the ways that participation and competition are spread throughout the state or isolated in certain communities. Policy-makers may respond to the specific conditions existing in the communities they have chosen as locales of reference. The disparities that exist between locales may stimulate political conflicts. Clashes between wealthy and poor, urban and rural, farm and industry, white and non-white, or Republican and Democratic centers of a state may shape alignments in the legislature and the policies enacted. The way in which different traits are combined in the same locales may also have a telling impact on the political process. Where intense competition occurs in the wealthy counties of a state, the results of the competition may benefit a different kind of policy than where competition occurs most prominently in the poorest counties of a state. Also, the proportion of a state's economic resources that are available to each income group may affect the policy process. Where resources are spread evenly there seems likely to be a different style of politics and a different set of policy demands than where a wide gulf separates the wealthy and the poor. A study by Thomas R. Dye suggests that the distribution of resources among income classes corresponds with political traits in the states: party competitiveness and voter turnout, plus certain features of the state constitution, interest group strength, the power of the governor, and the appointment of state
agency heads. Another study considers the geographic distribution of economic and political traits among the counties of several states. It finds the even distribution of income, political competition and administrative professionalism related to the generation of state-wide policy benefits. It also finds that the ways in which professionalism and economic resources are combined in the counties of each state are more closely related with certain policy outcomes than are the simple state-wide aggregate levels of professionalism and economic resources.

**Implications of Aggregate Analysis**

What does all this mean for the policy-maker? An attribute of aggregate, comparative policy analysis is its promise as a link between the work of academic political scientists and economists and those persons (both officials and citizens) who formulate and implement government programs. We should remember that it is "basic research," however, and its immediate meaning for policy-makers is not always clear. There is a continuing tension between the role of the academic and that of the practicing policy maker. One strives for more complete (i.e., general) understanding of the policy process, and the other wants specific recommendations for discrete problems. Nevertheless, the policy-oriented political scientist or economist is joined to the policy maker by a common focus. Some of the techniques of analysis and some research findings of the academic may aid the specific concerns of some policy makers. Given the policy makers' greater familiarity with their own needs for information, it may be their task -- rather than that of the academicians -- to know just which techniques and findings are useful in the policy process. As academicians, we may be able to offer no better general recommendation for the practitioner than that he acquire sophisticated training in comparative policy analysis, and reflect upon the academicians' work.

Some findings in the available basic research can help the policy-maker. They can tell him how policies are generally related to levels of economic activity, how "general" those relationships are, and what conditions are associated with
relative freedom from economic influence. The analysis of residuals along with general tendencies can indicate where the policies of a particular jurisdiction stand in relation to others of comparable environmental characteristics. For the policy-maker who wants to innovate, this information may specify the fields of policy where his efforts are most likely to bear fruit, and where he may have to accommodate his proposals -- or strategies -- to the level and distribution of economic resources or to the nature of his political environment. In within-state distributions of educational spending, it is the derrant cases that seem most interesting: those states with a relatively uneven distribution of spending, and those where the highest levels of spending occurs in counties with low income, low political participation or weak competition between the parties. Policy-makers in the more "normal" states may learn from these cases how they may allocate extra funds to needy communities.

Several of the findings we have reported are not trivial. That is, they are not self-evident, and could not be assumed within the ken of policy-makers in the absence of empirical research. These include the demonstration that many economic-policy linkages are weak in their statistical power. Numerous jurisdictions surpass the expenditures and policy benefits that are "usually associated" with their level of economic development. "We can't afford it" and "The voters won't stand for it" do not often excuse policy-makers from promoting an improvement in public services. Many populations pay an unusually high bill for public services. Even where taxes are already high, comparative analysis may reveal policy outputs that are markedly lower than those in other states. It may take an investment in public relations to convince one's own population that an increase in its tax bill is feasible and worthwhile. But this is a selling game and not an encounter with immovable economic barriers. We do not know how many public officials can sell their way out of a revenue-service bind. For some, at least, the payoff in better services would be worth the risk.

Another non-trivial finding concerns the lesser vulnerability of state and
federal than local governments to economic constraints. This suggests the arenas most likely to bear policy fruit. All taxpayers sound loud shouts of pain, but the local property taxpayer seems to present the most serious challenge. During wartime, no level of government is a rich vein of domestic money, so we should not be surprised by the recent lack of federal money for many programs. With the hoped-for relaxation of international tensions we may advise a concerted push for program development at the federal and state levels, especially in the case of middle- and lower-income states. There the local governments are weakest, and public services will depend most on federal and state help.

Recommendations for Further Inquiry

Two recommendations grow out of this essay: 1) that we pursue the within-state analysis of educational services with measures that go beyond "spending" in tapping key ingredients of public policy; and 2) that we pursue explanations for the derrant cases that appear in this preliminary exploration. Of course, 1 is the primary recommendation. It will allow us to test the relative evenness of within-state distributions of educational services that appears in the data for spending. Also, it will allow us to see if the states recorded as "derrant" in regard to spending score similarly in other measures of policy distribution. By looking at the derrant cases, we may isolate some features that have a telling influence on policies but do not show up in the studies of aggregate indicators for economic resources or political indicators. With this kind of information, we may be in a better position to advise policy-makers how, when, and if they might change their programs in dramatic ways. We know that gross features of the economy or politics are important in the policy-making process. We also know these features do not -- by a long shot -- explain all manifestations of policy. What we should do is to undertake in a systematic fashion a project that will tell us what kind of features are capable of upsetting the expected relationships between
environmental characteristics and policy. With that kind of information, we may be able to advise policy-makers how -- or under what conditions -- they can be creative.
NOTES


2. Sharkansky, *Spending*, Ch. IV.


5. The data was collected initially for a study of welfare payments. The
states were chosen on the basis of making full reports of payments, by county, of the major public assistance programs.

6. In computing the coefficient of variability, you divide the mean county score for each state into the standard deviation according to the formula:

$$\frac{s.d.X}{\bar{X}}$$

7. These data come from the City-County Data Book, 1967 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Washington, 1968). The election used in the calculation of participation and competition is the presidential election of 1964. It was chosen because it represented the available political data reported for each county that was closest in time to the measurement of the policies. Other likely determinants of policies that were subject to similar analyses, but not reported because they correlate highly with the variables listed here, include county-by-county measures of urbanism, education, industrialization, housing quality, levels of employment, population density, and measures of income showing the proportion of families above -- and below certain income levels. Median family income is reported here because it bears the closest resemblance to measures used in state by state aggregate analysis; this will permit a greater comparability of findings.

8. A complete report about these factors is found in Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Mofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," American Political Science Review, LXIII (September, 1969). The items loaded high on the various factors include: Industrialization: value added by manufacture, and percentage employed in manufacturing; Affluence: median school years completed, estimated value of real property, personal income per capita, percent white, and literacy; Professionalism-Local Reliance: compensation of judges, compensation of legislators, expenditures financed by state and local governments exclusive of federal aid, and proportion of state and local expenditures financed by local governments; Competition-Turnout: proportion of legislative seats held by minor party, turnout for gubernatorial election, and the liberality of suffrage statutes.
NOTES -- Page 3

9. Strictly speaking, it is inaccurate to say that current research identifies the influence that certain elements exercise over policies, or the changes that policies cause in their economic, social or political surroundings. The closest approach to causation is the discovery of relationships that are consistent with causal patterns. Starting with the hypothesis that element A brings about policy B we can infer support for that hypothesis if we find element A and policy B typically associated together in the same time and place. Of course, we must determine if the coexistence of A and B are due to the common trait C that might cause both A and B to occur together. In other words, we must "control" the relationship between A and B to see if it might not simply be a product of C. One hypothesis, for example, contends that high levels of political participation brings about generous levels of public service. If we find that states showing high citizen participation also show generous levels of public service, we have superficial support for the hypothesis. But we must check other explanations for the findings. It might be that the level of economic well-being influences both political participation and the generosity of public services. We know that people who are wealthy and well educated show more than the average amount of interest in politics, and we know that wealth has something to do with the resources needed to support public services. So the amount of economic wealth in a state may lead it to have both high (or low) levels of political participation and corresponding levels of generosity in public services. On the other hand, it is possible that the political cultures in certain states lead their citizens to participate more (or less) actively than expected on the basis of their wealth; or lead their government officials to greater (or lesser) levels of commitment in offering public services. At this point, it appears that participation has an "independent" relationship with certain kinds of policies: those which are "politicized" and the subjects of intense public dispute (Sharkansky and Hofferbert) 10. Dye, Politics.

11. Dye, Politics.


20. Cnudde and McCrone; and Sharkansky and Hofferbert.


24. Fry and Winters

25. Dye "Income Inequality"

26. Sharkansky, "Economic Development"
### TABLE 1

**COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABILITY FOR SELECTED MEASURES OF COUNTY POLICY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending for education</td>
<td>0.226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending in total</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending for highways</td>
<td>0.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending for welfare</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending for health</td>
<td>1.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita local government spending for police</td>
<td>0.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita property taxes</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average salary of local government employees</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average payments for Aid to the Aged</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average payments for Aid to the Blind</td>
<td>0.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average payments for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average payments for Aid to Families of Dependent Children</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average payments for general assistance</td>
<td>0.517</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* calculated as the 36-state averages of each state's coefficient of variability for each policy
TABLE 2

COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE CORRELATION BETWEEN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS AND STATE MEANS AND COEFFICIENTS OF VARIABILITY FOR LOCAL EDUCATIONAL SPENDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Characteristics</th>
<th>Industrialization</th>
<th>Affluence</th>
<th>Professionalism - Local Reliance</th>
<th>Competition - Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State mean for county educational spending</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient of variability for county educational spending</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Coefficient of Variability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE</td>
<td>NEGROES</td>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>PARTICIPATION</td>
<td>COMPETITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEORGIA</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOWA</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANSAS</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KENTUCKY</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUISIANA</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARYLAND</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSACHUSETTS</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICHIGAN</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINNESOTA</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSOURI</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONTANA</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>-.49</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKLAHOMA</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OREGON</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTAH</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASHINGTON</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST VIRGINIA</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WISCONSIN</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WYOMING</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-.61</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Counties of 36 states considered together: -.38, .47, .45, .19
### Table 5

**Coefficients of Simple Correlation Between State Environmental Characteristics and County Correlations, by State, Showing Distributions of Educational Spending**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Environmental Characteristics</th>
<th>Industrialization</th>
<th>Affluence</th>
<th>Professionalism</th>
<th>Local Reliance</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negroes</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LEARNING TO TOLERATE DISSENT:
Political Socialization, Education and the Meaning of Conflict

Hans N. Weiler
Stanford University

Paper prepared for a research workshop on "The Politics of Elementary and Secondary Education", sponsored by the Committee on Basic Research in Education, Division of Behavioral Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, at Stanford University, September 14-19, 1970
This paper proposes to pursue Robert Hess' perceptive and provocative challenge to the "consensus bias" in political socialization research in general, and in the investigation of the school's role in political socialization, in particular. Aptly summarizing the prevailing ways of our thinking about political socialization, Hess notes that "political socialization assumes an acceptance of the system and a degree of agreement that its goals are appropriate and should be pursued," but goes on to wonder whether this notion of political learning is still tenable in a situation in which such goals have become increasingly a matter of disagreement, dissent, and outright conflict: "If there is widespread division with respect to some contemporary values and behavior, what is the function of the school in terms of political socialization?"

While it could (and will) be argued whether the recent incidence of more or less violent divisions along the major "fault lines" within and outside American society constitute the only reason for questioning our past, consensus-oriented notion of political socialization, Hess' polemic against that notion nevertheless points in a direction which, we believe, could and should be pursued in the direction of a more balanced and, hence, theoretically more valid view of political socialization.

In order to deal with this question more systematically, a brief review of some of the main conceptual and theoretical assumptions in past socialization research will be necessary in order to substantiate and illustrate the claim that, with some notable and
recognized exceptions, this field of research has been largely
dominated by a more or less explicit assumption about the need
for a substantial degree of congruence between the outcome of the ongoing
political socialization process, and the belief system already prevalent
in the political system.

Next, it will be argued that the maintenance of a political system,
and of the belief system which supports it, constitutes only one
of the possible frameworks for the conception of political
socialization, and should be supplemented by the notion of the
inherent conflictual properties of political systems in general,
and pluralist systems, in particular. In other words: there
is a need for conceiving of political socialization as an
important instrument not only for "inducing" the young into the
political belief system of their elders, but also for
generating attitudinal and normative orientations towards
various types of intra-system conflict and its resolution and regu-
lation.

Thirdly, an attempt will be made to elaborate on a possible
conceptualization of "conflict socialization", primarily in terms
of the capacity for dissent toleration or— in terms of group
psychology—of the "latitude" of accepting deviant, dissenting, or
non-conformist types of political or politically relevant behavior.
Within this framework, we will try to show how such a different
concept of the political learning process and its outcomes may
lead to a somewhat different research strategy with regard to the
role of the school as an agent of political socialization.
Our criticism of what we perceive as a somewhat unbalanced conceptual and theoretical notion of political socialization can probably be best expressed in terms of the various propositions which Dennis, among others, has grouped together under the aspect of the "system relevance" of political socialization—referring to "the question about what effects political socialization has upon political life" and conceived in terms of the alternative that "political socialization may either contribute or serve as an impediment to the persistence and stability of the political system and its component parts" ⁴. Dennis' basic reference in so defining the linkage between political socialization and the political system is, of course, Easton's concept of political socialization as a source of "diffuse support" for the stability and cohesion of the political system—a kind of support which is generated by "the positive encouragement of sentiments of legitimacy and compliance, the acceptance of a notion of the existence of a common good transcending the particular good of any particular individual or groups, or the kindling of deep feelings of community" ⁵. Most research and writing on political socialization to date has been concerned with the elaboration and operationalization of this basic postulate and, on the whole, has moved in the direction of interpreting it in essentially "conservative" or even "preservative" terms, assuming "that in one way or another socializing processes assure the continuity of a political system in relatively unchanged form", and thus relegating change
to the role of "a residual rather than a central or expected product of socialization". One of the most unequivocal commitments to this concept of political socialization is found in the lead article of a rather respectable symposium on the topic:

Having once internalized the society's norms, it will presumably not be difficult for the individual to act in congruence with them. A politically organized society has the same maintenance needs and consequently has an additional function: the political socialization of the young. Political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted and practiced by the ongoing political system. The goal of political socialization is to so train or develop individuals that they become well-functioning members of the political society. A well-functioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes) society's political norms and who will then transmit them to future generations. For without a body politic so in harmony with the ongoing political values the political system would have trouble functioning smoothly and perpetuating itself safely.

Given this tenor, it is not surprising that, in one of the most recent and extensive reviews of the state of the art in political socialization research, Dawson and Prewitt see fit to speak of the "generally conservative bias of political socialization" and conclude their book with a plea for mobilizing the concept of political socialization as a potentially important explanatory tool in our efforts to understand "the mechanisms which transform one network of social relations, one pattern of cultural values, into another.

In their own major contribution to political socialization research, Easton and Dennis deplore the narrowness and inadequacy of a
"system-maintenance theory" of political socialization as tending to "bias research toward investigating those conditions favoring the perpetuation of stability of the status quo" and call for "a more comprehensive conception of the theoretical relevance of socialization for the political system, one in which change is not interpreted as a failure of the system to reproduce itself but is viewed positively". Whether their own attempt to overcome this problem by developing a "neutral" conception of political socialization has been entirely successful is, in our view, arguable; from looking at the ways in which their data are organized and analyzed, it appears that they, themselves, have gone considerably beyond the minimal requisites implied in the notion of the system's persistence, in spite of their theoretical allowance for political socialization being able, under certain conditions, to contribute not only to the maintenance or replication of a given system, but also to its transformation or even its total destruction. This, however, is not the place to argue how close Easton and Dennis in their actual research endeavor come to the requirements of their "neutral" persistence model. Instead, our point is that the linkage between political socialization and the political system can be conceptualized in terms different from both the stability-oriented "system-maintenance" model and the more "open-ended", presumably less biased persistence model which Easton and Dennis propose. Furthermore, we would argue that the theoretical decisions involved in designing an alternative model of the socialization-system linkage will bear significantly on the design of political socialization research in general, and on further inquiries into the role of education therein, in particular.
Conflict and political socialization

Essentially, one may challenge the prevailing consensus model of political socialization on two grounds: On the one hand, one may duly note the fact that protest, dissent and conflict have dramatically increased in both extent and intensity in contemporary and, especially, American society over the last decade or so, and come to realize that intra-system cleavages of a very consequential nature can no longer be relegated to the position of "marginal" or abnormal societal phenomena, but have to be regarded as key elements in the fabric of social and political life. This realization, it seems, underlies Hess' polemic to which we referred earlier; while one could hardly argue with either the accuracy of the empirical observation or the relevance of the propositions derived from it, there still is something of an "ad hoc" quality about this argument which leads us to search for a further and perhaps more generic basis on which to build a revised notion of the political socialization process and its relationship to the political system. Our search for such a modified conception of political socialization leads us, perhaps not surprisingly, to some of the work in the fields of political sociology and social psychology; while we could not claim to provide, in the framework of this brief paper, a thorough and exhaustive review of the many relevant propositions that have been generated by these two burgeoning fields of inquiry and theory-building, we hope to show that some selected contributions in these areas lend considerable support to, and provide helpful explications of, our own preliminary notions about a "conflict model" of political socialization.
As we have indicated, our objection against much of the conceptual and theoretical basis of past research in political socialization results from the fact that this research is largely guided by one or the other variety of "consensus theory", and tends to neglect the importance of conflictual elements in the operation of political systems. It seems indeed odd that theoretical concerns in the field of political socialization have apparently remained unaffected for so long by the challenge to consensus theory which has loomed large in the development of political sociology over the past decade. Some time has passed since Lipset stressed "the proper balance between conflict and consensus" 13 as a crucial element in the nature of social and political systems, and argued for acknowledging the interdependence of conflict and consensus in the sense that "consensus on the norms of tolerance which a society or organization accepts has often developed only as a result of basic conflict, and requires the continuation of conflict to sustain it" 14. Another early and important contribution to the debate was Dahrendorf's attack on consensus theory and his attempts to develop a theoretical framework for "the explanation of systematic social conflict in industrial societies" 15 that would go beyond the Marxian theory of class and supersede it by a new and similarly comprehensive formulation—an attempt which has lead Dahrendorf to recognize that "class conflict is but a special case of an even more general phenomenon", and that "a new departure is needed in the sociological theory of political conflict and social change" 16.
It is characteristic of these and many other, similar contributions to consider the ubiquity of conflict ("Societies do not differ in that some have conflicts and others not; societies and social units within them differ in the violence and intensity of conflicts" 17) not just as an unavoidable deficiency of the human condition in its social manifestations, but rather as an essential requirement for the stability and integration of social systems in general, and political systems, in particular 18.

From this point of view, the argument that "the stability and 'success' of democratic societies depend on the sharing of general political and pre-political values" 19 is subjected to severe criticism which, explicitly or implicitly, extends to a good deal of work in the field of political socialization 20. Whether criticizing the biases of consensus theory must of necessity lead to the adoption of the Marxist theories of "pragmatic role acceptance" and "manipulative socialization" would see--Mann's interesting argument in that direction notwithstanding 21--open to further theoretical and empirical examination. What does seem indicated, however, as a result of the various challenges to the notion of the beneficial effects of consensus and intra-system harmony on the stability of the system is a reappraisal of the categories in which we have tended to view the process and outcome of political socialization.

Our review of relevant contributions to the development of more conflict-oriented theoretical propositions about social behavior would, of course, be highly remiss if we did not acknowledge those
attempts in the field of political behavior research which have sought to come to theoretical as well as empirical terms with the tenuous relationship between consensus and conflict in the realm of political beliefs and values. It is one of the most significant achievements of McClosky's and his associates' project on political belief and affiliation among American party leaders and followers to have subjected operationally meaningful assumptions about this relationship to empirical tests within the framework of the American party system, and we are in similar ways indebted to the work of Converse, V.O. Key, Prothro and Grigg, and others. And yet: This considerable concern in the study of political beliefs and values with the nature, correlates, and distribution of conflict has so far ostensibly failed to have a tangible effect on the ways in which we theorize about the various learning processes, especially of the young, which we refer to as political socialization.

How, then, would we begin to conceive of political socialization as a process which leads not only to certain levels of regime norm acceptance, political efficacy, trust, etc., but also to types of orientations which pertain much more directly to the individual's ability to cope with dissent and conflict, and to the system's ability to manage such conflict? Such an attempt will have to deal primarily, of course, with the choice and the conceptualization of our dependent variables; in a further step, we may try to formulate some tentative assumptions on the ways in
which various factors can be expected to operate on such variables.

With regard to the choice of dependent variables, we would like to illustrate our point by elaborating on one type of attitudinal orientation which we perceive as being particularly salient to a conflict-oriented notion of political socialization. If we follow V.O. Key's notion of political conflict as being represented by a more or less polarized bimodal (or, in some cases, multimodal) distribution of public opinion, then the question of how individuals and groups identifying with one of the opinion clusters perceive of, and relate to, adherents of a different or even opposite opinion becomes of major concern to the analyst of the system's development. Answering the question becomes all the more crucial the more one is interested not just in stating the presence of conflict, but also in its future development, its persistence, its effects on the system's operation, and its possible regulation, resolution, or disappearance. On a very elementary level, for instance, one might argue that (in Rokeach's terms) the degree of "dogmatism" which prevails in the relationship between holders of diverse opinions would greatly affect the system's ability to "process" existing conflicts in such a way as to maintain the system's basic cohesion without at the same time taking recourse to repressive action against one or the other group.

The complexity of the relationship pattern is, of course, bound to increase the more reality differs from the pure and simple model of a bimodal distribution of opinion.
We would therefore argue that the ways in which the holders of diverse and conflicting opinion regard each other could and should be conceived as one of the outcomes of the political socialization process, and that our attention ought to be more clearly focused on the factors which can be shown to influence such outcomes under identifiable and specified conditions. It would seem that Rokeach's notion of a distinction between "open" and "closed" cognitive systems and his discussion of their respective properties and correlates provide useful guidelines for the more elaborate and specific formulation of the kinds of dependent variables which we ought to be studying, although some other approaches to the problem could probably yield similarly useful conceptual and theoretical assistance. If we succeeded in operationalizing inter-group attitudes in situations of conflict over political or politically relevant values, and then developed research designs which would test our assumptions about how different socialization agents contribute to the formation, maintenance, and change of such attitudes, political socialization research could significantly enhance its contribution to the understanding of not only the emergence of conflict in political systems, but also of the determinants of its intensity and its chances of "successful" regulation or resolution.

Let us carry our discussion one step further by specifically looking at one aspect of the "open-closed" dichotomy: Rokeach assumes that, in the overall dogmatism syndrome, the degree of "closeness" of a cognitive system is highly related not only to authoritarianism, but also to intolerance. If we pursued this
further in the context of our thinking about conflict and political socialization, we may find some value in concentrating on toleration, or the lack of it, as one important attitudinal dimension of both the antecedents and consequences of conflict. In doing this, we would follow Rokeach's plea for a more generic definition and use of "intolerance" than the narrower and particular concept of ethnic or racial intolerance of the "Authoritarian Personality" variety has provided 28. At the same time, however, we would have to be mindful of Rokeach's observation that "current concepts and measures of intolerance seem to woefully inadequate in addressing themselves to non-ethnic forms of intolerance," 29—a statement which would naturally hold as true for the obverse of intolerance, tolerance or toleration. It is here that the Sherif's notion of "latitudes of acceptance and rejection" 30 of others' behavior would seem to provide a helpful construct in our attempt to formalize the inquiry into socialization processes which may lead to different levels of toleration in the political realm: "The latitude of acceptance and the latitude of rejection, relative to a given sphere of behavior, together constitute the reference scale on the basis of which evaluations or appraisals of specific behaviors are made" 31, and this reference scale may vary from one setting to the next, both within and between societies.

Thus, it should be possible to design measures which could serve as specific indicators of the acceptance and rejection latitudes with regard to various types of controversial political
behavior, and to begin to develop testable assumptions about the ways in which the variance in these latitudes across different subgroups of the political system can be accounted for by different socialization agents and processes. It will be important to bear the behavior-oriented nature of these "reference scales" in mind when one sets out to design appropriate measurements of "toleration". For instance, it will be insufficient to just solicit reactions of agreement or disagreement with statements representing more or less purely attitudinal orientations without referring rather explicitly to the type of behavior in which such attitudes would be most likely to manifest themselves. One direction which it may be useful to explore further would be to measure latitudes of the acceptance or rejection of controversial political issues through a modified "social distance" scale: the level of acceptance of a dissenting position on a presumably controversial issue would be indicated by how "close" a role the respondent would allow the holder of such a position to assume—with the distance scale ranging all the way from, say, speaking on television to personal friendship.

While the problem of measuring attitudes which we can conceptualize in terms of latitudes of accepting positions on controversial and at least potentially conflict-generating issues will require further study and empirical validation, an equally important problem arises with regard to the factors that can be
assumed to affect the development and change of such attitudes. Some of the hypotheses developed and tested in connection with the Sherif's work on the salience of accepted or rejected behaviors could be expected to lead to useful propositions for the more specific realm of political behaviors. Thus, the finding that "the latitude of acceptable behavior, defined by the norms of the group, varies according to the importance of the activity to the members" (which is subsequently differentiated by referring to the different standing of members in the group as a further factor) should provide an adequate starting point for the analysis of differences in dissent toleration between, say, different age groups or groups of different socio-cultural background. While we find this particular set of propositions especially appealing and useful, there are probably several other ways in which theories generated by research on small groups can be made directly relevant to the study of differentials in the toleration of dissent and conflict as a result of political socialization processes.
Dissent toleration and education

The purpose of this paper calls for a specific consideration of the question as to how we might go about formulating intelligent hypotheses on the role which formal schooling, and the factors and influences associated with it, may play in the development of the kinds of attitudes which we have earlier described as being in need of assuming a much more central position in political socialization research. It is probably true that here, as in the case of previous research dealing with a different set of dependent variables, we are also faced with the well-known problem of identifying the separate influences of different socialization agents; it may just be, however, that the nature of the political socialization process in which we are interested may provide us, with the help of some inferences from previous findings, with the possibility of making at least some assumptions about the kinds of school-related factors that we ought to be particularly aware of.

Previous research shows that, at least in the case of political efficacy and related attitudes, the formation of political attitudes is strongly influenced by the practice of commensurate kinds of behavior in other, non-political social contexts. The findings reported by Almond and Verba, for instance, indicate a strong relationship between the degree of participation in family, school, and job decisions, and scores on their "subjective political competence" measure; furthermore, the data suggest that the effect
of these various participatory experiences is cumulative.\footnote{37} Analogously, we might argue that the degree of involvement in situations which are characterized by a consistently high level of dissent and diversity of opinion may well--especially if the assumption about the cumulative effect of such experiences could be generalized--be an important factor in accounting for varying "latitudes" of accepting dissent in the realm of more strictly political beliefs. With regard to the educational context, it would appear promising to adopt, with some modifications, the notion of the "open classroom climate" as developed and used by Ehman\footnote{38}; the key factor in measuring this variable, which was shown to have a substantial effect on such attitudes as political efficacy, participation, and cynicism, was the relative frequency with which teachers discussed controversial issues in the classroom, illustrative examples of such issues being the Vietnam war, minority group relations, etc. It should be possible to expand this measure to obtain additional information on the range of positions taken in such discussions, the intensity of disagreement, and the prevailing modes of managing such conflicts as the discussion may have generated.\footnote{39} If, moreover, experiences of this kind could be generated and systematically varied in an experimental or quasi-experimental design so as to maintain some degree of control over demographic as well as other experiential variables, a fairly solid test of whether, and under what conditions, our assumptions about the experiential source of attitudes towards dissent hold true should be possible.
On a different level of analysis, there seems to be a case for going back to the substantive framework for formal learning about politics provided in the codifications of civics textbooks and similar material. To be sure, political socialization research to date has not yet produced any convincing results on the ways in which the sheer content of civic instruction, regardless of such intervening factors as modes of teaching, teacher personality, etc., may influence the process and direction of political learning especially in terms of the acquisition of normative orientations to the political system. This is, of course, at least in part the result of the tremendous difficulties in operationalizing instructional content as a truly independent variable—a difficulty which in turn would account for the relative reluctance to study it systematically. With regard to the question of dissent tolerance, or the formation of different latitudes in accepting non-conformist behavior, we may have a slightly less ambiguous situation than in the case of other attitudes for which it may be more difficult to find clearly commensurate precepts in instructional materials. There is no question but that most civics textbooks in this country as well as in other Western democracies place heavy emphasis on the importance and the desirability of consensus and harmony in democratic systems; instances of cleavage, dissent, or conflict are generally relegated to the realm of the extra-ordinary, deviant, or marginal. However, there are also variations in this pattern,
and it seems that concern among social studies teachers and curriculum experts with the more genuine role of conflict in democracies is becoming more widespread and serious. Thus, if our expectation of a considerable range in the treatment of dissent and conflict in instructional materials could be substantiated, a case could be made for the exploratory value of an admittedly gross analysis on the differential effects of being exposed to differently biased instructional content. From the results of such gross, yet probably rather suggestive types of analysis, more refined approaches could be designed which would probably have to rely very heavily on some of the theoretical and methodological developments in the field of curriculum research and evaluation.
Conclusion

The latitude of the charge under which this paper was written ("If you were to study something that would contribute the most to this field—i.e., of politics and education—, what would you study and how would you study it?") has probably contributed to its somewhat diffuse quality. Hopefully, however, it has been possible to convey a sense of concern over the direction in which—at least in my view—an immensely popular and ever increasing field of political inquiry seems to be moving.

Given the fact that political socialization research has come to be one of the most favorite meeting grounds for politically interested students of education and (with a little less enthusiasm) educationally interested political scientists), concern over the problem which we have tried to describe should by no means be confined to the political science community. Whether the alternatives discussed in the later part of this paper point in a direction in which a theoretically defensible solution to the problem can be found remains to be discussed.
Notes


2) ibid., 534

3) ibid., 534-35


7) Roberta Sigel, Assumptions about the Learning of Political Values, *The Annals* 361 (September, 1965), 2


9) ibid., 218

10) Easton and Dennis, *op.cit.*, 24

11) ibid., 42

12) ibid., 66


14) ibid., 2


17) Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy*, op.cit., 145


19) Mann, *op.cit.*, 423

20) *ibid.*, passim

21) *ibid.*


24) V.O. Key, *op.cit.*, 54-56 and passim


28) Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*, *op.cit.*, 15-16
29) ibid., 15


31) op. cit., 62

32) For various dimensions of social behavior, such measures have been successfully developed; see, inter alia, Muzafer Sherif, Conformity-deviation, norms, and group relations, I. Berg and B. M. Bass (eds.), Conformity and Deviation, New York: Harper and Row, 1961; Muzafer Sherif and Carl I. Hovland, Social Judgment: Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Communication and Attitude Change, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961.

33) In a recent study, the author has used measures of this kind to investigate levels of dissent toleration among West German youths; see his Correlates of Dissent Toleration Among West German Youths, Stanford: Institute of Political Studies, 1970 (mimeo).

34) For a detailed discussion of some of these hypotheses, see Sherif and Sherif, op. cit., 88-95, 178-180.

35) op. cit., 178


39) The author's study of toleration among German youths has explored the feasibility of several ways to obtain this kind of information, and has shown that most of it can indeed be obtained through appropriate survey methods (cf. note 33).
40) One of the few attempts in this direction is Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States, American Political Science Review 62 (1968), 852-867, which comes to the somewhat guarded conclusion that "under special conditions exposure to government and politics courses does have an impact at the secondary school level" (866).

41) One widely used civics textbook—to give but one example—concludes its chapter on "To Insure Domestic Tranquility" by saying: "There are many provisions in the Constitution which help to create and preserve harmony. Without harmony no nation can progress, no people can be happy. Harmony within the nation has helped the United States become a world power. It has helped the people work together to build a better future. The men who wrote the Constitution were wise in their choice of goals. To insure domestic tranquility is one of the most important goals mentioned in the preamble." Richard E. Gross and Vanza Devereaux, Civics in Action, San Francisco: Harr Wagner, 1966.

American Schools as A Political System

by

Frederick W. Wirt*

Lecturer,
School of Education;
Research Political Scientist,
Institute of Governmental Studies:
University of California, Berkeley

*The author wishes to express his appreciation for assistance in developing this article to David Easton, James Guthrie, and Michael Kirst, although responsibility for the final work is the author's alone. Financial assistance was provided by the Institute of Governmental Studies and the School of Education at Berkeley.
Introduction

By a mutual but unspoken and longstanding agreement, both American citizens and scholars have decided that the world of education was unrelated to the world of politics. But while election and referendum might be judged "political" for other policies, in education, Americans have proceeded on the assumption of magic that one can change an object's quality by giving it a different name. Yet not all have been deceived. Over a decade ago, Eliot demonstrated to political scientists how education was political, while also urging research along many lines. His agenda of research is still valuable because so few scholars have dealt with his suggestions.

But recent signs suggest that the rivulet of research on the politics of education which we knew in the 1960's will in the next decade become a flood. The reason for this is that perspectives on education have changed as a consequence of strained local resources and new national policies. The point is not that the school system suddenly became politicized. Rather it is that more have become aware of this political quality because of publicity over state-local demands for financial assistance, the passage and administration of massive and growing federal aid programs, national efforts to eliminate racial imbalance, and increasingly bitter contests locally to wrest school control into the hands of groups aroused over these policies.

Our purpose in this paper is not to argue why education should be viewed politically. Rather it is to explore the need for more useful theoretical orientation of the research movement now getting under way and, in the process, to indicate some of the knowledge gaps which research might fill. Iannaccone has explained why much needs to be done in such research. When education is a "closed system," its leaders, by maintaining an isolation from politics,
free themselves from external control and, by controlling their own environment, reduce change within the system. Such effort is clearly functional for professional educators, freeing them from the plurality of external constraints and unsettling demands of internal change which characterize other social institutions touching the political. But in the past, so skilled were educators that they moved the community to adopt ostensibly nonpolitical concepts and terms to apply to their work. As Eliot noted, a successful superintendent was one adept in "community relations," but "Why not say frankly that he must be a good politician?" As for political scientists, they unquestioningly accepted the closed system definition of the educators. Only recently have they begun to see here similarities to other policies; "Rosy O'Grady and the Colonel's lady are sisters under the skin."

The objectives of research into politics and education are those of any research interest: description, explanation, prescription and evaluation. Educational journals are filled with descriptions of pieces of reality—of the operations of school systems and subsystems, of their actors and agents, and of their laws and regulations. Further, this description of reality is invariably accompanied by normative evaluations, that is, statements of preference, often accompanied by recommendations to change or retain the observed reality. Further, description and evaluation merge undefinably into prescription—recommendations on how to change reality so as to achieve normative objectives, how to close the gap between the real and the ideal. What is least found is explanation—suppositions and supporting evidence about the causes, consequences and interrelationships of that which is found in reality. In the scholarship of education, causal theory of this kind is found a great deal in the psychology of education, to some degree in the sociology of education, and very little in educational administration.
However, when we ask how much of these four research objectives are found in the study of the politics of education, whether case studies or aggregate analysis, the answer must be, "Very little." The reasons for such omissions lie in the myth of nonpolitical education, in the mass of data to be studied, and in the lack of a directing empirical theory. Less is found about educational politics than about politics of almost any other widespread policy in American life because, in part, of the belief that one has satisfactorily described reality by saying education is "above" politics. Under the mantle of such thinking, descriptive research is regarded as misguided, and consequently it becomes impossible to test theoretical statements. Further, there is a vast array of data to be dealt with: in 1962 there were almost 35,000 school districts in the United States, constituting the most numerous elected units (38%) despite their sharp reduction during the 1950's, although by 1970 the number was down to about 16,000; these districts are holding board elections every year or so; and there are thousands of annual school referenda. Further, this pool of data is swollen even more by the profusion of school policies among states and districts.

But if one pierces the screen of "unpolitical schools" and wishes to work with such data, he finds highly inadequate theory and methodology for his employ. As Kirst and Mosher have shown, there is no single theory, simple or complex, which presently guides this work, nor is there agreement on the appropriate methodology. Political scientists are severely split between traditional studies of institutional and legal analysis and studies of political behavior which utilize statistical and other empirical methods. What one finds in a review of the literature, then, is a grab bag of both theory and method. While this is a typical condition in the early stages of scholarship on any subject, such consolation makes it no less frustrating.
for those concerned to make some order out of the confusion. This is
certainly no discipline for those who define scholarship as the explication
of established truths, but it will be exciting to those who prefer to inno-
vate and develop theory and hypotheses.

A Sketch of Systems Theory

Much of this uncertainty can be seen in the application of "systems
typey to the politics of education. This theoretical formulation provides
what its author, David Easton, has termed A Framework for Political Analysis. We would like to demonstrate such a framework and its limitations by showing
how the available research relates to it and by noting what it does not do.

Easton visualizes the political system—which provides in every State
an "authoritative allocation of values"—as the focus of societal stresses
which create input—like the form of demands and supports—which the political
system may convert into outputs or public policies, which in turn feeds back
values or resources into the society whence the process began. The major
costs here—system, stress, input, conversion, output, and feedback—are
thought to be interrelated in a dynamic and ongoing fashion. We can see each
of these major concepts as a useful way of categorizing the research of edu-
cational politics, but a somewhat fuller explanation might be helpful.

Inputs arise out of other systems in society—economic, for example—
which generate stress over value concerns. That is, stress, generated by
differing claims for scarce resources, produces organized activities directed
toward the political system, seeking to satisfy these claims. These inputs
to the political system take the form broadly of demands or supports. Demands
we associate most often with the private pressures upon public government, the
claims for justice or help, for reward or recognition. These demands mobilize
resources in order to affect other private groups and to influence the
disposition of the political system. The particular kinds of issues which develop and the particular form in which the attendant demands make their way into the political system vary with different cultures, economies and political systems. As for the input of support, a steady flow is necessary if any political system is long to maintain its legitimacy, that is, the generally accepted sense that the system has the right to do what it is doing. Indeed, so vital is this input that all societies indoctrinate their young to support the system, a function in which the schools have a dominant, although not exclusive, role.

The political system, the object of such inputs, is defined as the mechanism for converting inputs into outputs, demands and supports into policy. Clearly, however, not all demands are so converted, and this differentiation is a function of values dominant in the conversion machinery and personnel as well as in the larger society. The conversion is seen in its machinery--elections, referenda, boards, legislatures, all carefully authorized by some charter or constitution--as well as in its personnel--executive, legislative, judicial. The personnel constantly interact in the conversion process, either with those outside or inside the political system, and their behavior stems from role definitions imposed by that system. Indeed, such interaction generates inside the system certain pressures which also shape the conversion process, what Easton termed withinpus.

Finally, the outputs of public policy, although varying with culture and over time, tell us much about the values of those who have power and privilege in the system. The administration of this policy upon the larger community always has differential impact. Any administration must enhance the safety, income and deference of some while restricting that of others. Such impact constitutes feedback; that is, it differentially affects groups, other systems
and, inevitably, future inputs which will be fed back into the political system itself.

The preceding résumé is unfortunately an oversimplification of extremely complex institutions and processes which Easton has sought to integrate into a comprehensive description and explanation; for the educational scholar for whom this is new it is highly recommended that Easton's original work be examined. Such a theory has two broad uses in the study of educational politics. First, like any good theory, it should generate hypotheses amenable to operationalizing for research purposes, the results of which can test the theory. Theory in this form is directed toward explanation and predictions by means of "a set of...related propositions, which include among them some lawlike generalizations, and which can be assigned specific truth value via empirical tests...."9

We would like to set aside that purpose for now, however, to consider a second use of general theory, which is its heuristic value. That is, theory may not be so much a predictive scheme as one which analytically separates and categorizes items in experience. Systems theory enables us at least to order or arrange existing knowledge and thereby determine what portions of the theory are clearly untenable, what have at least some empirical support, and what totally lack previous research. Heuristic theory, and many in political science are of this kind as Gregor has shown, provides a "framework for a political analysis," as Easton clearly claims for his own work. He describes it as a "conceptual framework," a "preliminary" to theory development, a way of raising "appropriate questions" and finding "appropriate ways for seeking answers." Indeed, he entitles one of his writings, "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics."

In this view, then systems theory can enable us to see in a more or less
connected way what the phenomena of educational politics are and where research is needed. The rest of this article relates available research findings to Easton's categories as a brush clearing necessary before describing our research needs.

Review of Research

Macroanalysis

The environment in which the political system operate has consequences for its operation and output. Easton conceives of the political system as "analytically separate from all other systems," but realizes that these others create influences across such putative boundaries; he refers to these as "exchanges or transactions [by which] each is coupled to the other in some way, however slight it may be." Thus stress within these other systems influences inputs flowing into the political system. For example, the structure of the economic system should be such a powerful influence. Our reference here is not merely to the fact that a school is a commercial institution or that it is the object of commercial pressures. More importantly, variations in economic resources from district to district should be associated with variations in life-styles and hence with inputs of demands about the resources and outputs of the schools.

This concept has given rise in the last decade to much use of the technique of macroanalysis to test such a relationship. Essentially this involves testing sets of socio-economic indicators for their relationship to other sets of policy indicators by the use of multivariate analysis. Dye, in his extensive work on state and city policy outcomes, uses such a model to test whether the economic or the political system is more related to school outcomes. These concepts of "development," "political system," and "outcomes" are operationalized by the selection of purportedly appropriate variables.
Then we are ready to ask, in Dye's words: Do political system characteristics mediate between socio-economic inputs and educational outcomes... or are policy outcomes determined by socio-economic variables without regard to system characteristics....? 

From the pioneering work of James onwards, the repeated answer has been: if educational output is measured in expenditure terms, socio-economic variables are more important than the political in shaping the policy outcomes. Further, the measures of wealth are directly and strongly associated with size of educational expenditures, holding all other considerations constant. 

This primacy of the economic in policy outcomes is a finding not without normative and methodological debate. Some, regarding political variables as more significant in affecting state policies, deny that for creating a good life the reputed values of the democratic political process are less important than a given stage of economic development. The rebuttal has also taken the form of questioning the appropriateness of the statistical techniques and variables used to indicate inputs and outputs. By the end of the 1960s, the best reading of the research would be that (1) different models of economic and political interaction are associated with different policies, and (2) the statistically unwary should tread carefully when he enters this field. 

Expenditures are not the only measure of educational policy, of course. Political scientists have traced the factors associated with the output of educational innovation and school segregation. Yet others have turned from standard economic and political input variables to determine the influence upon educational expenditures of other inputs—religion, metropolitanism, and city-suburban life styles. The sophistication of such macroanalysis studies is impressive, and the use of comparative data contributes much to extending the generalizations they test. At the very least, we have learned
more in recent years about the factors underlying the variability of public policy in the American states than was possible earlier where arithmetical means was about as far as political statisticians went.

Community Power Structure

One environmental context contributing inputs to the political system is the configuration of power—social, economic, or other—within which the political system operates. More simply, what inputs do or do not enter the political system for conversion into policy and how the conversion process itself operates may be shaped by those not in the political system but who nevertheless control it. One can conceive of nations or communities dominated by a particular subsystem—the military, the clergy, the wealthy, the aristocratic—which in turn dominates that political system. Indeed, much of the literature of political science from Athens to the present concerns itself with whether such subsystems do or should dominate.

One aspect of this consideration in the study of educational politics is the American fascination with "community power structures." A voluminous research and polemical literature exists, often pitting sociologists against political scientists, debating whether the structure of local power in America is hierarchical and elitist or whether it is segmented or pluralist. The debate over the methods for detecting the powerful and over the implications of these findings for our democratic society. Such research has in the most recent years leaned increasingly toward comparative studies.

The community level is of course the site of schools, so this debate has some consequences for school administrators. If a community were "run" by an "elite," as earlier studies by sociologists found, professional schoolmen could only operate as a dependant of that clique. If on the other hand, as political scientists later said, power tended to rest in a number of hands,
being more specialized to a given policy area, then the administrator might not be so constrained. Further, regardless of the particular structure of power in the community, it is important for the administrator to detect the real power holders and not be misled by reputations for influence.

During the 1960s, we can trace a transference of this scholarly interest from the social sciences to educational administration. Blumberg and Sunshine in 1963, as part of the excellent series by Syracuse University on the politics of education, showed the relevance of community power studies in four suburbs. But the work having greatest impact among students of educational administration was that by Kimbrough; his study of the way in which the school policies of four Southern counties were sharply affected by differing power structures was the first by an educationalist to transmit word of this research to his fellows. Also in 1964, a collection of essays stressing the research potential of this analytic context brought together both political scientists and school administrators.

Much of this work has consisted of showing educators how to be better administrators, but this prescriptive air has yielded to more empirical work. McCarty suggested how community power structures influenced administrative tenure; Gregg showed the relevancy of community power studies to educational leadership; Minar found in a study of several score suburbs some factors differentially affecting conflict in school systems; Crain studied the relationship between power structures and segregation in eight major cities; while others have suggested an interdisciplinary framework for community study.

If demands originate outside the political system, what do we know about them? Appearing as "a social want, preference, hope expectation, or desire," some of these become political demands when they "are voiced as proposals for
decision and action on the part of the authority. Which enter the political system is determined partly by cultural restraints against some wants; thus gangsters have little overt access to this system. Also affecting entry are what Easton terms "gatekeepers," positions in the social and political structure which can control the demands—interest groups, party groups, opinion leaders or the mass media. What gets in the system then, as well as what gets out, reflects these gatekeepers' preferences and power. However, the system undergoes considerable stress if its outputs do not meet insistent and persistent demands and/or if the volume of demands exceed the system's capacity to handle the inputs.

Because in a democratic polity, public preferences play some role in the system's outputs, the detection of these demands and the determination of the conditions under which they are heard and made effective have been questions of concern to educational administrators long before the recent interest in the politics of education. Given the probably unique condition among nations in which our citizens vote upon school policy and its makers, it is not surprising that such officials have long sought to detect and defending themselves against such control. Such concern in past decades was concealed under the rubric of "community relations," a literature much preoccupied with methods of selling professional views to the public. But little of this rested upon empirically researched propositions. Often it was, and to some degrees still is, anecdotal in form, a nice little story about how a bond issue was maneuvered to success in some town. But by the end of World War II, such validation was appearing in the literature, as in the report by Hamlin on tested techniques for increasing citizen participation in school decisions.

Because such analysis focused upon gatekeepers who shaped public inputs, only occasionally did research turn to the reverse question, how did the
demands shape the gatekeepers' position and policy? Thus, Walden has traced
the relationship between school board members' defeats and consequent super-
intendent turnover, reflective of a syndrome of voters' discontent with
school policies.27 Only a few have examined the relationship between refer-
endum decisions and other policies; despite the widespread nature of such
data, they are nowhere centrally collected for convenient access. Masotti has
traced biracial differences in referendum participation and support in one city
for a five year period, while Willis has analyzed voter response to school
financial issues.28 It is conceptually possible that the referendum device
can make for conflict between school board and public over a given policy;
it has been empirically validated in efforts at school desegregation and
district reorganization.29 However, when there is public satisfaction with
schools, as there generally is in the more affluent districts,30 there is
less conflict expressed through the referendum. But that consensus shatters
when gatekeepers and citizens diverge; currently across the nation such a
schism appears in the increasing refusal of citizens to support local bond
issues.31

Intermediate between citizens and officials are the special interest
groups of educational concern. As early as 1958, Gross showed how, among the
major forces affecting school policy, were groups exerting pressures to split
the board and weaken financial support.32 Concern over curriculum (discussed
later), teacher qualifications, tax increases and school decentralization
seems recently to have proliferated educational pressure groups across America.

Educators themselves use pressure tactics to secure a larger allocation
of resources, although as the comparative study of Masters and others shows,
they have been timid in some states;33 at the national level, educators were
long active in seeking federal money.34 In the latter 1960s, teachers
became more aggressive in demanding not merely better salary and working conditions but also control over the education process itself. From 1956 to 1968, those teachers believing they should be free to work in partisan elections rose from 23% to over 75%. The two major national groups—National Education Association and American Federation of Teachers—are presently showing increasing signs of merging, if not organizationally, at least in their issues and tactics.  

The Nature of Support Inputs

Inputs consist not merely of demands but also of supports—for specific policies, for the regime, or for the constitutional order. Decline of support for the total political system is always dangerous to those in power and so must be strengthened. Strengthening can occur by changing system structure of processes. But it occurs less radically and more frequently by generating what Easton terms "sentiments of legitimacy, recognition of the general welfare, and a sense of political community" through the usual processes of political socialization. Finally, flagging support can be checked by providing inputs to the system which meet a particular dissatisfaction, a form of quid pro quo. Research here has concentrated upon political socialization. How nations socialize their members to political norms of belief and behavior has captured the attention of many political scientists during the 1960s. Consequently a voluminous amount of such work has evolved, treating the perceptions, attitudes, and knowledge of the young and the means by which these come into being. Essentially two questions are involved: what support do citizens provide the schools and what support does the political system seek of citizens through the schools?

Evidence of citizen support for schools is ambivalent. On the one hand education is very highly regarded; as the earliest observers of America noted,
we believe that "Education Is A Good Thing." Its financial support is regarded more vital than that for other major policies, even though the citizen often has very little knowledge of his own schools and much criticism of specific policies. Research on this subject conducted at Stanford University in the late 1950s represents the most comprehensive effort to understand this ambivalence; covering all the states, it surveyed community leaders, several thousand voters, hundreds of school administrators, and many elections. A decade later the Field Poll of Californians reported their high regard for schooling but their belief that they could do little to improve it and their willingness to leave it to the professionals. This is certainly not the case, however, on specific issues.

When we reverse the question, however, and ask what supports the political system seeks of citizens, one finds wide belief that schools are a vital tool for transmitting basic, political system values. Easton has provided theoretical statements and major empirical analysis of the proposition that a primary function of schools lies in its political socialization which contributes to—or may undermine—the support of the constitutional system and the wider political community. The reinforcing role is not new, of course, but little research examines the possibility that some schools may undermine the system. Thus, do schools in black ghettos today add to or detract from the level of support for policies, the regime, or the constitutional order?

Whatever the reality of this supportive process, there is a popular expectation that teachers and the curriculum will support the political system. While such constraint might offend those who associate it with authoritarian nations, studies of the freedom of American teachers and the rigidity of the civics curriculum consistently point to their constraints. Almost 35 years ago, Beale found in a national survey that American teachers were not free,
as he defined it; 30 years later Spitz could still castigate teachers for their conformity to community pressures. Yet because of such pressures or teachers' own beliefs, recent research demonstrates that they, much like their students, have little knowledge of, or attachment to, the values of civil rights or other aspects of the democratic theory. They also stand in sharp distinction from other findings that the strongest support of civil liberty exists among the most educated.

Inculcation of system support is also seen in the familiar ethnocentrism of each nation's curriculum. Certainly in America the 50 states control the instructional courses, some of which are imbedded in state constitutions, and all of which show considerable variety. Litt has shown that different models of civics courses—the usual conduit for system support—are at work in political socialization. Their professional level tends to be very low; teachers, poorly trained in concepts and methods of political science, emphasize idealized description with little relevance to reality. During the 1960s, some political scientists began to develop curriculum and training programs to overcome these defects. The need for such remedies stems from lack of evidence that these courses were actually effective in their socialization. An unexplored possibility is that unreal instruction in system operations, when acted upon, may contribute to cynicism about—if not alienation from—that system and its values.

Whatever its shortcomings, however, efforts to move the curriculum away from this formalized support precipitates a fierce counter-attack from what Lunstrum has called "curriculum evangelism," thereby weakening efforts to apply professional standards of curriculum theory. Curriculum and textbook which speak well—or even at all—about the United Nations or established welfare policies have in some regions precipitated tremendous pressures upon
administrators and teachers, with the latter essentially helpless. Elsewhere, any textbook treatment of America's diverse minorities which ignores or insults them also precipitates complaints and even Congressional hearings.

Ironically, little such pressure arises in support of the original Americans, the Indians, who may be the most poorly educated of all our minorities. Under pressure from the right and left, the teachers lack independent power to resist, particularly when their loyalty is questioned. Although increasingly militant on other aspects of school life, on support matters they are not masters in their own house.

Conversion Process—Structures and Policies

This mixture of demands and supports pours in upon a political system to be converted or not into outputs by the process of (in Easton's familiar definition) the "authoritative allocation of values." To Easton, the political system's conversion process is not static or its parts passive, for in:

the goal-setting, self-transforming and creatively adapted system...members of the system are not passive transmitters of things taken into the system, digesting them in some sluggish way, and sending them along as outputs....They are able to regulate, control, direct, modify, and innovate with respect to all aspects and parts of the processes involved.

Here, then, are the institutions and personnel of government, the offices and officials, who interact with their environment to convert private preferences into public policy.

At the local level, the thousands of school districts can be viewed as a myriad of miniature political systems. There is, of course, a uniform pattern in this profusion: voters elect a school board which develops and oversees policy administered by the superintendent whom the board appoints.

But within this common rubric, political conflict can rage, as in the recent demands of urban blacks for community control and decentralization of their
children's schools. Another example of the political variety in school policies arises from the seemingly prosaic budgetary process. Budget decisions in any district combine not only economic and technical but also political criteria; considerations of political and social benefit are thus as important as measures of economic efficiency. How board members and superintendents differentially evaluate these input components provides one analytical scheme for understanding some influences upon educational policy. The pattern school board and principal relationships may be viewed conceptually in other ways. Research has shown how elections and superintendents are reciprocally related, how the boards are functionally related to inputs from their community, and how community, board, and administration can interrelate in different fashions. Or, in more normative terms, questions may be raised about such boards' responsibility and responsiveness to community demands.

Then, too, one might approach this conversion process by focusing upon a specific level of government, viewing each as a political system, some of whose inputs are from other systems. Some have fastened upon the suburb, in case study or comparative analysis. There are also studies of educational politics in the big cities of America, also in case studies or comparison. At a yet higher level, there are studies of the school political system at the state level, and again there is case study and comparative analysis. Most recently we find interstate coalitions developing to coordinate planning on common problems and to confront federal educational policy.

Climaxing decades of public debate, Washington from the mid-1950s onward became a major participant in local education through policies of regulation and subsidy. Regulatory policy stemmed originally from the decisions of the
Supreme Court overturning local actions deemed repugnant to the Constitution, e.g., public support of religious schools. When in the last decade it struck down the widespread practices of school prayers and Bible reading, resistance developed that moved Congress close to amending the Constitution to permit what the Court had banned. In another regulatory area—racial balance—the Court’s decision of 1954 did not find Congressional support until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Directed first against Southern segregation, by 1970 the effort involved Court, Congress, and President in striking—albeit turbulent—improvements. Segregation in the North, however, is just beginning to be attacked, a prospect which has unglued Congressional and Presidential support.

Another federal involvement in local schools is in supportive policies, primarily financial aid. Washington has provided such aid since even before the founding of the republic, although the amounts were limited and the programs few. But after World War II, increased demand for schooling strained state and local sources and generated demands for federal assistance. The subject of intense partisan debate, such laws were few during the 1950s, but in the Johnson landslide of 1964, additional Congressional support, when paired with a solution of long-standing religious conflicts, produced the landmark Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. If it had not been know before, certainly the passage and administration of this law emphasized the strong tie between education and politics. In the cut-and-thrust of conflicting demands pouring in upon Congress and in its reaction to such pressures, we can clearly see the group struggle to obtain that authoritative allocation of resources so central to Easton’s notion of the political system.

The Conversion Process—Personnel

Yet the conversion process involves not merely authoritative groups—
boards, legislatures, and so on. There is a very personal element in the interplay of politics in which the outcome must be judged also by the feelings and values, failures and successes, of human beings. Thus, school politics may be viewed as a struggle for power among parents, teachers, administrators, or school board members.\textsuperscript{78} In another sense, it may be viewed as a study in leadership, the way by which a few mobilize large numbers in support of the few's judgment.\textsuperscript{79} In this perspective, any notion that only blind blocs of men engage in the politics of education is simply insufficient in description and explanation.

The empirical literature of conversion personnel overflows with anecdotes of individuals in a given place and time. Much of this was earlier used as a source for learning how to be more effective as administrator and "community relations" expert;\textsuperscript{80} political science literature of recent years had its case studies, also.\textsuperscript{81} But most political scientists and educational scholars now employ more aggregate studies of key personnel which are designed to draw broader generalizations about their role in the political process. Thus, there are studies of the role of state governors and attorneys-general in the Southern desegregation conflict\textsuperscript{82} and of state legislators' differing evaluations of school needs.\textsuperscript{83}

At the local level, board members, administrators, and teachers have had their personal values and perceptions explored. McCarty and Carver have studied different sets of board members to determine why they serve and how their class affects their role expectations.\textsuperscript{84} Increasingly educators note that superintendents, particularly those in large cities,\textsuperscript{85} perform a political role in the community, and that their leadership styles are mediated by different structures of power in the community and board.\textsuperscript{86} The superintendent, the go-between of the polity and bureaucracy,\textsuperscript{87} finds his politicization thrust
upon him not merely by communities seemingly more contentious about school affairs but by the once docile teachers's turn to unionism. 88

Output and Feedback

In this interplay of groups and individuals, demands and resources, educational policy flows out from the political system. These are outputs in Easton's terms, "authoritative allocations of values for binding decisions and the actions implementing and related to them." 89 Designed to meet demands by acting—or seeming—to change the conditions which gave rise to the demands in the first place, such outputs serve to diminish the stress which precipitated prior demands. By this feedback the system is made to respond to environmental stress; thus, as Easton has it, "A system is able to make some effort to regulate stress by modifying or redirecting its own behavior." 90

This process of feedback and response to output is writ large in the infrastructure of education. The effects of practices in curriculum and administration constitute "withinputs" of the profession, and the texts and journals of the profession for long have been filled with such evaluation. Often however, such withinputs radiate outwards to affect community segments who in turn transmit into the total school political system the demands for new practices. The public outcry during the 1950s over why Johnny could not read is illustrative of the school professionals generating public concern which is transformed into a political question. In that sense then, probably any professional policy has the potential for becoming a political issue, so that the syndrome of output—feedback—input is an analytic framework applicable to many school aspects. Even in other nations lacking the decentralized sovereignty of our schools, this possibility exists; one recalls the French college students' riots in 1968 over instructional practices.
While this conceptual framework may be applicable to a wide range of school policies, this article cannot cover them all. However, it might be useful to apply the framework to a recent policy output with great consequence for schools, namely federal aid. Such involvement has been with us since 1785; over a score of major federal policies have been or are now on the statute books. In adult education policy alone there are 454 separate programs, and the scope of federal involvement in other policies promises to expand immeasurably in the decades ahead. The more significant question for citizens as well as scholars, however, is the impact of these policies upon their schools. The requirement in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 insisted on by Senator Robert Kennedy, that the programs under this Act should be evaluated subsequently for their effects, provides institutionalization of feedback and response. This could be a powerful tool for reshaping future educational programs, although by 1970 there was sharp criticism that evaluation was lagging badly.

Federal policy has consequences for other aspects of the school than curriculum. Thus, it can place major demands upon state and local school administrative structures, but the consequences of this are not yet clear. Campbell has recently urged that the ESEA of 1965 generates such a demand upon state educational departments, and that this reaches even down to the school boards. Even without federal laws, it is likely that the penetrating influence of other national forces develops mutual interests which creates standardizing inputs on school systems. Further, Osman has shown that federal financial aid stimulated considerably all state-local expenditures for education; for every $1.00 contributed federally, there was $4.11 increase in state-local outlay. Given the presently strained support of local levies and the sweet taste of federal money, the most likely consequence of federal
aid will be a feedback demand for more, despite the fears of the ideological opponents. It is certainly true that the state policy output has consequences for the local level. As Guthrie et al. have recently shown for Michigan, the traditional distribution of state funds has created schools with rigidly unequal resources and pitifully unequal student achievement.98

In the administration of major federal policies, the value orientation of representatives of different levels in the system are not always the same, a differentiating factor which affects the outcome in ways which have had little research. A Congressional report on a sample survey of state-local officials suggests some of this variety. Along a continuum, the polar extremes "Orthodox States Rights" and "New Nationalism" philosophies, accounted each for only a little better than ten percent of all officials; 43 percent held a state rights philosophy but pragmatically accepted federal aid on specific issues, while another 33 percent accepted the federal aid but reflected little philosophical orientation.99

Certainly differential attitudes by local officials have made a difference in the administration of the Supreme Court and Congressional requirements for school desegregation in the South. Just as some Southern judges have been more reluctant to urge compliance,100 so some Southern states have been more adaptable to this policy demand; as the reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights have shown over the years, there has been more compliance in the Border States than in the Deep South. Recent federal law has converted the U.S. Office of Education's primary concern from supporting local control of education to demanding equality of educational opportunities; these two values clashed sharply throughout the South in the 1950s and 1960s, just as it will in the North in the 1970s.101 Even in an act as popular as that of ESEA of 1965, its administration has precipitated a continuous set of problems.
This has resulted partly from the newness of federal-state cooperation in this field but also from the differing value orientations of the two levels. Bailey and Mosher have shown that for the first years of this Act such conflict arose from the best, and sometimes mutual, motives among federal partners.102

The Need for Theory, Conceptualization, and Research

Problems in Theory

The preceding bibliographic review misleads in one major respect by suggesting more theory, hypothesis, and research findings than actually exist. Citations are often only to a single study, a study may often treat with only a few cases, and the restricted locale and incidence of research limit the possible generalization. In this concluding section we hope to outline the dimensions yet to be pursued in the study of school politics.

That very systems theory which has provided the analytic framework for the preceding section is far from satisfactory as a theory. As Kaplan noted a decade ago:

Perhaps the first thing to be said about systems theory is that it is not a theory. It consists of a set of concepts. No propositions about the real world can be derived from infinitesimal calculus, or from the methods of science in general. Advice to a political scientist to use systems theory to solve a problem, even when it is the appropriate methodology, would advance him as far but no farther than would advice to a physicist to use the methods of science.103

In other recent writing, the inutility of systems theory as a theory has been stressed.104 These critics' persuasive reasoning and analysis have moved the present author to use systems theory much in the manner they have suggested, as a device for "mapping the field." As such, this article is in keeping with Landau's judgment that our discipline is marked by "high information level and low theoretic yield."105
Yet this research review has pointed up another way to utilize theory. This alternative purpose is not prediction of what will happen but understanding of what does happen. Both theories seek to explain the interrelationships of events in experience. that is, both strive to speak of, if not explain, causation. The understanding function, however, is satisfied by far less demanding criteria of validity than the predictive function. In this article, we have sought to show how understanding a complex process of school politics may be sought by using a theory which simply categorizes data. In so doing, we have pointed to discrete research projects which have aimed at the predictive function, even though they are not necessarily or demonstrably generated by systems theory.

In such heuristic terms, then, systems theory seems to provide an understanding of an inter-linked policy coevolution structure responding to persistent stress by achieving outputs of policy which lead to outcomes which in turn reduce the original stress. This involves not merely one system, but a mosaic of sub-systems, and at different times all or part may be operating. In Figure 1, we can see some of this complexity of categories as they exist within our federal system.

(Figure 1 about here.)

At a beginning point, arbitrarily labelled Time 1A, a sequence of stress—conversion—output transpires upon and through the national political system. The School Outputs 1 refers to the policy set which results and which is transmitted for administration at Time 1B to the State School System, forming a somewhat different Stress Pattern 2 (the difference indicated by the 1,2 designation of Demands and Supports). The result here is the set of School Outputs 1,2, the numerals indicating that the national policy has been transmitted by state inputs and within inputs into a somewhat different form from that
Figure 1

Intergovernmental Relations in a Systems Framework
which emerged at the national level.

At Time 1C, such outputs, when administered upon the Local School System from the state system (direct federal-local system relations can exist also), constitute yet another Stress Pattern (3) and another combination of transmuted demands and supports (1,2,3). These interact with the local school system to achieve yet another modification noted in School Outputs 1,2,3. These may be decisions on curriculum, attendance zoning, salary improvements, racial composition of teachers, budget allocations, etc. This policy set is then administered so as to achieve some kind of Educational Outcome for those who interact with local schools—Students, Teachers, etc. The outcome may involve no change or it may constitute some degree of change in the educational stress which precipitated the policy making process originally. Thus, does the output of federal aid, when it finally gets down to those it is designed to affect, actually achieve the desired outcome, e.g., more qualified teachers of science or language, or students better prepared to start school or express their ideas? These outcomes may in turn generate yet another set of stresses, e.g., defects in administrative techniques, insufficient resources being employed, or unattainable goals. As a consequence of such feedback, then, at some future time (Time 2A) the whole process is recycled.

While such system analysis contributes to our understanding of a complex process, its utility does not end there. If sufficient data can be provided to describe what happens for many of the jurisdictions symbolized in Figure 1, it may then become possible to develop some predictive theoretical statements for testing. For example, it is quite certain that on the federal aid policy, differential results will be observed as outcomes across the sweep of 16,000 school districts for even one phase of that policy, while differential patterns will likely develop across several policy phases. That outcome is more than
speculative, given the power of diffusion in the prism of a federal system. If so, what theoretical explanations less sweeping than the federal structure are there for such variety of outcomes? Is it possible to predict the conditions under which local compliance with national or state outputs is high and when low? Is the key variable the structure of the community in which the policy operates or is it attributable to the skills and other qualities of actors on the local scene? Macroanalysis studies, which emphasize the primacy of wealth as the best indicator of system performance, undermine severely the scope left to actors to affect the system. Yet another set of queries might seek to determine the explanatory power of the presence of the state system in the process. Does funnelling policy administration through the state facilitate or inhibit local systems' achievement of national goals? If the answer is variable, what factors account for—and thus possibly predict—occasions when either facilitation or inhibition take place?

This merely suggests the fashion in which one may move from heuristic theory through categorization of data to the development of true general theory and hypotheses. The theoretic yield is highly promising despite the critical condition of general empirical theory at the present. Yet, if misery loves company, we might note that this current theoretic poverty is possibly no less than that of education itself in its other aspects; according to Smith, education currently lacks that theory which would give structure to its body of knowledge.106

It is certain that this application of systems theory does not bypass the perspectives of social science which are being increasingly brought to bear as explanations of the behavior of the educational system.107 There is a whole new world of models and paradigms now being focused upon educational administration.108 Of considerable utility are concepts of organizational
behavior and research, some of which Bogue has shown to have direct application for educational administration.\textsuperscript{109} There is a similar body of knowledge on decision making\textsuperscript{110} which can have utility; we have shown earlier its use for understanding community decision making but which may also be of value within school administration.\textsuperscript{111}

Yet we should not exaggerate the availability of general theory; much of those in this paragraph are of limited range, at best middle range. One sign of the inadequacy of general theory is the paucity of research in comparative politics of education. While there is considerable literature in the field of comparative of public administration,\textsuperscript{112} little of it deals with educational politics in a number of nations. Coombs, it is true, has recently brought a systems analysis to bear upon "the world educational crisis," but we agree with Sroufe that the relationship between the theory and the crisis is not clearly established.\textsuperscript{113} Lacking guiding theory, scholars have provided mainly special studies of educational politics in a given country, such as the USSR, Canada and England.\textsuperscript{114} It may well be that the scholarly perspective of the schools as being political (as distinguished from Marx's political perspective, in whose view everything is political) originated in America because of local control of education through the ballot box. But an appropriate general theory of educational politics should encompass the variety of experience, of which the American is but one. Accordingly, developing such theory cannot proceed when scholars fail to look elsewhere for educational politics.

One essential element of such general theory must treat with the origins, operations, and consequences of social change. Systems theory has been criticized for its emphasis upon the system's efforts to maintain stability and to fend off stress; Easton himself is aware of this criticism but regards it
as inaccurate. He focuses upon the "persistence" of some kind of system for authoritatively allocating values, even though the regime (political structure plus political values) may change or remain stable. The allocation system can persist regardless of the change or stability of the regime. Easton insists he has nowhere postulated "either stability or change as a necessary condition, a goal, or even as a useful theoretical tool for analyzing the ....regime."115

What we urge, however, is a concern for a theory which explains—and predicts—the origin and acceptance of innovation. The role of social change is emphasized here because it offers a chance of explaining differences in the many aspects of systems theory seen earlier. What is required is a theoretical explanation of the origin, acceptance, or rejection of change.116 Clearly there are available different models of how such innovation arises and is accepted,117 in which some officials such as educators may be "agents of change"118 working against the inertia of bureaucracy.119

Problems in Methodology

Nor is this policy area without needs in methodology, both simple and complex. At the simplest level, there are questions of whether we can obtain some data; thus, there is resistance by many Americans to studies of their children's politicization.120 More broad, however, are the problems of the kinds of data gathered and the method of doing so. Kerlinger has criticized the "mythology" of educational research for its overemphasis upon methods and descriptions and its failure to ask prior questions for which data can be gathered.121 Such problems are not unknown in political science, of course.

Possibly we can best indicate the needs in methodology in more summary fashion.122 It is clear that one can go just so far in understanding general behavior through the use of case studies. While a philosopher has noted that
one can understand the universe by reflection upon a pebble, few of us are philosophers and even less have the perspicacity to perform that task. We need to know the relationship between the many pebbles, the pebbles and the shore, the wind and waves, and indeed the total ecology of pebbles. Further, we need better integration of case and aggregate analysis studies, and the knowledge when to do which. Clearly also, aggregate analysis techniques have problems of validation and reliability, that is, whether the grossness of the measure aggregated encompasses the important but subtle aspects of the relationship studied. Thus, if one measures school output only by educational expenditures, he is not measuring whether the system will make the child happy or inculcates belief in democratic values. Similarly, we need to determine better the range of inputs operating in a given policy decision, for it seems unlikely that the totality of demands on school boards is encompassed within the records of official minutes.

We believe that the recent work of Salisbury considerably advances the specifying of such input-output variables and the theorizing about conditions under which the conversion process operates. Expanding upon Lowi's distinctions among distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies, Salisbury adds the self-regulation type and then suggests how such outputs may vary as a function of differential demands and differential costs of policy production. Thus, he hypothesizes that as there is an increase both in the aggregate demand and the cost of meeting that demand, one set of policies is more likely to be the output than when demand and costs are low. Assuming that empirical indicators of such input components as "demand" and "cost" can be devised, this strategy provides clearer notions of inputs and outputs, particularly applicable to a policy world more colored in plaid than in dun.

We recommend Salisbury's ideas about concept and method as an illustration
of how the two interrelate and what direction we need to move in operationalizing the components of general theory.

Some Research Suggestions

These needs in theory and methodology are equally matched by the needs for research in special topics. In a general sense, there is a need for replication of almost any topic cited in this article, for very often the empirical underpinning of a statement we have made rests upon no more than one or two studies. There is also need for more longitudinal studies; much of the work cited here covers only the last 15 years, which means that we have no way of knowing whether the finding can be extended back into the past. Too, there is clearly more need for aggregate studies and less of case research. While use of the latter is more characteristic of the early stages of research in any discipline, if any systematic statements about the field are to be made, however, there comes a time when comparative studies must be undertaken.

In reviewing the literature in the main section, some specific suggestions have arisen about where research might be fruitfully directed. How do we know that our input and output analysis is related to "stress," that it is this phenomenon which activates the political system? Given the variety of American communities, we need to know more about how the variety of community power structure is relevant to education administration; one innovative approach is the development of a permanent community sample with resident investigators who can be used for comparative study about the origin of and conflict over a particular policy. We need more studies of educational policy demand—why are some educational pressure groups effective and others not in engendering support for school programs, under what kind of demand conditions is a school referendum accepted or rejected, and what role do forces outside the community play in generating local demand?
Too, is the pattern of school support found as the 1960s opened that known in the 1940s or 1970s? Thus, are younger school teachers as supportive of the regime as may have been true earlier, and if not, is their political socialization effect upon the young as monolithic as it once was? What difference in socialization content arises from those male teachers deferred from the draft, those who have military service, and those never affected by the problem? Or in another dimension, is opposition to school policies diffuse or concentrated in the population? Do some oppose many school policies consistently while others oppose only one issue and support the schools otherwise? Are the political values transmitted covertly as well as overtly to the very young? The shifting nature of the issue agenda of education makes judgments drawn from an earlier day of limited utility.

Research needs in the studies of the conversion process are numerous. There is great room for aggregate studies of the relationship among superintendent styles, school board roles, community demands, and policy output. There is need to know the way in which the conversion machinery is affected by state and national policy requirements. Curiously, there exists no single case study showing the interrelationship of state, national, and local policies in a single school district as the diagram of Figure 1 implies. One may find an inventory of such policies existing in a given district, but their interrelationships and their impact upon school operations and educational policy are not provided. As for the conversion personnel, many research questions are raised by existing literature and others need be asked. Why are some teachers militant, others not, and what accounts for their change; how does the professional training in administration affect leadership qualities—if at all; is the institutionalization of the administrative profession functional for the whole school system or just for the profession; what are the conditions
maximizing community support for administrative innovation; in newly developing nations can the teacher or school administrator be an agent of change independently of the dominant political system?

As to the research on the feedback process, we can do no better than raise the various inquiries about this process put by Easton himself.129

We would need to know, for example, what kind of information typically returns to the authorities along the feedback loop and the extent to which it is accurate, false, or distorted. To what degree do time lags and lags, the number of feedback channels, the length of these as transmission belts and their variety, influence the type of information fed back? To what extent is accuracy dependent upon the perceptual apparatus of the authorities and the way in which it may be influenced by ideology, prejudice, indifference, or lack of ability to obtain and interpret information?... We would also need to inquire into the decision rules guiding the retrieval of information from the collective memory banks in which past experience is stored.

The preceding paragraphs have provided an agenda for a decade of research at least. It suggests we have made but limited advances from the agenda set by Eliot as the 1960s opened with his call to political science. But as Kirst and Mosher have shown recently, the development of this scholarship during the 1960s has been curiously uneven and biased (for example, emphasizing input rather than output analysis), but major forces as the decade closed have begun to move students of school politics more in the direction suggested by the present article.130 When the 1970s end with many of the research questions raised above more nearly answered, it will be a particularly difficult task, for the contours of American education will be constantly altering under the increased federal and state finances.131 Certainly the task will be easier if more students of education and political science enter this field, rich in theoretical and empirical innovation. Possibly by that time we will
have begun to meet the criticisms of Goldhammer in 1965 in reviewing books on school politics.132

All the books appear to waver between a sort of missionary zeal to help the educational administrator become a more adept politician and a concern to found exhortations upon a more respectable knowledge base than is currently available....Until there is a more general theory developed, descriptive data are likely to appear merely as curiosa, interesting facts of little value in suggesting further research or in providing assistance in guidance of practical affairs.

The change required, then, is from the use of "a knowledge base" for "exhortation" purposes to its use in developing a systematic explanation of the causes, processes, and consequences of school politics. Such a requirement is not without its challenge to the best of scholarly thinking. At its worst it may do no more than correct "the schoolmen's political myopia"133 that they are magically blind to and unseen by the political process. At its best we may be able to make a major contribution toward developing a general field theory of political behavior in its broadest sense.
FOOTNOTES


8. The major source is David Easton, The Political System (N.Y.: Knopf, 1953), and A Framework for Political Analysis (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1965). The latter volume is used for major references hereafter, referred to as FFEA. A brief version is found in "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics, 9 (1957), 383-403.


10. Ibid., 125. On Easton's understanding of the developmental nature of his thought, see the preface to FFEA. See also, his "Categories for the Systems Analysis of Politics," Easton (ed.) Varieties of Political Theory (Prentice-Hall, 1965), 108-09.

11. Ibid., 125.


25. PPFA, 122.


34. On aid to local education, see Fomon and others cited in footnote 73-76 below. On aid to universities, see Harland Polkinghorne, "National Associations and the Shaping of Federal Higher Education Policy," *Sociology of Education*, 31 (1968), 176-78.

36. PFA, 124-25.


46. For example, see the occasional papers of the High School Curriculum Center in Government at Indiana University, under Director Howard Nehlenger.


53. Probably the most publicized evidence of this, affecting college faculty, is analyzed in David P. Gardner, The California Cattle Controversy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).


55. EPPA, 123-33.


57. For an example of this type of material, see Mayer, Loccit. For some new thinking on the subject, see Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government: The Local Foundations of Political Life (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).


For an example of the specification of inputs, see Michael Becker, "Representative the Educational Policymaking Process: A Problem-Solving Approach,"


For analysis of events leading to this decision, see Daniel M. Berman, *It Is So Ordered* (N.Y.:Norton, 1966).


Eidenberg & Morey purposefully employ a systems model for explaining the passage and administration of this law.


83. See the Ferguson report cited in footnote 68 above.


89. Ibid., 128.

90. Ibid., 128.


99. U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittees on Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal System as Seen by State and Local Officials (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1965), Section E. It should be noted that this sample is heavily loaded with the larger, more urban states, especially with those from large cities; see 31,215.


4'01* tf

Gerald Sroufe, Wichita State University, was a keynote speaker at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 1969.

At the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1969, Horace L. Darrow addressed the topic of political behavior.

Footnote 7:


111. For example, see Lawrence J. Clarke, "Decision Models for Personnel Selection and Assignment," Personnel Administration, 32 (1969), 48-56.


115. David Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 63 (1969), 1051-61, notes the major criticisms of behaviorism and his own work, suggesting that some are quite valid; see also the point of social change since 1957. The Easton & Dennis volume (at footnote 37) defend his theory against such criticism; the citation is from a letter from Easton.

116. There is an extensive literature in this area; cf. the review in Elina Katz et al., "Traditions of Research on the Diffusion of Innovation," American Sociological Review, 26 (1961), 237-52. As illustrations of these views...

117. Such an approach is suggested in Hans Walther, "Education..."


120. See Jennings & Fox, supra, at footnote 37, above.


122. An excellent review of this subject is Kirst & Kosher, supra, at footnote 104, above.


125. For the various meanings of "community" and the resulting real-world variety, see David Hinar & Scott Greer, The Concept of Community (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).


127. See footnote 38, above.

128. I am obliged to Michael Kirst for bringing this omission to my attention.

129. PP. 130, 130.

130. See footnote 104, and Sammons, supra, in footnote 3, above.


POLITICS, EDUCATION, AND THEORY

Sheldon S. Wolin
Cowell College
University of California
Santa Cruz, California
95060

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California
The subject of this conference comprises two of the oldest, most pondered matters in the recorded history of Western civilization, education and politics. Shortly after the ancient Greeks discovered philosophy as a self-conscious activity focused upon a complex of "problems," of which politics was one of the most important, they made the same discovery about education: the latter, too, presented problems of which politics was one of the most important.¹ The union of politics and education within a common frame of philosophy was uniquely symbolized by the figure of Socrates. Socrates, who in the fine characterization of Cicero, "was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and established her in the cities of men,"² was also the first to designate politics and education as distinct and, above all, interrelated subjects of systematic inquiry. The intimacy of the union was deliberately reenforced by the institution of the Academy founded by Socrates' greatest pupil and, somewhat less so, by the institution of the Lyceum founded, in turn, by Plato's greatest pupil.³ The union was maintained despite, or perhaps because of, the continuous criticism directed at the Socratic

¹ This is one of the major themes in the classic work by Werner Jaeger, Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. G. Hight, New York, 1945. See also E. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge, Mass., 1963.

² Tusculanæ Disputations, V. 4. 10.

conception by rival schools of philosophy as well as by rhetoricians, poets, and politicians. But the disputes were mainly over the proper admixture of the two elements, politics and education, not over whether education ought to be political or politics educational.

As I understand it, this conference is not about the problems arising out of the historical association of politics and education, but about how best to study the behavior of those who make, or who influence the making of, decisions about education. Or, alternatively, how best to study education as a political process. Judging by the papers which were sent as illustrations and examples to the participants, a strong predisposition exists among political scientists to recommend the use of "systems theory" as the preferred method of investigating the new subject-matter. If we grant that a "field" is defined by the way we propose to study it and that the methods and/or theories brought to bear embody certain assumptions and discriminations, then we are justified in scrutinizing the proposed mode of inquiry, particularly if the field is thought to be relatively undisfigured by prior theories or if one has grave doubts about the utility of the theory being proposed. Mindful that the participants in this

conference have been invited to submit their views on how best to study the politics of education rather than to criticize alternative approaches, my comments on "systems theory" will be brief. They will mainly be directed at showing that the assumptions of the theory are symptomatic of a broader range of problems which constitute the proper starting point for thought and reflection on the subject of this conference.

Since every theory is an abbreviation of reality, it is, in varying degree, a distortion of reality. In social and political matters, it is not enough for proponents of a theory to acknowledge this. Distortions and omissions cannot simply be justified on grounds of convenience or because a certain amount of arbitrariness is inevitable. There is too much at stake to permit such an easy way out. Any theory which attempts to depict a society in broad, political terms and which also claims to generate propositions that are testable by the actual operation of that society is engaged in very serious business. Political theories deal with structures which embody and exercise the most awesome powers of which man is capable of concentrating. On some occasions these powers are used violently and destructively; more often they are used to intimidate; and still more often they are used to reinforce a going system of distributive inequities. Much depends, therefore, on how meaningfully a theory deals with these basic features of any political society. The capabilities of a theory are determined by the nature and type of distortions
it embodies. In the case of systems theory these distortions are crippling. It enables its exponents to talk about "outputs" but not about distributive justice or fairness; about "steering" but not about statecraft; about "messages" or "inputs" but not about the quality of the citizens or their lives.5

These embarrassments may be of little consequence when a theory is being applied to that abnormal and deceptive state of politics which is called normalcy, and is supposed to signify a state of prosperity, peace, stability, and equity. But when a theory, with all of its distortions, omissions, and assumptions is applied to a deeply troubled domain like education and when that domain appears to mirror the larger troubles of a society in crisis there is reason to question its utility. If one thing can be confidently stated about the Miltonic chaos of political science it is that a great and pervasive doubt now surrounds the main assumptions that have governed "mainstream" political science of the past three decades and have been incorporated into systems theory.

Among the insecure assumptions are the following:6

(1) that the best possible politics is one whose basic "rhythm" is set by the competing pressures of organized interest groups; (2) that the best mode of political competition

---


consists of interest groups striving for material advantages and that the worst or most dysfunctional mode of competition occurs when political parties present sharply defined alternative programs and "ideologies" to the electorate; (3) that from the interplay of group pressures the most equitable distribution of material goods will emerge as long as no one group or permanent combination of groups exerts dominant influence; (4) that the main tasks of government are to mediate between group demands, enforce the standard of fair competition embodied in the constitutional and other legal rules of "the game," and somehow seek to reconcile the public interest with the self-serving thrust of group pressures. These tasks are commonly held to be discharged by showing either that no single group has consistently dominated public policies or that at certain times there has been manifest governmental concern over the plight of disadvantaged (i.e., unorganized or powerless) groups. Given the constraints of group power and influence and the resulting limits which fence political action, it is not surprising to find that in the eyes of most political scientists the "political system" has exhibited a natural and healthy genius for slow, piecemeal, incremental advance.\^7

The comparatively unenthusiastic support which these assumptions now command are directly traceable to the startling

\^7This is systematically developed by C. E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York, 1965), pp. 3-17, 117ff., 274ff.
emergence of specific problems, such as environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, the disappearance of habitable space, intensified racial conflicts, urban decay, campus unrest, and military disaster. As we are coming to recognize, these problems only appear to have emerged suddenly. Most of them have been in the making for decades, which suggests why it is that political scientists seem so uncertain about the main assumptions of the political system: the problems were concealed or misrepresented by the normal operation of the system, so much so that in many quarters it is feared that the problems have either become insoluble within the current terms of the system or worsened. Nowhere are these doubts more evident than in the field of education where there is widespread lack of confidence about the capability of existing educational institutions, practices, and values; deep scepticism about whether society can be persuaded to face up to the heavy financial, political, and psychic demands which radical change requires; and despair over whether the traditional methods of policy-making, supervision, accountability, and community involvement can cope with the dimensions of the crisis. Meanwhile, our schools, like our cities, are streaked with lawlessness, violence, alienation, and incivility.

The general situation which obtains both in politics and education is marked by fundamental disorder or derangement such that the ills reenforce the causes which have produced them. The political troubles arising from racial conflicts, poverty,
urban decay, and campus rebellion have contributed to an educational crisis whose political effects will continue to be registered for several more years. Civic man is, in large measure, the product of our schools; and the future vitality of our civic life and its values is being determined in the present. If, in the midst of a profound political crisis affecting education, it is proposed that we study the latter by means of a theory which assumes that the former is functioning normally, the results are bound to be misleading. The task which confronts us requires a political theory that will illuminate both politics and education, but it must be a theory which starts from the assumption that the society is in deep trouble, proceeds by searching for a formulation which identifies those troubles, and concludes with some sketch of the possibilities, necessities, and dangers for a better politics and a better education.

No one, of course, is foolish enough to pretend that he has the theory which will solve all of our political and educational problems. However, it is possible to get some of the questions a bit straighter. Toward that end I shall contend that our present political condition is being shaped by many novel and unprecedented factors and that, consequently, the main theoretical task must begin with the search for new categories and concepts. Before turning to these novel factors, I would briefly mention two questions, first raised by the Greeks and then retained by later writers, that are central to
any discussion of education and politics: What kinds of persons should education seek to encourage and, inseparably bound to that question, what is the proper image of the citizen which is to be followed in preparing the young for membership in the most general and inclusive association, political society?

These two elements, the quality of the individual person and his quality as a political or civic being, are complicated by a third consideration which forms one of the paradoxes of education: in a democratic society education is said to be justified by the extent to which it promotes the development of the individual—how far it develops his mind, cultivates his sensibilities, and equips him with a command over certain bodies of knowledge and skills which will enable him to move about in the world with some measure of confidence. From the standpoint of society, however, education rests on a different and sometimes contradictory justification. Society requires and demands certain skills of its members so that economic, administrative, scientific, military, and other socially necessary tasks will be performed efficiently. During the nineteenth century much of the momentum for popular education stemmed from the recognition of the growing needs of manufacturers for literate workers. A decade ago the Sputnik crisis led to widespread demands for increased education in science and engineering.

Thus one justification is individual and qualitative, while the other tends mainly to be functional and quantitative,
i.e., how many literate workers, how many and what types of engineers? But, as Plato discovered long ago in the Republic, the difficulty is to reconcile the two justifications and satisfy the legitimate claims of each. That difficulty is mainly what the politics of education is mostly about, deciding what kinds of individuals should be cherished and encouraged by education and what kinds of social tasks properly require educational support. To clarify this conception of the politics of education it is necessary at the outset to identify those forces which are shaping our society and are at the heart of its crisis in politics and education. What are the most insistent imperatives which are shaping the contours of society, the forms of work and socially necessary skills, the relationships between classes and groups, the assignment of rewards and status, and the rating system by which some forms of knowledge are preferred? What are the imperatives which are causing many of our personal and collective tensions, providing much of the "stuff" of our major political decisions and policies, and dictating increasingly the style and means of political action?

Imperatives of this range and magnitude form the primary substance of a potentially significant political theory. In a preliminary way, they can be conveniently grouped under the concept of "technological society" or, more broadly, "technological culture." Today there is scarcely a sphere of society or a major aspect of human activity which is not
infected or affected by a technological component. There is
daily confirmation that contemporary politics is mostly about
the future imperatives and past consequences of technology;
that education is increasingly being affected by it; that
popular culture has become inseparable from it; that, in short,
our society can be most accurately described as technological.
Neither politics nor education, nor any combination of the
two, can be properly understood apart from technological
society.

What, then would the beginnings of such a theory look
like? It would start with an attempt at some general overview
of the distinctive nature of technological society, some
perspective which would help us to understand its nature and
distinguishing features. Such an overview would form a
network of concepts that would aid us in describing, explaining,
and signifying the relevant phenomena. It would start from
the common knowledge that technological society is distinguished
by a special form of collaboration between modern science and
modern industry and by particular institutional and
organizational forms which have been evolved to promote and
exploit that collaboration. The distinctive feature of
technological society is that it is an order based upon the
union of science and industry and that that union has issued
in unprecedented forms of power which have created a constantly
changing environment, natural and social, and give every
indication of being able to change the human species as well.
In its several component parts, this ordered totality of activities does not appear novel. Other and earlier civilizations have cultivated science, technological innovation, social organization, and environmental change. What is unique is the union of these factors and the systematic and premeditated cultivation of that union. In this context, intense cultivation signifies more than the encouragement of techniques or methods, be they scientific or industrial; it points to a special ethic which has become generally diffused throughout society and definitive of the dominant values and socialized consciousness of the members. Thus society, environment, and man are being altered simultaneously. The future which looms already in the present is of an artificial nature surrounding a mechanized society inhabited by a species which has been christened a "bio-mechanical symbiote."  

There is little need to remind this group that the main issues pressing upon our society have their origins in, or are powerfully affected by, the operation of technological society. A theory of technological society should be a response to the evident urgencies of our condition, not simply a search for explanation, much less a cause for self-congratulation. Toward that end, the concepts employed in that theory must not begin with an isolate, not even with "technological society," much less one composed from the vocabulary of technological society

itself, e.g., "cybernetic society" or the "technetronic society." It is not merely that technological culture has a history, i.e., it came from somewhere, but rather that its novelty and significance depend upon the kind of contrasts which history alone can provide. To mention one obvious example: one cannot appreciate the significant changes in the nature of "work" unless one has a fair idea of what work has meant in other ages. But while some older concepts still retain vitality or can be modified by a new emphasis (e.g., "information" is an old notion but it has acquired a significant and new emphasis), there are others which may cease to be relevant. For example, it is no secret that in many sectors of advanced societies the absence of "authority" explains more than its presence. It may be the case that technological society will be governed by "processes" rather than authorities.

What, then, are some of the possible concepts which could form a theory of technological society and thereby help us to find our bearings, politically and educationally, in this "new world" which Saint-Simon prophesied more than a century-and-a-half ago?

1. Like all previous societies, technological society constitutes an order, but of a distinctive kind. It is essentially an organizational society which integrates, coordinates, and subordinates activities in accordance with the requirements of science, technology, and industry. Much
of modern science and most of modern industry are administered activities in the sense that their success and efficient operation depend upon a high degree of organization, the careful ordering of sequences, immense amounts of planning, and formalized methods of accountability and performance. It would be superfluous to add that the technological order thrives on impersonality---of effort, achievement, and service.

2. Although many previous societies have accorded high place to the pursuit of knowledge and to the value of "useful" knowledge and have supported the institutions of knowledge, such as monasteries, academies, and universities, technological society is not only deeply dependent on knowledge, but peculiarly reliant upon knowledge which is systematic and interlocked. (Contrast, for example, the mediaeval preoccupation with distinguishing various bodies of knowledge, as in the Thomistic distinction between, among others, philosophy and theology, with the contemporary assumption about the interrelationships between "fields" and the constant search for new overlappings.) The contemporary emphasis upon the various sciences, mathematics, engineering, and, now, the managerial sciences is reflective of this dependence, as is the use of the phrase "knowledge-industry" to describe the modern universities. This dependency is further distinguished by a continual dynamic; particular forms of knowledge are not only specially cultivated but are cultivated in ways that are
intended to make them continually expanding. Technological society is probably the first society in history that continually renders vast bodies of knowledge obsolescent and at the same time threatens to engulf itself with ever-mounting heaps of new knowledge. It might also be noted in passing that the primacy of knowledge in technological society, as well as the rank-order in prestige among various fields of knowledge, will play a large role in assigning stations of power and powerlessness throughout society.

3. As the above suggests, technological society is not classless. Scientists, engineers, experts in management, "information" specialists, as well as hybrid types, such as the scientist-entrepreneur or the scientist-administrator, exert great power and influence throughout society. Within these categories, however, the growth of knowledge is so rapid that skills are constantly being rendered obsolete: today the engineer who specializes in space engineering enjoys greater rewards than the engineer who specializes in road construction. Perhaps more important technological progress has jeopardized most of the forms of work which were the lot of the vast majority of the working population less than a half-century ago. The destruction of work and the ever-changing demands of technology threaten the lower classes with permanent subjugation. The new structure of inequalities has a most important bearing upon education, not only for the obvious reason that education is looked upon as the means of outfitting new generations with
new skills, but because education is being asked to prepare classes and groups which hitherto have lacked even rudimentary skills and which, at the same time, are becoming politicized before they have been "technicized." And all of this is in addition to the problem of whether technological society can continue to absorb vast numbers of college-educated persons and offer them meaningful work.

4. Technological society accentuates concentrations of power and influence. The clusters of skills which it demands and organizes, the goods and services which it produces, and the equipment which it employs are all extraordinarily expensive and beyond the reach of most small-scale enterprises. Heavy governmental support is needed, not only in the form of funds but in the form of future assurances. A web of mutual dependency grows between governmental bureaucracies and corporate bureaucracies and its symbol is the governmental contract. Any viable distinction between public and private enterprise disappears.

5. At the same time that technological society encourages the concentration of power and facilitates its exercise by means of rapid communication and ingenious forms of surveillance, it becomes increasingly difficult to alter or significantly modify the society by means of political action. The novelty of technological society is that incessant innovation flourishes amidst rigidity. As the present problems of the cities and of

---

the natural environment have taught us, it is very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to separate the social costs of technology from its benefits, impossible to have the one without the other, and impossible to remedy the former by larger applications of the latter. Without the possibility of significant change, political action dwindles in importance. Perhaps it is no accident that virtually all of the major prophets of technological society, such as Saint-Simon, Marx, Lenin, Bellamy, and H. G. Wells, have all reduced the role of politics to administration, as if to emphasize that in the society of the future efficient and stable routines are what matter and that creative politics is atavistic.

This list of concept could be prolonged. If space permitted I would want to examine such notions as "consumerism" and explore the new "rhythms" embodied in technological society. But a more important closing note would emphasize that whatever its benefits, technological society forms no exception to Freud's gloomy wisdom that all culture is purchased at a human price. There can be no true theory of technological society which is not also a theory of evil, and hence there can be no politics and no education worthy of their names which are not committed to countering many of the forces and promises of the new society and to preserving, rather than merely redefining, what is human.
Proposed Research Project

by

Harmon L. Zeigler, Jr.

Paper prepared for C.O.B.R.E. Research Workshop on
THE POLITICS OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
September 14-19, 1970
Stanford, California

August 1970

552
In proposing a topic for research, I will violate several traditions which have appeared with startling persistence in the youthful field of the politics of education. First, I do not propose to study political socialization. Second, I do not propose to use systems theory as a basis for gathering information.

Concerning political socialization, I am not impressed with the arguments of Hess and Torney that the school is the major agent of socialization. The jury is still out on the question, and I suspect that the most feasible way to seek an answer is through longitudinal research, a technique which I do not understand fully.

Concerning systems theory, there is little point in reviewing the numerous essays by political scientists and educationists trying to fit existing research into this void. I am in agreement with those who argue that systems theory is, in essence, a useful device in raising appropriate questions, e.g. in ordering our bundles.

Instead of building a research problem out of systems theory, I propose to ask a question asked frequently by many who have no recourse to systems theory. As phrased some years ago by Gross, the question is simply: who runs our schools. Lest this question appear too mundane, let me suggest that, as of now, there is no clear answer to this question. I believe that little is actually known about the relative distribution of influence among the various potential and actual participants in the educational decision-making process.

The list of such participants is not necessarily simple to develop. If one were studying, say, the Congress, enough previous research on this single institution exists so as to give one a pretty good starting
point. However, there are approximately 23,000 school districts; and relatively little known about them. When one considers the singular functions of school systems, the salience of education to parents and children, and the tremendous investment of financial resources, there is little reason to doubt the political significance of school systems. Unfortunately, one searches in vain for systematic studies of school districts of the sort characterizing other political institutions in the United States. To be sure the surge of political socialization studies and the flurry of reports dealing with teacher militancy and racial desegregation have brought to the fore the essentially political character of schools. There are, also, occasional case studies which treat various aspects of the schools from the point of view of the political process. But only a handful of studies can be described as having approached the public schools as political institutions. Even fewer have considered the attack in terms of how and to what end schools are governed.

Given the paucity of evidence, our first task is not more theory. Our job is to compile a list of participants in the governing of schools and assess the influence of each. While making no pretense at inclusiveness, I suggest that we consider the activities of the following participants: (1) administrators, (2) school boards, (3) teachers, (4) interest groups, (5) students. I recognize that this list is based upon the assumption that the basic locus of control is local, hence the exclusion of state departments of education and the various federal agencies with an interest in education. I am excluding state and national participants solely because the sheer magnitude of the task of assessing local influential is staggering. I also recognize that, in even preparing a list, certain
assumptions about the governing process appear to be made. For instance, does not the presentation of a list assume that influence is distributed among those various agents irrespective of the nature of the struggle for influence? I do not think that it does. That is, I anticipate that the ranking of the participants would vary from issue to issue and from one type of district to another. However, in spite of this "pluralistic" assumption, I still think it likely that for most districts and on most issues, the ranking will remain fairly stable.

To illustrate, Crain argued that, with respect to decisions about integration, the school board was able to seize the initiative and operate the schools in a manner that was displeasing to the superintendent. However, since Crain was interested in only a single issue, it is possible that—had he studied the other conflicts—the superintendent would have proven to be dominant. Thus, in the districts studied by Crain, it is likely that the single issue of integration was a small portion of the decision made and that, in an overall assessment, the role of the board was substantially less than his research would lead us to conclude.

Let us consider the list of participants, in some detail, having dealt with these troublesome questions.

1. The school board and the superintendent. There are approximately 121,000 board members with the formal responsibility of running the schools. Although I cannot be certain, I suspect that there are more board members than, say, city council members; yet we know virtually nothing (other than the usual information, e.g., they are disproportionately representative of the middle and upper-middle classes) about them. Compared to other units of government, school boards are a dark continent.
I think we should explore school board behavior because school boards are a symbol of one of the prevailing mythologies of American education: local control of the decision-making process by laymen. Why the American system of education has its foundations in such an ideology is the subject of a variety of explanations, most of which make reference to the cultural traditions of an emergent society or, if the writer is of a particularly bitter frame of mind, to the anti-intellectualism and distrust of "experts" which is--so the assumption was--part and parcel of the exuberent and youth-ful democratic traditions of the country. Contrast America with England, for example, where school boards were abolished precisely because it was decided that laymen had no business meddling in the affairs of professionals. While similar proposals are occasionally made in this country, there is clearly no social support for such radical tinkering with the mechanisms of "participatory democracy".

In spite of the persistence of such an ideology, the researchable question is: how can such laymen compete with experts? What resources can they muster and how do they use these resources? The ideology of lay control does not have the benefit of a reasonably articulate set of defenders while the educational system itself has been producing a corps of professional managers whose ideology--while hardly consensual--is more carefully promulgated than is that of the proponents of lay control. School superintendents, subject to a relatively uniform (in contrast to board members) occupational recruitment pattern, possess an occupational ideology which is somewhat at variance with the traditional mythology as described above. This ideology centers on expert autonomy for the superintendent and a fiduciary role for the board. Such an ideology is hardly unique to
school superintendents and, no doubt is shared by the various professions which, taken collectively, comprise the revolutionary cadre of the "managerial revolution".

The available evidence suggests that superintendents take a dimmer view of the supervisory responsibilities of boards of education than do board members themselves. Assuming, therefore, that superintendents and boards have competing ideologies, who wins and why?

It is perhaps natural for a superintendent—whether the prototype of the Lasswellian power hungry politico or not—to find it annoying to have a half-dozen or so relatively uninformed laymen bustling around in matters believed to be purely administrative. Superintendents might make the old, absurd, but remarkably persistent distinction between policy and administration. If such a distinction is being made, it may well have very little to do with the actual division of responsibilities between board and superintendent. While empirical studies of board-superintendent relations are rather sparse, the thrust of available evidence suggests that, desires and aspirations to the contrary, school boards do relatively little supervising and a great deal of delegating responsibility. But certainly this is not always the case. A great deal depends on the issue, the community, etc. On the one hand we have arguments that school boards perform the function of legitimating the policies of the school system to the community, rather than representing the various segments of the community to the school administrators. On the other hand, there are certainly some boards which, if nothing else, nip at the heels of superintendents. There are, in other words, contexts within which the superintendent is placed under strong constraint by the board. What are these
conditions? One possible avenue of inquiry is the relation between board-superintendent conflict and general community conflict. It is well known that superintendents— in addition to their expert role— also espouse an ideology of education being above politics. Whatever nonsense is contained in this ideology, there is—from the point of view of the superintendent— probably a great deal of common sense in isolating the educational from the general political system. When community conflict reaches the board level, does the tendency to supervise the superintendent increase?

Another way of looking at the same problem is to think of routinized versus non-routinized decisions. Given the greater technical resources of the superintendent, his relative expertise in matters of management, and his commitment to his career, it is perhaps to be expected that board members will avoid challenges to professional authority. The issue can be phrased in such a manner as to make professional authority a negotiable resource. Perhaps Crain's study of integration can best be understood as a category of decision for which there was no professional authority.

Perhaps, then, the strategy of the "successful" superintendent is to avoid phrasing issues in terms which tap the emotions of diverse and competing segments of the public. If this is done, then the competition between a full-time professional and less committed participants is likely to be highly uneven. The unequal distribution of resources between professionals and laymen helps to understand the cooptation of board members, a pervasive theme in the literature of organizations. The ability of managers to master the complex flow of information, to rely upon the capabilities of a staff, and to devote a major portion of their time to a problem
are resources unmatched by comparable ones on the part of board members. Unlike many elected public officials, school board members typically do not speak for a clearly defined functional or geographical constituency. Unless an issue is clearly beyond the professional competence of the superintendent, as was apparently the case with desegregation, board members appear to be at a disadvantage. It is probable, therefore, that school boards are somewhat more acquiescent than are other public bodies in their relations with administrative officers.

To reduce the problems described above to workable proportions, we might focus upon the existence of opponents to the superintendent. The questions are:

1) On how many boards does a substantial proportion of the members frequently oppose the superintendent?

2) In what kinds of communities does opposition develop? In addition to the usual ecological variables, I have in mind ascertaining something about the level of support for education, gathered from surveys and from the outputs of the community (frequency of defeat for bond or tax levies, for example).

3) What kinds of formal structures of decision-making foster opposition to the superintendent? The formal structures in which decisions are made have been the focus of widespread concern on the part of various reformers in both local government and educational administration. Indeed, most of the energy on the part of reformers was directed toward various institutional modifications on the assumption that "desirable" behavioral consequences would flow logically and naturally from these modifications. In municipal reform, the non-partisan ballot and city-wide elections,
for example, were instituted because such forms would keep "politics" out of local decision-making. If there is no Democratic or Republican way to collect the garbage it is even more true--according to the rationale of reformers--that there is no Democratic or Republican way to educate children. Accordingly, school boards are constructed so as to minimize partisan conflict. Nevertheless, there is enough variation to enable us to examine the relation of opposition to the superintendent with (a) whether elections to the board are partisan or non-partisan, (b) whether elections are district or at large, (c) whether school related elections are held simultaneously with other elections, (d) the frequency of elections, and (e) the legal term of office. All of these variables can be linked theoretically to the exacerbation or softening of conflict that has been presumed to encourage certain sorts of pressures. For instance, we would hypothesize that district elections would create more constituency pressure and hence provide a base of resources for opposition to the superintendent.

4) What is the internal control of succession to the board? Are board members subject to electoral opposition? Are incumbents regularly returned to office? These variables give us some idea of the "openness" of the system. The more open the system, the greater the conflict between board and superintendent.

5) How are board members recruited? The recruitment of board members might be linked with their behavior toward the superintendent. It may be that the reasons for seeking the job and the manner in which a person is recruited are of equal influence to the occupational socialization of the job itself. Recruitment should be a good predictor of socialization which, in turn, should help us understand the way a person looks at the
world. Of course, such a clear model is not necessarily empirically true. For instance, there is apparently little relationship between the role orientations of legislators and city councilmen and their patterns of recruitment. In our case the possibility of a linkage may be high because it may be possible to discover that opponents and supporters of the superintendent had different reference groups prior to their becoming school board members, or that opposition to the superintendent was a part of a potential board member’s intellectual baggage before he joined the board. Basically, my concern over recruitment centers upon whether or not opponents and supporters are recruited by agents from within the “educational establishment” or by agents from within the general political system, such as by groups whose interest extends to matters other than education. It may also be that opposition is more likely to take place when board members are "self-starters" without any organizational ties to the community.

6) What are the resources of board members. Essentially, resources are weapons in an exchange, assuming that both parties to the exchange are contesting the authority of the other. Those who deal in exchange theory propose two categories of resources: (a) detachable and (b) non-detachable. A detachable resource is one that is transferable, e.g., not linked to a unique individual while the opposite is true of non-detachable resources. For instance, organizational membership is detachable but socio-economic status is not. With regard to detachable resources, a further distinction can be made. Resources can also be internal or external. External resources, which are brought by the board member to the interaction with the superintendent, might be the control of a bloc of votes, or the representation of an identifiable constituency.
Internal resources might be typified by technical knowledge which, as we have suggested, is a resource monopolized by the superintendent.

In a sense, the competition between the board and the superintendent might be viewed as one of external versus internal resources, with the board, because of its legal status, having greater access to external resources and the superintendent, because of his training and the requirements of his job, gaining easier access to internal resources.

Resources of board members which may influence level of opposition to the superintendent are: length of tenure, socio-economic status, organizational membership, and interaction with community groups.

7) What are the values of opponents and supporters? Is the superintendent the defender of the status quo, as Crain has suggested, or are boards more likely to play this role?

2. Teachers and students. Although teacher militancy has become an increasingly important topic of research among educationists and political scientists, there are many unanswered questions relating to their role in the governing of schools. For the sake of feasibility, I propose to limit the research on teachers and students to their rising expectations for participation in decision-making. American school systems have traditionally been organized along fairly hierarchical lines, with teachers and students occupying a position near the bottom. In spite of the surge of militancy, the available evidence suggests that these underdog groups remain without much power in their competition with school boards and superintendents. There is also evidence, however, that the actual role of teachers and students and their aspirations are at variance. What appears to be happening in education is a small reproduction of what is
happening in the larger society: groups with an inferior influence position are seeking to expand their power.

The difference between these groups and school boards is that there is very little ideological support for an expanded role in the decision-making process. Teachers like to think of themselves as "professionals" but it is difficult to agree with this self-concept. Among other attributes, professionals are supposed to have some degree of autonomy in exercising their special competence. Yet teachers cannot exercise much independent authority even within the classroom to which they are assigned. There is among teachers an "employee" orientation which requires a basic loyalty to the "boss" (the superintendent and the school board). Yet it is apparent that, even if the employee orientation is dominant, some teachers hold a genuinely professional view, which impels them to seek to expand their power at the expense of administrators and lay authorities.

If teachers have traditionally adopted a subservient position, this is even a more accurate description of the role of students. If those who have traditionally held power have resisted the demands of teachers, they have done so even more vehemently with regard to the demands of students. Further, when student demands are voiced, teachers frequently find themselves defending the status quo.

In essence, we have the opportunity to study the conflict between a growing professionalism on the part of teachers and growing dissatisfaction on the part of students and the authoritarian structure of the school bureaucracy. The researchable questions are:

1) What is the extent of militant professionalism among teachers? Estimates now range from between 10 and 40 percent, depending upon the
measure used.

2) What proportion of students are seriously interested in taking a more active role?

3) What kinds of school board members and superintendents are likely to respond with favor on demands from below?

4) How much support from external sources, e.g., the public, can teachers and students expect? Tentative evidence indicates that there is substantial public support for a greater voice for teachers, but considerably less among school board members and superintendents. Presumably, the public is much less tolerant of students; certainly boards and superintendents have taken a dim view of student power.

3. Interest Groups. Another threat to the status quo comes in the form of various segments of the public. Some evidence of a decline in public support can be seen in the rise in the proportion of local bond issues rejected. While the "taxpayers revolt" might be a fruitful topic of research, we are better off examining the role of intermediaries between citizens and officials, e.g., special interest groups. As early as 1958 Gross asserted that interest groups were occasionally successful in exerting pressure to split the board and weaken financial support. On the other hand, Crain has argued that interest groups were of little consequence in influencing the course of integration decisions. The problem here, as elsewhere, is that studies have usually been issue specific, with no effort being made to develop a general notion of the role of interest groups in school governance. The appropriate task is one of uncovering the influential groups in educational decision-making and assessing the overall impact of group activity upon the decision-making process. The questions
1) What is the inventory of groups whose activities come to the attention of decision-makers? Is the pressure predominantly from the "right" or the "left"?

2) What is the intensity of group activity? It is probably true that some boards operate in an environment relatively free of group activity, while others are besieged by interest groups. We need to know the factors associated with variations in group activity. Some possible clues are: the complexity of the community (group demands should be more intense in complex social environments); the level of stress within the community (interest group activity should become more intense as stress increases); the extent to which the structure of board decision-making is "political" (interest group activity should be more intense in more political structures).

3) What are the consequences of group activity? If we view interest groups as bargaining agents in the allocation of public resources, then we need to know what difference they make in the way school districts conduct their business. We raised the question earlier of whether or not interest groups thrive in an atmosphere of heightened tension. Does it therefore follow that group activity might contribute to heightened tension which accompanies a decline in public confidence? Imagine, for example, a school district suffering a decline in public support. Assuming that interest groups will probably become active in this district, does their activity translate the loss of confidence into observable phenomena? What is needed is some measure of the consequences of group activity which would tap the dimensions of "issue arousal" and "issue disposal". I am thinking, for example, of the relation, if any relation exists between
interest group activity and, say, financial defeats or superintendent turnover.

The strategy of research can be understood as consisting of two parts: macro-analysis and micro-analysis. The theoretical justification for reliance upon two levels of analysis stems from my desire to generalize about the American educational system while at the same time providing detailed information about the vagaries of the decision-making process. Given this set of requirements, the strategy is one of broadly based survey research and detailed case analysis, based upon the generalizations of the survey research, to provide follow-up information.

Neither survey research nor case analysis is solely adequate for the task, since each method has inherent weaknesses. The weaknesses of survey research are that its findings are based upon reports of behavior rather than observations of behavior: it is difficult to describe the decisional process in any detail based upon these reports. The weakness of the case method is that, in order to generalize, we must commit the fallacy of reasoning by analogy. That is to say, because two units are structurally, functionally, or behaviorally homologous, i.e., there is real or near identity between them, it does not follow that we can treat them as analogies and assume that statements about one are as good as statements about the other. This is why the case approach has had remarkably low theoretical yield.

The strategy thus consists of two distinct phases. In the first phase, the survey, we need to select a relatively large number of school districts. In these districts, interviews would be taken with superintendents, school board members, teachers, students, and the general public. Of course,
I recognize the extraordinary problems and expense in conducting such a survey, but the utility of gaining comparative data from a variety of groups is sufficient stimulus to press on with the job. In this phase, the analysis should be primarily at the non-individual level. Although the information is necessarily based upon individual responses, the data should not be analysed primarily in the traditional fashion of tabular presentation of individual responses. Although the individuals in a group and the group as a whole make decisions simultaneously, in the real world of decision-making; it is the group as a whole and not the individual members which is the effective decision-maker. It follows that we want to make statements about the group as a whole rather than the behavior of its component parts. This is particularly true in my case since I want to compare the behavior of many groups. Of course it is impossible to observe the behavior of the group without observing the behavior of the individuals in the group. As Eulau suggests, the solution is to bring all the unit's properties to the same level of analysis.

To illustrate, interviews with the entire population of teachers, much less citizens, of a district is obviously impossible. However, it is quite feasible to interview all the members of a school board. To take the example of opposition to the superintendent, boards can be classified simply according to the proportions of opponents. Or to take the example of interest group activity, we should be able to develop a measure of group intensity for each district. If the data can be expressed at this level, then causal modeling, or at least multiple regression, should be employed.

In this first phase, we will also need to make some decisions about
the kinds of districts to be selected for more detailed analysis. Some possible alternatives are: (1) classifying districts according to the level of tension and selecting districts which typify each level of tension; (2) classifying districts according to the extent of conflict between board and superintendent; (3) classifying districts according to whether influence is largely in the hands of the superintendent, the board or both.