This paper presents a critical review of empirical and theoretical treatments of group reaction to attitudinal deviancy. Inspired by Festinger's (1950) ideas on resolution of attitudinal discrepancies in groups, Schachter (1951) conducted an experiment that has greatly influenced subsequent research and theory concerning reaction to attitudinal deviancy. Although Schachter's findings on sociometric rejection of the deviate have been frequently replicated, his data on communication to the deviate are partially inconsistent with theory and other research. Additional evidence is presented which suggests that individuals who deviate in nonattitudinal spheres are also subject to negative group sanction. Rejection may be employed against persons who impede group goals, transgress group norms, or differ in personality from other group members. Finally, data are presented which indicate that deviates are not always rejected; rather, deviation in some settings and by some individuals may be tolerated or even encouraged. (Author)
REACTIONS TO ATTITUDBNAL
DEVIANCY
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REACTIONS TO ATTITUDINAL DEVIANCY

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Report from the Peer Group Pressures on Learning Project
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PREFACE

Contributing to an understanding of children's cognitive learning and improving related educational practices is the goal of the Wisconsin R & D Center. One of the Center's three major research and development programs—Conditions and Processes of Learning—consists of laboratory-type research projects, each concentrating on certain basic organismic or situational determinants of cognitive learning, but all united in the task of providing knowledge which can be utilized in the construction of instructional systems.

Any complete study of the variables which influence human learning—whether in or out of the classroom—must ultimately consider social influences. Professor Allen and his associates are engaged in a research project directed toward the analysis of social determinants in the acquisition and retention of basic cognitive skills. In this Theoretical Paper, Mr. Levine and Professor Allen provide a critical review of the literature on group reaction to attitudinal deviancy.

Herbert J. Klausmeier
Director
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents a critical review of empirical and theoretical treatments of group reaction to attitudinal deviancy. Inspired by Festinger's (1950) ideas on resolution of attitudinal discrepancies in groups, Schachter (1951) conducted an experiment that has greatly influenced subsequent research and theory concerning reaction to attitudinal deviancy. Although Schachter's findings on sociometric rejection of the deviate have been frequently replicated, his data on communication to the deviate are partially inconsistent with theory and other research. Additional evidence is presented which suggests that individuals who deviate in nonattitudinal spheres are also subject to negative group sanction. Rejection may be employed against persons who impede group goals, transgress group norms, or differ in personality from other group members. Finally, data are presented which indicate that deviates are not always rejected; rather, deviation in some settings and by some individuals may be tolerated or even encouraged.
INTRODUCTION

While reaction to attitudinal deviancy in the small group setting has received relatively little systematic empirical investigation, the theoretical attention devoted to this problem has been even more limited. This paucity of theoretical consideration is somewhat surprising in view of the centrality of the deviance problem to the basic relationship between the individual and the group. Perhaps, most investigators consider the problem solved, concluding, as do Kelley and Thibaut (1954, p. 768),

It is common knowledge that when a member deviates markedly from a group standard, the remaining members of the group bring pressures to bear on the deviate to return to conformity. If pressure is of no avail, the deviate is rejected and cast out of the group. The research on this point is consistent with common sense.

However, is group reaction really this simple and invariant? To answer this question, we shall attempt to review and integrate data and theory relevant to the problem of group reaction to attitudinal deviancy. We believe that careful consideration of the data will indicate that Kelley and Thibaut's (1954) statement vastly oversimplifies the range and complexity of treatment accorded an individual who deviates from group consensus.

Leon Festinger and his students in the early 1950's provided the initial impetus for study of group reaction to deviance; unfortunately, little new theoretical clarification has emerged since. In an influential paper, Festinger (1950) asserted that pressures toward group uniformity arise from two sources: (1) social reality, group members seek consensus to validate opinions not anchored in physical reality; and (2) group locomotion, uniformity is sought to enable attainment of group goals. Uniformity pressures (from either source) produce communications oriented to reducing discrepancies among group members. Such communication can resolve attitudinal discrepancies in three ways: (1) the deviate may change his opinion toward the group, (2) the group may change its modal opinion toward the deviate, or (3) the group may redefine its boundaries by rejecting the deviate.

Festinger offered several hypotheses concerning variables which affect the relationship between communication and uniformity. Regarding the magnitude of pressures to communicate, Festinger hypothesized that perceived discrepancy among group members, relevance of the issue, and group cohesiveness are all positively related to communication pressure. Variables which determine communication to a particular individual include perceived opinion discrepancy, perception of individual as a group member and/or desire that individual be a group member, and perception that communication will alter deviate's opinion. Factors positively related to opinion change in a communication recipient include group pressures toward uniformity, forces causing the individual to remain in the group, and lack of issue anchorage in other group memberships. Finally, perceived discrepancy, relevance of the issue, and group cohesiveness are all positively related to rejection of the deviate by the group.
NEGATIVE REACTION TO ATTITUDINAL DEVIANCY

EARLY RESEARCH

Several studies were conducted by Festinger and his colleagues to investigate relationships suggested above. Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1960) interviewed M.I.T. students, living in married-student housing developments, on attitudes toward a tenants' organization. Data indicated that cohesiveness (% of in-group sociometric choices) was negatively related to the percentage of individuals who deviated from modal group opinion on the tenants' organization. Thus, the greater the attractiveness (cohesiveness) of the group, the greater conformity (less deviation) to group norms. Regarding reaction to deviation, the investigators found that deviates received significantly fewer sociometric choices from group members than did conformers. It appears, then, that deviates are rejected by group members. However, the correlational nature of the data make causal inferences impossible; we do not know whether deviation produced rejection or whether initial rejection freed individuals to deviate.

To resolve the direction of causality in this relationship, we need either correlational data with clear temporal sequencing or experimental data with one of the two variables independently manipulated. Two studies fulfill the former requirement. Festinger and Thibaut (1951) hypothesized that (1) communication will be directed primarily to extreme deviates; (2) if the group can subdivide or redefine boundaries, communication to deviates will decrease over time; and (3) greater pressure toward uniformity will produce more change in group members.

In this experiment, groups of 6 to 14 Ss used notes to discuss one of two issues, treatment of a juvenile delinquent or football strategy. It was hypothesized that opinions on the former topic would be more resistant to change than opinions on the latter. Instructions were used to manipulate pressure toward uniformity (High, Medium, Low) and group composition (Homogeneous, Heterogeneous).

Results indicated that on both topics communication varied directly with the extremeness of the recipient's opinion, i.e., extreme deviates received the most communication. Moreover, communication to deviates varied directly with pressure to uniformity. Regarding changes in communication to deviates over time, results differed in the Homogeneous and Heterogeneous conditions. In the Homogeneous condition amount of communication to deviates did not change significantly over time in any of the three pressure conditions. In the Heterogeneous condition, on the other hand, communication to deviates decreased significantly over time in the Medium and Low pressure conditions, but not in the High pressure condition. Thus, when pressure to uniformity is high, communication to deviates remains high, regardless of group composition. However, when pressure to uniformity is low and opportunity for subgroup formation exists, communication to deviates decreases over time. Data concerning change in members' opinions are partially consistent with predictions; both high pressure to uniformity and group homogeneity produce relatively high change toward group uniformity. However, these results hold primarily for the football strategy issue; Ss' opinions on treatment of a juvenile delinquent are highly resistant to group influence under all conditions.

In a related experiment, Gerard (1953) sought to test the effects of group composition and pressure to uniformity upon communication, using two kinds of group disagreement. Subjects were brought together in groups of 8 to 14 and asked to (1) indicate which of two issues relating to federal aid to education was the more important and (2) express their opinion on each issue using seven-point scales. Instructions were used to manipulate group composition (Homogeneous, Heterogeneous) and pressure to
uniformity (High, Low). As in the previous experiment, Ss used notes to communicate with one another. Subjects were dichotomized into majority and minority members, depending on the issue chosen as more important.

Results were partially consistent with those of Festinger and Thibaut (1951), i.e., more communication was directed to extreme deviates than to conformers, and change toward group uniformity, though relatively slight, occurred primarily in the Homogeneous-High pressure condition. However, Gerard found that communication to deviates decreased over time only in the Homogeneous condition; this result is opposite to that reported by Festinger and Thibaut. Gerard (1953) explained that since few opinion changes occurred in his Homogeneous condition, Ss gave up trying to influence deviates and decreased communication to them over time. In the Festinger and Thibaut study, however, opinion changes did occur, and, hence, successful communication did not decrease. In Festinger and Thibaut's Heterogeneous condition, uniformity pressures arose and deviates were only rejected after opinion discrepancies became clear during discussion; thus, communication to deviates decreased over time. On the other hand, Ss in Gerard's Heterogeneous condition began rejecting deviates immediately because tendencies to agree with perceived group "experts" reduced uniformity pressures. Interestingly, Jones and Gerard (1967) report that Gerard's (1953) results support Festinger and Thibaut (1951): Jones and Gerard (p. 351) state that Gerard (1953) found that communication "went to less extreme opinions only when subgroup formation was possible, that is, in the heterogeneous condition."

Although results of the Festinger and Thibaut (1951) and Gerard (1953) experiments are not perfectly parallel, certain consistent and interesting relationships emerge. However, one may still ask whether these data are directly relevant to the issue of group reaction to deviance. First, since deviance is not directly manipulated, the number of deviates varies in an unknown fashion across studies and across groups within a study. Although a weighting technique was employed in both experiments to take account of the number of individuals at a particular opinion position, this method does not solve all problems. In essence, the number of persons in the group who are "deviates" depends completely on S's own position; deviation is defined in terms of discrepancy from S's position rather than discrepancy from group consensus. It would seem to be quite different, psychologically, for S to confront one deviate vs. four deviates in a group of five. Thus, the basic phenomenon of deviance from group consensus is not directly tested in either the Festinger and Thibaut (1951) or Gerard (1953) study.

Second, the a priori definitions of "communication" (as attempt to influence) and of "decrease in communication" (as rejection) are problematic. We have no independent evidence that Ss try to influence one another in their written notes; neither do we know that decreased communication indicates rejection. Data such as content analysis of notes and sociometric preferences would greatly clarify the mechanisms underlying group reaction to deviance.

SCHACHTER'S AND RELATED CONTRIBUTIONS

Let us now turn to experiments in which deviance is directly manipulated as dissent from group consensus and in which less ambiguous measures of rejection are utilized. In perhaps the most influential and misrepresented (Berkowitz, 1967) study of group reaction to deviance, Schachter (1951) experimentally manipulated discrepancy between deviate and group, relevance of issue to group, and group cohesiveness. Subjects were recruited as members of clubs organized around four different topics. One-half of the Ss were assigned to clubs they found attractive (High Cohesive), while the remaining one-half were assigned to clubs they found relatively unattractive (Low Cohesive). In addition, the topic discussed in both High Cohesive and Low Cohesive conditions was either Relevant or Irrelevant to the group purpose. Thus, four conditions were created: High Co-Relevant, High Co-Irrelevant, Low Co-Relevant, Low Co-Irrelevant. Each group contained five naive Ss and three confederates (Mode, Slider, Deviate). The Mode agreed with Ss' modal position throughout the discussion. The Slider started as an extreme deviate, but gradually came to agree with the modal position. The Deviate maintained an extremely unpopular opinion throughout the discussion. The topic of discussion in all conditions was treatment of a juvenile delinquent; Ss verbally communicated on the issue for 45 minutes.

Following the discussion, Ss filled out a sociometric questionnaire and nominated group members to committee positions varying in degree of attractiveness. Sociometric data indicated that in all conditions the Deviate was rejected significantly more than either the Mode or Slider, who did not differ significantly from one another. Moreover, while the Deviate was rejected significantly more in the High Cohesive than in the Low Cohesive condition, Relevance had no differential effect on rejection. Regarding committee nominations, in three of the four conditions (except Low Co-Irrelevant) the Deviate was overominated for the least desirable
committee and undernominated for the most desirable committee; the Mode and Slider were not systematically rejected. In addition, the Deviate was rejected significantly more in the Relevant than in the Irrelevant condition. However, it should be noted that the differential effect of Relevance on rejection was primarily due to a startlingly high degree of Deviate acceptance in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition. Finally, Cohesiveness was not significantly related to rejection on the committee assignment measure.

Data on communication to the three confederates were also obtained; however, since Schachter's (1951) presentation of these results was somewhat unclear, our discussion will be based partially on Mills' (1962) and Berkowitz (1967) summaries of Schachter's (1951) data. Regarding overall communication, the Deviate received approximately 4 times the number of communications directed to the Slider, and 7 times the number directed to the mode (Mills, 1962). Thus, amount of communication varied directly with extremeness of deviacy from group norms. Concerning trends over time, communication to the Mode remained uniform, communication to the Slider decreased, and communication to the Deviate increased steadily in all conditions except High Co-Relevant, where a final decrease occurred. While these results generally support the Festinger (1950) and Schachter (1951) hypothesis that communication is used to achieve group uniformity, other communication data are not consistent with the hypothesis. Regarding only communication to the Deviate, the greatest amount occurred in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition, where, theoretically, pressure to uniformity should be lowest.

Let us review a partial replication of the Schachter study (Emerson, 1954) before discussing the implications of Schachter's results. Except for the use of high school students rather than college students as Ss, and the omission of the Relevance manipulation, Emerson's experimental procedures closely replicated those of Schachter. Emerson's sociometric data showed that the Deviate was rejected more than the Mode or Slider, who did not differ from one another. Also, the Deviate was rejected significantly more in the High Cohesive than in the Low Cohesive condition. On committee nominations, the Deviate was overominated for the least attractive committee, but there was no significant difference between the High Cohesive and Low Cohesive conditions on this measure of rejection. More communication was directed to the Deviate in the Low than in the High Cohesive condition, and communication to the Deviate consistently rose over time with no final decline in any condition. No data on communication to the Mode or Slider were presented.

Rejection of the Deviate on all three measures was lower in the replication than in Schachter's (1951) study. Emerson explained the relatively low rejection of the Deviate in his experiment in terms of subject factors. That is, Emerson's Ss were younger than those of Schachter and, hence, tended to change their own opinions rather than the Deviate's in order to achieve uniformity. Emerson presented data indicating that significantly more Ss changed toward the Deviate in his study than in Schachter's experiment.

Several questions can be raised about the conclusiveness of Schachter's (1951) and Emerson's (1954) results on group reaction to deviance. First, communication data in both experiments indicate that most communication is directed to the Deviate in conditions where theory predicts least pressure to uniformity. Thus, the validity of communication as an index of "pressure to uniformity" is questionable. Moreover, since neither Schachter nor Emerson presented content analyses of communications, we have no direct evidence that Ss try to influence one another at all. This omission seems strange since Schachter (1951) reported, in his methods section, collecting data on the implied approval and disapproval contained in communications. The questionable validity of communication as an index of pressure to uniformity also casts doubt on the use of decreased communication as an index of rejection.

We submit, therefore, that the communication data presented by Schachter and Emerson are, like earlier data of this type, inadequate to test hypotheses concerning pressure to uniformity and rejection of deviates. Fortunately, however, postexperimtmental evaluations of deviates provided by Schachter (1951) and Emerson (1954) can be taken as fairly reliable indices of group reaction to deviance.

Mills (1962) also argues that Schachter's (1951) communication data may not reflect attempts to achieve group uniformity, but rather indicate aggression displaced from a powerful and frustrating E to a helpless deviate. Mills asserts that Schachter angered Ss by violating norms of the experimenter-subject role relationship. That is, Schachter frustrated and angered Ss by placing them in unattractive groups and imposing irrelevant tasks. By this reasoning, the rank order of conditions, in terms of frustration, is (from high to low): Low Co-Irrelevant, Low Co-Relevant or High Co-Irrelevant, and High Co-Relevant. Mills argues that, because Ss cannot aggress against E, aggression is displaced to the deviate. Communication, then,
should be rank ordered in the same manner as frustration; the data approximate this relationship.

Mills' analysis, while interesting, is open to attack on two points. First, we have no evidence that communication to the deviate expressed hostility displaced from E. as mentioned before, no data on communication content were presented. Second, Schachter's (1951) results show that the Deviate received least rejection (on the committee nomination measure) in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition, where Mills would have to predict greatest rejection.

Aderman (1968) has speculated regarding the dramatic acceptance of the Deviate in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition on the committee nomination measure. Aderman suggests that in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition acceptance is positively related to an individual's communications to others, regardless of content. Thus, if we can assume that the Deviate spoke more in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition than in any other condition, rejection should be lowest in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition, as found. However, the Deviate was strongly rejected in the Low Co-Irrelevant condition on the sociometric index. Unfortunately, since Schachter presented no data regarding volume of communication initiated by any of the three confederates, Aderman's hypothesis cannot be tested with existing data. Emerson (1954), however, provides evidence both supportive and nonsupportive of the hypothesis. On the one hand, group members who received even more sociometric rejection than the Deviate contributed least to group discussion; on the other hand, the Deviate, who received more rejection than the Mode or Slider, talked more than any other single member. Clearly, judgment must be withheld on the communication volume hypothesis until adequate empirical evidence is available.

RECENT EXPERIMENTS

Approximately a decade after the initial flurry or work on reaction to deviancy, Sampson and Brandon (1964) sought to investigate group reaction to opinion vs. role deviancy. These investigators hypothesized that both opinion discrepancies and role expectation discrepancies produce increased communication to the Deviate and/or redefinition of group boundaries to exclude the Deviate. It was suggested that communication is employed when the deviation is specific and potentially modifiable and when external demands for continued interaction are present.

Female Ss were brought together in groups of four to discuss (under no external uniformity pressure) treatment of a Negro juvenile delinquent. A confederate initially presented herself as either bigoted (Role Deviate) or racially liberal (Role Conformant). During the verbal discussion of the delinquent's treatment, the confederate either agreed with group consensus (Opinion Conformant) or strongly and consistently disagreed (Opinion Deviate). Four experimental conditions were thus created: Role Deviate-Opinion Conformant, Role Deviate-Opinion Deviate, Role Conformant-Opinion Conformant, and Role Conformant-Opinion Deviate.

Results showed that Ss reacted very differently to Role and Opinion Deviates. Communication data indicated that the Opinion Deviate, as compared to the Opinion Conformant, received significantly more overall communication, expressions of hostility, and requests for information, and significantly fewer expressions of solidarity. In contrast, the Role Conformant, as compared to the Role Deviate, received significantly more overall communications, expressions of hostility, and information. The investigators interpret their results as indicating that Ss attempt to change the Opinion Deviate but withdraw completely from the Role Deviate.

Data on perception and evaluation of the Deviate indicated that (1) Ss saw themselves as significantly more similar to the Role Conformant than the Role Deviate, and (2) Ss expressed significantly more liking for the Role Conformant than the Role Deviate. The investigators suggested that, if E had applied external pressures to uniformity, perhaps the Opinion Deviate would have been liked significantly less than the Opinion Conformant. Indeed, on another sociometric question the Opinion Deviate was liked significantly less than the Opinion Conformant.

The communication data in this experiment was interesting for several reasons. First, Sampson and Brandon present the most adequate data yet encountered. Second, these data clearly demonstrate that communication is not a unitary phenomenon; various communication indices do not invariably correlate highly with one another or with overall communication. Third, several communication indices (e.g., expressions of solidarity and hostility, requests for information) do possess face validity as measures of pressure to uniformity. Finally, for the first time, extremeness of deviation is inversely related to amount of overall communication directed toward the deviate, i.e., the Role Deviate received relatively less communication than did the Opinion Deviate. Our interpretation of role deviancy as more extreme than opinion deviancy requires some explanation. We feel that Sampson and Brandon's
use of the term "role" to describe the confederate's bigotry or liberalism is questionable; it seems that extremeness of confederate's opinion was actually manipulated here. (Interests in variable Ss' perceptions of the confederate's opinion were used to validate the Role manipulation.) It appears reasonable that a bigoted confederate would appear both more extreme and less amenable to change than a confederate who merely deviates from group consensus on treatment of a Negro juvenile delinquent. Thus, the Role Deviate is a more extreme opinion deviate than the Opinion Deviate. Hence, we would predict, as did Sampson and Brandon, more rejection of the Role Deviate than the Opinion Deviate. Sociometric data supported this prediction. However, overall communication was inversely related to extremeness of deviancy, rather than directly related as previous investigators have reported.

Sampson and Brandon assert that the Role Deviate was so completely rejected that no pressures were exerted on her. Perhaps, as Festinger (1950) suggested, the relationship of communication to deviate's extremeness depends on Ss' perceptions of the deviate's willingness to alter his opinion. If so, communication may be positively related to extremeness when the deviate is malleable and inversely related when the deviate is rigid. Perhaps, then, only in the Sampson and Brandon experiment was the extreme opinion deviate, i.e. Role Deviate, perceived as totally unamenable to persuasion.

Katz, Libby, and Strodtbeck (1964) hypothesized that deviance may not be punished when lack of deviance (conformity) threatens the existing group status hierarchy. That is, since higher status group members are threatened by the conformity of low status individuals who are upwardly mobile, conformity may be punished more than continued deviancy. In this study, Ss were female sales trainees who discussed a tape recorded salesperson-customer interaction. Two confederates (Deviate and Slider) deviated from group consensus in a manner similar to Schachter's (1951) confederates. Subjects were told that group status positions were either permanent throughout "group training" sessions (Stable status) or would probably soon change (Mobile status). Results indicated that both the Deviate and Slider were ranked significantly lower on an index of liking than were conforming group members. Moreover, the Deviate was rejected more than the Slider, regardless of group status mobility. Thus, the positive relationship between extremeness of deviance and rejection overrides influence of other variables such as status threat.

Streufert (1965) investigated the influence of a communicator's "importance" on the evaluation of his conformity or deviance. "Importance" was hypothesized to vary inversely with interaction distance (a composite of spatial closeness and temporal length of interaction). Subjects listened to two tape recorded communicators, one who agreed with Ss' opinions on rock-and-roll music (Conformant) and one who disagreed (Deviate). Then, Ss were asked to rate the two communicators in three hypothetical situations varying in communicator-S interaction distance. Results showed that Ss rated the Deviate significantly less favorably than the Conformant at all three interaction distances. Favorableness of ratings toward the Conformant varied inversely with interaction distance, i.e., the more important the Conformant, the more Ss liked him. However, favorableness of ratings toward the Deviate varied directly with interaction distance, i.e., the more important the Deviate, the less Ss liked him. Streufert hypothesized that the Deviate's importance was directly related to the amount of dissonance that he produced; this dissonance, in turn, was directly related to rejection.

SUMMARY

Let us at this point attempt to summarize the more important findings reported so far. The amount of communication directed to a given individual generally varies directly with extremeness of the individual's opinion vis-a-vis the communicator and/or the group (Festinger and Thibaut, 1951; Gerard, 1953; Schachter, 1951). In addition, Festinger and Thibaut (1951) reported that increased pressure to uniformity produces significantly more communication to deviates. These findings are consistent with Festinger's (1950) hypothesis that communication is employed by group members in order to achieve group uniformity. However, conflicting evidence also appears. Both Schachter (1951) and Emerson (1954) found that the deviate receives the greatest amount of communication in the conditions where uniformity pressures are lowest (low group cohesion; irrelevant issue). Moreover, Sampson and Brandon (1964) showed that communication varies inversely with extremeness of the deviate's position.

Decrease in communication to deviates over time (often considered rejection) occurs (1) when uniformity pressures are relatively low and subgroup formation is possible (Festinger and Thibaut, 1951), (2) when subgroup formation is not possible (Gerard, 1953), and (3) when a highly cohesive group discusses a relevant issue (Schachter, 1951). Note that Sampson and Brandon's (1964) communication data may also be relevant to rejection of deviates.
Several studies report that group members reject opinion deviates in sociometric ratings and/or committee nominations (Schachter, 1951; Emerson, 1954; Sampson and Brandon, 1964; Katz, Libby, and Strodtbeck, 1964; Streufert, 1965). Rejection generally varies directly with extremeness of the deviate's opinion (Schachter, 1951; Emerson, 1954; Sampson and Brandon, 1964; Katz, Libby, and Strodtbeck, 1964). There is also some evidence that rejection varies directly with both group cohesiveness (Schachter, 1951; Emerson, 1954) and issue relevance (Schachter, 1951). Finally, Streufert (1965) found that rejection varies directly with intimacy of hypothetical deviate-subject interaction.

Regarding group change toward uniformity, Festinger and Thibaut (1951) and Gerard (1953) found the greatest changes in homogeneous groups under high uniformity pressures. A study by Back (1951), not directly pertinent to reaction to deviancy, reported more change in high cohesive than in low cohesive dyads. However, Emerson (1954) presented data indicating that in neither his nor Schachter's (1951) study did variation in group cohesiveness significantly affect the percentage of Ss changing toward the deviate's position. Emerson did show, however, that significantly more Ss changed toward the deviate in his replication than in Schachter's original experiment; this difference was attributed to variations in Ss' ages in the two studies.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

The studies reviewed above, while dealing with both modification of the deviate and group change as possible resolutions of attitudinal discrepancy, clearly stress rejection of the deviate. Does evidence from other research areas substantiate the hypothesis that rejection of the deviate is a ubiquitous reaction to group disagreement? Two conformity experiments provide data that deviates are often rejected by group members. Allen (1965) manipulated deviancy by having one group member deviate from group consensus on 12 out of 20 items dealing with personality traits, famous persons, and drawn figures. Questionnaire responses indicated that approximately one-fourth of the Ss reacted "very unfavorably" to the deviate. Allen and Levine (1968b) asked Ss in a conformity experiment to rate both a Social Supporter (who agreed with S but disagreed with the erroneous group) and an Extreme Dissenter (who answered even more incorrectly than the group). Results showed that Ss rated the Extreme Dissenter significantly lower than the Social Supporter on four evaluative scales (Likeableness, Intelligence, Sincerity, and Adjustment).
NEGATIVE REACTION TO NONATTITUDINAL DEVIANCY

Several additional studies, while not dealing directly with attitudinal deviance, are relevant to the general notion that groups reject deviates. An attempt was made by Schachter, Nuttin, DeMencheux, Macorps, Osmer, Dujker, Rommetveit, and Israel (1954) to investigate the relationship between threat to a group goal and rejection of a deviate in a cross-cultural setting. Threat was defined as varying directly with valence of the goal and inversely with probability that the goal would be achieved. Subjects were school boys, living in Holland, Sweden, France, Norway, Belgium, Germany, or England, who volunteered to participate in an aviation club. The Ss were brought together in groups of six or seven and told that the groups would compete on a model-airplane building task.

Valence of goal was manipulated by telling Ss that the competition would determine either continuation of the club (High Valence) or receipt of tickets to a dull movie (Low Valence). Probability of attaining the goal was defined as either High or Low. Thus, four conditions were created: High Valence-High Probability, High Valence-Low Probability, Low Valence-High Probability, and Low Valence-Low Probability. During discussion of which model to build for competition, a confederate deviated from group consensus by choosing a dull glider. Since Ss were instructed to decide on a model, the Deviate clearly retarded group locomotion rather than merely confusing social reality.

Unfortunately, results are difficult to interpret because of the confusing manner in which they were presented. Three experiments (English, Belgian, and German) will not be discussed here since adequate perceptions of the experimental situation were not created. For the remaining countries, sociometric data indicated that Ss rejected the Deviate more in the Low Probability option than in the High Probability condition; the Valence manipulation had no significant effect on rejection. Generally, greater rejection occurred in the High Valence-Low Probability than in the High Valence-High Probability condition. Data on the second rejection measure (nomination for club president) indicated that neither the Valence nor the Probability manipulation produced consistent differences. Although the investigators state that "in all countries and in all conditions the deviate is considered relatively undesirable as either a working partner or a club president," no significance tests are offered to substantiate this statement.

The communication data are interesting primarily because an attempt was made to include only "imperative-minority," "aggressive," and "threatening" remarks to the deviate. In essence, the communication index is the proportion of all relevant comments initiated by Ss which are intense communications to the Deviate. This index is certainly far superior to the gross communication measures used in some of the previously discussed studies. Unfortunately, not even the improved communication index can clarify results of this experiment. Significantly more communication was directed to the Deviate in the High Valence-High Probability condition than in the High Valence-Low Probability condition; this result is both opposite to that found on the sociometric measure and contrary to theoretical predictions.

At the end of their paper, Schachter et al. (1954) offer theoretical interpretation of the data and indulge a penchant for drawing theoretical curves. First, the investigators "demonstrate" that cohesiveness is independent of both valence and probability by showing there are no significant differences between conditions on the question, "How frequently do you think the group should meet?" This, of course, is only one definition of cohesiveness (Adlerman, 1968), and, even if the definition were adequate, this single postexperimental question seems inadequate to test the important hypothesis that cohesiveness is independent of valence and probability.
Schachter and his associates state next that both tendency to redefine the group (rejection) and tendency to restore harmony (communication) vary positively with group cohesiveness and valence of the goal and negatively with probability of achieving the goal. How, then, can one predict which action the group will take to attain uniformity? Schachter et al. do not answer this question straightforwardly; instead, they employ unstated and undefended assumptions to create theoretical curves, which are then purported to accurately fit the data.

We are offered, however, illuminating formulae such as the following: Rejection = cohesiveness + tendency to redefine group - tendency to integrate; and Communication = cohesiveness - tendency to redefine group + tendency to integrate. The investigators state that their theory, although not well substantiated, offers the possibility of integrating communication and rejection data into one conceptual framework. Such an integration would be welcome, indeed, but we are skeptical that the Schachter et al. formulation, as articulated, is powerful enough to accomplish the task.

Two related studies have obtained evidence concerning reaction to deviation which retards group locomotion toward a valued goal. Berkowitz and Howard (1959) told groups of 8s that prizes would be awarded on the basis of either group performance (High Interdependence) or individual performance (Low Interdependence) on a judgmental opinion task. Subjects were led to believe that one group member differed strongly from modal group opinion. Results showed that more overall communication was directed toward the deviate in the High than Low Interdependence condition; moreover, 8s in the former condition had less desire for future interaction with the deviate than did 8s in the latter condition. It appears, then, that rejection of the deviate varies directly with his interference with goal attainment. A more direct test of this hypothesis was conducted recently by Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz (1965). These investigators led 8s to believe that the probability of group attainment of a $50 prize had been lowered by one member who did not follow directions. Results showed that negative evaluation of the deviate increased as a function of the degree to which he hampered realization of the group goal.

Mudd (1963) wished to demonstrate that intensity of deviate rejection is a direct function of the interaction between degree of deviation and importance of violated norm. Mudd developed equal interval scales to measure (1) degree of deviation from norm, (2) importance of norm to group (speech, cleanliness, honesty), and (3) severity of group sanction administered for deviation. Subjects were presented 27 behavioral items, varying in degree of deviation and norm importance, and asked to assign one of 11 sanctions to each behavior. Significant main effects for norm relevance and degree of deviation were obtained: rejection varied positively with increasing levels of both variables. Moreover, as norm relevance increased, severity of sanction per unit deviation increased. Results for norm relevance support Schachter's (1951) findings on issue relevance; data on degree of deviation are congruent with results obtained by several investigators (Schachter, 1951; Emerson, 1954; Sampson and Brandon, 1964; Katz, Libby, and Strodbeck, 1964).

Freedman and Doob (1968) manipulated deviancy by varying 8s' perceptions of their similarity to other group members on general personality scores. An initial experiment was designed to investigate aggression directed toward deviant and nondeviant frustrators by deviant and nondeviant 8s, who had no choice of victim. High school girls were brought together in small groups; each 8 was told that (1) she was similar to or different from other group members, and (2) another 8 (confederate) was similar to or different from other group members. The confederate then broke a machine, eliminating 8s' chances to earn $5.00. Next, 8s were asked to rate the confederate's performance on a task; medium intensity shocks were hypothetically administered to the confederate when a majority of 8s rated her negatively. Results indicated that nondeviant 8s (the group pertinent to our discussion) did not rate the deviant confederate more negatively than the nondeviant confederate; thus, it would seem that the "deviant" was not rejected.

However, note that two types of deviancy were actually manipulated in this experiment: (1) personality deviancy, and (2) unauthorized tampering with equipment. Both the personality "deviate" and "nondeviate" were guilty of tampering with the equipment. Perhaps, 8s reacted very strongly to this tampering, creating a ceiling on aggression; if so, we would expect no difference in rejection of the personality "deviate" and "nondeviate." To test this notion, we need an experiment identical to the one above, with the exception that the confederate not break the equipment. Freedman and Doob conducted such a study; results again indicated no difference in treatment of the deviate and nondeviate confederates. Evidently, reported personality deviancy does not elicit aggression.

In yet another experiment, Freedman and Doob investigated aggression by deviant and nondeviant 8s, when the 8s were allowed to
choose either deviant or nondeviant individuals as victims. Each S was told that (1) she was similar to or different from other group members, and (2) the remainder of the group was composed of three nondeviants and one deviant. Half the Ss were asked to choose another group member to fulfill an unattractive (shock) task, while the remaining Ss chose another person to participate in an attractive (money) task. Results indicated that nondeviant Ss tended to choose deviates for punishment but not for reward. Deviant Ss, on the other hand, chose deviates for reward but not for punishment. Thus, in this experiment, nondeviates did tend to reject deviates.

Unfortunately, Freedman and Doob do not provide adequate theoretical integration of their discrepant results. The investigators conclude that differential aggression to deviates occurs when the victim can be selected by Ss but not when choice of victim is eliminated. Thus, deviancy affects selection of target for good or bad treatment, rather than amount of aggression directed toward an already chosen target. This, of course, is description, not explanation. An attempt is made to relate the "scapegoat" theory of aggression to rejection of the deviate when choice is involved. The success of this attempt is questionable because Ss were not frustrated or angered in the last experiment; hence, explanation of the results in terms of aggression displaced to the deviate is un compelling.
GROUP SIZE AND MEDIATION OF REJECTION

Much of the data we have reviewed to this point strongly suggests that individuals who deviate from group consensus are rejected. However, one relevant and theoretically crucial question about rejection has not been considered. No one has yet investigated whether rejection occurs because the deviate breaks group consensus or because the deviate disagrees personally with each member. In other words, would each group member in a dyadic interaction with the deviate reject him as strongly as when the deviate disagrees in a group situation?

Recall Festinger's (1950) assertion that lack of group uniformity may impede group locomotion and/or confuse social reality. Regarding group locomotion it is clear that in either a dyadic or group situation where unanimity is essential to valued action, disagreement might produce strain eventuating in the rejection of an unyielding deviate after influence attempts have failed. Thus, no clear prediction can be made regarding differential treatment of the deviate in the dyad or group where unanimity is essential to locomotion. However, where only general consensus is necessary to locomotion, we might predict more rejection of the deviate in the group than in the dyad, since consensus can be reached without the deviate in the group but not in the dyad. That is, the group can afford to reject the deviate and still be able to reach its goal, while the deviate is necessary for locomotion in the dyad.

Turning now to social reality, the situation becomes more complex. If individuals seek attitudinal congruence with one another in order to have an unambiguous picture of the world (social reality), one might predict more rejection of the deviate in the dyad than in the group. That is, the deviate in the group would present little threat to social reality because several people would agree on one opinion; hence, the deviate would not be rejected. In the dyad, on the other hand, S would have no social support for his position and, thus, S would reject the deviate who challenges his perception of social reality. We are asserting, then, that rejection is inversely related to S's confidence on the relevant issue. This hypothesis derives some support from a study by Worochel and McCormick (1963).

Worochel and McCormick state that certainty of one's opinion is inversely related to the dissonance produced by contradiction. Certainty is also inversely related to tension. Therefore, an uncertain person reacts more unfavourably to a contraditor (who increases tension) and more favorably to a supporter (who reduces tension) than does a certain person. In this experiment, each S gave his opinion and degree of confidence on handling a hypothetical interpersonal problem, and then heard his "partner" either agree or disagree. Post-experimental ratings on several evaluative scales indicated that uncertain Ss liked the supportive "partner" more and contradictory "partner" less than did certain Ss. Here, then, rejection of the deviate was inversely related to S's initial confidence.

However, other data suggest that rejection may vary directly with confidence in some situations. Asch (1951) found that single individuals who dissented from group consensus on simple visual judgments received "disdain" and "derision" from the majority. Strickland, Jones, and Smith (1960) told male Ss in groups of three that they agreed on the issue of "big time" athletics and that one of the three would be chosen to attempt to influence a fourth individual. Subjects were asked to rank several arguments in order of potential influence utility, and each S was led to believe he had been chosen as the communicator. The Ss were told that the other two group members either agreed (Support) or disagreed (No Support) with their selection of arguments. Then, the arguments were supposedly taken to the fourth individual, who derogated the arguments and S. On free
response personality sketches, significantly greater hostility was directed to the derogator by Ss who had received group support than by those who had not. Thus, in this experiment, rejection was directly related to Ss' confidence.

Although the issue is clearly not resolved, let us assume for the moment that confidence is inversely related to rejection. Can we then predict that rejection of deviates will generally be greater in the dyad than in the larger group? Perhaps not, for several reasons. First, the perceived discrepancy between S and the deviate may be larger in the group situation than in the dyad. Second, the group may disinhibit aggression. Third, S may seek to gain status in the group by zealously defending group norms. Any one or a combination of these factors might overcome the hypothesized tendency for S to reject the deviate more in the dyad than in the group. At this point, however, we have little or no empirical data adequate to test these hypotheses. Clearly, further research is needed to provide adequate theoretical conceptualization of the relationship between group size and deviate rejection.
ALTERNATIVE REACTIONS TO DEVIANCY

As noted earlier, this paper has been primarily devoted to discussing rejection of the deviate as a strategy for achieving group uniformity. This stress seemed reasonable because most research has been devoted to this particular resolution of deviance. We have also mentioned two additional resolutions of attitudinal discrepancy proposed by Festinger (1950): attempt to modify the deviate and change in modal group opinion. There is, however, a fourth solution to the problem—differentiating or ignoring the deviate’s response. In a paper of high potential, Dentler and Erikson (1959) proposed that groups "induce, sustain and permit" deviant behavior because of its functional properties. Essentially, deviant behavior is necessary because it delineates boundaries of acceptable group behavior and, in so doing, defines the group and its members. Therefore, the group provides special roles for deviates (e.g., low sociometric rank) and strongly resists alienation of these members unless deviant behavior becomes critically dangerous to group solidarity.

Dentler and Erikson provide evidence that deviates in Quaker work projects and preschizophrenic trainees in U.S. Army squads are protected and retained by the group. Relatively weak pressures to conform are exerted on these deviates, and there are no attempts to expel them from the group. While dramatic, these examples of deviate acceptance do not unequivocally validate Dentler and Erikson’s hypothesis. For, in both Quaker projects and Army squads, specific norms exist prescribing protection and acceptance of group members. Thus, to clearly substantiate that deviance is generally permitted, we need data from groups which do not possess such clear-cut protection norms, e.g., political groups, business men’s associations.

Coser (1962) discusses in detail three potential reactions to deviancy and concomitant group consequences. First, the deviate can be opposed and the group strengthened: boundaries are defined, common sentiments are revived, and normals feel righteous. Second, the deviate can be tolerated and the group strengthened: group norms are affirmed by tolerance (Quaker work groups). Third, the deviate can be rejected and the group weakened: membership decreases, competing sects emerge, etc. The first and second reactions to deviancy (opposition and tolerance) are interesting because both are based on strengthening group norms. That is, some groups strengthen norms by opposing deviates (John Birch Society), while other groups strengthen norms by sheltering deviates (Salvation Army, Quakers). This line of thought supports our discussion in the last paragraph concerning the generality of deviate acceptance: moreover, it suggests that specific group norms, and not merely variables such as extremeness of deviancy, may determine the manner in which a group reacts to deviancy.

The ideas of Dentler and Erikson (1959) and Coser (1962) concerning the functions of deviancy have relevance to Festinger’s (1954) notion of social comparison. Both formulations imply that individuals utilize comparison with others in order to evaluate and define themselves. Festinger asserts that people seek out similar others as referents. However, Dentler and Erikson, and Coser, imply that persons utilize deviates who stand at the group boundary as referents. Thus, Festinger implies an attempt to decrease the distance to the comparison person (assimilation), while the other theorists imply an attempt to maximize the distance from deviates (contrast).

Permissive, accepting behavior toward deviates has also been reported in therapy groups (Stock, Whitman, and Lieberman, 1958). Patients were observed to alter their perceptions of deviate behavior so that the behavior was acceptable. For example, remarks that group therapy was "useless" were perceived as merely superficial verbalizations that masked
actual agreement with group consensus. This evidence for acceptance of deviation may also be explained in terms specific to the groups observed. That is, absence of deviate rejection may have been due to (1) fear of doctors' reactions, (2) fear that a rejection precedent might backfire on any group member, or (3) adherence to norms that idiosyncratic behavior should be tolerated in the therapy setting. While the latter two factors are mediated within the group, the first factor (fear of doctors) is clearly imposed by external forces. Thus, as Coser (1962) asserted, consideration of the external environment can clarify our understanding of a group's internal response to deviancy.

A final example of deviate acceptance, e.g., the permissive treatment accorded a high status nonconformer, has been discussed by Hollander (1958, 1960, 1964). Hollander suggested that "idiosyncrasy credits" accrue to individuals in direct proportion to conformity to group norms and demonstrated competence. These credits are tangible indicants of status and are directly related to the amount of nonconformity allowed. However, when an individual deviates from group norms, he uses up idiosyncrasy credits; complete exhaustion of credits produces rejection.

Note that Hollander suggested that status is directly related to license for deviation. Dentler and Erikson (1959), on the other hand, posited an inverse relationship. Homans (1961) suggested that a curvilinear relation exists between status and deviation: middle status persons conform more than individuals of either high or low status. The previously mentioned experiment by Wiggins et al. (1965) provides data relevant to the conflicting predictions mentioned above. These investigators found that high status deviates receive more punishment for major interference with attainment of group goals and less punishment for minor interference than do lower status deviates. This interaction between status and degree of interference may be due in part to specific expectations regarding the role of the high status individual. Although relatively immune from group sanction in matters of little consequence, the high status person who retards group locomotion in important matters (where he is expected to lead) will be severely criticized. Thus, the low status person is expected to conform on small matters but is "allowed" to hinder goal attainment; the high status individual may deviate on unimportant matters but is expected to perform capably in pursuing important group goals. These speculations, if true, seriously limit the adequacy of idiosyncrasy credits in explaining the relationship between status and deviance. It would appear that idiosyncrasy credits may only have predictive utility in matters of relatively little importance to the group.

Hollander (1964, p. 214) stated that nonconformity is "perceived" and "evaluated" in light of the idiosyncrasy credits a person has accumulated. Though perception and evaluation seem to be used synonymously by Hollander, a distinction can be made. It would seem meaningful to distinguish between the following two statements about a heavy drinker: (1) "Joe really doesn't drink much," and (2) "Joe drinks a lot, but with his wife and job, he deserves it." While Hollander, Dentler and Erikson, Homans, and Wiggins et al. stress evaluative factors in deviate acceptance, Stock, Whitman, and Lieberman suggest altered perception as well. This distinction seems important to analysis of the mechanisms underlying group reaction to deviancy.

This paper has attempted to review and meaningfully integrate empirical and theoretical work on the issue of group reaction to attitudinal deviancy. Clearly, many issues are still unresolved because adequate data are not available. Thus, in conclusion, we echo the hackneyed but so often inescapable conclusion that more research is needed.
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