This paper discusses the methodologies used in a study analyzing the administration of Federal aid in California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, and Texas. The study, conducted by a team, was designed to integrate the case study method with the comparative method. The author describes the methodologies used in the study, outlines the methodological problems encountered, and recommends methodological modifications. Conclusions concerning the administration of Federal aid in the six States are presented. (Author/JF)
SIX STATES AND FEDERAL AID:
KEY CONCLUSIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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Stanford University

Research Methods

This study was designed to integrate the case study method with the comparative method by analyzing the administration of federal aid in six states: California, Michigan, Massachusetts, Virginia, New York, and Texas. Because science aspires to generalize, the case study method has always had ambiguous status. While a single case provides intensive data, it cannot be the basis for valid generalization. We did not, however, have the resources to research enough states to claim representative sample data.

Our study falls under Lyphart's classification of hypothesis-generating cases:

Hypothesis-generating cases start out with a more or less vague notion of possible hypotheses, and attempt to formulate definite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases. The objective is to design theoretical generalizations in areas where no theory exists yet.

Hypothesis-generating case studies are distinguished from "theory confirming" or "theory infirming" case studies because the latter are analyses of single cases within the framework of established generalizations. In essence, the case study or studies test and subsequently confirm or infirm a proposition. In the absence of any prior research on the specific topic, we attempted in this study to construct some tentative propositions. The pattern of federal aid allocation provides the dependent variables and the political-organizational variables are the independent variables. Although the comparative case approach limited our research to six states and precluded national generalizations, it was selected for several related reasons. First, the fiscal and economic data presented in Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits by Joel Berke et al. showed a significant variation in distribution patterns among the six states. The fiscal data was gathered as the first phase of the study reported here.* Although we have traced some

*The first phase has been published by the Senate Select Committee in Equal Educational Opportunity.
aggregate patterns, the analysis of each federal title revealed a scatter-
ation indicative of particular state factors—factors which could best be explored on an individual case basis rather than by a survey.

Second, other research indicated that surveys of structural factors of state government or of individuals with formal decision making power could not explain federal aid distribution.\(^2\) Survey data on the chief State School Officer's fiscal independence or the governor's veto power would only mask the important political factors. Indeed, we suspected federal aid allocations were primarily bureaucratic decisions made by the SEA, with limited involvement by the legislature or Office of the Governor.

Third, we believed that division directors or bureau chiefs within the SEA were significant decision makers on intrastate allocations. Bureaucra-
tic negotiations between division heads and local school staffs, as well as the complex federal negotiations between USOE officials, with their general guidelines and state officials, with project approval power, required a case study approach. Moreover, the variables we were exploring are the ones policy makers can do something about. Social economics status is not very susceptible to policy manipulation but leverage can be applied to standard operating procedures of public bureaucracies.

Finally, the great diversity of state political culture, educational decision makers, and patterns of educational policy formulation apparent in our initial findings, demanded a comparative case method of analysis. The methods and concepts of comparative government research seemed most appropriate. The range in the education policy making process between Massachusetts, Texas, California, and Virginia, for instance, turned out to be enormous and would likely be obscured by aggregate statistical indicators of either an economic environmental or political structure nature.\(^3\)
In short, for this study we did not concur with Thomas Dye who states that his evidence suggests "that the linkage between socio-economic inputs and policy outcomes is an unbroken one, and that characteristics of political systems do not independently influence policy outcomes." Such a viewpoint implies case studies are not needed to probe the kinds of interest constellations that exist or the policy preferences of the key decision makers. We concluded, however, that research on federal aid allocation cannot be done through statistical analyses and correlations among quantifiable state variables; political variables must be considered if the patterns of federal aid allocation are to be understood.

A six state study of politics and administration of federal aid is plagued by both a "small N" and many variables. To reduce the problem of many variables Lyphart suggests that the comparative analysis be focused on "comparable cases." By "comparable" he means "similar in a large number of important characteristics and variables which one treats as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other."

In the context of our study we could accomplish this objective by limiting the geographic spread of the states examined to one region—perhaps the Southeast. We chose to include a range of states with widely varying characteristics because our audience of public policy makers need to understand the diverse complexities of educational politics in the various states. Architects of public policy tend to devise general policies with only a few states in mind. As James Sundquist observed:

In the drafting of federal aid legislation, a drafter's view of the role the states should play is likely to depend upon which state he is thinking about. If his picture is of New York or California, he is likely to
write his bill in terms of what the state can contribute. If his picture is of a small and backward state, he is liable to leave the states out of the administrative channel in order to prevent them from impeding progress. In the drafting of the Economic Opportunity Act, an "Alabama syndrome" developed. Any suggestion within the poverty task force that the states be given a role in the administration of the act was met with the question, "Do you want to give that kind of power to George Wallace?"

While the numerous variables impede comparative analysis, a far-ranging study is likely to result in more informed, intelligent public policy. Indeed, we found that generalizations on the variables investigated rarely hold for all six states. Our initial hunches were confirmed in some states but not in others. With an N of 6, the exceptions are important. A conclusion of substantial state variation argues for the federal government to adopt a differential approach, working through some states and bypassing others in the same education program.8

Research Design

In a recent review of the literature Segal and Fritchler characterized the subfield of intergovernmental relations politics as "largely untouched—a kind of methodological Cinderella after midnight".9 Consequently, research designs in this area are pioneering and must be based in large part on concepts from other subfields of political science. For instance, intergovernmental politics focuses on a "relationship" and the concept of sovereignty was borrowed from the study of nation states. The concept of dual sovereignty and the "states rights" ideology followed.10 Stressing that nearly every function is shared by almost every level of government, Morton Grodzins demolished the myth of dual sovereignty. His analysis of the relationship was highlighted by the rubric "cooperation,11 and he contended conflict occurs not between governments but among branches of the same level of government.
From 1968-1970, federal grants to states and localities grew more than fivefold, from less than $5 billion to an estimated $25 billion in the 1970 fiscal year. Federal grants-in-aid as a percent of total federal expenditures has risen from 6.1 percent to 12.8 percent. As this growth has occurred the Grodzins' cooperation conflict dichotomy has become too general to be very useful. Between 1960 and 1970 the basic character of the typical federal assistance program changed from helping state or local governments accomplish their objectives with prefunctory general federal review, to using state governments as an administrative convenience under some explicit controls for accomplishing specified federal objectives. Surely, such a change would lead to tension between federal authorities and requires a new theory of intergovernmental relations. Indeed, Sundquist warns that the conflict has grown to such an extent that the federal system is threatened by "the power struggles and treaty negotiations among mutually jealous federal-state-local agencies." In his view, intergovernmental struggles often change the basic substance of the federal program. A 1970 survey, however, revealed 75 percent of the local federal aid coordinators (usually in a mayor's office) still elected the first alternative for describing their relationships with federal government.

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<tr>
<th>Relationship Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cordial and friendly, noncompetitive</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly competition</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cautious and guarded negotiation</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>Hostile</td>
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A similar state response would indicate that the conflict is rarely overt and usually kept on a subtle professional basis. Indeed, state professional educators probably are more at ease with federal educators, who share the same general values, than with general government executives or community groups. Conflict may be rare and federal deference to state opinion is probably the norm.
The state studies were conducted in part through elite and specialized interviewing; the techniques followed those outlined in *Elite and Specialized Interviewing*, by Lewis Dexter. The interviews frequently led to the discovery of relevant published and unpublished hard data. Documentation for these studies included state plans prepared for the U.S. Office of Education, state guidelines and reports, internal SEA memoranda, and other pertinent articles and books.

To insure that the five researchers located at different universities were primarily investigating the same issues, we standardized key components of the case studies. All of the researchers considered the following topics in their intra-state analyses:

I. Historical

--State political culture--particularly the impact of "localism" on the influence of state officials

--Traditional political pattern of urban-rural conflict and/or cooperation

--Role and effectiveness of state political coalitions among education interest groups

--History of professionalization, performance and politicization of the SEA

II. Role of Governor, Legislature, Parties, and Interest Groups

--Interest in federal funds

--Staff for oversight

III. Coordination and Overall Priorities for Federal Education Aid

--Use of state comprehensive planning including relationship of federal categories to state funds

--Impact of federal categories on balkanized organizational structures

--Central management capacity
IV. Title-by-Title Analysis

--Distribution formulas within the state; changes over time

--Importance of federal regulations and guidelines

--Interest group constellations for each Title

--Influence in setting program priorities

--Monitoring, enforcement, dissemination by the State Education Agency

Research Assertions

Before the study commenced, we formulated six major assertions to be tested in each state study. If these six assertions were confirmed in the states, they would together provide a theoretical framework to explain and predict the distribution of federal aid in additional states. In effect, future research could move from our "hypothesis-generating" stage to "theory confirming" cases and deviant cases. Consequently, it is desirable to begin analysis of these six broad assertions before moving to a more detailed examination of each federal title (we included Titles I, II and III of ESEA, Vocational Education, Title I NDEA, and some attention to Title V ESEA).

The six assertions are listed below:

1) There will be less involvement and political influence by the governor and legislature on federal aid in comparison with state aid. General government executives will leave allocation decisions and negotiations to state education professionals.

2) The influence and impact of the urban school lobby on the state allocation of federal aid will not be significant. Cities will not form state coalitions or use existing coalitions to direct more federal aid to their needs.

3) As federal aid increases and states have more discretion in allocation, pressures will increase on state government from organized interests. Consequently, a longitudinal analysis would show a gradual change in interest group intensity.
4) The state education agency will attempt to minimize political conflict and pressure by using existing state aid formulas for allocating federal funds. Most of these state aid formulas are not adjusted very well for core city needs.

5) Federal aid, except in a manner restricted by federal guidelines or requirements, will flow within a state as it has in the past. Once the pattern of state distribution is established based on assertion #4, then the flow will only be altered by explicit and vigorously enforced federal regulations.

6) SEA personnel are socialized so that they view their proper role as providing technical assistance to the LEA’s, not enforcing or policing federal requirements or setting program priorities. This rather passive, technical assistance role vis à vis the LEA’s would preclude such things as setting reading priorities or restricting Title I aid to elementary schools.

If it had been validated, this set of assumptions would have resulted in the following scenario for state allocation. The federal money flows to the SEA where the governor and legislature are largely unaware and uninterested in the decisions. The impact of lobbies on state allocation decisions is minimal but growing incrementally. The SEA’s use the distribution criteria in the state aid formulas and change these only when federal regulations are enforced by threat of fund termination. SEA personnel maintain cordial relations with LEA’s and stress their technical assistance role.

While our assertions proved to be relatively accurate descriptions of the central tendencies found in our six studies there are striking exceptions. In California, for instance, the legislature has extensively earmarked the federal aid allocations. In Michigan, the SEA has employed a needs assessment and targeted funds to urban areas to counter the state aid flow—thus contradicting our fourth assertion. The service and technical assistance role attributed to SEA personnel in our sixth assertion is not valid in certain titles (particularly Title III of ESEA). Coalitions of urban districts have not concentrated their efforts on federal aid as yet, but Detroit and New York have hardly been as unaware
or passive with respect to state allocation of federal aid as our second assertion would suggest. Large scale changes in the flow of federal dollars in Michigan and California were not related to changes in federal regulations or enforcement policies—clearly exceptions to our fifth hypothesis.

The matrix below summarizes our findings with respect to the research hypotheses:

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<th>Hypothesis</th>
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Each of the case studies specifically analyzes the factors, weights, and formulas for state allocation of federal funds on a title-by-title basis. Many of the titles across the states show a strong similarity to state aid formulas, primarily with respect to uniform per pupil allocations and the merger with formulas on teacher units or teacher salaries. The equalization parts of state aid usually employ an adjustment for assessed property valuation, and this is not included in federal aid allocation formulas devised by states.

**State Political Culture and Federal Aid**

The political culture and traditions of state education politics—different in every state—principally determine state distribution and administration of federal aid. Federal aid is channeled into an existing state political system and pattern of policy; a mixture distilled of federal priorities and concerns and frequently different state priorities and concerns emerge. The federal-state (and local) delivery mechanism also insures that the implementation and policies are not uniform among the states. State policy with respect to federal aid is very different in Michigan than it is in Texas or Virginia. The sanctions and incentives available to the federal government are insufficient to radically alter
the traditional pattern of state education policy. Federal money can be
considered a stream that must pass through a state capital; at the state
level, the federal government is rarely able—through its guidelines and
regulations—to divert the stream or reverse the current. Consequently, the
specific political context in each of the six states needs to be carefully
examined by the reader.

Each of the cases examines the political culture and historic attitudes of
the state in which state education politics is embedded. The "religion of
localism" in Massachusetts or the "audit mentality" and unassertive state govern-
ment in Virginia are the key contextual elements within which state aid operates.
As Edith Mosher stresses for Virginia:

...the changes (from increased federal education aid) were brought
about in accordance with the state's characteristic mode of orderly
and consensual decision-making. Its elements are a strong and astute
governor, a relatively compliant legislature, low profile interest
group activity, and an unassertive bureaucracy, including the State
Department of Education. It is apparent that even Governor Holton
does not consider his election as a mandate for dramatic policy
upheavals, since during his first year in office he has displayed
the conciliatory tones, deliberate pace, and regard for continuity
to which Virginians are accustomed in the conduct of public business. 16

With regard to urban-suburban-rural priorities, the state allocation
decisions are also embedded in a tradition of political relationships. The
New York case highlights the traditional political interactions between Albany
and New York City. The lack of priority in state funds for Boston is the
reflection of years of Massachusetts political history. While several states
(Virginia, Texas, and California) display an emerging urban alliance, concerted
multi-city action has not yet had a decisive impact on federal aid decisions.
The traditional rural concern in Texas education politics is most graphically
reflected in the distribution formulas for vocational education and NDEA. In
all of the states, the core cities are currently attempting to create alliances
and are gradually becoming more aware of the potential impact of federal aid. State interest group activity with respect to federal aid appears to be on the increase.

Each of the cases analyzes historically a number of SEA characteristics. Although the major portion of recent SEA growth has been underwritten by federal funds, federal money is funneled through an SEA administrative structure and pattern of policy, and again state factors influence its eventual distribution. In Michigan, a statewide assessment program, comprehensive planning, and priority setting have ordained a consistent urban priority even in federal programs without such mandates. In Massachusetts, the religion of localism has led to an absence of state priorities—urban or otherwise—and a passive service orientation. Department personnel in Massachusetts apply gentle persuasion with respect to federal regulations but retreat when an LRA protests vigorously. In short, state departments and units within state departments display administrative styles along a continuum from aggressive leadership to passive technical assistance. In some state contexts, particular administrators—Riles in California and Porter in Michigan—can move a state from one administrative style to another. But in Massachusetts and Texas, the overall state political culture imposes such great constraints that a more activist program priority orientation for the SEA is not feasible.

The states also vary enormously with respect to the partisan political image of the SEAs. The apolitical image, paramount in Texas and Virginia deterred gubernatorial and legislative concern and intervention. On the other hand, Superintendent Raferty was viewed as immersed in politics; because he was not considered an "objective educational expert," the legislature interceded in federal aid administration.
Discordent educational interest groups fragment educational politics in California, Michigan and New York; administrators feud openly with teacher and citizens' groups. By contrast, the Texas State Teachers Association remains unified, including administrators and urban school districts under one roof.

We see a pattern in which divided educational interest groups encourage intervention in federal aid policy by governors and legislatures. If the educators cannot agree and appear to be out only for their own parochial interest, governors and legislators are more likely to intercede in the administrative and allocation decisions of the state bureaucracy. Only in California, however, did we find sufficient staff to enable governors and legislators to oversee the implementation of federal aid. Other governors and legislators lack the information and analysis needed to intervene in federal aid administration.

A detailed summary of the political culture and style of each of the six states would only detract from the richness and in-depth treatment by each of the authors. Some striking elements are 1) the importance and diversity of state political culture for determining federal allocation policies; 2) the consequent variation in state political and financial outcomes—e.g. no standard federal aid policy exists; 3) the substantial discretion and leadership of administrations in some states, and the overwhelming constraints on state leadership in others; 4) the traditional estrangement of city lobbies from SEA decisions, and the very recent urban-district awareness of the potential for changing state policies to enlarge the flows of federal money to cities.

Coordination, Comprehensive Planning, and Monitoring

The concept of comprehensive state planning has several interrelated elements as applied to federal aid.
1) An assessment of state needs--this could be based on achievement tests, measures of social economic status, attitude surveys, etc.

2) Establishment of Statewide Priorities based on the needs assessment. Given the limitation on total federal funds, priorities must be few and not all inclusive. Educational planning of priorities seeks to project the future.

3) The coordination of various categorical federal programs to develop critical mass. Federal aid should be treated as a single fund and critical mass developed by linking ESEA and NDEA program expenditures with EPDA, Vocational Education, etc.

4) The targeting of unified federal funds to the state priority areas--e.g. central cities, migrants, etc.

5) Focus and reinforcement of federal aid by linking it to changes in state aid based on the state priorities. State aid will buttress the federal aid flow and also be targeted.

6) Institution of a process of control and monitoring comprehensive planning is more than making projections and setting targets.

Comprehensive state planning necessitates such federal aid administrative changes as: a consolidated application form that integrates several federal categories; consolidated and improved management information systems; and consolidated monitoring of LEA programs. Such broad-scale changes in the states can only succeed if the federal government is agreeable, indeed enthusiastic, about packaging the various categories. Each federal category, however, is some Congressman's footnote in history and some OE bureaucrat's expertise base. Consequently, the fragmentation is extremely difficult to overcome.

Of the six states in this study, only Michigan has the basis for development of comprehensive statewide planning. We must hasten to add that the federal government has not maintained any sustained commitment to the concept. A brief flurry of interest in 1968 in "packaging" was followed by a change in policies. Special Title V ESEA assistance for state planning and evaluation, provided for two years, was terminated abruptly by the Office of Budget and Management. Proposals for bloc grants (termed "special revenue sharing") have not stressed
adequately the concepts of statewide comprehensive planning (e.g. financial aid and federal standards) and have met with Congressional disinterest. For instance, the Nixon administration's proposed special revenue sharing alludes to needs assessment, but provides little specific guidance. The Texas study examines the abortive attempt of the Texas State Department to implement comprehensive planning in the face of a wavering federal/state commitment and a lack of statutory encouragement.

In view of this lack of federal or interstate movement, the Michigan comprehensive planning-needs assessment is especially noteworthy. The assessment provides data on achievement, school services, and the social-economic background of the pupils; it has been the basis for targeting federal funds to disadvantaged children, regardless of the lack of explicit priorities in particular federal statutes—e.g. Title III of ESEA. The immediate intellectual force behind the current Michigan assessment effort was provided by staff members in the Michigan State Department's Bureau of Research. Enthusiastically supported by State Superintendent John Porter, the programs were successfully negotiated through the governor and legislature.

The assessment is complemented by Common Goals of Michigan Education, prepared by a task force of educators, students and lay citizens. The assessment's documentation of the extremely low social-economic background of many Detroit pupils was instrumental in the targeting of federal aid to Detroit and the initiation of a special state aid formula for disadvantaged children. Because assessment fostered accountability within the MSDE bureaucracy, top level priorities were able to influence the federal aid decisions made by the various divisions responsible for day-by-day federal aid policy. The comprehensive planning and priority setting establishes a standard for lower level administrators.
indicates Michigan has moved even further in its concentration of federal aid on
the disadvantaged than the case study in this volume indicates.

In Michigan, the state superintendent and state board were able to seize
the initiative and set priorities in part because of the factionalism among its
educational interest groups; discord reigns among teachers, administrators, school
board members, etc., and no group has been able to establish inordinate influence.19
Beholden to no interest group, the MSDE could play each one off against the other
in order to chart its own course. The superintendent's needs assessment and
priority setting program enabled him to fend off the importuning of specific
lobbies, such as vocational educators, when they conflicted with his priorities.
The low visibility (only 7 percent of Michigan's total expenditure) and complex
categorical nature of federal aid has deterred the governor, legislature, or
political parties from interceding in MSDE allocation decision. As Scribner
points out, legislators and gubernatorial staff only vaguely understand federal
aid; thus these general government officials do not consider the issues very
relevant or exciting. Scribner concludes:

-- The proportion of federal aid is too small to arouse serious,
lasting public attention.

-- Public awareness over federal aid issues in Michigan is negligible
and to an extent blurred by the more immediate and tense issues
of state and local concern.

-- Though the governor has budgetary powers, he lacks any direct
influence on the functions of the state department of education.

-- The legislature possesses some fiscal control and passes legislation
affecting the state department, but has very little influence over
actual execution of state programs.20

**State Boards of Education and Federal Aid**

On paper state boards of education have enormous power over state education
policy making. Although we have almost no studies of the policy role of state
boards, the predominant suspicion is that the boards rarely exercise these impressive formal powers.21 The state board is reputedly dominated by the SEA or immobilized by other political forces, despite the fact that the state board appoints the superintendent in 25 states and in the others must approve the major policy proposals of the chief state school officer (CSSO). In view of the contradictory evidence, this study paid particular attention to the impact of the state board on federal aid.

We found state boards of education to be hampered by the same constraints that local boards face. Indeed, because state board members do not live in the state capital and meet only once or twice a month, these constraints are greater than those faced by local boards.22 State boards lack expert, independent staff. Laymen with other demanding positions, members are usually not presented with performance criteria or objective output data upon which to question the judgment of the CSSO and his large staff. The complex categorical nature of federal aid—in contrast with state goals and priorities—is difficult for lay boards, untutored in phraseology or rationale, to understand.

The method of board selection contributes to the state board's lack of impact. Sroufe described the election as a "non-event" in which most candidates put out only one press release. The public remains unaware of the issues or candidates. Consequently, rarely does a board member have a policy mandate from his campaign or a constituency to represent. All of these constraints result in the state board being at best, a forum for and most likely, a captive of, the education professionals. Only in California did the board have a significant impact on the state administration of federal aid. In the other states, the board may have routinely approved federal aid issues but the lack of interest group activity on these issues made approval routine.
The California case is noteworthy because of the ideological split between
the CSSO (Raferty) and a state board composed of holdover members appointed by
Governor Edmund Brown, a liberal Democrat. The California State Board reviewed
federal aid proposals carefully with little regard for Raferty's opinions. Indeed,
the California legislature specified that Titles III of ESEA should be
administered by lay Advisory Commissions responsible directly to the state board--
thus completely bypassing Superintendent Raferty. Wilson Riles, the present
State Superintendent, thrived under this political arrangement when he was the
head of the Division of Compensatory Education. Possessed of the state board's
confidence, Riles was influential in the appointment of many members of the
Title I Advisory Commission. When he became State Superintendent, Riles moved
swiftly to trim the power of the legislatively established independent Advisory
Commissions and to reconcentrate power in the Office of State Superintendent.
The state legislature approved most of his requests for reorganization. The
state board's review of federal aid decisions is also less intense under Riles.

**Specific Allocation Decisions**

The lack of general policies and comprehensive statewide planning for
federal aid necessitates a title-by-title analysis. No state policy for federal
aid exists; there are only policies and guidelines for each federal title. More-
over, the federal categories display no consistent priority or coherent policy.
Some are directed at a target group--the disadvantaged; others, at equipment and
books; still others, at such concepts as innovation. If the states do not put
them together in some fashion, it is unlikely the locals will. Each of the state
studies devotes considerable effort to the individual titles. Again the most
striking fact to emerge from a comparative analysis is the diversity of state
policies and underlying political structures and traditions. The search for
generalizations is frustrated frequently. At one end of the continuum, California and Michigan promulgate and monitor specific policies to concentrate funds on disadvantaged children. In his study of Michigan, Scribner discusses the state monitoring team that reviewed Detroit's Title I program in detail and the changes that ensued. At the other end, Massachusetts' administrators restrict their Title I enforcement to friendly persuasion. Iannaccone summarizes the Massachusetts situation:

The Massachusetts State Agency has generally not seen its role as one of using its discretionary power to maximize aims through the establishment of high quality standards for programs in the local education agency, neither demanding sophisticated methods for program development, careful operating procedures, tough criteria for program proposal review, nor careful evaluation requirements. In short, the Massachusetts State Department in allocating federal funds and administering federal programs has, in effect, generally transmitted to the local educational agencies the discretionary powers which the federal government and federal legislation give it.

Briefly, where federal mandate requires the Massachusetts State Department to exercise control over (local) programs and specific in detail the nature and/or form of such control, the...Department has complied with federal regulations. Otherwise, it has not availed itself of the discretion available to it.\textsuperscript{23}

In essence, title-by-title policies in any state are established and executed according to a general state department administrative style. A specific program or bureaucratic unit, however, may deviate markedly from the normal pattern of state policy; in Massachusetts, the Title III ESEA Office is staffed by more activist and research oriented personnel than the other federal program offices.

The vocational education section in each state study deserves special mention. Vocational education appropriations have grown rapidly in recent years ($487 million) and the USOE is instituting a new program in "career education." Vocational education programs have always involved substantial state participation and discretion in allocation. As each case emphasizes, the federal sanctions
and incentives have been insufficient to reorient substantially the content and 
state allocation of vocational education programs—despite frequent Congressional 
atttempts to legislate significant program changes through detailed amendments. 

Each of the cases examines the specific distribution formulas used in each 
of the state discretionary titles. The determinants and criteria of each 
distribution formula should be noted by the reader; federal regulations, lay 
advisory councils, local pressure groups, and top state administrators influence 
the formula's ultimate composition. Especially interesting are the changes over 
time in these specific distribution formulas as well as the reasons for the 
changes. The aggregate impact of these title-by-title decisions is displayed 
in Federal Aid to Education: Who Benefits that also analyzes the flow of state 
discretionary funds compared to Title I ESEA and other criteria.

Values Underlying the Research

Fiscal and political relationships between state government and core city 
schools were examined extensively in the six case studies. Our concern with 
these relationships drew substance in large part from the distressing, deteriorat-
ing fiscal plight of urban schools analyzed in the companion study Who Benefits. 
As a consequence of these statistics, the case studies focused to a greater 
extent on the factors that determine the cities' share of intra-state federal 
funds than on those that determine the suburban and rural allocations. However, 
to ascertain the variables responsible for the urban share required the analysis 
of the suburban and rural capabilities for attracting federal aid as well. 

The researchers espouse an aggressive and effective SEA for several reasons. 
This viewpoint also influenced the emphasis of our case investigations. State 
aid formulas presently favor districts outside of core cities, particularly 
the suburbs. In our six state study, Massachusetts is the only exception to this
trend, and Massachusetts provides a relatively small share of state aid compared to the other five states. A strong, independent SEA could use federal funds to correct the inequitable situation created by state aid. By invoking its discretionary power, the state department of education could redistribute federal funds to core cities—thus recognizing their special fiscal problems. Adoption of such a policy demands an intrepid SEA—unfettered by political alliances and unwilling merely to plug federal money into state aid distribution formulas.

Many of the federal statutes, particularly Title I and vocational education, delegate to the state the responsibility for insuring that federal funds reach the target population of disadvantaged youths within school districts. For instance, Title I aid must be channeled to schools with high concentrations of low income children, while nearby schools with many disadvantaged students cannot be assisted with the limited funds. Adequate and aggressive SEA application review, monitoring, and information dissemination staff are required to effectively administer the federal provisions.

Finally, the researchers favor the use of SEA discretion to insure that limited federal money is expended on a coherent, comprehensive program; though the federal statutes usually leave the mi of program and curriculum choices to local-state negotiations, they do permit the state to determine substantive thrusts. In California, for example, the ESEA-Title I program demonstrates a clear preference for elementary programs; the programs must contain a number of components designed for comprehensive impact, e.g., teacher training, nutrition, etc., in addition to an academic focus like reading. In our view, these program priorities will be related to the particular educational problems of each state and, consequently, there will be great variation among the states.
Methodological Considerations

The AERA panel is particularly interested in a critique of the methodology as a guide for future efforts. Obviously, it is difficult for the person who designed a large scale and costly research effort to appraise himself. With this caveat in mind, I will do my best.

I think our research could have been strengthened by inclusion of models of organizational choice (and rigidity) as a supplement to the political approach. A recent book by Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* examines the Cuban missile crisis through economic, organizational, and political models. Paul Peterson and Tom Williams have written an article stressing the usefulness of macro-organizational theory to enhance the political analysis of the Chicago School Board. Much of what we found could have been predicted by the standard operating procedure: "satisficing" limited search for alternatives, and structural rigidities of organizational theory. Indeed organizational choice models could have proven to be the most reliable guides for explaining the activities of State Departments. The standard operating procedures, routines, and traditionally appropriate procedures in an existing SEA organizational repertoire may vary widely among states because of distinctive political cultures. But each of the state departments resorted to these in large part and considered only a short list of alternatives for allocating federal aid. As Allison stresses, an organization's search for alternatives is constrained by its existing goals and procedures. The menu of alternatives defined by organizations in sufficient detail to be live options is severely limited both in number and character. The short list of alternatives reflects not only the cost of alternative generation but, more important, each organization's interest in controlling, rather than
presenting, choices - for example, by serving up one real alternative framed by two extremes.

In short, our study could have benefitted from an integration of organizational theory with the political variables we stressed. Each of these models of behavior-political, economic, and organizational-provides one snapshot of a three dimensional event. We never systematically undertook the organizational snapshot. Organizational routines might have been a better predictor of federal aid allocation than such political concepts as interest groups, coalitions, and bargaining. Each distinctive state political tradition and culture modified SEA organizational routines so that there was no cross state generalization, but many of the same organizational variables were operating. From the standpoint of theories of organizational choice the Michigan SEA might prove to be an interesting case of an organization changing its goals, routines, and standard operating procedures as it became more assessment and urban oriented.

This study was blessed with the individualistic talents of five researchers. These different individual styles, however, led to substantial problems of data aggregation, reduction, and uniform research design across the states. We used mid-course meetings to make sure we were all researching the same variables but different people will have divergent views on the important phenomena to follow up in depth and highlight. Moreover, the presentation of each case will display an individuality that makes comparisons somewhat difficult. Edith Mosher's paper will provide a case writer's viewpoint on these issues.

As coordinator, I found it difficult to reduce data in the distinctive cases to the level of details we all desired. Some cases, for example, treated State Boards of Education in depth, others superficially. All case writers treated in depth, however, the key variables we agreed to stress at the start. This highlights
the need for the initial design to be correct because it is difficult to redirect five different researchers in mid-stream. Given the lack of theory to guide our initial design there is a great chance our initial foci will not be the most important or useful.

When we first received the completed cases our plan was to rewrite each one in a uniform style and pull out the key variables for extended discussion. Consequently, we planned to discard much of the contextual and historical data. Once we perceived the importance of distinctive state political culture and traditional patterns of policy making, however, we decided it was best to preserve the contextual and historical data. This choice, however, makes it more difficult for our readers to compare the case presentations in our forthcoming book. The five cases read as if five different people wrote them.

The final major problem I wish to discuss is the issue of generalization of this data across all states. If our major conclusions are correct there is little need to do this - e.g. states vary so much that empirical generalizations do not emerge or those that do are of minor importance and not useful for guiding changes in public policy. Indeed, our study stresses the need for federal government to treat different states differentially - work through the good ones and bypass the bad ones. Assuming there was a need to follow-up this research, we have not yet been able to isolate the variables one could use in a survey. Perhaps this could be done but it is not clear to me how. On the other hand, fifty cases are an expensive and unlikely follow-up. Many case studies conclude with an exhortation for someone to replicate it, but it is seldom anyone does.
FOOTNOTES


2. See for example Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, Politics in the American States (Boston: Little Brown, 1965) particularly those sections relating to the governor. For a reader on comparative state politics see Frank Munger (editor), American State Politics (New York: Crowell, 1966).


8. For an elaboration of this differential concept see Sundquist, op. cit., pp. 270-272.


14. Morley and Fritschler have made a start on such a theory in their APSA paper.
15. Morely and Fritschler, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Response rate was 44 percent. They proposed a four-fold typology for federal-state relations: a) joint policy-making, b) mutual accommodation, c) innovative conflict, and d) disintegrative conflict.


23. Laurence Iannaccone, "A First Step in Making Sense Out of Massachusetts," unpublished paper presented to the group working on the federal aid project reported in this volume.


