Student discontent against higher education transformed campuses throughout the country as revolutionary headquarters to challenge the Establishment—the state, the military, and industry—in 1968-69. But militant tactics employed by students deprived them of public support; it was this tactic that contributed to the passing of the University Bill. Nevertheless, it was student power more than anything else that triggered the events through which university administrations and faculty members became aware of the need for university reform. Student power challenged the hierarchic structure of higher education, the academic elite and its social ramifications, moral corruption among administrators and faculty members, as well as the raison d'etre of the Ministry of Education. Though student power failed to realize its goal in the 1968-69 period, their activities of that period form an important chapter in the recent history of Japanese education: it exposed the vulnerable aspects of higher education to the government, educators, and the public; it undoubtedly will have considerable impact in the formulation of future educational policies and in educational planning. Student power is an element that cannot be ignored in modern higher education in a democratic society. (Author)
RECENT JAPANESE STUDENT MOVEMENT (1968-69):
ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM

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RECENT JAPANESE STUDENT MOVEMENT (1968-69)
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Though the causes of recent Japanese student movement stem from two basic issues—dissent against militarism and the system of higher education—this paper deals only with the latter. It consists of three parts: (I) The Problems of Japanese Education, which describes the causes of student discontent; (II) Student Organizations and Activities, which traces the origin of student organizations and the process of fragmentation of student power, and presents two examples of recent student activities on campuses; and (III) State Power and Academic Freedom, which is intended to focus attention to one of the most crucial issues facing Japanese higher education. Although the paper primarily deals with the events of the 1968-69 period, these events are examined by placing them in a historical context.

I. The Problems of Japanese Education

1. Nationalism and the Development of Popular Education before World War II

Education under Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868) remained the monopoly of the elite—courtiers, feudal rulers, and samurai. It was based on the neo-Confucian classics which provided the political and economic rationale for Tokugawa feudalism. For over two hundred and fifty years, the Tokugawas ruled Japan with no major domestic war or foreign invasion. This period of peace made possible the rise of the merchant class. Popular education gradually spread among merchants and city dwellers through Confucian and Buddhist sponsored institutions of learning, commonly referred to as jiku or tera-goya, while Western learning, particularly that of the Dutch tradition, became popular among the intellectuals. The rise of the merchant class threatened the economic foundation of the Tokugawas, while the development of the means of production and distribution, the rise of the standard of living in urban commercial
centers, the encroachment of Western powers in East Asia, and interest in Western learning contributed much to promoting critical views of feudalism. Shinto clergy, scholars of Japanese classics, and rebels against the Confucian oriented establishment of the Tokugawas, began to advocate the restoration of Imperial Rule. They joined forces with Confucian leaders, who advocated economic reform, and with the dissatisfied samurai and city merchants. Employing the imperial institution as their rallying point, they challenged the Tokugawas and succeeded in restoring Imperial Rule in 1868. By this time, the English, French, Dutch, and Russians had established solid beach-heads in East Asia. From the late nineteenth century, therefore, nationalism was strongly emphasized in Japan, aiming to industrialize and militarize the country.

Japan engaged in a series of wars soon after the establishment of the new Meiji government. Ch'ing China was defeated in the war of 1894-95 and Japanese troops joined the allied forces in suppressing the Boxers' Rebellion in China in 1900. Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Korea was annexed in 1910. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 enabled Japan to take over German possessions in East Asia and in the Pacific during the first World War. Expeditionary forces were sent to Siberia during the Russian Revolution. Manchuria and North China were invaded in the 1930's. Each war stimulated industrial development and capital growth, both of which enhanced the development of a war economy and of militarism. Education was the key to realizing economic and industrial development and to fanning nationalism and militarism.

A modern system of primary education was instituted in 1872. Its curriculum was patterned on a French model. Enrollment was close to 30% of the school age population. Each war contributed to educational development, and students eagerly attended schools under an atmosphere that stimulated nationalism and militarism. By 1900, compulsory education was solidly established: 81.5% of all primary school age children (90% male, 71.7% female) were exposed to the benefits of modern education. By the end of the
Russo-Japanese War, this was up to 95.6%, and by World War 1, 98.5%; in the early 1920's, the figure reached the astonishing height of 99%, and by 1925, 99.5%. If education was the key to fanning nationalism, nationalism in turn contributed much to promoting compulsory primary education.

Since 1950, enrollment has always been above 99% in both elementary and lower secondary schools; in the 1960's, the figures rose to 99.8% and 99.9%, respectively.

2. Higher Education after World War II

Prior to the end of World War II, a system of six-year compulsory primary school was observed. Ten per cent of primary school graduates, screened through a rigid process of examination, entered lower secondary schools (or middle schools) which provided five more years of education. Graduates of these middle schools considered themselves an elite group. Those who desired further education entered the higher secondary schools, consisting of three years, and finally might advance to colleges and universities. At each level, students were subjected to a rigid examination. The university most difficult to enter was Tokyo Imperial University, now simply known as Tokyo University.

The rise of the middle class marks the history of Japan in the last two decades: roads are flooded with private cars, television antennas arise en masse even in isolated villages, and homes are equipped with modern electronic gadgets. Among the free nations, Japan has ascended to second place in terms of GNP growth, having surpassed West Germany in 1968. In terms of per capita income, however, she ranks around the twelfth. Nevertheless, labor unions have demanded, and received, annual wage increases to the extent that income among blue collar workers now surpasses that of most white collar workers. Currently, a nine year compulsory education, patterned on the American 6-3-3-4 system, is observed. In 1950, 45% of junior high school graduates entered senior high schools. By 1962, this figure had increased to 75% (in Tokyo, it was 87%), and by 1970 had jumped to a high of 82.1%, the females leading the males by 2.1%.

About 30% of senior high school graduates entered colleges and universities in the 1960's. Toshikatsu Horii, the chairman of the General Council of Japanese Labor
Union (Sōhyō), claims that 70% of the children of factory workers now attend colleges and universities. Although this figure seems rather inflated, it is nevertheless true that economic prosperity has made it reasonable for the families to aspire to higher education.

Facilities were not adequate to meet the soaring enrollement in higher education, however. In 1962, only one out of 11.7 applicants entered the more prestigious universities; in 1963, the general rule was that one out of five were admitted to four year colleges and universities and one out of two to junior colleges. In response to the great demand for higher education, established colleges and universities expanded their physical facilities and new colleges and universities were constructed at an average rate of some twenty per year during the 1960-63 period. Institutions of higher education were in good business, since demands for their services far exceeded supply. Lack of adequate facilities produced the rōnin, the 'wanderers' without school affiliation, anxiously preparing themselves to pass the entrance examination. One-year rōnin, two-year rōnin are common phenomena; not too unusual are the 4-5 year rōnin who have their minds set on passing the entrance examination for a prestigious university. Failure to pass a university examination has been a frequent cause of suicide. Altbach says, "The suicide rate for Japanese in the 15-24 age group is the highest in the world." The high rate of suicide is due to the "examination hell" to which students desiring higher education was subjected.

The following figures give some idea of the nature of "examination hell": In 1962, the number of high school applicants for four-year universities was 226,000, but only 139,000 or 61% of the applicants were accepted. The total number of students who actually did enter universities that year, however, was 201,000. This means that 62,000 students were ex-rōnin, who had spent a year or more, after graduating from high school, preparing themselves for a university entrance examination. Fifty-eight per cent of the students in Tokyo University, 68% of those in Hitotsubashi University (both national universities), 61% of those in Keiō and 63% of those in Waseda Universities (both private), and 77% of those in the Kyoto Metropolitan Medical School were ex-rōnin in 1962. The growth of privately operated rōnin
college preparatory schools (yobi-kō) is a social phenomenon that shows poor manpower utilization, and rōnin schools are institutions of frustrated students. An accelerated program of educational development without the provision of adequate physical facilities produces frustrated students and higher education of reduced quality.

Statements from leading Japanese educators bear out these points. Michio Nagai, professor of sociology at Tokyo Institute of Technology, says, "...Japanese students work very hard until they get into university, but from there on what is expected is to get a degree rather than an education." Kan'ichi Fukuda, professor of political science at Tokyo University, states further, "They (students) have a superficial knowledge of many subjects, but only enough to pass college entrance examination." Hiroshi Orihara, professor of sociology at Tokyo University accuses the parents as well for contributing to the "examination hall." He says, "While government authorities and business interests bear a large part of the responsibility for quality discrepancies among schools and for the test hell phenomenon, parents must also bear their share of the blame. They have been too enthusiastic about getting their children into the best college no matter what the cost." In short, Japanese students, regardless of their reasons, study with fanatic intensity in high schools and in rōnin schools, but seemingly are exhausted by the time they enter a university.

Fortunately, for mediocre students, the overcrowded situation in universities encourages faculty and administrators to overlook performance. Once a student is accepted, he can generally expect an automatic promotion. When performance is overlooked, however, faculty prestige is likely to suffer. According to the November 24, 1968 issue of the Asahi, students who claimed to have any degree of respect for faculty members numbered 30% at Nihon University. Dwindling faculty prestige is a common phenomenon at other colleges and universities. Why is this so?
New institutions of higher education mushroomed immediately after World War II. The Ministry of Education was extremely disturbed to discover that though physical accommodations met the minimum standards, libraries were short of books. To deal with this problem, books were borrowed from private institutions and individuals and shared among a group of colleges and universities until reprints, new editions, or new books became available. A faculty is also one of the important facilities in higher education. Competent faculty members cannot, however, be reproduced or instantly made. Furthermore, because of low salaries, even the most outstanding professors normally taught at two, three, or even four universities. Colleges and universities in rural areas were and still are staffed by many absentee faculty members, who reside and maintain jobs in urban centers, delivering series of "concentrated" lectures once a week, once a month, or even once a semester. The necessity for moonlighting precludes the possibility of serious research, and lack of research leads to the turning out of still more incompetent faculty members. Most damaging to faculty prestige, however, is the university employment system. With the exception of part-time lecturers and what are known as "departmental assistants" (joshu), faculty members are given unconditional lifetime employment; salary is based not on academic merit but on the basis of seniority; and colleges and universities tend to hire graduates of their own institutions.

Furthermore, the pre-modern notions of conservative loyalty and of reciprocal obligation (o and giri), which Ruth Benedict had so much to say about, have contributed much to the development of academic cliques (gakubatsu) and to corruption. Academic cliques have their social ramification. For example, on April 22, 1960, the Asahi reported the suicide of a Yoshiteru Kashiwara, the chairman of the Osaka Board of Education. The incident exposed the fact that Kashiwara's trusted men---officials delegated power to assign posts---were accepting bribes from 'competent' teachers, men
and women who had no hopes of advancement primarily because they were not graduates of an acceptable academic clique. The society of educators is similar to that of feudal gangsters (bakuto) inasmuch as human relations are concerned: it is hierarchic and is characterized by strong emphasis on on and giri and by the absence of contractual agreements. Bribery is the tacitly recognized way to win the favor of the man in power, particularly for one who does not belong to the established clique and wishes to realize promotion. Cliques are determined by the school from which one has graduated.

"Examination hell", mass production of students, moral corruption among administrators and indifference to student problems among faculty members, academic cliques, and the hierarchic structure of education are the causes for student discontent. These are the elements which students identify with the so-called Establishement, which, they maintain, is supported by the state, the military, and industries.

II. Student Organizations and Activities

1. Student Organizations

Japan's student movement had its beginning in the early twentieth century. It was active particularly during the 1920's and the early 1930's and demonstrated the high degree of liberalism which characterized the political mood of that period. From late 1933, however, it came under the influence of right wing elements, though resistance to them appeared sporadically. Some opposition to the military took place even during World War II, but university students as a whole were kept under military control during that period. Cakuto-dōin, "student mobilization" for the cause of the state, was the term that characterized student subordination to the government during the war years.

Zengakuren (All-Japan Student Government Union) was formed under the order of General McArthur, SCAP, in September, 1948. Though initially intended to function as a medium to promote the democratization of education, it has in fact become one of the most militant anti-American organizations in Japan today. Zengakuren has illustrious history of public dissent and revolt. During the first five years
of Zengakuren history, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) managed to exercise control over Zengakuren activities. When the Party shifted its strategy to carrying out proletarian revolution through lawful means in the early 1950s, dissension developed among Zengakuren members. They openly criticized the JCP-endorsed Cominform in January 1950. The 1952 May Day incident, which took place at the Imperial Plaza in Tokyo, was the first major and violent instance of Zengakuren revolt, though even prior to this date the group had been quite active. Zengakuren members armed themselves with Molotov cocktails, burned public and private vehicles owned by U.S. Security personnel, and fought a vicious battle with the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. The issue over which they revolted was that of militarism and imperialism.

Zengakuren identified itself as a "detached" force of the JCP at this time. The JCP openly denounced Zengakuren in July, 1955, however. The Stalin criticism at the twentieth assembly of the U.S.S.R. Communist Party in February 1956, the Hungarian incident during October of the same year, the Sino-Soviet rift beginning from 1958, and factional dispute within international Communism thereafter all had their effects on Zengakuren. The eleventh assembly of the organization was held at JCP headquarters in Yoyogi, Tokyo, on June 1, 1958. There, militant Zengakuren students demanded the resignation of the JCP central committee and assaulted its members. This date marked the split between the Yoyogi Zengakuren and the anti-Yoyogi Zengakuren, which were pro- and anti-JCP, respectively. The Zengakuren schism centered around the issue of the means by which proletarian revolution is to be carried out. The anti-Yoyogi faction advocated violence; the Yoyogi faction emphasized lawful means.

Today, the Yoyogi faction's slogan is "all students' movement". It maintains that state power lies with those who control the administrative organs of the state, supported by the armed forces, that the Diet is the instrument which legalizes violence against dissenters, and that the current government entertains designs to increase state power by ignoring the will of the people. Members of the Yoyogi faction therefore plan to distribute themselves among non-factional students with the
hope of causing them to realize the danger of capitalistic imperialism. They aim, further, to isolate reactionary elements in the government by gaining mass support, thereby giving rise to legislation favorable to Communism. This faction proclaims that it opposes violence but is willing to combat violence of the anti-Yoyogi type with equal force, if necessary. It assaults anti-Yoyogi groups, but as a rule not the riot squad, which is seen as an insignificant entity of state power. Its ultimate aim is to prepare itself to confront state power per se. In the meantime, casualties among its members are kept to a minimum.

Originally, the anti-Yoyogi faction received its directives from the National Committee of the Union of Revolutionary Communists (Kaku-kyōdō), a Trotsky front. But this faction split into: (1) the Student Socialist League (Shagaku-dō), (2) the Socialist Youth League (Shaseidō kaihō-ha), and (3) the Marxist League (Maru-kakudō). Though attempts were made to unify these three even before the 1960 demonstration against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (which was renewed), the Marxist League split further into the Revolutionary Marxists (Kaku-maru) and the Revolutionary Core (Chūōkaku). The former was organized in 1958; the latter, together with the already functional Student Socialist and Socialist Youth Leagues, formed the Tripartite Zengakuren (Sanpa Zengakuren) in December, 1966. During July, 1968, the Tripartite Zengakuren split into (1) the Core and (2) the Anti-Imperialists (Hantei), comprising the Student Socialist League, the Socialist Youth League and others. September 1969 saw the formation of the All-Japan Common Struggle League (Kyōtō-rengō), a confederation of all anti-Yoyogi splinter groups (numbering more than forty at that time), such as the Anarchists, Proletarian Army, Student Freedom League, International Communist Student League, Mao League, etc. Currently, they all agree that a successful revolution requires both a historical situation which brings about public awareness of the danger of the Establishment and a revolutionary organization that is prepared to respond to that public awareness, that the Yoyogi faction is a reactionary front, and that action speaks more clearly than words. Their common grievance is that though the Yoyogi faction speaks of revolution, it avoids direct confrontation with the Establishment.
Among the anti-Yoyogi factions, the Revolutionary Marxists are the most well-versed in revolutionary doctrine. They are anti-Stalinists and represent the mainstream of Trotskyism in Japan, regarding the Yoyogi faction as Stalinist and the Anti-Imperialists as disorganized elements shifting between Stalinism and international proletarianism. They do not ally themselves with the JCP or the Socialists because they believe that these parties have lost the support of the proletariat; they remain separate from the Anti-imperialists, contending that unnecessary violence of the Anti-Imperialist kind cannot lead to a successful proletarian revolution. Having shifted their tactics from direct confrontation with the police to indoctrination of members, the Revolutionary Marxists are critical of both Red China and the U.S.S.R., regard Alexander Dubcek as a bourgeois socialist, and believe that the realization of international proletarianism requires the overthrow of Stalinism, Maoism, and both U.S. and Japanese imperialism. They propose violence as a means to show the people that parliamentary government is a disguised instrument of bourgeois democracy calculated to exploit the proletariat, and claim that all forms of military alliance are detrimental to the realization of a proletarian revolution, that international proletarianism should replace the idea of military alliance as a means of national defense and that militant demonstrations are to be spread throughout Japan by the training of militant students who will lead laborers, farmers, and urban citizens toward a proletarian revolution.

The Tripartite faction held their last meeting on July 21, 1968, splitting into the Core and the Anti-Imperialist factions. The Core is the most militant of the anti-Yoyogi groups. Its lively slogan is "anti-imperialism and anti-Stalinism". Among the Anti-imperialists, the Student Socialist League, which also advocates militant tactics, commands the greatest number of followers. The Student Socialist League is a unique member of the anti-Yoyogi factions primarily because it is Stalinistic; nevertheless, it regards the Yoyogi faction as having succumbed to state power, an imperialist in revolutionary's clothing. The League is in agreement with the Core
insofar as anti-imperialism is concerned, but not on the issue of Stalinism. It lacks the theoretical orientation of both the Yoyogi faction and the Revolutionary Marxists.

The Core and the Anti-Imperialists are the most militant groups. They believe that confrontation with police and riot squad, rather than group indoctrination, provides the greatest revolutionary experience. But whether demonstrations and confrontations are successful is not the crucial issue for them. The crucial issue is to focus public attention on the dangers of imperialism and militarism. Imperialism is conceived not only in terms of military activity but also of expanding spheres of economic influence, particularly in the developing regions of the world.

Disputes between the Yoyogi and anti-Yoyogi factions and among anti-Yoyogi factions make coalition of left wingers impossible. Though the Yoyogi and the anti-Yoyogi factions have a common goal—the destruction of the Establishment—their respective means to realize it differ to such an extent that coordination or conciliation between the two cannot be expected. Makoto Nakajima, a veteran of student and mass movements of the last two decades, says, "dialogue between the Yoyogi and the anti-Yoyogi factions is an impossibility."

The Metropolitan Police Report of December 14, 1968, describing the strength of Zengakuren, indicates that:

1) Student unions at 156 colleges and universities (there were 845 colleges and universities as of 1968) are controlled by the Yoyogi faction. 95 of them by anti-Yoyogi factions.

2) 460,000 college and university students (out of an estimated total of 1,525,000) are members of the Yoyogi faction, 374,000 of the anti-Yoyogi factions. 11,900 of the former group and 7,600 of the latter are considered activists.

3) Yoyogi faction is capable of mobilizing 38,300 of its members, and anti-Yoyogi factions 31,700.
The total number of student activists as derived from the police report is therefore 19,500. This is probably a very conservative estimate. The Ministry of Education report of May 1, 1968, states that there were at that time 845 colleges and universities in Japan with a total number of 1,525,000 students. Taking the police report at its face value, it can be assumed that:

1) 18.9% of student unions in Japanese colleges and universities are controlled either by the Yoyogi or the anti-Yoyogi factions.
2) 0.5% of students are anti-Yoyogi militants.
3) 4.6% are Yoyogi and anti-Yoyogi militants
4) 54% are registered members of either the Yoyogi or the anti-Yoyogi factions, i.e., protestors.

The November 24, 1968 Asahi reports, however, that over 60% of students at Kyushu University, about 50% of those at Tokyo University, and about 20% of both Nihon and Doshisha Universities have participated in demonstrations as one time or another.

Although the Yoyogi faction (relatively discrete and less violent) is numerically superior to the combined forces of anti-Yoyogi factions, it is not in control of the student movement at all campuses under Zengakuren control. The anti-Yoyogi factions achieve their strength by the use of force when their views are challenged; their weakness stems from fragmentation due to frequent schisms. It is this weakness that the JCP seeks to exploit. The student movement at Waseda University provides a good example. Though anti-Yoyogi factions assume leadership in practically all aspects of the movement there, the Yoyogi faction is in control of the student news, Sokoku to gakuen no tame ni (For the Cause of the Fatherland and the Campus), which is alleged to have a circulation of some 400,000 copies, according to its editors.
The strategy of the JCP, then, is to place the Yoyogi faction in posts that have far reaching consequences, such as the indoctrination of non-factional students (who make up the majority). During brawls, instances of non-factional students supporting the Yoyogi faction are frequent. The Yoyogi strategy is obviously a more effective one, particularly in view of the fact that student violence has provided a justifiable opportunity for the Tokyo Metropolitan Police to request increase in budget and personnel. The government appropriated the Tokyo Police for 1969 a 14.25% increase over the 1968 fiscal year. It is largely due to the efficiency of this well armed squad that student violence was significantly curbed by 1970. Also, what cannot be ignored is the fact that militant tactics of the students have deprived them of public support, as the following Mainichi poll of late December 1968 indicates:

- Support Student Movement: 1%
- Sympathize with Student Movement: 6%
- Annoyed by Student Movement: 52%
- Student Movement be Controlled: 26%
- Other Opinions: 15%

2. Student Activities on Campuses

Tokyo University is the breeding ground of the most elite clique. Nihon University is a representative case of moral corruption. Student discontent at these two universities will be examined in some detail.

Tokyo University: On January 29, 1968, the Student Government Association of the Tokyo University Faculty of Medicine decided to boycott classes in protest against their faculty. Loyalty to the department chairman was the established tradition of this faculty, as well as of other faculties. The chairman exercised absolute authority over the teachers and students in his department: patronage was bestowed on students by the chairman on the basis of loyalty rather than on academic merits; disloyalty would have prevented even the most competent student from attaining a significant career post. A student had no liberty to pursue a curriculum or carry on research of his own choice for these were dictated by the chairman, who in turn carried out laws and regulations dictated by various government agencies with little or no concern for the welfare of his students. Propriety governed the
department: a junior student could not submit his dissertation unless senior students had submitted theirs; any student selected to remain at the hospital for graduate research was under obligation to the department chairman and senior students, because the University hospital was overcrowded with research fellows and graduate students. Loyalty, propriety, and seniority governed the medical students of Tokyo University through their careers.

Even more serious was the system of internship, during which students were employed to fill manpower shortages and were not given adequate clinical experience. Existing laws regulating medical practices were revised on May 10, 1968. The new laws required medical students to pass the national examination and to gain two years of clinical experience at hospitals designated by the Ministry of Public Welfare with remuneration, which amounted to $69.44 per month at national hospitals and $42.00 per month at university hospitals. On June 23, under the new law, close to 40% of medical students who were qualified to take the national examination refused to take it. Student discontent was due to the fact that the new law ignored the crucial issue, namely that department chairmen exercised absolute control over students' career.

Medical students at Kyoto, Osaka, and other major universities simultaneously presented grievances to their respective administrations. These issues were, mostly, resolved by a positive response on the part of the faculties and administrators (with the exception of the Tokyo University Medical Faculty). As a result, on October 20, 1968, 96% of the qualified medical students took the national medical examination. Issues were not resolved at Tokyo University because the Dean of the Medical Faculty failed to recognize a legitimate student demand and because students in turn resorted to extreme measures. They held Dr. Harumi, the head of the medical staff of Tokyo University Hospital, a hostage on February 19, 1968.

To counter student violence, the University, on March 1, expelled seventeen medical students accused of involvement in the Harumi incident. Raging students occupied the central building of the Medical Faculty, while another group surrounded the Faculty Union at Kanda, where a faculty meeting was in progress, and demanded amnesty for the accused students. The faculty refused. Tokyo University's commencement...
scheduled for March 28, never took tilace, because Yasuda Hall, the traditional
commencement site, was surrounded by approximately one hundred medical student dissenters.
Anger spread throughout the campus, because students of other faculties shared with
the medical students the feeling of discontent over faculty-administration authoritarian-
ism.

One June 5, militant anti-Yoyogi students entered Yasuda Hall, set up barricades,
and demanded collective bargaining with the university administration. President
Okochi requested outside police aid (since Japanese campuses are not provided with
their own police force) and students at Yasuda Hall were evicted. Some 6,000 students
of the University assembled on the campus on June 20 to protest police intrusion.
This assembly, however, resulted mainly in a power struggle among militant student
factions. In the meantime, Okochi gave in to student demands for collective bargaining.
They also demanded general amnesty for medical students formerly expelled. When this
demand was rejected, indefinite boycotting of classes was announced. On July 2,
Yasuda Hall was again occupied and barricaded by anti-Yoyogi factions. Okochi announced
the re-examination of the case, setting up a faculty committee to investigate the
problem of student government. He admitted the undesirability of police intrusion
onto the campus, but explained that circumstances had dictated its necessity. The
students in turn condemned Okochi with abusive language and their assembly, already
controlled by militant anti-Yoyogi factions, submitted the seven demands:

1) Amnesty for medical students who held Dr. Harumi hostage.
2) Amnesty for students who barricaded Yasuda Hall.
3) Amnesty for students involved in all events arising from and
after the January 29 incident (boycotting classes by medical students).
4) Self-criticism on the part of faculty members responsible for
inviting police onto the campus.
5) Public assurance that no private investigation would be made
of students thereafter.
6) Recognition of the Union of Medical Students as a legitimate student organization.

7) Resignation of faculty members and administrative personnel responsible for causing the events of January 29 and thereafter.

Okochi resigned.

The faculty committee elected Ichiro Katō, Dean of the Law Faculty, as the acting President on November 4. On the same day, students confronted Kentarō Hayashi, Dean of the Faculty of Letters, and demanded amnesty for one of the students of that Faculty. The Dean refused and was subsequently held prisoner in his office for 173 hours. On November 12, students fought among themselves over the issue of barricading campus buildings. Katō later met with students and was exposed to verbal abuse for five and a half hours. This period only provided a scene for rivalry over leadership among anti-Yoyogi factions.

Violence reached its peak when student dissenters armed, barricaded themselves into Yasuda Hall, better known now as the Yasuda Fortress, and fought against 4,000 members of the Tokyo Metropolitan riot squad on January 18, 1969. Police employed helicopters and sprayed a liberal amount of tear gas from above while high-power hoses were directed at the Fortress from the ground. Students responded by destroying valuable manuscripts, microfilm, laboratory equipment, books, etc. throughout the campus. Militants rebelled at Kanda in an attempt to lure the police into the streets and decrease pressure on the Yasuda Fortress; nevertheless, it fell on January 19. Students caused a $2 million damage during the two day confrontation with the police.

Nihon University: Nihon University is a private institution with a total student body of approximately one hundred thousand and over five thousand faculty members. It is the largest multiversity in Japan, though not the best, academically. It has consistently suppressed student movements by employing its own police force—the Association of Physical Education and the Rotters' Association—actually a group of ruffians.
Student grievances can be traced back to November, 1966, when students planned to invite Professor Shingo Shibata of Hosei University, a critic of Nihon University, to deliver a lecture. The University refused and over-ruled student decision. On April 14, 1967, the student assembly decided to invite Gorō Niwa, a historian by profession and a consultant to the Tripartite faction of Zengakuran by hobby, to deliver a lecture. It was cancelled due to interference by the private police force, the ruffians. On April 21, 1967, the University ordered the liquidation of the executive committee of the student assembly, and on May 4, twenty students of the committee were suspended by the University.

Students rose to violence on April 2, 1968, after a report in the news media that the University had failed to account for some $8-9 million. According to the Japanese Bureau of Taxation, the total amount of tax evasion between 1963 and 1967 amounted to over $5.5 million, but subsequent investigation revealed an additional $2.8 million or more unaccounted for. The exact amount will probably never be known since one of the accountants entrusted with University finances committed suicide and Chief Accountant Tomizawa fled into hiding.

Furthermore, bribing school officials to gain admission is tacitly recognized, if not openly encouraged, at this University. In January 1968, a professor was charged with extorting $15,000 from a student in return for allowing him to enter the University without taking the entrance examination.

Students requested permission to assemble and to discuss matters pertaining to the University's financial situation on early May, 1968. When permission was withheld, they demonstrated on May 25. The University ordered house confinement for fifteen leaders of the demonstration. Students of various faculties organized the All Student Resistance Committee and demanded campus reform, resignation of all regents, public inspection of University finances, and retraction of the order suspending students—all to no avail, however.
The first major confrontation between the students at large and the University supported toughs was triggered by a trifling affair. On June 11, students attempted to prevent the administration from closing the shutter of one of the University buildings. The ruffians were called in by the University and a melee followed, resulting in some hundred casualties on each side. On June 12, some 1,500 students barricaded themselves into two buildings on the campus as a demonstration of dissent. Immediately, a group of well-intentioned faculty members requested the regents to open discussion with students. But on June 18, toughs attacked the barricaded students. Attacks and counter-attacks were repeated by both sides, resulting in many casualties, while student dissenters managed to continue to occupy buildings.

On July 7, some 200 students forced their way to the side where the regents were assembled. Jūjirō Furuta, chairman of the regents, promised to open a discussion with students in the near future. On July 20, the University announced that a meeting with students would be held on August 4, but on August 1, it cancelled the meeting because of what it termed an "existing threatening mood" among students. In late August, the University appealed to the Tokyo District Court to force student dissenters off the campus. In the early morning of September 4, a riot squad of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police succeeded in ejecting students from six buildings: one hundred thirty-two students were arrested and a captain of the riot squad was fatally wounded by a stone slab. By late afternoon of the same day, students managed to re-occupy two of the buildings.

At the September 21 board of regent meeting, it was decided that the present regents would resign, the University rule restricting student activities would be removed, and a general amnesty would be provided to all students who participated in demonstrations. All these decisions were contingent, however, upon one crucial issue: the Ministry of Education's approval of the Nihon University by-laws which the regents were drafting.
Students were skeptical over the contents of the by-laws and they demanded that Furuta meet with students immediately. Furuta rejected the principle of collective bargaining but informed students that the regents and deans of various faculties would meet with them at the University Assembly Hall in Ryōgoku, Tokyo, on September 30.

On that day, 10,000 students assembled. It was a display of considerable drama: regents and deans unanimously apologized for having employed ruffians to obstruct student demonstrations, for having cancelled previous meetings with students, and to have called a riot squad onto the campus. They promised mass resignation. Another meeting was scheduled for October 3, but the regents again cancelled the meeting and enraged the students. Meanwhile, militant student factions clashed with non-factional students, and buildings were burned on campuses outside Tokyo. On October 31, Furuta announced that due to unforeseen difficulties, the drafting of the University by-laws, which were to have been submitted to the Ministry of Education, had been delayed. The regents refused to resign. Once again, students resorted to violence. It was directed at Furuta, his regents, and at the deans of various faculties who had lost the confidence of their students. Students revolted because of administrative mis-management and corruption, low quality education, and a despotic attitude on the part of the school administration and faculty members.

"The Barricade of the Revolt" (Hagyaku no barikeido), written by Nihon University students actively involved in campus disputes, begins with the lyric,

We live, live, live,
in the spirit of the barricade;
We live,
nourished by teaching ourselves,
And refreshed
by talking to our comrades.
We live
vigorously...

There is a touch of pathos beneath what the student dissenters of Nihon University regard as 'vigorous living'. The University has suffered a loss of $5 million since
the student revolt began. In addition, 800 students have been wounded and over 700 arrested. Though Furuta died of natural cause in 1970, his regents still retain power over a corporation whose annual income is estimated at $1.5 billion, an amount approximating the annual budget for the city of Kyoto.

III. State Power and Academic Freedom

The problem of higher education in Japan seems overshadowed by the spectacular display of student violence. To the average citizen, a university is a battleground for police-student confrontation that is dramatically televised throughout the nation. The crucial issue, however, is not the police-student confrontation, but academic freedom.

On April 30, 1969, the Central Educational Council, an advisory board of the Ministry of Education, submitted to the Ministry its recommendation concerning the ways and means of solving campus disputes. It consisted of a four-stage approach to settle these disputes (applicable only to national universities):

1) Enable the university administration to handle campus disputes independently, without government intervention, for a period of one month.

2) Empower university presidents to take necessary steps to bring about a settlement, after the one month period.

3) Order a university tentatively closed, if a settlement is not reached within six months thereafter.

4) Permanently close a university if the dispute stretches out over a year, and establish a new administration and faculty to be determined by the Ministry of Education.

Implicit in this recommendation is the right of the Ministry of Education to suspend faculty members who have demonstrated unwillingness to comply with the Ministry order.
The Council recommendation, referred to as the University Bill, was approved by the Diet in August 7, 1969, in the face of stiff opposition from the Socialist, Democratic-Socialist, Kómei, and Communist Parties and despite the fact that government interference with university affairs is a matter which is highly questionable under the present constitution: The Ministry by-laws (Article 5, Section 8) specifically stipulate that "the Ministry functions in an advisory capacity to matters pertaining to the administration and the functions of national universities." The Ministry maintains neither the right to supervise nor control national universities. It can, however, "act according to rules established by the university administration", meaning that it must adhere to the decisions of a faculty committee of national universities, according to the Education Act (Article 4). Furthermore, the Ministry cannot interfere with the right of expression of any member of the faculty or with university administrative proceedings. Though the intent of the Ministry was to curtail campus violence (and to this end it undoubtedly was successful, given the fact that the number of campus disputes decreased from sixty-six in 1969 to only seven in 1970), it remains that the employment of state power to maintain order within the campus is an obvious violation of academic freedom.

The fact that traditional academism is now being challenged and that fundamental change is needed to democratize higher education notwithstanding, university reform is a matter that needs to be realized from within, not forced by external government action. Admittedly, universities need the support of the government and of the citizens at large. But what the average tax payer expected of a university was never explicitly spelled out during the 1968-69 campus crisis, although the November 21, 1968 issue of the Asahi showed 46% of the people polled holding the questionable view that a university should mainly provide job-oriented courses.

To be sure, neither have university faculty members proposed a concrete plan. Nevertheless, the majority of professors were in agreement that a radical reform was in order and there were signs that they were seriously considering the means to realize it
The June 20, 1969 issue of the Asahi reported that over 30% of professors whose universities were razed by student protests believed that a dialogue with students to restore campus order was possible; another 20% believed that university policies should be changed to respond to "the demands of the time". Government intrusion into academic affairs was not one of the means considered worthwhile by the majority of the professors, at least among those affiliated with national universities. What was considered, specifically, was to change the hierarchic pattern of administration. It was this administrative structure that was challenged by students at Tokyo and Nihon Universities. Ironically, the Ministry of Education responded by incorporating the existing structure within state control.

It must be remembered that immediately after World War II, by the order of SCAP, the practice of state control over education was abolished, an educational policy based on the principle of democracy was instituted, and the Ministry of Education was downgraded to the status of a service agent to facilitate education. Within the last two decades, however, a distinct trend toward centralized education has become quite obvious. In the latter half of the 1950's the Ministry succeeded in establishing control over local educational administrative policies; periodically, a junior member of the Ministry is dispatched to various prefectures to examine local educational policy related to primary and secondary education, to make recommendations to prefectural educational councils (a practice which local educational authorities consider a nuisance), and to report to the Ministry the extent to which its policy is being carried out.

In 1956, the Ministry instituted a nation-wide system of examining academic performance rates in primary and secondary education. Only in August, 1968 was that practice abolished due to the vigorous protest launched by the Teachers' Union on the ground that the Ministry was interfering with education and transforming it into a competitive game. Nor can the element of nationalism be overlooked. "Authorized"
history texts employed in primary schools, dealing with the founding of Japan, explain it mythologically. Though an investigation of a country's mythology is an important factor, the Ministry's guideline closely resembles that of pre-war Japan, which articulated State Shinto, an ideology that engenders a narrow historical perspective and stimulates nationalism. In addition, the Ministry has revived a course in ethics, which was popular prior to 1945, as further means to inculcate nationalism. Although the context is admittedly far more sophisticated than that employed in pre-war Japan and the text employed examines personalities and ideas ranging from Šākyamuni to Socrates, from neo-Confucianism to existentialism, an "authorized" guide book is generously provided.

The Ministry's intent became obvious in November 1965. It made public its version of the "Expected Human Image" (Kitai sareru ningen-zō), a tract prepared by the Central Educational Council. Surprisingly, this included a section which encouraged patriotism and respect for the emperor, matters over which bitter opposition was raised by Japanese intellectuals. The Ministry has subsequently issued directives on the course of study, is currently giving educational instructions through government owned media of radio and television, and is involved, directly or indirectly, in educational affairs.

Though there are obvious merits in some of the projects that the Ministry has developed, there is always the possibility that its involvement in education will revive the system of state controlled education, under which condition academic freedom is most likely to suffer.

Most disturbing, however, is the Ministry's practice of "authorizing" texts. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Education says,

In Japan the text books which may be used in elementary and secondary schools are limited to those authorized or compiled by the Ministry of Education.

In 1966, 564 textbooks applied for, passed the examination, and became authorized...

At present, 1,231 textbooks are approved and used.
Professor Saburō Iyenaga attacked this practice as unconstitutional. In July, 1970, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Iyenaga. He referred to this decision as "a triumph of the citizens' right in the selection of school books without state interference."

In the context of the Ministry's performance during the last two decades, the passing of the University Bill is an alarming sign that signals transgression against academic freedom. This freedom is maintained only when education is placed above the interests of political parties. Interference on the part of the Ministry of Education can lead to an educational policy dictated by the Liberal-Democrat Party which is now in power and has been for over two decades, with the exception of the 1947-48 period when the Socialist was in power. Though the Central Educational Council has time and again claimed that student power should be controlled for the sake of maintaining the political neutrality of higher education, it might also recommend curbing state power for precisely the same reason. Curbing state power, rather than student power, is fundamental to realizing university reform.

Summary

The author concludes that student discontent against higher education transferred campuses throughout the country as revolutionary headquarters to challenge the Establishment—the state, the military, and industries—in 1968-69. But militant tactics employed by students deprived them of public support; it was this tactic that contributed to the passing of the University Bill. Nevertheless, it was student power more than anything else that triggered the events through which university administrations and faculty members became aware of the need for university reform: student power challenged the hierarchic structure of higher education, the academic elite and its social ramifications, moral corruption among administrators and faculty members, as well as the raison d'être of the Ministry of Education.
Though student power failed to realize its goal in the 1968-69 period, their activities of that period form an important chapter in the recent history of Japanese education. It exposed the vulnerable aspects of higher education to the government, educators, and the public; it undoubtedly will have considerable impact in the formulation of future educational policies and in educational planning. Student power is an element that cannot be ignored in modern higher education in a democratic society.
FOOTNOTES

1. Eiichirō Tamura, *Nashū orizumu to kyōiku* (Nationalism and Education), Tōyō-kan, Tokyo, 1964, p. 64.


4. Ibid.


10. Ibid., p. 49.

11. Ibid., p. 45.

12. Ibid., p. 23.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 55.


20. Monthly salary of a university 'assistant' (joshu), the lowest ranking faculty post, is about $100.00, an amount approximating that of a beginning high school teacher and lower than that of an industrial laborer. The Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, p. 302, give the average monthly income for faculty members in 1965 as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>National University</th>
<th>Municipal or Prefectural University</th>
<th>Private University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>$256.35</td>
<td>$289.15</td>
<td>$238.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>178.55</td>
<td>194.50</td>
<td>165.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>135.90</td>
<td>150.95</td>
<td>128.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Assistant</em></td>
<td>102.80</td>
<td>111.85</td>
<td>87.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Michiya Shimbori, Nihon no daigaku kyōju shi jō: rakubatsu ne kenkyū (The Academic Marketplace in Japan: A Study of Academic Cliques), Toyo-kan, Tokyo, 1965, p.62, cited in the Journal of Social and Political Ideas in Japan, p. 300, gives percentage of faculty members who are graduates of schools other than those where they are employed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo University</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto University</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waseda University</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keio University</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Dental College</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitotsubashi</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Cf. following books for diaries and memoirs written by students drafted into the Japanese armed services during World War II: Kike wadazumino koe (The Voices of the Sea Gods: Memoirs of students who died in the battles of the Pacific), comp. and ed., Wadazumi-kai, Köbun-sha (second printing), 1959; Minnami no iwao no hato ni (At the Southern-end : of the Rock: Memoirs of students who died in the battles of Okinawa), comp. and ed., Kazuhiko Kingo and Masao Obara, Köbun-sha, Tokyo, 1959; Jūgonen sensō (The Fifteen Year War: Memoirs of students who died in battles between 1930-45), Köbun-sha, Tokyo, 1963. These diaries and memoirs were written at the battle-fronts and subsequently collected and published by their surviving comrades after World War II. A section closes with Stéphane Mallarmé's quote, "Solitude, récif, étoile, A n'importe ce qui valut. Le blanc souci de notre toile. . . . April 19, 1945". Others make reference to the essays of Mill, Hegel and Schiller. Exposed to the lofty idealism of the West and fully aware of the futility of war, these students nevertheless volunteered as members of the suicide corps in the desperate battles of the Pacific and perished into the waves of the ocean.


6. The history, principles, and activities of the Yoyogi faction are described in *Zengakuren kaku-ha*, pp. 34-48. The Yoyogi Zengakuren is also referred to as the Minsei faction. This faction claims 12,000 activists and capable of mobilizing 38,000 members. Its total membership is 460,000.

7. The history, principles, and activities of the Revolutionary Marxists are described in *Zengakuren kaku-ha*, pp. 63-72. This faction claims 1,800 activists and capable of mobilizing 3,500 members. Its total membership is 66,000.

8. The history, principles, and activities of the Core are described in *Zengakuren kaku-ha*, pp. 50-63. This faction claims 2,000 activists and capable of mobilizing 6,500 members. Its total membership is 67,800.

9. The history, principles, and activities of the Student Socialist League are described in *Zengakuren kaku-ha*, pp. 74-84. This faction claims 1,500 activists and capable of mobilizing 4,200 members. Its total membership is 101,500.


For details concerning discontent of the medical students at Tokyo University, cf. *Tôdai funsô no kiroku* (Record of Student Dissent at Tokyo University), Nihon hyôron-sha, Tokyo, 1969, pp. 1 ff and pp. 443-445.

Ibid., p. 179.

Ibid., pp. 317 ff.

For details concerning student discontent at Nihon University, cf. *Bangyaku no barikeidô* (The Revolt of the Barricade), San'ichi shobô, Tokyo, 1969.

Ibid., pp. 158 ff.

Ibid., pp. 319 ff. documents the record of the assembly.

See ibid., preface.

*Education in 1966 - Japan*, p. 21.

*Asahi*, July 17, 1970.